a i • i _ - ' This document consists of 2 pages number 3 of 10 copies Series A ' v ' J E FROM LS TO I ·-t 'l -- DtTE f MEMOliNDUM FOR 1t McGEOROB IWDY THI WlllTB ROUSB • Subject Dimona Inspection and Need to Implement Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Prollfera• tion tn the Naar Bast A United States inspection team visited the Dlmoa a reactor lite January 30 1965 Although the ten hour apent at tha site did not permit as detailed a visit as desiiable the team believes there was aufficient time to determine the atatus of acttvlty at Df slona Major findings eee enclosure included 1 The future direction of atomic enerSY development in Israel appear uncertain bocause anticipated acqu1ait1on of s nuclear power and desalt1Q8 plant has increased Israeli interest in alishtly enriched uranium fueled reactor fron abroad and reduced interest in developing natural uranium fueled reactors in Israel 2 While nothing suggest an early weapons develop• ment program the Dimona site hae excellent development and production capability that warrants continued sur• veillance at intervals not to exceed one year The team findings indicate that we can af f ord to accede to Prime Minister Eshkol'a request that we postpone the next agreed siX-monthly inspection until af ter the parliamentary e lections in November this year We remain concerned that Israel may have succeeded in concealing a decision to develop nuclear weapons the team fiadins• must be weighed again1t the following facts 1 Israel concealed the existence of the D1mona reactor from us for about two year GROUP 3 Downgraded at 12 year intervals not automatically declas1ified ·' - SBCR§I 2 - 2 Israeli officials did oot allow adequate tlM for tho ough inspection of the Dimou aite and arranged no vlait• to aites of projected related facilities 3 Israeli officiale ruled queatiou abCNt procurement of uranium from abroad nwteide tbe acope of the visit aod suggested takiag them up through normal dlplomatlc chauel1 4 lerael is acquirlng at11llea from rrance daaiped to accommodate either biah-explosive or uuclur wcrheada 5 Public aud private atatementa 'by Israeli official• suggest military planning that iucludee the uae of nuclear weapons Given these eircumstancea we urge prompt approvel of the reque1t of the Acttng Secretary to the Preaident December ta 1964 for authority to initiate negotiations with Israel to extead IA8A eafe• guards to all Iaraeli nuclear factlttl••• Benjamin H B eed Executive Secretary s s RO Enclosures i-£ _ Pnliminary Draft leport NEA NE gssell rvc 2 4 65 1965 NEA - Mr J n Mr NESCI -- Mr Da IW' Thomas cc A EC e iPM G PM-Mr C Moor G PM unsigmed S§CR§T lncloaure Thie doc ument conaiat1 of L pages number of to copte Serie• A EXCLJJSJYI DJSTJIBUTIOW PULIMDlAB Y DW'l llBPORT 0 DIMOKA lNSRCTIOJf ftAH Introduction 1 Professor lgal almi dastguted by the Prime Mtnieter of Israel•• his repreaentativa aud Mr Moaha C11boa lecort Officer durio8 the 1962 1nd 1964 vialta met tba team at tho airport at 1830 27 January 1965 'the 1chedule for the vleit aa proposed b7 the laraell called for vielte to tbe Weizmann ln tltut• and the reactor at Rabal Soreq 011 Thursday 28 Jauwary and a Yilit to t'be Negev Institute for Arid Zone ae earch •t Beerabeba on rrt day momtng The formal visit would beg1u lrlday afteraoou wt th• trip to the phosphate mines at Oron The viat t to the Dimonl Site wae scheduled for Seturday The team aµggested that the trip to Orou be deferred until Sunday to permit the vlait to Dt mona to begin rrt day afternoon Profeaaor Talmi promleed to lnveetlgate thle pos•iblllty but on Thursday evening reported that• viait to Dimon a on Jrlday would require informing many more peopte 'about the purpose of the visit He urged that the team accept the proposed schedule The team then requeeted a very early start on Saturday and arrlved at the ef te one aod oue•half hour earlier than tb original achedula The le aelis were cooperative and cordt el throughout the vi11t and made every effort to expedite and to facilitate the team•• activlti••· The team requeeted an additional meeting wt th Mr Pratt the Dtmona Site manager and Profeaaor 'falmi on Sunday morning to recapitulate the results of the vieit and to clear up any uncertal11tt ea A8 for the visit last year not all facilities could be vlatted ln one day at the eite It wa also necessary to curtail IJQlletbles rather rudely detailed diecusstons of research pYojecte ln order to complete the minimum requirements for the vlsit The lsrae11e made it rather clear that they would not favor an extension of the vialt into tbe late evening Although the pace waa faat and the Yi alt not as detailed as could be desired it it th• conaensua of the team that the visit provided a satisfactory bael• for determtntna the statue of activity at the Ot moaa Site SBCMt GaGUP l Dowugraded at 12 year intervals not automatically decla1aiftad s1cm - 2 - '• Highlight• of the Visit 1 Major uncertainties exist reprdlng the future direction of atomic energy deve lopaient in larae 1 Theee were etatad to be prtmarlly the re1ult of the u s lsraelt desalting project 2 There appears to be an aeaumption that the desalting project will reeult in Israel getting • nuclear power and deNlinatiou plant at half-price or lees Thia ha• reaulted in lncrea1ed lnterest ln slightly enriched ur•nluro fueled reactor from abroad and dacreased intere1t in 1uppo t of developmeut of natural ur•nlum fueled reactor• within Israel for the near term 3 Tbe national vater company Melcorot ha• a eumec1 the dominant role in tbe deealttna project and the laraeli Atomic Inergy coaat eion has 11 ttl• if any influence Thu ba1 lead to the retipatton not accepted of the Cbaf rmau of the Atomic Bnera C01111B181iou and to obviou1 coucern on the part of the Director of the Dimona Center 4 Construction of the uraniwo rocovery plant associated with the phosphate works did not proceed Dl1cue1lou resardlug 1uch a plant are still io progre11 but• firm decision to build the plant has not yet IH en made The plant now betna dhcusaed would be located at Arad rather than OronJ with a capacity of 12 to 30 tons of uranium per year 5 The fuel fabrication plant at Dimona ur•ni 111 metal to canned eub-aeeeanbliea wae placed in ataadby condition on January 1 1965 and operatiou ie not expected to reaume for at lea1t one year baaed on fuel requireuianta for the reactor 6 The metal recovery plant aleo ia being shut don The fir t stage of operation the vet procea•ea were discontinued in November 1964 Procesotns of th present stock of materials will be completed by mid•Marcb 1965 and the plant will be placed in atandby condition at that time the Director of the Dimona Center said that it vat indefinite When or if the plant would be returned to operating condition 7 Th• reactor etarted a three-month demon1tratioD or acceptance run at design power of 26 MW on l ecember 7 1964 Operatt 011 at 32 5 MW was acknowledged to be possible wtthto the original bot spot temperature limitation s Integrate4 power on the reactor at the time of the viett was approximately 1700 MWD about 200 MD ton average Two fuel elements were removed at about 65 M1 T in order to insert two element made in Israel The reactor is loaded with 167 fuel element• containing 8 35 tonnes of natural uranium alloyed with o si Mo §EQRKT EPROOUCEO AT1HE NATIONAL ARCHIVES @§CW - 3 9 The team made au effort to account for all of the Uraalum at the Dimona Slte and was able to make an approximate material balance for about 25 tonne• both by examinat1oo of record• and by partial physical count 10 Then stUl are about 40 foretgner1 11 at tbe elte 1ncludtna about 18 at t ha reactor They vt 11 stay until several laing construction •nd toetl11g jobs are fluf ahed which may be at z montha or more Principal jobs me11tioned were lnatallat1oa of auaUtary equipment itt the fue 1 etorage pond aDd repatr of COz blower for the reactor's experimental facllltiaa 11 There••• little evidence of immediate plan for experf meatel use of tho re•ctor eveft though the design power test run abould be completed wttbia about one month Thia la at leaet parti all7 ration• atized by the fact that blower and other eqvi llllent for the teat facilities will not be ready for aeveral montba 12 There baa been oo approval of• raaearch aud developinant program or of a budget for the flecal year atarting April 1 1965 A program was prepared by Prof Bergman but bae not beau appro red An a D budget of flve million Israell pounds hae been requested by Mr Pratt••he baa only been advised that he wtll set 1111 Ile is very peaaimiettc about future 1upport and even talked of the possibility of having to ehut down tbe reactor Total coet of running the center would require approxS mately an addttlonal 26 mlllioa l1raell pouoda 13 Questions regarding pt'ocurement of uraat um from other countr1ea were ruled to be outside the scope of tbia vlalt It wae suggested that auch queauon be t1ken up through normal dtplo• matic chauaele Mr Pratt and Prof Talm1 denied any kaoll'ledge of aucb orrangemen ta · Th la lnfcmnation was pa seed on to the Amba1aador who app arentl7 vill await fvrther lnetructlou v s 14 Plaa t eecurity baa beea increa1ed by luAllation of au electr1 1 fence••reportedly the reeult of ••botaae actlvltle• arowut the Jordan liver project 15 There is no ••ldence of further activity oa Pu extraction from irradiated fuel However some ba1ic work le nou in in the extensive Pu research facilttiea using 56 gram of the 159 grams of Pu avaUabl e to them from the Frencb A180 f t vu autad that one of the roama in the hot laboratod ee with two 111t 1ll lead shielded boxee wae to be uaed for small 1 11• traoeura1d • element extraction from reactor fuel samples roar••• - - • §§CRET - 4 - 16 While there appears to be no near term possibility of a weapoue development prosram at the Dimona Site the eite bas excellent development and production capability thAt warrant• contlnued surveillance at maximum interval of one year 17 Heither the total lsraell capability to produce natural urallium nor to manufacture Pu at Oimona b now being u1ed At present facilities do not exist to prodvce more than about three tone per year of natural uraDium no capability exbte to produce and recover Pu However tbe potential to e11tor into the•• compaalon efforts is there and could be implemented by installing addttion1l equipment An estimate of this potential follows Present Poa1tbt11 wiE l ea e Craab effort maximum tt at axal urania production ptue Oron Arad phosphate tonne• U yr Y Ore COQ£ CQte O 12•30 80-160 0 10•30 30-100 0 10•30 mu ifiS §tion at Dimona tonnes yr 61tr te to Ywetfl at Dimona tonus yr fuel Rod F abriS§tlon 0 in 1965 at Dt mona tonnes yr g as or a Pp 4 15 tn 1966 Prodgctton capacity for Pu@ 8 3 tounea eore 75i on stream 1200 MWD tonne s s b c 20 kg yr for Pu@ 8 3 touuea core 85t onatream 32 MW 800 MWD toane 10 kg yr for Pu@ 9 0 tonnes core 85 oustrea1D 45 MW 800 'MD 15 kg yr 70•90 Ji _ s s a p 'r µt'Jt fd_f f 1 _t __ r u1a - cl'RODVCl O AT lHE NATIONAL ARCHIVES kl r X DEC LAS FIED ' • S CRB'J 5 - Present Repr2cess na for Pu Pontble WUh MU Crash effort mke Eecoyeq no eqvipment installed 0 0 fJ J@ta 1 Production UnkaOWG but adequate space and e•earch equipmeut ezi• t• for oa etdereble production Bo production plane SECBBT 0 NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Duplicity Deception and Self-Deception Israel the United States and the Dimona Inspections 1964-65 2020-11-03