Rt produccd 1t fht ' alion 11 n hin DECLAS - IFIED 1 '1 11ori1y By NND'i-012 0 IM NARA Date J 2 U- DEP F-ffMErH OF STATC Bf l FlNG fv1Lfv10F ' NDUM S S CONFIDEN'L'IAL November 19 1977 'I'O The Secretary 'rIIROUGH S P - FROM S P - Richard Feinber¥ Anthony Lak J1✓ President Videla An Alternative View A common view has been that President Videla would gradually but effectively move to improve the human rights situation in Argentina and that he also represented the best hope for Argentine ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco If these views appeared probable when General Videla assumed the Presidency in March 1976 a year and a half later they are increasingly difficult to support It is widely agreed that the GOA is failing to improve its human rights performance and Videla is unlikely to counter his advisers who are opposed to ratifying Tlatelolco Videla probably has good instincts on human rights but several fundamental factors are preventing him from taking effective action --He adheres to the clandestine war doctrine which argues that subversion must be countered with illegal measures He also accepts that this illegal war be waged in a decentralized manner with local captains and commanders acting largely on their own This makes it impossible for the top generals including the junta to effectively control the security forces-but does provide the junta members with plausible deniability -Videla fails to make a sharp distinction between terrorism and dissent The loose application of the term subversive to the government's enemies has encouraged the security forces to strike not just at -CONFIDEN'J'IAL DECLASSIFIED NNfY- -1 c I J 0 I V ·'v NARA ale i J - ·1tli lrily By e j CONFIDENTL' L -2- terrorists but at a wide range of civilian opinion Certainly less than half of the prisoners and disappeared persons estimated by human rights groups at 15 000 were active terrorists some estimates place the figure at under 15% --Videla is closely tied to his minister of economics Martinez de Hoz whose austere economic policies have hit the middle and working classes very hard These policies which have successfully improved Argentina's external accounts have failed to bring the rate of inflation under 100% As the government now moves to attack inflation through strinqent monetary measures economic discontent will mount as a recent wave of strikes foretells Mounting popular discontent threatens to provoke further official repression However well intended Videla may be he will be hard put to fail to take the necessary political measures required by his economic policies --Videla's own personality and governing style is to seek a cautious concensus in order to attain the central objective of maintaining unity of the armed forces Therefore even though the moderates in the military are numerically superior and could probably win in a showdown with the hardliners they are less aggressive in putting their views forward Videla prefers to accede sufficiently to right-wing pressures rather than risk a rift in the military In the most recent promotion cycle Videla apparently failed to make a serious effort to retire certain key hardliners These very basic elements help explain why Videla's performance on guaranteeing the security of his citizenry has been--and is likely to continue to be-disappointing The presence of Videla and other moderates has probably inhibited the hardliners from a tempting to mount an all-out war on ''intellectual and economic subversion 11 i e dissenters of all stripes speculators CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the aiiooal rchin·s DECLAS8IFIED NNDL -to'l 20 13y 1 -y i' AR Date 3 J f •1tllurity J CONFIDENTIAL tax evaders etc Nevertheless the numbers of dead disappeared tortured and jailed are so high as to have directly touched u large percentage of Argentine families Drafted by S P RFeinberg ejq x20822 11 18 77 CONFIDENTIAL