This document consists of 1 page J ' No _L of 4 copies Series A · DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON h ·p- _· cf OFFICIAL-INFORMAL Sf efll li' Dear Steve l ' · c u · 0 c ' u w ii- o c i- _ ' i Jg O 0 - • ··· t ' ' -' ' ' I • t • • · 1· ✓• x 0 111e i''· · · With warmest regards to both of you ••• Sincerely yours D ctor Office of Research and Analysis for the Near East and South Asia Encls RNA Monthly Alert List for June cy 27 Research Memo RES-11 cy 80 Stephen E Palmer Jr Esquire First Secretary Amerl can Elllb aa -y Tel Aviv Israel d· ll ' -- You will notice the restrictive classifications and that it highly speculative Thoughts like these however tentatively ey must be held lie behind some of the things that worry us tantly I hope we are not living with Alice in Wonderland y personal reaction 'IOU may have would be welcome Jae l'_ ain - • G 1 • A' '2r § J d6 C f2 The advent of the Monthly Alert List reminded me that you might be interested in the enclosed RM on Dimona which Les Brown whom you met in my office when you were briefly here prepared 20 - -8 0 ' 1 u Wf · ' J' GQN'l'HO LI d iY J ilJIStiH ulle oitt1'Ultt u s · DEPARTMENT oF sT ATE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH RES-ll Ml y' 10 1965 To The Secretary 80 JI •- -• I · Jr l A L Hughes lt'l WA v · _- Through From INR - Thomas Subject Implications ot the 1965 DlD na Inspection Finding• s s 0 - ABSTRACT The fourth US inspection of the Israeli reactor and associated facilities at D I Joona took place in January 1965 The team's findings suggest that the Israelis are uncertain about the f'uture of their atomic energy development I be pace at Dinx na has clearly slowed certain planned facilities have not yet been built and others have been shut down Since Di mna is ditticult to explain except 1n terms of' a potential supplier of fissionable m terial for a weapons program its current status suggests that the Israella ay have concluded that Dimona cannot in fact support a weapons program ot aey practical benefit to Israel in the foreseeable tuture It is unl 1kely however that Israel is prepared to give up a nuclear weapons option In exam lning the various alternatives open to them -- an exam mtion tbat is perforce somewhat speculative -the possibility ot an Iaraeli-Prench arransement must seri aly be considered GROUP 1 lkcluded trca autom tic dovqp ading and decluaUication SPCJatm JG 'A W HasBM CC¥'PAIUIP HBBlll sneRHf flG POOOiffN DISl lEM N'J ¥101 BB QJS6BH Slowd o m at Di Joona In January 1965 a US team inspected the Israeli reactor and associated facilities at Dimona 'Dlis was the fourth US inspection since 1961 he impression carried a by the inspector• on this visit was that there lfere mjor uncertainties regarding the future direction of atomic energy development in Israel specifically that the pace ot the effort had slowed at Dimona its operating and research budget ws being cut and that eta ff' morale wal I bad The planned uranium recovery plant associated with the phosphate works at Cron hae not yet been started the fuel fabrication plant at Dimona was placed on a standby condition on l January 1965 and is not expected to be reopened for at least a year the metal recovery plant 'W8 S also being shut down and was to be on standby by mid-Mt rch 1965 No date for resumption of operations had been set It is fairly clear that construction and operating plans revealed to the inspectors in 1964 have not been carried out in the intervening year It is clear also that the Dimona staff' at least do not expect them to be executed in the foreseeable future What is less clear however is my The explanation provided by the Dimona statf was that the US-Israeli desal ting project w s causing a shift in interest to enriched fuel reactors at the expense of natural fuel reactors ot the Dimna type Furthermore they said the desalting project was the responsibility ot the Israeli National Water Coiqpa ey not the Israeli Atomic Energy Ooanisaion IAEC The heed of the I A re Bergmann baa long held that Israel should opt -tor natural f'uel reactor desalting in part because Israeli experience prinm rily at Dimona has been vith this kind of r•ctor and 1n part because big natural fuel reactors could provide a large unaaf'eguarded plutonium production capability i f Israel were to start development ot nuclear we pons Bis reaction to the current US-Ieraeli examination of the desalinization project which is predicated on the use of a US enriched f'Uel reactor hae not been enthusiaatic and be bu made no secret his feelings in private converH tiona vith US officials he 1napect1on teem -was told in f'act that Berg Mnn bad tendered h1a reaigmt1on which w a not accepted over the desalting issue and particularly O'ler the virtual exclusion of the Am troll the project 'lbe ottic1al explanation tor the al owdown bu a certain plausibility and is reinf'orced somewhat by other conaiderationa 'lhe us ·Science Attache in Tel Aviv noted 1n a recent report on lB m that i f one leaves the poaaible JD1l1tary tactor• aaide Dlmom must be considered a colossal blunder lt SIDl1l fB8 Nl tlf SIi merrrmaal · • - · a- - be affected by any c-onceivabl trn-Israeli desalting agreement hence the stalld-down of D1mona lltWlt l eo be examined for its effect on fUture Israeli m111tary requirements High Israeli of'f'icial 8 have coru istently stated the position that Israel was not engaged in a nuclear weapons program and that Dimon it• elf i • covered by a peacetul-w es-only agreement w ltb the French On tbe other hand these same o t' t'1ciala have also con• i • tently reiterat l that Israel can llBlce no binding future commitment on the aubject o t' advanced vee pona and that their actions vould be dictated by developments in the aree specifice lly 1n t he UAR The attractions of cutting back at Dimona are in basic conflict vi th the potentia1 dema ixls of national security -- demands it should be noted which muat be anticipated well in ad TB nee since the plutonium production capability of the Dimona reactor ie quite sail It the Iaraelis were to decide now to begin a veapoDJS program they could probab produce at best no oore than enough material for two vee pons per year ft ds f'act puts a high premium on starting plutonium production as early as possible and minte ining i t at the highest tee sible rate lhe irradiation or tu el rods to produce plutonium and their subsequent cooling take by t'a r the l argest proportion of time 1n the plutonium production cycle and there is no way for a given reactor to speed this process For D 1 Dx na 1 rr d1at1on and cooling would take about 9 n ntha per reactor core am would reault in about 4 kg of plutonium It is unnece• aar y however to process the 1rrad 1ated rods to extract the plutoniua until there is an actual requirement for plutonium meta 1 The tuel rod a can be stored indefinitacy and an entire core of irradiated tuel can be processed 1n a tew weeks 1 1e raat theretore that there is nov no plutonium extraction tacillty in Israel need DOt prevent the Israelis from atartillg the irradiation phue o t' the plutoniua production cycle at any tiae ' le Israelis have the ta cllitiee for t'abricati Dg new cores 1 ley have a1ao obtained trom Argentina enough unaat'eguarded uram ua ror about 10 core loading• and are apparently atteq ting to obtain an equal uomrt trom Gabon Since the origiDal 100-ton uranium oxide purchue t'raa Argentina 1• far 1n excess o t' that needed to operate the reactor tor research purposes 100 tone would lut about 20 year• one 11 torced to assume that at least • ome preparation tor plutonium production bu taken place The or1g1Dal French-supplied core hollffer is apparent •till in the reactor which Wilt critical over a year a so and the 1'ac111ty tor 1'abr1cat1ng nev cores haa been abut down rt doee not appear tb ore that the Israelia are atte91 ting to wx11l1 • plutonium pr x· uction at the preeent time • 11- - - What then are the Israelis up to It has been suggested by the Science Attach in Tel Aviv that there nay be an element ot blutt 1n the whole Dimom project By its Vf fr'y existence it keeps alive the potential threat of an Israeli weapons program and my force somewhat m-re cautious and circumspect behavior on the part ot the Arab• particularly since in a nuclear race the Arabs would tind themselves hopelessly outdistanced even by the quite modest effort the Israelis could now mount There is clearly a llmit however to how much money the Israelis would be willing to spend to mintain the blutt and DJ mom exceeds by a great deal what might be considered a reasonable investment tor such a purpose P wu noted above the D imona investment also appears extraordinarily high to be justif'ied solely in terms ot research I his tact -- indeed the errtire secret comtruction history of D1 n m its high security and the covert French involvement -- supports a judgement that a military purpose fllere is nothing in the current political atmosphere in the Middle East to suggest that the Israelis feel they are any less threatened nov than they were in the late tit'tiea when D1mcma was conceived Yet virtually all qm 11 f'ied obaervers agree that DJJDom is not now being used to support a weapons program Furthermore except tor the purchase or a quantity ot uranium oxide Vf' r'Y' little ba8 been clone to prepare Dimona tor this role it a decision on a weapon• program were later made was envisaged for D1mona The Israeli Dilenma Of the variOU 8 possible explanations tor this state or a ttairs one at lee st merits close examination -- that the Israelis recognize that D1mona cannot in t'act support a weapons program ot an y practical benefit am that some aolution to Israel• s security problem other tban native weapon developmeat will have to be round was noted earlier D1mom at beet can produce o vc-y malJ quantities of plutonium By early 1966 it could produce oncy enough mterial tor one or pos•1b two devices with a wx1nam potential ot perhaps tw per y- r the reatter ih1a would be barely enough to support a teat program in tact it would be enough only to allow pe rbapa t110 or three tests over the next tn yea re and the atockp111Dg ot t o or three large and heavy devices 'Die Israel Def'enae Forcea howver poaaeas no medium or heavy bOlllbera flleir current airc rat't can carry nothing larger ·· than a 21 000-lb 30-inch diameter device unleaa one were to include external carriage by the c w i1 1 Jet aircnt't ot the Israeli national 1airline El Al ll an ettort were Dade to develop a weapon that could be As SJBflf NePENmlfMSe M OCll lrI IBP ' lBf 11'1 ' · -· • ·- s IIO i-8N B J iiil1 QWJRAI EM BlSE'a4 - 5carried hy a Vautour light jet bomber or a fighter the entire plutonium output of D1 mna over two or three yearo woul1 be required for the tent program alone leaving no fissionable material for a stockpile of the weaporui themselves Missile delivery would raise even more difficult problems of weapon development because of very stringent limits on weight and diameter The Israelis have ordered f'rom France a missile deeigm ted the MD-620 which appears designed tor a nuclear warhead of perhaps 1500 lbs and 30 inches diameter Without outside assistance it would probably take the Israelis at lea st five years and probably nr re to produce a compatible warhead in other -words it probably would take several years after the missile itself was ready for deployment Again the problem of obtaining fissionable m terial for the test program and for a ff W warheads would intrude itself 1n a very acute way F qually serious t'rom an Israelis' point of view 'WOUld be their imbility to conduct clandestine tests With a requirement for several tests to develop a deliverable weapon am with an equally urgent requirement for a stockpile of fissionable m terial over and above that needed for a test program time becomes a very critical element -- tillle measured not in months but 1n years The first test the Israelis 1conducted 'WOUld not be a demonstration of deterrent power but a flagrant · provocation an invitation to both their enemies and their allies to take BW'irt am possibly violent action flle risk wou1 1 be particularly high 1 the Israelis were to undertake a nat1ve program because they f'elt that they were unable to cope with the Arab threat by cotwentional mea m If' the conventional threat had reached such proportions that the Israelis f'elt compelled to build and test a nuclear device the threat might well be adequate to destroy Israel betore a weapon could be usef'ully deployed From a pol itical standpoint the risk would also be high 'lhe reaction of' moat of' Israel•• present supporters except possibly France 1l0'Uld be violently condemnatory unless Israel were actually under attack or t¥St of' it or unless the UAR bad somehow acquired or was on the poin of' acquiring a micl ee r we pon at the time of the test 'l Jua baving created a s1tmt1on where the risks ot military action were high Iarael would f'ind itself' virtually Without allies Possibility of' French Collaboration These a1dtward tacts have no doubt been considered by Israeli planners rt 1a mt inconceivable that since they have been unable to resolve the EIBEIRBI JJG NIE6lf BmEBt 88l'1R9lrlaH9 B SSBI SJJ8P Jff- HQ H B ii Q81 0nYIB BfB6BM - 6 problem f' n'ther expenditure on Dimna bas been suspended 'Ibis is not to say that the Israelis have necessarily resigned themselves to a non-nuclear status forever One avenue that might be open to them for example would be third-party assistance -- in this case from France For a milit rily uset'ul native program Israel would m ve to obtain fissionable materials design data and probably testing tac111tiea A better alternative would be an arrangement prorlding for acquisition of complete weapons since I1rael1 requirements are 11m1ted basically to a Vf rY snail number ot missile warheads of a single type or to bombs compatible With snail jet aircra tt It must be emphasized that there is no evidence that the French are parties to such an arrangement Nor is there aeything in French official statements to suggest that they would consider it in their interest to commit themselves to aey kind of a nuclear weapons agreement with the Israelis Quite the contrary ve have long held that it would not be in their interest to do so and there is considerable evidence that the French Foreign ottice at least shares US concern over the possibility of Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons i lese otticials continue to state unequivocally that France has no intention ot usieting aey other country 1n achiffing a nuclear weapons capability although they doubt the practicality or even the possibility ot an airtight aareguard system and preter a fiexible approach tailored to the nature or the project and to their Judgement of the intentions capabilities and trustvorthiness ot the recipient country In this respect they seem to be reflecting the views of President de Gaulle with 'Whom the decisions a rter all would rest that proliferation is inevitable French performance in the case of Iarael suggests a somewtat relaxed attitude In tbe tirat place the French built Di mom Whatever its limitations u a producer ot t'iseiomble nater1al it baa same CQ b111ty Safeguards are virtually non-existent and apply eo far u we can determine onq to the tirat French-supplied core vben it 1s removed and returned to Prance French sat'eguard responsibility w1ll cease inexplicable trom a non-proliferation point ot view is the French-Israeli agreem11ut on the 62o miaaile Little is known about the origin ot this agreement particularly whether the development cost 1a being shared by the two countries 1n the expectation that both will ultuateq purcbue it tor their armed services or whether it is a m taaile built atrictq to Israeli apecitic tione It it is the tma er the fact that it appear• to be deeigned to take a nuclear as well u a Bllll l 'IIO NIBIQlf MSGIN 961iituflfJ B B BSa - - • -JI ·- • SB8R Jf HO FORB IBN B f9fJil f g arr se BiDOBM - 7 - high-explosive warhead can be aatiaf'actorily explained by the planned 1''rench U8e of it Ir it is the latter however its dual capability becomes more sinister since native development by the Israelis ot a compatible nuclear wrhee d would be a long and difficult task an MD-620 missile built to Israeli specif'ications raises most acutely the problem of' a possible French-Israeli arrangement on nuclear warheads It is not inconceivable that the French might consider an arrangement whereby French nuclear w rheads for the MD-620 would be supplied in the event that any Arab coun try obtained nuclear weapons Such an agreement would not be out ot line with past French Near Eastern policy wu1d not be inconsistent with their public proliferation posture and would run virtually no risk of upsetting the military balance in the Midd1e and in f'act could be justif'ied as a move to naintain this balance From the Israeli standpoint a contingency agreement of this sort woul d appear to be equally advantageous at least for the foreseeable tuture l't would insure them against the worst eventuality i e Arab acquisition of' nuclear wee pons vhile avoiding the very high political and military risks of' a native program It would not of' course affect the conventional arms be en e but we do not believe that the Israelis would be obliged to meet the problem of rectifying a future imbalance of Arab-Israeli conventional arms by introducing nuclear wee po becaU8e it is US and probably French policy to see that this balan' e is nairrtained It the Israelis felt that an unfavorable balance w s developing becaU8e the manpower advantage of' the Arabs had become a significant military taetor we believe the Israelis wow d first press the US for a security g arantee before committing l self to a nuclear weapons program Whether a French-Israeli nuclear weapons agreement exists or bas even been considered w cannot say The current aspect of the Israeli nuclear program however particular the slowdown at DJ mom the deep French involvement in the Israeli missile and nuclear programs and the ambivalent French 1 08it1on on aateguards and proliteration all suggest this poss1b111ty 8BEltBI lf8 NaQJf B IBEBI -eetfm81mBB B 9CBII NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Duplicity Deception and Self-Deception Israel the United States and the Dimona Inspections 1964-65 2020-11-03