3 DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTION MEMORANDUM S January 30 1973 TOP SECRET NODIS To From T Jn Under Secretary- for Political Affairs P1 v Ronald I Spiers Forthcoming Visit of Prime Minister Heath Possible Request for POSEIDON During the past two weeks State and Defense have picked up a number of indications that Mr Heath may be planning to ask the President whether the United States would be prepared to sell the POSEIDON missile system to the United Kingdom In his January 18 letter to Mr Kissinger Secretary Laird strongly urged that the US not make a commitment of any sort to the British in the event Mr Heath made an approach at the White House level on POSEIDON We believe that it would not be desirable at this stage to give either an affirmative or a negative decision on the sale of POSEIDON to the UK We believe that a sympathetic but non-committal response to the Prime Minister would best advance the interests of the US at this point A memo to Mr Kissinger setting forth this position and explaining the reasons underlying it is attached Recommendation That you sign the attached memo to Mr Kissinger Attachment Memo to Mr Kissinger TOP SECRET NODIS Drafted PM AE HGHandyside r x21835 30 73 Clearance EUR - Mr Springsteen draft'J J 1 - EPROOUCEO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES To From Nuclear Questions Although the list of topics for the forthcoming Heath meetings handed us by the British Embassy did not include any reference to nuclear matters State and Defense staff members in the past two weeks have picked up several indications both here and in London that Prime Minister Heath is planning to raise a number of nuclear questions with the President Despite active probing of British officials we have not yet been able to obtain any elaboration of precisely what Mr Heath has in mind A quick survey of US-UK cooperation in the military utilization of nuclear energy may therefore be helpful History During World War II and then beginning again in 1955 the US and the UK have worked extremely closely across a broad spectrum of nuclear research weapons development and military operational planning including understandings covering prior consultation on the use of nuclear weapons The extensive sharing of scientific data weapons technology propulsion information special nuclear materials and equipment including the non-nuclear components of weapons has been and is still being carried out under the Agreements for ATOMIC ENERGY Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes signed in July 1958 and May 1959 An elaborate structure of Joint Working Groups JOWOGs and an extensive program of exchanges of documentation and personnel has been devised to implement this exchange of data For nearly a decade we shared virtually all our weapons technology with the British nuclear technicians and supplied Britain with substantial equipment including a complete submarine propulsion plant and nuclear materials In 1965 however the US decided to begin gradually to narrow somewhat the scope of our nuclear cooperation Since that time we have restricted the TOP SECRET NODIS EPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 'l 'OP SEC T NODI_S -2transfer of data to information about weapons systems HMG already possessed or had firmly decided to acquire Thus information about our most advanced nuclear weapons systems e g Minuteman POSEIDON has not been given to the British Recent Developments Since 1967 the need to modernize and improve the UK POLARIS force has increasingly concerned the British In 1969 HMG requested US help in analyzing the vulnerability of their POLARIS missiles to Soviet ABM defenses and hardening them to withstand the effects of a nuclear counter attack In 1969 the ad hoc working arrangements between the two governments were formalized in a Memorandum of Understanding that committed the US to provide design critiques engineering assistance and test support In 1971 the President authorized DOD to respond affirmatively to the UK request for assistance in the Project Definition phase of the development program Super Antelope the British technicians had devised to meet the vulnerability hardening problem Last summer 1972 the President authorized DOD and AEC to provide the additional assistance the British had requested further engineering help participation in additional nuclear effects tests underground tests of three or more British designed and built nuclear devices at the Nevada Test Site and flight testing on US ranges Current Issues Although the British Cabinet has authorized the Ministry of Defense staff to proceed with certain long lead-time actions in the Super Antelope program it has not made any final decision on the whole program and is not now expected to do so until April Meanwhile the Royal Navy continues to press vigorously for the purchase of POSEIDON from us in place of the Super Antelope up-grading of the UK POLARIS force We can expect requests from HMG either for still further assistance on the Super Antelope program or for the outright purchase of the POSEIDON weapons system The working levels in State and Defense believe we should agree to assist HMG through the Engineering Development stage of Super Antelope and that we should not make any definitive response -- whether positive or negative -- to a British request for POSEIDON until we have completed a careful study of all the issues involved Certain provisions of the 1958-1959 Cooperation Agreements must be reviewed during the next 18 months and appropriate actions taken to renew renegotiate or terminate them TOP SECRET NODIS EPROOUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES ' «NC 4 ----------- TOP SECRET NODIS -3Article II covering the exchange of information will continue in effect beyond December 31 1974 unless one of the parties notifies the other prior to December 31 1973 of its intention to terminate the exchange program Article III covering the transfer of materials and equipment will expire at the end of 1974 unless positive steps are taken to renew it The State staff has already begun an intensive study of both the bilateral US-UK aspects of the problem and the multilateral pan-European implications Anglo-French nuclear Cooperation European nuclear force European defense posture -- conventional and nuclear -- through 1995 US defense relationships with Europe through 1995 etc of a decision to continue or terminate our special nuclear relationship with Britain Ambassador Johnson has sent a memo to Mr Kissinger informing him that Heath may raise certain nuclear questions with the President Attachment cc Johnson-Kissinger memo of January 30 · • ISP EUR NE - ·' J j p I J • 'Tf r -- · ·• 73 017 ·- ·---- TOP SECRET NODIS Drafted _ J f HGHandyside rg 21835 1 29 73 Clearances EUR NE - Mr Burns in draft J PM ISP - Mr Terrell 41 - EPROOUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES · ' • - I •• I I IODIS ftEVIEW ' ' - -' v-u E t ·Cat c-r· U 't · S Et -· r ' I · r• j• c·· l 1 I I t_ ui -- II JO _ ·roP SECRET SENSITI f V A SH If- - - I_ · --- ---- 730 756 - - ed 1 •J r d lo Q FADRC ---r-J 04 · - I · 1c- u Jft d b $ S • I •r C it C • C i -tk i 1 - uslody I1 r· · 0 N ' 't-- It_ • r --_ lieview-ed b y Din anuary9 ·-- ___ - '7 NODIS 'l • o e ·r- ect to 0 fJl f1R C - r T l lona1 accca 1 · 1 1 973 MEMORANDUM FOR MR HENRY A KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE CO •JES 'l'O EU i l FM Subject Possible Request from Prime Minister Heath for POSEIDON Over the past two weeks State and Defense have picked up a number of indications that Prime Minister Heath has decided to raise certain nuclear questions in his forthcoming meetings with the President and specifically that he may ask the President whether the US would be prepared to sell the POSEIDON missile system to the United Kingdom If Mr Heath in fact decides to raise the POSEIDON matter he will in all likelihood to avoid the danger of a premature rejection put it as a hypothetical question If we were to ask you to sell us POSEIDON Mr President what would your reply be In his January 18 letter to you Secretary LairG strongly urged that the US not make a commitment of any sort to the British should the latter make an approa8h at the White House level on POSEIDON This seems to me sensible for a variety of reasons and I should thArefore like to record here the Department of State's strong support for Mel Laird's recommendation We believe that it would not be desirable at this stage to give either an affirmative or a negative response to the UK on the sale of POSEIDON Any definitive response even to a hypothetical quest i un at this s- age would foreclose options we believe should be kept open up to another twelve to fourteen months There are two evolving situations which have a direct and immediate impact on the question of the sale of the POSEIDON system to the United Kingdom Both should be XGDS-·3 BY_S S-l · EPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES ' ' -------- TOP SECRJ 'l' SENS ITIVE NODIS -2allowed to develop naturally for roughly a year Only then after we are further into the transition will we be able to perceive the direction of evolution sufficiently to permit us to make sound and sensible recornmendatio s to the President on our future course First -- The controversy between the advocates of the Super Antelope route to the up-grading of the British strategic nuclear force and the partisans of POSEIDON is still going on within the British Government Although the Cabinet authorized the ·staff of the Ministry of Defense · to proceed with a number of long lead-time actions for the Super Antelope program it has made no final decision on the program and is now not expected to do so until April Meanwhile the Royal Navy continues at every opportunity to press for the purchase of POSEIDON t · · • · ·· According to the DOD technicians who are familiar with the British program Super Antelope is an imaginative new appro9 ch which successfully resolves the vulnerability hardening problem confronting the UK POLARIS force DOD's preliminary technical analysis suggests strongly that Super Antelope is -- from the British vie •1point -- by far the better system It is designed to meet precisely the strategic goals the British have set for themselves it could be on line two to three years sooner than POSEIDON it would be significantl less costly than POSEIDON and the required expenditures ould be- mad·e · 1argely within the UK ' arid spent ·through nuclear installations which the British wish to keep alive in any event So far however the internal maneuvering within HMG appears to have obscured these technical judgments and kept them from the Ministers If we were to provide a firm 11 yes 11 answer to a POSEIDON request at this stage we might halt the internal process of discovery in mid-passage Eventually however officials in the British Government could come to realize that as a result of our forthcomin g response on POSEIDON they had opted for a costly weapons system that was something less than the optimum solution to their problem If we were not very careful in presenting our response our decision to sell POSEIDON could be represented as a commercial coup for the US that had signif ica ntly aggravated the UK's Balance of Payments proble m TOP SECRET SENSITIVE NODIS EPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES _ ·- - • • •• On the other hand we believe the likelihood is great that HMG will reach a sound decision if the Super Antelope POSEIDON debate continues through to the end Clearly it is very much to our advantage to await that conclusion Meanwhile we can profitably use this interval to weigh the substantial contribution to our own Balance of Payments position which the sale of POSEIDON would represent against the undesirable effects of the release of this sophisticated weapons technology Second -- The sale of POSEIDON to the UK could adversely affect our eff6rts to achieve a SALT Two agreement with the Soviet Union While the Super Antelope up-grading of the UK POLARIS force could be kept secret the sale of POSEIDON would for technical re J sons ultimately become public knowledge The sale would be regarded by many as MIRV proliferation and would almost certainly be portrayed by some as a step-up in the arms race Many vocal observers private citizens and Members of Congress alike -- would make no secret of their unhappiness Other legislators particul2 rly several members of the cToint Committee on l-- tomic Energy would vigorously oppose the transfer of our POSEIDON technology to the UK Moreover the conclusion of a POSEIDON Sales Agreement might well set off another round of the Executive Branch Legislative Branch quarrel over treaties and executive agreements ' • · · Finally the sale of POSEIDON to the UK would clearly c6nstitu£e the tiarisfer of an off n i siri egfc riuclear system and as such would directly affect the SALT nontransfer question Whether or not the Soviets would react vigorously against such a decision by the US they would undoubtedly intensify their insistence on their askingprice for an agreement on strategic offensive systems We have up to now taken · the position with the Soviets that we will not accept any non-transfer provision until we c a n see the outline of a total offensive arms limitation package Until we have a much clearer appreciation of the kind of agreement we might be· able to r uch with the Soviets it would not appear desirable to for e close at this stage any of the options that are open to us A firm commitment now to the UK to sell POSEIDON would do just that Equally important -- looking at the problem from the opposite vantage point -- a definite 11 no 11 answer to a POSEIDON request would also produ ce adverse results Many in Britain would resent our refusQl to make one of our sophisticated modern weapons avail ble to such a close and long --t ime ally and would question whethe r the special TOP SECRET SENSI'l'IVE NODIS EPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES -- - · · ·4- relutionship ·which has ex st cd for so 1 on J between us had been terminated by US fiat Moreover it is conceivabl even though not o likely tha circumstances might arise over the next year or so that would argue in favor of the maximum possible expansion and improvement of the British strategic deterrent All these considerations argue strongly for the most careful and thorough study of the full range of issues and rRmifications before we reach either a negative or a positive decision on selling the POSEIDON missile system to th British •rhus a warm sympathetic but noncommittal response to a Heath request for POSEIDON would seem to best advance US interests at this point Accordingly we would urge this course upon the President JJ 24i M a 1 O A __ exis 1ttohns-ofi 1 Attachment Laird-Kissinger letter of January 18 __ - • ' • • · • - - · · •· · TOP SECRET SENSITIV3 NODIS · ' - · F IGio UGlEO AT THE NA'l IONAL ARGlHIVES - l I 18 JAN 1973 Honorable Henry A Kissinger Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Executive Office of the President Washington D C 20500 Dear Henry There are some potential developments in connection with the British Polaris_ Improvement Program _o f vhich you should be a1 1are In brief sum ary the UK Ministers are presently considering several possible alternatives regarding updating their se -based deterrent Continue the Super Antelope Progr m for improving their Polaris Ask the U S to sell Poseidon Ask the U S to sell a Poseidon hybrid The lattijr two of these alternatives c2nnot be consi lered seriously without having an idea of the po·siti0n tl e U S rni9ht take le understand that in consequence Lhert is a hlgh probc ility of i high pclitlc il 1c' 'e1 approach to e plore our vie · on this point in the very near future We have been unable to ascertain specifically where or when but understznd further that the approach could be made directly to the White House during · '· P r·i me Mh1 is te r · He-a th 1-s vi s H in early F_e br u r Y • ' - ·· - · · · · · · · ·· - - ' · ·- - As you know we have been assisting the U K in the Project Definition Phase of the Polaris Improvement Program generally referred to as Super Antelope This phase is essentially complete now and the results have been submitted to the Ministers for decision as to the next course of action r have had a request from Lord Carrington to continue our assistance on the program during tl1c period of Ministerial deliberation approximately through March 1973 to avoid a disruption in the program should they decide to go ahead I have agreed to such a continuation with the proviso that it does not constitute a ommit c t y the U S to support any follo -on Engjneering Development phase · t 'l '' •j i Sue t l t I I ES ' C J it 1r ¥- o 1 n s TOP ··--- ------ l' ' -r• 'l-' r · 1 ·· I •- _I • ' _ • Sf 101T1' C L ' I i _ I• i Qt JQEO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 2 The intent of Super Antelope is the development of an improved re-entry systcr 1 for the 81·itish PoLJris A-3 missile to provicl a better cc ipability to penetrate defenses The sche 1 1e requires a major redesign of the reentry system and includes hardening the reentry vehicles to nuclear effects and provision of exo2tmosphcric decoys While the official British position has been consistently that of wanting to improve their Polaris A-3T missile in this manner the Royal Navy has advocated a different course They wish to abandon Polaris nnd replace it with Poseidon or more recently with perhaps a hybrid version of Poseidon which wi 1 l be described below Their rationale is not over convincing -t e case being based p imarily upon how bnd and expensive things might beco e if the u · S were to disc6nti·nuc de 16yme t of Polaris and they are left to go it alone Their studies seem to ignore almosc completely the avai labi 1 i ty of surplus· Polaris ·cor 1 po·nents as •1e make the transition · to Poseidon and do not make equivalent assumptions in estimating cost of Polaris upkeep compared to Poseidon They cite also an improvement in range capobil ity which would amount to approximately 250 NM in the case of Poseidon with ten RVs compared to their Polaris · - Recognizing the possible difficulties associated with a request to purchase the l'ilH 1-·c 2 ile Poseidon they the Roy Jl t-l2vy have recently begun to build up cnthusios n for a hybrid version of Poseidon in vhich their improv d Super Antelope reentry system wot1ld be placed upon the Poseidon in lieu of the U S Poscic on r ultiplc RVs They secr i·to view this as a means of avoiding the MIRV problem I do not believe that it does however since the hybrid sti 11 would require the MIRV-capable bus and would be capable of _ carrying a MIRV payload ·· ' • ·· · • · _ _ i - ·· ·· •··· • The bus is an inherent part of Poseidon and any attempt to 1 cc le-MIRV it would be either relatively simple to undo or else be so major as to constitute essentially a new and different missile requiring n major development test program The latter alternative probably would vitiate the reasoning o hich led the Ministers to allow the 11 hybrid 11 as one of the alternatives to be considered - - ·••f ' - •• · ·• ' ' ' For the U S the issue W face is h'hcther supplying a MIRV capability to the British is in our overal 1 best interests This issue is complex wi ·th both do 1cstic · 2nd for eign ir 1p ic a ti6n·s · For ·the s·r·i ti 's-h _ fh0 issues include 2 judc Ci - nt on 1·1hcthcr they actually need on their O ·Jn a Copability to pcnetru c a-defended target 1 ike Moscow a jud crncnt on whether this could be achieved best by Sup r Antelope or Poseidon and the cost irnplicutions of the several alternatives I - -· • • - • • ·- I r ' -- - · - C _ · _ • --c __ _ _ __ 3 Because of the complexity and serious nature of the question I •have cons ti tutcd a spcci l study effort within DOD for its assessment and am asking Bi 11 Rogers to appoint a member to partic pJte We intend to give you at least a p1·climinary recom endation by the end of January If the British make an approach of this nature at the Hhitc House level before 1·1c have forwarded our recommendations I stron9ly urge they not be given a commitment of any sort but rather that they be told we wi 11 take it under advisement Sincerely ' - · · • · i • • • _ ' · ' • • • · - - • • j - • •• • •• • - • • •• •• - Ir ·- -- _ _ • I · • • • • -'· •• ••r • I' •· · ••· · _ · · · ·- __ __ '