February 19 1993 To First Deputy of the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine V V Durdynets Dear Vasyl Vasyliovych The solution of these issues requires a well-rounded expert assessment of a wide range of aspects of the complex problem of nuclear disarmament If possible experts from different fields relevant to the issue must be engaged to produce precise assessments In making primarily political conclusions about possible consequences of different types of solutions to the problem the MFA relied on data at its disposal although they are mostly approximations However even the these indicators allow to make certain conclusions The Ministry continues to participate in relevant negotiations and contacts regarding the fate of nuclear weapons located on the territory of Ukraine and to deeply analyze this issue We will continue to inform the Verkhovna Rada accordingly Attachment the abovementioned on 6 pages Respectfully Minister A M Zlenko signature ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO UKRAINE'S NUCLEAR POLICY 1 Undoubtedly the development of a nuclear missile complex in Ukraine would require considerable capital investments although the exact amount is difficult to determine at this stage Appropriate calculations must be made by relevant experts According to expert estimates made on the basis of open source materials in the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine the direct costs associated with the creation and build-up of the nuclear missile complex in the Soviet Union between 1943 and 1963 amounted to 1 trillion rubles in the prices of that period It must be noted that prisoner From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive Per your request I am sending you additional information in a follow-up to the analysis of possible consequences of alternative approaches to Ukraine's nuclear policy labor was widely used in implementing nuclear programs In the United States about 100 billion dollars was spent during the initial stage of creating the nuclear missile complex According to estimates by American experts about 1 billion dollars is required to build a storage facility for weapon-grade nuclear materials while reprocessing of nuclear material from warheads requires 400-500 million dollars annually The MFA considers that expenditures on non-productive goals could substantially undermine efforts aimed at conducting social and economic reforms in our country especially in present financial and economic conditions According to estimates of the experts of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine the cost of implementing a comprehensive program of elimination of nuclear missile weapons in Ukraine including expenses for social needs construction of housing social facilities training new skills etc would amount to approximately 5 6 billion of Ukrainian karbovantsi in prices of the second quarter of 1992 If carried out in the United States in American prices such project would entail a cost of approximately 2 2 billion dollars It has been estimated that just the maintenance of the existing nuclear missile complex of Ukraine for the period of 7 years requires around 5 billion karbovantsi ll At present the United States has announced its intention to extend to Ukraine 175 million dollars in aid for the elimination of nuclear weapons on condition of their full destruction Negotiations are underway to provide Ukraine with additional 150 million dollars in aid to pay for social aspects of this comprehensive program It is evident that these funds and any possible western and non-western credits for the conversion of military industry will not be extended to Ukraine should Ukraine declare itself a nuclear state 2 Ukraine's political decision to change its status to that of a country that possesses nuclear weapons today the international understanding is that Ukraine is a country that has not yet joined the NPT and that does not have nuclear weapons of its own but that nuclear weapons are temporarily deployed on its territory under the operational control not of Ukraine but of the Joint Command of Strategic Forces of the CIS would inevitably provoke a negative international political reaction political diplomatic and economic pressure on Ukraine as well as a possible introduction of certain political financial-economic sanctions even at this stage A move toward the implementation of a Ukrainian nuclear weapons program would lead to increasing pressure and sanctions the way it is done for example in relation to North Korea India Pakistan Republic of South Africa partially even Israel with which states according to existing international nonproliferation regime it is From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive Since Ukraine already possesses about one third of the necessary components required or the nuclear missile complex there are no elements for the production of solid and liquid rocket fuel nuclear warheads other key elements of the programill the cost of the construction of the entire complex will be commensurate adjusted for current prices prohibited to trade certain materials military and dual-use technology and know-how and to cooperate in these fields Countries which do that cooperate with proliferators themselves fall under sanctions of member-states of the London Club nuclear suppliers Certainly nuclear forces of any state become targets of the best forces of its potential adversaries Nuclear states use nuclear weapons for this purpose The possibility of using them preventively is determined by a specific military and political situation during a standoff Although in the past during the Caribbean crisis@ for instance or in cases of mistaken warning about a nuclear strike by an adversary we managed to avoid an actual preventive strike a future possibility should not be ruled out entirely since it is difficult to predict the nature of possible complications in relations specific circumstances affecting decision-making of leaders on different levels and other factors that could define a hypothetical crisis situation on the eve of a possible preventive nuclear strike Thus a country's non-nuclear status by itself somewhat reduces a hypothetical possibility of nuclear use against it by a nuclear state in international relations there is well-known practice whereby members of the nuclear club undertake a commitment not to use their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries Even during a possible military conflict between a nuclear and non-nuclear state it is hard to imagine that nuclear weapons would be used against a non-nuclear state At the same time a threshold status of certain states and even more so a formal declaration on joining the nuclear club inevitably renders such a state an object of increased attention including from a military perspective from all states that perceive it as a threat to their security Forecasting behavior of two nuclear states in a possible conflict from the perspective of likelihood of either one of them using nuclear weapons is very difficult Today only some nuclear states China and Russia have undertaken an unilateral commitment not to use nuclear weapons first which does not rule out the possibility that they could deploy such weapons in response 3 The universally recognized status of a nuclear weapons state that currently applies to five states which tested nuclear weapons before January 1 1967 provides them with certain advantages in international affairs They carry special responsibility for maintaining peace and security which means their position in one way or another is taken into account in deciding practically all international issues From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive We must account for the possibility that in the final stages of creating a full production cycle of nuclear materials and developing other components of a nuclear weapons program in addition to large-scale or comprehensive sanctions military action may be undertaken against certain facilities in Ukraine similar to the attack on nuclear facilities in Iraq and in a somewhat different context Libya In this case the means of attack would not have to be necessarily nuclear so such an action could be undertaken not only by nuclear states but by any state that felt overly threatened by the changed circumstances The case is complicated by the fact that the USSR and now Russia are de facto and de jure nuclear states recognized by the international community Ukraine is not recognized as a nuclear state on legal grounds proving otherwise would be very difficult if not impossible Certainly world's leading nations both nuclear and non-nuclear will employ all possible means to prevent Ukraine from acquiring the status of a nuclear state including the abovementioned political and economic sanctions pressure blockade and possibly military action of preventive nature 4 The extent of additional guarantees of Ukraine's national security from the nuclear states depend on the course of relevant negotiations with these states and willingness to achieve mutually acceptable results One should realize that there are certain mechanisms and documents in the world and Europe today both politically and legally binding which are aimed at ensuring international and national security of states that participate in international affairs Obviously they do not always work effectively However in modern circumstances it is rather difficult to undertake military actions against another state without the support of the international community since sharply negative reaction to such actions could lead to unanticipated sometimes even counterproductive consequences Even such great states as the United States France and the United Kingdom do not venture to use military force without proper authorization by the UN Security Council or at least regional organizations support of the Organization of American States toward the U S armed action against Grenada Under such circumstances even Russia would find it hard to move beyond political and economic pressure Ukraine's n ational security could to some extent be guaranteed absolute guarantees are practically impossible to obtain by strengthening these international mechanisms and documents as well as by additional guarantees from nuclear states which in case they are given a high public profile would be difficult to violate even in case of a severe confrontation 5 As mentioned in Para 1 the maintenance of the existing nuclear missile complex in Ukraine without a significant capital investment into the development of the missing elements requires approximately 5 billion karbovantsi over 7 years Approximately the same amount needs to be spent on the implementation of a comprehensive program for the destruction of nuclear missile systems deployed in From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive If Ukraine could also receive an universally recognized status of a nuclear weapons state we could predict that it would wield considerable weight in deciding international issues solely due to its possession of nuclear weapons However considering the inevitably severe negative attitude of other countries to Ukraine's attempts to gain such a status its standing in international affairs would be negligible An example of such seeming paradox could be seen in the attitude toward the Soviet Union during the period of greatest escalation of ideological and military standoff say in the early 80s The reputation of the USSR as an aggressive state the evil empire resulted in a negative attitude toward it which seriously impacted Soviet Union's domestic and international standing and its capacity to advance its ideas in the world Nonetheless as a nuclear state it undoubtedly had considerable influence in deciding certain important international issues Ukraine Afterward the funds that would have been spent on maintaining the nuclear missile complex could be used among other things for re-equipping the material and technical basis of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other needs of domestic development of our state As mentioned above it is now generally recognized that nuclear weapons states are those states that tested nuclear weapons before January 1 1967 Other states are considered non-nuclear The international community is very concerned by the possibility of one non-nuclear country acquiring the nuclear status which would pave the way for other threshold states It is practically impossible to maintain normal trade economic scientific and technical relations in the field of peaceful use of atomic energy and space with states not parties to the NPT even harsher measures could be expected toward a violator of the non-proliferation regime which is quite clearly defined and formalized by the members of the London Club Zanger Committee etc ill The MFA analysis here in imprecise Pavlograd Chemical Plant in Ukraine produced solid rocket fue 1-- Mariana Budjeryn ill The USD equivalent of this figure is difficult to calculate since Ukraine was suffering from hyperinflation in 19921993 and there is no indication in the document as to when the calculations were carried out Assuming that calculations were carried out in January 1993 when the official exchange rate stipulated by the National Bank of Ukraine was 640 karvobantsi to 1USD 5 billion karvobantsi would amount to about 7 8 million USD Most likely however he calculations were done in 1992 and considering the average exchange rate of 208 karbovantsi to 1 USD for that year the amount would convert to 24 million USD a more likely figure for maintaining strategic nuclear forces in Ukraine over 7 years -- Mariana Budjeryn ill Cuban Missile Crisis -- Mariana Budjeryn From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive 6 In case Ukraine adopts a decision to acquire the status of a nuclear weapons state it will not avoid accusations of violating the nuclear non-proliferation regime even though Ukraine is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT The nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime is defined not only by the NPT but also by relevant rules norms and procedures developed by member-states of the London Club Missile Technology Control Regime MTCR other similar organizations and groups