31 -- ' OUTGOING ·r LEGRAM INDICATE 0 0 Department of State COLLECT 0 6 7 9 3 • CHARGE TO SEORE'F Classification ACTION Amembas sy TEL AVIV PRIO a MENT OF 0 STAT IL lftfoa gratified at GOI agreement schedule Dimona visit USG naturally unhappy at Israeli postponement to January 30 but can accept this date so long as it thoroughly understood that f I inspection can be effectively comprehensive to meet our needs -· Since Dimona now operating over 12 months inspection requirements rt more complex than last time 1 ' At minimum must include following Visiting XMii team will require whatever time necessary 1 minimum estimate two days complete observations at site with full access to reactor and all other facilities in order verify nature all such facilities their production capacity and their present utilization 2 Team should have opportunity review operating records reactor and any facilities either at site or elsewhere in which irradiated or unirradiated reactor fuel is stored fabricated or processed perform physical inventory and make independent Df•fted by _ _J -- ------ hf ra phi tr n 11 1ion and NEA NE HERussell rvc 12 l-' Q t pprovodby NEA - John D Jernegan c N E - Mr Davies SCI - Mr Thomas INR - Mr Brown AEC - Mr Kratzer AEC - Mr Reichard CIA - Mr Devlin CIA Miss Cooney ux S S - Mr Hillike1uh -White House Mr Kom PRODUCTIOi FROM THIS COPY IS Sl Cft E'f PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED MDS-322 Classificatio11 ' _ Pag e_4 _ __0 f 0 telegram to 'Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY SEOR El' Classification 1 measurements as may be necessary to verify production of reactor since previous visit 7 This more detailed inspection necessary to account for production 3 Team also should have opportunity verify location and use any plutonium or other fissionable material produced in reactor 4 • ••• _J L SECR E'f Classifica tio11 · · -Page •z-a of telegram to _ Am e m ba s s y T E L A V I V - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - 6BOR£'P Classification 7 4 rhorough inspection outlined above which corresponds to US bilateral and IAEA requirements minimum necessary permit President at later date reassure others on peaceful nature Israel's nuclear activities FYI Visits to date have fallen considerably short normal safeguard requirements and at best accomplished only determination nature facilities at site and productive capacity at time of visit AEC and intelligence community agree above more thorough inspection imperative We regret earlier date for inspection not set Embassy's excellent reporting of developments on Israel's domestic scene has helped explain Eshkol's attitude We appreciate difficulties and distractions he faces but do not believe secret Dimona inspection would si gnificantly affect his party's election prospects Decision permit six-monthly Dimona inspections originally taken by Ben-Gurion and reconfirmed by Eshkol presumably after full Cabinet discussion Deputy Defense Minister Peres also involved in decision Thus ll difficult believe hard liners in cabinet could oppose Eshkol on decision in which they and Ben-Gurion participated Embassy's reporting suggests that with approach elections domestic pressures likely increase rather than lessen L Thus imspection earlier than January 30 would appear decrease risk adverse domestic political _J repercussions Our 8EettE r Classifica tio11 I ' • of t elegram to _ _ cA me'-m b -a s s Ly_TE L A VI V__________ ______ _ _ SB6RB'r Classifi catio n Our inability fathom Eshkol's ar guments for delay naturally heightens our security fears 7 Eshkol's remark that we cannot build nuclear weapon in two months notreassuring in light estimate US experts that if Israel decided to produce weapon following January 1964 inspection it could produce enough plutonium for one or two nuclear devices by the end of 1965 USG of course would not presume to suggest to Eshkol best timing of inspection politically We hope however he will not invoke domestic political problems as pretext for further delays Given other indications suggesti119 that Israel may be engaged in development weapon further efforts delay inspection would bring into question Israel's good faith END FYI END GP-3 ACTING BALL _J L Classi ica tio 11 -- ------ ------------' a- OUTGOJNG TELEGRAM INDICATE 0 0 ' _ Departlllent Qf State • J z 0 w Ill COUECT t- CHARGE TO SBO lil'f u0 Cla ssifica t ion Ir 0 Origin IL PRIORITY Amembassy TEL AVIV ACTION EXDIS 7 Embtel 660 At earlies opportunity you slreuld inform Eshkol President gratified j visit week end January 36 at GOI agreement now operating over months inspection requirements more complex than last time 1 Since Dimona Visiting team include following require whatever time necessary minimum with full access to estimate two days complet e reactor and all other faciliti order verify nature all such facilities their production capacity present utilization 2 review operating records reactor Team should have unirradiated reactor fuel is stored ricated or processed perform be necessary physical inventory and make independent This more detailed to verify production of reactor inspection necessary to account 3 location and use any Team also should have reactor plutonium or other fissionable material produce 4 • •• _J D o ted by NEA NE HERus sell rvc 1 2 CJ ancu MDS-322 hleg 1phic t onsm uion ond clou lico on 1pl tO¥ed by NEA - John D Jernegan ___ I - JI NE - Mr Davie SCI - Mr Thomas ffvl INR - Mr wn AEC Mr Kratze C - Mr Reichard IA - Mr Devl IA - Miss Coone S S White House REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS SECitE'f Classi i ca t io11 PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED r EXCLl SIVE·-l TRIBUTION No · C Qlf1 s I s RECEIVED t t ✓ u M If VJ r ' v - ID 0 ' v 1 I 7- ljY SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION BY B C Tueller stt f BR CLASS IF RD POST TEL AVIV GH INCOMING OUTG°4 DATE Dec 14 1964 6793 CONT'W I SUBJECT A fI ' V G - JI S S Chron Fi le• No's 8 and 9 s so EXDIS G PM v✓ 2 - 2 SAL WHITE HOUSE S MF EXCOM ACDA CIA E SEC'Y DEFENSE H AID INR • HUGHES ✓ -- J '- USIA II INR VICE PRESIDENT 10 TREASURY OTHER L A C - ¾-t - 5 p SCI s v v CONFERENCE FILE DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE FILE p AF Microfilmed ARA CLASSIFIED SITE COPIES DESTROYED EUR 17J 't V I J - 7 t I r BTF P FE NEA 0 CPR ✓ -4 l i 2 l 2 lI 'y' I ry k EXCLUSIVE FORM 11 •64 DS-1570 DISTRIBUTION EXDIS NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Duplicity Deception and Self-Deception Israel the United States and the Dimona Inspections 1964-65 2020-11-03