- - - - - - - - - - - - ·-·-- fOP 9E6RET IP ASSISTANT SECRETARY qF 0£FENSE 1 2 OCT 1q1o WA eHfNaTON D C aG a i October 10 NENORAN SUBJECT 191' FOR TH£ SEC ETARY OF_ DEFENSf DIA Concems About 11 oru I bel Ieve the ness concerning Kore•n developments substMtl•I ly overst•tes·· · the dange s of an attack 8y looking exclusively at a few •11 ltarj Indicators I think lt provides a 111lsle•dlng picture of llorth Korea's current sltu tlon and likely pollcles If the North ICoruns wer-e pointing ta rd a confrontiitlOfl or attack on the South would they leave nwtny of their frontllne pilots deployed In Libya Would they risk encarklng on an adventure when the re· J lablllty of Soviet and or Chinese support Is questionable When their economic roblems are sufficiently acute to warrant a new effort to reschedule debts wit Japan When there Is evidence of Incipient contacts between the· Japanese nd South Kornn 111llltary establishments At a ti• wfi en they appear to h ve embarked on an effort 10 refurbish more moderate International credentla s as evfdenc ed by behavior at the Havana NAH At a ti- when they seem unce taln as to how to proceed In relationship to the US but are actively xplorlng posslbtlltles of opening contKU at the UN7 When any 111111 tary rovocatlons would harden US Intentions to intaln forces In Korea lndeflnlt ly And when there •re renewed lndlutlons of·posslble polltlal opportunl les In the South arising out of the recent ROie actions • lnn----- ---the Opposl t Ion 5 ------t · · ··----- ·--- - - -- · • l - ·-·--- fA fBP SECft T 1 r · OFflCE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE · 11 · J L • October 1·1 197 Memo - ' - For·--------------- Hr HcGlffert's note 10 re s 11 ·· 1 r·_ · I agree with Mike's conclusion above but nevert eless I think we hould ask ourselves whether there are any actions prudently should take In c ase that conclusion Is wrong _ e g Increased readiness show of force demarcbe to PRC etc This would be a useful subject of discussion with Wlckham Slysteen In Korea during your trip DEH • j _ _ · ' · · -2