SANITIZED THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON D C 20505 June 28 19 73 PERSONAL MEMORANDUM FOR DR HENRY KISSINGER In response to Brent Scowcroft' s note of June 26 1973 the attachment suggests some points you may wish to cover th Lord Cromer fiJ a R Schlesinger Attachment Discussion Points on UK FBM Upgrade Options TS Sensitive SANITIZED -pa- 60 Use J O'g SANITIZED pei-- '50llse 4c 3 g Discussion Points on UK FBM Upgrade Options 1 In earlier meetings covering the period from August 1972 through May 1973 the US stated that only de-WRV'd capability was being offered in the assistance options 2 The UK stated that a MIRV capability was not desired in any case since the deterrent capability desired by the UK was only that of an assured penetration of the Moscow NCA ABM system US analysts noted that a single FBM boat with de-l 1IRV'd POSEIDON or ULMS-1 missiles equipped with suitable MK3 warhead RV bodies would provide such a credible deterrent through a high confidence of exhausting that defense 3 The US in SALT II rejected the inclusion of both a ban on SLBM MIRV systems and on the transfer of strategic offensive systems in any SAL T treaty Yet since a de-MIRV'd POSEIDON or ULMS-1 missile would meet the UK stated need there would be significant difficulty in defending a US decision to provide at this time a MIRV capability to the UK The critics both within and without the US Government regard MIRV as a capability particularly prejudicial to long-terms arms control possibilities Given the Soviet proposals in SALT II and the almost certain difficulties noted above a debate on this subject would now be inimical to the US negotiating position 4 At this time we therefore believe that the UK should only consider the range of upgrade options offered in our past discussions It is technically possible to refit a MIRV capability into both missiles if at some future date this was thought necessary or desirable by our governments SANITIZED 'SOllsc-ws gJ _b3 1 j sJ