T O P SECRET TO J - A m b a s d o r Johns THROUGH - Mr EA - Winthrop G FROM SUBJECT EA - BrownfJp Basing of u S StripAlertPlanes at Tainan Airfield on Taiwan ACTION MEMORANDUM -- Current JCS directives governing the conduct of aerial reconnaissance along the coast of Communist China prevent our aircraft from going closer than fifty miles fromthe coast as compared to a CPA of twenty miles in force beforethe EC-121 shootdown and direct maximum fighter strip alertas feasible The only feasible place to provide fighters on strip alert for the protection of planes reconnoitering along the South China coast is Taiwan DOD hasasked the Deprtment to secure GRC permission to deploy sufficient fighter aircraft toTaiwan for this purpose Four fighters would be kept on alert at a time and at least one or two more would be needed on Taiwan in reserve Fighters w i l l be launched at any time that the reconnaissance aircraft receives warning conditions 1 or 5 and would proceed to the defense of the recorqaissance plane They might be launched earlier as a precautionary measure but in that case would be held in a ready CAP orbit well clear of the mission aircraft unless a more serious threat developed In any event our aircraft will certainly be observed by the ChiCom radar i This would mean that for the first time since the last Taiwan Strait crisis the United States will be regularly operating combat aircraft potentially targeted against a ChiCom target from Taiwan T O P SECRET ’c 2 I baseg We must assume that this will be seen by Peking as a significant escalation of the U S base use in Taiwan something that we have been trying to avoid at least until we could come to decisions on NSSM-1 4 Policy Toward China It obviously also risks a clash between U S and Chinese Communist aircraft a clash that would be linked with Taiwan Moreover this will probably be seen by Chiang Kai-shek as further evidence of the correctness of his intransigent position towards Peking He of course would almost certainly agree to the placing of our fighters at Tainan It is possible that if we tell him that we propose to go ahead with o w plans to recognize Outer Mongolia despite his objection he might drag his heels on this one and try to hold it up but I believe that would be doubtful Therefore this action is undesirable from the pint of view of our policy posture towards both Communist China and the GRC There is also some doubt in our minds as to how much protection aircraft on strip alert can in fact provide Nevertheless the President has directed that these reconnaissance flights be resumed and we have warned the intelligence community that although we think it unlikely that the ChiComs would shoot down one of our planes they might in view of their present very hostile attitude and the example of North Korean success in the EC-121 episode be strongly tempted to follow the North Korean example Under these circumstances I do not see how we could ask that the planes go unprotected so we probably have to go along with this proposal with a strong recommendation that the number of aircr t and personnel sent to Taiwan should be the minimum necessary nd soon as be removed aspossibla f We have considered suggesting to DOD that we run a few test flights with a 50 mile CPA to seewhat the pattern of ChiCom reaction is before making the final decision that fighters need to be based in Taiwan But we feel that a we would be criticized for taking even this amount of risk and b a test period without reaction would provide no real assurance for the future T O P SECRET t 3 AC w We have also consideredthe use of GRC fighters for this purpose But we reject this because it would be even more provocative than using ow own and would give the Gimo a greater claim on us We therefore reluctantly recommend that we agree to DODIs request and request yourapproval Disapprove EA WGBrown era 5 29 69 Approved EA MGreen substance Cleared EA ACA HThayer EA ROC RHart T O P SECRET