r · Dist approved by S S J Perey f pt CJRANDUM l-'AR'l'J Cl PAN'I'S OF COJ VER - A 'T' lON us The Secretary Assistant Secretary Ves t Ambas£ador Bre wsl r Minister Streator Peter Sommer 1 mb tssy N• t C ' 11 e r UK Francis Pym Secretary of State for De f 0nse Sir Frank Cooper Perman e nt Unde r Secr0t 1 y r- • 1D Michael Quinlan Deputy Under Secretary Po li cy and Programs MOD Roger Facer Private Secretary to the Secreta ry DATE PLACE - SUBJBCTS COPIES -- May 22 1979 Ministry of Def nce Conservative Cor imi tme nt to Defe nse NA'rO Issues TNF US Strategic Syste s SALT ABM MBFR UK's Nucl ea r Deterrent SALT III CTB Anti-Satellite Negotiations Arms Sal e s to China S D P S P NSC S S PM EUR T INR C S MS ACDA Conservative Commitment to Defense Pym said he was privileged the Secretary could visit the MOD and he personally wanted to emphasize the Conservative Party's anxieties over the growing Soviet threat and Britain's weakened defense posture The Conservatives are determined to do something positive As a first step the Conservatives had increased military pay which in some ways was only a minor achievement but i t did underline the Conservatives ' commitment to defense He added that the Conservatives however would be hard-pressed to improve substantially current defense programs because the UK economy is at zero growth The Secretary replied that he was pleased to be able to come to the MOD and the US is pleased with the Conservatives' strong commitment to defense SECRET NODIS RDS-1 3 5 22 86 DECLASSIFIED Authorit lJW l 't 7 MICROF M£D BY S i ' · -2- Close Cooperation Bctw cn Mini sters --- • - - - -· - · - - _ __ __ - ·-- · ·- --·- ··· - ·· - Pym said he look d forwar d to cooperating clos e ly with the s c cetary and Dr Brown and noted that he had emphasized this desire to Dr Brown l as t week at NA'rO The S - CrE tary said both governm nts should b enef i t from the cross-experie nce between Foreign and Defe ns e Minist0r s n calling that in a previous gove rnment tour he ha d work d close y wilh Dr Brown and this clos e worki ng rP l a t ion' ·hi p conti 1· ucd today The Secretary said he kn ew Pym cJnd Lord Carrington were close associates and this s hould pr ave helpful in integrating foreign and defe ns e polici e s i n the many areas where they o verlap A1 _ __L - ' - 1 ise Pro9_ra _a_ __l__ T_c_c n __ _ C ca c j n_ Defense Spending _ The Secretary said now that t he Allies had crossed the important watershed of approving the NA'l'O LTDP it was important that it be irnpl 0 mented Th re is a danger th t if we don't keep our energie s and stre ngths b e hind it it will falter and much good work will have been wast d Pym agreed that carrying it o ut is the hard part coo Gr said the biggPst probl e m impeding impl ementatio n is economic growth and this affe cts the UK's a s well as others' economies Cooper added there are competing demands and Defense Ministries had to make a clear prese ntation to their public on the thre at facing NATO The Secretary asked for UK views on the prospects of countries sticking to the 3 percent r e al tenn increase in defense budgets In stressing his newness to the job Pym said he had a hunch 3 percent was on the ambitious side but it was probably tagged about right i e it presented a challenge to countries Cooper added there is a tende ncy for countries to juggle figures in order to meet the 3 percent and said the 3 percent goal had served the added purpose of sharing knowledge about how countries price and prepare their budgets Quinlan emphasized from a political point of view the big countries must set a positive example and meet the 3 percent challenge without this the small countries couldn't hold the line The Secretary said the US knew it had to set the proper example the President himself and Dr Brown were all committed to the 3 percent but there was always a struggle with 0MB Pym emphasized the United Kingdom's determination to meet the 3 percent challenge but also referred to the UK's economic difficulties SECRET NOD IS -3- · The Secretary reme mbering his days as Secretary of the Army said he was afraid now as the n there were a lot v f positive noises about arms coope ration but rea l progress was slow He then asked are we makj ng progres s and what are the possibilities for co-production Pym o ine d arms cooperation was marvelous in theory but difficult to impleme nt The Europea ns shoul d be abl e to get together per ha · s within the E t C framewo rk and produce weapon systems for Europe but politica l con siderations made this impossible Cooper emphasized that the Allies must keep working at arms cooperation equipment costs are so high tha t countries must coopc rat0 Ministers are good at knocking h eads togeth e r whic h helps overcome certain military obstacles but inclustri al employment and financial considerations continue to block progress A few solid success e s would help Quinlan sa id the picture is not all dark and r eferred to the rece nt agreement among Europeans to co-produce t he Aim 9L Side winder missiles Cooper stressed that while the goals are laudible the British are under no illusions For example the FRG just bought some Lynx helicopters from the UK but certain countries are upset with this decision cooper implied that the next really big arms cooperation project on the European agenda is tactical combat aircraft The Secretary asked if the British foresaw any possibility of cooperative tank projects or is this too emotional an issue like tank guns Cooper repli ed t ha t someday the Allies should be able to cooperate on tanks whose chassis after all only repre sent b eefed-up automobiles However he did not foresee NATO standardizing on a single tank within his lifetime The Secretary said we should be able to do more in the area of ammunition and communications Quinlan replied that NATO has made progress in communications The Secretary indicated the us is acutely aware of our own particular arms cooperation responsibilities and the need to pursue vigorously this challenging problem which we all need to over come with a view to spending our defense monie s more efficiently Stock Levels Prepositioned Equipment and Infrastructure The Secretary said he was not up to date on the issue of stock levels but felt this was an area in which all the Allies could do better Quinlan replied that in theory NATO has agreed that each country should have 30 days of war supplies but some disagreement still exists over the basic question of what is an average day or consumption rates Quinlan indicated the unde rlying cause of this disagreement was differing views ··- -DECLASSIFIED - Authoril IJJ 9 la 't 1 SECRET NOD IS • · ··1 • • ' · · • • · •• • • • c• • • 'I - 4- pr-rhaps beca us e of divergent gGogrciphical situa ti ons ov r ¼hat kind of war it would be Cooper in agreeing th t countri es haven't done enough emphasized there are three fundamenta l guC' stions 1 wh a t kind of war 2 how long would it l ast rnd 3 how 1nany wp ir- ons w i 11 be use d up The S1 crC' tary said he was a s t rong pro1JrJnent of the US prepositioning more equipment i n Europe The US al so nrcdcd to enhance its airli f t capabi lity In this regard Quinlan said it was helpfu l tha t NATO h d agreed to a hi gher infrastructure ceil ing albeit l ow r th a n the one the UK and US had sui p rlcd with sp c i f ic provisions to build su port faciliti es fo r US reinforceme nts ' · J - _ ' ' The Secretary for s aw the Germans having problems accepting add itional mili ta ry facilities of any k i nd noting their procedures for Federal and in particular l ocal government ap £- roval are cumbe rsome the active environmental lobby also posed difficulties Cooper noted that the British were also ah ays under pressure from local German authorities anytime they contemplated changes in the FRG affecting UK military facilities Quinlan emphasized that requests associated with conventional fo r c e s while clearly less sensitive than the territorial is s ues rai 0 d by TNF put pressure on the Germans by forcing th0m to make decisions affecting their soil Pym added that Chancellor Schmidt in discussing TNF with the British had an almost emot ional attachment to the phrase German soil Theater Nuclear Forces Turning to TNF the Secretary said this is one of the major problems confronting the Alliance and we need to mobilize the necessary support for a decision this year to modernize Pym noted that the Germans are keen to have the High Level Group and the Special Group meet together this fall He felt we have not yet reached that stage and could not make collective decisions on arms control until there were specific technical options to discuss The Secretary agreed noting that it should be possible to complete the studies on the choices confronting the Allies within a reasonable time to include details on systems capabilities and stationing possibilities He saw a real problem with stationing ground-launched missiles on German soil He added the US would be reviewing these issues with Chancellor Schmidt in Washington on June 6 Pym said he had discussed the matter with Apel and they were basically in agreement However sites are a problem Can the Dutch be persuaded and the Belgians and Italians It was all uncertain and vague The Germans • -OF C'LASSIFiifo - SEC_RET NODIS Authorit IJ 42il J St- CHE'f NOD TS ·· · - · JSla 't 7 '· seem to favor putting them on the water The S0cretary agreed that Schmidt personally leans towards a water solution i e sea-launched missil es Coope r added tha t NF modernization was certainly the mo t formidnb le p r obl em facing NATO in 1979 yet in the f L-1al analysis ev e n after considering the arms control component it is individual nations that must make the hard politi cal decisions The German problem was compounded because they wanted to maintain the public stance o f b e i n g a non·-nuclcar pow r If the Germans accepted systc s tha t could hit the S- viet Union the Russians could make a counter claim that because of this acceptance of long range systcras Germany had now become a strategic targe t Cooper said that in fact Germa ny already is but the Soviets would use long range systems as a propaganda issue For stationing on the Continent that l ef t the Netherlands Belgium and Italy and Cooper personally would not bet on any of them • -5- DECLASSIFIED Authorit'IIJW ·• I ·- -- ' The Secretary acknowledging the problems 0rnphas i zed that since stationing was essentially a political issue that the Foreign Ministers must roll up their sleeves and come to grips with it Quinlan said there was a powerful temptation for political leaders to emphasize the arms control aspects The Secretary said arms control is a complement to adequate defense strength but i t is self-defeating to use arms control as a basis for modernization decisions The Secretary said he favo red pressing for a positive TNF modernization decision _ · __ at the political level and then proceedi ng to see how this decision fits in with arms control objectives Otherwise there would be no decision • Cooper said another complicating factor is the Ger ans don't want to be seen publicly as taking decisions contrary to their Ostpolitik yet the longer countries put off a decision the harder it becomes to make the right one particularly for countries with coalition governments In this regard the Secretary noted problems in the SPD and some elements of the CDU on this complicated TNF issue and hoped the Allies would be able to stick to their target and take a decision by the end of this year Cooper added before the German elections Pym agreed and said if we want eventually to include arms control measures we need to have something to bargain with US Strategic Systems The Secretary gave a rundown on US plans to modernize the three legs of the nuclear Triad He said we are improving the capabilities of our existing land-based ICBM's We are also developing a new ICBM system probably the MX noting however there are differing views over the size of the MX With respect to ground-launched systems the current issue is the basing mode which we have narrowed down to three alternatives • • · ·· · · •• I • •• • • t• · DECLASSIFIED ·-6- AuthorityAl 42 i J 't J He added spPcific r 0cormnen 1at i ons y ouJ d proba hly he s ent to the President within 3 to 4 wreks He doscr i b d the alt ernatives as multip e r 0J s · ca launchPd systems and mobile missi le l aunch r MX basing system ' ' • The Secretary noted that the Chiefs favonc d the multiple aim point alternative Tlie Soviets b0 j •1e such a syst m is illegnl under SAL T IJ r l i i11 inc i t t · c o nii i a l e nt of additional launchE -rs Furthc-·n iore this opt ion posed s e rious verification probh 1 1s and if the us oi-Jt0d for such a system t he Sovi c·ts coul d follow su it The Secretary said he found t he mobile missile la unchers ba sing syst e m the most attractive option because it addressed the inherent tension between survivability and verification 'fhis option cons i sted of trench es from 10 to 50 miles long which could be dug on USG properly in the West At the base of the trench was a railroad track on which a self-propell ed ve hicle containing the launcher could move up and down At mi le intervals there would be hardened shelters with s l ide back roofs It would take the launche r c1bout two mjnutes to move from one shelter statjon or l aunch point to another Satellites could locate the shelte rs which would be open under nonnal circumstances In a crisis they would be closed and with 10 minutes warning time the launcher could be moved 5 stations with 20 minutes warning time 10 stations and so on The Secretary in emphasizing that the President had not yet selected an option stressed this one appealed to him because i t was truly mobile survivable and verifiable Returning to modernization of the Triad the Secretary said we are upgrading the se a leg by placing new Trident I missiles on existing submarines by introducing the new Trident submarines and by developing the advanced Trident II missile for deployment on the new Trident submarines The Secretary added we would also be upgrading the air leg of the Triad by equipping our B-52 bombers with long-range cruise missiles He said it is a good balanced program but it will be hard t o explain to the American people why SALT does not erase the need to spend $30 billion on modernizing the nuclear Triad SECRET NOD IS • - 7Sl l T II - l Pym asked if SALT would be ratif ied by the 5 nate The secretary r eplied t hat it will be a t oush va ttl c - our hardest battle -- but we will conv ince the Srnatc of its merits and get it ratifi d once Lh e Sc ators are exposed to the t erms of the t reaty 'i'he S · re t a ry lldP rlined that SALT II cons tra ins the S0v i Pt s 1 n a nu be r of important ways P0 rh 1ps the Jnos t i1 · o ct-cP1t b -i ng the limits on m u ' ber of v arh eads o n str tc ic missil e s SS17s 18s and 19s This particular l im itation begins to come to grips with the Scvicts ' arlvant a JC'S in throw-weight and ref rese nl s a qu2 ntum 1 -i·1p forw 1 r0 S ALT II also restrains to one each t he nu r t c-r o- C ff· ¼· nd - i 1 c can be built giving a n advantage to the US since t he soviets currently have four new missiles un lcr deve l opment The sub-ceiling on number of mirved mi ss il e s al s o offers greater stability The reduct ion in missile launchers and heavy bombers f r om 2400 to 2250 is a step in the right direction and con cls the Soviets to do dWay with 250 missile launchers Some people c laim this means the Soviets will only be phasj n g out obsolescent syste ms but in reality they will be getting rid of systems equivalent to th e US and UK Polaris and Minut e Man II missiles The Secretary went on to say that verification ag re ements also represent a quantum jump forward especially when compared with the situa tion with or without SALT Without SALT the Soviets have the total right to impede national technical meansSALT II specifically prohibits telemetric encryption when it impede s verif i ca tion This banning of deliberate conce alment mea sures places us in a stronger position Furthermore SALT II gives us a good idea of the parameters of the Soviet strategic force structure and mak e s it e a sier for us to plan and structure our forces to cope with their major systems The Secretary said all of these represent important pluses and opined that honestly he cannot s ee any minuses Turning to what he called a European concern the Secretary emphasized that cruise missiles could not be deployed within the protocol period and thus SALT d oes no t constrain deployment of the se systems He emphasiz e d that when the three year protocol expires it would have to go back to Congress prior to being extended The Secretary said our job now is to lay out the rational e SECRET NOD IS t ' i t DECLASSIFIED - Authorir J $$ k't 7 -8- f or SALT making a convincing case to Cong r es s and t he A erican public Another important a spect whi ch mus t b e wciyhed is the political r epe rcussions o f the us Se nale not ratifying SALT Pym said SALT is a real a chi ev - P•ent t he Secre tary had made a powerful ca s e fo r SALT and h e look d fon ard to seeing it rat ified At th e s ome ti1 1e Pym added he ·as p erson l ly some o ha t n yst if ied over all the controversy associ ated with t I LT and asr e d the Secret 1ry if he cou ld expla i n it The Secretary said there are two f undament al r easons One an inherent distrust of the Sov i e ts -- a gut f ee l ing they can't be trusted and two concern ove r ver if ication issues The attack on verification co nta ins a l o t of sffioke - misleading information - and has c e ntered o n encryption of telemetry We have a good solu t ion to this problem The treaty bans all tel emetry tha t impedes verification and if there is a dispute it can be taken to the Standing Consultative Commission In the final analysis the President could renounce the tr aty in the unlikely event that the Standing Commiss i on could not resolve the dispute The Secretary added tha t lilOnitoring of Soviet military activitie s is a complicat e d subject one g• nuinely mysterious to most of the American people The s cretary added ve rification is further complicated by the loss of the Iranian sites but we are confident we can continue verifying Soviet activiti e s through a variety of national technical means Soviet Attitudes on ABM Systems ' cooper asked for the Secretary's views on future Soviet policy toward anti-ballistic missile systems The Secretary replied that he doubted the Soviets would go in for an improved ABM program adding the Soviet economy is not strong and they would prefer to spend money on offensive systems Pym then asked in which fields will the Soviets increase their efforts as a result of the limitations SALT places on their strategic capabilities The Secretary said he felt they would build up their sea capabilities an area in which they are inferior to the US and NATO and strengthen their conventional forces MBFR The Secretary said he saw advantages to be gained from MBFR Phase I reductions but Lord Carrington had been skeptical in yesterday's discussions Phase I SECRET NOD IS · • • • - · I • • I • • ·- I '•• DECLASSIFIED Authority Jtlp · • i k't Z -9- reductions would •·esult in the withdrawa l of 3-4 Soviet divisions and lOOC tanks a ste p j n the right direction although ad mitt« l y the Sovjets would be in a b e tter position to redepl oy withdrawn forces t o the c e ntral r egion The Secretary added an agreement on the data base would offer an import ant precede nt for Phase I I 'f e Se cretary - aid within t ' e cont P xt of pr eparing for t e Summit t 1e Soviets had suggested bi l at e rally to 1 he US -ome new i dea s for ' '- FR The US had brit fe d o u r A J l j r s the Rritish and Ge-nnilns in detail on our MBFR talks with the Soviets The Secretary emphasi 7cd we would continue to pursue YRFR through NATO in c l ose consultation wi h our Allies Quinlan s id the British were happy to hea r that the l S viewed data in the same vital way th ey clo The Secre - ary noted hat da t a docs not pose as sPrious a problem in r · ase I a s it would pose in Phase I I UK's Nuclear De terrent _ Pym returning to several of the previous topics said he US nuclear modernization program was very impres s ve the Conservative government would support SAL'r and the Secretary 1 s reassurances on the transfer of technology were most welcomed Pym implied the UK would need US support in selecting a follow-on to their own Polaris system The Secretary said the US would offe r continuing cooperation SALT would not limit the US ability to continue existing cooperation Pym sai d the Polaris follow-on decision was now coming into his purvi e w The Secretary then referred to the British problem with the use of the word necessarily in our non-circumvention statement He added we had reviewed it a aain at PM Callaghan's request and decided we needed theJword because it made clear that we would take into account the magnitude of the request but the overall language does not prohibit the transfer of technology Meanwhile we hope the British will go ahead preparing views on the Polaris and Vulcan and we will be ready to talk and be helpful He welcomed an eventual visit by a British group to discuss this subject The Secretary said our response to an eventual British request for cooperation would be positive and he would convey this message to Mr s Thatcher tomorrow SALT I I I The Secretary said we must soon start more intensive consultations on SALT I I I and reach a cl e ar understanding on objectives and the appropriate forum in which to discuss grey area systems whether in SALT I I I or another forum The Secretary emphasized that there are a cluster of questions - ·'t S _1- C Pl· T C_ J J s_ •• •• - ·· · _ -- ' ' -10- - · _ · · · - J -- - · _' associa t e d wi t h S l LT 111 whi c h m11s t be addressed Pym sai d it was his j r 1pr s sion that l he Grrman s fa vored ac j r r ssing grey ar0 a systuns in Sl l T I I I he had no v iuw of his own Coope r add0 d tha t SALT III will b e ve r y serious busin s s for the Eur0pcans Af t r a ll u ntil now SALT ncgotidtions h a d br e n mostly 1 j mi t c d t o d irect Soviet and US concerns Ile the n asked wh r- n s J 'f III negotiations would b e gin ' l'h e Sec r e t a r y aj d discussions contrasted lo n eg oti a t ion s shoul d egin s o on We need to 1cach a r eement o n ob j Pct i ves SALT J I ljsts four principl e s for SAT r J I I 1 further signif iCilnt reductions 2 qual i tativ e r c sl r a jn ts 3 ade - 1uate verification nd 4 enhanced sta b i lity of t he s t rategi c relationship The Secretary stres s e d the US is r eady · 0 begin discussions later this s ummer b e fore t he SALT ati fication process is comple ted it is no t too enrly lo get our ducks in order Coo p e r stressed t hrre is a growing realization that a large numbe r o f Sov i e t mi ssi l es are a direct menace to Europe he added t h e Eu r opean s are paying closer attention to Soviet the nt e r forc e s but European views about what to do are _ncither r at i o n a l nor so l id i f i 0 c P ehensive Test an The Secretary said he and Lord Carrington had gotten hung up on the question of how many national s e ismic stations should be located in the British Isles Ca r r ing t o n had explained the British probl e m -- the mone tary i mplications -- and the Secretary agree d that clearly t e n stations on a country the size of the British Isl e s was unreasonable The Secretary felt however the Sovi e ts would not settle for anything less than five UK stations He added perhaps a worthy idea was to have some of the commonwealth states like Australia and New Zealand accept a station The Secretary noted that yesterday Michael Palliser had suggested a formula allocating seismic stations in relation to each country's land mass The Secretary joked that under such a formula Britain would probably end up with only half a station Pym said a change in the rules at this stage would make it difficult to achi e ve agreement The Secretary underlined that we will be unde r pressure to make progress in the next CTB round which begins on June 4 because if we do not it is unlik e ly negotiations will be completed on time for the NPT Revi e w Conference The Secretary said the US will press the Soviets at the Summit to stop linking the number of seismic stations and the other remaining technical problems related to verification but he was not sanguine that the Soviets would budge Pym promised to discuss the se issue s with Lord Carrington Cooper asked if there would eventually be a threshold under the c•ra treaty The Secretary said the US would insist on limiting it to laboratory tests for a treaty of three years duration That is as far as we can honestly go in keeping - - -l U ' SIFH D - - I i Authon IJMi U SECRET NOD IS • ·'· • l · · - 1 1- the Joint Chiefs aboard and conside r i ng the re li abi l ity o f our nuclear stockpil e The Secretary re orled we are making progress in negotiations on anti-satellite systems and we are striving to r each an agr0ement in time for the Summit as a companion piece to SALT He doubted that this wou ld he pos sible but said there would be plus s fo r al l if we Cdn limit anti-satellite sy sLems The Chiefs he said f avor lase r experiments which the Soviets want to stop _§ales to Chill_ ' The Secretary raised arms sal es to the PRC not· ing that the US must keep an even balance in the way we d e al with the Soviet Union and China To do oth erwise would badly skew our foreign policy especial ly in gP o-politi cal terms Hence the US does not want to sell arms to either the Soviet Union or China which explains why we r0 s ist putting arms sales to China before COCOM The Sec r etary ad led this approach avoids forcing us to take a posit io n by voting no in COCOM on sales to China Pym said he understood why t h e US hoped to avoi d the issue but other Allies e g Germany for exact ly opposite reasons want COCOM to bless their arms sales to China Cooper described this appr oach as a n eed for countries to share the blame and sug ge sted the need for an extracurricular syste m outside of COCOM Cooper added that the Germans almost without anyone noticing had become a leading arms exporter and the y like d and needed the international cover of an organization like COCOM The Secretary acknowledged that we needed a solution meeting everyone's requirements and said he would talk privately to Foreign Minister Gen scher about i t next week in Brussels and then perhaps raise it at the Quadripartite meeting Vest recommended that we first sort out the German position before raising the issue in the Quadripartite forum Quinlan said the British did not want to ask the US to pull their chesnuts out of the fire but anything the Secre tary could do to promote a solution would be most appreciate d Press Guidance Pym said the Secretary's visit had b ee n interesting constructive and helpful The talks illustrated how much remains to be done and the enormous amount of effort the US had already devoted to resolving the probl ems The - -i ECLASSJFIF D - - SECRET NOD IS Aurhorit IJ J'y la - 't 7 • -12c c-c r c tary acknowledged that the prob ems are compl e x o rfr3ing Lhat they are also fascinati ng Pym s ajd Mini sters J d to duca te their publics on th e se i mportant i ss ues rhe e nvironmental lobby which he beli eved is on the upsw ing in Europe could frustrate governm nt actions -3 l tho ugh ns yet this loLby did not appe ar to be a ma jor problem in the UK The Secretary agreed that governme nts 1 ust expose their publics to the Soviet threat the puh li c s n eed to understand the nature of the thrPat In concludi ng the Se cretary and Py m agreed to li mit their remarks to the waiting press to they had revi e wed a variety of problems relating to NATO's conventional and nuclea r forces and other matters of mutual int erest -DECLASSJFij i - - IJ$ i a 'J Z Aurhorit SECRETLNODIS