Fet' SEGRE I SENSITIVE Outside the System ME1tORANDUM f 87 7'f NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFOPJ1ATION March 14 1980 MEMORANDUM FOR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ' _ JIM THOMSON l FROM SUBJECT · Meeting on UK Strategic Force Modernization March 17 1980 4 00 PM COPY CARTER U8RARY The purpose of this meeting is to review our timing options for the UK Strategic Modernization decision The paper at Tab A which I drafted· with Molander's and Blackwill's assistance analyzes the options and forms the basis for the meeting On its own State has circulated to DOD and NSC a paper on timing and consultations with Allies which is not particularly germane but which I include at Tab Bin case it comes up If you don't have time to read the entire Tab A paper I suggest you focus on the four timing options that begin on page 7 a6t My conclusion which is shared by Welch Blackwill and Molander is that our real options are two A Begin now to move as soon as possible to consummate the deal B Wait until late April to decide at which time we would either 1 for 1980 SALT ratification and delay the British · decision until late summer after the instruments of_ratification are exchanged or 2 immediately consummate tAe UK deal FSt go -- ------- The other two options -- Wait until C late St¥D Iler or D mid-1981 strike me as risky The main reason for such delays would be to put SALT ratification behind us so that the TRIDENT decision does not queer the SALT deal with the Soviets and -- perhaps -- to avoid complicating the Belgian TNF decision But SALT would only be helped if the British and our own bureaucracy go along quietly Leaks linking the delay to SALT would be harmful on the Hill With the first option A David would soon notify Wade-Gery that we want to meet in late March to complete preparations for an exchange of letters between the President and Prime Minister The major item on the agendawould be the financial question -- the matter of R D recoupment discussed in the paper before goi ng t o the Brit ish we would have to determine our own position which is currently in disarray see end of memo We could ·- also use the initial meeting with the British to put the Prime Minister's and President's letters in final form see Tab C and to discuss our inability to make a firm commitment to supply them the plutonium they will need through the Eighties to build their new warheads f 5t 'i'OP 6 SCR-ET SENSITIVE Revie March 14 1 2010 Classified extended by Z Brzezinski Reason for extension NSC l 13 a DECLASSIFIED E O 13526 Authority 11a-NL C - a2 2 NARA Date 1 0 ·S- @ 9 f l COPY CARTER LJBRAIW __ Presuming the talks with the British go well the first option A could lead to a public exchange between the President and Prime Minister within a __month It would be most su i table to the British and -- so long· as we are not going to try for SALT ratification this year -- to us as well For a number of reasons - dealing with the Soviet reaction in SALT mitigating the impact on TNF in Belgium and avoiding the appearance of a US - UK conflict over this issue -- it is in our interest to get this issue out of the way as soon as possible However if there is a finite chance that we will try to ratify SALT in 1980 the second option B becomes more i nteresting A British decision before SALT ratification could create difficulties the chances that the Soviets would react negatively in the SALT context e g by demanding explicit compensatory SALT provisions would be increased Further the para 36-b arms export control revie-A period on the Hill could overlap the Senate debate on SALT thus linking and complicating the two legislative processes Since we will probably have to decide by late April whether to seek ratification in 1980 these considerations could argue for delaying the British decision at least until late April The success of this approach would hinge on ready British acquiescence in it If they only went along grudgingly we would risk the possibility of US - UK conflict over the delay and its reason SALT leaking out publicly with adverse consequences for SALT and US - UK relations One way to secure ready British agreement is to meet their inter est in a date certain Wade-Gery told David that the British would find a lengthy delay more agreeable if we could promise them a decision by a date certain We could offer them a variation -- a double date certain we would tell the UK that we would promise an announcement either in late April if we don't seek 1980 ratification or in late sUIIl l1er after deposit of instruments if we do seek 1980 ratification To prove our bona 6i deli we could begin preparations for an exchange in late April by sch iduling an early April meeting with them aisr As you can see the two options merge toward one since there is not much difference between an early and late April announcement Both- provide time for a 36-b review to be completed before Congress recesses for the political conventions Both would have roughly the same i 11pac t on the Belgian TNF decision • • Both would have roughly the same temporal relationship to events related to informal compliance with SALT I interim agreement the Soviets must start dismantling a YANKEE SSBN in late spring we must start dism ntling two POLARIS in tha summer 1 B The key difference is whether we want to continue to link delay in the British decision to the SALT ratification process If there is little chance of SALT ratification in 1980 there is no point to a link and we 'lOP SiCiilE ll- SENSITIVE should put the TRIDENT problem behind us as soon as possible a chance which I cannot judge we may want to continue the the lines of the double date certain but even this risks an British reaction and possible leaks that could backlash in the If there is link along adverse Senate I feel that we should get on with it and forget the SALT link Even if we decide to seek ratification this year the British decision would be a plus on the Hill It would also be a vivid demonstration of US - UK solidarity and could perhaps be coupled with some other post-Afghanistan political step Annex R D Recoupment It is possible that the out into the meeting though decide The fact is that by Jta ta share of our R D costs sale Under the old POLARIS onJ y collect $100 million DOD - State dispute over this issue could spill I hope not because we are not yet ready to current law we are required to collect a p o this would mean $400 million for a UK TRIDENT Sales Agreement's 5 percert surcharge we would -- The DOD staff argues that we should only colleci --$100 M and waive the remaining $300M in exchange for qui d6 which are not yet defined but might include British air defense for our bases in the UK British conventional force improvements etc State argues that we should collect the whole $400M Without seeing a firm list of proposed qui d 6 it is not possible to judge this · issue and it will not be possible for Congress which is sure to want to know that we are going to get $300M worth But I note that what DOD has been talking about for qui d 6 are identical to the list of things we told the Brits we wanted cooperation on simply as part of our TRIDENT cooperation not for any cut-rate deal Unless we see something better from DOD we should collect the whole $400 M COPY CARTIR LIBRARY ' 'e P SEGRE£ SENSITIVE