b 1 I 3 EO 12958 1 4 b 25 ·EO 12958 1 4 c 25Yrs EO 12958 1 4 d 25Yrs EO 12958 1 4 e 25Yrs EO 12958 3 S c EO 12958 6 2 c 'llr' T RET __________ ------ No _ __ ' · COPY _ _ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFO TION ·' Notice The attae ed document contains classified National Security Council lnfonnallon It is to be read and discussed only by perso ns authorized by law · Your signature acknowledges yt tJ are suclfa person and you_promise yo will show or discuss information contained In the document only wlllt pe1S0ns who are authorized by law to have such accie8$ lo this dOCI ITlent · · · · Persons handling this document acknowledge he or she knows·ani 1 understands the security law relating thereto and will cooperated fuOy with any lawful Investigation by the ·united States Government Into any unauthorized disclosure of classified lnfonnatlon contained he rein · · Access List · · NAME DATE DATE NAME· APPROVEDFOR---RELEASEn DATE 25-April-2012 · -- - · -- -- __ -C 0 --3 7 4'7 8 1- • • t - -• · • • - - • ----· - ·- ·· ·•· • _ _ _ ' ·· -' - • · - __ __ ·_ • · -- · - ·- · -_ No· _-- - - - ·copy__ ' - N-ATI-ONAL· S-ECURITY • ·coUNCIL INFORl'dATION -- l ·- _ Notice The attached document contaln·s classified National Security Council Information It 1s· to be read and discussed only b y persons authorized by law Your signature acknowledges you are such a parson and you promise you wlll show or discuss Information contained In the document only wlth persons who are authorized by law to' have ac c ss to this document Persons handling this document acknowle ge ·he_ oi she knows and understands the security law relating thereto and will cooperate fully with any _lawful lnvesflgatlon by the Unfl d States Government into any u authorlzed dlsctosure of ptasslfled lnfqrmat on con aln d herefn _- · Access List b_ATE NAME-- -DATE NAME I - ·- · ··- ··· · ·' · t j · · - · · • · l DCI Report The Rise of tIBL a d Al-Qa'ida d h Intellige ce Co un ni esi on seLJ · March 19 2004 ---- ------' ro '--- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ·•· -'· · _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ • ··- _ - -- _-- -·· - - __ _ '-'- -'·-·· _____ ' ' C 0'5'3 7 4 8 l_ i r i ' -ir - t '7 T' ' fi ' '1 S '' '# tctif ' 1J fffK'i' 'if'¥r' ' ' ' '• t ''J ' ''·· ii''i ''itj • r •· I • _ •• L __ _ _ _ _ _-_------ --- -- ----- -- ---- -----' ·j Contents $cope Note - •• • ll •• - •• 1futroduciioll • • •• • • ••• • • • • 1 The Early Years · T rist_ FiruuJ ci_er l 986 -1996 ' •• · J Th Taliban Sanctuary Years Evoly ing into a Strat gic Thre_at 1996 2 01 · ······ - •• 8 The IC's Efforts tq T ck Distup and Bring in n to Justice ' ·· •• l2 · The·S1I ategy -•••• · •••• 12 The Intelligence·CotilII11lnify Role ' 17 Working·Wifu Foreign Liaison • _ ••· ········ 24 Sµpport to the 1 1ilitmy- 26 Budget an d Re ur6e s - 27 tegratio1r O O ectton 1·· ··· •• • •• ••••••••••••• 41 Warning arid Analysis i• • ••••• -• • 42 · Coyert Ac on · - ' · 44 Autb orities - 44 ·Operati DS_•• - · •• - 45 lip ilat ffort·Using Afghan Tribal Asse ' • • -_ • · 4Z ' Executing ·The Plan •••••• • i••· · •• •··· 1 48 The Kuala_Lum pur Meeting 52 Raniadan 2000 Plans Disrupted 53 •-• • Increased Al-Qa'ida Activity Detected 54 Attempting to Capture B · Ladin ······· 58 The Predator Initiative • • 60 Continued Warning· - 63 Summruy of CIA •s Collection Posture Against UBL's Sanctuary 65 Resul ts - _ 66 ·hnpact of Sept ' j 11· _ - • 70 The War with Terrc rism A Look Ahead 71 Where We Are in the Fight Against Terrorism - 72 Counterterrorist Strategy for the Coming Y$ - 74 ' fO 1• • • • ' • · ' ' • PCI R port The Ris ·of- L and AI-Oa'ida·And' e Inte gence Com wiity esp o l-----' Swpel 'lote document was preparei 'hy theClA's Direc r Review _ · IGr-0up totrms assist the nq in his review of the cen i sues rc lated to tp e war on terrorism and the Senteinber 11 200 l attacks i · Introduction 17s tember 11 brought the fight with international t rism home to Ameri most vivid way But the InteWgence Community IC t and the FBI were already fully engaged in this war many years b fore Septetnb 11 • The IC did not discover terrorism-suddenly I 9n September_ 11 200t _us _ ffhe growing terrorist-threat to citizens and facilities V orldwide '• · · - c luQirigin the United States has-been at the 'top of the Intellig 'llce CoµunU llity's _ - · · · agenda for many years This R rt lays out-a nearly decade-Iorig·record of Intelligence Community involvement in lighting terrorism and particularly Usama Bin Ladin and his al-Qa'ida network · • It is a record ofkeen awareness·ofthe threa4disciplined focus and persistent efforts to track disrupt apprehend and ultimately ring to justice Bin La din and his lieutenants and dismantle aIO Qa'ida It is als h a record of consistent efforts to policymakers of the seriousness of the al-Qa'ida t111 eat- warn The Early Y ars Terrorist Ffuancier 1986-1996 · jBin i aclin ained prominence during th ·Afgh _war for his role in financing tn e recrmtment transport ation and training of ethnic Arabs who fought alongside the Afghan mujahedin against tlie Soviets uring the 1980s ' At e 22 Bin J · · ' · - · Ladin dropped out of school in Saudi-Arabia and joined the Afgµan resistance almost · immajiately following the Soviet invasion hr pecember 1979 His· mone and his· ex ·enence as a -froritline fi ter enhanced his· utation ffi n Ladln lrad drawn on hisiamily's weru and donations from sympathetic merchim t families in the Persian Gulf region _to i · · · r ganize - e Islamic Salvation Foundation or a1 Qa'ida tThe B e ' -The foundati9 · maintaine hecruitment centers and guesthouses in seycral Middle Eastern countries ·and organized and funded paramilitmy training aµnps in Pakistan and t f stan • ·j I · Under al-Qa'ida's auspices Bin Ladin also-imported heavy equipment to •build roads tunnels caves hospitals and storage dep_ots in Afghanistan· for use by the-mujahedin and eventually to form part of-his terrorist infrastru9ttire · I thie Afghan experience was· key to· radicalizing Bin Ladi D ·_and_ cementing his dedication to Is l c extremist causes It pro 'vide l him with opportunity to make and strengthen contacts with a wide variety of Islamic extren of various nationalities Many of the men who became key members of th al-Qa'ida lead hip met and fought alonttside ·him· in Afghanistan against the Soviets · · · It is aiso at-this time that Bin Ladin began perverting the teachings·of Islam and the Prophet_ Mohammed for his own-violent pw poses And it is then that he began to-exploit underlying soci% political d econoniic discontent and -- - widespread resentqient ofthe West in any_parts of the_ Muslim world __ • • In a 1988 press interview he claimed I felt it a sign from God to battle all opponents of Islam whcm a mortar shell that landed_ a few feet away from me did-not explode u Urged on by fervent Islamic radicals he began using his · personal fortune to shelter and employ b undreds of militant stateless Afghan Arabs and train them for jihad or h• ly war·arourid the world I Wtliough_ Bin l adin returnM to Saudi Arabia to work in bis · family's construction business after the Soyiets left Afghanistan in early 1989 h continued to ·support militant· Islamic causes and radicals who by then had begun · redirecting their-efforts against secular and mo derate Islamic governmen in the region · · · He began publicly criticizing-th e Saudi Government and harshly condemn_ed the Gulf Vfar ·and the-presence of US and other Western forces in the Arabian PetU 1 1 ula ' - - - - - - 2 - ·- - - - - - - - - - · ·' '· ···· ' · · f 1 ¥ if· -' t x ·f C 0 5 3 7 4 1 7 81 ' _ · ··· · - · · · ' '------ --- ----- ------ -- ···· •· ·· - ' ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' ' ·eyrevok bis ci p·int994 jmn _Laditi ti th · atten ti the CIA as an enter 'terrorist - - hi s-sta___ -in Sudan from 1 991 to I99q Bin ·I During his fi e-year resid -ht Sud Udin mbin business with jihad under the umbrella of al-Qa ida In association with powerful ' m bers of the ruling Sudanese National Islantjc Front be emh ed ·on several business· ventures that probablv multiolied his fortune Hts worlcforce in Sudan included militant Afiman war veterans __ __ · · ·· --- ---- 1 -Vhlle in Sudan Bin Ladin and akQa'ida financed Islamic extremists who opposf XJ secular-and moderate Islamic governments and who despised the West Following are several examples of what e Intelligence·Community learned at tliat 'time regarding al-Qa'ida s a9tivities froni· Sudan • Islamic extremists who fu December 1992 bombed a hotel housing US La din financed _their gro ------- servicemen in Aden _____ ___ I ----3--------- · • · · • · ' ' Ji ' i ' t ' 'I t y ' E · --- -'-- -- ---- - ----' ····· ····- • _ _ 1 1 • We believe his exp ence in om8 1ia played a signif cant rol in molding his perceptions of the United State He has publicly said the US wi drawal from Somalia demo11strated that Ameri s ·were soft and the United States a paper tiger that could be more easily defeated than the Soviets had been in Afghanistan · to acqurre mater i eve op a T - - - 4 - - - - - - - -_· _ _ 1 fft itt' rft -t · - - -tt l ivJ rtE - · · ----'-- --'-'-'--'- -'----'- -- c ·1 · ' • • · _ _c - -- --- --'----'''- -· _ · · ' · ·I· · ··· • chemi b iocica1 1ocica1 mlci ccin Nl caoli mtvl CIA s es ent of Bm din dllfh i ilie iy 90 W ' that he was a major terrorist'_financier The 1c· vi twed him largely ail a financial pporter of ther terrox ist groups artd itJ dividuals not'as· the centet of a separate 'rirganizatfon or network focus f ori carrying out- terrorist attacks o i the United 'States Moreover he was only one of a number f potential terr9rist threats and _at that-time ·not cpnsiderecl the · most portant As sue the Bin Ladin al 'ida tar ei com ted for resQurces with oth targe · a - · rI our awareness o grown significantly• • I - ---- btablisbment in late January 1996-of Issue S tion'' within the DCI Counterterrorist Center CTC to focus on fue ''the Sudan based terrorist financier'Usama Bin Lad' 5 ·-· '-------------------' · · · I • 1 •• • ' ri · ' · · · m m as terronst orgamzation bent 011 attacking the United States Ladm's intent tQ target the Unite fStates on its soil and bis interest in· acquiring CBRN materiais to propuce weapons ofni ass destruction • • 1 l_ • • • • • • • ·· • 4 • • •• _ •• •• • Y me Bin 4d ft Sud _in· 19 6 an4 relecated himself · and his terror network tq Afghamstan 1he Intelligence Commumty had-gamed a · · substantial appreciation ofjhe·significance of his tbreat·and was taking strong action to try to stop him · · - -' t ' ·· __· - ' • · • •· ·•· • _ · · · •· ·· · ' ' 1 1 I _ L ---'e'C - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -'- - -- - - - - - _ - - - - - ' • • - ··• · ·· • '•• · • · ···· ' ··- · ••• • • M• ••••• -- · · ··· _ · t· 1 · · · · _ · · • · · I' · - · · _- - - · · _-_ · ····· • •'• • • • • •• • • • • •• _ • • • • • • - • • • • ' • • I• • • -r • • • • ' • •• •• •' ' • -The Taliban Sanctuary Y ears Evolvmg ·into a Strategic Threat- 1996-2001 · · •• · ·'- _ I · ·' · i c·_- • i • PIA fforts to track Bin 4 llil s wh ab - c tipue4 _ · ·· even during flietransitj9n period·ofhis relo ation-fiom Sudan to·Afghanistru i • · · • -· · · - ·- · -· • · ' · ·· • ·- · ·· I '· · --· · · ' · · · · · · •· - · · · · ··· · ·• · '•i • - · __ · 7 ¥ · · -· · ·- - ' _ _ ·i i- ' • · · · ·· - ·· ···· 7•· -- - · • • · • · • •• · r·· v• --·· i •' I 'r----------------------------------- T--- - ----- -- l 'F· ·· · · · ·-· - ·· • · - • • _ · ·- __ • ' -- f - --· · · fo lii il · · ••••• - 't · •- - _ -' _-_ ·r_' - · - - - · _ r · r _ t etune ' • ere··was •-- · - · ·- - · · •· ·· · · - '· insufficienf eyid¢nce to indict him in the Uriited-·Sta tes· aiid iSsiie ·us· wanifuti · • · - ---·- -- ·· · · - · · • · • · · • - ·· · _ T- -•- - · _ _' r n -· • • • ·•· -•· · • __ · _ ' - · ·•- 1 ' ·· i •'-' ' •' ··· · • • _-·_ -- - · r e · - · - ± - ' - __ -- - · • _ - • -·_c' ··' 2 t - - ' •• r ' ·- • · _ i' • · ' IJ i · 1 I - - J iI · _ _ - _Ei i _- _ r_ _ - - ·• - -- •R°-'· - · J - ••• _ - •• • · - · · •• · •• ••_ r - •1- · 1 ·11 ·• • n • r i- ·• · • v ·· · - ·• - · - • ' · · _ - ·• i - ' _ _ I 3 i · ·· - ·· · '- ·· · · • ·1 ' · · _ ' l · _ _ -· ' · -· · • · · _ ' -- li'Fan c y - dr -o' 'ubr - ts - em' - ' -- run · -- a - cou tc- ea _ o-zc--ce -c-·- _ -- - --- __J· - · · _ _ - --· U9 i $ es repr¢sept tijhi'·J a4 2 m8 '_iciit -they w f u y disp µe l f a' ' · · · · · · · ·· · · sen 'hfdeclarations li e i$suetf fto ·lij ref ige in• Afghruiist d_uring -t be l-996- l Qa · •· i i· _ ·- ' ' - ·· · • Ce C· em- - r gm c __ g • •• 0 •• - ' • ••• -- • '· · _ · _ i · ti T ·· · _ ' ' i C · ·· • · · -_- · - -i ·t· · - · ·· riJ ·· · ·_· -· · - ·_· · · · __ · i ·· - - ' - _ ·· ' - _ -- ·J · r· · · ·· · • ·Inan undated interview inAf tari-ptiblishectinJqly 1996'in theLoitdoi i · -- · · · · _ · •·· daily ' lne Ind pe11dent Bin t a clared that the killing ·o Ani cans in th ·-· ' · · • · • _Khol Towersbhinb - Sa f1 iairiJunel996 matked·the egfuiri g-•- _-- · · · ·· - · · · · · · ofthewarbetweeiiMuslims -and 'tlieUnitedStatest ·· · ··• ' - - ·- · - · · · - __ · • •· · · · - -· · · ' · ·· - ·' East Africa _al Q11 1aa '1 ¢d anotb erfatwa uncl the b ei - fthe-· Wodd-· · · • · · _ -· · • · · - - ' - t- -- · 1s1 ic ·F tj t__ror 1iiaf itlihsq - c sa1 i-s' r ia 1t al M lims · · _ ' · ·· · · - · _ • · - · · ·· • ·_ have areUgious qufy_ 'to· JdJLA ii j erip d therr alli boij i _q1viUan· U id· ···· · · _ · · _ t · ' •E · ··' _· __ · i · _ ' 0 -f _·· s· -_ _ ·_ ' · ' ' - · - · - · -- ·· '· '1li w _rl41d i _ ' _ i - _ _·_ · · ' ' -· _' _ · - - ' - ·· - - Puring asubs uent'µi a _intervi w -BinLa _explll ln'ecl- tall US··citjzeris · · · - -· · _ ' vere legititruite·targets beca1JSe·th ypay'taxes to thf Js·dovernmentt · ···· · c _ · _ '· · ·- i ·· · · · · _ · ili L -immtmltl Jf j ji£Ji i-- · - J-' ' • ·_ · ' ' ful pl g and exhaustive fiel p epru -atj ms whicli- I3ih -La i ti ' Y -a piereq sit L · _ _ • · · · - • ·· · · ·· · ' · ' ·_ • •• _ - '- • •• · · · # -_ - • - ·· - · •• 1• f - · _ r i r · • ' · c · · · · · sophi tica@ teqonsf or l t19n 'bent on causmg large ntm1bers o Ant can •- · · - - - · • • •·• - ' · 1- _ · ··• ·_CIA afrsts·looked at al Qa'ida targetingstudies·and trainiriginaterlals · · '· · ' _- · _ _·_ · · ·9aptured around thetinle o the 'EasfAfrica and USStJol -atfu#ksl-The f ' --· ' · · --- '_- · · · · _ _ ·· ··· · · _ publis ed- anui epthinte igenctrstudyo al Qa ida s terrorlsfop°iratioris·· - · tevealed _that mu _ofthe ierroiistsfadvanceplat ming inyo ved·clll'eful · · • ·- - · ·patiep - and meticulous ·preparation · _ · _ _ · i° · • · · · ·· _ ··· · I · · -i ··_ - tdetailed' thfwJ'4erabi11tles of potential target$ In 1 be· e' ofthe g S· Eii ib sy · - - _ ·· · - · · · fu Nairool f r x pl the terrorists' casing study was pr ared in' 1993 fiv¢ · · · ___ ' ' ·• · I · · ·-· ' - · • · ' r - - c - '- - - nsciou of · - ' _ _ - · · ecqpty · - --- -- '- • - · ·· · · op tiQ_ •· - · ·· · I • · before the illtaclg a'idii'li1 etnods · • · · _ ·· - _ · '_ · • · -' · · · ·· · · · r · · ·· · •_ · · _' · · · · • 'his fu Iudid- kjensive surv illlarice d the preparation of-casuig' stu fiefUiat ' · · · · - -· _ ' · · · · · - · · · · - ' · ' ····· ' u · · · · r •····· · •· · - -_ - · · - _ · '· · - · ' e ere atso·beceining increasin y coziciemecl mict ' - - ' · x ·• · · - - ther fore am a out _ 7Qa'ida's interest-in acq png ch ical BI d biQloID9al -_ · · Z- ·-w r r i crul at a r -t'' ' ' ' · - · ·· · · · - weapons ·a ' 'religious duty and noted • How we· would use them- -qp tcf '· · · · _ · ·• · ·- ·· _· ·_ - __ ·· _ -· _·__ •_ ·_ - · _ · ' ' ·- • • · · •- • •' • _ •· -- - • · ·· • 1 ••• · - · - ·-· · · · · · · · · · · · · - · • • · '· - ' · •' - --··t -t _ · · · · • •• - _ ' - - · · ·· • - 1• •••• ·- • •• · ·· · · i··-·· · - l·'·f o · · · · · • · - ·t ' - - · • • •'·•· '----------- ------- -------c- ---------'· -· _ ' · ' · _ - · · · - · · ' • · o e· j J •Jiai Qa -id i ri • - · · - · ·' · · '• · · · · · ·_ p19 ttjng p aoning recniiting and i raining i tb 'Iate 199Qs - oW 4 hay b n· possibJe· _ · ' · · · - · withoup he Taliban sancthazy -Afgluuii ·· · · · · ·· · - ·· · '· · · · · · · · · • • i· ·· • · _ - · • • · Although Afgh stan had served as aplaee of refuge for international ·· • • • - ···• ··• · - • teoo jst amJ s and refuiingto · · -• · _ -·terrorists since tlfe 1980s the Taliban aided Bin Lad in b I ' · -· ·· · ·_ · · _ ··· · - _· coopera1otii - i' · · ·· · onmrwiity to e41 qtdite·hfin after the US·indicted him m JiJAtfl998·for his -·ca 11 · - - · - ' · · ' for-a worldwide· 1 Iioly w_ l f' giiins t'US citizciis - - • · · ' _ ' ' - ·· _ - · - _ · · · · · · • •• • • • • · -· 1 • ' • ' • • • • • • • • • • •• •• · • · • - · • ••I · - •• ·-- - L fl- - __ t t - · -· ·· · •-• • ·• · ' • · ·· - ' - - r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' · ·' ·· · · ince th So et µiv i n- anti its ermath - Afghthn _ · ·-- - -- --- -' · · became som · ·· · · · g akin to Teµ-orism corporated a country_wi a·vast infrastructure of _ ' ps and· faciliµes· for ifrefuge iig fadqctrination g · filld f4iat1cin g' o ·t · - ··· · _ • - · · · · · · · • - · ·• • · _·· ' C _of - - op W om_ 1· e he Yr ' i ·- f J · - • i - '· - _ - · It provid¢Bi#µidin aniso1atedand r elativelys feop¢tathig viromrieritt9 _· · ·• · · i ·· _·· · o verse his'org zation swoddwideterrorlstaciivitles _ ' · -i _ _ · i · · · · _ - · _ _ - _ __ · i• - · ' f ' 'i · · · · · i ' · · - r_ - ·· ·a ' ' i · _ · · · · ---_ · · · · - · · • Militants who J ece1ved traJnu g-there were senUo fi@ t-m1wa 4s' 1n Kasbiirlr t _ - · ·- ' · · · • I • • • • • • • • _' • • • • • •• •• t · ' ·I ·• t·•··• '- L2• • I • • ' '•i n • • · '• ·' 1· • • • • __ · ·• · · ·· · • '5 · _ _ ' · ·• · · • · ·• - · f' ii' t Di z J1· · · ·'--' - - · ·• - •· ·' · ' ·····•· ·· · - -• • • · •·- - · · ·• 7 · ' -·· • ·· · t · - -• _ ·-F ··f • _ - · · '- - - r - -• i -_1- • - - ' · · -_ - · - - fro m diy ¢ -I cati_ons to f lfgeJongstanding ideological -logi aQd p_ onalties_ ·_ · _·- --_ - -i• ·' --- - ·- - · - • • ••• _ ••_• - -·· ·-· ·-·· _--- ·• •M •• · · · - - - -_ - - _ _ ·- ·-i - ' · ··- · _ - _ __ _-_ •_' _• ·· __ _ _ -· ·_ ·_ L -------- ------- - -c ---- -- -- - -' - ••••• l •• • • • • • • • •• • • • •• • • • • •_ • • ••'• t • • •• • • •••• • • • - -- _- - ' _ ·_ - ·· - _ ·- ' _' ·_·_ •_ _ _ B ·Ladm epip asize4indQ ctruiation ti extt' st_i-eligioµsjdeaS aridinclti_d --- - -·· -- ' _-_· -_ - · _ _ · · _ -· _- -· · _- - - -- r·· · _ - - - _' - - the_constanfreffetition- ib tt4e Unifed·sta -·evil dJbat thfc ent- · i • - - - i · _ _--_ -- regimes of o countries are·not-ttue beiiev in Islam- and sij_ottld be - ---· - ' - '-h • - - _ ·· _ · · ·-· overthrown_ as ·a5religious duty ·· - - · · _· -_ --- l '- _ - · _ _ · · · · · - _- • _ - -_ --_ -- - ·· · - ·- · · - ' · · · r · ·-· · -- ' t · ··· i - · - · · · ·· · ·• · __ _ · - _ · ··•• ·· F-'---·· · · ·- ·· ·1 · · · - · ·· · · · · ·- -· · · · · · tin suiimiaiy what Biri Ltidin creilled iri w a s a sqp tic lled' i C' · · • · •· • ··· '_ · ·· · • -· · • • • • · • •• •· ' • • • • • • · • ••• •·•• • _ -_• · •• • ' · · 1 · ·' -· •• '· • - • • ' c •• • _ · - • - · · • ·· · - • - •• •• - •• • ••I • _ _ _· - r-_ _ ' - - · _· 1_ _ · · - - • _ r----- - - -'- _ __·_·_ _ _c_ --' _ '-- _'-- '-- 1 - _-'- 2 c c - '-'··_ · - '· '- · c _· __ _ _· _ _ ·-'·-' ·····- ·· - ·· · · ··· · - ·· · ·· ·· ' _ it ·- · -· · •- - _ ··- ··· •_ -- -- · · •· · · · · · · '· •• '· •· - ·· · '· - ·· • · · ·· ·· •• --· ·· _-•• ··· •·· - H - ·- • 0 - • · · t - · · ••' · - · •' ·s_1 t · ···· _ ·• __ · · • r_ · - ·· -· ·' - - ·· ' · - · - - · - • - •·· · · • • - I -••• ····-·· -•· · · ·· ' ·• · · ·-· --- · • I _- _ ---------- In- - e s- rin- _· -of - I- 9-9-9 -· in -res- p o- n-·se _ j-o th -'e- o -C -P-s -req -ues_ _ fo 'r - a-·_ - -__ ' ·' °· I I '-r- as e '· - -e-re-- -vi-- -e-w-or__ - e - - 1 s opetatfohal strategy ag st ·Bui I' 4 iiiand - i'new-sttategi c · • •' plan ere prod · a e icomprehensive operatio al pla n of a ck against the Bin· L · 1 · din- al-Qa iqatarget ipsid_ ·an d o-µtsid_eAfgrumistan • ·_ - _· · · - _ _ · · ·- - · -· ··-· · - - · -Th ·PI p ized iri ts multiµ _ ix · i· ' - _- _ th¢ _ptjoricy o_f capturing an i en e ll g to jristice_Bhi n@d liis_ p cipal li t - i C - • · ·• · ' _ · • - '•'• · - ' · ·r • - ·- · ·· ·· · · - ·__ · - i i • 1 ·· ·· · ·· I • •• ' •• · · · _· · · - · • • •• • I• · ·· • • ·- ' ' ' · ••••• ••• •• · ·_ • _ - -- •• • • • • ··· ·T Orl P · ' s·- ·- t · · ·- ' ' _ · i _ • ' f _ ' · i f L _ 14i • - f • - -·-- - •• • ••• ••• •• •• ••- •• • ·••• • •••• ••• •• • • • • i- • • 0 •'• --- ••• ••• J• • - · · - _i- _ · · • · - _ - __ _ ' ' _ _ _ · · · _ _- '- - · _ · · · ·__·_·_ • _ -' · _ · · -_· · · ·• ·· • ···_' _ · _ ·· - __ - - - J - _ · · '· • · -· -- · -· - - • ·•• · - •- - · i ·· r-• ·· - - -·' • r · ·· · •· - · · - _ ·· -• '· · · •·· 1 ·- · •• -- ·-'·• • · _ · ' --- · ·• · · _ · · · -· --- - ·· ·· · · ' · _•• ·- - · · _ •-1 --- ·· · -· _· - · _ · __ _ - - _ · - · - · · ¥' - • - - _ _ - MO _· · · · · ·_ _ · · · - - · _ r· -- - -· _-_·· · _ · · · • • · -·_ -- - rlt · r rft • 1 r •-1 · i ·· - ·· · · · _ - • • • _· · · •· • ··• • · ··· · ·- · · ··· -Another eleiiie1i£pr'$e strategy hatem erged · · · '··· 'alve ··c1e· A · in 2000 and 2001 was tb e usif f - ·• •· -· · · · ·-- - · _ ·· -· • · · · • • · _ - • - · _ ·-· - - - '- ' ·· · · · · '·- - - -· •• _ - •• - -• '' __ - • - - stlii 's - --ce _n-L_ •' 77 - ·1- ·str a- t-egy--- --_ w_a_s_p-- _la__y _e - -d·-0-µt - a-gam • -- st '-th _e_n- ece-s-si -ty-_f1 o_Jr_'·aggres$hr e · r· - - --J _' fy al- --- Afi -'gh-• · aru ···-stan- --fo-- - -' --- •'·_- - - _ - -- - - · ·· · • -· - -· and_ ccimp e ffti to · · · dj$rupt _plant ted Bin Lajjt i $1'9µ o r terrori t operatjons op a wo r14 J asjs _ilµc ·diluted fhe focus· Ladin himself · · on··Bhi J ·' • ·•· ··· ·_ - · c o s 3 7 i7 8 1 • • · • · ·•• '- - •i- · •• - · _ · ··_ - ·· ' · · ·· · · · -·· · • · • '· ·· _ · - mo t1$ l ngjo Septeniber- l woi ked-fo s'hift- th ffocus of9p tionaJ- ff9tt i-· - · _ --· · · · -· ·' · _· r ·_- · _ · · · _· a vay frc P f¥ i imi' ti im ' ' ·' - -· - ·_·_ · _ - · _ ' - - · · · _ ' - _ i ' i flf t · tr · • - _· - ·· · - _ ' ·• · · ····· - · · _ ··· · · -··- ·· - - l · _1- ' · _ - · -- · · ' • _ · · Ii • • -·· _· • · · · · • • 1•· ••' · ··· _-_ • _ -r_·· ·· · - · · - ·- - · • 1 •• · 1-- ··· 't' - - · · · •· ··· · ·- · · _ - i· ·'·· ·-·· · - · _ - ·• _ · - • - --· _ - · -_ - -·· · - _ n - • • f • 'L _ • t - ·· · • I• • • • •• 0 1 • ··· · •· · · - _• Up to tliis point ·this paper·hasfociµ ecton OIA s·role · in·d yeloping our · ·• · ·· ·_- · · · · · · · ·· undel s llig of e al Qa'io a eat tmd ·devlsllig ruici impleiri eiifµig_ fopust and weih· • · - t r t r83t1t Y •· · · - · - ·' · · · · ·· 1 9 rc·· •aggre sive y purs iil r itge cy repr rit ati9n ·b th°jn line_ ·· · - · - · -· · · ·· · · · _ · ···· · · managemenfanctatthe· worlqng-le vel si Uce Jj tablishn7 pit-i · 80 ·_9-ver Ui Y eiµ-s - - - - j- · this emphasis ·has fostered bcith im1 roved coipmunica ons as we as be t br ·· ·f'· ' _ • • - · · · _ · · · · t4e - it¢ cu t t al baiii ts tC teatl Vt ti1 e tiye_ sµpport· · • r i · · · ·· · • JQ top era ons By20Ql Jhe Centet ad epres nµt ti y fro1 1r 9re than a d z _ · · · · - · ·__ · agen ies y lvt d in tµ Ji hf agai errc fo p t_ pf the Ceiite r's erSO el · · · · · _ · ·--- •··· · tn t 1 11 - · - t···· ·' · · t i··· - · · • ·· · · · · · · ' · · · · - - - · · • · ·· -· · - · ' 1-------- -- c - ----- - ---- -- - · • • · - ··· • · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · ' ·- - • 1 ·- ·· · - - ·· · t ' ' • ·• · · · • r · · _ _· •_ i- ··· 6 T i ' 1ftiC1 Ci c Offi • · · IA- l as assign cifficer to workWfth I 'Bl o sistffiem m •·· __ · _ •· - _- · t- · _ - _ ·• · · ·-'··-·· -· -_ ' lishing th if trwrrforeign iiitelilgen e r rlj g fanalysis p il ti ii- i · · · - · --· ·· · · 7 ·· · _ _ · ·· · · i · · _ · •··· · - · · _' 1 · · ' _ _ · · · ' · p fi · · • • · -· ·' _ · · •· ·· Frori1th wid 19 90s· th e -Cent #as h dl · · · · -· · · ·· 'detitlled fr lin NS A ' whi eJ SA in additionto ·hostiµg•wotking evelC ·· '· ·····'· - ·· · · ·· · ·· · ' ·-· '' _ _ ' · officei' s_ _haduiitilrecehtl° ·aseniot CIADirectorafe6f · ·erationsofficer · ·· ··· •• · i • · · · • · • l • - - erc·r P p it · Q · # st Bin di •· ial Qa'i ' _ ·· · _· · ·• ·· __ · ' · · - r latio ships a rid titutiori_al at qevelope l oye_r Jhe yeari 1m1ong C ori_nlt ty _ - · • - • _ _ · · • _ · · ·· • I - · • - • · - · agencies p_aid · omioufdividciicls hi the fight ½th e tert_Qrists a f91l ws· ·ai e feiy · · · ·•· · •· I•ii' ·• ·I ' offur - •' -· Si pj · · · • ·• ·· ' ·· · - ·•· - ··· ' 11• ·· · · · · · 1i•• ··•···· • · · · • ·· • · · '· ·· · y1· · · · _- · · ---·· -- ·· • ' · '- - - -- - --- -- -- _ _ _ __ -- · - - · - · · -l · -_ · - ·-• · - · --· _ · -_ · -- · • M -· · ·-·· 00 - • • ••• 0 ••• M J• ' - • • 0 • ·· • ·· · · - _ - ·__ · ·· '· f_ _- - '1 · M _ _ ·-· _ t i ' ' · · · · - ·• · ·- ' '_ __ · · - ·_ · 'T · · • - · · ···· · 0' - - ·I _ bv they fueFBii dCIJ ·have··V r ' a - _ -· · · · • · · • ·band combatirig teirotj sm· 1 pde CIA's ·comitei t¢orism·program particuJar y from· s · - ·· ·· _ 19 5 orward was ffe @ by tµ e_strongjJ91ibf ph is o _ crimtnai' ves gatj -18 · _ · · · ·· prosecutions ·as OOJlllfertei ri rism tools There have peen numerous·successes and· some · • · · · · · • · _ ·• taii es wii e oo ope£3 t io1 90uld be better The n Xf for to ·work bettert9 geth ·h · _ - ' _ -- ·- l ng'J _- ab ¥ # i c iµ- _- '·· - · · _ _ • • · · · · '• -• • - · · • • · l •• ' • •• •' • l _- • • -• • • • • • ' •• • • • · ' ·• •• • · · · · • • _ - wapmonmraw - · • _ • •· · · · · •' I · · -lo- s- 1- -to- g --- -er - _in__ --e-'-a - - _ a th-0-f - ' ' _ ' ·· - -- - - · - - --_f B - - ·-d- -_ o ' -- -- -w' r- ed- _ · th first Worl Traae Gent¢r om b ng · · · '· · · · · _ 7 · I · _ · - - - 0 · -' · ' L -_ t · _ ' -·· ·· · · · '- ·1 · _ · • ·• ' · Wne1i ' px obJ do OC µr i is fu e re lt of cfil ferert o a o -sultut es • - - ·different objectives -differenttradecraft and in some·cases alacl c of ' _- •- • •' 1 - - •· _J ·· · · ·' · · • ·· -· - ·· •• _ - _ - _· _ ____ - _ •r- · -- · · • ·• · · ·· ··· ····· -· - · _ -· ' ·- • ·· · · ·• · · · · · _ · ' · ·· _ · · ' Z t t ' 7 - '•'ti -• _ '- · _ • - _ ' 'ij '·- rf v J d ' ' - ' ' ' '' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' _ l• ' ' -' ' i · _ _i • · _•_ --'-c __ __ _ _ ____ __ __ c _'---'-'-· •• · - ·- · ·· ' · · _ _ · ··· ' _ •· · · • · · · · ' •' · · • · · · · · · · ' • ·· _·' -· • •-· · · ' · ' •' •·• · · ·' '·' • · · ·· • ·• _•-· - _ _ ·•· ·· •-• - · -- · • • t • · •- • '· ·•·• · I' ' ' · ····_·' - - ·· · •- ·· - · - · · • _ _· r · •· ' - ··· - · _ · ·• • ··· · · · • • Bf d CIA ciillabo ated foseif· an the T Wi S 00 ·c e · ' _ · ·• - · · ·_- ·• - • After tfi e crash ere munajiaiely'formed -a working ·gi-ouj · to • assis tlie FBI Q9 i ·· · _ ·C'i • _ ati n' · · agencies in the inv ti · · · •·· ' · ·· ··· · · •· · · i S r- ·- ··'· _ - tbieats --m · · FBI 'C · r· p a f1 _c lo s Iy n _ · e unt rin - tet ro tjft_ - - _ - · · ·' · · · · ·· · · •·· · Afi w -recej voo tash· 9f r $ - p i9 9 tlir t nfui attii¢ki n tlie hmteci •· · · · · e h e 1 d -o · ·' # _ · t ····· · · -· - · · - •• - · States we wor ed togefl1 ertq provide advisories fo loc flaw· oicement· · · · · · - l Fi ·· · · J ·· · ·_ - · - · ' 1 -r · · ·____ · · ·· · - · f i ii t1ie i i dr·_ -- - · ·· · · · i998 to hijac lc a plane o ·tli e4s co ast of thcf'Umted S tates to· attempt to· -' · • · · · · · · free the blitidsha 'lgt'' from prisoril · ·-·· ··• • · ·I · i ·· · ·· · _ - • 1 · ·· • 1 ' • ·' l · · i j' L'- - -- • -- ·· • •· • · · · - ' _ _- · · - ··cIA and FBI paiticipataj with oth ·agencies in NSC -cha ire l eetings of the · j • ••• • • • - --- - _ #·- ·· _ · ·' ·• -counterterrorisr i Security Group to discuss ¢is reporting and take acqori'on · _ -it ' · ·•· - · i · ·r-'----'-'-- -- '-'---_ _--'-__ _ __ __- _ ---'---- ---- ' '--'-'---'---' ---'- ---'-- _--- - -- '· · _ ·· · ·· - ·· ·· · ·-· - i• - · _ - · ·- · - · • • • _i_ ··t _ • · · · CIA and FBI- als hvorked clo ely an4 successfully to um plots and s venil'other ·eiises 2 000 · · · -_ · • · · ' 7 _e -p-_ect ·· -_ · enm · c _ c _-- _ ·· · •-- -··-'· -'· ·-'·-'· _·_ -'·-·o ·--' ·_·c _·__ · ·-' · · _ '_' ·-- -- '---'--· c · _·_c· _'· ·_·_ _ _ · __ _ __ · ·--· ·• · t · '• l _· ' · • • r·· ·- - _ · ·•·1• · • ·· · · ··•• '• - · -· · ' - · _ · · · _ • -• - · · ·• · · · - · ··· ' · - t • •- ··_ • · t •• L----- ---- -- - ------------------------------------- -· ··' - • ' - · · ·· • - ' ·- _• • • • • ··•··•i g ifi '- ·· - -· _ ' - • • 20 •••_ -- - • - · • -· - - · - - --- - _ _ --- • ·-·· _ · •· --- _ 1· · · _ · · · · Ji •ii1 f ' iifa t _' _ _ _ _' •_ - - - _ _ ' · • · - · 1 ' ' • · · --··· - - - '--''--'--''' -' C _'--'-' -- -l ·_ ' · '' •· · __ __ _ '- ----'CW 5 _d c ' t i I t · - •'• · f ·· _c __f · · •r'--'-'-'---'-- '- c-c_c_c_c_c c- • c c-c-c- · · ·· c S ' · • --'- --·_·- '' '-''-'--· _·_·-'-•--' -·c · ·_· ·-·_·_·_' · _ _·_ _· • ·····- • · i fI ' _ r · r-- T · · · L• _ -· - - · · - · •' · t- i -· -· -· · ·· · -· · - i ·- · ·· ·• · - ·- · · -· •· · - · •· • · • ' · · · ·· '• - •' • • • - - • • • • T •• i 11 •1' - 7 --- - - ------'-- - r j · - --'-'-- - - ---'---'- · · • • • • •• •' ·1 • 1 - I' • ··· ·· ·- ' I · · P i _ijis cireeli j 1' f boratio 1e nSsc · cotitinue A major _-ongoirig· p cerii is FBI' s lfrdn emal diss_eniiniitio1i'sys _tem 'C · ' _ 1· · · · ' · · • ·officers··stjll often·fihd it -ne ssiary to hand-delivey til essages to the -itttend lrecipienf • i· · · · · · - - · ·_ thjn FBI additj o l BI - nqt'perfected its F1_r orting systeµ ii dJi quarters- - - · · i · · _ · · field communicatio -so ·ssemination ofintellirrence outside·ofFBI stillis · · · · · _ _ · soottvl 1 -- ' · · 1· · · ·•· ' - · _ · · · · · · _ · _ · ·· · • ·som cases ClA-and'FBI- uld e etfonnecl'better' · __ · _ ' c • • _·· ·'· ·- · · to eth r · ·· · ·• · · - _ · · · • · ·· · ··_· · ·' _· - · - ·· j ••• 0 R • • · · · · - ·· _ _ · - · • _ · · · • • · ·· ·• • •• • · · · I• • ' -- · ••••• rrtie·_ fferentorgani atiori i'gtilfuretihd goal pfFBI d- - ·- ' · · ·- ' · • • _ -r- 1- · ••• ' • ••• · · CIA sometimes getm 'the way of desired resul -_The FBI foctl$es on gathering evidence · · _ · tp solv e crltnes· fil1d CI Afoctisekoii ·threat assess ents _lµld coU cting and-analyzing ' · ·' · ' _ - iptel igence Wh ·these-iw _goal conipete _problem Jiay Q _ · ·_ • · --- · -· • · - • · ' ftfffR JiI ' rt lt J ft t • ·• f ff 'i lf ft' I 1 y fIVf j yr P _ h - ' mtfa •· • -• · - •• •- ··· · ··· ··· · ·· ··c · · · · · · · · •· · ····' ·'· ••' ·· · · ···'· · ·· ·· · · •• _ •_ · '· · ' • _· ' -· · · • · · · · · · · · ·_ ·····• · -' · · · ·· ·•· '·t ·-· ··· · ··· -- · ·• · ·· ' '' · •'• · · -· • · - --· · ·_ · - •• · -·· - · • · · · ···'· · · · _ ··· _ · - _ · · · - ' ·· ' ·L-- -------- - -- -- -- ---- - _- - - ----- ------ --c-----__J ·•· · ·· · • • ·•• • ··'- --------_J -2000CiA torlGeneral G tep rton CTC ··· · --· · ·_ ··· · · µeluded that many unprovei nents haci'b ril de· cfi hat' rel tio rispips·befureen 'CJA · _ · · · · · and FBI had been -institutiortalJ Zed ' · · ··• • · ··· ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ J evei thehiss -theIGreport·a so ··· • - pcijnted tQ cot tinuea prob Ienis tm tt ptirnaps iµig11 t be impossible ·to oyeicom ly · · • · i · ·· _ · · b cause of''thenaturalJ nsion that sts betw t4e o orgimizations 4erivmg'froip_ - _ · - · 'their qiffererit missions w ch ¢an e n eg tlat¢cf' b'lit never 'e jmjnated t_ S9_ni of tlie'mq· t- · - · - · • - · 1 r ·1 ·' · · · ' ' · · · · · ' · - t ' · · t · i · ii ' i i t · i t C 1 ·ci 1 · · · • · The difference it ror ganiiational mission4-intelligence collectioi·and Cover · · Action Agency' d successful prosecuti on ofterroris for e FBI for e 1 i - • · · · ·· • ·_ _ -· 2 ··· -'°· · · · · ' · · · • · Con s iri borii o gani tions out ac · to e · issio1i · ' - · - ·· - ·· • · · _ · inforniatl i i-· _ - · · - ·· - - · ·· · ' · · · · · p ties·b us fd f ge t i · - · · _ ·-· - · '· · · ' · _ · · · • · · · · h lciss f po tial i11tellig nce ·· ·· - · ' _ _ _ ' · _ ·· _ · -•jm orcemel 1_ o s - · ·· · · · _ - ·'· -· · ' · · - ·J ·· - j · • •• · __ · · · - -__ • ·· onethel s ·the l er5hip · thi o ag ci · y ' -· '' - c · • - - · · · · · C lll Sist ntly worked these· ISsu s•and will continue to do sq·rurwe ideqtifY them -·_ - -- · -- · · · · ··· · · · · i_ _ _ ···· '· ·· · ·· ·· •·· - · -· · · · -- ·· ·· · · ·· · · · · · • ·· For exam le th · sigrimenfof_top ffl t_jpern 0D11 ho signi f p os itj o at -· · ·' ·· · · · · _' · · · · - · - ' · • · • e h q arters l el o the rnro afe h ·suQ sr-itt Y l pr°' xt- ' · · --- · '· _ · · · · • ' ' · · - - • i coordmation _ _ · - • • · · · · · · - • · - • _- ' ·····•· ' - '· ·• ·· ··· · i · - · t 1_··· 1 t- · ·'· - · · _ 1 _ - - · g · · · Irr ' Y -· · • · - -- ' _ ' L· • ' · · • · ·1 ·1trAJ µi niin -· o--· ote o rr¢¢t- bj ' J_ 11 · ' · ¢lqsmg· gapJ tw n w Jiere we aj' lµl J ·w bere· w -w tJ9 J ei Pr gr i i°Ms41g fu¢ · · • · _ -- · -' ' · · · · - ye t f oper ti9n o4i '4ie'eomni ty ag c es ov# tlj ' Y as t J y fo · · · • - · _· ' ' _ ·_ - - _ ·_ · watningpolicymakers ttopPilig and·disrupting_at aclcs agairist-US ¢sJ $ overse i'° ·- - • ---· · ·· · • - · · •· · t • • •• t • • - • • · • · - - • · _ · hqµf$ fitlptlt oti th ·domestic µexus· ofintern tiorial t eftori m · C¼ - ·· · · - _ - · · - • ' an ysts woiifcHiave ·been -hard-pressectto· pro vide' t hreat waniliigs in e Iy _· ' · ' · - · - August'i® l 'that ai Qa'1¢1 contµiueg· tcrview the US homeiancfas a hi · · p Qtf tar·· · · ' · e t ' _ · · · · '' ·· ' · ' ·• · · · · -' · · · · · -i t • · - · · · ·· •·· -· · I · ··• ·_ · • · ···· · ' ' · • - ·· ·· · · --· - -' · · · · · ----- ··· • - Wt r-Wllg Witl For ign Liii iso · ·· '·i'-··L · -- 11 - · - _ · •• · • •· · _t- · J· ·· •· • ·· · · ·•· ·· · - · ·· · · · r ¥inK li aison p s h been an indis ·ensable · ' -9l9 ely -with ' foreign ' •· ' • · •• • · t# _ • • · • • ·· • · i ·i • ·· - · ·- · · • #' - -· ··· -· · · · -- - • ·· __ ·• · ·· ·· · · · · ·' · _ - · · · -· • ·· ··· • · - _ · - · - f_ · i -· · - · · · · · • · - ' ' io - ' · - ·· ··· · · e --- - - · '_ 4--- - - · ·· - · • · • ·_ ·-· · · · - - · ·_ ' · ' ·· ·-·- · ·_ · ·_ · -•· ·- _·- - · -· ·- - - - · ·· -· · - •L · i' 0 k _ ' · - 1·' f · · '_-1·· 1 ···_ · ··_· • · _'' r - i • · · - ' ·· · · ·· ' · · ' · ·_ · · _ - '· '· ·• ' _ · - _ · · ·' _ · · · · · · · ·_· · ·· ·· · · _ _ • '' ' s - · · · · ·· · · - · _ · ·· · · ' · · _ _ __ _· __ - - ·' it ···· · ··- · ··· · · - _ •- '- ··• 'i i ·- - I· · ·· · · • · • · - -·· · · · · i· ·· • · -· ·- · - ' · ·-__ _ - · · · •• · · · •• _ _ ' -·· - · · • · • _ •• · · ·-· ' I · · · · • _ - -- - • · ·• · · · - ·· ··· _ •· ·• • · - - · · -· · ·t·· · - · - - · - -- · • - · j ' · · -· · · ·· • • · • ·_ · •' • ••• t ··· - · - · ·· · t m0't7t · ·t w t 1 se7t ' i ' - jii6 jj_ ' i L · L· · _ _· · - - - - - --- --- _ -···-· - -- ·__- --f- - - --· - - · ---- - - - -· - - · - ·· · · · ' · - · - - · · · · - • - u · · · · · · • - ·· · · · • · • · - · · - - ' • • • · ·· • •'• '' '- I •• - · · · the l lilitiiry · · e telli en tY · c1 c1A·sp r ed· eth · _ ·· · · Support to · - ·' ·- · support of 9n actual and several plan ii ed crqise··Jirissjle attacks agafusrJ3mLa deii ilild · '· · · ·· · the afQa'ida leadef$ip The deniand 1 y policy·officials foririultip1e corroborative · · · · sources piilpoinµng the time and· place where Bin Laden· would be vulnerabi to an· attac ±· · coin billed with concems damage howeyer ·served as maj r· _ · · · ·• ab9t t collateiaf • • tQ civili I • · · ··· ·· ·· · constraitifsto th ed mal go-ah ad to'launch · i · - ·· - - ·' · · · - · ___ · · -- ···· · - · · OnAu · 20 -I t ditJ sta · ndrict a'InmJ ii kswitli · ··· ' · - missiles against targets in S udan· d Afghanist h fa respo e -fo clear · ·· · · ev idence of Biri Ladin's resporisibjlity for the p lanning· and x tiori-two· · · - · -· •c ' · weeks earlier·ofth ·bombirigs ofour ehlbassies• fu-Nairobhmd Da ·es Sa_t - - - i-fi · - -· ' ··· ·•' - • · ·1 in· -· · · - - - · · ' ·· '· · La in and his lieµtenants would be l r ei lt iii oµe of several- t amps· located · · · · · · ' · · · · ··riearKhowstin Afgham stiui cni ' eb Iieve· t w d ged·· ev of _ ··· · ·· · · ··· _ - - · • · ·· · · · · · the µrt ded gets inAfgha llistan ru idldllcilodnjuted•'approximately 80•i ·· · f · • ·· · · -' · · _ ·terrorists BinLadinestaped iriiurv ·nossiblv•jed fa v ce f e - '·-'·· · - -·· ··· · • lw•fe· d C C ' · '• · ' ' •· Jn Novenili l9ps W ' j · increasingly interested in our tribru Afi ·an sources' r rting o 'Ujn Ladin s · -_ · ' · ·· - · - · -•· • - • J llQVem entsh-- --- c-c-- ---- --------c- __ in Q d for•tf' ·· _ · · - · · ossible ·cruise•missi e attack The1military expre$s ·ooncem··abouto uf -' · ··_-' · · · ·_- ·· - · ·- · · ' · ·- · ·•· • · · · ortin · -- t· ·· ' beifr 'reffabletm ou ·· for I6cationaF cla '· ·' _ - t - i • 0· '· --- ·· J·· ··'·• · -· · · · · · • • • • • · • • •• •• •• _ •• • • •' •• • • • • - • • r• L ' • _ L 2 · •·' • '•·••· ·•• i i•• _ ' i f ··· f ·_ · J o1 · · · - - __ l t · ' · -_- _-• - -- · • · · - • _ • •• •• -- - • ••• • • •• •• •• -• • • • • l • • • • • • •• kEL C ••••··• c J•J c • 0 •• · • • · - · ' · ufflmafu Y 1cy om- - · - · - - -- ·· d 1' · er -of ' co d$ ge W • byn·•j i c _ _ _ · __ · • · • · ·- · ' _· '_ · · · · · •· • _ · · ·· · o q t gr t f ·i · i i · 1 i i r i · · ··1nFebru¢1r-Marbh 1999 nnlitacy tithigen oyp1aniiiug·o1 1astclke a·· st·'• i · · -· 5 --_ · - ·- · Bin Laden·fo used on huntin ¢a tnp ·uscii by UAE 'j dn s · - r- · · • -· _ · · · · · · ·_ · ······ · 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - o ' wm ' '·' -gc' '·· 'p q Y1c y ·o cr v - - ---' · • 4is cussions wi the UAE about ept oo ce ofits mili tary• - l30s in the ru - a· · - · - ·_ ·-- · • · · · _ _ · rcampUBLre@rte Ybad ykhAli'sCam -·• ·•r···-_ • · _-·· 1 • In May· 1999 -the militaiy ag 'CORtefu lated ·a cruis ·missile strike a airisL · _ -·· · -· _ _ BinLadin ih the Qandahat ar - · • e- m tens · e _ __ o_ _ I whereabouts fot almost a wee · · · · · m Ma 13 19 A ain ·the' · · - - · _ · · · itarywas·coJ medabouttheptecisi9 i · · ·· · · · ·respect to id tincati on ofparticular·J uildfugs as we 1as poteri 1 ial•CQl lat al· - -- · · · · · · · 'damage' to ·surrounding facilities -iesultjng in ·policy officials D otauthorizing· a •· · · - -· · · · ·strike ' · ·· · · ··· · · · · · -···· · · • ' -·' · · · · • ' • · _ ' · · · ·Biidget aitd Risinii §· c S · · · 1 · · I • · · · ' - · ·· · ' · · - - · •· a • · • • '· · i• ·· · •' ' i ' · · t' '-oi ·· iTh IC s· Vith al-Q 'ida·m e·decaciep rt Sep b Yi i t · · - ····· come cheaply 'In a period when overall ·funding for the h1teliigen Cqmµiunity and the· · ·· Agency shQwed ittle if an ···actual owtii ·CIA s·caj reqµests to'tlie con esirfor · · · · ·· · · · counterterrorism funds ore than For·ii nuinber of · '· · to·· riation includecbn b tantial SU ' ementals These·· '· ' -• · · · · ' •· · - · ···· · r· · • • · · · o• • -- o_ o o• 0 0 • -- o'•o o •• 0 ·_ • 0 • • 0 • · 0 o • 0 ••• · 0 • · • 0 •• l oo o · 1 I ' ot o 0 0 • • • oO O R 0 ••• - O • ·' 0 • 0 op••• • 0 -• Wint tltls groW ili pattern eariy fa onible he t ci tliat itre ted-· · · - - _ · - · _ · _-- · significipitly ·o n supplemeiital appropriations - d other ergericy measur es · · · · • inQreased the fµculty_in program pl g · ·· ' · · _o - c- · • •• • j · · · --- · ··· · · · ·-·• · - · · · eild¢hl nstrate - stead · · • These fi terroris f 0 o • 0 · 0400 · o 0 ·eted ·ag tlnst · r o P•• o • 0 • o · •• I i ·I · I _ A teyie - i thecoiitext_µl' hlc iJ so ylr outceiweieallo·cated· ·- _ _ __ ·- · - - - _ ·' mcµcates that desplte-the·downs rig or -in1tthe I in-generhl ·duffirg••fii •i990s·a- --· ·- · · · · · - - • · ·-- - - series· ofDCI s v orked aggressively tc pro'Vi de-mferihimcedleveror efforfagafustiliilf- · · - _' ·• J · __ • -- · · 1· - -- _- _ '3 _ __ • ··· inbreasingly dangerous··and·s•phisti ted tiiiget 0 • • -· · - • · 0 · ·· · · · 0 • · ·- ••• ••• 0 o - - In-the'd depriot -fotheatttcks_ o septem 11 th Intelligerice ·_ _ - · ' ' · · __Community expeiiep ceq ·a stantial decre c in p·erso t l r s'°actoss th _board - -· · - · · · · This reduction egaii'ih thlw e ·ofth -dem i e of the -Sovief U nior ru id conlliiued -welf· -· · - · · · · ·' ' · · - · ·· ·· - · into the· mid l990s ·reachingjts nadir in 1999 ·d v etail C minunitv resourcefwere _· · - ·- · · - · · lresµitmg'in• a · - · ·- - · -- - -- · · -· · - -- rec1ucedJ - substantial decrease _in' case officers 'in the fi_eld l9sing o f some _stations ·'iµid sigmfi¢ant-- ·-1 _• · - ' -· -' · ··· - · -- · · _ _ _ · ¢u o _' f- ysts· - ppprt_ p on nif - · --· · i · _ · _- · · _ · _--_ t '_t _ ' •'• J ·' _' ·- _·· · · · 1· · - · -1 The telligertce CoµtQ1Uiiity dealt w th r SOlJ tistra neti p S _ - _· _ · · · · · -- Cold War etivironrii t_ by priori zfug the fQcus-ofitsiwo k- tigh such moohanlsms'as' · · · · · - ··· · · · · · · PD P-35 But at the same time it continued to face·n demanqs from the policy _ · _ - - · · -community for ititiI igence support that required ne vJ and _different approaches aild ili e _ •• ' c ' ' '' -- 0 • • M O 0 0 t fa Jt ir 13 • 1 - - - -- -' ' · --c - - r---'• --- _- _ i ' - -···•· C --0 -· ·_ ' ___ ·· · ·•C 5 3 7 4 7 8 L · ' ' ¥r t1f 1 ff · ··· - - · -- -· · ·· ·· _ - · · · · cr tion ofi ew buteaU atkentities that m ew on·cIA expertise ands persolinet · - · _· · ' · hideeci 'CIA had to ntend with the t gµtqe dema1ids 9f sev ¥ eineighig heighten · · or t J Li i J 2 ilfi i t d t I · ·-• -·• ·---• i •- -_•- 1 · · • - · issue #toyed sharply to the' forefront as iicetns-'aros over the1a' Jc-o · ' '° - · ·S·c '· ' · · security °former_ Soviet- stocli Piles aggressiv _effo ¢ bi Iran - ' -° · · - · · · - Norf4 Korea to ieyelop these wtjtpons an th ir JJ1 1of delivery it af' · - · · · · ·· •' · · · 0 • - · ' · · - ·· 'the·ood_pf he decade theem ergenceoflndiaand P tjucleartensions -· • • t •• • • •• • • •• • ••• ·- • - ••• • • • • • • • • • • · · ••• • _ • • • - • • • • • • • - • • • - · ' · · •• • '• • ' • •' ··- _ · - _ · - · · · · · ' · I · - · ·· -- - · JThe reduced Sllpply_ of_perso1m etan ·ex 'and rif Ig d d for sµpport to poticy makers and war fighters sharply cons e tg w-abthty to shift · · - r _ personnei resourcefwithin fue geiicy fo address·Qies pew filf4 shiftiitg-priortty ·· · cog OOJ ' DS Our flexib ility was further reduced by the vety ·sub ifu'itial thlle it takes to · · r 9 t tntjn -anci' de v l9-ptheexpeitise·ofb6t4analysts' arid• cil$ officers ' · _-· • ·-•· -·- - i I this e d vuo' fl C t a - r was not'omy· - • • · · ' · • • ··- · -· -· · '• sa to it · _ · - ·· - · ' • ·% t tQi 1 t e- onneI resQuic es coinmitted to the co sitfeffort '• ' ' 'protected tit actQally·_etlhanced l he 4epth of the Commuruty · · · · • L -- cJr-a_w_ d o-wn- -p-ers_o_nn_el p-_ o-s iti o-ns_w __1- thin -CT -C gr-e- ----1 ---------' · __- · espit '---· · ·· · ···· ·· _ percenfreduction '-iri'personriel AgeJ 1 cy_wide · '------ -_ _ 0 · · • __ _J · · · '· _ · I i - tto the ctlyti eff 11 · 20 ·1 '· s · _ -· · ·· · · · 1 · Agency were making analytic contri utfons to the rollllt¢erroµ t nµssion in ·a varie of· · ' ·ways such traditi9n analysis targeting and' operational ·SU Ort · ·J editjtted to al-Qa'ida The equivatent o ereJ Vorltjng_ ·· · ' • · - tcm'qri sm t l oo issues or·applymg spedallzed skµIs·fo the-terrorisnfm oblem fi oni ·ttfoir - - · · - · · - · - _ _ as '-- -- J · Sep'iembe l 1 those numbers rose· ' · · · _ · · -I positici ui·tbe Df ·-in additiog · · · · ·dramatically Th_e to_ analytic presence in qrcj •· · • · ' - -• ·- - _- •_- · --· · --i- - · · · - - _ ·· · - ····· ' ·•· - · - · 9 •· · 1 • · •• · - · -- _ •·· • '' ' ·- - · • · • •• n s -x _ _ _ -_ - · ' _ -_ • - -_ ___----l ___ · •' • • • • • • ··- _ _ ••• _ ' · · j 1 · t· · i - · '·•·· I- • · ·- '· · ' • · ·· · - · •· ' ·····--· · ·· · · ---- ' ' --- -- ' II l -- -- ----- -- --- -- ---'-- - - - - -' -C _ - - -- --- -- - -- --- - _ _ _ ·· · - · a· · _ · ·_ _ --- -· ' ··'·· - ··· - '-' i_ -·· - _ --- - --_ ·•j· • - · - _ · · _ - · - ·· ·· -1 - ·· · • ··· ··· · 't • C053 7 4 7 s 1 · _· _ · 1 •• -' • · _ · · · · · - - _ - · · ·1 •• ' ' '··· ·-· ··--·· · - ·· 3 I l _ - · · - - ·· ·_ • ·· J · _ _P •• • • - •••• I · -···'' ··- - l o• _ __ '- - - · -· ··· 'I CO 5 3 7 4 7 8 1 ' · e • · - •• · · · i - · · ' - · •·· - · ' 1 · · -· ·· ·· · · · · · _ · ··f· · - · ··• · _ _ ··· · · · · · -·· · · · · i ·1 •·· • · ··· -'-· · _ · - - •· - · · ·· · • ·· ' i• •· · • ·' • • _ · ·- 'l 3 · · '• · ·- - · · ·· · •' · ·''· •· - • · ' -if ··i • · •'• · f ' jf' fo l iilif li f i - ·· · · - ··· •· · · - _ ·· G • 1 S iJ j co 53 7 417 s 1 I • • ·• • • •• ··'· • ' • ···- • · · · •• · •' • ·- • • ·-- •· - ··- - - - ··· • _ d ••• - ' ' '• ' ' i • t' - ·_ ' · · ·•- · · · • · - · ' __ · -· - · •· ·· ···· · • ·• - • · · -·· · • i C0 5374781- · - T l - -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ -· -- 1 t · ' i f · f· j ri' I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ J I W e are using all of the traditional oal and are usin new means of ettin I i j I i f i fo·' s 7 7 1 · 1 •' - · - T - ------ ------- ------ -------- -- J 1' · f ·J ·' l ·1 T L------- ---_ _ __________J • • C O5 3 7 4 7 8 1 - -_ • ····· -• ·· · · '- ·_'_ · _· rw ' r ' ' t '_- · ·i · - · _- ' -- '• •• · ••• -• ••• • · • ·• · t· · ·· ··· • '1 - f 3l- '' - ··- -- •• 1- • - r• • • _ ·_ · • · •• · • •· •· •· • - · · -CO 5 3 7 4'7 8 1 · _ _ '· ·_ ·_ · · · -·i ' _t· -- -·· · L------ ----------------- ----_r-wyzing terror finance trends working with the US nolicv and law enforcement communities- 'Ind utilizing all source informatior1 · • Identified al-Qa'ida's growing interest in cash couriers and trusted hawala networks as vehicles for transferring funds in the Middle East and South Asia 7 1n ncn '-' T Kn J'-----------------' • · ri's 3 7' 7 s '· · • i-'· · ·' · · · ·' ·- ·'·r ' i tt fff ' i ''Sl I· -- _ ·- · ·- ------··· -·' _ • 't --- -· -·· · -------------------- co 53747 '31···· ·_ -· _ · · _ - - y f ' f f · '-t -· - _ •·i 'J • ·--- j' • • • •t•··· i - ---- - - - · -·- · ½ ·_ - -- - · ' • ' •' i •• - ·-·· · • ·• - r 1 ' r I ' i · i li i i 1 -i 1 1 _ • _• ' · _ - · · - - - r· ···- _ rte os 3 7 418 1 ' · r- ' - · · _ ' •· - - _ - · -· · · · · •' ' · r ·l i - · ' - - - ·· i • -l l ·· ·· · · •• · •· ·· ·· ·- · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ J ' CO 5 3 7 4'7 81 · · · -f _ •• • • ' · '_ · · - -- _ · • · · · · • • l •• _ _ T 6p ' · · · ·L----------- ----- ·J tegration of Collection • In undertak iri g this integration eff'ort ·tn e·ADCf for Collection oonvened daily · · · meetings with analysts and collection officers from NS NG and CIA to f • Through focused coilectio ictureof • This integrated intelligence· collection effort also supported military targe ing operations prior to September 11 including the cruise missile attack against · · _the al a ida trainiI g lex noitb eastern Mgllanistan 4i August 199 8 in addition it helped o provide baselin data·for the US Central · Command's target planning against -Qa'ida f lities and infrastructure throughout Afghanfstan · · I ollowhlg the Sept ber 11 ·atta s th ic redoubled its efforts to collect and inte ate all of the intelli ence d'· · · 4 1 - '-------- -- I • ·· · --· · ---'---' - 1 co 5 3 7 4° 7 81 ···· · ··' '- _ · ·_· • ' ' ' - _ · · · -·· · _· -_ _' · · · ··' - _ · ·• · -- ' · ·_ _ _ · - · - •_··· _· · -' · - _ ' - - · · · ·- · · · · _ - - _ __ _ __--'_ - - - _ _ _ c _ _ _ _- --_ ·_· ·- _ ___ __ '-i'---'-- --' '- · __ _- _ · - -'-_ --'-- - - -'- - ' - -' ' ' '- - _---- - _ ' · - - - - - - - - - - - - an mmunity collection officers meet daily to ensure ocus ynru mc collection on Bin Laclin and residual al-Qa'ida I dership · Waniing and Analysis · 1·· 10ur al assessed'al-Qa' a s-modus 'operandi capabilities ari d · intentions to · cquire weapons of ass -destructi_on Similru -ly they warned policymak ¢rs during the· summer of2001 tb at the threat of terrorist attacks was real arid seriot1 s Such performance was $ e result of significant measures by the Directorate ofI t lligence to enhance our mialytical capabilities assigned to this target · jAfter the East Africa bombings in 1998 B n Ladin and al-Qa'ida ere the target against w ch w arr iyedl f _ i e't' c_ · · - · was - JEaoh ·analyst responsible for the full range_ of tactical and strategic work _e_a cli b-eann · g responsibility for supporting senior policymakers ·operations long- · ·term research current intelligence briefings targeting d - nore ·re llity however · most analysts were consumed by tactical work We needed to iget the right balance · between strategic and tactical analytical work by giving more'efforl to strat gic analytic issues • ·c Unit in· July 2001-to fix this The Unit allowed us to isolate the analysts assigned to it from the focus on 'the biggt r picture '--- - grind_ of daily-crises to • •· T ___ ----4'2 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ •· •· · '1 ' 'I C0 5374781 •• • • · • · ' · • · i •• · ·· ·· ' · - · · · · · · · · --- ----------' •• • •• ' • • • •• I • • • • • • In addition during 2 000 and·20 01 we engaged in a full-scale effort to ush our analysis into tl_te broadest possible circul tio • I y of these - teps contnl uted to our alys ' warning during th S UllIIler of 2001 that Bin Ladiri and aJ Qa'ida were engaged in intensive operatjonal pl g and preparations against US-iilt ests We ·documented the increased threat in cun erit i ntelligence pt oducts such as the President's Daily Brief PDB and the SE B ·· citing plotsin the ArabianJ4 ninsuta--and Euro ur-eiutent intelligence pieces particularly s d out · · · · · · · · ·· i Ort June 29 200i our alysts published a piece in the SEIB entitled ·• -· ·· '7errorism Bfn Ladin Threats Are Real1' which' concluded that recent indications o°f riear-tenn attacks were not part ·of a disµifonn3 ti9n campaign · but were consistent with other-reporting and public·stat ents by Bin Lad in - Aiune-30 SEIB cl entitled 'B Uldin Plans High P ofile Attacks I al-Qa'ida op tives expected fl cir · next round of attacks to have dramatic consequences · • Another SEIB article on July 25 oted that _altliough ope B111 din attack _had been delayed for a few rn on preparations for oth near-tenn attacks were ·still W9erway _ · ' on August 7 2001 · ''Bin La din D termined to Strike in US underscored Bin La lfu's desire to conduct terrorist attacks in the US homeland Ii noted that the Millen¢um plot fo bonib ·the Los Angeles· airport might have b n Bin-Ladin's first serious attempt to strike in the United -· States It pointed outtbat al-Qa'ida memb including some who are_ t J · · c citi zens ve resided in- or traveled to the US for years and the group ·· apparently maintains supp_ort ·structure that could aid attacks • · A SEIB articl -· · · r---7The interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism through CTC's Comm unterterrorism Boar also issued several threat advisories durin the - summer _of 2001 ·1 l rti addition· to the alyti efft¢ don in CTC malysts from across CIA - · Directorate of Intelligence contributed to the couriterterrorism mi$sion·by doing ecialized wotk on topics such L - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 the financial flows th t enable tem ris '-----------------' _ -----------------' · _ - _ • · - · · · · · · · · - ·· · · · - • · · ·· ' ·CovertAction · - · · · ·· - ·'Atithorlti s ore · ·- - · ·· -· • · · • · · _ 1 · •• •• · · · ·· · i - ··· · - i ·• • _' - - ' •· · ·' · •· ·••'• • • t - ostfinan •S ft ad tt _ a · sophisticy ted and eteimined global'terrorlst'org atio ti tha i-epresented serious· threat to the security or AIµericans at hoine and abroad As rich the CIA's stt ate against this threat became phatj Qlilly off sive · · · · · · · ·· - · · ·· •· I • y · • ' · · ·· -· · ' ·• t _2 1_ · _-· _ •' • --·-·-· •- ·--i - -t -- • ·· 1 ' ' - J i'· 0 f_f I r_ _ _ _ b- -· · •• J • - '' _y -e · r es l en t un- - - n-g- tn-e-1 - -U_S__ s--p-aJ _¥_ __J t¢ • l tivi ty agai11S t al·Q ' da bitt also _ se t b owidaii s to twl lat_Jhe_ Age cy w 811d · - · · _ _·-- _· 1 _ - - qould ot do Indeecl although thes¢ MQ s piovi4 roijd a' itlioriti tcrr¢ der Bin - di they ' also· gave rise to pel' Sistent conc¢rhsJritliin ftj e Agency· ab Gut the legal 'and_ · • • • • ·- • • _ • - _ ' • ··· · • - ' ·· • • • • - • • • l •• • •• • •• • • • ·· 'I_ • - - · ' _' - -- ·· · •' • • • • • ° • • • •• • • •· --'---'- -- '-··_ ·_ _ ·_ _ '-'-'-- '•' _ •·-- _· I · -· · • ·--- --'--·· _ - ' _· _ --'- --- · · _· -· · -I · · _· _ _ · · · ·•·i•' ·· ' 0 53 7 4'7 1' ·· y•· c •· · · Y'' ' Y'T t 7·- ' '' - · · -_ · -· L--------------- · orocedural limits thev nlaced - for • A December 24 1998 MON the fust time authorized the use oflethal force hi offen$ive operati ns designed to capture Bin Ladi lsp Il o t the arameters within which letha _l_ro_rc--t -w_u_w_u_oe - a_u_m_o_nz_eo_ r estrict1ons - • ·· -· · uthOnttes eing approv were m keeping With xecunve Vrur r did not constitute assassination but were legal under the US d_efinition of self-defense Thejr implementation also was subiect to constraints regarding the risks for collateral damage '-71 ' ' 1 j j j an 1 t ha t an ---y 10rceful measures • 999 au fiorized the CIA to work with the Afghan and od nst UBL -·--- --· -·-·· ··- • i 999MON Operations · J · · · I ed with these specific auth rities ns ts and delines the CIA between ·199g and September 11 pursued a multi-track approach to ' l' i ·- - · -- - - - - - - - - - - - -co··$3 7 47 s 1 • ····· - ' • · · • - · • • 1 · - ••• • - · · ·· ··· · · • ·· ·-_-_ fop·sirni_ '------------------ J · bring Bfu Laditfto justice and destroy al-Qa ida It-involved building up our HUMINT · · _· and technical co11¢ion capabilities working with-foreig1diaison services and friendly · local · ou S---- inqludin Northern Alliance comman er M oo L ---------- -- -l Operational oiannin Bin Lad' lay an opera ona ·p o use a menu1y 10_1 cu u ow group m - At-gb -_run ·s_tan_t_o capture Bin Ladin ·and-turn him over to us· offi s· i I I I • The operational -pro sals-were discussed with the Whit House in May 1998 The plan ·a1so was discussed with other principals -but CIA did not formally f submit the plan for approval because we as essed the chances for success_ low · · · · · · · · ·· fram J • During the same general ·ume Saudi Director of General Intelligence to I the Taliban to ex el or d rince Turki the jpressure ort Bin Ladin - - - - - - - - - ' of In ·tb e wake the East Afri ca bombings three months _later a s lar'--p lan--to_u_s_e th-e fri en_ dly tribal group to capture Bin Ladin was forwarded to and· approved by the Presid t in the fonn of the August 1998 MON Its authorities noted · · earlier were expanded in subsequent IviONs The following·aqti ons were initiated_ under - -- - - 9 Et Y -- • - fu- i Jlele ' · -- • - - - ' t j t • j ·' · ----- - - ···-··· _ _ September 1998'-Afghan tribal assets initiated a search and rendition operation in their area 9f iiifluence Efforts by this group CQntinued until 11 Sep 2001 without significant results Qn-9-Aug 2000 an amb h operatiQn was reportedly launched against a convoy in which UBL was a·passenger ft was unsuccessful We have been unable to confinn that this op tion actually took ·lace '• r------ - In addition to the unilatei al-efforts·then·underway lso isted_ for capture and rendiµon operations a ainst UBL J e_ ___ _ _ __ _ _ ____J TOPSECRE · ··• '• C05374781 · · · · · - _ · · _ ·_· ·' • · · · · -·· - ·· ' ·_ ··· · '---------- ------- --- ------- ' l I i '' exc ge to-deve op a plan tor tne capture and rendition f Usama Bin Ladm · e main resource to be used in this- Ian was a Af1 · tribal assets ou of rovidea several · o_p_ti- o-ns-to-ca-_p ture--an-d_r_e_n der-u a L in-q-lu din _g_th __e-am-b us h-o f-_a_co_n_v_o_y_m_which UBL a passenger Kandahar A MON or an assault on the compoun beiiig used by UBL near was -- -• · N' -· •- ·- --- _--- inal ietailsuforA h effort were compl lted- bySepterilber -- -19 9 g '_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - - ' • ntinu a capture operation to moiutor s actiVIties m an several montlls with no S actrv1ty_ continued for 98 -1 on December 24 the Af gr up _was told that under new gwdeliries just received they were only authorized to use lethal force in the context of a capture operation if the oppo ty arose contingent on a d_etermination 47 - ------- -- - ••• · • -Li -- • · •• •• · - t - C05374781 ' - · · · · _·· - -' ·'--'- · · · ·· · · • --' ----'- ·· ·· -·-· • __ _ ··'-' ·_ · · · _ · - T n I· Al d J'---------- --------'- · - • -1 •• • • 1 • -that a successful operatio -to capture was n o- -t feas i bl e'- F o ll o-'--'Wlll_' - - - - - - had launched an ambush against a convoy '- -o -v- - c _ es m---- -w- -h- ---ic- --h yU l3 L-- -w-as----- - -e -lie-v - - - --- - to·b-e a passenger The-ambush was tenninated · · when the attackers heard the voices of women and chil Irenj '--- ----- --- --c---- --c---'IWe have been unable to confiriii thr-at---- -- thl s-o_p_er-- -a - -ti o n-- -a ctu - -- alrrJy took place Although the group continued monitoring the activities -ofUBL until the s·eptember 11 2001 World Trade Center attacks they were·un ble to e C te a successful operation ·to -captute·l JBL fTh · I prin ipal reason for th inability to execute the capture · · and render operanon was the absence of timel · and accur e int 1li en e n e plans · intentiorts -and travel ofUB · ughout the o erational ri e from the area in eavy security for UBL·also had an adverse impact on efforts by th indigenous gr9up to launch an operatio q throughout the operational period Various questi ons on the reporting accuracy · of the indigenous group also surfaced during the course of this operation Most of the· questions were never answered satisfi ctorily This created major difficulties in Df aking decisiorts regarding proposed operations b ed solely on reporting from group this Executing The Plan I 1In the spring of i999 CIA bega'n put th elements ·of its Qperational strat gy '7he Plan At the time of the Plan's creation ·CIA already had mad a significant im act on the al Qa'ida ontanization d its affiliates · pla errons ceus m tuoama er ruJ an stopped at least two probable· attacks agam-- -s tu s m-te-r-es ts-1 ·n-Al b- -1a---an d i nthe Persian· Gulf region In addition these operations created disruptions in the regional and international terrorist infrastructure al-Qa' ida was attempting to build in those countries and the region and we believe created doubts in al Qa'ida's perceptions about its ability o organize and operate with impunity • ·-This activity was in addition to efforts to bring the perpetrators of the East ' -Africa embassy bombings to justice CIA operations s·ent the· message·that the Up ited States was not only going after al Qa'icla for crimes it had already committed but also·seeking out breaking up and rendering to justice terrorists eng ed in planning future attacks wherever we could find them · • I C05374781 • · ' ' ·· · • ere was an impot1 ant yef uninten ed consequence o ' Uf activity iigainst the al-Qa'ida target prior to our development ofthe Plan tl_iat deepened -the challenge of-identifyi11 g and stopping the terrorists activities They increased their security practi $ no only for physically guarding Bin Laclin himself ru id his senior lieutenants but also for compartiµenti_ng terrorist operations • P sistent publicity and 1 Qf information bout our methods in the United ·· ·· states1llld-abroad -eaus oo ·theterroristsio -------- -- -- - emphasize their compartmentatiorl and recru· inclivid 'tions whb h ad never attracted an -kind of attentio • Thus paradoxical y our successes against the terrorists made it harder to · break _up their future operations · · · 1 The Plan was thus ini d¢ to regain the initi ative through _a wi e range of operational activities td identi locate and render to 'ustlce Bin Ladiit and bis principru-lieutenail - - - c - --------- - ----- - -- c----'We understood that such an' approach WO e eve opment O t type office of • We knew there were-insufficient case officers in CTC twe arted'--to- h o m-e-has-_e ______ Clandestine Service Ttjlin in CTC In the meantµne we moved encourage quality 9fficers from liq e divisions an_d other directorates to rotate to CTC Headquarters and overs slots directly hired officers with special · s --and fully developed and cto_ss trajned CTC EE homebased o cers in all categories• I - · - _ • · · · - - _ · _ J • -· We au ented ot ir trainin ro am considerabl understood that we needed to mRintaitl and reinforce where ne alread strnM fillison rel tion · 4Q ------- --- f ' · ' y i f f · f · ' - ·· ' _ · _ • · · ·· -'-- --'-- _'----'-- C ----'--'--'----'----- -'--'-''- _- - ·- ··· · - ·· --- • • - -·· ···-· _ '·r--'--'-' -'--'-'--- -'--'-- --'---- -'-- -'-' '- '-'-'--- - -- - ------' -·-· ·-- - ---'----'--- ·· - · · • - - - - revamped approacfrb egan to'pay l ig 4i viden ds towar is · ofl999 d-CQnQiiuing·Qn ri 200Q · · - · · • • · · ··- ·· · - · -' t_ • ·- - - 5o· • Nc-6s3 7·it ·s 1' -_ _ 1· t - · · · ' '·· · · · ' · · · •· • -· I _ T _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __J -' · get access-to him -and tried to convince the Talib regime that Bin La din was a liability to·theqi • · · • · ·-i ·1 lt should be kep jn mind that CIA efforts to get to Bin Ladin L- --an 1an ru s -c_p eo p-- 1e - m - A 7' rg rnam s µm· took place a ainst a backdrop of a worldwide effort against ' · T ----- 1 1 --------____J • ·' ' ' ff'i _ ·· --------- al-Qa'ida We cooperated with forei liaison-services· throughout the world to·break up i number of specific terrorist plots - · _Lj - -_ The Ku la Lumpur Meeting ··I twas during the De ber 1999-January 2000 pre- and post-Millennium · period that o of the September 11 hijackers-Khalid al-Mihdhar and N awaf alH i-came across our screen which has raised the question of how we were able to identify them bu not uncover the plot they were part of CIA _ in fact d id some things on · ·· • _ - - - - ' - - - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - ·-_ _ ' __··_ ii · · · · • • • - I • • • • • _ bis c ase superbly white· others ·revealed flaws in our approach that we subsequently •I · _ • fi st to how we •I ·- - were abkto identi al-Miridhat and aV-Hazmi om ·l ·i i a consequence -ays -- - -1a - t c-o-s up-p - o- - rt -- r - -egi o- - n' 7T' t- - e rr on s p an - -s---·__ _ L_-_ co n-c- cem - - _ - -- - -a - -- -- - -- -- ---- - ---- - r -- --- - or-operations I IThe results · f these efforts m t that 'Ye knew Khalid al-Mihdhar's true name by early January 2000 d Nawaf al-Hazm i 's by early Mar h 2000 These two dates resp·ectiyely were our first oppoitunities to ·watch list them We had anotlier · · · opportunity-to do so 'iil Decem b 2000 'when we were able to link one of i he· ole · · · bombing pects as a participant in the Kuala Lumpur'meeting In August 2001 ° as a result ofincreasing concem about an Qa' toattack in the US we review ed our holdings and on August 23 2001 sent ··the Department of State FBI INS and · other US Government agencies requesting t at al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar be entered into I ITIPOF J- -- -- ---- -- ·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - be watch listed immediately and denied entry into the US · · j ' i --- --' I them I IThe ct that e did noi recommend' either of for w t h listin in March or December 2000 is not attributable to a single-point failure Rather it • - ··_ _ - _ _ -- •_ - demonstrated that a whole pew syst WBS AQ Jl lst a fix at a single po ii ·• • • Ramadan 2000 Plans isrupted lww1 · I we did rio prevent_ the attack on USS eoie we were able during me Ramadan period in tp e aunµnn of 2000 to break-up terrorist · · cells planning other attack_s against US and foreign military· and civilian targets in the Persian Gulf re on -These o erations disru ted al a'ida Jans for terrorist cks · durjn Ramadan L---- --------- ------ --- ---J C053 7 41 81 - - ' •••• ·' ••• ·• - · · •• · •• _· ··••·· • • · ·'• · •• •· ·• ·· - ·'·• •- ·-· ·1 ·- · jf• - •• - · •• i -1 · · • • · fr• • • · -· • • • ••• • · - - • - •• i · ·· ·· j· 1-5-Lf -J_ -1'j 1 F i ' -- - · -- • · · • ·· ' • • ·· _ -· -· - • • •• • -- •• • • t• • •·• • ••• - ' ' _ • -' ' · •·• · ·'l - ' 10 ___ C O' ii 3 7 4 78 1 · - • •• • · c - · i -· •1 • · -· ' ·- S - r • f••· • •· •' - ov • · _ • • · •• - ·- - • • ·· •• ••• •• • - •- •• 1 l · - - ·· · · •• ·• · ··· • '1 - - --- -· · · - ' •• · •• - • • • - · · • _ • ••- · • • •- · • - · · _ _ ' · - -- ·•· ·- ·• ·1· ' Y • · • · - · · · · _ · •· - · · •• ' •' • Attempting to Capturt Bin Ladin -i Let us now tum to o so ifi activiti in ilie Afghanis sanctuary to capture and render Bin Ladin l'-- --_ n- a_v_e_m_o-re-th an-a ten-p-er_ce__ nt None of the available potential capture units were Judged to chance of cal turing Bin Ladin __ _ _ ____J'-fv h ----'anc _tri ·'--'h-'-'al'-m-- -o c__ n ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 was judged to be unlikely to successfully c-r--c--cr• - ---- - - - - -r - c' 'T - - - · • _ •w-- - -······· · r_i · --- · · ·---- _ ¼ Masood had to be engaged to help in the attempt to capture Bin Ladin but with the understanding that he would be his own man never an agent or surrogate of the US Governme rit and would help if his interests intersected with those of the United States Even ifhe agreed to do so his ·chances of success arminst the Taliban were iudo-ed to be less than five nercent I I Ij I l i I i - --------- i _ - -- ·- _ · - · · ' • • · · f s_·q·_ - DI r V - - • '•·-·-- · -' ' · _ -·-··· -· -·- -·· · - lco'§374ivs1 7 ·· ' · · •_ ·_ _ • f_ • • ·r ···-••-••·•·•••·_-·-- -_- • L__-------------c-- · • -- l l our Y late 199 CIA realized that chances to accomplish the · anns o e s u ·o-vernm--en t regarding Bin Ladin by using the options described above- - localAfghan tribes Masood and neighboring li son services-were extremely poor · • - •-- •• • • • •- •·-• • - · • Consequently we needed a new initiative • I ·__ __ _ z·i· · ·- · - - _ ·•· • ' •· •• The Predator Initiative with I ---- fter consulting the Defense Deparbnent and others the CIA began aavocating the use fUnmanned Aerial Vehicles in Afghanistan for reconnaissance purpo_ses in th spring of 2000 · •· The idea of using UAVs in Afghanistan originated in April 200 0 as ·a result of · a request from the NSC' s Coordinator for Counterterrorism to the CIA and the Department of Defense to come up with new ideas to go after the terrorists·in Afghanistan • In response the Assistant DCI for'collection the Assistant DCi for Military Support and the Director of Military Operations J-3 at the Pentagon agreed that Predator UAV reconnaissance flights could be a useful so1 Jrce of actionable intelligence of on-the-ground terrorist activity in Afghanistan I _____________ c _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ' i t •r0 74· ···•• •• ·•· i · ·• • t - - · · • ·- ' '·· ' · - · ··-· ' - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' The decision to recommend to ·the NSC that CIA and the '----------- o er -- a g en c 1es --- -su p-p0- - _ gcn'· e program b allowed fo proceed with Predator 'testing and operations was made in late May 2000 'The decision came only after considerable d1 liberations and debate at CIA about the Predator's utility as-a collection platfoM the manner in which t4e aircraft shou1d ed and the risks involved be mid August 2000 the program was well on track and progress g rapidly · ' • · · Testm b an l i 10 to conduct lliO fustPredaior mission ovei j'September 7 2000 · LI_ _ --------- Afghanistan '· i _ - _ ' 'r i' J · 0 -1 __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ - - - - - - - - - - - p -_ i- _ e - k '1 %1 ' - - • The Taliban unsuccessfully scrambled a Mig-2l durin il and some in CIA expressed concern that the aircraft w-as c vul_n_erab--le_t_o_ ___ · detectio -- - Such concern intensified after the US Air Foi ce notified CIA that it would have to pay for lost aircraft -·· • J • J • - - - - - - - - - - - ' t h e UAV had completed ·10 miss_ions __I with yarymg degrees of su s -· · '------------- r- - _ · _ i -· ·· ·__ ·- -roP· - u - - - _--- - -------- --- --- ---- -- _I I I ------ It _is i poitant to riote lbat at this time ·cIA and the policy · community saw me objectives the Predator program as two fold giving the United States eyes on the target'' capability and collecting intelligen · of · 1------·-_- ----- • Twice in the fall-of 200tl ··tlie Predator observed an individual most likely to be B_in Ladiri however we-had no·way at th e time to react-t this information P_Ianning began_ f t a 901 --- --ep _ o ym---- -en t ----- -co-m__ 1t -e-- - -t er-ro n -s-m -o---c 1 ---s 1 sc -u ---ss fhe possibility of capitalizing on Air Force program to weapQnize the Predator by adapting it to carry and fire Hellfire ·· missiles · · · · · · · · · • CfA leadership from fll e·beginning'feltit important that there-was a full understanding by the President the National Security Council ·of the capabilities of the aqn XI Pr ator and the iinplications of its use ' and ' l ----- trhe decisiori i6 dvo e anning the Predator· foilowed · considerable cteoate within the A gency • _· Some ci nteilded that the potential risks invoi ed m deploying an armed · aircraft exceed the potential intellig ce 9peraf io ll y tag - •sra 1 • ·' ' -• ' -• • ' -· li'- ·ili _ i ' -' ¼iAW' d s • • c r · while argueo fyto·stt tx 1'aeBm· Eia'din it' ne cou1a 'btf -- - ' ° •- · · located would outw gh the risks involved in-an rcraft being shot down over Afghanistan · · - · · ' - I iAnoth debate ntered on·whether r nnaissance only flights should be conducted while the weaponized capability was being engineered and policy and legal questions were being resolved · • Sonie maintained that flying the Predator for reconnaissance purposes · produced high-quality imagery intelligence and insights could not be ob tai n-ed _-oth- --erwi s-_e ___ ' • · Others pos ·wh_at eventually becirine·the Agency's position that ntinued use of the UAV-for recorinaissance only could reveal to· al-Qa jda and the · · Taliban e areas in Afghani tan in which the United Stat¢ was particularly interested and possibly result in sh o otlng one down Either premature I tnat 62' -------- '• · l ' COS374781 ·· · · · · • •·· _ z -· · · ·· · · • · · · · ' · · ' ···· · · · - - • - · - • • ' · • · discovery pr l ss_ wouJd r uce the ·chance s ofsuccess ifpolicym ers later decided to use the•weapo eq aircraft · ·· · · · · _ · · · iability r lost ators- d ey oping co and and control arrangem t also emerged as lDlportant _issues · _ '• ' i •· Neither DoD nor CIA wanted to· assume the· cost oflost UAVs While we finally agreed to Split the cost evenJy tl_ie· questio was still 'in rtegotiatio J It is important to emphasize howeve r t this issue while · ---co-n t Qn ti-ou s- d 1 l not slow down theJ 1 Qgram We_ continued to work all the preparations for deployment including resolving sev technical problemst wi the missile with the full expectation that the ding q1 1estion would eventually he resolved September 4 As a result CIA was authorized --------- lreconnaissan'- --ce _p urp - ---o - s es -o -_ y -' -- ------- · - •¼ e - •· e -• ·•- 1--- - - J 1 'if k h _ - 1-• ' -'' - ease -' ·· · - ' '- i __ · ' -½b¾ 2 r · - ·· ·· _· ·· -·-· _ I ··rnie· lead hip of the Ag cy'- tediy warned the policy unity in the Exectttive Branch and the Congress of the serio ness of the threat · · • During the MiUennium threat in late 1999 we told_ the President to expect ·betw 5 to IS terrorist attacks against American interests qtti here d · overs • In spring and summer of 2001 we sought every opportunity to'vehemently express our concern about the hi ·Ievel ofthreat and we launched the massive program of disruption described abow · · • · We placed-the Bin Laciin threat prominently in ev 1ysingle annual testimony to the appropriate Congressi9nal Corilmittees on the Worldwide Threat since 19 98 In the 1999 testimony for-example theDCI stated that There is not the slightest doubt that Bin Ladin is pla@ing attacks against He will strike us Tl J 63 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - r Ic o5 rts1 · · ' • · ' '·• • - · ··· i ·· - • · • ' · · · · • ' · · ··· ·- · • · -·· • • •l• '•• -- - ______________ I I · ·· 1 ' anyWher in the orld he thinks e are ' iulnerable • arid I rilust·tell ·you W - ·--are ·concerned these strikesJcan o ur at any time We ·atso·warried about the growing Ukeliliood of ati · conventio al CBRN attackin tli 3 United_ States ·homeland and elsewhere '--- - ---- - - ---- ·ltbreat from 'al•Q_a ida was an imm iate and pressing concern '' A nd_ th t Despite 9ur succes ses ·there_ areJimi to what we can do We will generally nof have sp_ inc tjm and place wa nrlµg · · ofterrorist attacks The result•••is that l consider it likely that over the next or-soihat thereW1llbe att mipt tcirorist attack agai t US interest ' year • _· • · i ' During the week f July 2 -2001 the DOI htacted by phone app cix tely 13 of his foreigri l aison coµnterparts·to urge them to redouble their-efforts· · · against alwQa 'ida The chlef f the Counterterroris t ·center the chief of Near EastDivisio and others made additional ut ent calls The DCI's concern abo tit the al--Qa'ida threat was such that he sent a memo to the top lea ers- of the CIA n December 4 1998 s ting th e following · • _ _ · - We must now enter a new ph e in our-effort against Bin Ladin Our wo d to date has been remarkable and iii si m e instanctis heroic yet each day we· ail _acknowledge that retaliation ·is inf vitable and that its scop may be far_ larger than we have previously exp_erienced We must redouble our effo against- · Bin in-himself ·his _infrastructure followers fin ces etc with ense of enormous urgency We are at war want no resources or people spared in this effort inside CIA or the Community either f_ __7E en with e intense f cus on t rism in gJ a1 an Bin µidm · · _ _ -·• - _ ti 'i ' i il 't J- i 1''· 'iparu telligence 1iatt to deali¾th··sweraPofiler uiajor ' 5alreft e1r '--· os'- f L '' %1£ ' '' · ·• ' ''• 'l i -' l' '-'· - that demande4 the high'est attention • •J • Some issues were thenisel es clos Iy'linked to terr rism such· as the proliferation ofwe pons ·of mass q estructfon and t4e danger that some · ·_terrorist grQUp would acquire sue weapons mthis regard we have work extensively-both operationally and analytically n the d_ailger of rogue element · elpingJerrorists gafu access to tlies e WC J pOns ·· ·· T ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' t '1 C05374'7Br ·· · · • ' '• · · · • · · ' · · · · '•• - · ·- · ' ·-· ·-· _ - -- · --- ----'c-- -------- - - · - - ·_-_ _ _ _ -i _ _ _ _ _ _j_ _ _- - - - _ _ ' sotirce J · lmgh·prioriiy is es h d cons·equences fo -colleclion operatiqrts ·an analysis And some of these issµes required _fncr as edtaslqng-of Ilection assets tµat were in direct com etition with our efforts oil terrorism · · Summary of CIA's Collecti_on Posture_ Against UBL's Sanctuary I IBy· s- temb 2001 our ititellig m collection posture in ·Afgliani tan covered a wide array of capabilities that could help bring about CIA's st ate against Bin Ladin and al- a'ida · ollowingUBL's departure -from Sudanin the·s iin of1996 we had in' _e 1g_en_ce_o_p er ations targeting ·his Afgfuutistan presenc J ' ·- · · _ · By spring 1998 we had o ened contact with the Northern Alliance's Commanaer Masood and the UISF the DCI' s December 4 1998 ec aration of war 65 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · · ··· ' ·'·· CC 53 74 781 ' • · · · · • ·• • ·-· · · ·· • · - · · • ·· · · · - -- _··- - --- I I I · · JOur efforts against al Qa'ida over nearly a decade and particularly our -ac ti ons- t-o-pe-n etra _ ·te· the Taliban-sanctuary laid the groundwork for our rapid response to • ·th September 11 attack B this in conjunction with our close ordination with the Dej artmet1t of Defense was a major factor in the US Governments ability to defeat the · Taliban and drive _out al-Qa'ida-from its Afghan redoubts with minimal casu ties · - ---------- ·· C0' 3 7 4 7 81 · -_· · _ - ' · - •• ·· • •·· · '••· · •r • •••• • ·· • · - •• ° • '···- -- -------- r · _- - e IC's nearlydecade-long war_ iili_Bin in_arid- -Qa'ida- ·_ ' _ · · • _ ·• ' · ·prior to Sep bci 11 we lean ied enormously about the threat their intentions th methods their tactics their detennination their strengths and· theit' vuln bilitl - · • We used this knowledg to improve· our operations to exp1oit·every opportunity to collect informa on on the threa t• and to gauge the risks and costs of what ifwould-_take to defeat the enemy • We also used it to provide strategic warning that alNQa'ida-was the number · one threat to the security ofAmericans and that amajor attack against·-t1S · in --pOSSIUlyincluding even the·us homeland was coming We succeeded in giving the policymaker a good appreciation of the increasing danger· the _US faced from the 'terr9nsts · i Ai Qa'ida's extr e-seourity eas es · comp etttatio and · sopln ecrafl as ell as their sanctuary in Afghanistan prevented us from ·obtaining the detailed information required to provide tactical wamitig of the major · attacks against our bassies in East Africa of the bombing·ofthe USS Cole and of the · tragedies of September 11 · · · · · '- • In each of these cases we saw the smoke but could not see the flames directly · · e n we talk ab oiiresults it is--pahu-al-to focus on those instances h terronst operations succeed by making horrific headlines Seldom do we discuss the · headlines that might have _been were it not for disruptions by the heroic -efforts of our intelligence and law enforcement officers · · ' ' i' • • Examples of tQ ose hea dlines would include Hundreds killed durin Millennium terror attacks t- k- i -l'r ° - - r _ t - I ti'he _ C's war with al-Qa'ida tiught us a fe ingredients that boost the prospects for success • The various INTs working togetb r'produce better results • ' Close cooperation with friendly liaiS Il services is sential • Aggressively fyacking down all leads increases the chances for disruption Finally good luck helps • 1· 10ur success in thwarting the plo jus Embassy in Tir 1s an excellent xampl9 ___________-- -_____ J 67 - T ' - - - - - - - - _ _ _ __ ____ ·- · · -- -- · ·- · · _ · - ·· -·_ _ ·_ - · - · ··------ - ' - ---' --'-- -------------- - _ _- -- --- -------- -----· • •• -· · · ··- ·-· ------- -'1· l· Our actions during the-Milleniriwn wh as already related we laooched _a_m_as_SI v ·e_w_o_ r- -'id wide effort-that Jed to the arrest of many terrorists and th breakup qf · cells overseas sh9wed the importance of close cooperation with foreign liaison friends t • There were no attacks and we orobably saved thousands of lives · - • •• • • I ·-' · • • • • • ·· T ' - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ I With the crease in Ramadan-related threat reporting in November D er 2000 CIA worke d -withI to de_tect and preempt -attacks · In the spring an cl summer 2001 we launched another e----m-as-s-- -iv_e_d 11s_ru_p_n_on-en o-rt 1 n-re_ sponse to -the increase in terrorist operational actiyity and indicators of imminent attacks Our actions stonned several attacks and nrobablv cause cl terrorists to postpone others For examole - - ·I The IC also was at war with other terrorist 111Y1Uns not inst alQa'ida And we scored successes those fronts too I on I I ' ' ·o J CREJL_____________ - 1 ___J · · ' · · • _ · · ·'t_' _ · · · · ·· · ·· _ · t ·· ··· · -· · · • •• • _ ·• · · • • • · ·· -· •• •• • · _· · •· · · ·· · · · • • ·t· i- fii- · - -- '----- ------------- -- ---- -· · · ' ··· ·· · Impact of September 11 · •• • • • • ·r I' ' I ii whai e The tragedi of Sept b did Jntelligen Community s loud and incessant warnings 90uld not do They'galvairlzed th attention and ended the inhibitions of the US Government they galvanized and enraged the Ainerican peopie into action and they galvanized foreigirgovernments to· talc strong o ieasures against terrorism • • ' D ·• We together with our allies used our miliiary power to clean out the terrorist den that Afghanistan had become · · • We are spending billions of dollars in _dressing lax security measures arociid our nation's transportation infrastructure partjoularly airports · • We are hnplertientlng vastly increased se'curity ·m ures around our energy and indusµfal infrastructure ·· · • e are revamping the pro ss surrot inding_ the administration of foreign student visas and developing the ltjqds of infonnation flows to keep track of forei$fl visitors · -- j ve have significantly expanded the ·authorities ·and resources of the Intehigence and Law Enforcement Communities to_target ·tb e errorist threat ·• The USA Patriot Act of 2001 mnong°other things oved legal impediments to the ability oflaw enforcement-agencies to share with CIA· __ ___ _ _ _I i J • Because of e strong p rt e have ceiv fr µl these ttees_ d • - • · · -· · -- ·'· '''- ••'· ' t- •fg 1 1ef f ri · J_ • r$4 f f ' i Mii r bfljex @ailgreSSf 1e hav e tlyliiCf mflliifffiidffi Osepuncyr ·• m 'i ' 'fW i t• · Y' 9 f logistics technol gy and communications_ support to ·our counterterrorisrn objectives · These new resources have buttr sed 'our pre-Septemb 11 initiatives to • · liNone ofthese-authoritles resources and measures would h e been likely e traumatic impact' of September· I I • There-is p ow a whole new approach to the issue of homeland security · we • This country's infrastructure Yas absolutelyunpro ected d have been helping the President's Ilomelanlsecui ity Coordinator Tom Ridge think through how to protect it· · · · 70 __ T -------- ____ __ _---'-- _ __ __ · · - - - - - - -' - - - - - - - · - ·-- · · _· _ _ ·_ · - ·· · - _ - · - _· · · · · · ·· · · · 1-' - · • · · · ·_ · · · · · ·· • --- · · - ' · ' ' • ·· --'-- --- --· - _ ___ ---- -_ - _ _ _ · · __- - _------ ·· · - · _ -·· - · - - T - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · · • · The ttacks chariged ajl _rules-perhaps forever I ' '· · · • 1 · The War with Terrorism A Look Ahead · · · I and difficult ·trhe ar th irit tfo al·t ri continu the fight will long · · · ·• · · · •· -It w require the patience and -diligep ce that · · the President has ·asked for • it- 1i r uire resour s-- ustained over a multi-year period- t ie-ca italii our intelligence infrastructure at pace that ma tches th changing technical·· and operational environment We face • It will ·a1s0 require countries that have previously ignored the problem of terrorism or_refused to cooperate with us to step up and cho ose sides ' • It will require even closer sharing of infonnatioµ between intelligence and law enforcement agencies · fa · d despite all our efforts· an ther major terrorist a$ck _is not just ·· possible but lilcely · · · · •· · Our-effectiveness has increased since September 11 and the Intelligence· ' Commu nity will continue to be riveted to w i ·offensive-strategy ofbmtging · that war the terrorists ·But in ilie counterteirorism business ere is-no such thing as 100 percent uccess and there never will be to • Al 000 batting average would mean the complete _absence ofterrorispi which would be extraordinary and unprecedented I jAs we look _ahead in 'this Wfil' with terrorism and Co gr s tries legislat effective measures against the tbreatt significant-questions arise about security and freedom safety U d privacy which call for extensive public debate ap d careful consideration l y Congress Terrorists hav e learned to exploit the vt tlnerabilities inherent in free open and democratic society like ours a · · T 71· '--- ------- ---- ----- J l · - · · · ·· · - '' ' ' · • _ - ·· · - - ' ·'··· · •' · ' ··· · · _ · · •' ·-··· · · · - __ - - • ··· · · · · _-_ - · ---- - - - ·' • The ' 9 hijack _of September 'i 1 hloved -fr ly_in s untj opei atfug iii a manner that gave O't U' law enforcement colleagµes 9 proJ able cause to pursue ' • --- · - ·· • They used the international banking system to freely fer funds and - fin_l llce their 11ctivities · · · · · · just · I ri'be war therefore will need to be pursued not bro d ut also at · · home and success-ornmure will nave to 'be defined in tenns· of the overall national effort · · · · • As the President's National Security Advisor Dr Rice pomted out early in _· 2002 one of the lessons of eptemberl 1 invol ves ian· d to innocence about international politics ·and our own vuinerabilityt and that the terrorist attacks ·''underscored the idea that sound foreigrl'policy_begiils at • home - Where We Are in tlle Fight-Against Terrorism year Over the past We haV€i made substantial progress in - attatjdn g-th_e_ru___ l_a'-id_a_tar-get We 4ave'focused on the al-Qa'ic la·Jeadership and on · neutralizi worldwide al a'ida cells ile these successes have d1 Srupted al-Qa'ida command and control nevertheless al- a'ida retains a ca aci ·to mount destructive a«acks n -·T '-- ---- ------ - ---- -_____ · · · • • ··· • · - _ ·I• ·• -- - · -- · _ Top·i -' l------------- ---------__J 't j i t· f -lf f· £l -' i 1· ' 'l'l'lDt t -7 _ ' l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___J · · ' • Couriterterrorist Strategy for the Coming Year· •i• t• f- f_ - J - l·• 74 - - · - ··· · ·'· - ·- ·· · ·· • · ·· · ·_ - - _ •· · • ' • '·· - - ---------------------- ----- - - --------' • -· - ··· - i • - - · · 75 ------ ---' - • · • - i · _ · · 1 -z · • _ · T - - - - - - 7 - 6 _ r_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __