-- X 2 JEN SEGRE q_« r NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL � - � �02 �5�06� __ - � A�S�H�fNG '-- TO�N� -D�C � ---- --�- --- -�W� •·� Meeting of the National Security council DATE LOCATION TIME SUBJECT August 4 1990 Camp David 8 00 - 10 00 am c0 '0A -- � � 10'1 o I 2 D J Minutes of NSC Meeting on Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait S PARTICIPANTS State Secretary Baker White House The President The Vice President Governor Sununu Brent Scowcroft Marlin Fitzwater Treasury Secretary Brady DOD Secretary Cheney r NSC Richard Haass CIA Director Webster - b � •�-� �� -·· _ � jj Br i e fer JCS General Powell General Norman Schwarzkopf LtGeneral Horner The President I want to concentrate this morning on military options But first we can get an update from Bill Webster yt° Brent Scowcroft I agree First we'll look at intelligence then the military operation and then we will have the general f conversation Director Webster The Saud is have mobilized two brigades along their Eastern coast Iraqi forces occupy all of Kuwait They are mopping up the resistance Very little of Kuwait's Army survived The Iraqi pursued some Kuwait forces across the Saudi border We have reports of Iraqis moving against our Embassy in Kuwait but they are not confirmed We are seeing a strong reaction from the world about willingness to fre�ze assets Iran is reportedly arguing with Iraq for not informing them of their invasion plans $' Secretary Cheney You asked us to look at military op�ions Of course much depends on what we decide are our goals ¢ SECRET Declassify on OADR SEGRE - DECLASSIFIED IN PART PER E O 13526 c ODS- 6'8J - R o -Lf I 13 f1 Buth library Photocopy 6EGREJ SECREi'£ 2 What we will present is a longstanding p an defined over the last few weeks This is similar to what we presbnted to Bandar yesterday The plan is doable It will achieve t�e mission of defending Saudi Arabia and a basis for moving north into �uwait It is difficult but doable It will be enormously expensive to project and sustain a force of this size It will require some r serve cal -1 up There are two dimensions deterrence and war fightipg The sooner we can get an invitation from the Saudis the bette� I believe the Iraqis would think twice before engaging us We can get our air power in quickly We can handle the Iraqi Air Force We also have some naval forces that can be augmented Ground forces c n be introduced over the course of a month All of this would tdraw down our ability to act anywhere else in the world The ultirn te size of the force would be roughly 100 000 $ I General Schwartzkopf Iraq has over 1100 aircraft but mo$t are antiquated and they have almost no experience with using heir air power offensively The key is getting HNS from Saudi Arat ia Iraq is not 10 feet tall but is formidable They have an army of 900 000 men 63 divisions over 5700 tanks Once again we see a pattern of a large number of weapons but only a small number of high qualityl •They have no self-propelled artillery One of our advantages is th�t they would have problems fighting over long distances They have bitger forces but much lower quality than what we could field Their aircraft could not reach the lower peninsula It would be a short amount of time before we would gain air superiority Their navy is insi�nificant Very quickly we would gain control of the Gulf They hav¢ dense SAM envelopes around key sites such as Baghdad Overall theit strengths include numbers experience cw and some modern arms Tfueir weaknesses are centralized command and control a depende�ce on foreign spare parts and a lack of offensive experience l 5 General Scowcroft What do we know of their stockpiles % General Powell Director Webster Governor Sununu General Powell distribution How centralized are their stocks Z Some are centralized but also there is s�me $ i �eneral Schwarzkopf Their invasion of Kuwait stopped at lone point suggesting som� shortage of parts They have several att ck options They need one week to prepare a 7 division attack along tree lines They could mount a 3 division attack in 72 hours $' 1 I i i General Powell Saudi Arabia is not doing much to prepare ifor any of this now ITT i -SECRET ' 6E6REr '9ush Library Phot�nnv SECRE'f 3 General Powell Saudi Arabia is not doing much to prepare ifor any of i General Schwarzkopf Iraq maintains 56 divisions along t�e Iranian border But this is a defensive force As for ourselves everything I am going to say is based on certain assumptions Iraq �as consolidated its position in Kuwait Saudi Arabia provides HNS there is no allied cooperation we have a no-notice execution anp there is no partial mobilization The major problem for us is the ristance The time it will take for us to get forces there will exter d if we have no warning and no mobilization Everything we do wou�d be visible Within one week we could get five tactical figh er squadrons and two carrier battle groups on the scene We ould double this over two weeks We could also have a force slightly arger than a division in after two weeks The overall plan would tak 17 weeks We don't have good ratios for attacking them in Kuwait 0�r limitations include the fact that this would stretch us PL would come from HNS we would need to deploy reserves water an selected munitions shortfalls 5 this now $ I Lt General Horner We can have 400 aircraft in the area i� 11 days Our forces are on alert and ready to go Z I Secretary Cheney % we are concerned about their CW capabilfty i General Schwarzkopf All of our forces have desert enviro$ment experience as well as CW training Iraq tends to use CW e�rly on against command and control targets We would obviously w�nt warning of the attacks j Secretary Cheney The history of air campaigns suggest th�y are not terribly successful Why would this one be different Ot I 9eneral Schwarzkopf I am not an advocate of air power al ne But this is a target-rich environment There is no cover int�e desert Their army has never operated under attack and we have so histicated munitions fl The President� Would the Saudi Air Force be of help � I ¢J Lt General Horner Yes especially their F-15 and AWACS The President GCC states as w�ll as Egypt and Turkey I l Any other friendly help Lt General Horner I s' 8EGRE'f - lgush Ubrtstr-y Phot ocoov SECRET 4 i i General scowcroft I worry over one thing The Saudis ar e concerned about our seriousness Ground forces are the best symbol pf our commitment but this plan is air-heavy % i Bandar made a point that they were unhabpy-with our offer of one Tactical Fighter Squadron but they have no dofbts now · after hearing our briefing � Secretary Cheney I My worry is the lack of Saudi will and that they might bug out We need to ask them jt I General Scowcroft We have a chicken and egg problem Thby don't want to get out in front and be left vulnerable and we wa�t to see if they have the will 5 i The President The President I am worried over the American lives at stlke The President pullout ft What do we know regarding the report of an Iraqi General Scowcroft This is the Middle East happened to Kuwait 1 Director Webster It is all talk ¢ Look at what I I CZ i i I General Scowcroft I don't assume it is all talk I can $ee him pulling out a brigade This would give the Saudis a chanc� not to act � AT THIS POINT THE BRIEFERS LEFT THE ROOM General Powell I really think Saddam does not want to me�s with us Therefore I believe we need to get the Americans in 7 we need to show the flag $ Secretary Cheney �- qt I The President I am inclined to feel a small U S militar� presence and the air option will do it Iraq did badly ve�sus Iran $ i Governor Sununu He no longer has the Soviets as a friend J iI The President I worry about the implications of attacking Baghdad $ ye' Secretary Baker our using air versus Baghdad could turn tlings against us unless it is done in conjunction with an Iraqi mpve into Saudi Arabia i �ECRE P- II i Bush Library Photocopy 5 Our first objective is to keep Saddam out of Saudi Arabia Our second objective is to protect the Sau is � against retaliation when we shut down Iraq's export capab'lity We have a problem if Saddam does not invade Saudi Arabia ut holds on to Kuwait Jef i - The President I i General Scowcroft We accomplish what we want by closing his economic capability 3' l General Powell The Saudis will only shut down the pipeli1ne if the U S Army is there t i Secretary Cheney We can only start this if we are pr epa ed to see this through like Panama You must be prepared to de� end Saudi Arabia put the Kuwait royal family back The problem is that the American people might have a short tolerance for war CZ Secretary Baker We can only bomb Iraq if they attack saJdi Arabia If they don't our policy must be to protect Sau�i Arabia and sustain economic sanctions Otherwise we willl lose the economic advantage s-1 i Governor Sununu The key is the pipelines $ The President Turkey is key It may be doable But Ozal1 wants a NATO assurance of support I assume NATO groundrules wo�ld cover this Why not move U S forces in Germany into Turkry 7 I'm also sure that the French would be supportive General Powell There is a tradition of informal arrangem�nts among the allies in the Gulf 9' I Secretary Cheney of money e' If we start this would cost one hell o'if a lot l We should try to get the Saudis to help with i i Secretary Cheney This could take months It will not be cheap The President this Z Z The President financially I Can't we ask Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to heip I 5 General Scowcroft support this l2' My guess is that the American people w�ll Secretary Cheney I don't know The oil mostly goes to Jlpan We will be seen as helping royal families Their support fay be short-lived $ s EGRE'f i I l i IBUtih library Photocopy I iI I 6 Secretary Baker Our goal should be to get Saddam out of uwait We should make clear that if he goes to Saudi Arabia he is� at war with us We could lose the ability to hurt Saddam unless attacks first e � 1 The President Another ingredient of this is our embassieb We are not going to sit there like we did with Iran What wo ' ld we do It would be an act of war 5 l Secretary Baker We should begin pulling people out But this is another red line $ Secretary Cheney we can't let Saddam hold on to Kuwait I Ji i I General Powell Even the restoration of the Kuwait rulinglfamily would not be enough because they would always be intirnidatyd % I'm not sure you are right because Sactbam might not be able to survive this 8' II §is-ns-ral Powell our long-term goal is to hurt Saddam � General Scowcroft Governor Sununu The best way do to this is to squeeze th m economically 2' The President If the Amir goes back Saddam will lose international support Secretary Baker standing it General Scowcroft % I I i International opposition to Saddam will Je long Covert options need looking at $ i Secretary Cheney You must consider the possibility of wh�t we will do if they don't attack 1 General Scowcroft The President � tz � l We have laid down a marker on that $ I Our objective is to get Saddam to fire firs Secretary Cheney of money t The worst thing would be for Israel to com� in General Scowcroft Richard Haass The issue is who fires first I Again all this will cost an enormous ampunt i 1 -cs-· ' �- •• �·-· · • Bush Library Photocopy ··-··-•-··· ··-----··- - ----·- - c- --_c �- - SBCRE·r 7 •- I i I The President -rt is reasonable to ask Kuwait and Saudi Afabia to help r I Governor Sununu The most likely scenario is that we put �ir and limited ground forces into Saudi Arabia Iraq does a parti�l pull out but stays in Kuwait We need our presence to do the eFonomic tightening Shutting down the pipe line will be key The �ssue will be whether Arab politics will permit this $ i I don't like red lines when American boys �re vulnerable We can't agree to any approach that leaves us1 vulnerable I think we are overestimating Saddam's will I have 1 lost confidence in King Hussein The President I �eneral Powell Saddam has a lot of oil and a lot of monet but I don't think he will take us on 6 i The President He may be underestimating world oppositiont Lots of people are calling him Hitler f i Powell If we get request from Saudis it would that there not just be a U S flag $ General The President Richard Haass b1 wise It is too much to expect NATO to extend it�elf But we may be able to do something along tije lines of the Korea war model of a U S led multi-national �orce 5 Secretary Baker our strategy is three-fold to keep Sactctdm out to make him a pariah and to topple him through sanctions �nd covert actions O I General Scowcroft Our first goal is to get him out of Ku4ait Baker Should we blockade support if we do this Jn Secretary We may lose internat ional i I General Scowcroft I don't see why we would lose support iif we blockaded Closing shipping is no more than closing the pipeline J5 The President We ought to try a blockade yB' Richard Haass W� need to consider options that are not �Jed upon Saudi Arabia giving us what we want at the outset I usr Secretary Baker We could do a blockade pursuant to a UN c ll t for sanctions � I l SECRE'P I I I -��-- •· �- --' �- � j r__ __ i •_ �- -� L f� I I Bush Library Photocopy _SE6RET 8 - l Secretary Cheney If the Saudis don't go along we shoulq iI J5 consider air attacks on Iraq I We can't do much if the Saudis won't help I or if they are going to double deal � The President General Scowcroft call the Italians Secretary Baker We need to work with NATO � We have no You could also about the EC - U 'ii HJ' �I Secretary Cheney He also has to carry out orders And audi Arabia is worried We will take a look at non-Saudi opti�ns •· Can we do anything more with the Sov· ets Bake e They can help us in the UN r Secretary I t fretary Cheney We need to look at non-Saudi policy op ions The Vice President The Presigent do ¢' We should consider what our naval forces qould General Scowcroft We may want to quarantine shipping I i 5 Richard Haass We may want to send special emissaries to baudi e' Arabia and Turkey SECRB'f1 Bush Library Photocopy