' flf _18 -SECRET c c s C J1A 1 THE 11TH SSC - 29 July - 2 August 1979 Mr Watari Gentlemen l am delighted to open the meeting I wou ld like to expres s my gratitude to US Officials the 10th meeting was held here also The discussions were close and fruitful there have been frequent visitors to both countries Since SSC 10th Secretary Brown to JaJan Foreign Minister Sonoda and Prime Minister Ohira to the US President C 3 rter to Japan next month Minister Yamashita will go to the US c reate mutual understanding These ln the security area Japan and US have exchanged info and the implementation of Japan-US understanding is welcomed Various studies under the guidelines are presently ongoing is being made e Steady progress Now we are required to deal with various problems in 1980's seek a richer partnership in foreign affairs and defense On behalf of the apanese side let me introduce members of the Japaneses delegation Mr McGiffert Thank you very much Mr Jatari I look back to last SS C with pleasure in the sense that we accomplished a good deal A lot has ha ppened i n the world s ince then I ntroduces US delegation Amb Man sfield agree with Hr McGiffert I would like to •compliment Japan on your st rides in the last two years sin ce SSC Since the last SS C US Has noramlized relat ions with the PRC Pri me Minister Oh ira came to Was hington Prime Minis ter Fukada also came in 1978 recently the re ha ve been t wo summit s in Tokyo The ene rg y s u rnlt p la ced J apa n f ron t and cen te r c n the world st age substantive res u lts on energy and re fu gees came ou t of i t Diploma ti cally Japan has advanced rapi d ly espec ially as regards ASEAN and because o f Fore ign Ministe r Sonoda's tra ve ls Japan has advanced SECRETmuch further I would add that it is t ime In the defense field Japan has continued its expansion 8% growth per year for 10 years -- this ls ve ry sizeable Japan has recognized the emergence of the Soviet Pacific Fleet as a major factor in the world We hope for discussions of the White Paper recently released by the JOA Thank you for your support in the upkeep of US forces in Japan including labor cost sharing utilities residences and the I ike And we hope in conclusions that y0u will be very frank in raising any questions which you may have especially in view of situation since 1978 Mr McG i ffert Thank you very much Mr Ambassador for your u5eful comments ' for setting the tone for disucssions which I hope we ca r live up to Admiral Weisner guests from Japan Hr HcGiffert PACOM is pleased to have you especially our hope you have a good time First subject is SALT SALT II -- handout - pe r t ext First po int - - cr i t ic s have bee n una b l e an d will be una bl e t o develop compe ll i ng t echn ical a r gument s agai nst i t Because of t h is and Sov i et buildu p SALT is a debat of t he relatio ns hi p be tween US-USSR and what it f ut ure should be -SECRET SALT is a competition We believed it should be minimized We think that failure to ratify the treaty will be destabilizing Second - as the JCS pointed out it does tend to stabilize relations between super powers numbers are stabilized which were not in SALT I The Treaty takes an important first step In controlling numbers of warheads as well as systems this Is especially important since the Soviets have larger weapons throw weights as opposed to US hi ch by choice chose to develop smaller missiles of higher accuracy Soviets will dismantle over 250 launchers by 1985 US can modernize missiles and build MX as our response to increases in Soviet accuracy we can develop TRIDENT develop air launched cruise missiles continue Don sea launched cruise missiles none of these are compromised ve rification it Is not based on trust of the Soviet Unlcin WRT The loss c f facilities in Iran will temporarily limit our ongoing monitoring ca pabilities but overall verification is very diverse and since · trategic systems take years to develop we are confident that we can de tect and respond to any Soviet cheating before It could affect the strategic balance Fina l ly the t reaty does not const rai n nuc lear prog rams i n wh ich NATO countries are interested It does not cover so-called forward · based nuclear systems the US maint a ins in Eu rope now does ft cover nt erdependent Br iti sh and French nuclear forces It does not prevent de ployment of cruis e missiles or IRBM deployment to Europe If the a l liance should so decide The protocol restricts these untl 1 1981 but that it meani ngless si nce US won ' t produce them before 1983 The US rej ec ted Sov iet efforts to ins ert a non-transfer clause in the Treaty The non-circumvent ion clause is merely a measure to ensure compllance 't -ot--W--b--1 You may ask and we ask ourselves what are the prospects for rat i fication by the Senate Consensus building takes time The initial rou nd of hearings have given chance for the administration to respond JCS supports the treaty The Also distinguished people such as Averell Harriman and Admirals Gaylor and Kidd support it Kissinger testified today Other oppose Henry There is no report on what he said Nowt have it the press reports that Henry Kl ss i nger supports ratification but onl y if the US Makes a binding commitment to increase defense appropriations Let me comment on defense programs Comments do not only include strategic progress Senator Nunn General Haig and now apparently Henry Kissinger has stated that greater strategic and conventional defense efforts by US are now needed Since this is an emerging debate my comments will be per sonal but I think my colleagues will agree I r e ferred earlier to relations between the US and the USSR that are both cooperative and competitive If we look at the competitive side the US and Its Allies including Japan can outcompete the Soviets in all respects except one 1 Je can outcompete them politically and socially their system ha s no magnetism We can surely outcompete them economically in inter- na ti onal markets let alone prac t ical consumer goods another story Militarily it i s Russia has a history of bei ng strong in military forces It as a pol i tica l system that al l ows it to channel si gn i f i cant re sources in to mili tary channe l s It ri ghtly s ees the US as having more difficu l ty i n main - ta ining high l evels of military investment Trends are ominous in the sense that consistently for 15 years the Soviets have been modernizing and bu i lding up and wh ile US and Allies have don e the same by some calculat i ns as t o resu l ts In mili tary capabi li ty trends favor Sov iets for at l east two reasons iECRET - II l • • t I I Some expenditures by the US and its al lie s are wasted in that thev are dupl lca tive or less efficient than they s hould be because - effo·ts are not standard iz ed or Interoperable 2 Greater proportions of Soviet expenditures go to resources which cre He military capability ours goes to personal salaries I say all this to ind i ate my view that global balance if allowed to continue is a legitimate i tem of discussion for all governments to be concerned with That let me emp asize is a different question from whether appropriate responses to that sitJation should in some way be linked to SALT I I -- SALT I I after all can stand on its own feet as a contribution to limiting the expansion of strategic arms on both sides and stabilizing US-Soviet relations in that respect Nevertheless as I said earlier the debate about SALT I I is more than a debate on treaty itself This may be one area where the Senate and country may wish to broaden the debate Lastly comments on procedure WRT t he treaty The Senate can rat ify or defeat or it can attach non-bind i ng reservations which do no t require renegotiation The best guess in Washington whi ch is on l y speculation is that we can expect a vote somet ime in NOvember This comp l etes my presentat ion on SALT I wil l be happy t o entertain an y dis cus si on Amb Ma ns f ie ld ag r ee wi t h Mr McG i ffert My st rong impress ion i s there wi ll be i ncreases in defense expenditures as a matter of course rather tha n as an answer to Senator Nunn General Haig or Henry Kissinger ar e re l ated to SALT except t ha t they might s tr eng then t he c hance for i t s ra t i ficat ion SEEREl In c reases ·SECRET Mr Watari Thank you for your remarks concerning SALT II the GOJ has already voiced support I would like to express my thanks for your valuable descrip t ion and explanation of SALT I I and global concerns We si ncerely hope for smoot h ratification Just like NATO we are interested in would 1 ike to hear its main themes SAL 7 111 gray area weapons will be included I would 1 ike to know whether Especially I have great interest in how US forward base system will be takne up in a new treaty Mr McGlffert First let me express appreciation for the GOJ's support Amb Mansfield reminds me that the Japanese government was the first government to come out in support of the treaty This is something our government appreci- ate5 very sincerely On the question of gray area systems the Soviets in SALT I and II attempted to limit forward based systems The US successfully resisted One of the reasons is that the Soviet Union defined US forward based system as strategic because they could hit the USSR but Soviet IRBMs which could hit Europe but not hit the US were not called strategic Shortly after SALT I I was signed the US made a declaration that any future limits on US system for theater systems shou l d be accompanied by limit s on Soviet t heater systems Thus the Sovi ets will have to abandon the ir lnsistance that on l y US theater system be 1 imi ted if t hey want to ach ieve any progress Soviets are willing to do so I don 't know i 1 arise I Whet he r or no t the If so two threshold ques tions The US Ha s a firm position on nether now Whether forward based systems theater systems more accurately descr i bed should be de alt with separatel y o r together wi th central sys tems 2 The degree of comprehens ivene ss which shou ld be set in any •• pa P I ' I iI I ' l • S£CR£1 I want to ask same question I asked last year Mr Tamba Sov · ets touch on FBS in the Pacific a f fect negot i ations on MBFR Mr McGiffert If you take up FBS in SALT Did the II I it will Is this correct I am not aware the Soviets raised systems in WESTPAC Nothing in the MBFR negotiations will prevent the NATO all lance from taklng steps it deems to be necessary or from steps which might affect arms control It is apparent there are some areas of overlap between Gen Lawson MBF and SALT It may be possible as we develop SALT I I I to separate nuclear expansion from those issues concerning conventional forces This may provide additional policies on MBFR Mr Watari It seems that SALT I I I will be concerned much more than SALT If with negotiations with US allies so we would appreciate it if you could provide us information Mr McG ffert Your request is very reasonab l e I might tell a l i ttle of whe r e we a re on t he modern i zing of TNF in Euro pe be cause 1 am Chairman of th e group The group has dec i ded there shoul d be mode rn izat ion t o - a r d the end of the yea r This wl ll A dec i sion on modern i zati on wi ll have a n ef f ect on the pos tu re o f both s ides in SALT 111 negotiations wil l t ake your request under adv i sement In any event we Jf you want to know any more a bout de t eils and if Mr Ar ma want s t o come to Washington l wil l brief him Mr Wa t a r i might ask que s ti on about this later Mr McG i ffert let's move on to Europe and NATO BREAK Mr Mc Gi ff er t I want to briefly turn to Europe and NATO and give an overview of where we are and where we're going signs of leveling off Soviet expansion shows But modernization is expected to continue unabated This spring the DPC reaffirmed the goal of expanding defense expenditure by 3% Most members doing a good job on this The US submitted a budget acccrdingly but inflation may have wiped out some of this pres s ure on '81 budget 162 changes were 1 isted gooc progress on these This will put NATO Last year developed a long term defense program This was decided in May in Washington We are making A summary has been provided to your delegation I wc uld 1 ike to make these points l They are designed to· correct the controversy of neglect arising out of Vi etnam and pervasive Soviet modernization 2 mprovements in NATO are not coming at expense of forces in Asia We intend to continue at least the current level of forces in Asia and make irn r pvoernents 3 We a re hast ily mak ing e ff o r t s to overcome problems of e ff iciency whi ch res ul t from fa ilu re t o s t andardi ze The r e are compl icat ed po l itical prob lems in 1 ac h count ry wa nt ing de fe nse i ndus t ry o f US wa nt ing to cou nt on no one ou t s ide for i ts own de f ens e The st akes are so h ig h t ha t we can overcome Sov · e t ove r s pe ndi ng us only if we become more e fficie nt Let me t u rn to t he ME and Persian Gu ld It i s a t r u i sm to say th e US Japan and indust ral i zed nations o f t he West s hare an interes t n un impeded 8 -5ECRffaccess to ME oil The Soviet Union has no vital inte rest in the area and thus can afford to take more risks more risky That makes a difficult situation even Thus we are concerned about instability in Yemen Afghanistan etc and ' nstability in countries undergoi ng great social and economic change Our response must take into account realities President Carter has made hero ic efforts to achieve an Arab-Israeli peace The US also made a strong res pons e to the Saudi request to help the situation in North Yemen How to dea l with internal instabi lity is a difficult problem in which all of us need to cooperate In the end however only the countries in the area themselves can solve problems of instability But the US may be able to provide the security environment against external threat so that the countries may be able to deal themselves wit internal problems In this connection the question we have been addressing wit hi n the USG is whether we should enhance US presence In area We have had for 30 years a modest ME force presence of 3 ships plus deployments of carrier and surface ba ttle groups which are increased in times of crisis fall of the Shah we had such a force posture Until the During t he first six months of this year we intensified our ef forts i n the 1 0 so that we have had a cont i nuous en larged presence in t he ME Force frolr Pacific Fleet forces That augmenta tion cam exc lu sive ly If as I be li eve we should at least modest ly in- crease ou r presence i n order to demonstrate our concern a mo r e diff i cult que s t ion is ra ised as to how to main t ain that presence wan Moderate Arab states us there but our presence becomes a pol i t ica l I iab il ity because it is a tar get fo r attack by radical Arab states · EEREt Given that pol i tical fact of 1 ife i t seems that the most viable alternative is to increase naval deployments Atlantic and Pacific Fl eets This suggests contr i bution from both the Since both Japan and NATO are concerned we hope they wil 1 think it appropriate even though ship days in say the North Paci f ic might be decreased modestly as a result 'Ila tar i As you have indicated stability of the ME is vital to Japan So we appreciate your efforts As to military measures newspapaers have reported Washington has discussed concrete measures including Force a Special I would 1 ike to hear your view on this McGi ffert There have been newspaper reports about what some call a Unllateral Corps this is bad name because it suggests the US might go·it alone that is not in accord with realities For many years the Department of Defense has r ad a planning · factor for programming forces flgrting one major and 1 2 minor conflict This planning factor has been Such units as the 82nd Airborne and some marine units have been though of principally as units which would be most useful i n what I would call a limited contingency The kint 'of limited contingency we have through of has been one In the Middle East or Korea for example to reinforce UN Fo r ces there So what you are seeing in these reports you hear i s not a referenced to the creat ion of new forces but an emphasis on our part in nak i ng those fo rces more mobile and better a b l e to per form when they get t here We have made progress in las t f ew yea r s In th is area Need less to say we do contingency pl anning for many cort t t ngenc les which m•y be remote and due t o t he that we have l 1 2 war plann i ng f actor this should no t Je t a ken to mean that we will necessari l y do one t hing or anot her but It has 1ad good effect on t he percept ions o f others Wat a r i One more que s tion Regard i ng mili tary fo rce r educt ions In the Indian Ocean I wou ld like to hear about the prog r ess - • zaw 5ECRETdon't know what you consider progress McG i ffert nego iations began ci icumstances changed After Massive Soviet assistance was given to Ethiopians and we told the Soviets this was inconsistent with negotiations That situation hasn't changed a vi w if it would be wise to begin again wonder whether you have If so we would be glad to hear it I think it is rather hard to say categorically whether Watar i resumption should be done or not What is important is your decision whether balance after negotiations be on the Western side If so we would earnestly support it HcGiffert missed Nakajima Your explanation of situation of Persian Gulf has given us mu ch encouragement mod 3 lity We appreciate your efforts Your have also mentioned You mentioned naval forces from both Atlantic and Pacific mentioned ship days in Pacific might decrease You Since from our view naval presence in Pacific is vital we are concerned if your presence in the Pacific decreases I realize this might sound contradictory but I must express the con ern of Japan am sure other Asian countries feel s imilarly would appreciate your not giving the 1mpresslon of decreasing your presence McGiffert We will no t emphas i ze it pu bl i cly Changes tak i ng place will be very modest so pract ically it will no t be o f great s igni ficance would l ike Adm iral Wei sner t o coffroent Weis ner You will reca ll yes terday Mr Nakajima when you visi ted my headquarter s I mentioned ou r pa n t o up dep loyments to the Indian Ocean to 4 per year from 3 and a plan to increase ME forces by 2 ships - those would come from Europe Also increas ed deployments would come f rom Europe so there would be no cha nge f rom the Pacif ic Sta r ting in ' 73 we were sendin g 4 dep loyme nt s pe r year t hen we redu ced to 3 So the new meas r _ i' · - •1 ' -SECRET wi l l not reduce the Pacific Fleet from pas levels To be sure there is no misinterpretation l share your concern and would like to have a little more effort in defense from both the US and from Japan Platt I have a question for the Japanese side Has there been any evol ution in your policy on ME This has been a subject of consultation at the h ighest level of governmen t We appreciate your support and appreciate your desire to move at your own pace on your own pol icy HITI Minister Esaki has visited the ME recently etc could you bring us up to date Nakajima lam sorry I cannot give you the most recent news reiterate our overall pol icy which I though I will talk about later you aid this has been discussed at the highest level wi 11 As Hr Esaki just came back and I think there has been no new assessment yet so I will only reiterate our general posture We will do our utmost to stabilize the area As for economic cooperation we will try our best independently and with continuity The modality of how we will do this has to be developed I am sure we will keep your government informed but there is nothing concrete at this time Yesterday Admiral Weisner when you briefed us there was mentioned of a tact cal air squadron being sent there We i sn er Yes in addition to Is this correct 4 deployments of ships per year and an increas e in ships we have discussed an Inc r ease of air squa dron dep loyed once per year etc For example F-15s in Saudi Arabia AWACS in Saudi Arabia We have not ye t decided on this McGiffer t We need permission of t he host count ry We is ner Saudi Arabia was only an example atari Shall we have lunch r Afternoon Session - 30 July The next topic is the current Asian situation McG i ffert l'd l ike to call on Make Armacost Mr Armacost a fev1 Many of you know more than I do so I will only throw out points for discussion will make three quick points 1 Politically and diplomatically thing are good 2 Some military points are unfavorable J This puts pressure on Japan and US because it affects what we are inte r ested in On the good side 1 USSR-PRC standoff has not abated Conflicts exist but they pit communist country against communist country 2 American military power consolidated by Korea decision Philippines bases agreement and our force posture which General Lawson will discuss tomorrow 3 US-Japan defense cooperation is greater than ever before 4 US-Japan relations with China cause them to act in a restrained man ner 5 Long - rang e trends i n ROK favor them over the North Wash ington - Seoul Tokyo - Seoul r e l at ion s good 6 Taiwan has adju sted well to norma li zat ion Sino-US 7 The US 8 is impressed by ASEAN ' s resilence and cohes ion The Paci fic Bas in 's economy i s strong mak ing the transition to i ndependence wit hout undue strife or external manipu lat ion All t he above are hopefu l and we should try t o con solidate the se nesc ti ve s ide of the l edge r On t he '5ECRE1· l Growth of Soviet power a there are several components Quantitative and qua itative improvements -- the Minski and Ivan Roger have deployed to Vladivostok there are i ncreased fortifications in the Northern Territories the acquisit i on of limited military operating ri ght s in Vietnam t he provision of massive military s upplies t o Vietnam the reby faci li tating the SRV aggression In Cambodia 2 Deve l opment of instabll lty around the Indian Ocean littoral and a s ronger Soviet foothold in SEA raises questions about the security of oil critical to Japan and US 3 Presence of N forces on Thailand border poses risk that the Viet nam conflict will spill over to Thailand 4 Conflicts in Indochina have forced not only Thailand but Malaysia Indonesia and Singapore all ASEAN except maybe the Philippines to reconsider the adequacy of their defenses 5 The refugee issue apart from the human i tarian aspects has threatened to upset delicate balances in Malaysia Indonesia etc because of Chinese emigra t i on f rom Vietnam 6 The Si no-Vietnamese conflict could recur 7 In Ko rea we have d iscovered North Korea is stronger than we thought an d the ROK wi ll have to s tr engthen de f ense ef fo rts US r esponse to these pr c blem areas Sov iet acces s to Indoch i na - we have expressed conc ern and coun t on Vi etname se na ti onal i sm to li mi t t hem in l ong te rm we need to see to i t t hat t he US SR pa ys a high dip l omat ic price for i ts entree t o mil it ary f acil i ties in Vie tnam and its underwrit ing of the SRV 1 s in vas ion of Cambod ia StCRt1 rrRrr LLht As I understand the GOJs response to Vietnam concerning access to the Soviets and what it will cost them it has been very helpful Concerning Indian Ocean we already discussed it this morning In some ways your information may be greater than ours Iran Afghanistan etc Thailand-psychological-warned USSR and SRV of danger of spreading also have expanded a i d and speeded the delivery of support equipment o Thailand We recognize danger o spreading so in short-term we want to forestall recognition of the Heng Somrln government and keep the idea of an inter-national conference on Kampuchea alive At same time we are trying to help other ASEAN countries This ls difficult because of Congressional cuts in assistance and because of jepletion of supplies Your Japanese aid to ASEAN countries has been elpful and in any ways you can help this is helpful to US With respect to China we think neither US or Japan should help China create an antiSoviet front We should encourage our cooperation US-Japan and conduct our relations wi h China in parallel In Korea Secretary Brown discussed new intel li gence that has caused us to reevaluate our withdrawal and now RO K must in crease defense spending They have big in f 1a t ion and an i ncrease i n defe nse spending wil l be d ifficul t so you r he lp in aid and assistance t o t hem would be he lpful Fina l ly on refugees The Tokyo Summit demonst rated wha t can be done rour fund i ng pl us our inc reased quota s plus wha t 7t h Fleet Is do ing is impr es si ve and has st imula t ed the i nternat io nal communit y Mr Wat ari Thank you very muc h Mr Wa t an a be Mr Armacost's presentat ion shows t he leve l of a -- coop ration between US and Japan I cannot improve what he said so I wi 11 onl ·t add a few remarks The Sino-Soviet split is not unwelcome but it is som• what destabilizing Mr Armacost says we should not be worried about one ommunist country pitting itself against another but this still is destabilizing Hike Armacost said we should not join in China's anti-Soviet effort and our approach to China should be in political and economic modernization We support these modernizations but not military modernization We sho uld encourage China's leadership to take a moderate course to the outside world China's leadership Is old and may be in a hurry at the China-Soviet talks We are looking am of the view that China may be reluctant to embark on a Second Lessr6n but some Chinese include Lee Chen Yen favor it This is disquieting We would like to spend some time on this China's view is that they would like to keep the Vietnamese worried so that the situation in Cambodia might improve might go for Laos instead of Vietnam r esponse Recently there is some feeling China Chinese might underestimate the USSR 1 s We would be interested in your view of the Soviet's scenario If China might again act the US and Japan should try to use their influence to moderate the situation because of possible Chinese miscalculation of the Sov iet response Mr Armacost I Sino-Soviet t alks -- mo t ives may be ma ny May red uce tension may buy time for modern i zation may creat e USSR-Vietnam jealousy may have trade advantages I don't think they ' l l get far bu bo th USS R and China may be trying to increase leverage vis -a-v is the US and Japan - -SECRET-Mr Sullivan I agree but I would 1 ike to bridge Mr Watanabe's and Mr Armacost's statements Mike Armacost mentioned spreading to Thailand and Mr Watanabe mentioned the possibility of a Second Less f n shouldn't wait for this to happen We We could be helpful in cooling things off - y I Making it clear to USSR that we will not have a US-Japan-Chinese plot againt them 2 That we want a solution in Cambodia to ease tension 3 We should support ASEAN through this period Mr Watanabe is Lee Chen Yen the one who has been Amb Mansfield making statements about the Second Lesson Mr Watanabe He was quoted in Newsweek as saying the First Lesson was not effective You mentioned the possibility of a Second Lesson 11 Amb Mansfield in Laos We know of Chinese road construction Have the Chinese left Laos as the Laotians requested o r are they sti ll there Mr Watanabe use guerillas I think they l eft Chin a could invad e or they could We are joking that Chinese could use the same tactics Vietnam used Adm Weisner from a mil itry standpoint we don't see ind ication s of a bu i ld up near Laos I t took 6 weeks to pre pa r e for the Fir st les son 11 • Thus in near-term we do not see indications of preparations bu t of cours e thi s is no guarantee that they wi ll not QO it i n the future Mr Watari l would like to ask Mr Armacost to present a balance sheet of the Ch l nese Fi rs t Lesson 11 against Vietnam especi a 11 y was it an asset to the West or not Mr Armacost At first it looked 1 ike an asset willingness to act a restraint on Vietnam etc lt cs It showed China's But now China must look on negative 1 No victory was achieved 2 There was change in Vietnam 1 s situation vis-a-vis Cambodia 3 It caused Vietnam to buildup on China 1 s border 4 Russia's efforts become greater Because of the above and because of cheaper alternatives with which to bleed the Vietnamese I don't think a Second Lession 11 is likely in terms of a conventional military assault Mr Sullivan I don't agree completely the Chinese probably accepted the costs hav done lt They • 1ill explain It as the From a long-term perspective They will not say we shouldn 1 t 11 tactic of the time We had to Act n The Thais and others may have concluded that they had to make a deal with the USSR if China hadn 1 t acted Mr Pl a t t Documents emerging from the National Peoples Congress support the view that the invasion was controversial but that it had to be done Perhaps this is an after the fact justification but perhaps it supports what Mr Sullivan said 18 Adm We i sner Casualty wi se both sides experienced the same --6 000 killed 30 000 inju red But now the Soviets are using Vietnam's bases mucr more both ship s and aircraft etc Soviet advisers went from 2500 to 5000 This must be considered in the costs Mr Armacost This is a minus for the US at least if not for China There are some difference of views on the US side Mr McGlffert What is your view Mr Watanabe Mr Watanabe My personal view is that it was unfavorable to China due to the increased Soviet presence in Vi etnam support for China In ASEAN countries there was North Korea opposed it but ASEAN supported a re ponse to China's credibility being questioned in SEA how we evaluate the military situation in Cambodia evidence The act was The key question is There ls very conflict ing We would appreciate your assessment The Vietnamese are in control of popu l ation centers Adm We f sner and road networks There is resistance The question is can Vietnam continue and can they suppress the opposition Vietnam success prospects look good The near and mid-term The long - term prospects are not so The question ls how much did Po l Pot alienate the Cambodians and how far can Cambodia come back Mr Armacost f agree with Admiral WEisne r Th e problem is that the Sovi et Union i s willing to provid e the necessary support for Vietnam The Soviet s have no other frien d in the area CCCt tT SECRE 2 What they do for Vietnam lessons what they might otherwise have to do themselves I would apprec i ate your views as to how we can moderate Soviet assistance to Vietnam Mr Watari am not a Soviet expert The GOJ has failed to get its We will utilize our 4 isl ands back so our power against Soviets is limited dip lomatic channel to Hanoi and we will ask Washington to try to restrain Mos ow Maybe this is unbalanced Hanoi has always maintained they are ind ependent and that the Soviet presence i n Vietnam is exclusively anti-Chinese The J SSR Vice Foreign Minister Mr Golubin was rather haughty when he visited Tokyo He said there nothing wrong with port visits public and Golub in demanded we deny it Japan made his statement He said it would get him in trouble with Gromyko because it v ould unstabilize relations with ASEAN Mr Watar turn to lead Time constraints should make us move on Japan Security Pol icy In 1980s Now it's Japan's Director General Nakajima will present a report Mr Nakajima I will lead and my colleagues wil l comment see the report att ached Mr Watari We we lcome your ques t io ns on thi s report Mr McG lffert I will as k Mr Armacos t t o comment anc interesti ng pres ent ation It was an exce l lent It shows we both have gl obal interests want to assure you of our In terest s in bilateral planning We of course I I • • I 5ZCRET i i I iI agree fully wit h you on the absolutely critical importance of our bilateral relations h ip and i ts continuing and to be perceived as cred i ble by the Japan ese and US pub ic Meetings I Ike this help to ensure we as government officials are dealing wi th this in best poss ibl e way Mr Armacost I have a comment or two - it was an imp ressive rundown and a subt l e assessment of 1970s which is useful us pressing you too hard sta d ing has grown You need not worry about have been at this for t en years and our under- We are impressed with your autonomous development We have been encouraged by what you have done and we look forward to that cortinuing One other comment Your 1 isting of issues is logical and most of these will come up in discussions on bilateral planning your views about the SOFA On cost sharing I share I only hope you will continue to interpret flexibly as you have and use your economic power to help solve the problems involved with keeping forces overseas an for t he status quo Hr Ikeda Question - many of your premises for the 1980s What if you are wrong Ca l l another meeti ng l aug hter Mr Se ligman Le t me rephr ase the question Maybe you are r ight be m a ma j or evolution in Japanese thinking on defense in 1970s There 1 s It Is possible in the 1980s there wil l be voices in Japan cal l i ng for J apan's doing more wi • hout external s ti mulus for example calls for expansion of Ja pane s e naval fo r ces to the Middle Eas t etc Mr Wa t a ri Japan's de fense program and background wi l l be presented tomorrow and Mr Se l i gma nn ' s que st ion is r e la ted to t his -F rrn E F It is very -5ECRET-difficult to predict what world will look like ten years after but Mr Nakajima's projection is our best guess In a future session I will give my assessment of Japanese domestic political development Mr Nakajima Al Seligmann is correct Japanese public opinion will develop but they will not develop to calls of revising the Constitution Sending naval ships to the Middle East will not come about Conc e rning cost-sharing also more will be said but the SOFA has been expanded to t he maximum extent We have established a good basis and we can do a lot wi thin that framework Mr Tamba We will do more but within that basis I am very glad to hear that we don't have to worry that you vdll push us Government officails are very careful but your Congress- men for example are sometimes perceived as your government There has been a favorable trend on the Security Treaty in Japan because you have let us v ork things out and allowed us to insert legal limitations in the guideline s We kept saying this Is the I imit of SOFA and we still expanded but now h is is really the l lrn it much laughter Mr McGiffert We ha ve great fa i th in ou r ingenuity and yours Amb Mansfield t o t e po in t Mr Naka jima 1 s t hes i s was supe rb It was bri ef and I was ve ry impres sed Mr Nakaj ima Rema rks l i ke t ha t from a man I Ike Ambassador Mansfield i s e ry reassurin g Adm Weisner Mr Nakajima cou ld you tell us wha t migh t be poss i ble e • anltn z Mr Nakajima This has been discussed for 20 years or so There was a theoretical problem of whether we can do this constitutionally The thr•ee or four times it was discussed It was always criticized in the press The Government feels that sending forces overseas under a UN flag ls possibly different but it will take some time for the Japanese public to understand It is a bold guess as to whether this is possible in 1980 1 s units or nurses may be examples of what we can do Communication But since there has been no full public discussion it is hard to say what Is possible Mr Tamba It would also take a legal change since nothing in SDF law at this time authorizes such operations Mr Platt change In the 1980s You mentioned that Chinese and Soviet leadership will am comforted by the record of the US-Japan relation- ship for coping with change Our relationship is the stable one hov US and Japan transfer power pov •er they don't either the We We know don I t know how USSR and China transfer I have hope that the US-Japan relationship is basis for coping with changes You may be too conservative but I am cor f ident we can hand le t hings as before because our US- Japan demonstrated capabi li t y to dea l w it h change Gen Lawson I wou l d no te t hat I will sen d a cable home to stop wo rk ing on changes to SOFA and start working on word maximum Mr Tamba Pl ease s tress t he word f i nal 23 StCRE1- would like to explain the kind of cost-sharing projects Mr Watar i we are thinking about on Thursday As you know in Japan a change in leader- ship does not change policy too much If you agree we will move on to next subject Mr McGi f fert General Ginn will make the presentation We will have mc v i es Gen Ginn Read presentation see paper Mr Watari Thank you Joint studies between the SDF and USFJ should hc1 •1e come long ago but because of the pol it i ca 1 st i uat l on they haven't an moved by what has been done thus far appreciation for what has been done We I would Ii ke to express my are looking forward to these studies to teach the JSDF many valuable things I would 1 ike to emphasize that these a re studies and not decisions but I think they are very valuable in contrlbuti19 to our knowledge Mr McGiffer t You have ou r as s ura nce o f our cont i nua t ion and increased s uppo r t I vtou l d l i ke t o cong ra t u late Admiral Sakonj o and Gene ral Ginn and their sta ff s was wonde r ing i f t he y wou l d request expans ion i n t he ir s ta ff' s number s Gen Gi nn I al ready got 20 mor e Mr Sakon jo Mr Ikeda r efu sed me Gen Ginn Ask fo r 40 Admira l Hr Ikeda Our Jo in t Staff is ve ry eff i c i ent SEC ET--Mr HcGiffert Adm Weisner I hate to think ours isn't so efficient We understand your political constraints Mr McGiffert I was glad to see that the Associated Studies will consider logistics and complementarity go on long after the basic plan is completed think that will have to question whether and to what extent the training of Japanese officers in US ought to be expanded to support this planning effort Gen Ginn There are several programs undersay Mr Watari We hope to expand scope of training in the US problem is the high cost A detailed explanation will be given by Mr Ikeda torrcrrow Mr McGiffert We have more questions but shall we wait until tomc rrow Mr Watari Our let ' s adjourn I '9 - J c _ ·a 1 t r rr _· ' Th ird Sess ton Watari Today it is scheduled that the J apanese side will present the Present situation and long-range plans for Japanese defense If it ' s OK with you we'd like to present an explanat ion of Japan's White Paper on Defense published recently McGiffert Watari Is that OK Fine Agenda says long-term prospects but really will be mid-term prcspects because will extend 4-5 years Before getting into prospects f or Japan Defense let me touch on current public opinion in Japan on defense matters Recent Japan public opinion seems to see real i ty as it is I t seems to me this tendency has become strong since the end of Vietnam War i n 1975 In a r ecent opinion poll 86% of the Japanese public understand and s uppor t the SDF an d 68% su pport the Mut ua l Securi ty Treaty It seems t hat tr i s cha nge in nat ional opinion is reflected in a c ha nge i n Japan ' s oppos i t ion p r ti e s al thoug h such change is not a s c learl y v i s i bl e as cha nge i n publ ic op in ion yet The regu l ar session of t he Japanese Di et ended i n June Conce r ning defens e ma i nly the E2C procureme n t as a part o f the so-called Gruma n scandal was a topic January i979 Th is wa s fnitiated by the US SEC report of We had some trouble with the E2C ca s e bu t i t was a good escape for us fr om more se ri ous issue s Thank s to th e E2 C scandal th e fo cus o f oppo s iti on c r itici sm wa s shif ted from che gu ide li nes a nd cost - shari ng to incident a ls o f t he EZC prob lem about th e E2C s tart- up Because of t he deba t e on E2C we we r e worried Whe n t he budget was un frozen in July we sent our ------- of f icials to the Un i ted States • It was supposed to be an FMS case but it tur ned out we can contract with the US Navy and to the US Navy Concerning cost-sharing issues l ast year we received kind co n ideration from Mr McGiffert introduction For this we are thankful to DOD Thank you very much This includes my Now we will begin di scussion of three things Director Ikeda will discuss 1 The Present Status of Defense Power 2 The Projected Mid-Service Est imate 3 The Prospect of Feasibi l ity of Achieving the Estimate Ikeda Please see Exhibit A Japan has gradually built up its defense power He reads paper -- see copy Watari Weisner If you have any comments or questions we will be very pleased It was a very comprehensive report ap roach to many problems you have to consider It was a very balanced It clears the air and shows t c t you recognize various needs C3 etc radar air and land s ide as well It is clear that we all recognize air defense as one of the highest needs It i s equal to ASW On naval s i de I urg e you to give emphasis t o sh i ps that can work close in 200 to 300 miles as well as ships that ha ve sufficient l egs to work further out if necessary in de fense of the SLOCs Speak ing personal ly can see some s ce nar io s where it wou l d be in Japan' s be s t i nterests to control t he SLOCs as f a r south to speak boldly as the Ma occa Straits This of course i nd icates a requ ir emen t for logistic s upport ca pability conside rabl y i n excess of th at required to suppor t a zone of only 200 to 300 mi les a round Japan In logi st i cs recow mend you give atte ntion to petro eum storage mines explosive for mines and supp l ies not only for mines but all supplies land fo rces General Takashima and I had a good discussion of You should not neglect these He feels we should not overlook the possibility of land act ion invasion ln the North more or equally Important speaking personnelly One final comment think it is absolutely necessary to have capabil i ty to close the straits especially in patrolling aircraft mines c3 etc That would be the #1 thing Japan could do to help the situation Gen Ginn l endorse Admiral Weisner 1 s views We will discuss these in bilateral planning in addition to discussing mere hardware issues we will discuss how we will carry these programs out Gen Lawson the report us I would like to add my congratulations on the quality of I had a chance to take a quick look at summary you have provided In our own JCS studies in the last two years we have been impressed by worldwide nature of the Soviet threat and l was glad to see you recognize this It became clear to us that there is a need for coordination between the US and i s Allies e g NATO and Japan or a strategy mismatch will occur The probl ems for us a s we go i nto the 198Os a re not on ly that we expend resou rces in the most efficient way but a lso tha t we employ t hese weapons in most effl lent way for our joint defense Thu s we wi 11 try to ensu r e tha t joint exer lses are done in bes t way and in combined exce rcises ensu re that command and con tro l is carri ed out in the most e f l c ien t way and t hat th ey a r e effecti ve Agai n jus t le t me cong ratulate you on the quality of your ef f ort 28 -SECRET· Mr Wo 1few i t z I have a question of detail on logistics You me ntioned two important areas war reserves for the GSDF and improved storage for mines Mr Ikeda Can you give us any details I will try to answer as clearly as possible As far as the GSDF is concerned the total tonnage of ammo has decreased 1977 was the bottom year Since then we have tried to increase e g this year there was a 25% budget increase for ammunition We hope to continue that Increase through 1984 and I think by 1984 our ammunition supply will become sizeable We will have trouble in finding storage places so we need to cooperate with USF in Japan Regarding mine storage we thinking about two things thousand mines we are trying to get more j b I · L· · 'A take about two years ·• • · i ' Now have several Also presently mines are We hope to improve this It wi 11 From next year we will start building such facilities By 1984 we will have a very sizeable capability to do what Admiral Weisner asked blockade the straits Mr McGiff ert Mr Watari you referred to publi c opin ion changes and Hr Ikeda talked about 1% GNP expendi t ure as necessary to ac h ieve these goa l s rea l i ze i t i s hard f or you to say bu t i n thi s period of time you desc ribed will t he t% 1 iml t r ul e of thumb on defens e expendit ures erode Hr latari In formulating this esti mate we worked within the 29 SECRET SECRET assump tion of 1% in 1976 Th i s 1% ru l e of thumb was decided by t he Cabinent As members of government we must therefo r e work with this Whet he r this wi 1 l change or not is strictly a political matter As far as public op i nion cha nges previously publ le opinion support for defen s e was below what was necessary to sustain SOF opin ion has caught up to real i ty chan9e s in public opinion Presently public The future depends on future This mid-term estimate ls not fixed We will review it every year and every 3rd year we will do a fundamental rev iew so It ls not a Japanese GNP is increasing very fixed estimate so fa st that if we go up to 1% we will have a significantly increased budg e t Mr Ikeda Presently our budget is 0 9% so if we go to 1% the def ense budget will increase 230 billion yen Presently our defense investment hardware items is 430 billion yen In future we will put these gap fun ds t hose between 0 9 and 1% 230 bi l l ion yen into such i nve stment - a lmost a 50% increase Mr McG iffert I would like ta echo what my colleagues said aboL t the exce ll ence of your pr esentation Mr Wa t a ri Shal l we take a break Yes le t ' s 30 ECRET ECRE t After the break Mr Watarl As I indicated before please let us present an explanation of the recently published White Paper on Defense been published every year since 1976 week 24th of July The 1979 version published last We tried to describe only the facts •1as not very different from reality It has What we said The Japanese mass media said we responded to the Soviet buildup too radically Mr Ikeda will present the report Mr Ikeda 24th The White Paper was approved by the cabinet on July The report is thick and is not yet translated so you have a summary Reads English language summary This White Paper was treated more by the press than ever before and we 'IOuld 1 ike to continue it every year Your comments would be helpful in writing our next defense budget Mr McGiffert Can we read this summary and respond this afternoon or tomorrow Mr Watari Yes Hr HcGiffert Now General Lawson will make a presentation on the Indian Ocean and Asia In 1980 1 s Gen Law on said I will try not to repeat what already has been The recent opening of bases and airfields in Vietnam could have fer reaching consequences and we will monitor the situation closely Addition of the Backfire and other Soviet developments have affected the s i tuation We would be happy to discuss them with you in the discussion period If you desire But let me say the US·has not stood - I •' '' CRET-- After the break •• r Watari As I indicated before please let us present - - h ' ·' an exp l anation of· recently published White Paper on Defens TI- t 1 1 b-t•ir °' ·' - ut l ished every year since 1976 ' 1979 version publish d last week • ' - - 1 l-v - tU C ' •' 1 0 i tO We tried to describe only the facts Very' different - t 24 thi 1 • - ' - vi 'f Japan _ •ss media said we responded to h ra i' a ty ld -i1r Ikeda wil 1 present h l' r --r Ti L - • - _ 1 -- r ·'l n - - Mr Ikeda Approved Cabinet on - 24th 11 Report is thick and tJ•1 -n not yet translated so you have a summary Reads English language ' summary 4-h -_ This white paperl treated more by press than ever before and we would like to continue it every year Your comments would be help- fu in writing our next defense budget Mr McGiffert Can we read this summary and respond this af t ernoon or tomorrowf Mr Watari Ye • ·- '°'· Mr McGiffert J·· f- r -L i j · i t er Now General Lawson willApresent r-o-and Asia in 1980 ' ' Gen Lawson I will try not to repeat what already has t t been said_- Recent opening of bas es and a ir fields i n Vi etnam ' could have far reaching consequences and we will mon ito r -cl s- i Additi on of 1 Ckfire and other Sov i et development s have I afficte d the situation I ryu We would be happy t o discuss them wi th 4-h inl'l discussio n perio d if you desire £ot stood 1 i ll But let me say JS has We have and will remain in Asia Navy 'A 'f th Fl eet bui l t around Harr i er battle group and two amphibious ready gr oups Pr i me mi s sions inc lude peacetime presence i n ar ·n• s • l II I I SECRET 2 Pacific and Indian Ocean SLOG protection and offensive operations in wartime Despite uncertainties total force levels should increase in early 1980's Increase mainly in surf combatents and SSNs while reductions will come in auxiliaries and reserve ships We will remain flexible as we did in Vietnam drawing on ships from Atlantic More recently we drew on Pacific and Mediterranean to build up Indian Ocean In addition to sea-based forces Navy and Marine aircraft are located ashore ASW P3's regularly operate from Adok Alaska to Dojo Garcia sp etc By end of 5 year defense program all F-4's except those on MIDWAY and CORAL SEA will be F-14's land-based P-3's will be updated surface ships will be greatly approved by towed array and LAMPS McIII helo AF - PACAF has 10 squadrons of 192 F-4s 2 in P I 4 in Korea 4 in Okinawa 3 of 4 in Korea tasked for Korea others are available f or gen eral Asian contingenc i es f-i F- 15 1 s will begin fro m Kfdena next year AWAC s will rotate an d to K$dena by end of FYDP fiv e AWACs will be availab le i n Westp ac F4G Wild Weasa l wi l l dep l oy to Clar k s tarti ng n ext y ear Ground Forces 28 000 troop of 8th Army are part of CFC strategic reserve Withdrawals of 2nd Division will b e held i n abeyance by Pre s idential di rec tive 3 -SECRET Withdrawals beyond 1981 will be reexamined based on intel igence estimate of N-S military balance and evidence of retuction of tensions No changes in USMC deployments are programmed are afloat in MAU MAU and BLT Some of these deployed marines marines may operate more often than in past to Indian Ocean 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii is CINCPAC's strategic reserve I MAF is in East Pac -- no change is contemplated in its employment St1·a tegic Forces Squadron of B-52's and SSBNs are based in Guam First TRIDENT is expected in Pacifin in FY 1981 Mobility Forces MAC operates 70 C-S's and 234 C-14l's Based on US but great flexibility to deploy to areas such as Korea and Persian Gulf Yesterday we discussed Limited Contingency Force We are developiijg such a force for non-NATO contingencies with emphasis on Middle East 1 Kor ea and Persian Gulf i ndependent of overseas bas es and support exact siz e depend s on scenari o self-sus tain ing and capabl e of operat ing for at l east 60 days On e additional word about Indian Ocean thus far deployments mainly from PAC OM i n near fu t ur e dec i s ion f orthc oming f orces may come from EUCOM 2 4 SEGRE -infrastructure is meager Diego Garcia expansion will be completed by end of FY80 but still will be very austere Aircraft facility will be es p ecially limited In summary we will improve especially qualitatively Esp ecially navy's force size is long-term concern Grow through mid-1980s and still time for cecision on long-term size and nature of Navy Combination these military forces reserve forces airlift etc provide basis for our response We look forward to your questions Mr Watari Thank you very much Hearing in concrete terms US persence in WestPac and Indian Ocean and goal improvement I feel reasssured Let's ask some questions Mr Sakonjo MIDWAY homeported in Yoko Many newspaper reports considering another carrier homeported in Korea Pacific Islands Guam etc Amb Weisner will not be any et c Is there any truth Some speculation over years Guam can't Odds are there Pacific Island l acks housing Navy has l ooked at Austra l ia but odds a re very h eavy there will not be any f ur ther overs eas homepor t i ng Mr Watari Just before coming to Hawaii I saw pr e ss a r t i c l e that USN is consi der ing us ing s hi py ards i n Singapore Amb Wei s ner Al r eady using t o suppl ement Subic Any t ruth I do ubt any increas e Mr Wat ari Do you have a ny plan f or using Chinha e Ko rea See Br own visited and some pape r s comme nte d I s -SECRH Amb Weisne r Totally erroneous No increase there nor no plans for ho meporting there Mr Armacost in ROK He visited there to see some Navy facilities Had already seen Air Force and Army Mr Tamba Gen Lawson could you describe what kind of facility Diego Garcia will be at end FY-80 Does recent Korean decision affect military assistance to Korea Number 3 - does recent Soviet use of Vietnam bases affect your force posture Number 4 - will you change USMC force posture in Okinawa in near future Gen Lawson Diego Garcia Okinawa - no change Until now catch as catch can We are trying to make temporary facility permanent e g fuel tanks more permanent shelters Mr Armacost Still very desolate Some effects on assistance to ROK transfer was based on withdrawals a ffect equipment trans f er Equipment As withdrawals show it will Secondly some will go forward eg I - Hawk planned i n 19 3 battalions will be turned over Do esn't affect balance - simply wil l be turn ed over ou t st anding F-16 1 s e tc Some issues Due t o i nte lli gence expec t ROK to tak e anoth e r look particul a rly at giv i ng p r io rity t o gr ound forc es Unti l assessment complete I won 't say any t hing 4t h we hav e ma inta i ned high FMS lev e l s t o ROK we wi l l hav e t o l oo k a t t his als o in view of withdr awal de l ay et c Cong r essio nal cuts Finall y we will l oo k a t way s of improvi ng what we have i n Korea within budget const r aints du e to i n tellig ence as sessment L ' J L i 6 SECRET Amb Weisner First a little more on Diego Garcia - runway is being lengthened - ramp space-SX increase 600 foot pier put in POL storage-big increase 40 foot channel dredged anchorage enlarged now 1600 people includes 800 seabees permanent personnel will increase from 800 to 1300 Still agree with General Lawson -- it is austere and limited With regard to Soviet use of Vietnam we don't know how much they will use Don't know if they will increase use have Vietnamese increase size or send in USSR personnel there We do know they have had teams investigating port facilities and airfields Could b to advise Vietnam could be to impreove these facilities themselves Soviets etc capability some degree Any usage increases their Great increase in usage could increase their capability a great deal e g Cam Ranh Bay is halfway between Vladivostok and Indian Ocean to them This would be very helpful It increases importance of US bases in Pacific Islands us e of Singapore etc Yes if they used these bases it would afi ect our posture Mr Watar i At present wha t is your assessment of capa- bil ity of Dana g and Cam Ranh Bay to support ships and a ircraft Adm Weisner mi ght use Wil l need lo gi s ti c s f or ai rcraf t type s t hey Hang e r s et c a r e a ll in pl ace Danang ext ensivel y and use d Cam Ranh Bay For shi ps we use d Much a s de t er io rated Vi et nam or Soviets woul d have to improve i f th ey were to use th es e base s extensiv ely f or s hips r Watari I t is s a id that commun ication facilities have been constructed a t Danan g Do y ou think it ' s in us e I I i I I I 7 SfSRIT Adm Weisner Yes and will improve DF capability and point-to-point communications Mr Watari One more point concerning North Korea force levels is review complete Mr Armacost If so what is your assessment Not necessarily finished Increase emphasis since 1975 and there will be follow-on studies of near echelon support etc E g various studies have been conducted Div- isions strength revised from 25 to 37 Mr Watari Although it is past 12 I'd like to have Mr Okazaki present our view of Mr Yamashita's visit to ROK Mr Okazaki Practi ally no concrete results except visit took place Mr McGiffert Mr Okazaki That's very important So planned Just a precedent so it can be done again Process is maybe important and had to be done delicately In case of predecessor Kanemaru visit cancelled Plan leaked and This time no secret planning just kept saying it was important Yamashita and Okazaki both said twice publicly in Diet before hand Only JCP criticized No newspaper criticized St i ll al most canc elled due to mis re l ea se of Kim Dae J ung cables US State Depa rtment and du e to talk in h l ·· ' ----------- ·· 1n visi t could not b ·• Mr Sullivan testified in june as to purpose of Pre s ident Car t e r' s Kore an v isit Tha t helped So we quietly prep ared No joint commun i que press rel ea se int ell igence est imate of North Korea Onl y friendly ta l ks ROK side comp le t ely agre e d ROK 8 SEC Hgave no press release except schedule ROK may have even suppressed press -- less than parliamentarians visit We told them we told US to treat Korean withdrawal etc carefully Both Japan and ROK agreed to continue exhcnaging visits of military personnel and intelligence exchange Also Yamashita invited Minister Ro to Japan At dinner we invited Korean training vessels to visit Japan and they did also This shows how careful to now - not even training visits exchanged much Opposition parties didn't criticize so July was JSP solidarity with Korea month slogan was destroy Yamashita visit was in the Fall They thought the visit There were some demonstrations against but Police said level very unprecedently low mention this briefing Please don't Only background press much more favorable than we expected 1 Primary Press said no · opposition to visit in general 2 they are against future US-ROK-Japan military cooperation Prospects in future There will be mutual visits in future When Minister Ro wants to visit we must invite him f ut ure we must be modest In I t is my pers onal view Koreans -SECRCT- 9 They want more understanding from Japan favorable consideration in emergency Of course they want economic assistance etc But what they really want is sense of security want to have friends same as they want symbolic presence of your 2nd Division WatBnabe Want to emphasize delivery of presentation discuss out of room dimension Don't Deplomatically we have to add another In my personal view Japan and ROK mutually misunderstand see next page SECRET- - u _ 1 _ _ e L _ _ 10 each other due to colored glasses of the past must proceed carefully Korea Thus we Another point is stance toward North Japan supports security of ROK but have to take into account reaction of North Korea closer to Peking than Moscow we like that Today NK politically Because Peking is moderate We must look at changing environment - Japan-PRC US-PRC Sino-Soviet etc We were pleased by small NK response to President Park's call for lessening tension in January We are carefully watching I think Kim Kim-Il-Song is groping for ways to cope with changes in international situation not to his liking We note with concern your finding of NK increase in forces but most impor tant is NK's intentions violence etc I talked too much but wanted to add we considered NK reaction as well I agree with Mr Okazaki that it was good to break taboo We advertised only ceremonial visit to Japan public and NK McGiffert Plausible argument that Kim may see time running out What likelihood do you think of attack Watari I think in due course he must be per suaded to a ccept s t atus qu o Deng told us China and even USSR opposes v iolence Kim must adapt For a yea r or two or thre e I t hink North Ko rea wi l l not a t temp t overt ac ti on vis - a -vi s ROK I t h i nk Political Bureau of North Korea mi gh t be debating opening -SECRET-- I I II I I --- l - • • •• - 11 door to a better international relations yet their rejection of Carter-Park call for talks is disappointing But I think they are discussing whether to accept status quo or not Accepting status quo is completely opposite to what they have been saying to date My office was in charge of intelligence exchange Sakonjo We made same question to MG Kirn NK intentions said immediate future is very important He He said NK might attack if they can get help from PRC or USSR Ginn Three years from now we will be in better shape F-15 AWACs Right now tactical warning is only a matter of hours McGiffert Unfortunate reality that Seoul as an urban area has expanded to North 2 00 o'clock Shall we come back at 2 30 vice We will respect your confidence concerning Korea discussion Watari I agree with you on procedure one thing Gen Yamashita told me Let me just say He was impressed in ROK US forces on du t y 24 hours p er day 6000 mil es fr om Wash ington -SECRfF - • ' ' SECRET · 1 August PM Mr Watari Let us egin Mr McGiffert Mr Watari Mr Sullivan We have a few more comments on Korea if OK Please Appreciate Mr Watanabe's remarks a lso were disappointed in NK's lack of response We It was sti ll worth our asking however because we also realize t here is a reassessment going on there We must convince them invasion is not in their interest eg decision not to withdraw I will not speak about the likelihood of NK invasion but would like to say a little about PRC and USSR feelings On China one thing that has changed is US-PRC normalization Last time NK agreed to talk was immediatly after Shanghai ommunique 1 But we can't expect too much help from PRC As far as USSR they have avoided Korean involvement as too great Of course with leadership change a risk of conflict with US etc is always a danger So what is called for i s steady cautious approach confident that time is on side of ROK Mr Armacost Important in our de cis ion was GOJ concern to hav e wi thdrawa l tie d to diplomatic actions Also t ied to idea that NK's intenti ons are related to likelihood of US resp onse Want to insure NK understand any a ct ions on th eir part carry heavy risks 2 SECRET Mr McGiffert on Korea Mr Watari I think that concludes comments Thank you very much for opening this discussion Mr Watari Shall we go to next item which will be lead by US Mr McGiffert I think cost-sharing is next I under- stand you want to do that tomorrow Mr Watari I was expecting to discuss interoperability and technology transfer this afternoon I have not brought Mith me data on cost-sharing today Mr McGiffert and weapons systems Fine let us turn to technology transfer Let me make some general remarks to begin I understand from time to time Japan has felt it was not treated as well as NATO with technology transfer Not so Dramatic example is F-15 in which case we have released greater amount of technology to you than to Europe in the case of F-16 On the other hand I would not say there haven't been problems There have been some due to technical and administrative delays The se can result from process by which we make decision in case by case basis In addition to norma l process i nvolving DOD and Depart ment of State consultations there is an ad hoc committee involving representatives of service concerne d and officials of the Department of Defense in areas such as R D etc There can be del ays or problems if p ermissi on fro m NATO countries must b e sought as in the - r- _ •• 3 -SECR CT recent case of the SG-50 a I'm sure you have bureaucratic an d special interests that try to influence when to buy when to coproduce etc but it seems to me that the stronger our defense cooperation is the easier it is to overcome obstacles becuase the stronger our cooperation the easier it is to argue that transfer of technology is in our common interest Finally let me refer to some self-evident propositions 1 There may be cases where we can minimize duplication of R D thereby releaving funds for other purposes if we transfer technology 2 Release in technology can be important element in improving our ability to operate together have common logistics etc 3 On the other hand if efficiency is criterion if number of a system is small efficiency might be served by purchase rather than by cooproduction In cases where you coproduce equipment that could be purchased much cheaper I know yo u have your reasons fo r doing this however i t i s n't the most effici ent us e of resources Tho se are my preliminary comments we would be interested in your perceptions bureaucratic interests problems etc Mr Watari On the one hand I understand wha t Mr McG iffe rt said very well As far as cost aspect is concerned however you wou ld agree with me cost aspect i s not the Qr-r r r-1 I I ' • ' 4 only criterion We must also maintain defense industry in Japan even though small Domestic production also has advantage especially in repairs and operation Coproduction domestic production or import must be decided on a caseby-case basis We include considerations of state our industry In case of F-15 or P3C numbers justify coproduction of RF4 and E2C small numbers favor import In case Could you give us example of what you consider appropriate for import Mr McGiffert list E2C was appropriate Don't have any Consideration should be case by case Mr Ikeda As far as technology transfer we had not now some trouble concerning F-15 ALR-56 ALQ-135 request was rejected so we started our own R D gressed well now you say you can release but now we are happy Our It pro- Same with P3C Another case Senator Glenn came to our office and commented about low percentage of our budget for R D He said we should increase I explained our history Ten years ago we had 2% but we gave up to acquire major mis si les and airc ra ft JDA is th e only one custom er of our defense industry so i f our industry starts R D we must buy it So we will increase our budget but this is contradiction with buying more from your co untry But we will try t o mak e coopera tion closer Colonel Milburn It would be helpful to know in advance whether l icense production is going to be undertaken p ermitt ed or not s Sf CR£i Mr I keda This is not a problem i t is a fact Mr Watari Mr Ikeda explained the situation As far as release of equipment about which l i cense production is now underway there isn't any major problem at present Con- cerning t he procurement of equipment purchased by FMS there was some which were not de l ivered after the time they should have been l ater We have prepared a list we wi ll present you Concerning Tartar sp missile and NIKE Hawk some were paid for 3 years ago but not delivered As far as the reasons for the delay not only US at fault in some cases Japanese at fault also Anyway it is necessary to correct situation where no delive r y even through fragment made audit we faced this criticism This year in Deit I would like to see working level off icials have close cooperation If we can't do in Tokyo I am happy to send to Washington Not necessary to decide who is wrong j ust to solve prob l em Mr Mc Gi f f ert I'm glad you raised t his and gave me t his l is t so we can give it i nt ensive mana gement attention I hop e not nece s sary to send your offi ci als to Was hi ng to n but we are happy to receive them Mr Watari I don't know too much about detai ls and I don 't wan t t o ac cus e anyone j us t want t o de scrib e si tuati on Col Milburn by Mr Tsutsui sp to ten days LTG Grav es and RADM Altweg have li st given I be lieve answer forthcoming in a week 6 Mr McGiffert Concerning a comment made by Mr Ikeda I ' m not sure I agree with Sena t or Glenn As far as US is willing to transfer to Japan Japan engaging in R D in same area is likely to be duplicative and to lend to non-interoperative equipment Mr Watari Please let me touch upon another case are very much concerned about delay in F-15 program OUr engine producer informs us Japan enjoys a low priority are told your Defense regulation covers this cooperate with Department of Commerce We We Also you must We would appreciate favorable consideration Mr Armacost week We expect decision on this too within a We have requirements in the MOU on this matter Mr W tari Thank you Please allow one more question Necessary for JDA to know F-15 follow-on program to decide F- l SJ program Is it possible for us to continue F-15D even af t er US Air Force f i nishes Mr Ikeda We unde r stand y ou wi ll f i n ish F- 15 in Oc t 1983 after yo u have 789 or s ome t hin g no program now After t hat you have In our case next year we will get 34 we will ge t F-lSDJ We canno t get on time whether we can get or not get more in 1982 or 198 3 Also We are worrying Also we will ma ke a contract to We need t o kn ow if we can -8ECR 7 SECRET Mr Armacost Hard to get a firm assurance at this time There is a likelihood you can get it or can you possibly accelerate the rate at which you acquire the DJ model Mr Ikeda As I explained this morning as F-4s attrit sp we must get more F-lSs but if my information on your completion of F-15 is correct we cannot get them Why can't you buy earlier Mr McGiffert Mr Ikeda We cannot get our budget in advance Mr Armacost We have same problem Strong likelihood production will continue Mr McGiffert Mr Armacost decision Don't count on it At what point will you be able to make Can you make decision in FY-82 budget By that time you will know Mr Watari cooperate About this case we'd like to continue to I understand interoperability is to be included or we can go to next subject Mr McGiffert Let's go on Do you feel that current consultative arrangements are sufficient or should we consider improvements c hanges Mr Watari For the present we'd like to use existing channel if it proves insufficient we ' d like to consult again Adm We isner I think that's best If you haven't got good answ ers we will elevate to proper level of proper channels 8 -SECRE4Mr Armacost Like to reinforce early warning is good As in trade field Last fall when Secretary Brown was hre you raised problems we solved by getting to high level I think we can solve these by time your Minister comes Important to raise problems in proper time early enough Mr Watari Thank you When Minister Yamashita meets Secretary Brown we don't want them to discuss but we hope accompanying staffs can do Mr McGiffert Mr Watari That's fine With your permission I'd like to talkd about joint training and cost-sharing now I have my material Concerning joint training we think it is extremely important to upgrade technique -1--0 1 -SE0RH and exchange information so we can respond as appropriate I would like to expand joint training and exercises How- ever as you know Japanese domestic situation can pose problems for us so I'd like to go forward gradually step by steps so we can enjoy public support have experience this field MSDF and ASDF GSDF has not experienced yet I 1 d like to see GSDF have some opportunity but you have no US ground troops stationed in Japan so we are considering how to do this As for MSDF it has conducted joint training with US carriers etc and this year we are planning to send MSDF to RIMPAC exercise As for RIMPAC we haven't announced yet so I don't know what the reaction will be We have never done such an exercise before This might have subtle bearing on Japanese public feeling We would like to con- sult with US closely on this Nakajima I'd like to comment on this you at the time We will consult with We will explain to our people that MSDF will exercise with USN If we pa r tic ipate with AN ZUS i t would cause criticism Weisner We are anxious as you are to expand goin g to do i t two or three years ago We are ready to do it You were You had to cancel We have already agr eed to public affairs aspects to en sure it meets your needs 1'0 -oEGRH We recognize your problems so we will proceed at your pace Nakajima Thank you Ginn We will continue to cooperate militarily and politically We do not want to downgrade service to service exercises but we will also try to achieve more in GSDF - Army training combined joint exercises as well Watari Thank you training Please let me continue on joint As GEN Ginn mentioned Air Force joint training has proceeded well since second half last year to have once a month 12 times a year do among rescue forces too We want Also we'd like to As far as training for Japanese pilots go we were thinking of sending ASDF fighter pilots to US We discussed at last SSC and so continued discus- sion As far as we know for 24 pilots 50 hours each it would be $2S million We are looking for ways to make this cost more manageable for us Th i s i s what I wanted to say about joint e xercises and train i ng Weisner This tra i ning is f or F-4 pilot s and dep ends on wh ether yo u us e d our F- 4s or not might be less once type ye a r costs much lower I do n 1 t hav e fi gur e s but and l ocation dec ided Also second Also perhaps yo u might be able to ·-- ECRCT • use your ground support equipment and training missiles This involved the lease of 10 F-4s and purchase of all equipment from US Figures presented hopefully represent worst case situation McGiffert Quite a bit involved in this Perhaps Mr Watari staffs could also discuss this when Mr Yamashita visits Watari I feel that this pilot training is a cost rather than technique problem If we had more money we could do But our budget is limited so it would be difficult to go ahead even if we discussed when Yamashita visits Tamba We would also have to decide some legal questions fires accidents etc Armacost Do you know which specific areas are of concern Tamba No You have a SOFA with Germany for it Milburn We train 3000 HAWK and HERCULES peronnel at Fort Bliss Texas each year so I'm sure at least procedures for that exist Watar i About training we also have problem for training personnel for E2C USN Japanese off i cials now discussing with Prob ab ly we wil l di s c us s wi th Gr umann app re ci a te your he l p on t h is McG i ffe r t Certai nl y - ·- f - c·01· titaotJJ We would r • t -· l-3 Watari l _ Let's go to cost-sharing although I'm not sure I can lower it all Chart you are now reviewing shows Japanese expenditures in relation to stationing of US Forces in Japan About this I talked with ASD McGiffert last year and I feel we carried out what we talked about We budgeted for FY 78 for labor cost sharing yen In facilities we budgeted We would like to continue whatever we can do within existing SOFA As far as labor costs are concerned this year's measure are the utmost we can do and I completely agree with what Mr Nakajima said yesterday As to facility improvement aspect the problem is not SOFA but so called Ohira Statement In last Diet session we believe we have explained t his satisfactorily As far as cost-sharing for 1980 we are now considering with Finance Ministry We have no intention of changing the scheme as far as labor cost sharing is concerned But as far as facility aspect we are thinking of increasing this year 's 22 billion y en basis How much we can increase this fund remains to be seen have to deci de by end of August We About f aciliti es improve- ment ther e was a DFAA- USFJ mee t in g overall fi gure would amoun t to $1 10-50 0 mill i on 11 0 -50 0 bi l l io n y en f or housing etc This will require several years iv t 'µ · Q ' J -------- II I l-cf -··-4 -SECRET II About specific issue of mine storage we are not thinking of building that as part of cost sharing but will build for MSDF at Hachinohe near Misawa McGiffert views I will respond tomorrow I appreciate your Let me say how much we appreciate what you have done to now I know how difficult it has been and I want you to know how much we appreciate it II II II i I I SECRET Watari Let us begin the last meeting If the US side has any questions about Japanese presentation yesterday we would be happy to receive them McGiffert Watari Which one We are happy to move on if there is nothing laughter McGiffert REgarding cost sharing I once again want to express my appreciation for your efforts record you presented It is impressive I reviewed the In particular the initiatives you have taken the last two years have been particularly helpful They have reduced criticism in the US no matter how unwarranted that is ting a free ride that Japan is get- They have contributed to the morale of our forces and have stabilized our forces so we can get on with the job I would be less than frank if I failed to mention the continuing problem of funding US Forces in Japan year years For example O M costs are going up 10% per Cost sharing is going to re main a problem for many We rec ogni ze the current c ons t ra in ts We wou ld hope that ne ver t heless th at we wo uld look -fo r n ew ways that we would share costs in the early 1980s Also in facilities we hope that in time you wou ld be abl e to include ope rat i ona l facili t i es a s we ll a s licens i ng I be lie v e a notional l is t SECRET SffiRCT 2 of operational facilities has already been exchanged We were very impressed that when DG Kanemaru visited Secretary Brown he gave a list of cost sharing projects which later was adopted by the Diet larly forthcoming We hope DG Yamashita will be simi- Mr Chairman that completes what I We are now prepared to wanted to say about cost sharing provide comments on your White Paper if you would like Watari Before getting into the next item please let me say a few words about cost sharing As I made it clear yesterday we cannot bear any more labor cost sharing under the SOFA In Japan interpretation of the SOFA is very strict and any more would produce strong criticism by opposition parties in the Diet our utmost rising costs In 1978 and 1979 we did On the other hand we understand the problem of As I mentioned yesterday we are going to do our best in the facilities area But as to operational fa cilities even though it is not s t rictly prohibited by law we don't think it i s wise at t-is ti me Even from the list for bar racks etc i t would tak e $100 million per year fo r five years I do not say we won't ge t in to operational facilities in t he next five year s but we think it would be wi ser to wait at le a st a few years Ple ase l et me 3 clarify a few points fhen I said we understand the costs for stationing US Forces is rising I meant in general and we would like to cooperate in the area of facilities As for the exchange rate last fall was the l owest leve l then it was 190 yen dollar Of course we don't know what it will be in the future but we hope it will stabilize McGiffert Now please go on to the next point Mr Armacost will summarize our comments about the White Paper Armacost These are comments on the summary we will have more later when we see full succinct cogent and we agree Perhaps First it is very Particularly pleased with the way in which you described our bilateral relationship I was struck by description of the growth in Soviet force levels particularly when juxtaposed against your midterm estimates presented by Mr Ikeda In view of the Soviet expansion I wonder i f your efforts will be enough That i s on e reason i t is wise to make your estimates y earl y and r evi s e rather t han to make them ev ery fiv e y ears as you used to Docume n t s ays US ha s powe r advantage over all but not necess arily in strategic weapons nor in naval and air Then where is our advant a ge I gu e ss the answer is with the addi t ion o f yourand our NATO a lli es we ne c es sa r i l y agre e with t hat a s sessment Nor would Concerning EGRET· 4 Soviets our worry is their overall buildup and secondly their tendency to utilize military power against areas of the third world As Mr McGiffert emphasized the cumula- tive effect of their military effort is of concern Politically we should not become complacent ing our defense spending in real terms same We are rais' NATO 'is doing the US-Japan bilateral relationship is getting stronger and PRC is unfavorable to USSR Thus despite adverse military aspects we place our emphasis in our total efforts to overcome this Soviet buildup be carried out as efficiently as possible Our efforts must Those are my principal comments Watari Thank you very much for your detailed comments I believe some of your comments are valid but what you received yesterday is not a full translation and is not approved by the government We are thinking of translating it fully and sending it to you for your comments I can understand your comment that t he Japanese defense effort might not be enough when we emphasized the growth of Soviet power But we believe t hat growth in Soviet power must be seen globally and not just against Japan We would like to keep increasing defense power in l ight of the constraints of SRE - public opin ion 5 Also you might have got the impression from the summary that you think we believe Soviet power is greater than US power This might be bad translation and I would like my staff to clarify Ikeda When we estimated Russian strength we felt that Soviet ground forces which can be brought against Japan are not different in numbers from our own but they might be qualitatively better fire power So we planned to improve our Also we felt their amphibious ships increased so chance of invasion went up slightly Th-eir ship numbers haven't changed but they have more nuclear submarines Aircraft numbers have also not increased So we are trying to build more ships and begin a FRAM program Also we will get P3s and other new aircraft like F-lSs We want new SAMs and I think it is terribly important to get a new BADGE system Okazak i Every year we have this t r anslation problem give a c op y t o the fo re ign press who always makes t r ansla t io n a We qu i ck If I make th e s l i ghte s t chan ge f or example on page l you get a different impression We want to desc ri be the situation is severe ly rea l isti cal ly we want t o explain how t he wo r l d is shaping up We want to inform the public but we canno t direct l y say ev er ythin g wha t we s hould do CREF- 6 Weisner I t hought you did a good j ob of informing them Armacost I t hink you have to be careful i n point i ng out their improvements t o remember our areas of superiority which are significant Unfortunately these do not prevent them from projecting power in a place like Angola Okazaki We are not saying that ent ire power balance has been changed and that only Japan and allies are the advantage believe that you alone are superior are not superior in every way We What we said that you We will stand by this e g throw weight BACKFIRE etc no good example naval power McGiffert How about the statement about ground forces USSR has always been superior Okazaki Original text says they have been so Ginn I believe text is balanced and read Japanese press react i ons I think it does not alarm but indicates Re - gardi ng th e emergency legi slation which is politically sen s i tive and t he command coordination center are ment i oned it is import an t t hat you menti oned t hese Watari Thank you Are there any other comments McGiffert None on t his _subject I would like t o add my congra t ulations on t he ba lance of the paper and I look forward to the full translation ECREt Watari Next we would like to go into the domestic situation of US and Japan McGi f fert Platt 7 Will you go ahead Mr Platt will present This is very personal and informal I am trained to assess other countries McGiffert Let's ensure that is translated Platt I will focus on events of last month These are of interest to our Allies as well as to us I will look at changes in the situation and elements which haven't changed in this ana l ysis What has changed First the Cabinet McGiffert Are you sure Platt If you look at the Cabinet I think it has changed for the better As far as the President is concerned it is more cohesive and will better serve his objectives Technically as competent as his predecessor and some ways more so Economic team of Miller and Volker enjoy con- fidence of business world and upward trend in the dollar and stock mark et r e f l ec t t h is I t hink t h e n ew Cab i net a l s o pr ovides some mana gement ski l ls it was lacking fo r example t he Department of Ene r gy nee de d this and I b e lieve wi l l be getting i t from Mr Duncan Politically there is a f eeling among analysts that Ca b i ne t i s more pot en t linked to SECRG- 8 contrivencies --business blacks women Catholics etc if you include Hedley Donovan to White House staff - not Cabinet - there is even link to Eastern establishment press President told his taff he feels right about the Cabinet had to be made quickly and get on with business He said if he had to do it again he would not have asked for mass resignations because that gave impression broad that change was more fundamental than it was has changed known White House Staff What else Full extent not yet Hedley Donovan has been added and Hamilton Jordan has become Chief of Staff As far as I am concerned that is good organizational change President said in press conference that Hamilton Jordan is chief only of the staff but in · my year there I have felt that the staff has lacked coordination and thus the change is good The third change I would note is in President's attitude He has been throu gh a period of intense introspection He is much more forceful In contras ting him to j ust after he left Seoul he is more pos itive rested et c Wh en the Prime Minist er Ohir a met with the Pr esident in May h e urged him t o be as forceful as possible I think he has -SECRET 9 heard that from many quarters and has taken that advice What has not changed Popularity is still low but I think performance of government will reverse itself and popularit y will go up But performance is the key Issues haven't changed either - energy inflation state of economy will be issues of the next election without SJnator Mansfield remains rudderless Congress The security policy and foreign policy apparatus has not changed from the outset As an insider in the process I can say there was no change It was business as usual Refugees and other issues contineud and no problem getting President SecDef etc Dr Brzezinski's role unchanged but in future there may be fewer joint positions of Sec Vance Sec Brown and Dr Brzezinski which go to President rather than separate views Finally our security policy has not changed and will not change Policy to Asia in general and Japan in particular will not change Adminis tration has given g-reat emphasis and has ach ieve d in l ast 2 1 2 y ears many significant ev en ts we have ment i oned in this SSC normalization with PRC Ph i l bas es etc Re l at i onship with Japan will not ch ange In next months executives wil l emph a siz e infl ation and energy but th ese are not mer ely domestic i ssues Th ese wil l a ffe ct our I I II I '3E CRET 10 intelligence policy and will make us a stronger and better ally This concludes my analysis McGiffert Truly excellent summary with which I would l ike to associate myself Watari Thank you McGiffert If there are none I would like to supplement We are now within 1 1 2 years from election Budget submitted in January will be last before election He made commitment before election to balance budget I'm sure he will want to reduce deficit as much as he can even though he realizes goal cannot be met But in view of commitment to 3% increase in defense budget and in view of increase in Soviet buildup there is a strong argument to increase defense expenditures The Administration is already committed to increasing strategic programs and undoubtedly th e emergin g feeling on the overall Soviet buildup as heard in the SALT debates will be felt in upward pressure in overall defense f ie l d Efforts t o stem an economic r ecession mi gh t signal the reverse but def ense necess ities might produce conf licting pres sures over the ne xt few mont h s A great unknown i s th e ultimate atti tude of the American public on this issue I will hazzard a guess and only a guess I I Ii I I I ECREJ- 11 American public is in a conservative mood - conservative mood would favor a bigger defense budget However hard to say with regard to defense how strong a pressure will be exerted Lastly and once again I venture into an unfamiliar area my guess is that with the exception of Governor Brown of California who I don't know much about my view is that none of the major candidates are isolationists As security and foreign policy become issues in the campaign they will only be questioned only to whether the United States is doing enough rather than whe1herit is doing too much Ambassador Mansfield I have to catch a plane now So long thanks Watari Thank you very much for the presentations of Mr Platt and McGiffert reflective for me They were very informative and Mr Nakajima would like to ask a question Nakajima I agree with Mr Watari very instructive The statements were Listening to mass media in a foreign country we t hough the loss in popularity was rather unfair to th e President Could you e labora te as to reasons why the press says popul ar ity has dropped EGRET Platt 12 Polling is important but impressive way of taking temperatures of body politics There was increase after speech followed by a drop after Cabinet changes so it is back to where it was before the speech More important to keep eye on basics and look at results How quickly are Cabinet changes being accepted and how quickly are programs being adopted So far evidence suggests Cabinet changes are being accepted Everybody has his favorite poll f 1 President says his favorite was Washington Post poll six weeks ago where Democrats who voted for him last time - 70-80% said they would do it again Other polls of 1300 people say other things but I think we should stick to the basics Sullivan I have done some polling be misleading Long-term trends are what is important Good polls take time always lag at what is being measured to gas lines Short term results can You also have to look Many measures only reactions One thing that has been neglected except by George Will is that 891 of the people trust the President and that will get him elected I think so too McGiffert Mr Nakajima President has done superb job especially in energy and I think public will come to recognize it as they recognize his integrity ECREfWatari Thank you 13 It was very instructive It's late but how about a coffee break McGiffert Fine BREAK Watari I would like to present my personal view about domestic situation in Japan official to speak too frankly I t is dangerous for career I am not to different from these career Japanese officials and not too brave but I will present my view anyway I will have my interpreter read a paper that was prepared by my staff in Tokyo then I will add my comments Interpreter reads Watari I would like to call your attention especially to latter part of statement Clear that Japanese public is shifting its opion about defense but not too rapidly takes time for 100 million people to shift at chart as you listen to me It Please look LDP controls j ust about ha lf both House of Representat ives and House of Councillors About diffe renc es betwee n LDP and Oppos iti on not so much in economic and socia l policy however becaus e LDP i s in responsible po s ition i ts members are careful about what they say Opposition i s bold but wouldn't be differen t if they Jt t t - 14 took power As you may know JSP as a party principle holds to unarmed neutrality However this is becoming outdated and I understand there is confusion in the party about this principle Recent public opinion polls show that even the majority of JSP supporters support SDF shows a contradiction This Confronted with this Mr Isibashi powerful JSP leader responded that public has changed but people support the status quo low level of defense because JSP opposed LDP He said that if JSP becomes too tolerant in defense matters the situation would become much worse As you know there are leftist and rightist factions within JSP there are pro USSR and pro PRC factions pressed to consider defense matters more They are all As you know the Komeito Party has been becoming somewhat realistic in defense matters They have given indications they support SDF but this has not become their official policy very forthcoming in some ways more than LDP DSP JCP is the most antag onistic to th e government in defense policy They oppose SDF and Security Treaty however th ey a re not against arms They are against SDF as tool of us but if they took power they would have more defens e power Red Army Sh in Ji zu Club i s generally s ame as LDP As - 15 far as Social Democratic Federation they are former right wing of J SP and don't have much influence It is possible f or us to talk with Opposition Parties except JCP on a case by case basis on defense issues Mr McGiffert knows very well I conducted a secret trade with JSP on cost sharing and Japanese laborers at US bases How- ever political party we can rely on in the end is only the LDP In the Grumann scandal E-2C frozen funds all Opposition parties opposed releasing funds both speakers who were LDP controlled the decision According to recent news reports it is said that special Diet session will be convened in early September with general election later in September or early October May I continue even though it is overtime McGiffert Yes Watar i Even though no public opinion poll on it it is believed LDP majority will increase The extent of increase in LDP seats i s not easy to predict bu t as i nd i cate d i n the sheet I gave you there a r e 18 v acanc i es Mos t of these are from deaths of LDP members so that I th i nk t hey should get most of these Informe d sour c es say they will ' · t ·f ' - · -sECR increase bu 20 but we can't rely on it 16 The expected increase in seats for LDP is a welcome prospect for us but I want to emphasize that even if LDP has more than half due to consensus building system they cannot suppress Opposition curtain LDP must huil d Opposition support behind the Different from US system the lower house in Japan has the stronger power e g budget arid ratification of treaty can become approved after time if approved by lower house irregardless of upper house situation is different is necessary For a bill To legislate passage by both houses Because of this a situation government officials worry about House of Councillors elected next summer candidates Half will be LDP is having a hard time finding There is a tendency of upper house members to want to move to lower house so situation is difficult Next I will speak of the possible focus in the next election I think defense matters won 1 t be focused on Just like US what Japanese public is interested in is economic matters and l iving conditions so I th i nk prices and inflation will be i ssues For t he past f ew years the J apanese economy ne xt pa g e ECREf- 17 has been stable but recently wholesale prices have gone up and government is alarmed Recently the Bank of Japan has raised the discount rate and has tried to take a contraction policy in the economy Japanese public is worried about the energy situation but I don't think there will be panic like in 1973 The Japanese state of finance is in a catastrophic state and government is considering consumption tax but very unpopular so government is considering not mentioning till after election As you know very well there are so called factions within LDP but very dangerous far career officials to mention Career officials conducting own directional policy to these factions However as far as defense policy is concerned there doesn't seem to be much difference among the factions e g Fukuda Cabinet was considered hawk Ohira dove but there was no change in policy If we look at lo ng-term prospect for political social situation in Japan it seems to me rather stable Let me give you one example as proof of my statement -- public opinion poll in sp r ing Question wa s whi ch social class do you be l ong Upper middle low -- 87% said they belonged to middle or upper 70% said more or less happy 4% said unhappy Majo r ity answered they thought Japan was going in better dir e ction Although I don't know if l i ving standard of J apanese is satisfactory or not EC report sai d Japan i s country of workaholics wo rking in rabbit hutche s might be true but -8ECRCT 18 Japanese view that they are middle or upper class shows their s tabil i ty Although Japan public may not own ni ce houses th ey have mo ney but government officials are exception Mr McGiffer t Mr Watari Us too This concludes my remarks but since I gave you poll concerning defense problem I'd like Mr Ikeda t o • omment on it Mr Ike da Th ere is the poll of the PM office Poll on SDF concerns GSDF but same tendency to ASDF and MSDF Concerning reason for SDF -- maintaining security -- same as · last year but fourth table -- future what role -- for national security - this is the first time 1978 Page 4 compares 1969 and In 1978 68% favor MST only 4% oppose In 1968 12% In 1978 young people greatly support 84% they were the lowest i n 1968 Big change Mr McGiffert Mr Ikeda Why is this I don't know Mr Watari I' m t oo ol d They don't know about war and defects of old s ys t em Mr Ikeda As ahi sp Poll no t i n th e chart in 1978 20 some perc ent s a id US wi l l suppor t Japan 56% s a i d US won 't suppor t Mr Wata r i on th i s po l l I don ' t think we shoul d put t oo much empha s i s Japan e s e ha ve no experienc e i n r e lying on someon el se so peop le don ' t exp ect Pleas e don ' t unde r stand S CREJi 19 MY COMMENT THAT I mean that presence of US i sn ' t important Last chart is monthly J apanese poll Mr I keda Dislike Soviet percentage becomes greater Mr McGiffert Mr Ikeda How i s US Highly likely China is second and Korea is not likely Mr Watari after USSR Korea doesn 1 t like Japan either Second This is very delicate Mr Nakajima Mr Watari's explanation was very com- prehensive so I can't add anything but Asahi poll was mentioned saying 56% said US won't support some point to it My personal view is there is Some people do wonder if a foreign country would help us if they had to shed their blood Poll may not be precise but it should be ignored so we constantly try to explain to the people about the credibility of the Japan US security relationship and wear trying to make treaty operate more smoothly by solving base problems worki ng wi th Gen Ginn Mr McGiffert Perhap s Asahi poll s shows fear s of Japanese peopl es others the hopes Mr Nakajima We support the hop e s We are telling the people we should make operation smooth Mr Ikeda Don't us e the Jyi press poll pub lic It I woul d like to mak e brief comment Time is copys ighted Mr Tamb a i s short I was protester against Security Treaty -SECRSMr Watari mentioned changes up 20 But buds are just coming We should not pour too much water We need your help a s before Mr Sullivan esting Pro and con almost same till 1974 but then pro way up con down 1 Education Ministry Poll is most inter- Phase evaluation reason end of VN war 2 normalization PRC and 3 growth of Soviet power Mr Watari How do you rate these The other day Mainichi sp introduced a chart mentioning what you say They said 1973 was turning point and gap is ever increasing Mr Okazaki Can't say what is reason attitude may have greatly influenced Change of China May not agree with you that everything stable till 1974 Mr Nakajima I think end of Vietnam war contributed Also oil shock alerted Japanese to dangers to security Maybe not so much on Russian buildup as to change i n 1974 Mr Watari As you mentioned it is hard to single out individual factors but everyt h ing you mentioned helped increa se s uppo rt Mr McGiffert How do you think over withdr awal from Vietnam contributed Mr Na ka jima The r e wa s appr ehension afte r your with- drawal and US was l eav ing a ll of As i a Mr Oka za ki I perso na lly feel ther e i s a t i me lag A few years ago ther e was vi ew US was withdrawing from As i a -SEGRET 21 I feel we know this isn't true and I feel this may change in a few y ears Mr Nakajima Your leaders en sur i ng that you will not wi thdraw eg Secretary Brown speech in Los Ange l es last February i s very helpful to ensure us you are not withdrawing Also Secretary Brown's posture statement was very helpful Mr Watari Please let me make a final comment -- please don't put too much credibili t y of what is in Japanese press Believe us Mr Watan abe Mr Okazaki Mr McGiffert That is striectly off the record I think our staffs have agreed about press guidelines Mr Watari As far as these are concerned working level agreements are fine with me Mr McGiffert We feel this might have been very useful Appreciate your candor Li ke to meet again next year I suggest our staffs arrange a date next spr i ng or summer Mr Wat ari July there i s upper ho use elect i on Diet schedule is unknown we would like Nat i onal Therefor e diffi cult to say wh at I hav e a gen er a l idea of a bout this time next ye ar or J anuary of the following But since we can't predict we 'd like to cons ult with you Mr McGiffert Mr Watari Fine I would like to enjoy wi t h you th at t hi s meeting has been very useful I know preparations were SEGRE 22 not easy and I appreciate efforts of US personnel before and during the meeting I am glad we could exchange views f reely and frankly I am happy for friendly relations with JS I think we can solve our problems together and I would like to thank US participants headed by Mr McGiffert Mr McGiffert Thank you These discussions have been useful and very much appreciated by us Please take Secretary Brown's greetings to Minister Yamashita and say we are looking forward to his visit Mr Watari Thank you