FOR RM USE ONLY FE I lt HI EA cu u n p 10 FllO AID co F A il r I AB T AR JI MB CIA N A '-Y t ui' SECRET LIHITED filSTBIBr tl'ICti ' lit %_ AIB PWGH HA NDLING I N O I C A TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE F ROM Amembassy- TEL A VIV SUBJECT CUrrent statu R EF ptel 930 1965 t PP II 'Z ' ' J DATE Aprll 9 196S of the Di JDona Reactor ti r 11 We are 1n the procaes ot erecting a reaearch reactor whic _ will serve the needs ar industry agricultun health arxi scienoe •••• 'lb Ls reactor is dedicated entirely' to peac pu rpoeee 11 David Ben-3 lricn in ll lceinber 1960 11 In certain circumstances a virtuous wman ay not want to appear virtuous Chaim Yahil 1n May 1963 referring to a US request to reas• sure President Nasser about the peaceful nature of aoti viti es at Dimon a I desire to confirm Mr Ben Qurion I s clear asl JUl e on the character at the Dimona reactor 11 Prillle Minister Bl lbk al Au gust 1963 and purpose The quotations abow are typical at at least a dozen unequivocal statements ot reusurance coming from tbe top lsval of the ClovarlJllbut or Israel In the history of US-Ierasl relatiom there have been occasicnal misunderstandings but there bas never been a case of violaticn ot such a clear frequently repeat ed pledge As reWarcements for these good mtienticns tbe inte nsity of USG opposition to nuclear proliteratl on bae co Lt' a er C c I 0 been orcei'ul ly brought home to Israel frequently' and recently together with the realization that tb e de'V8lopment of an Israel nuclear weapon _J u- e t 0 0 would 1ead to sharp displeasure acoompaniad b y severe curtail DBnt of the American support 1n other fields which Israel needs so b 0 Lt s GROUP 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals not autotna tically declassified L SECRET FOR M • •U r• • Ln1I'lilD D5-323 SA RTWeb 4-7-6S The Ambassador in dra tt FOR DEPT USE ONLY DISTBfitrfiCN la Q0111 e POL - SEPalmar 1 Jr in dratt i SECRET LIMITED DISTRIBUTION Page 2 of A-742 fi'om TEL AVr rl Quite aaide from these assurances I there is ample independent evidence that Israel has not assembled nuclear waapaz m an is not now in the process of doing so High officials of the GOI have frequently admitted howevar1 that they are quite glad to 11 keep Nasser wrried11 on this subject This element of psychological warfare io stated by Israeli officials to be the reascn for the extraordinary security precautions ltdch have BW'rounded llimooa from its inception The extent to which this blutt is actually useful to Israel is debatable it may even be counterproductiva through creating a distrust stimulating the Arabs to gre ter efforts nuc-ie·a r and otherwise against Israel In arr case it seeJ11S unlikely that en y large fraction or the $60 m Uliai already spent at Dimona can be justified in terms of the bluff value at the inatal16 tion It therefore aee llB desirable first to approo cb a study of Dimona from the point of view of its value as a research establishment devoted to the ac lantific needs of the nation Available information on the Dimona establishnleht - its history facilities and staff indicates clearly that if military considerations are entirely ondtted from the equation of motivation it 18 not a sensible research project fitting into the total picture at the accomplisiiiiiinta acti vi ti es and needs of Israel's science On the contrary judging purely from this angle 1 1 t would seem to be a colloeeal blunder 'Which has dissipated more than hall' of the total funds devoted to construction of facilities for research whole nation during the past six years am development in the I£ 'W'B regard Dimona as 10 percent bluff and 90 percent b1under i oue baffl ing questions are answered For example why did all the med ers of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission except Protessor Bergmann resign in l 959 The departing 11Bmbera included BUch distinguished scientists as Professor Giulo Racah and Amos de Shalit lllbo Jere fully aware ot the nation' e great need for more adequate research facilities It could be that these men ref'used to lend their names an l reputati011S to such an expensive boondogle Simil arly the earlier public descriptions of Jlimona textile plant science department 0£ a new University of the South etc am the present security precauti008 electric fence trip wires aigna forbidding photography exclusioo even of most Israeli scient Lste may- be deeigoed not so much aa to tool tbs Arabs as to keep the highly articulate Israeli scientil'ic conmuni ty trom realizing what a fatuous waste or money there bas been If the rrsn who ar-iginally authorized the Illmona project really had in mind the construct ion ot a research establishment serving only the needs of industry agriculture health and science it is not dit'ficult t-o show that these intentions miscarriBd We will attempt to tline two types or argument l rle can study lllmona from the point of view of the ratio ot capital investment per professional scientist and c0111pare th1B ratio with bond - 'ide research institutions elsewhere in Israel To bring D1mona into line with the SECRET LD fITED DISTRIBUTICN DECLASSIFIED A i ' rted U gS' ltJt _ c - • '1 ·••• i· A1' l J f - D _7-'1-0 l I SECR Fr LIMITED DISTRI WT ON Page 3 of A-742 from TEL AVIV best equipped of these other laboratories would require a staff of professional nuclear scientiata about three times a a large as the total number of such men now resident 1n Israel 2 A chronological c utl ini of the establishmeat of facilities at Dimona leads to the conclusion that relativel y tew of th se seem primaril y ds• igmd to meet Ierae1 1 s real research needs ·In the process of pursuing this development Israel has overcome meet at the hurdles lying in the path of achie'Ving a production capacity- ar pl ut-onium the- basic ·material of nuclear weapons Capital Investment in search Inst Ltutiona A well-kncwn and frequent' cy deplarsi feature of the emergence of science in the past thirty years is the large capital investment required The modem scientist needs and expeote elaborate and cmtly equipzmnt ext ensive services a well-atooked library fast computing machines and ample wrld ng space in a modern specially designed building Following tbe Jl'nerioan pattern Israel has made great eff'orts to f'undsh its scientists with aatis f actory facilitiee At the Weizmann Institute the total cost or buildings equip111 1nt and services installsd since 1950 runs to about $25 million The Institute I s 2Bo professional scientists are thereby turnisbed with facilities as good as aey in the world at an average cost of sligbtly under $1001 000 per scientist The investment in buildings and services or research scientists at tba Hebrew Um ven1ity durin the same riod comes to about $16 million at an average coat per scientist of about $80 000 'J he capital investment par research scientist at the Technion is about $69 000 at the Standards Institutian of Israel it is about $58 000 and at the Israe1 AEC 1 s Soreq_ Research Establishment it is about $75 ooo The total capital investment in the Dinlona Eatablisbnent i B believed to be about $60 million Even if we allow a generous ratio of capital investment per reaearcb scientist of $100 000 per man the operation of Ili Jlona as a research establishment would require a stall or 600 professional scientiJ lta and engineers But the total nnmber at Israeli acientiiti and angineere doing research in all fields is now only about 2100 or these the estimated nuni er or specialiata in nuclear science and engimering is al moet exactly 2001 distributed aa folJ Olf8 93 at the Soreq Re159arch Establishment 55 at the Weizmann Institute 40 at Dimona a very rough guess 10 at the Technion and 5 at the Hebrew University It Israel ware to staff OLmCllla with enough talent to permit a reasonabl y economical use ar the capital investment it would have to find wqs of recruiting three times as many nuclear scientists as now reaide in tm ale nation In atµdying tbs impact at Dimona it 111W1t conetantl 7 be kept in mind that Israel is small and not very populc ns nation The commendable scientific reputation or the Weiuiann Institute the Hebrew 1lrl veraity and the Technion soaetimes obscures the £act that these three i Datitutions taken together employ SECRET LDnTED DISTRIBUl'ION DECLASSIFIED •'-r • - · n h ' 5' l tL I 1 n i l c 1 _ 0 1 7-'r-O l _ _ l - - 1 - - - - SECRET LIMITED fiilffiw tJ·nw Page 4 of A •742 i'rom TEL A VI •• only about 1000 prateasi onal acienti ata and engineers and that the total capital tbe7 have expended on laboratories and research facilities since tbs establishment ot the State amount is to only about $58 millim The $60 milllon spent on plant and f11c ilitiu at DS m ana looms large in tbis perspectiw It 1s hardly surprising that the academic acientista sometimes becoma irritable -when they hear Dimana referred to as a reaearoh Facility Research Facilities at nl mona Viai tors at Di mana in 1964 reported that the reactor had been f'unliabed with the usual provisions for providing neutron beams a Dd for the irradiation of materials Tbase included channels in the graphite and in the core itself for irradiatiCllB 14 radial channels beam parts into the reactor core a thermal column and a biologlcal irradiaticm facility- The intantion to use the Dimana reactor to supplement the service pro'Vided at Nabal Screq in furnishing radioisotopes was indicated by- the existence in the hot laboratory of equiPraent for tagging ooq oundll ld th radioactive atoms and far per f'orm lng experiments in conventional radiochemistry There 1s al lo a small theoretical research group wark l ng on the the or - ot reactor111 The neutra i beams emerging i'roa the radial beam ports would also provide a useful facility for experimental research The fact that all at the beam parts on the Nabal Soreq reactor are now in full W le for reeeareh iniiaataa that there sbouJ d be some demand for thJ Dimon a neutrons particular u the b1gher power at lli mona would yield a more intense beam • a vary val uahle feature in certain exper l mnts such as neutron spectroscopy It is therefore partioulJlrq aurprising to receive a recent indicatio tJ that there is no apparent ettort to install experimental equipment at the llLmom beam ports The cODStruction and testl ng of such equipment usually takes considerable time - a yea r or more Aside £ram the very modest research acti n tiea described in the preceding two paragraphs nearl 1 all at the considerable facilities at IH mana seelll6 to be devoted to the vari ous stages ot tualing and operating the reactor and bandJ1ng the Plutoniwn which is to be produced The great eJP9nse and considerable tal 1131 lt being devoted to devaloping tb 1111 t eahnology an alleged to be justi fied an the grcunds that Israel must prepare itself f'or the el ectx-ic power reactors and desalination reactors which wil1 certainly be installed ldth1n the next twentTyears Wb y Israel i'eels it must be prepared to build 1te 0W1l reactors and produce its own fuel for theae commsrd a1 enterprises is unclear particularly aince the Uni ted States Canada Britain and France are all eager to sell reactors and provide fuel on quite favorable terms In otber areas of advanced tecbnol og - e g jet airplanes steam turbines looomotivea oceanliners - Iarael eeems quite content to let -other natians arwaat out the development costs and pr vide tbe f'inisbed product Autarld c argument appear to have pre VIIJ ed with regard to the development of' reactor technology SECRET LIKITED 'l5 ffl'I Bt CN DECLASSIFIED _----- ----------- 1 ki J' i r f l t J I E' r e R O I 1-9- 01 SEC Wr LDm'ED ffimmJTICJi Page S of A-742 tran TEL AVIV It seems unlikelyJ however that a country which mat husband its resOIU'Ces would have made such a wasteful investment as lll mana would be it we judge it entirely an acienti tio and commercial groundaJ and aa a training facility for mu lear engineere • In addi ti an to 1 ts p011aible uses in se fields it seems likely- that the Ieraelli ha-n been deliberately developing their nuclear potential with national security in mind This is not to sq that the GOI is building or necessa riJ 3 definite plans to coaatruct nuclear weapons but it is entirol y concaivable that the7 are oona tnicting a high plateau at scientific techniquee an i facilities so that they can move to the rnaJd ng of weapona in a relati'V8l y short tim 1f' the internatimal situation should appear to require it If we introduce this element 1nt o our t h1 aid n g Dimon no longer appears as a wutef u boondoggle The apparent blunder becanes in large masure a security aategu ardJ intended to match devel opanta amcog t ba Arab countries should they mow in the nuclear direction For instance in tbe process ot developing the teohnolog r for buUding and fueling reactors it is quite remarkable how much progreas Israel has made along the path to a nuclear weapon Starting from scratch there are nine f'aci1it1es which JJJUSt be canpleted be ore a nuclear weapon can be assembled mi tested A description at these and an indication at their preaent status are tabulated below Status Step Daecr J ption l 2 Provision o£ adequate supply or Uranium ore £rem uncontrolled aource Acoompl1sbl ld in 1964 Facil 1ties for converting ore into pure Completed in 1963 Argentine ore Uranium metal 3 Facilities f'or alloying casting macbjni ng and cladding Uranium metal to yield fuel rock 4 Facility for irradiating fuel rods Completed in 1962 or 1 63 Reactor reached tull power ill 1964 5 Facility for 11 cool1ng or rn irradiated i'ue l rods in water bath Nearly completed 1965 6 Hot cell facility for remote-control decladding and brealdn up irradiated fuel rods N IU ly canpleted 1965 7 Chemical plant for separating P lutonium from irradiated tuel Pi lot plant being cm- etnicted in 1961 no subsequent evidence -or activity- 8 9 Facil ities for casting and machining Pluto aium in an inert atmosphere Preparation of site for weapon test 1 presumably underground SECRET LDO ' l'ED DISTRIBJTIOO Completed in 1965 No clear evidence cf activity • SECm LD UTICH Page 6 of A-742 from TEL VIV Evan though it is clear see introduction that Israel 1a firruy coaud tted to using the Dimona facilities or peaceful purposes it ia interesting to speculate on the time schedule which might be followed in dewloping a nuclear weapon should the OoveI'DJllilnt make an early decisian to move in this direction It seems probable that the following suggested schednl e would be within the t ecbnical capacity- of the DLmona Establishment and could be carried out without any noticeable stepping up of the ls-wl at activity Year Activities Replace renoh f'uel in reactor w1 th Israeli uncontrolled tuel 1966 Sta-t canatruction of chemical separation plant Complete pr-el J minary survey- at testing s1 te start mining operatioDB at testing site 1967 Put chemioal separation pl ant into oparat1 on Complete mining operationa at testing lrl te 1968 Assemble and test explosive device These tables lead to the conclum on that 1D add1 tion to the minor mot 1 ve o£ bluff' and the somewhat mare important om of gaining expertese in nuclear technique the Israeli have now created a fl exible basia of choice regarding the possibility at prcxiucing nuclear weapana Although t be techn1cal f'acil• i ties are iD an advanced state of preparation we believe that weapana are not now being made and there is no evidence that the Israeli have made a decision to move the rest of the way towards producing them There were indications early this year that a delacy- may have been introduced in the devel0p11B11t schedule of the DiJnana E tahl isl ment In January 196$ both the plant for producing Uranium metal mi the plant for convertillg tb1s metal into £ue1 rods were in tbe process or being closed down at least temporarily It is not yet clear what signi icance should be attached to this del-q but we reel quite aura that it does not represent any aat'tening 1n the f'undamental determination ot tbe GOI to maintain an option'' with regard to nuclear weapons Aey eftQrt on the part of the USG to areolocse this option is certain to be met with opposition bordering on tba f'rant lc The Eni assy will continue to be alert to deV9lopments at Dimona and will report any i tams that seem si g nif'icant FOR THE 4MB4SSADCR1 1 ifll -- n1L 1 mr Charge d 1M£aires a i sicm LDO' 'l'Efi DISTRIBOTIW NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Duplicity Deception and Self-Deception Israel the United States and the Dimona Inspections 1964-65 2020-11-03