C05373277 • '-----------------' FOPSE8A ---------- ------------------__J r 05373 277 -c----------------------------------------------- '---- ----------' Al-Qa'ida in Sudan 1992-96 Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths I · Key Findings U Whil based in Sudan from 1992-96 al-Qa'ida was transformed from an · only partially realized idea to' an international organization ready to operate on its own · A major factor in this development was the education · · al-Qa'ida members received working with officials of Sudan's National · Islamic Front NIF to strengthen Sudan-some re ortin sa s to build an · international ·ihad infrastructur • Al-Qa'ida left Sudan with an ind endent abilit to establish and o erate trainin cam · s Sudan a1-Qa'1'da deve1oned relattonswi ' • Wh1'1em everv noteworthy Islamic extremist group ·• Intelli ence re ortin on contacts between Iraq and al-Qa'ida ___ ___ _ Fin c lu ded seniOI' Iraqi officials and suggests the contacts culminated · Ira 's provision of e losives training to al-Qa'ida L_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ • Al-Qa'ida received funding from wealthybra c k ers · and the international jihad they supported -1-I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ j T --------------- c 053 J3277 ------ • The contacts and capabilities al-Qa'ida members established in the Sudan pe riod give them a flexibility that may help the group find creative and replicatable ways to compensate-for the loss ofits safehaven in Afghanistan --------------- C05373277 TQPS ORe j ----------------- Contents _page Key Findings U Scope Note U iv 1 1 Terrorist University 1992-96 I 2 2 3 Financial Infrastructure 3 Rea l ti ons W'th 1 0ther GrounsandStates Postl I'aduation Proven Sustainabilitv Throui h 200 I 3 6 77 8 99 10 10 - - - j - j j_ _ _ _ _ C 05373277 Scope Note U This paper was written in_ response to a request to review information on al-Qa'ida's years in Sud m 1992-96 with the benefit ofhindsight to identify key issues or threads ·of reporting whose importance may not have been apparent then or which may need additional exploration Although the paper·addresses al-Qa'ida's relationship with the Sudanese Government and National Islamic Front officials it also considers other activities al-Qa'ida was able to pursue because it had safehaven in Sudan· or because ofoonnectiops its members m de while in $udan _____ '----- ' ____ 05373277' Al-Qa'ida in Sudan 1992-96 Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths I sufficient intemationaLterrorist organization Al-Qa'ida also contributed money labor and material to building up Sudan's physical While based in Sudan from 1992·96 al-Qa'ida was transformed from an only partially realized ide_a to an infrastructure international organization ready to operate on its own - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - the National Islamic Front NIF ofS - -which seized power in a coup in 1989-welcomed al-Qa'ida and other extreinist_groups during the 1990s largely because these groups shared Khartoum's interests in promoting pan-Islamic unity 4 Jppling moderate Arab governments deemed hostile to Islamist movemerits and countering Western int uence in the Islamic world Hassan al-Turabi tlie NIF's leader and Khartoum's primary ideologue until his fall in late 1999 considered his primary goal to be the creation · of an Islamic state inside Sudan but he eagerly sefaed opportunities to cultivate like-minded foreign groups for a variety of asons · Terrorist University 1992-96 1- - • A variety of reporting indicates Turabi and other NIF leaders used such contacts primarily to raise and distnoute money develop recruits provide · cover for intelligence activities and promote their Islamist agen throughout the Arab world • Turab i formed and led the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference PAIC in 1991 as the Pl lblic face of his foreign outreach efforts Attendees at PAIC meetings throughout the 1990s included PLO HAMAS and Hizballah Iraqi Afghani Libyan and Iranian Oovemment representatives Islamic nongovernmental organizations NGOs and various individuals and groups advocating extremist and militant Islamist agendas I Sudanese officials aiso may have worked alongside al-Qa'ida mem s to acquire weaoons on· the international m-av arms market ·With the help ·of the NIF al-Qa'ida solidified its formal structure learned or enhanced key skills and ·made the contacts necessaxy to become a selfThis assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Office ofTerrorism Anal ·s Comments and · · T __-·_·- - - 1- - - - - - C 05373277 -------------- __________I intelligence according to Wali Khan al-Qa'ida associate convicted in 1996 for his artici ation in the Manila Air co Chemical Biological Nuclear and diological CBRN Programs Al-Qa'ida and Sudan also shared the goal of producing chemical biological and possibly nuclear or radiqlo ·cal wea ons 1995-after a- -·s1-·t-to- -arto- - by_fu_e_d ire_c_to_r_o f i Intelli ence Service S • Both Bin Ladin and Iraq had connections to Sudan's Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant which was destroyed by US strikes in August 1998 Bin Ladin ma have been connected tbrou his financin revealed the presence ofBMPTA a known •precursor used in 1he production ofVX EMPTA is 1he route by which Iraq planned to produce VX for its chemical weapon program according to its declaration to the United Nations • AI-Qa'ida also attempted to acquire nuclear material -' robabl fallin victim to scams-and • AI-Qa'ida procurement officer Abu Hajir al-Iraqi had good ties-not further specified-to Iraqi T - R9 _______________ rm ' G053732 7 · ------------ ·I a I-Q a 1da b e gan n 1 nn ne tr amm g c am p s a t B m __ J Ladin's farms and other facilities in Sudan Financial Infrastructure Relations With Other Groups and S tes Through meetings training D-d other activity the NIF facilitated contacts in 'Sudan some ofwhich had first been forged in Afghanistan between al-Qa'ida ·members and nearl eve noteworthy Islarttlc extremist ou interests I • Turabi's PAIC served as one forum for groups to meet from 1991 through its dissolution in 2000 I -Qa'ida had Iestablished cooperative relationships by 1_996 with at - least 20 Sunni Islamic extremist groups in 'the Middle East South Asia ·Africa and East Asia as well as wi$elements ofthe Saudi°opposition 1 This cooperation entailed generating funding smuggling routes training and in some cases terrorist operations I l ggests that al-Qa'ida established relations with o r Islamic extremists as well largely in Africa and Asia 2 ' -----------------' r Q-53 ' 32 7 7 TO R '----------- I • Al-Qa'ida and Sudanhelped L__ ------1 set uo aims smuo-o-lin networla • Both al-Qa'ida and the NIP ctintinuedrelations with Afghan leaden •I ' Ill-Qa'ida had already supported terrorist operations-through fim g planning or direct participation-by at least eight of these groups before 1996 For example al-Qa'ida leaders have publicly admitted to supporting operations in Yemen in 1992 and Somalia in 1993 I · ruggests ll-Qa'ida supported assassination attempts by allied groups against · leacJers it de6med un-Islamic such as E tian President Mubarak in Ethionia L 4 - Rei ---------- C0-53'J3277 TO '---------------- I inI adin contin ued to support anti- · Saddam Iraqis however such as the Iraqi members of al-Qa'ida through them Iraqi Kurdish and groups such as the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan • Iraq also probably used the PAIC as a conduit to contact Islamic o sand-states ·aqi contacts Wl 1- ------------ included senior Iraqi officials sugiesting movement toward co eration·at some level _ 1·ese contacts culminated in Iraq's reported provision of explosives · I Iraq sought Sudanese help to establish -c-o-nta-cts ---- with Islamic extremist u s includin al- a'ida ___ _ _ _ _ While Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and Bin Ladin differ ideologically we judge that the Iraq-al-Qa'ida relationship in Sudan showed that both wanted to monitor the other as well as to keep the door oi en to cooperation furablhad '-- gree--d t o intl u-e_n_ce-fun dam- -- -en tal - i-cst_gr_o__ ups in Sudan on Iraq's be 1£ I o t likely at Turabi's urging Bin Ladin developed an ''understanding with Saddam that al-Qa'ida would not support any onti-Saddmnacti ---- tr a m m-g--1to al-Qa'ida 1- ----------------- 5 t Rcrj --- ---------- r 0-5 3 ' 2 7 7 L------------ · Postgraduation Proven Sustainability Through 20021 i·v I connections an¢ capabihties al-Qa'1da developed m I· Sudan remained strong after they moved to Afghani$tan many su scquently expanded 6 l'OP SEC ef1 --------------------- €0'53'i 3277 ' L--------------- a1-1-la 1uu s associations w ith other Sunni extremist groups those ties have grown since 1996 to incl de cooperation on terrorist operations • UpQn returning to Afghanistan in 1996 al-Qa'ida took over almost all of the training camps in the country and refocused their curriculum on terrorist tactics · • Al-Oa 'ida and associated ro-onm still h up ·-• llnlccl L __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Ci0'53' 277 ' JJ Peec -- ----------1 T '----------------' '-------- ---------- c 01lf 3 'J 3 2 7 7 • The capabilities and contacts al-Qa'ida forged in · Sudan including with Iran and Iraq may give it more flex1 bility in designing creative resnonses to the loss of its safehaven in Afghanistan I T I ----------- -----------'