I t Br 't C F $SC 'fl cg 7 lalfSEeRff Eleventh U S -Japan Security Subcommittee Meeting SSC 31 July - 2 August 1979 Honolulu Hawaii r1As1ER Wf' 9E8Aliii ot- 'fr J J 6 0 11 C ' ELEVENTH MEETING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES - JAPAN SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ' ILIKAI HOTEL HONOLULU HAWAII SCHEDULE OF EVENTS 28 July 1979 COMUSJAPAN and party arrives BNL 090 0 SSC XI Administrative office opens Molikai Room 1015 Japanese delegation arrives Met by RADM Shelton and Mr Ohki Japanese Consul General BNL 1230 Washington delegation arrives Met by LTGEN Poston BNL 1304 Golf hosted by Admiral Weisner 0900 29 Jul 1979 · Navy _Marine GC o July 1979 0900 Amb Mansfield arrives by LTGEN Poston Met 0945-1000 Japanese office call on Admiral Weisner Mr Watari Mr Nakajima Mr Ohki VADM Sakonjo JOO office 0945-1000 Coffee for remainder of Japanese delegation hosted by LTGEN Poston with J02 and J heads ECR 1000-1100 Briefing for Japanese hosted BY JOO with J beads CCBR 1115-13 00 Japanese lunch with MAJGEN Lynn Schofield Brks 1300-1400 Aerial tour of military facilities for Japanese BNL 1400 Japanese return to Ilikai Hotel except for VADM Sakonjo 1400-1600 US Unilateral Organizational Meeting 1415-1445 VADM Sakonjo office call on RADM Wentworth Accompanied by CMDR Saito JMSDF LNO 1615-1815 Japanese Unilateral Organizational Meeting Kauai Room 1830-2000 No host get acquainted Cocktail party Imperial Suite 0900-1200 First Session Hilo Suite 1215-1330 Luncheon hosted by Mr Watari Dana suite 1400-1700 Second Session Hilo Suite 1830-2030 Reception in-honor-of SSC XI participants hosted by consul General Japanese consulate Aloha casual attire Bus transportation departs Ilikai at 1800 returns 2045 Kauai Room -Pearl Harbor 31 uly 1979 Ohki l August 1979 0900-1200 Third Session Hilo Suite · 1215-1330 No host counterpart luncheon Individually arranged 1400-1700 Fourth Session Hilo Suite 1830-2030 Reception in-honor-of GOJ participants Derussey Ball Bale Koa Hotel Bus transportation departs Ilikai at 1820 returns hosted by Asst Secretary McGiffert 2015 • 2 2 August 1979 0900-1200 Open session necessary Meeting if TBA s · 0900-1030 Pearl Harbor tour for Japanese PACFLT Boat land- 0900-1100 Military to Military Meeting ECR 1215-1330 Luncheon hosted by Asst Secretary McGiffert Hana Suite 1400-1700 Final Session Hilo Suite 1700 Amb Mansfield departs 3 Free discussion ing August 1979 0930-1000 1145 LTGEN Ginn office call on JOl office LTGEN Poston _Japanese delegation departs 1600 Washington delegation departs 1700 COMUSJAPAN and party and remainder of Embassy Toyko party departs 3 liNL 8EllfFl8ENfl'1 e Table of Contents - Prlnclpa1 1 s Book A Itinerary 8 C Scope Paper - for the 11th Security Subconrnlttee Meeting Point Papers for the Meeting '1 t Session 1• 1 Session 2 - 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 Overview of Global Developmen which Affect US-Japan Security Relation US LEAD Current Asian Sltuatl0n US LEA Sesslon Sunmary and Talking Papper Japan's Security Policy In the 1980 1 s GOJ Paper - Security In the 1980 1 s11 Status of Guideline Implementation MIiestones Problem Area and Anticipated Results US LEA Session Sunmary and Talking Paper Japan's Defense Pollcy JSDF Posture In the 1980 1 s Japanese Paper on the Defense Relationship with the US Status of Present Joint Defense Cooperation Projects Sunmary of 1979 Def nse White Paper Session 3 - Long Tenn Prospects for ·Japan's Defense JAPAN LEAD US Force Posture In Asia and Indian Ocean In 1980 1 s US LEAD 3 Session Summary and Talking Paper Session 4 - Defense Cooperation Objectives C0111parablllty Interoperability and Technology· Transfer Cost Sharing US LEAD · 4 Session Surrinary and Talking Paper 4 1 Cost of US Forces In Japan Table Cost of US NATO Forces Table 4 2 Cost Sharing - FY 80 Strategy COHUSJ msg 4 3 Tables - DOD Annual Operating Cost of Maintaining US M111 ta ry Forces i n Fore rgn Count r I es and Areas D Suggestions fo r Discussions Outside the Meetings D 1 G a'l de 1 t nes E e D 2 Proposed St atement for Soc ial Funct ions 0 3 Possib l e SOF Improvements Biographies E 1 Japanese Delegation E 2 Precedence List of US Delegation •Qff FIDEfff ' I • foOIF • f µllfft _ 8 9 11th SSC HEITING SCHEDULE UC C JON SUPPORT ASO ISA - - Convey atmosphere of Informality Agree on press coverage - None SALT and US Nuclear Strategy Europe NATO ASO ISA Nfd·East Perslan Gulf In· dlan Ocean JCS - Increase Japanese awareness of our mutual concerns In the global security env I ronment GENERAL TOPIC SPECIFIC TOPIC OJ'ENI NG' STATEl1ENT - #1 31 JULY 0900-1200 LEAD RESPONSE TO GOJ LEAD GLOBAL SITUATION ASIAN SITUATION U S 12 31 JULY 1400-1700 ISA NSC - - ISA STATE ISA EHIASSY - JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY IN THE 1380'5 Japanese P iper on Security STATUS Of GUIDELINES IHPLEMENTA• Bilateral Plan COMUS· nlng JAPAN Joint Exercises Training Intel I lgence TION Reassure the Japanese we wlll remain a Pacific power describe challenges In a way that Invites GOJ to reconsider the adequacy of their own efforts Securl ty SI tua• t Ion lh East Asia US Responses Exchange IEllif OBJECTIVE Support Japanese bellefs probe future Intentions In regional security Involvement Insure the GOJ that US Is politically c0111Rltted to bilateral planning to Identify defense needs to support continuation and sophistication of such efforts In the future • SESSION #3 P119' 2 Schedule RESPONSE TO I OJ LEAD GENERAL TOPIC SPECIF IC TOPIC U S LEAD SUPPORT LONG AANGE PROSPECTS FOR -JAPAN'S DEFENSE Weapons Systems Force Security - - PA E CINCPAC Discus's the adequacy of Japan's efforts In vlew of oil crlsls US limitations US FORCE POSTURE IN ASIA AND Soviet Kllltary In Asia Devalopments In the lndlan Ocean Middle East US Ind I an Ocean Actlvltles Outlook for US In Asia In 1980 1 s JCS CINCPAC - Describe reallstlcally our force posture and explain our appreciation of the shared necesst'ty In maintaining free trade access to these ocean areas Cost-Sharing Technology Transfer lnteroperablllty Comparison with NATO ISA OBJECTIVE 1 AUGUST 090_0 - r 200 INOIAN OCEAN IN 1980 1 s Iii 1 AUGUST 1400-1700 DEFENSE COOPERATION OBJECTIVES ' EMBASSY COMUSJAPAN PA E Promote a further expansion of GOJ c ost-sharlng llleasures an explore Informally various possibilities Defuse Japanese criticism of unequal treatment compared to our NATO allies Lay groundwork for ad 2 conrnlttee to discuss RSI devel opment technology transfer etc - SSC Schedule All events listed at lllkal unless otherwise noted nday July 30 OS Unilateral -time to be announced by Col Oewey 1830-2030 No host Get Aequaln ed Cocktail Hour Tuesday Jul ' 31 0900-1200 1200-1400 1400-110·0 1830-2000 SSC Session I Lunch hosted by Japanese Delegation SSC Sesshosted Ion 11 by Japanese Consul General Japanese Consulate Dinner Wednesday August - 0900-1200 1200-1400 1400-1700 1830-2000 SSC Sesslon Ill Lunch as desired SSC Session IV Reception hosted by Hr HeGlffert Hale Koa Hotel Thursday August 2 Lunch hosted by US Delegation 1200-1400 Final SSC Session 1400-1700 Dress for all meetings and all oclal functions Is aloha casual - SCOPE PAPER FOR THE ELEVENTH SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING 31 July -- 2 August 1979 Last year ' s meeting reactivated the SSC following a four-year hiatus The 11th meetfng will agaln be held In Hawaii and will Include policy level representatives from OSD JCS State NSC Embassy Tokyo CINCPAC and USFJ on the US side and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Defense Agency and the Embassy on the Japanese side Because the SSC Involves Washington and Tokyo policy-making levels has traditionally placed a premium on Informal and candid discussions and does not seek to produce negotiated agreements or collYllunlques It can reinforce what we are seeking to accomplish In bilateral defense planning as well as explore other aspects of defense cooperation ' - SETTING Oefense Is no longer a taboo subject in Japan In part this reflects ln freaslng Japanese apprehensions over the growth of Soviet military power Tn the Pacific e g the anticipated deployment of the Minsk access to facllltles in Vietnam and expanded military activities In the disputed Northern Territories In part It reflects concerns about the US defense posture and the reliability of our support The Self-Defense Forces presently enjoy unprecedented approval of the Japanese public a broad national consensus supports continuation of the Security Treaty The moderate opposition parties Komeito Democratlc Socialists and New Liberal Club have accordingly been 1110re supportive of Japan's alliance ' with the US Equally Important Japanese government officials have become noticeably more flexible and positive over the past two years In dealing with us on defense-related matters Support for the Security Treaty and the SDF by the PRC has not only undermined much of the opposition from the Left but has focused Japanese concern more than ever on the Soviet threat The one percent GNP limitation on defense spending Is no longer a crltlcal Issue and has already been exceeded If US accounting procedures are utilized The crucial question that needs to be addressed by both the US and the Japanese ls not how much money should be spent but for what purit0ses The Japanese participants at the SSC are generally willing and eager to expand defense cooperation They recognize the virtues of interoperability they acknowledge the necessity of expanded cost-shar i ng arrangements they will be look ng for ways of Increasing cooperat ion In such areas as Intelligence log is t ics C exerc is es an d traini ng a l though they wil l want to take their time t o deve l op J apanes e methodo logies f or meeting our desires They will be rather broad- gauged offfc l als whos e interest vi s-a-v is US pol i cy and force s tructu re ar e not conf ined to WESTPAC Despite these COIMIOn pe rcept ions there are also s t rong bu reaucrat i c rf val r les be tween Foreign Klnlstry and JOA offici a l s which may be reflect ed In the substantive exchanges DECLA ifiEO r S ft- · W 4 jj 91 Our broad goals In the talks must be to consolidate current trends in our defense relationship keep Japan closely t i ed to the United States assure that as Japan's defense capabilities grow they complement our own efforts and prevent trade frictions from Jeopardizing Japanese-American security cooperation OBJECTIVES At this SSC we should seek these specific objectives 1 Increase Japanese awareness of our mutual concerns In the global security environment We will review developments In SALT the Hlddle East Southeast Asia relations with the PRC and the growth of Soviet conventional military particularly naval power We will emphasize that US or allied forces countering the Soviets anywhere are acting also In the global Interest of Japan and that Japanese forces countering the Soviets around the Japanese littoral are acting In the Interests of the United States We need on the one hand to reassure the ·Japanese of our determination to remain a major Pacific power Including maintenance of our military presence and on the other hand to describe the challenges we face In ways that Invite the GOJ to reconsider the adequacy of their own efforts--both In providing for their defense and In support of our efforts 2 Insure the Japanese that the USG Is po11tlca11y committed to bilateral mlllta a planning as a means by which both sides can Identify their defense nees more clearly and to support the continuation and sophistication of such efforts In the future We will provide our assessment of the planning effort under the guidelines to date and Indicate our support for Increasingly realistic scenarios in the future We can expect the Japanese to query us rather specifically on such matters as Joint training and exercises secure communications Intelligence exchanges etc - 3 Describe reallstlcally our force posture In the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas and explain to the Japanese our appreciation of the shared necessity In maintaining free trade access to these ocean areas We need to add realism to Japanese thinking which has questioned on occasion our ability to come to their local defense In times of a worldwide conflict We will try to accomplish this by discussing more expllctly the linkages between our cOll'rllitments fn East Asia and the Middle East and the Indirect threats -i e extraregional threats -- to Japan's security We want to correct misImpressions from the past e g projections of Seventh Fleet sizing We wi 11 emphasize that U S forces countering the USS R In the Paclfle and lnd lan Ocean areas are acti ng In th e Interests of Japan We will poi nt ou t that US fo rces are capable of depl oying east or west as t hey dfd In Vietnam noting that earmarking forces for a certain area does not mean unequal treatment of other areas but Is merely a recognition of possible threat scena rios We want to Indicate the firmness of our c omnltment and the flexibility of our forces whl le explain i ng our problems especially from the late 1980's when our fo rce levels may decl i ne We should not be bashful about dlscussl g fiscal real ties and the constraints and uncertantles that they Introduce In our force structure •- seeH We might also probe outside the formal meetings Japanese attitudes as to whether GOJ maritime and air forces operating in the seas west of Guam and north of the Bashi channel tn regional SLOC protection missions would be constitutionally permissible and or politically manageable 4 Promote a further ex anslon of GOJ cost-sharln measures and explore In ormally various possibilities Following cone uslon of the Brown-Kanemaru talks last year the GOJ adopted a new $120 mill ton costsharing package for JFY 7 bringing the total GOJ expenditure for US Forces for the year to approximately $750 mlllfon Although cost-sharing has been Increasing of late the GOJ bureauracy feels lt has very little addltlonal maneuvering room within the SOFA on future labor cost-sharing arrangements It Js absolutely necessary however that otfier avenues be sought And we will need to persuade the Japanese that we expect US political and economic pressures for cost-sharing will Increase Some specific measures we can exp lor_e Inc I ude Joint use of both US and Japanese bases with the GOJ assuming a progresslvely larger share of maintenance and security costs Japanese construction of new joint operational facilities Japanese funding of depot level maintenance efforts· - S · oefuse Japanese criticism of une ual treatment· compared to our NATO Allies We will tell the Japanese o our attempts to eliminate inequalities which exist In areas such as conmunlcatlons security Imitations on and delays in equipment purchases technology transfer etc At the same tlme we wl11 point out to the Japanese some of the reciprocal obligations embodied ln NATO arrangements e g long termdefense program PROCEDURE We will want to conduct the SSC informally The arrangements for the meetings social events seating arrangements dress stipulation are designed to Insure such informality We will have to deal with the propensity of the Japanese press to exaggerate what the USG Is asking of the GOJ by llmltlng both sides' public statements to generalities and giving the meeting a low public profile Schedule of Events - This SSC spans three days There will be a no host get acquainted social function the evening of July 30 Formal morning and afterr ioon sessions are scheduled for July 31 and August 1 The Japanese will host a luncheon and evening reception on July 31 and we will host a social function the evening of August I The final morning August 2 ts dellber• ately open so that It can be utl 11 zed flexlbil ity for another formal session follow ing up unfinished business for private meetings golf Pearl Harbor tours etc We will host a luncheon on the ftnal day which will be followed by a free discussion session to aJlow ea-ch delegatlorJ to raise any desired lssue s Conclusion of this session In the late afternoon allows evening departures If delegates desire 3 2 SEEREt 1 TALKING PAPER FOR FIRST SESSION - U S - JAPAN SSC July 31 - August 2 1979 SUBJECT Y' Review of Major Global Issues Int oduction Since the last sec there have been rather dramatic changes in the security landscape--SALT II agreement developments in Africa the Middle East and South Asia1 challenges to the Western position in the Indian Ocean Persian Gulf the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty and the normalization of u s -PRC diplomatic relations further changes in our Korean policy and the situation in Indochina ✓ - In discussing these developments we will be particularly interested in exploring their implications for U S -Japanese defense cooperation - SALT II and U S Nuclear Strategy Let me start with SALT II I won't repeat the details of the agreement A short paper outlining the agreement has been passed to you Neither will I rehearse the arguments and counterarguments that have surfaced in Washington I would only like to make a few key points First a few words about its political implications Within the u s there has been growing concern about the growth of Soviet nuclear and conventional military power as well as Soviet involvement in Africa and elsewhere rhis concern is reflected most notably in growing public and Congressional support for real increases in defense spending The Soviet response has been ambivalent During 1978 Moscow showed somewhat greater caution in Africa but they increased their activities on their strategic periphery in Norway in the Middle-East and in Northeast Asia--perhaps i n part due to a self-induced fear of encirclement -- The n e t result is that the debate over SALT II as become more than a debate on strategic arms limitation treaty Ratification of the treaty thus ta k es on greater signifi cance We believe that the SALT II Agreement serves the interests of global stability by imposing limits on the numbers of central strategic systems 28 EO RE t Sb c w 1 - V The numerical limits in the treaty actually require that the Soviets dismantle over 250 launchers by the end of 1985 These limits provide greater predictability as to the size of our future strategic challenge and enable us t etter plan our own strategic capabilities _ -- ✓ SALT II does not preclude U S efforts to modernize its own strategic forces e g providing the MINUTEMAN III with improved accuracy developing a mobile ICBM continuing deployment of the TRIDENT SLBM system equipping our B-52s with air launched cruise missiles and developing SLCM and GLCM technology • • -- With regard to verification the treaty does l t o t require that we trust the soviets The loss of our sites in Iran will temporarily limit our information on some aspects of Soviet programs In any case the treaty is veri f iable from signing Le we could detect any violations that threaten our security Since strategic systems take years to develop we are confident that we can detect and respond to any Soviet cheating before it could affect the strategic balance Vinterests -· Finally the treaty clearly takes our allies' into account Strategic equivalence is maintained1 c s Forward Based Systems are not included NATO options to modernize long-range theater nuclear forces with cruise missiles are fully preserved7 existing patterns of collaboration and cooperation between the U S and its allies are unaffected The non-circumvention provision is simply a reiteration of obligations under international law and we successfully resisted Soviet attempts to include a notransfer ban in the treaty In addition our position is that any future limits on U S systems primarily designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limits on Soviet theater systems - - What are the chances of ratification bX the U S Senate consensus building takes time Many Senators have expressed reservations about the treaty All are examining the treaty with care The initial round of hearings has given us a chance to address the Senators ' concerns The treaty has won support from distinguished outsiders list some - Toon Harriman Gaylor Kidd Dougherty and from the JCS All of us have stressed t he need for vigorous U S and a1li ed defense ef forts with regard t o SALT Whether these r eservat i ons can be answere d dur i ng di scussions or whether they wi ll take the f orm of non-bindi ng Senate resolutions or even amendments to the treaty is not clear at this time However we expect t h at the Senate will vote on the ratification of the treaty late this year--perhaps in early November Basic gui delines for subsequent negotiations on t he limitati on of strategic arms contained in the SALT II Agreement s ets ve ry gener al guide l ine s Howev er wi thin the USG we a re ssey REt- 3 Europe and NATO Since 1973 the Soviets have been expanding and improving their conventional and theater nuclear forces In Europe The force expansion programs show signs of leveling off but the modernization programs probably will continue at a rapid pace during the next few years Specifically since January 1973 Soviet and NSWP forces have been increased by approximately 62 000 men with more than half the increase occurring in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and Polish ground forces There has been only a slight increase in tactical aircraft - The East European states have improved their military organizations and capabilities and they now play a greater role in Pact military planning and strategy for employment In response to this increased threat NATO--to include the u s --has taken a number of ste s to shore u the Alliance's de ense posture This spring at the DPC the members of NATO reaffirmed their goal of a 3% real increase in annual defense expenditures and with minor exceptions it appears that this goal will be met Table 1 indicates some measure of NATO's defense burden A Long Term Defense Plan--with more than 120 specific measures to improve NATO's conventional forces--was adopted at the Washington Summit in May of last year and we are making good progress in implementing it A brief summary of the LTDP has been given to your delegation NATO is also taking steps to improve both its battlefield and longer-range theater nuclear weapon systems I would like to emphasize three general · points about our efforts in NATO Fi rst our current efforts are designed to correct the consequences of prolonged neglect arising out of our involvement in Vietnam - '3 ·eeeREli - Second improvements in Europe are not coming at the expense of our forces in Asia our NATO defenses · complement our forces in East Asia and the Western Pacific and vice versa We are continuing to honor our pledge · to maintain our current level of forces in the Pacific--and we are making some quantitative as well as qualitative improvements to our forces in the region Third as you are well aware we are facing an adversary who is making extraordinary efforts in developing his military forces However the strength of the free world lies in our alliance structure Although the Soviet Union may be outspending the U S the defense spending of the o s and other NATO nations when combined is greater than the soviet union plus its Warsaw Pact allies Table 2 shows this fact graphically our security depends on our ability to capitalize on our combined strength Before we turn our attention to Asia I would like to say a few words about the Middle East 4 - The Middle East Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean nations Our response must include effective follow through on the Camp David accords countering Soviet supported adventurism as in North Yemen and dealing with those conditions which generate internal instability The U S has maintained a militar resence in the Indian Ocean or t irty years int e orm o t e MIDEAST orce and r outine dep loyments of additional naval forces • - _ o f cri sis We have augmented this presence duri ng periods z 'currently the U S Navy presenc e in the I ndian Ocean i ncludes the MIDEAST Force three permanentl y deployed surface combatants plus the deployment three times a year of alternati ng carrier battle groups and surface combatant - 4 •SECRET • - - COMPARISON OF 1978 DEFENSE EXPENDITURES BILLIONS FY 80 DOLLARS 240 - US AND ALLIU 224 8 11 N I 4 JAPAN 11 WARSAW PACT 160 92 OTHER - NATO I 80 - 165 USSR 117 U S - 191 21 OTHER PACT 0 - a8E8RE task groups Right now there is a surface task group of a cruiser three destroyers frigates and an oiler in the Indian Ocean In addition a detachment of Navy patrol aircraft P-3s has been staging out of Diego Garcia on a continuous ur basis since 1974 and more recently U S P-3s have operated IT out of Singapore Jr f' The MIDEAST Task Force be augmented on a permanent cJ' basis by two or three surface combatants drawn from our forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean Ya · - The Department of Defense has recently recommended Periodic task force deployments from the Atlantic J · - Jtvr J feasible include a Marine Amphibious Task Force t- IA -6 I' -- and Pacific be increased from three to four per year and ' if I - At least one land-based tactical aircraft be deployed to the region periodically and - c l' tr - 1111' Steps be taken to improve our security relations with the regional states and improve their self defense capabilities as well as our capability to support our forces in the region The President has not yet made a decision on this recommendation But some expanded deployments are likely to reflect our awareness of the strategic significance of Middle Eastern oil f 4 P I ' - - ­ µ f vs l4 1 F '-' £J t ee _ tr f'e 1 Jy - A 11 1 Jz - -10 - ·- -- -f 41M - c 8R - J i ' 'J I 7 Session I Part 2 Current Asian Situation Hr Armacost 1 The security situation In East Asia has been substantially transformed In recent months • On the positive side of the ledger there have been these key deve 1opments V t ✓ American military power In the Pacific has been stablllzed ' US-Japan defense cooperation rs greater than ever before V A The proliferation of Sino-Japanese and Sino-US economic technological and scientific exchanges tend to confirm elJlng's opening to the West · a I Ii ✓ - V eoul has continued to outdistance Pyongyang In the politicaleconomic competition on the Korean Peninsula · Sino-Soviet rivalry shows no sign of abating and rece_n t conventional military conflicts In East Asia have been limited to the communist countries Taiwan Is adjusting well to Sino-US normallzatlon The Soviet Union has been unable to translate Its growing military power In the Pacific Into unilateral political advantage 1 ✓ The ASEAN states -- Individually and collectively -- have displayed Impressive resilience and cohesion The Pacific Basin economy remains strong providing the underpinnings for p0lltlcal stability fn the non-conmunlst market economy countries f The Pacific Island mini-states have made or are making the transition to Independence w1thout undue strife or external manipulation All In all these are hopeful trends and our Joint Interests are served by working to consolidate them On the negative side of the ledger there have also been some developments which cause concern V - The Soviet power Into Soviet Far Ivan Rogov Union continues to expand Its capacfty to project the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean expansion of Eastern forces deployment of the Hlnsk and the to Vladivostok Increased fortifications In the ' ffREf VNorthern Territories acquisition of limited military operating rights In Vietnam provision of massive military supplies to Vietnam thereby facilitating SRV aggression In Cambodia ✓ The erosion of Western Influence In the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean littoral combined with the establishment of a stronger Soviet military foothold In Southeast Asia raises new questions about the security of these sources of oil which are so critical to security of Japan and the United States and to a lesser extent about the security of the SLOCs themselves In addition we have seen the problem that even a small loss of oll production can cause the world economy j The presence of seven Vietnamese divisions on the Thal border creates an obvious potential for Incidents and poses risks that the conflict may spill over Into Thailand ✓ The confl lets in lndochlna have forced not only Thailand but Malaysia Indonesia and Singapore to reconsider the adequacy of their defenses ✓- · The massive exodus of refugees from lndochlna has become an - enormous humanitarian problem In Southeast Asia and Its has some security overtones since the large Influx of Chinese could disrupt the Internal balance In Malaysia and · ndonesta and could Induce ubeggar-thy-nelghbor 11 pol lcles between the ASEAN members ✓- ✓ Sino-Vietnamese conflict could recur In Korea new 1nte111gence Information reveals that we previously underestimated North Korea's military strength more urgent efforts are required to overcome deficiencies In ROK defenses particularly Its ground defenses We have begun to chart responses to these developments but much remains to be done With re spect to the expanding Soviet ml I ftary access o Indochina we should work to see that Moscow pays a high political and diplomatic price throughout the region as a result of Its entree to military facilities In the SRV Its underwriting of Hanoi's Invasion In Cambodia V e 7 Recent developments In some of the Indian Ocean littoral states require that the United States expand aeployments Into that area There may be some diversion of assets currently assigned to the Pacific Insofar as US assets are stretched thinner we need to consider how we can complement each other's efforts more effectively In protecting the SLOCs t e ASW surveillance patrolling etc and In promoting stability In major suppl ler countries 2 a§ECRff iA ER Fu ✓ We · ✓ ---• - have attempted to minimize the dangers to Thailand posed by SRV Invasion of Cambodia by 1 reaffirming our c0111111tment to Thai security 2 warning the Vietnamese and Soviets of the consequences of allowing the conflict to spread Into Thailand and 3 expanding our security assistance to the RTG Including the acceleration of equipment deliveries • Beyond this the efficacy of our efforts to encourage political resolution of the Kampuchean problem wlll turn upon the balance of forces which develops In Kampuchea over the coming months We are seeking to forestall recognition of the Heng Samr ln puppet regime and keeping the Idea of an International conference on Kampuchea alive Note helpful GOJ role on refugees and economic aid a The other ASEAN count rt es requl re our support to Increase the readiness of their defenses without Jeopardizing development programs The United States Is attempting to preserve -- and to the extent poss Ible expand -- FHS credit levels expeditiously process requests for defensive equipment and handle arms transfer requests with greater sensltlvlty to ASEAN requirements Difficulties In the short-term Include I an austere budget 2 a depletion of excess defense stocks and 3 legal Inhibitions against airlifting utpment Explore whether Japan might be able to lend addlonal help through the provision of fungible economic assistance E g something analogous to our SSA ✓With respect to China ft Is In neither of our lntere5ts unwittingly to promote China's efforts to forge an anti-Soviet 11 conmon front 11 The appropriate stance for us Is 1 deepened US-GOJ defense cooperation and 2 promotion In parallel of our respective bilateral political and economic relationships wI th Be 1J I ng • In Korea recently announced adjustments of US troop withdrawals will bolster deterrence and the ROK has agreed substantially to augment Its own defense effort Given the high r a t e · Inflation In the ROK these steps may exacerbate domestic economic problems It would be helpful If the GOJ could look at ways In which It might contribute to ROK security by easSlng these economic difficulties-· e g ltberaltzlng trade access expanding credit etc V On refugees acknowledge Japan's initiative dramatically to expand Its financial support for the UNHCR and take note of the fact that we are lmpleme n tlng steps which Involve a wider DOD contribution to the refugee effort 3 l I IO SESSION 3 Force Posture in Asia and Indian Ocean in 1980's LTG Lawson US Our objective during this session is to describe realistically our force posture in the Pacific and Indian ocean areas and explain to the Japanese our appreciation of the shared necessity in maintaining free trade access to the nations bordering these ocean areas Talking Points - Introduction that Earlier in our discussions we indicated Overall we believe that the Asian security situation is relatively stable The U S is committed to remaining militarily powerful in East Asia the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean as well as to maintaining our strategic nuclear equivalence vis-a-vis the Soviets However we view with concern the Soviets increasing conventional military particularly naval buildup and will act jointly with our allies and friends to meet this challenge - But before we focus on United States force posture in Asia and Indian Ocean in 1980's I will briefly discuss recent Soviet military activities in Asia and developments in the Indian Ocean and Middle East v-- The recent opening of Vietnamese ports and airfields to Soviet forces could have far-reaching conse uences in the Western Pacific should the Vietnamese give political approval to continuation of such activities For example · Such bases could provide convenient staging points for Soviet forces and improve Soviet capabilities to sustain their forces in both the South China Sea and t he Indian Ocean Vietnamese basing could also provide the Soviets with facilities for crew shore l eave rep l enishment and repair for both forces in trans i t and those operating in these a reas CLASSIFIED BY DIRECTOR J-5 DECLASSIFIED ON 25 JULY 1985 DEC ASSlfJED 1£ W211 · - Soviet reaction times would For example Vladivostok is Subic Bay and about 2 900nm Ranh Bay is only 650nm from Singapore be improved about 1 900nm from from Singapore Cam Subic and 700run from Soviet forces operating from Vietnam could also conduct surveillance of the vital sea lines of communications in the region as well as monitor U S Navy activities in the area For example Soviet TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft and IL-38 ASW aircraft operating from Vietnam could cover the Lombok Sunda and Malacca Straits They could also monitor on a continuous basis U S carrier and other naval operations in the Subic Bay operating area In support of the Vietnamese Soviet naval aircraft could provide a quick reaction maritime patrol and surveillance capability in the South China Sea as well as search for Chinese ships supporting Kampuchean forces - The Soviets may also use Vietnamese Naval Bases and airfields as staging bases for exercises in the South China and Philippine Seas In particular coordinated ASW training would be enhanced by the short transit time and distance for their ASW aircraft The principal threats to allied shipping in the Pacific are the Soviet general purpose submarine force and elements of the Soviet Naval Aviation forces bombers with air-to-surface missiles In the past sea lanes in the Pacific were safer due to geographic and operating constraints on Soviet forces ASW barriers in the exits to the Sea of Japan and off Petropavlovsk could inflict losses on Soviet submarines deploying and returning to their bases in Soviet Asia 2 The range of the Soviet TU-16 equipped with surfaceto-air missiles 1s approximately 1 450nm without aerial refueling and 2 050nm with one refueling Operating from bases in Soviet Asia these aircraft could operate only as far South as the northern Philippines The addition of the BACKFIRE bomber to Soviet Naval Aviation forces in Asia and extended Soviet use of air and naval facilities in Vietnam would seriously impact on our defense planning The BACKFIRE has an unrefuled combat radiua of 2 600nm almost twice that of the TU-16 it replaces If used in an anti-shipping role and based in Soviet Asia its unrefueled operating area would include the Philippine and South China Seas and this could be extended even further by using in-fight refueling - TU-95s and TU-16s operating extensively from Vietnam would provide the Soviets with SLOC surveillance throughout the Southern Pacific and the eastern portions of the Indian Ocean They could also be provided fighter escorts if necessary Establi shment of submarine operating bases in Vietnam would shorten transit time for Soviet submarines make our ASW barriers at the ext ts to the Sea of Japan and in the vicinity of Petropavlovsk less effective and initially would complicate our ASW efforts in the Western Pacific In short Soviet bases in Vietnam would significantly enhance Soviet capabilities to interdict allied sea lines of communications in Asia during the early stages of a major conflict I would now like to turn to the Indian Ocean and d i 's cuss recent events in that region 3 0 • 3f8RR The U S has maintained a military presence in the Middle East for thirty years in the form of the MIDEAST Force which has historically been comprised of a command ship and two destroyer type ships We have augmented this force during periods of crisis such as the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971 the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and most recently as a result of the fighting in Yemen We have also deployed on a yearly basis both carrier battle groups and surface combatant task groups from Seventh Fleet assets in the Western Pacific Normally the carrier battle group makes one deployment to the Indian Ocean for about 45-60 days The other two deployments of like duration by our surface combatants are typically made up of a guided missile crusier three escorts and a mobile logistics ship In addition a detachment of Navy patrol aircraft P-3s has been operating from Diego Garcia on a continuous basis since 1974 and more recently U S P-3s have used Singapore facilities for transit purposes - As a result of recent events in the Middle East the U S is considering several proposals concerning its military presence in the region These include increasing the number and type of forces permanently stationed in the area increasing the frequency of our naval deployments and perhaps deploying land-based aircraft to the region on a random basis 0n The rationale behind proposals to increase U S presence in the Indian Ocean is that positive steps are needed in the aftermath of events in Iran Afghanistan Ethiopia and now Yemen to reassure U S allies who feel threatened by Soviet activities and to demonstrate u s resolve to protect its interests in the region the face of the Soviet developments I have just described the us has not stood still We have mainta i ned our military strength in As i a In fact we have increased our forces somewhat whi l e continuing to improve them qualitatively The ou tl ook for the 1980's is as follows • 6EBRR - ✓-Navy L - The Seventh Fleet represents the forward deployed naval component of CINCPAC's forces Centered around two carrier battle groups and two amphibious ready groups its principal missions include peacetime presence in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans contingency response SLOC protection and offensive operations in wartime • Despite uncertainties about funding levels and l fO procurement programs total Navy force l e v should slowly increase through the Moreover the increase will be concentrated in major surface combatants and attack submarines while offsetting reductions will come from the ranks of auxiliaries and reserve ships Particul arly significant I think is the increased use that we will be making of civilian-manned MSC fleet support ships In general we expect that the Pacific Fleet's share of total Navy assets will remain close to the present ratio Moreover our forces are inherently flexible and can meet worldwide requirements During Vietnam we augmented the Pacific fleet with ships from the Atlantic More recently we drew on ships from both the Mediterranean and Pacific to enhance our presence temporarily in the Indian Ocean We will continue to respond to those threats which directly affect our interests in close consultation 1th our allies - In addition to the carrier air wings afloat significant numbers of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft are located at bases ashore ASW patrol aircraft P-3s regularly operate from several fields ranging from Adak Alaska to Diego Garcia Support and special mission squadrons are similarly deployed Marine Corps attack or fighter-attack squadrons are located in Japan and Hawaii and a detachment of AV-8 HARRIERS ls on Okinawa ✓- - By the end of the FYDP period all carrier air wing F-4s with the exception of those on Midway and Coral Sea will have been replaced with F-14s F A-18s wi l l be introduced to Marine Corps fighter squad r ons Carriers will begin receiving F A- 18s Land- based ASW capabilities will be improved with the P-3 update program Sur f ace ship ASW will be markedly enhanced by the introduction of a new towed array and the LAMPS MK III helicopter 5 • StCRS LL' A_ Y Force --- PACAF controls ten tactical fighter squadrons totalling 192 F-4s Two squadrons are in the Philippines four are on Okinawa and four are in Korea Those at Osan Kunsan and Taegu are specifically tasked for Korea the rest are available for general Asian contingencies Two tactical airlift squadrons in Japan and the Philippines plus some reconnaissance and special operations units round out the inventory A 1ss will begin operating from Kadena next All squadrons in Japan will transition to the F-15 year the first AWACS will be on rotation to Kadena and F-4G WILD WEASEL aircraft will deploy to Clark We plan that F-16s will replace F-4s in Korea and a total of five AWACS will be available in WESTPAC Major Ground Forces ✓- - The 28 000 troops of the Eighth U S Army EUSA are part of the Combined Forces Command's strategic reserve By July 1979 3 700 men had been withdrawn By Presidential decision V--- Withdrawals will remain function of continue as of combat elements of the 2d Division in abeyance The structure and the Combined Forces Command will established last year Between now and the end of 1980 some reductions of personnel in U S support units will continue This will include one I-HAWK air defense battalion whose transfer to the had been planned since 1976 ROK --- The timing and pace of withdrawals beyond these will be re-examined in 1981 In that review the united States will pay special attention to the restoration of a satisfactory North-South military balance and evidence of tangible progress toward a reduction of tensions on the peninsula No changes in Marine Corps deployments are programmed • - 6 1 8E liT also have afloat a Marine Amphibious Unit MAU and a Battalion Landing Team BLT These units are deployed in the Western Pacific aboard two Amphibious Ready Groups ARG Totaling about 3 100 men they provide rapid reaction f rces for limited contingencies in the region No force level changes are programmed but amphibious shipping with Marines embarked may be deployed more often into the Indian Ocean The 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii with its j_ - reserve roundout brigade constitutes CINCPAC's strategic reserve The remaining brigade of the 3d Marine Division also is based on Oahu Although no decisions have been made the future configuration and orientation of the 25th Division is under review In the Eastern Pacific we have I MAF consisting of the 1st Marine Division and the 3d MAW located at Camp Pendleton No change is contemplated for the employment of I MAF 1 7' S t r ic Forces Y- units squadron and A of B-520s various tanker and reconnaissance 10 POLARIS-equipped SSBNs are based in Guam Additional reconnaissance and support forces are located throughout PACOM The first TRIDENT submarine is expected to deploy to the Pacific in FY 1981 obility Forces e Military Airlift Command MAC operates 70 C-SA and 234 C-141 transports Although largely based in the Continental US these aircraft contribute to our capabilities in all theaters Their range and payload are essential to our ability to deliver reinforcements d uring Korean and Persian Gulf contingencies In the last few years mid-air refueling techniques have f ur t her enhanced the r esponsiveness of our strategic a i r l ift The C-14 1B stretch program will add 30 percent t o th e payl oad of each air c raft a l ong with improved fuel economy and aerial refueling probes Planned modifications t o the C-5 wings will extend the service life of these un i que transports through the end of the century - 7 • E8ftEl I - SfeftS m 7 d Contingency Force V -consisting 1 imi ted contingency - force is of land naval and being developed air forces capable of responding to a wide range of non-NATO contingencies with emphasis on the Middle East the Persian Gulf and Korea The contingency force will have strategic mobility and will be largely independent of overseas bases and support The exact size and composition of forces for any particular contingency will necessarily depend upon the nature and location of the contingency It is envisaged that the force will generally be self-sustaining and capable of operating in an austere environment for at least 60 days t 1na an Ocean - '- hus far the majority of Indian Ocean deployments have come from PACOM but EUCOM contributions could increase in the future It ls anticipated that a policy decision will be made shortly to modestly increase MIDEASTFOR on a permanent basis and increase periodic naval deployments drawing from PACOM and EUCOM u s capabilities throughout the Indian Ocean area suffer from a lack of supporting infrastructure Programmed improvements ·to facilities on Diego Garcia should be completed by the end of FY 1980 but the island will remain a very austere base Aircraft parking space would be a particular problem during periods of heavy use Vsummar As you see our forces will be maintained essent ally at present levels with significant added qualitative improvements However Navy's overall force size remains a long-term concern to us particularly as we encounter additional requirements in the Indian Ocean Eventual outcome will depend not only on multi-year funding levels but also on Navy programming decisions national political commitments allied contributions and the nature of the threat Nonetheless the capability and probably the size of the fleet will grow at least through the mid-1980's and there still is time to make decisions for the longer term on a deliberate basis This overview has focused mostly on inplace forces Howevert the combination o f sealift mid-air refueling strategic airlift and the civil reserve air fleet CAAF also allows us to reinforce rapidly in contingencies anywhere in the world Specific deployment rates are very sensitive to assumptions about the scenario For example simultaneous crises in Europe and the ROK would spread our mobility forces very thin Allied air and sealift would become very important Nevertheless our own capabilities are substantial U 8 • IEBflEP'