NLF MR CaSe No 0 --o4 No #'J _ 1E iORANDU N1 Outside Sy s te n NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL --S - ' GRET SEI14SITIVE EYES ONTLY_ ACTION January 27 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM A Denis Clift SUBJECT WILSON VISIT -- US-UK Defense Cooperation The memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab I would forward background information and talking points for his meetings with Prime Minister Wilson on the following subjects -- Super Antelope - UK Polaris Improvement - - US-UK Nuclear Consultations -- Mildenhall Agreement on Consultations regarding French -- Diego Garcia It is our understanding that Wilson will wish to confirm the Mildenhall Agreement in his talks with the President State memorandum at Tab II The President in turn has the opportunity to seek U K confirmation of the February 1974 US- UK understanding on Diego Garcia This memorandum supplements the overall talking paper for the Wilson visit forwarded on January 25 RECOMMENDATION That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I SENSITIVE EYES ONLY XGDS FROM 41 F UWMW NiEMORANDTJM Outside System THE WH1TE' HOUSE 1 VASHINGT0N P- SENSITIVE INFORMATION DECLASSIFIED 1352'5 ap a ncied SIRG 3 wa sd dH-o - - Alb MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT oaE t ay oz t Slsloq o s a asiri FROM In the field of US-UK defens-e cooperation and in particular nuclear weapons cooperat on we have several'understan di ngs' with Great-Britain involving th UK Polaris irnproverneht program US -UK _consultation on the use of nuclear weapons US-UK consultations on nuclear contacts with the French - and an understanding on U b use ot Diego czar cza e You and Prime Minister Wilson'should_ touch -briefly on fhe_s-e is sues to confirm the satisfaction of both s-ides with the existing-at r-an ements and to 'Lyain reaffirmation- fr-om the Wilson Government of the private under standing regarding Diego Garcia Polaris-Super Antelope For cos-t- rearsons _ the-British under former Prime Minister Heath took the decision at the end of 1g7' to proceed with improve-ments-to their Pola-ris system rather than switching to the Poseidon system _ Super Antelope is t1ie complex warhead and penetration aids systern being developed by the British lot their Polaris SLBMs It involves two specially hardened Polaris RVs and a package of penetration aids 2 0 replica decoys- designed to -lookLike many incorning RVe to enemy ABM radars - The stated obj ective of Super Antelope is to assure Br t sI penetration of the Moscow ABM complex in an extreme o it alone s'cenario_ Super Antelope is lrnited to provision of test support and end to modifying missile to acceptthe Polaris re st''of the shipboard weapon 'systezi and the the new British built front end The Uo S role U S technical experts who part icipated in the joint US-UK design review found the British designs to be quite coxi plex and cost esti-ih'ates overly ambitious For -this reason we have-been- concerned that a U S decision SENSITIVE JP SENSITIVE to support the British in Super Antelope not appear to be -an endorsement of the British decision or of their estimates lest we be implicated in the almost inevitable problems that will arise Of particular concern are them logistics problems which would result from British deployment of a unique missile system in contrast to the current situation where the commonality of U S and British -SLBMs permits them to depend on the U S for logistics support Thus when the U S responded to Heath'-s January 1974 request for U So assistance in the full development-of Su-per Antelope the President's message noted that innovative aspects of the project may pose problems in order to put the onus for success or failure clearly on the- British However we are continuing-to assist the UK on Super Antelope On January 9 1975 Thou wrote Prime US-UK Nuclear Consultation Minister Wilson copy of 1-etter at Tab A to confirm that the Memorandum of Understandings-on-consultations b e tween our two G ov ernmentsirg d tan°s'iLatio on the use of nuclear weapons remains fully in e The memorandum provides generally for consultations with the British before any U S use of nuclear weapons- and- specifically fore a dvar_ce consultations before nuclear' weapons are used by' U Se forces operating from U K bases or territorial waters Mildenhall Agreement - -On August 3 - 1 969 President Nixon and Prime Minister Wilson discussed-the possibility of nuclear weapons cooperation The resulting agr eement has two parts -- First that the United States and Great-Britain will keep each other fully informed of any contacts with the French on nuclear defense cooperation -- Second and less firmly that w e will harmonize any contacts with the French on this subject so that -due regard is giveen--to Alliance cohesion NATO institutions such as the Nuclear Planning Group and the hope that France will return in due course to full cooperation in NATO purin Z Prime Minister Wilson's visit here the'-Brit ish -wish- to reaffirm this understanding particularly with respect to the undertaking to keep each other informed After doing so we will work out channels to inform the British of some of our post Martinique contacts with France Phbttocopy G6 tald R Ford Libr6ry L SENSITIVE Diego Garcia The official position taken by the Wilson Government on U S use of Diego Garcia is that the UK Government has agreed to proposals made by the United States for a relatively modest expansion of the facilities on the Island of Diego Garcia which the U So enjoys jointly with the U K under an existing agreement U S use of the facilities other than for routine purposes will be a matter for joint decision by the two governments In February 1974 'President Nixon and Prime Minister Heath exchanged letters copies of correspondence at Tab B in which the British Prime Minister said that he would give his personal and sympathetic consideration to any proposal which the President might make to use the Diego Garcia facilities in an unusual situation and he said that he would ensure that a very rapid response would be given - President Nixon stated his agreement-'with this understanding and gave -his assurance that- should such a need arise he would consult with the Prime Minister at the earliest possible stage This private understanding has not yet been reaffirmed with the- Wilson Government Your meeting with the Prime Minister presents a good opportunity to reach agreement on reaffirmation of the Diego Garcia under standing to The British nuclear deterrent makes _an improvement contribution the security of the West 2 I am pleased-that the UK'Defense Review has led to'the decision to maintain and improve your nuclear deterrent forceso 3 We are pleased to continue-to provide Polaris improvement assistande' - to you under the Super Antelope program US-UK Nuclear I welcomed your l etter of Decernber'-16 proposing that we confirm that 1 the US-UK Mem orandum of Understandings regarding Consultations on Nuclear Weapons 2 I was pleased to send you my reply of January 9 confirming that we regard the memorandum as remaining fully in effect 9P crr n XGDS SENSITIVE A SENSITIV E Mildenhall_ Agreement In connection with the close cooperation between our countries on the 1 entire range of nuclear issues I think it would-be valuable to reaffirm at this meeting our mutual intention to be guided by the Mildenhall Agreement in any contacts we have tivith the French on nuclear cooperation The essential point of this agreement is that we will each keep the other 20 fully informed of any discussions with the- French bearing-on nuclear defense questions In the course of this we w ill naturally seek to harmonize our approache-4to take account of our mutual interest n NATO and Atlantic cohesion 3 I believe an oral understanding between us on this- point should suffice If an exchange of left ers should be needed that can be handled at a lower_ level As to substance the French are interested in information of a technical ' 4 character on Soviet ABM defenses and missile guidance and- reliability We -are reviewing these fields and will dete--r ine later how we might meet - French interest m I appreciate the' continuing cooperation of your Government on Diego 1 -Garcia r 2 I will shortly be snaking a Pr esidential Determination'- - equ ire d by the Congress -- that will permit-the Department of Defense to- r-eprograrn some-$18 million in funds permitting- us--to-'proceed w ith the initial improve- ments at Diego Garcia 3 In February-1974 our predecess an agreement regarding U S - use of the-base facilities i e and sympathetic the British Prime Minister would give pe rsonal consideration to any proposal which the United States might -make to us e the bas e facilities -in an- unusual s ituation and would ensur e a very rapid response -to -such a request T SEI4SITIVE -- the U S President gave the assurance that should such a need arise he would plan on consulting with the Prime Minister in a positive spirit at the earliest possible stage I suggest that tive reaffirm this understanding in an exchange of 4 letters V -1 THE VI-JITE PIOU-S% 1'i ASII ING TO - 14' Janua ry 9 1975 Dear 1 ir Pr ime 1vlinister Thank you for your letter of Decerriber 16 1974 concerning the 1 1emora nd-arn of Understandings between our two Governments with regard to consultation on the use of nuclear weapons As you have noted these Under star_dings were last confirmed by an exchange of letters between Prime N11inister Heath and President i lixon on April 7 1971 and i -Ilay 4 1971 respectively In order to elixaina_te a possible ambiguity in the text of the Memorandum I agree to youZ proposal that paragraph three of the _NL iem orandum be amended as follows It should be noted that the agreement for joint decision by the President and the Prime IVSinister covers those United States Forces which would operate from land bases in the United Kingdom or in United Kingdorn terri- It follows torial w-aterss therefore that other United States forces i e those not operating from land bases in the United Kingdom or in -United Kingdom territorial waters would be covered only by the more general understandings referred to in paragraph 2 above Te_ C 'T Cn photocopy irorn G6rald R Ford Library t z 'I am enclosing the amended version of the Nfemorandurn am pleased to confirm that the United States Government -will regard the Memorandum of Understandings as remaining fully in effect The Right Honorable Harold 1Yilson Prime Minister London Enclosure phototopy frof G Id R Ford Librsry TSi OF Ul DERSTANDII GS VirITH THE RRITTS'Ci ON T -T Dn TTS1 '- BASES AN-D NULL-Ar 'a EAPO S The basic understanding is contained in the communique of 9 January 1952 covering the TrumanChurchill talks xeo Under arrangements made for the common defence the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom e_J We re-affirm the understanding that the use of these bases in an ter emergency would be a matter for joint decision by His Majesty's '7 Yx fas ' p' tAl M_ nr Government and the United States Government in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time Procedures --or carrying out this basic understanding were agreed upon in the Murphy-Dean Agreement of 7 June 1958 which was approved by the President and the Prime Minister 1 The covering document the Report to the President and the Prime Minister repeats almost literally the language of the Truman-Churchill communique 112 The basic understanding between the United Kingdom and United States Governments regarding the use of bases in the United Kingdom by United States forces provides that such use in an emergency shall be_a matter for joint decision by the two Governments in the light of the circumstances at the time Photowppy fPOf E Gerald R F6Yd Z There is a second more general understanding with the 3ritish that Y Ye will donsL'It With them before using nu clear weapons anywhere if poss ible The basic understanding on this point is contained in a nemorandLm of conversation of a meeting b etween the P resident a n d Eden on 9 March 1953 Eden had asked for an assurance of consultor tion by the President with tree Prime Minister prior to US use of any nuclear weapon He the President said that the United States would of coux se in the event of increased tension or the threat of war take every possible step to consult with Britain and our other allies The President re-affirmed this understanding when he wrote to the Prima Minister on 27 October 1960 in connection with the Holy Loch berthing With reference to the launching of missiles from US Polaris submarines I give you the following assurance -which of course is not intended to be used publicly In the event of an emergency such as increased tension or the threat of war the US vill take every possible step to consult with Britain and other allies re-affirms the assurance I gave Foreign Secretary 't'his Eden on 9 March 1953 This assurance is to be taken as-applying with respect to fleet ballistic missile submarines Poseidon equipped in the same manner and to the same extent a-s -with respect to Polaris submarines 3 It should be noted that the agreement for joint decision by the President F and the Prime Minister covers those United States forces which would operate from land bases in the United Kingdom or in United Kingdom territorial watersL It follows therefore that other United States forces i e those not operating from land bases in the United Kingdom or in United Kingdom territorial waters ould be covered only by the more general understanding referred to in paragraph 2 above phot copy fromGerald P Fc r i from Gerald R Ford Library