b 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _1 b 3 -C- 5375521 EO 12958 1 4 b 25Yrs EO 129581 4 c 25Yrs EO 12958 1 4 d 25Yrss-1 1 - 1 1r-------EO 12958 1 4 e 25Yrs · _ _ _ _ _ _EO 12958 3 5 c t - f 00903 EO 12958 6 2 c - • ca5375·s21 ·• 'T '-----------'I Terrorism Extr -'llists Planning Attacks Against US Interests in Pakista '----' Summary U lthreBJ ened to • k US diplomatic and- commercra l fiioliities as well as US citizens in Pakistan according to fress repo I I Usama Bin Ladin is strongly encoumging these attacks Since his return to Afghanistan in 1996 Bin La lin has forged close ties to several Pakistani militant groups particularlr those wit h connections to the Tab'ban •··· • ' • •• --- C0537S521 • Terrorism Extremists Planning A t t a c k s Interests in PakistanL___J I Increasing Terrorist Thr ats I I· - - - several Pakistani militant groups with al-Oa•ida and · 1'11 lih11n • • •att 1 el • Arab extremists based in Afghanistan also may be I bmlln•-- I • I This assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorlst Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis and the Office ofNeat ern South Asian and African Ana Mis -Comments and aneties a re welcome and · ma be cte L ---------------------- ---------1 1 W se M'Tj -------- ' -- - · __ C05375521 '· t j _ _ _ ___ 1· ·• __ - -- hreateningto attack US civilian diolomatic and-commercial interests in Pakistan • · Bin Ladin Taliban Strongly Encourage Attacks I I - Bin r adin who has close ties to several Pakistani militant groui s strono-lv encourai ina the anu-11s attar 1r 1 •• TnD 2 - T _ _ _ _ _ _ _____ '• C05375521 ' • ' I ' ·• Islamabad has taken a number of steps since 11 September to bolster domestic stabilitv and limit the influence of radical militant i ronn i I • 1 I ' ' r C0537 3521 J ·• ·•·· • A t 012 eec4'---------- •J C0'5375521 • TOP ·-rc ________ I ·_ ··• --------'' -C05375521 I j I C05375521 - • •• S ' - 11--'---------- 77 • • • •· _ QP8ECR'1 6 -------_____J J r - T • ·' ·•· •••••• 7 T - --___ I C0'5375521 T _____ _ _ _ _ ____ • AppendixB Long-standing Pakistani Militant Ties To Bin Ladin I I • The militant groups also find common cause with Bin Ladin and the Taliban through their struggle to wrest control of Kashmir from India which fits into the global Islamic jihad espoused by Bin Ladin The Kashmiri militant I I Training When the Tahoan came to power in· Afghanistan in 1996 it took control of militant trainin cam access • Nature of the Links count and rovided increased The ties between the militant groups and Bin La din mclude ideological affinity rhetorical su ort shared trainin facilitie I L ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ _ __ _ I Ideology A common adherence to an extremist understandingj • Instruction at the camps includes basic training in the handling of light weapons and grena4es more weapons and terror Slll advance d work withheaVIer techniques II of an Islamic Itheocracy governed bybeation sharia law a nd administered by Muslim clerics or ulema-is the most basic tie • Er in the 8 I ---- ca 75521 • •• • -# l i ll • I 1 1 j j I l __ I