-fOP ' SECRET _ Ci jSI rl E ASSISTANT SECRETAR'' OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON D C OJOI • · ' t ·· '• l l'ROGRAM ANAl YSIS AND I VALUATION I i f - 1 a v' ¥ r ' if · · 4-lfr t I I MEMORANDU FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SUBJECT PRM 45 S s i g ifhe omits or future RO in the is President · ' J R' k'' ------• ' DATE _ _ -z a_ re 1 d _ raft of PRM-45 recently provided by State for OSO review oes not adequately emphasize important considerations for defense programs I believe these areas hould be included ues to be reviewed by the June 7 sec and forwarded to the for decisfon · 'l t'i v'' Iii i 0 T§ RM- 5 examines the withdrawal of the 2nd Infantry Division from Korea as a result 'Of the intelligence cdrrrnunity's re-estimate of the North Kor an ground order pf battle Not' only are North Korean ground• forces abut 70% stronger than we believed at the time of PD-18 there is some p ssibility that the United States would have to introduce sub stantial round reinforcements in a war to prevent defe t of the RO This ill remain true through 1985 if ROK force improvements proceed as presen ly planned There is no reasol' however why Sou h Korea-with twic the population and already three times the·GtlP-- annot eventuall match the 9efense effort of the North i · tr t · j t J - f J• j I f 0 i 1 ' fi tA i SJ Prim rily because'I belie that it·will help to deter a war I V support a substantial delay fn the planned withdrawal of the· 2nd OivisioVo- -- ' I during th's period of adjustment However strengthening the ROK ground forces mu t be one_ of the highest-priority goals in our COlll'ilOn ·defense efforts Moreover given the very tight constraints on U S Army manpower it is important that we eventually acquire more flexibility in the use o the 2nd Division No matter what its peacetime location it should be eventually prograllJlled for contingencies throughout Asia including the Persian Gulf and not only in Korea in PRM- 5 notes several critical deficiencies in ROK forces and · sketches some corrective measures ·but 'i-t ignores or excludes al JIC st_ a 11 means to accomplish the measures · The PRM fails to make any connection lt_etween·a U S decision to delay or stop ground force withdrawals and a ROK decision to do more to strengthen its own ground forces -r believe tha before giving the ROK pr Japanese goverll lent c he t to de 1ay or stop the Jund force wi thdrawa 1s the _ shou1d seek a collllli tment from the ROI to do more tha1i i r Clni r lii d by sq1 Decla liy c 1_ _1U D''' --' X 41 J 1 • u J 1Lh c A E 8 5 - - - C 2 SO 3 COPY '---- --- · r ro SECR'Et SENSITIVE -------·-- • · M ' _ - Of1SECRfT SEN£1TI 2 now plans to strengthen its ground forces Moreover we should emphasize that expensive projects such is F-16 purchases or aircraft co-a·ssernbly to improve ROK capabilities in air and naval forces where the U S can most easily f111 the _gap should receive much' lower priority than urgently needed ground force improvements · a c to o h d a PRM also argues for th position made by the Ambassador endorsed by General Vessey that ROK defense spending uld not be increased significantly_ However accord1ng OSO and CIA economic analyses ROK defense spending ld be increased from the projected level of about 5 5% at least ·71 with little e fect on·ROK economic growth standards of living While recognizing that the poltt ical 1th of South Korea is clearly a U S • interest we nis lso something to improve the military balance on the-i enin a reduce the demands on scarce U S Army manpower Th · nomic burden on Korea can be eased by U S and even more ropriately by Japanese assistance Th PRM uggests that if the 2nd Division stays·fn Korea • FM credits and IHET funding for Korea can be reduced An lys1s of ROK needs suggests the opposite The planned FH credits of about $2S0 million and IMET funding of about $2 million-annually for the next few·years support the present RO Force Improvement Plan and will be needed whether or not th 2nd Infantry Division stays in Korea I n fact some 1 reases in FMS might be needed to cushion the fnmediate fm act of th surge fn·ROK defense spending that we should be recomnel'ldfng Th PRM does not consider ways that Japan could contribute to ROK defen such as those we suggested fn the recent PiC ba k-up book on the Consolidated Guidance Since defense of So th Korea helps protect Japan's interests Japan should pay s ·e of the cost perhaps indirectly The u· s should use an decision to increase its- planned contr1but1on·to ROK de erise--sui h as stopping_ the wfthdrawal--to elicit a Japanese co tr 1but ion • ff pr s pr · · • 4· lly the PRM does not consider the fndfrett cost of paring another U S dfvfsfon fo·r non-NATO conflicts uld the 2nd not be withdrawn a119 conf1gured as currently gr ed I bel 1e e that 1t is possible to remedy the most serious defi- ciencies 1n OK grourfd 1orces·and to bring the projected 1985 North to f • A FOP SBbR T ENSfTj E I ··-· _J 'A WP E CRET SEM31Tl'v'E • 3 South fi epower ratio of ground forces 1n Ko rea down from more than 2 1 to 1 5 1 Although only sketchy ROK cost data are available tentative estimate indicate that the package would cost a total of $8 billion in 1979 dol ars in the period 1981-85 Increasing the ROK defe se allocation from -the present 5 6% to about 7% of GNP would generate roughly $5 billion during 1 81-85 assuming 5% -real GNP growth as opposed to the better than 10% annu 1 real growth that South Korea has achieved since 1972 The remainin $3 billion needed by the ROK coul·d be shared equally by the U S and Japan · • J t' ff Som of the argument over improving ROK ground forces seems to center 'ill on wheth r the ROK can increase its defense expenditures substantially in t 1 the next program any sign that we any deci I i1 year or two However the real target for a substantial get well slater than that In fact production constraints will preclude ficant equipnent increases before 1982 However 1t is important et agreement on a 5 or 6-year ROK improvement program as part of ion to delay withdrawals In ddition to placing greater emphasis on ROK ·force improvements the PRC hould also consider Early U S Air Augmentation To make effective use of the very limited arning· available the United States should adopt a policy of conducti g responsive exercisesw to augment our air forces·on early warning indicators Also to make the u s tacair contribution more effect1v 1n the particularly crucial early days of a war we should consider increased peacetime stationing of U S air forces in Korea War Termination Policy The understandi ng that an allied counteroffensive would stop at the ·present DMZ weakens deterrence In discussing the possible need for U S ground reinforcement --which is 111 1ch greater now tha we thought tt was 1n 1977--we should make it clear that U S reinforcements would have the capability of ending the war on tenns more fa orable to the defense of Seoul than the existing DMZ Although we will obviously want to emphasize our expectation that deterr ence will continu to work rather than what happens if it fails I think that we can bot str ngthen deterrence and reas ure the- South Koreans by noting that th North would place 1ts own territory at risk 1f 1t attacked the South · ussell Murriy 2nd Russell Murray 2nd Ass 1stant Secretary of ·Defense Program Analysis Evaluation ' cc DepSecD f ASD ISA · fflP SteRrr S NSll ' 'i- _ l --1-- - ---- -ii -· ·· 7'·- -· ··i- -· -' - -' _ ··• - -- _ •·e - - - _- _ - ·· iJ - ·• - _·___j I JeP SE6REfstN3f flVt ASD PA E memo for SecOef subj PRM-45 S Prep by DASD PA RP PWo1fowitz hbk 6Jun79 Rm 2E 33 X-57341 L-· ' · i D1strfbu ion SecDe - Cy DepSecDe - Cy 2 Spec Ass Mr West - Cy 3 SecDef Cron - Cy 4 OSD Ma i1 Room - C 5· I ASD ISA - Cy 6 ASD PA E - Cy 7 OASD PA DC L - Cy 8 DASD RP - Chron - Cy 9 DASD RP - C B Cy - Cy 10 OASD RP sia Tapparo Cy 11 DASD PA GPP Porter Cy 12 - - •· ·· ' ftp SEBIS SENSl Pi I ·• J - --- ·--- --·c - -'- ·- i---- - -- - _ _ --- - ' ' ' ' 'l _ ___________ - ' - - - - - · - - i · ' •