_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - -•--' '1 alu_ _ •-•--a I ••-•• -•••-• _ _ No Objection To Declassification 2008 06 11 N LC-132-111-2-1-8 TOP SECRET SENSl'l'IVE --- --·2 - ---- c • the force will remnin assigned as is its Polaris predecessor to NATO and de iica ted to SACEUR t -irr1cts We will have to be 1careful not to ilccent this theme so much in Western Europe that we undercut the TNF decision • the improvement in NATO's striking power and enhancement of its credibility provided by the new force represents not only reaffirmation of the strategic dimension of the US-UK special relationship but also reinforcement of the Atlantic Alliance and of the US commitment to NhTO 1' • the increase in striking power which the UK will gain by this modernization will just permit them to maintain the • relative size of their ballistic missile forces with respect 1' to the USSR in the face of massive Soviet force expansion When i' i the new UK force becomes operational it will represent approximately 7 % of the size of Soviet forces roughly the same percentage the Polaris foncc represent6d when it became fully operational in 1970 l- t · Ill Consultations with the French The rnoin adverse reaction we can expect from the French should not come from the Elysee or well connected strateqic circles Noneth0lnss a negative reaction can-be expected frnm conservative Ga11llists who will ·1 profess t6 perceive some perfidious Anglo-Snxon plot recalling · the Skyholt Polaris brouhaha of the early 60'8 They will not ' - I i _ be pleased to sec the UK catch up to and overtake with a minimum of sacrifice their own SLBM forces which have been built at the cost of considerable French sacrifice At the same time the Gaulliits will be annnyPrl by Rritish proqrcss they can be expected to depreciate the political and mili 3ry significance _ t of the modqrnizcd UK force py emphasizing itn sontinued dependence - 1 on the US and its inte·g·rat'lon into NA'tO While the heat from l the French Right should not prov verly difficult for Giscard i to weather it 11' ay neverthele§s for a time render even more I •J't difficult any Franco-US or French-NATO cooperative military 1 efforts lt should also tend to short-circuit any British · interest in nuclear cooperation with France since they will be getting far mor from us than they could expect from the French • f i - While it is possible that conservative G nllist pressure could j be sufficient lo produce some unkind public 11usions to this US-UK cooperation we should be prepared to ignore 'Wch rhetoric Ou r f goal in consultations with the French should be to help Giscard f ' I weather whatever problems the announcement qiVf S him and also to try to steer thr French away from a possible rcQction of squandering - I -1 an even greater portion of their defense resonrces on their nuclear forces to the detriment of their conventional capabilities We will want tio emphasize • the effort the UK has been making in building up their conventional forces and their strong and continuing conventional and nuclear commitments to NATO TOP SEC T §F § f J VJ• No Objection To Declassification 2008 06 11 NLC-132-111-2-1-8 No Objection To Declassification 2008 06 11 N LC-132-111-2-1-8 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - 3 _-- • our rel11ct nnce to sec the UK cmascuLtt c its conventional forces in order to modernize its strategic forces wl1ich would have been t o lik lihood f independent modernization We • should also ask Ciccard if it would h lp him for us to make a public dist inction between French and UK forces with respect to dependence on us und commitTTtent to NATO • necpssity of improving western nuclear forces in the face of the cxp 1nsion of Soviet forces • us willinyness to continue and expand its cooperation with the Frrnch but any such expansion will involve additional quids which we would be har•r Y to discuss with the F'rench on the basis of the principles entailed in our April offer of last year • reassurance that current activities will continue and we will mainta in c liscrctior i according to French rlPsires ' -11 i 1 While these points may not help Giscard deal with public controversy they may help him contain it inRnfnr as we enable him to make the following arguments to key Ga 1llists Debre Chirac Jobctt who are aware of current proqrams • the same rntionale for UK modernization -- the expansion of Soviet nuclear forces -- can be used to ju Lify expanded French efforts We will nevertheless hope to dissuade the French from any expansion that would sacrifice their conventional forces •I H 1 I t1· Ji - • the UK will remain clearly tied to NATO thereby accentuating the independem e o' the French force I' - the us is willing·to expand cooperation with France but a hostile F ench reaction could lead to disclnsurcs about current French act1vities with the US or at 1cast block the - t• ' I • path to their exp nsion While we do not know in advance ho Giscard will wish to handle the conservative Gaullist leaders we will need to be responsive to our consultations solicit his views on what his problems wi l be and ascertain how we can bes he of help in managing th m IV Consul tat ions with the FRG md other 1 11 1 • 1 European circles who- opposed thc·· fNF _dccis 10n--wTiTn i - ·hy a GLCM force of over 500 wP 1p0n is nr- C ' 'lqary when the U ' · l l be addinq a like number to its SL8M force a few years l 11 •t Pro-NATO antiTNF Europeans looking for any alternative to ' ''II -' will no doubt embrace the ' CEUR-dedicate l UK force as most fortuitous We can also expect thC' Soviet rP action wil 1 trnd reinforce tha ' 'NF-alternative arquments Our consultations with Allies will therefore h vc to address these arguments by ' i j' rqp 1 c 1 _rl - s 1JvE No Objection To Declassification 2008 06 11 NLC-132-111-2-1-8 I ' ·1·· ' '' ' ' ' ' - _ _- -z ----•11----•h- II• __ _ •-- _ No Objection To Declassification 2008 06 11 N LC-132-111-2-1-8 -· • T_OP___§_E_C l E _ _S _t _N _T IVI 4 • underlininq the front rank role of th0 UK in pushing for 'l'Nr' in add i ti rm to mNiPrn i 7 i nq th0 i r l RM force • arquinq that posing the modernized HK force as an alternative to TNF would raise q iestion of ' -coupling and nuclear rcyion ilization • rcm i nd i nq the Europeans t hat the UK SLUM force can't be expectod tn lrncl tn eterrpnce what US SLBM forces can't • wnrkinq out an advance joint public line for the US UK and PRG which emphasizes the strategic central-system character of the UK force as opposed to Lhealer • highliqhtinq both in consultations and the public line the UK comm itmcnt to improve its conventional air land an l sea contributions to the Alliance via savings generated through this cooper it ion with the us· as opposed to independent modernizationi Other than the cloctrinc1ire Left military and political circles in the FRG should welcome the announcement as evidence of reinforced US commitment to NATO r1nd enh inr•ement of NATO's J ' lj I l ' l lj I i credibility in oscow's eyes Some will beli vf th t the new UK force ill strengthen the European fin er on the US nuclear triryger an 1 thus cons ti Lule powerful counter-0rgumcnt to the Gaullist cont ntion that NA'1'0 has little crcc1ibility in Soviet eyes It is alsn evidence of UK determination to keep pace with French nuclear forces and thus maintain their r onnterpoise role to excessiv Vrench influence in Etlropcan str tcqic concerns In private consultations with Allied leaders allude discretely to these considerations A w0 may wish to __ _-'I- i J ' · t iit-· I --- J ' ·i J 4 ' All icd concerns about this·· move consti t11t i 'l a fatal blow to SALT II will·no doubt be reinforced by thP prerJictable Soviet propilgandn re tcLions We should nev 'rthcless stand our ground and poj nt to this cooperation as evidence th l L the non-circumvention ' clause of SALT lI will not prevent cooperation with our Allies but that we sti 11 int end to push the Treaty forward to ratification 1i at the proper time We should also point out how small the UK force remains in comparison to Soviet and W forces l 1 l 'j V Consultdtions with the Congress Atlvance consultations with senior leaders of the For0Tqn-Affc Trs anrl Annr •l SE rvices Committees of both honses wi 11 have to be carefully rch0str 1ted In addition to the corr man themes of consu 1 t l t ion we w il 1 use with our Allies we wi 11 have to addtP 'lS ftinflin J prr•hlt m and the instructions rnir npr3ntirttors wi 11 rer -iv_ for •·ominq to an agreemE nt with the UK on pu l hasc of theTrid nt system Since we will wanl to woid havinq to '10 throt1rth wi I h wh 1t could be an unpredjct abl•· h•• rinq prf1r0 s in an p nrt l••n Yf'•1r our qoal will be tu c1t i 1 i L 1te smontli an•1 unev1•11t •il I' 1• saqe of the required 50-day c e1 ti f ica tion pcdo l TOP SF CRF T F NSTTrvr No Objection To Declassification 2008 06 11 NLC-132-111-2-1-8 1 j I ___ _ _ _ - - - - - - - dn • - - - -- - ---··· - _ _ _ - - _ _ ·- -' -•-- i ·------------- ----- No Objection To Declassification 2008 06 11 N LC-132-111-2-1-8 I 11 TUP SECRET SENSITIVR - • ' Ii - On pritcnt 'i -il clt mcnt rif cnniircs ' ic- n l di ffic11lty is the quP stion of the UK share l f R D ' Ind nt he r nnn-rc•currinq costs 'l'he PSA formula W JS hiyhly ivor 1blc to t he tll but lcyisliltion p 1ssed sinc c r0quircs rt COVl'1·y of a f c1it share ol such costs on a pro rata basis We are informed by DoD Lhat in the case of 'l'ridcnt the Jiffercnce C' t1lcl be as rnuch us $400 million Recovery can be waived in the case of items which enhance NATO R S 1 As the UK force will be under SACEUR wu could argue that such cost recovery be waived but unless we could show that we had received a strategically advant iqcous set of quids from the UK sufficient to offset the $'100 million loss to the Treasury w0 coul l expect some congressional oppo5ition to a It 1· I I i t t ' J ' · j i• j f give-away to surface ft ···•• - - ' Our consult tions with the Conqrcss will lso have to address the question of U1e force's rcl 1tionshi p to any· SALT III ner1otir1tions as well as to ratifict1tion of the SJ LT II Treaty lf this HspPct of the consultations is hnndled properly it is entirely pos iblc tho t the new lJK forcf could be a help j J ' i 1 •-I to Senate ratificntion • f 1 J I I 1 I I I 1 l l I' ·' i II 11 Ii • No Objection To Declassification 2008 06 11 NLC-132-111-2-1-8 I