I J • OUTGOJNG tELEGRAM INDICATE 0 0 -- Department of State l • J z 0 llJ COLLECT CHARGE TO SECRE'f Classif i ca tion Origin Amembassy TEL AVIV ACTION Info Il1MEBMl r 1 t t ATl D lass'n 1U'Wtth EXDIS · concurr c t ifY Oi · I V '1 0 L 01 NS _ _ _ J I • U u _ - -7 s--c i e- -tD I Following instruction s fte s-DEFTEi -4 In response to PM Eshkol 1 s informal plea to President on FOR AMBASSADOR E0 t 2356 Dimona you should make following points to Eshkol privately indicating that you are speaking on Presidential authority 1 President appreciates the frankness of Eshkol's informal message outlining the problems posed for him by the ti ming of our next visit to the Dimona reactor We can of course understand the ever present difficulty of reconciling conflicting domestic and foreign interests 2 Nevertheless President does feel bound to urge the importance of the semi-annual visits on which we have previously agreed V we are engaged in a continuing effort to prevent pro- liferation of sophisticated weapons not least in the Near East 0 We believe Eshkol fully agrees that this effort is in the interests of Israel A vital element in its success is our none ability to assure all parties that of them has attained or _J NJM1cdJDJernegan Text from WR 11 25 64 amp l1 --a ••m White House - Mr Buedy' · ' S S - Mr Davies IR M · SECRE'f Classification e-s3 DS-322 NEA - Mr Talbot NE - Mr Davies REPRODUCTION THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED Page_-- - of telegram to_A _m _ _ _ E_m_b_a_s_s_ _·y_·-- 1' -E-- L -A_V_ _IccV_ ________________ SECRET Classification l i s seeking a nuclear capability and to give this assurance we must b l able to satisfy ourselves on this score 3 The problem is made more acute by the recent explosion of a nuclear device by Communist China It has alarmed many countries and made some of them--such as India--think again whether they should not attempt nuclear programs of their own This is likely to focus Arab suspicion even more upon Israel 4 Our interest in the security of Israel remains unchanged but the grave responsibility which this puts upon us convinces us that we must leave no stone unturned in our efforts to maintain peace President hopes therefore that Eshkol will see his way clear to arrange for a visit by our people to Dimona in late November or early December FYI we regard early inspection of Dimona as imperative END FYI S In return President has authorized following measures which we hope will ease Eshkol's problem a We willing consider waiving Israel commitment to another six- monthly inspection until after November 1965 elections contingent upon satisfactory findings next inspection and without prejudice to resumption schedule of six-monthly visits thereafter b We also willing postpone passing results inspection to Nasser L SECRE'f Cla ss ification - -- - 'J ag'l • 3 of telegram to _---- -AmE mcc1' _a_s · _sc y _·_ T -·E L - AccV I V _ _____________ SEGR E'f Classification until after November 1965 unless situation in Near East such that US and Israeli interests better served by informing him course consult GOI before such step 7 We would of However you should emphasize that the agreement on semiMannual visits to Dimona is particula y important to our efforts with Naseer because he knows as doe s the rest of the world that Israel is probably the only country in the Near East which has the scientific capability to produce nuclear weapons and also has a facility in being which could be converted to such production If we were unable to reassure Nasser periodically for example he might well be driven to greater dependence on the Soviet Union and even to irrational military action against Israel He would of course be more resistant to our urgings that he limit his own arms development particularly in the missile field 6 If Eshkol avers that his problem is with hard liners in Cabinet you can point out our difficulty in understanding this argument since BG personally agreed to periodic inspections in May 1963 · He resumably with concurrence of Cabinet END RUS'' _J L SECRE'l' C la ssif i ca ti on r EXCLUSIVE - ' MASTER FILE COPY HO 8 DISTRIBUTION EXDIS • - --• SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION BY CLASSIFICATION NO COPIES f-E CEIVED s 2 ✓ ✓ u M - 7 _y 'V POST TEL AVIV OUTGOING 441 11 25 64 CONTROL 0 - _ 1 G G PM S AL SUBJECT ' - ✓ ACDA 13193 ' ✓✓ 6 Alo WHITE HOUSE E EXCOM H CIA INR - HUGHES SEC'Y DEFENSE INR - SCOTT ISA 10 JCS L AID p USIA SCI VICE PRESIDENT S P TREASURY OTHER AF ARA Le ' J c CONFERENC LE EUR DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE FILE BTF FE NEA S s- 0 V✓ ' --1 CL1 I -V CLASSIFIED SIT E FORM PR COPIES DESTROYED U2J 3 Jr- I I -1 4-64 tj I ¼ 0- « 7 l3 OS-1 570 BR JM GH INCOMING DATE -- SI S SECRET EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION EXDIS NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Duplicity Deception and Self-Deception Israel the United States and the Dimona Inspections 1964-65 2020-11-03