Completely Outside System MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 'TOP SEGRE'il SENSITIVE URGENT ACTION May 24 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR DR KISSINGER r t FROM £ c47 Cc_ u u7a r Phil Odeen Hal Sonnenfeld1 U K Questions on Polaris SUBJECT In London the U K raised a number of questions on the options for upgrading their Polaris force They presented several of these questions in the form of a short paper and others arose during the discussion Our earlier memo on these questions and the U K papers are at Tabs B and C You promised a U S response to the U K questions within two weeks We have prepared a paper which responds to the questions raised by the U K Tab A The paper discusses in some detail the U K assessment of the Soviet ABM which we found to be misleading Their assessment appeared written to justify a Super Antelope conclusion _ and our paper tries to provide a more balanced view The paper was reviewed by Jim Schlesinger and his comments are incorporated Since the U K Antelope in the development of request sale of may decide between the Poseidon and the Super next few weeks we need to turn our attention to a game plan for handling the U K request If they Poseidon we wil need Presidential determination to sell MK III re-entry vehicle under the Atomic Energy Act which is then submitted to the Congress Consultations with the Joint Committee Key members include Pastore Jackson Price Anderson and Holifield and we would probably want to advise them in advance of the determinations 5 E'OP 0ECRE'f 3ENSITIVE DECLASSIFIED E O 129 ii '' p • ·l j t 3 S IJL By 01 ji - 3 bl 1 ¼ -Jr 1 f g a w ' t ifi · 1 xtc _s tJ 0 -p toflt 2 'fOP SEGRE'J SENSITIVE An Executive Agreement stating the sale is pursuant to Article IV of the Polaris Sales Agreement This would not require any Congressional approval Allied and Soviet consultations If they request continued assistance on Super Antelope or sale of Poseidon boosters for STAG we will face similar requirements In any case we will need to be extremely cautious and urge the tightest secrecy on the U K so as to avoid leaks before or during the Brezhnev visit J -r- We have recently learned that the OSD official who handles the U K Polaris Poseidon matters G R Barse has been talking extensively to the U K on this subject He has previously told them that the U S would never sell Poseidon to the U K and last Friday announced to a meeting of U S and U K technical officials that the White House was preoccupied with W-atergate- and has de-legated 11 full responsibility for this matter to OSD meaning him Such irresponsible talk is disturbing and we recommend you Tell Sikes and Cromer to ignore Bars e and suggest their people avoid him unless absolutely necessary Mention these incidents to Jim Schlesinger or Bill Clements and suggest they get some discipline in their staff on such matters 'fOr' SECRE'f SENSITIVE 1'_ l I • May 24 1973 C055 9 417 6 ·sANiTIZED COPY - n OFFICE FILES-63-4-1-5 - This paper responds to further questions raised in ou r continuing d i scu ssions regarding your r equest for US support and assistance in This paper responds to further questions riased in our continuing mai ntaining the credibility of the UK FBM force discussions regarding yoti r request for US support and assistance in A ssess_m ent of Russian ABM Def_e nse maintaining the credibility of the UK FBM force I 1 W e b elieve y ou mi s c on s t rued Dr S cJ ilesin ger' s r emar k that the As s·essment of Russian A BM Defense We believe you mfoconstru_e d Dr Schlesinger·•s _remark that the _ J UK deterrent might lack credibility 1n·three to four ye_a rs 11 The US does· not b _e lieve· and his ever suggested th _-t terminal ABM -defense comparable · 2 penetrability of the POSEIDON MK-III re-entry system is ·evident evident One might be led to b elieve that against ABM If this is intended in the dis cussi on l es s capable tha n SPRINT SUP ER ANTELOPE and POSEIDON in paragraphs 1-7 of your paper we would disagree are of equa l effectiveness a w N t- z Cf The implica tion of your discussion is that the Soyiets must penetrability of the POSEIPON MK-III re entry system is SUPER ANTELOPE and POSEIDON are of equal effectiveness SA IT ZED -- -pe ' ° b 1 J d e ploy an ABM comparable to the US SPRINT befo re the superior On mi ght be led to be i v -e t h t - - fo the US SPRIN I I Soviet If this i s inte11 ded in the discussion in p a ragra phs _1 7 of your paper _ we would disa gr·ee 3 The p ·enetrati n ca p ability of British missiles employing the SUP j R ANTELOP·E concept 3 The pe_n etration capabil ity _of British mis s iles employing the SUPER · ANTELOPE concept could be threatened within a f°ew years by Soviet ABM developments Any a£ a numbe r of _possible developrn ents co ld SANITIZED COPY C0S 5941 76 · SANITIZED COPY •· - ---· - FICE FILES-63-4-1-5 SANITIZED COPY - 2 - - 2 - this about As we understand it the SUPER ANTELOPE concept bring this ·about As we understand it the SUPER ANTELOPE is predicated on the assumption that credible exoabnospheric concept-is predicated on the aBBUillption that credibl e exoatmospheric penetration aids can be deployed from a modified POLARIS missile penetration aids can be deployed from These penetration aids together with planned hardening These penetra tion aids together with planned hardening of of t h e RVs · a r e intended to exact an exchange ratio _of several ·' a modified POLARIS missile the RVs are intended to exact_ an exchange ratio of sever al for each POLARIS SUPER ANTELOPE GALOSH int_e rcepto rs for each J OLARIS SUPER ANTELO PE missile as compared to the expected one-to-one ratio of the existing POLARIS missile as ·compa ed to the expected ·o e to-on·e ratio ofthe Achievement of this increased exchange ratio existi ng POLARIS Achievement of this increased exchange ratio is dependent on 1 the credibility Of the penetration aids in simulating is dependent on 1 the credibility of the penetration aids in simuthe re - entry body signature and 2 their continuing credibility · lating the re-entry body s ignatu·r e and 2 their continuing· credibility to an altitude comparable to the commit altitude of the ABM interceptor Relatively simple modifications to the GALoSH missile to 'inccirporatc a ' 'loiter capability or substitution of ah ABM interceP tor with higher _a cc eleration than ·GALOSH but in - · no sen i'e compara ble to ·SPRINT co u ld allow the coiµ mi_t time to be delayed until atmo s pheric fi_ltering had negated the effect of the p enetra tion aid 0 LLJ The US b e Heve$ s u h'impr vements in USSR ABM N capa bilit_y are feasible_within a few years z that surface-to - air missiles c 9uld fe sibty ·b e upgraded to J SAN TIZED COPY The U S also believes SANITIZED COPY SANITIZED COPY - 3 - 3 • aids In addition improvements in Sovi-et ABM sensor technology better radar dis rirnination or use of IR sensors could iegate the effectiveness of·SUPER ANT ELO_PE penetration aids 4 4 The above cited modifications and upgrades are less technically demanding_than a SPRIN' 1'-type system and for _that · - eason are judged as more Iikelyin the near term In· some cases e g improved radar_·a scrimination ofdecoysJ Soviet ABM capabilities are_ dependent on factors such as computer capability and software SANITIZ_l i 9 s3l' '-o f-1 o - _ - I In all of these cases the POSEIDON MK-III re-entry system provides high confidence penetration 0£ the postulated ABM d e f e n s e _SANITIZ D 0 3 u'b t2Y4 s i w N 1- POSEIDON MK-III re-ent i y vehicle_ is less visible to radar and 4 re-enters at substantially higher velocity · z This compresses the time available for detection tracking launch and intercept the time available for detection tracking launch and intercept increasing the likelihood o £ penetration of the MK-Ill last feature is This of importance in _consideration of SAM upgrade where large numbers of _interceptors with _marginai ABM capabilitycould be deployed ·1 SANITIZED COPY C0559417 ·--· · ·-· ·ICE FJLES-63-4-1-5 SANITIZED COPY SANITIZED COPY - 4 - - 4 5 The US fully endorses the statement in paragraph 7 of the British 5 The US fully endorses the statement in paragraph 7 of the British paper that the only high confidence tactic for penetrating ABM defen ses is by providing mo e incoming warheads than the number of defensive missiles The US believes that penetration aids are ANITIZE s Yb' 4't The US believes that penetration aids are invariably sensitive to technical details of the design of enemy ABM defenses Since some of these technical haracteristics may· never be known with - ce dainty one cannot have high confi°dence that J enetration aids will permit successful penetration of enemy ABM defenses 6 In addition to the general comm_e nts above there are a few 6 specific areas whe re we may- not have made ourselves sufficiently specific areas where we may not·have made ourselves sufficiently clear during the Marc h di s cu s s ion _s • 7 In addition to the general comments above there are a few clear during the March disC ussions 7 In ·paragraph 3 lines 7-9 you state there is no evidence of t_h e 11 enti cly ne w a·dar system that a terminal d fense would 0 w _require 1- system would be required for a termina l ABM ·we believe en existing radars in particular the new one s· under development N z 11 ' The tJS· did not indic ate that an entirely ne_w radar · could in fact be used as part 0£ a t rminal ·ABM We _d id state in March SANITf _·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - 1 pefi -3 1 i ' But this latter poir t is irrelevent SANITIZED COPY C _ - - FICE FILES-63-4-1-5 SANITIZED COPY r SANITIZED COPY j - 5 - - 5to considerations of terminal ABM defense since chaff does not to considerations of terminal ABM defense since chaff does not penetrate the atmosphere penetrate the atmosphere 8 8 Your suggestion in paragraph 4 that it ·would take the_ Soviets 12 years to develop a SPRINT -like system is not felt to be appropriate The 12 years expended fo-r the US SP_RINT develop- rnent -_was due largely to_non-technical £actors 5uch as changiI g · p rograin _goals· _exl niled policy deliberations and fiscal constrai ts Most US projections of Soviet force s anticipate Soviet -capability SAN 112 ED to deploy a SPRINT-like syste ' 9- '----- We note that the sea 0 operating room question was not addressed - - -- - fV' - 3 1 ' 1 1 9 _ We note that the sea-operating room question was not addressed This was thought by us to be of concern to you if you implemented This _was thought by us to be of ·concer n to you if you implemented the SUPER ANTELOPE program -·calcu lations disc us-sed in the the SUPER ANT ELOPE pl'ogram Calculations discussed_·in the February meeting showed that the POSEIDON MK-III p _a yload 0 w N t z Februa ry ·m _e ti ng showed tha t the POSEIDON MK-III payload provided a f ctor of 3 greater operational room over the SUPER provided a factor _of 3 greater operational room over the SUP ER ANTELOPE option As we under·stood the STAG program the ANTELOPE option range of the SUPER ANTELOPE - type payload on _POSEIDON As w understood the STAG pro_g ram th ·range of the SUPER ANT ELO i E type payload on POSEIDON would provide about the same range as the current POLARIS would provide_about the same r ange a s the current POLARIS Soviet ASW advances might m ke this is-s ue _as important as the ABM upgrade issue J SANlTiZED COPY C05594 17 6 ··-·· ' FICE FILES-63-4-1-5 - 6 - I Maintenance Support for POLARIS and POSEIDON Missiles - 6 10 The US affirms that the assumptions stated in paragraph 8 of the British pa peT are consistent with current US planning Maintenance Support for POLARIS and POSEIDON Missiles We now 10 plan to replace the 10 older POLARIS submarines with TRIDENT submarines begill' ing in the late 1970' s would be phased out by 1982 or 1983 The US affirms that the assumptiong stated in paragraph 8 of the British paper are GOnsistent with current US planning All POLARIS submarines We now plan to replace the 10 older POLARIS submarines with TRIDENT There is of course the submarines beginning in the late 1970's possibility of retaining P LARIS beyond that date if the TRIDENT would bQ phased out ·by 1982_or_ 1983 program is significantly delayed or a decision is made to expand All POLARIS submarines There is _ of cou i se the possibility- of retaining _P OLARIS- beyond that date if th TRIDENT our strategic forces or phasedown land-based systems prog i am -is significantly delayed or a d_e cision is made to expand · u The US now plans to retain POSEIDON in the force for the indefinite future our strategic forces or phasedown land-based syste ms The US may deploy the TRIDENT I missile l'l The US now plans to retain POSEIDON in the force for the in some of its POSEIDON submarines but it does not envision indefinite future ·The US may deploy the TRIDENT I missile that all 31 POSEIDON submarines would carry TRIDENT I in some of its POS E IDON submarines but i t does not envision that all 31 POSEIDON s ubmarines would carry TRIDENT I POSEIDON Procurement Under the POLARIS Sales Agreement 12 _POSEIDON Procurement Under the POLARIS Sale s Agree _ent The US has examined the POLARIS Sales Agreement and is of the opinion tha_t Article IV provides sufficient authority for the sale of the POSEIDON Weapon System less warheads to the UK The US ha s examin ed the POLARIS Sales Agreement and is of the The opinio n_that Article IV provides sufficient authority for the sale US is prepared to so interpret and apply Article IV to this end the POSEIDON Weapon System less warheads to the UK should the British so request _ US is prepared to so inter p t and pply Article IV to this end should f h_e British· so request IJ ' The of C05594l76 -- •n - FICE FILES-63-4-1-5 - 7 - - 7 - Availability of MK-III RV Technology 13 Availability of The President is authorized to make a statutory determination 13 to off er sale· of restricted data design information and hardware MK-III RV Technology The President is_ authorized to make a · statutory determinatipn _to offer sale of restricte_d data design·information and hardware for the POSEIDON MK-III RV to the UK under the Atomic Energy for the POSEIDON MK-III RV to the UK under the Atomic Energy Act The Preside nt is required to notify the Congress of such Act ·The·· President is require_d to notify the Congress of such· determination and unless disapproved by a Conc urrent Resolution determination and unles s disapproved by a ·c_oncurrent Resolution the dete r mination i s aut orp atically approved aft er 60 working days the _d_etermination is automatically approved afte_r· 60 working days e l apse The Joint Committee 6n Atomic Ener gy can waive thi s elapse J he Joint Committee on Atomic Energy can · aive this wai ting peri od We would anticipate approval waiting period POSEIDON Production Status 14 We would anticipate approval POSEIDON Production Status The US will make its final procurement of many components of 14 The US will make its final_procurement of m _a ny _c omponents of P OSEIDON missiles and weapon system • equipments in _J u ly and POSEIDON missiles and weapon system equipments in July and August of 197 3 August of 1973 Over the next year or two US POSEIDON production lines will begin to shut down The earliest and most Over the next year or two US POSEIDON important production line involves critical components for the - production lines will begin to shut down The earliest and most important production line involves critical comp_o nents for the MK - Ill RV and will start to shut down in September 1973 · MK-ill RV and 0 As we wfll star to shut down in September 1973 9 meeting As we stressed in the March 9 meeting delay of a request for POSEIDON stressed in the March beyond September will result in increasing costs in reestablishing beyond September will result in increasing costs _in eestablishlng production lines_ prod ction lines ·' ·- delay of a requ_est f r POSEIDON · C0 5 594 1 7 6 _ · · -• • -FICE FILES-63-4-1 -5 - 8 - - 8 - Impact of Strategic Arms Agreements 15 The US does not anticipate that possible US Soviet strategic arms Impact of -Strategic Arms Agreements 15 l imitations w i ll impact any of the UK options We have rejected Soviet demands for a ban on transfer of str·ategic offensive weapon The US does not anticipate that -possible US Soviet strategic arms limitations will impact any of the UK c i tions Sovie t demands for systems a We have rejected ban on tr' ns fer of s trategic offensive weapon We are not proposing limitations on SLBM MIRVs s ys tems • We a re not proposing Further we d o not anticipate i taticins on SLBM MIRVs a comprehensive test ban which · would preclude UK devel pment and test of a MK- III type warhead Further we do not antidpate a comprehensive test ban which · would precl de UK development ·and test of a MK-Ill ype warhead for POSEIDON Ior POSEIDON ·-