Originally Processed With FOIA s 2009-0275-S FOIA Number 2O09-0275-S FOIA This is not a textual record This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff Record Gro p CoUection Collection Office of Origin Series Subseries George H W Bush Presidential Records Scowcroft Brent Collection Special Separate USSR Notes Files Gorbachev Files OA ID Number Folder ID Number 91128 91128-005 Folder Title Gorbachev Dobrynin Sensitive July - December 1990 5 S111ck Row Section Shelf Position G 34 3 4 7 WIIlTE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM Special Message Routing X X The National Security Advieor requests this messaiie also be c l1111eminated to the incfi vduals noted below o J C VJ r ' d tll 0 1 § r I I r lii d ' d 8 0 n 0 O '- lMMtUIAlt -SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM PAGE 91 OF 07 PRT SCOWCROFT SECTO SI T PRES MSG S F I LE S I T --------------------------------------------------------------------- PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS SESREr DTG 0909452 NOV 90 FM USDEL SECRETARY IN USSR N 0 D I s TO RUEHC SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5118 RUEADWW WHITE H OUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE -5- E e R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTO 24037 NODIS FOR SAND S S - EYES ONLY E 0 12356 DECL OADR TAGS 0 V I P BAKER J AMES A I I I l ME·MORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT MOSCOW NOVEMBER 8 ME MORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM JAMES A BAKER 111 SUBJECT MY DAY IN MOSCOW NOVEMBER 81 19 99 I 5E6RET - ENTIRE TEXT 2 I H AVE HAD LONG AND RATHER EXTRAORDINARY DISCUSSIONS WITH SHE VA'RDNADZE AND GORBACHEV TODAY I' LL GIVE YOU TH E FULL BLOW- 1BY-BLOW WHEN I GET BACK FOR NOW LET ME PASS ON THE HIGHLIG HTS OF THE DAY AND OUR DISCUSSIONS WE TALKED ABOUT THE GULF IFOR NEARLY SIX HOURS FOUR VflTH SHEVAR D'NADZE TWO WITH GORBACHEV EACH LISTENED EXPLAINED THEIR CONCERNS AND NOTICEABLY MOVED DURING THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS SH EVAR D NA DZEI I N PAR T I CUL AR CAME CL OS E TO OU R POS I T I ON THAT A UNSC RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING FORCE SHOULD BE PASSED THIS MONTH AND BECOME OPERATIVE SIX-EIGHT WEEKS LATER HE ACTUALLY CALLED GORBACHEV ON THE PHONE AND PUSHED HARD TO HAYE HIM GO ALONG WI TH OU R APPROACH HE WENT OUT TO GORBACHEV ' S DACHA TWENTY MINUTES BEFORE ME TO LOBBY HIM FURTHER GORBACHEV IS CLOSE BUT NOT THERE YET 2 IN GENERAL GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE SEEMED TO BE ACTING 1 1 N 0 D I s 1 DECLASSIFIED PER E O 12958 AS AMENDED tpECRET C S- ooC 1 - ii n'i 111 aqq M M IMMEDIATE SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM PAGE 02 OF 07 ON CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS Al THE US AND THE S OVIET UNION MUST STAY TOGETHER ON TH E GULF 1 THEY BOTH SAID IT'S ESSENTIAL 10 THE SUCCESS OF TH POLICY AND I S REFLECT I VE OF THE FACT THAT OU R MU TUAL WE LL - BE I NGI AN D F'U TURES AR E L I NKED SHEVAR DNAD ZE WE NT SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT A OUR FAILURE BY US IN THE GULF WOULD DAMAGE PERESTROIKA SUCCE SS WO UL D BE A SUCCE SS FOR T1HEM - - AND OU·R FA I L U'RE WO UL D BE GORBACHEV SAID MUCH THE SAME THING l A REAL BLOW TO iHEM SADDAM HUSSEIN 'MUST CLEARLY UNMISTAKEABLY FAIL T1HEY Bl N 0 D I s EMPHASIZED THAT HIS A GG RESSION MUST BE REVE 1RSED ANY HOPE FOR A NEW PEACEFUL ERA DEPENDED ON THIS AND ON DENYING HIM ANY V I ·CT OR Y - - NO MAT TE R HOW SMAL L TO T HI S END WE COU L D NOT STAND STILL WE HAD TO BE ACTIVE NOW IN PURSUING FURTHER STEPS TO REV ERSE HIS AGGRESSION ACTIVITY THAT DID NOT APPEAR TO MEAN PEACE MISSIONS SHEVARDNADZE WAS CRITICAL OF THE NAKASONL BRANDT AND YES PRIMAKOV MISSIONS FOR HIS PAR f GiORBACHEV NOTED OUR DISAPPOINTMENT WITH PRIMAKOV'S MISSION AND SA I D HEI T OO HAD BEEN D I SAP POI NTED I C GORBACHEV AND SH 1EVARDNADZE FIELT SANCTIONS MIGHT YE li WORK AND 1 1 'rs - a N 0 D I s IT'S PREMAT UIRE TO PLAY OUR LAST DI PLOMATIC CARD -- A CARD THAT ----------------------------------------------L EAVES US NO CHO I CE B1UT TO USE F O R CE I F I T FA I LS WH I LE PREPARED TO BE ACTIVE I N PURSUING MORE STEPS IN THE UNSC TO BUILD THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE CERTAINLY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE DAY WERE AMBIVALENT ABOUT A UNSC RESOLUTION THAT AUTHORIZES FOR CE OR ALL MEANS NECESSARY TO I MP L EMEN T UN SC RE SOL UT I ON 6 6 0 I T' S NOT THAT THE Y RE J EC T THE IDEA OF SETTING A DEADLINE OR EVEN POSING AN ULTIMATUM IT ' S THAT THEY STILL FEEL IT ' S TOO EARL Y TO DO THAT 3 I EXPLAINED LONG AND HARD WHY T I ME AND CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD NOT B·E ON OU R S I DE I NDEED I OUTL I NED WH Y I F WE COUL DN' T PASS SUCH A RE SOLUTION THIS MONTH WE MI GH T NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO FOR -IEBREf- iMIVltUIAlt SECREl WHllE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM PAGE 03 OF 07 SEVERAL MONTHS -- SOMETHING TH AT COULD GET US INTO THE RAINY SEASON t RAMADAN THE HAJJ t AND ALL THE WAY TO NEXT SUMMER BEFOR'E THE USE OF FORCE COULD BE CONTEMPLATED 4 SHEVARDNADZE FOUND THIS ARGUMENT COMPELLING BECAUSE HE SAW HOW THIS MIGHT MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO SU STAIN OUR FORCES I N THE AR EA I EMP HAS I ZE D TH I S POI NT AND AL SO SA I D I F WE COULD N' 1i SU'STA I N OUR FORCE S OR HAD TO REDUCE THEM I T WOULD CONVINCE SADDAM THAT HE COULD PREVAIL BT •4937 BT S f e ft E -f- SECT I ON 92 OF 93 SECTO 240'37 NOOIS 5 AS A RESULT t SHEVARDNADZE BEGAN TO CHANGE HIS POSITION A POSITION THAT WAS PREMISED ON F'URTHER UNSC RESOLUTIONS THAT WOULD SHOW INJERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY HEIGHTEN PRESSURE ON SADDAM ANO BASICALLY EXHAUSJ ALL DIPLOMATIC NON-MILITARY OPJIONS OVE TIME 6 TO A LESSER EXTENT GORBACHEV BOUGHT THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT BUT I FOUND HIM TORN MORE ABOUT HAVING TO USE FORCE AT ALL WHILE I THINK SHEVARDNADZE IS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT USING FORCE HE IS MORE INCLINED TO THINK IT WILL HAVE TO BE USED EVEijTUALLY FOR HIS PARTr GORBACHEV' S IMAGE OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL OR ER IS SUCH THAT HE HAS A HARD TIME RECONCILING f HE F AC T THAT WE MI GHT NEED TO USE FORCE I N THI S I NI T I A TEST• 1 HE REFLECTED THAT SENTIMENT IN HIS LETTER lO YOU AND HE SAID AS MUCH TO ME TODAY OBSERV I NG THAT WE WANT THIS ERA TO BE DIFFERENT FROM THE COLO WAR ANO BASED ON DIFFEREN KINDS OF NORMS 7 I ANS WE RE O HI M I N TWO WAYS F I RS T I T' S HARD TO EST AB L I SH RECOGNIZED NORMS OF CIVILIZED AND PE ACEFUL BEHAVIOR IF A BRUTAL AGGRESSOR WHO QUITE SIMPLY REJECJS THESE NORMS IS ALLOWED TO SUCCEED BECAUSE THE WILL TO USE FORCE IS ABSENT SECOND THAT THE ONL Y WA Y TO PROOtUCE A PEACEf UL OUTCOME - - 0 UR CL EAR PREF EREN CE WAS TO C·ONV I NC E SAO OAM THAT I f HE DI DN' T WI TH DRAW ONLY WHEN SADDAM PE ACE FULLY H1E WOULD BE FORCED OUT MI L I TAR I LY i GRET- i 1 ·1 IIVIMtUIAlt SE6RET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM PAGE 04 OF 07 BECOMES CONVINCED THAT A MASSIVE Mf LITARY RESPONSE WAS IMM I NENT WOULD A PEACEFUL OUTCOME BECOME POSSIBLE 8 THAT WAS THE PARADOX THAT WAS THE REASON THAT OUR APPROACH WOULD GIVE US A CHANCE TO RESOLVE THIS PEACEFU LLY I E SA 0 0 AM WO UL D REAL I ZE THAT THE I NT ERNAT I ONA L COM MUN I T Y WOULD SUPPORT THE USE OF FORCE AND HE WOULD HAVE ONtY A L I Mlif ED AMOUNT OF TIME TO AVERT A CERTAIN DEFE AT NOTHING ELSE WOULD SIGNAL HIM SO STARKLY AND CREDIBLY AND YET A RESOLUTION PASSED NOW BUT OPERATIVE ONLY AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR WOULD ALSO SHOW THAT WE HAD GIVEN HIM EVERY CHANCE TO WITHDRAW PEACEFULLY A'ND t INDIEED THAT WE HAD GIVEN SANCTIONS A FAIR AMOUNT OF TIME FIVE AND ONE-HALF TO· SIX MONliHS ifO WORIK 1 N 0 D I s 9 SHEVARDNADZE SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE SAW THE LOGIC OF MY ARGUMENTS AND I FELT GORBACHEV TOO WAS BE I NG PERSUADED BY THEM BUT HE DIDN'T WANT TO BE PUSHED INTO MAKING A DECISION TODAY AND CLEARLY A PART Of HIM WOULD STILL LIKE TO DELAY GOI NG DOWN SUCH A DEf I NI T I VE PAT H I THI NK THAT ' S WH Y HE SUGGESTED A KIND OF INTERIM STEP PASS TWO RESOLUTIONS THE FIRST WOULD WARN SADDAM THAT IF HE DION' T WITHDRAW BY A CERTAIN DATE WE ' D PASS A SE CON D ONE THAT WOULD Eff ECT I VE LY AUTHOR I ZE THE USE Of FORCE 19 • WH I L E NOif I NG THAT HE WAS CL EAR L Y TRY I NG T O BE RESPON S I VE I SAID I SAW SEVE'RAL PROBLEMS -- OUR ORIGINAL UNSC RESOLUTION 669' CALLED FOR PMME DIATE WI J HDRAWAL NOW WE ' D BE PAS SI NG A RESOL UT I ON THT GAVE HI M SOME TIME TO DO SO THIS WOULD ACTUALLY LOOK LIKE A RETREAT FROM OUR EARLIER POSITION - - HAV1 NG PASSED THE f I RST RESOL UT I ON WH AT I F WE COUL DN' T GET THE SECOND RESOLUTION PROCEDURALLY r WE PROBABLY COULDN 1 T GET BOTH RESOLUTIONS THROUGH THIS MONTH AND WE MIGHT HAVE REAL PROBLEMS ONCE YEMEN WAS l'N THE CHAIR SUBSTANTIVELY SADDAM MIGHT PULL BAC K PARTIALLY OR FOR THE FIRST TIME OFFER A REALISTIC IF UNACCEPTABLE PART I AL DEAL AS A WAY OF UNDERCUTTING CONSEN SUS BEH I ND THE USE OF FORCE - - I F WE NE VE R GOT TO THE SE CON D RE SOL UT I ON WE WO UL D HAVE SHOT 1 I ' s r N 0 ID I s 1 1EBRH i - 1 IMMt'UIAl t SEERElWHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM PAG E 05 OF 0 7 N 0 D I s Is rw N 0 D I s OUR WAD AND BE FINISHED TRYING TO WORK THROUGH THE UNSC THAT WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF DESTROYING THE UNSC AS A CREDIBLE MECHANISM FOR PRE-EMPTING MANAGING OR SETTLING CONFLICTS IN TH IS NEW ERA 11 GORBACHEV' S RESPONSE WAS TO SAY WELL IT WAS UST A THOUGHT AND HE NEEDED TO TH NK MORE ABOUT THIS SHEVARDNADZE LATER TRIED TO SAY fHAT WE MIG HT FORMALLY LINK THE TWO RESOLUTIONS MAKING THE SECOND ONE PREDETERMINED IF SADDAM HAD NOT PU LED OUT BY A CERTAIN DA rE IN TERESTINGLY TARASENKO AR GUED AG A I NST HI S B OSS SAYI NG YOU COUL DN' T G UARANT EE SUCH A L I NKAGE YOU' D L OOK f ECKL ESS I F YOU COUL DN' T DIEL I VER THE SECON D RESOLUTION AND THIS WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD ENSURE A MOVE AWAY FROM THE UNSC AND TO THE USE OF ARTIC·LE 51 TO LIBERA TE KUWAIT BT a 4 IJ 3 7 BT 8 E e RE T SECTION 03 OF 03 SECTO 24037 NODIS 12 THE UPSHOT THEY WANT TO LOOK AT OPTIONS AND GET BACK TO US BEFORE PARIS I EMPHASIZED WE DION' T WANT TO PUSH THEM BUT WE NEEDED TO BE ABLE TO ACT WHILE WE HAD THE CHAIR AT THE UNSC AND IF NO DECISION WERE MADE UNTIL PARIS WE MIGHT NOT HAVE TIME AFTfRWARDS 13 MY OWN SENSE IS THAf IN THE END THEY WILL GO ALONG WITH US GORBACHEV MADE A REAL POINT Of SAYING THEY'D Sl l CK WITH US ANO HE EMPHASIZ D THE IMPOR l ANCE OF ACTING UNDER UNSC AUTHORIZATION NOT ARTICLE SL PARTICULARLY BECAUSE IT WOULD ENSURE OUR CONTINUED UNITY AS I SAID SEVERAL TIMES WE SAW THE EXTRAORDINARY VALUE OF THEM PARTICIPATING WITH US If FORCE WAS NEEDED BU r UN DERSTOOD THEIR PROBLEMS I NTERNAL PREOCCUPATION AFG 1HAN SYNDROME WITH NOT DOING SO IT WOULD BE FAR HARDER FOR US TO UNDERSTAND THEIR BLOCKING US FROM THE CLEARLY PREFERRED OPTION OF A UNSC RESOLUT I ON THEY GOif THE PO I NT AND I BEL I EVE T HE I 1R ST AKE I N GO OO RE L AT I ON S ANO OE S I RE FOR PARTNERSHIP WI TH US WILL LEAD THEM IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION BUT IT MAY TAKE SOME T I ME ANO EFFORT TO GET THERE iESREr I MMl U I AIt -S ECRE-f WHITE f- IOUSE SITUATION ROOM PAGE 06 OF 07 OTHER ISSUES AND IMPRESSIONS 14 N 0 D I s ' s r' N 0 D I s GORBACHEV AND ifHE NATIONAL HOLIDAY GORBACHEV SEEMED BUOYED BY THE LACK OF SERIOUS VIOLENCE OR COUNTER-DEMONSTRATIONS YESTERDAY HE DION ' T MENTION THE INCIDENT ON RED SQUARE AND SHEVAR-ONADZE DOWNPLAYED IT GORBACHEV FELT THAT THE REAL SILENT MAJORITY HIS WORDS HAD SPOKEN YESTE 1RDAY BY NOTi HEEDING THE CALLS FOR COUNTER-DEMONSTRAiTIONS I WOND1ER IF THIS IS WISHFUL THINKING OR AN ACCURATE READING PARTICULARLY BECAUSE I HAD THE SENSE THAT THE THREAT OF CRACKDOWNS AND VIOLENCE M1IGHT HAVE DIMINISHED THE CROWDS 15 GORBACHEV' S HINTS AT THE NEED TO IMPOSE ORDER GORBACHEV SPOKE OF THE NEED 10 CREATE TOLERANCE AND THAT THIS MIGHT BE HE KEY TO ACHIEVING A MARKET ECONOMY HOWEVER HE ALSO SAID THER WAS A YEARNING FOR ORDER AND STABILITY AND SAID SOME TOU GH STE PS MI GHT BE NE EDED WE COU LDN' T SA CIRI FI CE THE RE FORM PROCESS FOR THE SAKE Of SOMEONE'S AMBITIONS OR ACCEPT THE DISINTEGRATION OF OUR SOCIETY HE SAID A FINE LINE HAD ifO BE MAIRTAINED BETWEEN MOVING FORWARD AND PRESERVING STABILITY NOTED THAT WAS A LINE THAT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN WH I LE H1E SAI D I T WA S I MP ORTAN 1i TO REJ ECT THE CON SERVATI VE ABILITY TO EXPLOIT ifHE DESIRE FOR STABILITY I WAS UNEASY ABOUT THE TONE AND DIRECTION OF THESE COMMENTS I DON'T KNOW IF THEY PRE SAGE SOME KI ND OF CRACKDOWN B UT WE WI LL HAVE TO WATCH THE SITUATION CLOSELY 1 6 GETTI NG FOOD FROM THE OUTS I DE FOR THE WI NTE•R GORBAC HEV NOTED A PARADOX MOVING TOWARD THE MARKET HAD LED COLLECTIVE FARMERS 10 WITHHOLD THEIR PRODUCE FROM CERTAIN AREAS AND CITIES REQUIRING THE CENTER TO HOLD FOOD RESERVES AS A KIND OF INSURANCE POLICY HE WOULD BE GOING TO THE GERMANS iND OTHER EUROPEANS FOR EMERGENCY FOOD SUPPLIES ON A CRE DIT OR GRANT iE eRET -I ·-1 1 IMMEDIATE SECRETWHllE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM PAGE 07 OF 07 BASIS f OR THIS PURPOSE HE SAID HE MIGHT BE COMING TO US ONCE HE KNEW HilS NEEDS BETTER HE'D BE INTERESTED IN SOYBEAN S AMONG OTHER THINGS AND WE MAY WANT TO LOOK AT WHAT WE COULD DO IF WE DECIDE TO BE RESPONSIVE 11 AR MS CONT ROL I TH I NK WE ' VE F I NA L L' Y CL OS ED OU T THE - N 0 D I s - - - -- - - - - - - NETTLESOME CFE ISSUES BUT EVERY TIME YOU THINK YOU' VE SETTLED EVERYTHIN G SOMETHING ELSE CROPS UP IN ANY CASE I THINK -AND HOPE - - WE' VE F I NA L L Y DONE I J 0 N1 SJ ART WE CL OS ED OUT THE 1 NON- CI RC UMV ENT I ON I SSUE AND MAY WI TH SO ME E•F FORT BE ABLE T0 RESOLVE THE REMAINING IS SUES IN OUR NEXT MINISTERIAL THAT WOULD PUT US ON TRACK FOR A JANUARY SUMMIT GORBACHEV IS EAGER TO NAIL DOWN THE SUMM1IT DATE BUT JOKED THAT A MI D- J ANUARY SUMM I T M'I GHT BE ESPECI AL L Y I NTEREST I NG GI VE N WH AT WE MI GHT BE DO I NG I N THE GULF AT T•HAT T I ME l BAKER BT 4037 N 0 D I s IE CR El·