-- THE WHITE HOUSE u WASHINGTON M June 19 1978 A N MEMORANDUM TO ROBERT LIPSHUTZ FROM H JOYCE STARR I R C I L G I H C T y s Pleape find attached priority confidential memoranda on 1 Our Human Rights Policy and Coordination 2 CSCE 3 The Impending Resignation of Ambassador Arthur Goldberg Failure of u s Diplomacy c s c E _____ G 0 L D B E R G I I ij H THE WHITE HOUSE u M WASHINGTON 'A N p R 0 L c June 18 1978 li RANDUH TO ROBERT LIPSHUTZ STUART EIZENSTAT FROM JOYCE STARR I I y I I HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY AND COORDINATION I' I I l The problem as I have outlined it to you on several occasions and through a series of memoranda has now been validated by conversations with Ed Mezvinsky meeting of 6 16 EM SE RJL JS and with Justice Archur Goldberg meetir g of 6 12 AG RJL JS This problem is operational at two levels On a more general level we have failed to consolidate control and coordination for our over-all human rights policy within the White House At a secondary leve1 1 and a consequence of the above we have failed to assume political authori-ty for those human rights commitments contained within Baskets I and III of the Helsinki Accords an international agreement of far-reaching consequence The guiding rationale for our approach to-date has been based on a dual premise first that as a foreign policy matter human rights issues are best left to the foreign policy professionals secondly the particular foreign policy professionals charged with this responsibility have the commitment and clout to ensure that our hu an rights initiatives will be conducted consisted with the President's wishes This judgement 1 ha pro n e drieous for the following reasons The Division of Humanitarian Affairs DOS -- Patt Derian is not perceived within the Department as a spokesperson for the President Her wins and losses are essentially dependent on the consensus and support of Secretary Vance and Warren Christopher This varies depending on the region of the world However when i t comes to policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe insofar as human rights are concerned this is synonymous with the Helsinki Accords Patt finds herself consistently overruled by Marshall Shulman and by the European Bureau Dr Shulman chairs the Inter-Agency Task Fo ce on Scv 2 Affairs he and the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs George Ves are compatible in their views on our approach towards the Soviets -- a perspective Derian generally does not share The institutio al infighting in this arena has been extremely frustr ting to Derian s i t was for Justice c s c E --1 'I G 0 L D B E R G i r H THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON A - 2 - Goldberg Patt is increasingly unwilling to enter the fray were i t not for the untiring efforts of her assistant Cliff Brody CSCE would now be under the total domination of the European Bureau an4 our human rights policy in that area of the world a mere shell of pretense I have documented for you in a second memorandum the extent of those efforts over the last 16 months as conducted by the European Bureau The evidence suggests that the President has received minimal back-up from the bureaucracy on public stands he has taken while Secretary Vance has indeed raised human rights issues and cases during his trips to Moscow and in the course of various Washington talks the facts demonstrate almost no follow-through at the bilateral embassy level Please see the attached for clarification 2 The National Security Council -- The National Security Council was specifically structured under the Carter Administration as a parallel foreign policy arm more or less equal to the Department of State and not its controlling voice The human rights concerns of its supericrs Dr Brzezinski and David Aaron should not be disputed the fact remains however regardless of the reasons this philosophy has not been given weight at the staff level Jessica Tuchman is expected to oversee our global human rights policy along with all arms-transfer matters She has a capable assistant in Les Dennen but his expertise is limited to refugee issues Bob Hunter formally responsible for CSCE and a person of exception judgement and commitment has effectively been excluded from Soviet policy determinations He had no input for example to the Gromyko visit--despite the direct relationship between Orlov's conviction Scharansky 1 s impending trial and the Helsinki Accords nor for that matter did Jessica Tuchman--she did a briefing paper on her own initiative but it apparently arrived LOO late to be included in the briefing book Our human rights policy as it pertains to the Soviets and Eastern Europe falls in the domain of Reggie Bartholomew Brought to the NSC from the Dept of State Reggie has little interest and less inclination for institutional battles on human rights matters This waJ amply demonstrated by the role he played in the Gromyko visit whether by intent or neglect Bartholomew did in fact allow the State Dept co forward talking points to the President with no mention of ·Drlov Scharansky Helsinki etc I iiN ' R I G H p 0 L I c y c s c E G 0 L D B E R G i R THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON - r 3 - The Solution to the uroblem outlined above also necessitates a two-level response u 'M lA IN n jR r IG R y ' ' 1 A high visibility person within the White House must assume over-all responsibility for our global human rights policy This should not be construed as an attempt to duplicate the work of DHA Derian nor of the NSC To the contrary the objective should be one of enhancing Derian's political position within the Dept and offering political directive to the NSC This need not translate into a massive increase in work-load for that specific person Rather I suggest it be viewed as a responsibility for political guidance when and if it is needed The most logical person to assume this authority is Hamilton Jordan since this is very clearly a political matter However I have no illusions that Hamilton would be eager to widen the scope of his present activities I do not believe this would be necessary The fact is that Hamilton can in this instance designate someone to speak in his behalf just as I have been doing for the past months with some success considerable vulnerability and no authority 1 reco mend that Joe Aragon is the logical person to carry out such a role Over the last several months Joe has shown quick grasp of the dimensions of the problem has on more than one occasion put himself 'on the line' in support and seems to care a great deal aoout the issues Since my slot is formally with Joe's office it suggests a ready and natural solution I think it would be a error to bring a fifth and pew actor into this equation beyond the two of you Joe aad myself Both of you have been crucial to the continuity of our human rights policy without the so-called expertise I would hope a situation could develop wherein this contribution could be strengthened not diminished The least attractive option as I see it is· a-n or g ani z a t ion a l chang e t h a t r o u l d p r e c 1 u de this role p 0 L I c c s c E G 0 L D B E R G cl u THE WHITE HOUSE M A WASHINGTON N p R ir 0 L I H y - 4 - 2 Special Li ason for CSCE sh t ld b established u 1der the authority and direction of the individual responsible for our over-all human rights policy This person would not be limited to this duty but would have the necessary title and credibility to liason between the De t of S ate the Ambassador-at-Large for CSCE the NSC and the White House 3 The Ambassador-at-Large position currently held by Justice Goldberg should be retained as the coordinating authority for CSCE 4 A Presidential Directive should be issued clarifying these changes and emphasizing the link between the White House and the person empowered to give force to our commitments under the Helsinki Accords G i T c I l I I I I c s c E I I _1 1 I I t I ' II 1- II G 0 L D B E R G tL CSTFIATI iZI Y CONFIDE ITIAL H u THE WHITE HOUSE M A N rune 19 197b R E£ tOAA ·JDU ·1 I G FOR ROBERT LIPSHUTZ STUART EI'ZENS'I'AT H JOE AR GON T FAILURE OF U S 0 L I c y s JOYCE S'I 'ARR CLIFF BRODY CSCE p c DIPLO CY s c E This J ssue can be stat ed very simply most of our embassies in Eastc n Europe and certainly ·t e u S Er bassy 1'-loscmv ha ·e not act ed in an official capacity to convey CSCE p iori ties including human rights to th dr host sovernr J ants As earlv as Apri of 1977 Patt Derian's office exoresse c 1cer - • vithl the Dept of State to officials responsible r European matters that our embassies should 0e explQini 1g the President's hu nan rights concerns to Soviet Bloc gove cn -nE nts ' ' 'lis dialogue was to reflf ' Ct mut ally negot atec nd a· reecl comrni tments as set forth i_n the Helsinki Fi 1al Z ct G 0 L D S'2n' L-nent on tl 1e part of the European Bureau supported b · t he -i aj0r -' y of our A i'Tbassadors in Surope was co side-step t -· _3 -23 ·Jnsi 2 lity rr'he cons2r sus Tiew 'tvas t lea 3 t _s cask to our Delegation in Belgrade despite the objections of c he Human Rights Bureau B E R G re3ult was predictable and to the st ong disadvantage violating 2'Tery ru2 e C f co rn mon ser se and c1i 1or atic courtesy 1 the United States entere d the mult il at eral B2lgrade talks without first presenting to each c g ve nment Washington expectations for compliance to all lsinki pravisions he Ford Kissinger era had in iact 'T ' r s C j 1J S t s l1Ci1 a e_r' i es r_ f - f ic ia l lJ S Clerr 1arcil2 $ T - · s he _ he un ted States ex - ----pi for or Secretary to ralse o have on th2 fri ges of non-rel ted d sc ssions be n ta en up H u M A N e very first paragraph of last week's cable from our R I G H ·lc sc o v E Pbassy sets fortr this cor tradiction c f terms T C t· -etb c has stated i that a CSCE de -etal ·che T p 0 L I c y ·Tl President and the Secretary of State have discussec £ icular ca3es and resented lists to their Soviet co•mte- cparts _ Hmvever since the E mbessy iP l losco v has chosen to avoid an active diplomatic effort either to reconfirD our interest in these cases or to delineate e actly • hat the u S seeks the Soviets a ce oscov- · E nbassy has permitted a fevr low-level inq•Ji cies consular officers on the stat s of particular epplicacions 2migrete eifen these officers are not instructed to s the So for favorable decisions but simply to c iterate interest in the application process Nctwichst nJing lie sion that the SlepaK - JrTO i - -·----- J c e c s c E Y 4·4 1l_s all' ' ed - o ·e - erclze thei - ·r els 1k5 t gnts -- e·ven i •u L h ie si 1ki Final Act sp o cificctli y- provides t 1e O JIY rt · _ ' y oi s· ch in crver tion Tl s Errbas S'l has refused to take ' Lis -_ z G_ J - ' '__ _ _L r --_O tssadc I' l- 2 5 t o 1 T _ D ian T t· -_ '-''oulc object t r any s Jcb nsLn ctions and ther is d i si 1 clination on tl1e part o D Sh llnan and t he Et rot - · reau to tek2 lssua with this a proach ' n e iiad theJ_-9 eC n a th c scE vito 3Uflp trtecl s s would have ensured Cuo C i n t cr - J_ thin t 13 T '-lhi t' Ii J Se Presi c12J 1 ' S 1 t t t JIL J l t is r t o position p ciorJ ties would ave 2 c C bc n - - -- -corn-e e· Ten be ore B- lg r-a de G- - - f g 2 s hand rl C fa J_ - -cc- tpLi a 1d car l_-j_ed fort1 as Q t 112 c ot l iu r ·_Lr q tt c J- ff er c2 - -L r- 9 1 _ dj_p L J t c i c s_l enc - J_ L r l rJ ll3 r as e· -iC cr s2c- r-· -cl Q L t c1'1 t ' i' - 7 3 · ' r_ ur J bj 2ti-·e3 - i te s 42 _b - tS S rlC i d C f tl f'J _ 3 it is ffl3 r2tiv2 thJt we 'J l i t j_ cal a P£ 0 i rt t Lr e rt cf i l G 0 L D B E R G H u THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON June 19 1978 M A N p 0 R L I I G MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT LIPSHUTZ STUART EIZENSTAT FROM RE AMBASSADOR A qHUR JOYCE STARR c H T y s ---c GOLDBERG s c E Ambassador Goldberg has asked that I communicate to you the following information and request 1 J· He has now decided to accept the President's request that he be recommended to serve as a member of the World Court 2 The Justice has discussed this decision with Secretary Vance and Warren Christopher with the President's approval he is now prepared to tender his resignation from his position as Ambassador-at-Large for CSCE 3 Timing is now of the essence as to a suitable replacement for the Ambassador The National Committee responsible for making recommendations on the World Court appointees will be meeting on July 15th The nomination must then be approved by the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations This should be proforma with final confirmation taking place by August 15th 4 In light of the above the Justice requests that a meeting with the President be arranged at the soonest possible date He feels it is imperative that h1s res1gnat1on be interpreted in the most positive of terms specif1cally that any act1on taken be v1ewed as the result of a Presidential decision with a mutually agreed upon statement as the product 5 The Justice discussed his plans with David Aaron in Dr Brzezinski's absence David concurred that the timing of Ambassador Goldberg's resignation and the appo1ntment of hls successor should co1nc1de 6 The Justice recommends that discussion with the President be approximately 15 minutes in length Those present would include Dr Brzezinski Secretary Vance or Christopher Robert Lipshutz Stuart Eizenstat and Tnvr P St-_arr --G 0 L D B E R G H u M A 7 The Agenda for this meeting would be as follows Discussion of Ambassador Goldberg's resignation from CSCE and his nomination to the World Court Discussion of the designation of a new Ambassador-atLarge for CSCE and the continuity of CSCE policy This would include the Justice's recommendation that a Special Coordinator for CSCE be appointed within the White House to provide the necessary and vital political link between the Ambassador-at-Large and the President The Justice intends to recommend to the President that I Joyce Starr fill this position Agreement upon the wording of a Presidential statement to be issued concurrent with Ambassador Goldberg's resignation N p R 0 I L G I H C y T s c s c E ----G 0 L D B E R G