C0•541-1 -9 67 ·' ·t t r - ·· · • -'• _ · •• • I ROUTING •AND RE O -SHEa _ SUeJlCT ll Pdonoll Tal g PC i 1 - I Options for Attac king the Us a Bi Ladin Pro em E tention NO DI TE ·24 November 1998· -z 3 • · - ·· 1-4 --- --------------- ____ _ - --5• b 1 · b 3 EO 12958 1 4 b 25Yrs EO 12958 1 4 c 25Yrs EO 129581 4 d 25Yrs EO 12958 3 5 c 6 7 8 10 11_ 12 13 -140 oooi79S- C054119'67 ' • • • • •• • • • • • • •• •• I • ' _ - · - -· -· TOE SEGRE I I _ • ·24 Novem r 1998 Option_ fo ng th Usaroa_Bi adi_ - em _ Following are the range of op are avail le for US polic_ymak to - from to address the Usama Bin· Ladin problem · · · · · · CONTINUE CURRENT PLAN· contin to to brjng B n Ladiri toju tice '--t _ _ U_p_s_id-e- -_L_ittl_e- r _n-_ o-co- i- t e I to' 6 b ta· I I· · ama -· - · · · Downside We are•in·a res din o-everit ode _ e cannot tak the initiative limited likelihood of su s · · -· · · - · · · · • I · --- TRIBAi DON RES CE· tribals have cornofeted clans for an armea 1me ra o one e res ncef I mg I - · • ·Upside Restores Im inilialive to us p -the param lenls I I of tt e tribals· increases chan s of succe '-- --- -- ---y --- --__ -- -- -- -pl · Iit •I aangerous I totnbals prefer tl is o to n ambush use they b lieve their forces both dur_ing the operation and after TI1e assets ·tor example believ they can better control the 91 8rational setting when attacking a single housethanwhen·attacking a multi-vehicle ccih-Voy They also believe that a raid s a bett r chance than an ambush of being executed • quietly thereby decmasing the chance that nea y Taliban security forces will be alerted - ·• · Dawnside Increases ri k of collateral damage to noncombatants increases the risk of casualties amon -our o eratives· scenario lends · self nnr e bT' - · ·• --- -0001800 I · - - · ·- i • • r••• ' · · ·-- -- ' - •• · - _--· -_ _· - ·_- - -_ _· i f• - · - ·· - · ··· -- · __ _ --- · _ I I iP e flCffET I I · _ -• ·US MILITARY I We ar e providin the mirttary with ·the loqations of the re idences Bin ladijl i shuffling among s1mu aneous cru1Se ·m1ss1 e a a qn each would increase the lil elihood of catching Bin Ladin one ofthem • Upside Restores the initiative to U$ no risk of US casualties high ctiance of success if Bin Ladin is in one of the reside little risk of casualties to our assets clear signal of U S resolve · - · e I Down$ide High risk to _noncombatants clear expasure of the us· han might miss some all of the targets AaJte embarra'---ssm -e-n t __ if information inaccurate · · · '· 2 0001801 J •· · · 11 oiP SiE ejR iiE Ti J- -L' -_ - t · -· _•• - · • J • t· - -•··_ •· _·· Masood is an o an mg · __---- 3H - - - c - - -T- - -- -- - - - -- - - nc c- n 1s a - a s -1ehas agent rietWork • · ·asood agents operatives migll be· a le · an ·-t 0 _ave a_ more·diffic ult time ca turing-am ei I I IOPSEe g t -• C0§411g67 · • ' · · · · · ' • · -_ _ ·· · ·• • ·· · · --·· · ··-· iOP SECREI I I • Upside Give us new Agency n options lik ly increase in Fl on Bin Ladin no · ·risk to US lhres · · · _ - - I 4 i IOP sceR Ei _ · · - · - -- - ···