DECLASSIFIED Authority Nr Ji J e1 l Jo7 p c - ISRAEL LBJ to ESHKOL --• 1 11 24 64 ' 25 9 J c TELEGRAM Department of State· • OtARGl TO SECRET •• ACTION Amembassy Woo TEL AVIV J -3f 021 l au 2 7 o 'p '1 '6 t EXDIS FOR AMBASSADOR VERBATIM TEST Please deliver following 2£i2 lmessage to Prime Minister from President Johnson as soon as possible QUOTE I appreciate the frankness of your message outlining the problems posed for you by the timing of our next visit to the Dimona reactor I can of course understand the ever present 0 difficulty of reconciling conflu cting domestic and foreign interest '- Nevertheless I do feel bound to urge upon you the importance of the semi-annual visits on which we have previously agreed We are engaged in a continuing effort to prevent proliferation of sophisticated weapons in the world and especially in the Near East I believe rou fully agree that this effort is in the interests of Israel A vital element in its success is our ability to assure all parties that none of em has attained or is seeking a nuclear capability and to give this assurance we btifEA JDJe negan _ryc 10 ' 30 6frl0Phlc a1oa M Governor Harriman Test recd 1 rom WH J J 24 64 clauiRcalioa app ovod •v• NEA - Mr Talbot White House - Mr Bundy NE a Mr Davies REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS S S Mr Davies PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED SECRET Dnltoc1 1 I - I MDS-322 -- - - t DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 1 1 ff 2 Page I Jo7 r of telegram to __ Am_cm_b_a_s_s y___T_·EL __A_V_I_V_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SECRET must be able to satisfy ourselves on this score The problem is made more acute by the recent explosion of a nuclear device by Communist China This has alarmed many countries and made some of them •such as India 0 not attempt nuclear programs 00 think itgain whether they should of their o -m This is likely to focus Arab suspicion even more upon Israel ' You may be sure that our interest in the s curity of your country remains unchanged - The grave responsibility which this puts upon us is an important factor in DJ my conviction that we must leave no stone - lfXlllilm unturned in our efforts to maintain peace I hope 11 therefore that you will see your way clear _to arrange for a visit by our people to Dimona in late November or early December In return we may be able to ease your problem along lines which I have asked Ambassador Barbour to discuss with you 11'ND QUOTE We have studied considerations cited your recent telegram and appreciate your effort reconcile divergent US and Israeli interests I·' ilowing Department's guidelines fo r discu on with Eshkol L Dimona i nspection within 1°2 months imperative 2 We willing mm mm consider waiving Israel commitment to sfa -monthly inspection until after November 1965 elections contingent SECRET DECLASSIFIED Authority NN01S' 3 Page l 7 r·- - - • ' - _ _ • _ • _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J V - TEL AVIV ______________ _________ Amembassy of telegram to _ SECRET ' upon satisfactory findings next inspection and without prejudice to resumption schedule of six-monthly visits thereafter • 3 We willing postpone passing results inspection to Nasser uatil after November 1965 unless situation in Near East such that US and Israeli interests better served by informing him of course consult GOI before such step We would However the President ishes you to emphasize orally to Eshkol that the agreement on semi- nn al visits to Dimona is particularly important to our efforts ·w ith Nasser because he knows as does the rest of the world that Israel is probably xp the only country in the Near East which has the scientific capability to produce nuclear weapons and in addition also has a facility in being which could be converted to such production ' If we were unable to reassure Nasser periodically for example he might well be driven to greater dependence on the Soviet Union and even to irrational military action1gainst Israel He would of course be more resistant to our urgings that he limit his own arms development particulatly in the missile field 4 If Eshkol avers that his problem is with hard liners in Cabinet you should point out our difficulty in understanding this argument since 00 personally agreed to periodic insp ctions in May 1963 presumably with concurrence of Cabinet RU-SK SECRET RUSK NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Duplicity Deception and Self-Deception Israel the United States and the Dimona Inspections 1964-65 2020-11-03