•· J ' • ' y 1 DEPARTMENT OF' STATE WASHINGTON r - v November 5 1964 • seeRH MEMORANDUM FOR MR McGEORGE BUNDY THE WHITE HOUSE Subject QC - x EXCLUSIVE DISTB IBtrrION _ ' lv-1 JZ Israe 1 's Request to Defer Inspection of the Dimona Reactor w · J i J _ 't -r y J Y - 1 - l l 11 v•- v-·· '- CL- YGJ-· SANITIZED E 12958 NLJ @A 0 1- l t COPY LBJ LIBRARY - By ARA Date SECH GROUP 3 Downgraded at 12 year intervals not automatically declassified '·I w • · t -·•··A - wv - _ Prime Minister Eshkol 's appeal to the President to defer the V _' next inspection of the Dimona reactor until after his November 1965 parliamentary elections confronts us with a painful dilemma We have little evidence that Eshkol is in as difficult a spot as his message would suggest or that another secret inspection of Dimona would significantly affect his party's election prospects The decision to permit periodic U S inspection of Dimona was originally taken by Ben-Gurion and reconfirmed by Eshkol presumably after full Cabinet discussion Deputy Defense Minister Peres was involved in the decision Thus we find it hard to believe that hard liners in the Israeli Cabinet could buck Eshkol on a decision in which they and Ben-Gurion participated Moreover neither U S nor Israeli observers believe that domestic political problems pose a serious threat to the leadership of Prime Minister Eshkol who has had a series of domestic victories Our inability to fathom Eshkol 's argum ntfor delay naturally heightens our security fears Contrary to Mr Eshkol's reported statement that there is no possibility that the Dimona reactor could be converted to military purposes in so short a period of time we believe that to allow a gap of about two years since Israel's reactor went critical our last inspection was in January 1964 could be highly dangerous Failure to inspect Dimona before November 1965 would allow israel time to produce enough nuclear material for one or two test devices We are further concerned because NOV 5 l9b4 7'f'L I' I· r • -eEeftB'f - 2 - a Israel has the technical capability b the Israelis were building fuel preparation facilities well in excess of normal research re uirements when inspected in January 1964 c td French technicians whose presence provide a measure of safeguard are believed to have left and e Israel has purchased· 100 tons of yellow cake uranium oxide from Argentina not covered by IAEA safeguards Although Prime Minister Eshkol has stated orally tha·t Israel's nuclear activity is peaceful neither Ben-Gurion nor Eshkol has ruled out the possibility of Israel's embarking on a nuclear weapons program if the situation in the Near East warranted I _ l We conclude we must view the Prime Minister's request for postponement of the· inspection in the context of Israel's conviction that maximum effective security measures are vital to its survival Since Israel has contracted with France to acquire ground-to-ground missiles his appeal could relate to a decision to develop in secret a nuclear weapons capability Following upon the exptosion of a Chinese Communist nuclear device failure to press Israel to meet its commitment for an inspection every six months could vitiate our policy of opposition to nuclear proliferation weaken the test ban agreement and encourage other countries such as India to develop a nuclear weapons capability of their own • It would also jeopardize our efforts to persuade Nasser to slow down the U A R sophisticated weapons buildup and could drive him to greater dependence on the Soviet Union Moreover to permit Israel to renege on an inspection commitment which was secured by us only as the result of long and painful pressure including repeated intervention at Presidential level would undermine our position that we must have access to Dimona to assure ourselves against nuclear proliferation Ambassador Barbour agrees to the need for inspection of Dimona this year and has proposed 1 a visit in the next month or two 2 a waiver of the Israeli commitment for subsequent six-monthly visits until after the November 1965 elections and 3 an offer not to c0111DUnicate ·the results of the visit to Nasser until after the November 196S elections · SECRBT• COPY LBJ LIBRARY - · ' -· # ' • ·SECPJi '1 • - 3 - We believe it is imperative to press Mr Eshkol to set a date for inspection in the near future We recommend approval of the enclosed telegram to Embassy Tei Aviv which is responsive to Ambassador Barbour's proposal·and urges scheduling of the visit to Dimona in late November w Averell i an Under Secretary for Political Affairs Enclosures · 1 2 Proposed Telegram Technical Asl lessmeitt • I COPY LBJ LIBRARY SEOREL WORK COPY · ·'- u •·· • rm • I 9MSSADOI ·_ IQI • E O 12958 Sec 3 S NSC Memo 1 30 95 State Depl Guidelines · __ By NARA Date sr- u -01 • f · n u 11 ll•lsla ora MIUP to him Hl11iater h'm hcsldant ' '- • ·- - lftn•- •· e r DECLASSIFIED 'Ii aautDIBD I ' ·f··-· - u 1e1 M --- · · nf S- _ tba our vlstt to t e Cll4' tiDIDg of Dtmoma ' · _ -- J of _ ' ' ·· • - 11ute UDCferatllffll tlae o e r • 41 fflculty of ---j naDUllllla CGll lldlq doalelltic t I ' anaaclal · · i t _ ncl tontp lDCa • la la la c·• ' at rose· co piewac waraclaa ot · dab 9'al a a eac1 ate Pe are anp 4 1D a contiml •peclal •- ·• • la llaff • - ca aoplal 11 cu wa aou 111 ·the world and I l el JDU ful agree tbat tbt2 effort · ar t A Yltal elemetat la I ta nccesa ls our aJtlllt7 c all - claC of cbea bu attaf ud or ts Ung co at - •••a a • mat 1Nt able • aaetw apalllltf• _ -· -· _ P• ·· - 1aporcaia ce eii ld tla Blslff leeaime lie bcma u 4oea the res •- _ t ' I '• ' of the world ••• I • • 111A • 1'111111p Talbot ' nu _• S 8 1964 NOV 5 oRM DS-322 3 COPY LBJ LIBRARY _ · _ _ J iu✓ f Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before 'delivery to Teleco munications Operations Division ' • TELEGP PHBRANCH • 2 L ' ' J • • • • # -- WORK copy· -i ' lrte fJS7 m -Avrl of tha Wl'l•• · tbae tar•l la in ot ably the only cowtt J 1D the Bear aat vhlda 1laa tbe ecleulflc capablllly to i roduca nuclear weaporaa and 1n 3d4ltlon · ' allO baa • facl11t7 Sa lielaa wbtcla co1114 be com ert ecl to suc h production If ·- • • n _ l• te na n Illa _ erlodlcallT he mf gbt vetl 'be clrlven •Pftd-- • laraet Illa · J· -- ha Sovtet Ual• and eve to l rrattoul • llltary actf on azat12st ww Ba •f resistant c aar••· le e a 1 a c aCJ to our OW11 _ 'loplelat Clllaa ur lnga that be 11 mlt · artlcutart1 ln th• alaaUe field ncam Ul loaio11 of a msct ea · devf ca be pnltlell la aada acute by th• lli jlillauimiut i aet to greater ftla Ila• alameil any eouncrl aa· and s ldca some of thoc- aacla aa ladl a-daf al aplll 11bett r tbeJ a11oul4 not attempt GUClear prozt' • of tball'-- 'lllla I a IU 17 ' · · · - TOIi 8IIZ8 t GIii' -rem b the aacud ty of your country rci ains - ·vnchastp4 I ' - • 'Ille na f t 111 ty •hlc tbls-·pata upcm • • • I f Mbtal a puce · ·- £ u ls an lmfJort ant · •• · factor la- C01191ctloa that·• • • ' foc u Ar•b au ptcloo na more upom Grael • Co · - as leave ao atomt unturned ·lD our efforts to _ • · •• - • • • • • • • ••lDa• I llape tllenfora thaC JGD wlll aea 1• •7 clear to arranze for ·· lla·uve at SW 1 •r•tl ou ctted your' recut telegram and appreciate t' - ·--- · your effor · ncoaclla 41wqallt ·VS aml Iaraeit llltai-uta Following Departl leut 'a -rt - ctlaa to your tlare• pola propoal aucl gu1dellaea for cllscuaslon vlth Eshkol 7 - - • t - _• jp'ea cue D1-naa lupeotloaa vltlalD 1-2 montba laperative ·' · -- - 2 ••••• · Correetfon1 made on ortginal ' iJIIMWl -be made on this and other ____ fltmsy work c pies before ·delivery to Telegraph Branch COPY LBJ LIBRARY ' t ' t o- I0-80 TELEGE p BRA CH j l'Oll 6e-aaaA ' ' · f -ii Ameehtar 2 Ve vl 111 q WORK COPY - nt AVIV coulcler ulvlDg Iarael CCllllltmnt to alx-mnthly I lupectf oa uiatll after Bou b r lt6S elections ca11t1Dge11t upon •atbfactory Md hapecttoa _ without prejudice co naumptloa achedule of fl D411ap aiz- oatbl •lalta tbenaftar 3 Ve vlllf q poat - paaslag reeulea lupectlOD to rtasser until --ts-r 196 S' • - - altuatlon 1D Jfear last aucb that US and Israeli __ - · Weruta ccar 1 _ W OIIWIS bf a · Ve W011ld of course consult • · _ rif ·Jtitf -GOI ··lief n · · - aaclt· · •tap · · · · · ' 'i -1 · - _ _ ·· · 'f -- •· - · - •• -· - · mm Q-J - · ' ' - ' · ' ' ·- t • ·• · · •• c- - - ' - ' · • •JI • • - _ __ -·• 1 ' - - f Correctfc n1 made on orlgfncn gifWJXtlsr be made on this and other - · · · flfm y wo k copies befe re delivery to Telegraph Branch COPY LBJ LIBRARY • • -t '' r' ' - · I ---·- - -·-•- -···· --·- _ -·- ·------ - EXDIS -·-· · ·- •-------·- -- ----·--·· · -· - - ·--·----· Ana cyats October to inspection conc1uded tho tram the AEC 0 Md the Departme it ot State mc t on examine the conacqucnces o t postponing the next the Di mom reactor site until l Januar l966 and zr -TECHNICAL-ASSEs·sMP NT ___ ·-·-···· --·- _ - 3 'f b 1 toll ow111s A In the period bet-ween the last inspection ot Dimona in Janwir r 1964 and 1 January 1966 the Dimona reactor opera ting at a power lwel design to m Cimizc plutonium production could produce 6 to l2 kgs o t plutonium from f'uel elements to br tcated 'by- the Israelia ·thcm selves Th13 would be enough to provide mterial or one or two test devices B All the facilities necessary to acquire plutonium except a chem cal separt1t1on plant ·are or coon v UJ be available The • 100 tons of' uranium ·concentrate recently' acquired from Argentina tar exceeds the uranium rcquirem s tor the Dimona rea ctor i f operated at stated power and irra diat1on levels If the Israelis intended to maximize reactor opc -ation s tor prodµct1on ot plutonium suitable tor weapons the 100 tons ot uranium concentrate would be suft1ciem tor about two years · · c I The critical el ement tor the Israel is 1n obtaining tiss1ona ble material tor a weapon is the capability- to separate the plutonium tram the irradiated ruel clcmeuta from the Di a ona reactor A chemical separation 1 1 tnt could bo built to proccas reactor corca tram D llnona in about two years after a dcciaion to da ao i e i f started short a t'ter the last inspection 1n January 1964 it could be opera tional by carq 1966 If such a schedule vero tollovcd the Isra alis would bczin to acquire s 1gnit1cant quautitics o t vca pom e ·plutonium by mid-1966 rbcre 1a a _posa1b111t7 that the Israc l is could separate small qwmt itiea plutonium_1n pilot-plant operationa duri%l3- this • period o extent ot their capa bilities to separate plutonium boweverI coul c1 o be determined by' on-site inspection• · · Ii ' SANITIZED · NJ I AAC 01- ·- • _By NARA oat J·Q3 E O 12958 Sec 3 6 91 B COPY LBJ L IBRARY t ' - EXDIS Group 3 Downgraded at 12_year intervals not automatically declassified · - --· · · - - -¥ · ' • ' •' SQiaJ E2G § D 1 scuscion The Israelis have bouaht lOQ to UJ of uranium concentrate trom Arccntim in the last yea r JUJd are plAhn fna to ncae·tiatc for an additional 100 tons aeon These amounts arc to r u excess ot the rcquircmcnta of the Dimom rco ctor 0 cra tcd ti Jr rc scarch purposes a s tnsle core loo d1n g ot about 8 tons·ot metal the cquivnl ent of 10 tons of co11ccntra tc woul d la Jt about ttro yea rs It 1a unllk that Israel trould irurcha ic larce qUD ntitica of uranium concentrate tor sto iling aincc it is read o va Uablc under satcgua rda on 1 hc wrld J113rltct a t a lower price about $13 oo per kg as opposed to the 7 9 paid by the Isracl ia tor the Aracntinc concenbratc - ' · ' A plant tor reducing the concentrate to metal 1s now in · operation at ·Dlmona If' operated at fUll co pa city it could produce about ·50 · to 6o tons ot uro nium metal per year rougncy the equivalent of processing 6o to 70 tons ot concentrate • • A fa cility tor tuel element fabricntion is expected to be in operation ey the end of 1964 and will be able to produce a complete core tor the Dimon a rcactor 1n tm or three montha or tour to s lx reactor cores per year A chemical separation pilot r lant ws not yet in existence 1n Jan1 UU7 1964 at the time of the lo st ilu pcction althoueh the bu fl ding bad been constructed Tha Iara ells oaid at the time no decision had been made to GO toru ird with installa tion of' equipment The orig tnal plan called for a proccssi Ja co pacity of about one kg ot uranium per d J r i e pilot plant size A 1 ul l size plant capable of bandl 1ng several reactor corca per ycrrr would talte about tliO yes ra to build a t a cost ot a bout · $20 million If the Israelis Gtarted construction of such a plant 1n ca r 1964 fol l viDg the la3t in pection they could begin proccssil J« a backlog ot irro diated tucl clements by ear 1966 and have separated 6 to 12 kg ot plutonium by the later part of 1966 · he D llllona inspection teams recommend eel in January 1964 that the nexb ection trom a tcchnicnl point ot view should 1 - be Vithin -- I • I EXDIS ftftl f o - COPY LBJ LIBRARY ---v - - · • - · - - - f1 • ·- · SQ ep EXDIS - 3 - be within one yem tor the following ren sons o by that time the reactor is expected tQ be o t tull poucr b l'ucJ m tcr lal production tacilitic s altho possibly not yet cODq lctc 'llJD Y be more accurately a s csscd run c the probability tho t their fuel production capacity· 1 J at a level inconsistent w ttb tha rcquircmcma of currently planned- programs be more a curat evaluated The ncv inf'ormation tint has bccom vailablc aincc JamuJ 17 1964 · atro i ccntorccs tho inspection teem' s recommczidation ror an inspection this year • · ·' _ •· • • • I • ' • _ · ' ' ' ' _ - · · · _ • -·_ • • ' _ __ · • _ -- j - ·· · · ·-· • ' · _ · r • f· • • I COPY LBJ LIBRARY ·• - · r· ··-•-··· -· • I · -•·' • - ---- - · NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Duplicity Deception and Self-Deception Israel the United States and the Dimona Inspections 1964-65 2020-11-03