• · i if ii i @ · ''•u • • t t · •' - · l ircch r of Central Intelligence '· · r- J 1-H' • -_ 1 u u 1 ¥ t M t 1l tifui£ ft 'EW· a · roved for Release 2018 06 28 C053305 · · · i· · · · · · t-i X· -• ' -tA - 1' J i h'c ' t• •3 - NJ- x M B 6a t s » q l M P- ft8 #'1d•'0 pproved for Release 2018 06 28 C0533053 - · ' Approved for Release 2018 06 28 C05330533 - Ii - roved for Release 2018 06 28 C0S33053 · • ' - ' -_ '' ' ' '-· ·· · · Approved for Release 2018 06 28 C0S330533 f' J Iti i · • ' ·' a · iia·jflt k 1 · a · # ' • ' eeii' most · y ai SU c e1wr -Jvi9ija ma Zia ·ut Hac il · -t · j -'- ' ·- _ j established the· Martial La w Admfoisttatloh'HtPakisfan but the Bou·n try -' _ · · _ 1 - r- ··teniains ini' 5·erfo l of politicafuncer'f Hitv f· · ' n6ert int'y·c·o ld lead t i - · · tri - 'ierloiif 1nsfabilitit 'iii' the· ·c6tnhig'frtfoh s ' ·• · t r··b11 i d ·to treach' f_ t · r d cisi6ni't i' the· ra·te' iof ·lm'GHson d 'iatrn fr _rime· mi's'tet·· z'ti'itiri1fAii 'tiif t ' · A · 1 i3hutto' ·andf6 _ -'the s'tablishment tfi l't1BioJl6t it1' offit f ihilitlrftand · _ · ' _ _ • · '_ ·_ dv ili rt gov rn e·n i - whateve 1 t'fari'tzntlaills -iifttiiesfbroblemr· hl t _ ' _' - · - 4 1 - '•1 ' - t _ • •• ••'' ••- ' ' ••••• Jll •J '• •• -i • •• Ejt JJ 1 t -t l •• • • •• J ••' s t• • •• • •• t • ' rtt almost certainly will face contiriued_ i olitical_ in_rest ftirther erosion oCi-ti - i- •ii· - · · · · · · -t 1t iJop Ia't-' u·ppoi-t filr h is'o n 'r rd1 ne l11 itia·it 1J iric easinf· lts' o tebt'·f ' · · · -' n _ • A _ · n t· if ' HJ t _ i 1 ti t tr t·· _ _· _ -· - _ · ·- - _ · · · ' - t- 1 J C l L Pfessµ - Ilayt- h _ad - t HI urt_ e - ' - ' '· _ t iF' 'd 't r ·dd't' · 1· dl ' ' - - - -- - - governmen ·an · o a 11ona • 1 amag · _ o i 4ange§ _1 a q t3 n_ - -• a ·•·'t'' • r -' '· ·• 'd''·• ' -' '•f ' • 1 •• - _ _ oun ry snt-a rea • • •• - · · y ' i · - --' · _ _ _tf r ' ttenfe ebled P liticaL in titutions ·btit af 'nrit 1 e y m · ihi hea ·term_·' t i- ' ' · ·t _ · _ _ - t '_· _ rt 0 result_1n _t imposi_tio_n of a rad_i IxI I f t Q J§ i ' l r le r -' ·i t - · · '·· -t 5 - · i·· We believ·e that basically conservative milita'rY l' ofh riilitai y controlled · ' - · · · · · i1if' l s v f m f ·is' li lvrtp ·pe sis rtt J f 2x rf h jie _t J _ -J_r thi f t f t · · _ · r i vears even if Zia_is replaced by other sepior imy officer or ifcivilian - _ ·_ · · ···• '--' ' ·iNf poliHc'i ns ·are· brought irito· the' ·goieriinierit f it Is 'inu'ch Je tiikeivi'tllaf r t ·_ · · · · - '- i· ' ' i ' ' i an· effective all-civilian government viILb st hlisli' d or 'that raclical i - _- ' l _ i ·_ ' · · · • · · -- - milifary br civilian leaders - -'will -'seiztiI d install an ' xtrem 1r i 1 · · ·· - _ · • ·• ' 4 • •••f •• • • -- • _ 1 •• • _ • - - • • i · · · · · f f i t t- · t- iir t tl_ ' t -Ys '-· · ''' • - ·• ' - Pakistan 1s an• overwhelmmg y Mus 1 - ✓ • •b• - - • ' ' 1 •t • • • •' • • s _ •••1f • 1 •• • •• · ·'·fr - S - · • · · · u eep regiona t - N - i - - · ·- --- ·- t · -i cult ral and ethn ic rivalries have·st itnecLfh o'uiittt·i oHticJnvste'm t ' ' t_ - · · · · · ' ' · f i since_ iridei endence Regionally _ba'secf 'p frfipaL--gioho in j ent vears c· · · · · · -· - lia ve'_sought provincial atitoµom y ath r hart ·ieSes_sion hui Jhesi i fr ins t · · rr - · persist md 'may in fact interisify°'_following h't sstiiriptfort 'b i ower'-fi · · ' _·__-·· · 1 _ ' ' -- · _ · ·_ 1978 h-v what the Pakistariis --considei Jo be £ tfommunis t -conti 61led · _ - · · • - _ · · - · •- Approved for Release 2018 06 28 C05330533 · ' - h i i t 'i s s i ' · - _ i i J i irtl'ci ii £· 1 · ¼_i _ G f ' ' J _ t k - h • · ' - • · roved for Release 2018 06 28 C0533053 --Approved for Release 2018 06 28 C05330533 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ··_ ' ' ' ·· ' Approved for Release 2018 06 28 C05330533 · ' - • ' ' ' ' i • - · ' •' • I _ • · -- ••r _ r 1r 1 · t 1Aif1 Jii l t $ j 1'i • •- ··· • • ' f Ap proved for ·Release 2018 06 28 C05330533 · t fr - i ttt tt'#Jl t i • • •· • _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____J' pproved for Release 2018 06i28 C05330533 -------------- - r '- t ½1 1 Jik' -k' ' · · roved for Release 2018 06 28 COS J· · · ·7 • • · · - • s • '·• r · ' ·z ' k· · - • • · ✓r· • ·• ••' • pproved_ for Release 2018 06 28 C0533053 3 3 b 1 ' - ·' Approved for Release 2018 06 28 C05330533 tl it w mi a1A1 i _ttl 11 t oaii i ifi· d higherJcosf i er unfr 'of ele tric t t a ' vo _l_ h droelccfric or sas•fucled ower pl n itt I h s · i rolccts ' at' well · as several others i' crircse11 perid1 · ihiit uicl be''re 1tr'ectecl ·io'm ire' vQ r th v h11e # aeifA 1·ngs ortalter ativetv 'eliminated t bring· pendi iif inore lii1-' line with do mestfoj espurc s ·' i 9z1 ir Jdci· it i i kJ6k- - c lr 9 lC l'_ip rio t'rct 1fov l t11nitted r11l nuctear rei 1lo'ceijfrii i ikli' 'itt ii tt if j i - i Tifi · Paklsta· · 'If bo vfog -rfo us pressures ·· _ 'iils flnus Zia 'inove'rc utl usly n' ngricultural inatted t9tn'✓o l antagbiiizlng' ''lar t l ndowne1i in the ru'raf nrcns Acldittonally 'i the· governm·ent Jace s'·· a_ifffoulf qJ clec1s1011Ibet Veen'jµbs1d1z1riil h J ncreas f IJ P' · · 1 •' foocf'dtsfrtbuted ln ·the cities th l bl ' re# K · ffhaymentf ot higher vrtce11 to 'tai1nerstor' i a t f c _ • · increases on and risking rioting in' the citiesitA h ' · moment the' government· is - favor ins _ m¢asureft · ·1gned f i rimarilv f to orestaJL Y r a un st· ' • J •_ •' • _ t _•• •• •' •• t I • ' • • - i • • •• ' • i£ l • '·• • - • • • l• 40 - Domestic' economic conditions _ in· Pakist l · • • 1t'' · rre Hv tabk • and ·concern b ef the balaii9 o ' 'i has asel s j re ul ' f irpl 'increased ' remittances· 'fiom'Pakistanis workifig_ Ov payments problem -''fiijj Alrriosf 1IT'rilillioii' Pakistarii '1are oft'i sf4in ihroid i ri i ily1fn 'tJ ie· Persian' Gulf statef ijd h · · United _Kingd m wi tff ' imall numbers_ tnJtis i' 1 · 'l Etiro and theUnited States Remittances from lj ½ ·expatriates have ·jumped from the 1§0 ill i # ir F y 914 t ali suma - 1 iJg9 HJs cai -· · · c' t· flows ·•- · 1 shou · · 1d i · ·en6u h t r1reduce th These lJt ' g 97 %tor· Jiirr i' F1ccount ·derich i round J at - - n i P m1 · l ' iJ fstabilizt · financl g reciuirementsJ··•'' T e ··go ern 1 1 · currentl_y' expects that aid_ ·atr adY ommit e4J H _ c fcover it · _ financing reciuireinents withotit for citj' · ·f 'raki tirt' ri'idriiw -do 'n'significan0y'·' its $ 9Qctr· iii f J bi ' ' til lf '·-' m c1ebt _biit Ien tof iiasf 'fout vears ' ·t h scheduli g· li afii # ts ei oti iit_g J n L- creclitots'Jn ' 19' 7J l'ht lirre t · ra nseme _t f l I 1_ R 0 Jtin i W Jiihd t ft r _t a dat_fPaki t an 9 $235 million tiritp tn debt s ryic ing _ - eli v n i 1h J1 · P •• s -- i ·•· ad burdeiLPakistaii 'has' forin aU nnot meet tlitS a e • · 'ii t fihi Wort fiiiW twhlch chafrs tlie gfon'6t · - iitajotao orl r · a d1uona1 A t - · r u hri'1tt _ - tncreaied amotirits ' ioL' assistance · begin ntni - - _ i i 97Ci 'i l ' ' fi iJ 11 t D t 'i _ -2 r Re e se 2018 06 28 C05330533 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -'Approved - -for -- ' · Y · ·t ' - ol iiiH Ji t ki 1 t Wt 5 · roved for Release 2018 06 28 C0533 - __ · · '· ' · · · -· •• 1 l 2 ·· r Release 2018 06 28 C053305 Approved for Releas_e 2018 06 28 C05330533 1 L · -e · · -i i _ • 1 • •• •lc' '· if ·· •· ·- __ Approved r· · Zf - - -- - J i ¼ J -r t · -2ti _ t1 ·_ -· · · for Release 2018 06 28 C0533053 - • •• •• •• - · 1 - ·· 1 n i i i i 111 r L 1 - overcome his di££iculties and resume··power Ho veve _the1fShah s'i i i es-' faded by early 1978 wh iiJf h indic'a ted hts· willingness· to ·work ith· the •curren · akistani ·_Government ·- · - ' - - - · t ·· J · ·''f ti Wii it t ·i' i i 1t' ti tft ·YJ 1 ' 2 Primcti Minister Bhutto ···reoriented Pakistan s cireisn pollcy f 'after t·i97llbv ·strengthening the 1vities a tit ' Bafochistan are• ·concerrie· 1 · riowini to'untrv•s ieswith 'its ealth Islamfo _neighbors in the _ that the Shah views· unrest and ·calls for autonomy· in_ Middle East'j•h 'ext nfto vhich he·succeeded is seen Balucht'stnn as an ·incitement to revolt' to the Baluchtid ifiii' the' substanti'al for ign· ··a1d Pakistan has received on th °Iranian _ side · ·or the border -· Zia s 'careful'• • from OPECfcciuntries inchidtni Irnn General Zia fi' ha dli f9£ thif North-West Frontier · Provinccf ind 'xrtov·ect ict'Jourish these'Jmportant 'relationships with Baluchtst r if-1ssu s' ' '$o· £at has · promoted ' imlitic al '· - rsori f tisittimm ia·telv faf ter' ·he ·assumed vower rrapp ' ocheinent betwe i the ·two states although the · heraf Ziatl feffdrtsffo f ment ' tieston i the- new ta be -s·ucc eding as Shah -pr bably · remains ttneasy about Pakistan's i eiri_ 'j n' he _tribes in Baluchistan i l jY t 1 lcfr1g as _the·goyer_nlllent claimed it was'· o ly an interim ·t fai f J i ' '- A Jl i ' · · _ - ·--' ·-· · · _ · ' -' - - ' JijBt ·one but ' vheit · ·were 1cahceled ·in laie 1977 t q J akistan ·owes a large debt to Iran and qnnnot i ' and' Bhut_to's itr ial for _murder was 'announced the '' thereforetafford to be too brusque in rejecting out-o_f i'tt Arah ' couritries i ppeared to be reluctant to disburse _· _ _hand h - Shah's -' current initiativt f r _ai ' _ _Asia ni e' · _if_b r#e ts · Kine Kh lid of ·sa di Arabia common market that would include India Pakistan _S_ i Sheikh Zay1d_ of the _ Umted Arab Emirates and long-term fears that Iran and India may cooperate to coloneL oadhaf of Libya were all 'personally con _ Pakistan'f detriment remain ·undiminished ies ite I 1 t erncd i Bhutto•s 'death sentence seyeral Arab states t - relatively- -good relations among the three states · arid irged lemency i - - i - - - ·· · · -r ' ' _ ·i - _· 'al lea st' initially have inclined the Pakistanis to take''a - b ' if i '' l -i · ·· · ' '_· _ ' ·' · - ·_ ·' ' ' c ' $ 'defen·s1t 1nd very'· tough'• pos tiori 'iigaliist thEt Shah's M f _kista n s P most i J rt nt ackers in the J vropased· ·venture Ultimately if pr ssed hard by' t r ab' - M1 dle East a - Sau 1 Arabia nd the U 1ted Shah and offered· assistance in other fields ''perhaos'-1rLJ r V uratf · - aud1 a_bfa expect_s little of Pak1s an ' · ' arms·· sales Pakistan might agree to a very' limited ex e t t t ' lt remam a stable non-Communist - '' ' _'region J - nomic_ greementJf 'i 'v re guara'iitee 1 Musl f9Y - • lh e UA 'on_ ·_th t r hand looks such benefits' financing transport ··system· 1tt Pak1st n as -s_ig ificant ou c of_mihtary trair•' ag ' ' ' 'and'• •vrofitahlo'ta iffs j ' _ _ _ _ _ ·_ - ·- - - i_ - j cMl_ian manpa- ver and food imports _Besides supply- • ' f X ak sta· · m exe'ro s·e·· c rt whe e''·iriin'sJensl g loos i overntrienfi behalf' nb11eared· elections as fo a· 'new _ • ' · _ f jJ i·i ti ' '-- - · ' - · f_· i - ' · i' -- _ · · ·_ · ·_ ' ' ' i1 riti l - ri'tr i j1 r - · k ist r 7tio Z1 61 - Pakistan s ·relations-· with Bangladesh have · d · · · 1 · · • •· _ _ ' · ·•· d· · d' ··· h -· · · - · · · - -- · · - - f _ J ·supI Orte the· Islamic cause in international forums 1 warme stea 1ly m t e seven years smce secession 1 ·t c· · - •··1 z· _ h -· · -· · 11 · -h 1•' d Ki H · • f · · ·• - · · · - -• - · ·c- f enera 1a W o persona y e pe ng ussem o • 0 · o- only because smaller countries on the periphery_ of t·· · ·d· - - - -•· · ·h' - _ '· · · · f· h h· ·• I d'' 'i t• -· '· ' ·- ' i·· ' •1 •t· ·' ' ··· - •· _ ·'th 1 '• • - ' idOr an in_J1 at country S 1g Lwit the fedayeen m _ _ n 1a· 1 v1cwA guou re a 10ns _among emse ves as f J· 1 · i - -h' • ' f f' t·' t '·• • ·t···d·t ·'· · _ __ · · ·h' · t -··d· · 'th th c ·- · - - -· · -- · · · · ··- · • · · · · - Ji as a emp e o improve 1s s an mg w1 e 0 197 _ _essential for self-de_fense ·Although Bangladesh prob• l -'p ·1 ···t· -t-- f• -·· -Jd·u · ·pk·· t - · · 'd d 11 ·· · 'ably' would like to go further and restore much of the' '_' ya e - 1 1- 8 - n 't 0 n·s· a 1 - - - 1 e sm a tradi g pattern of pre-1971 Pakistan Islamabad is · n_ - Por r _o_ma ia _ - _ _ · · · _ much less interested for two reasons -trading partners 4 -_ rhe·· pps ibility that Zia ight establish still - have' ' changed - arid· vastly increased trade would · J dose - relations· -with - and elicit 'significantly greater -· ·invol i overland·- transit through India ·_ implyirig 1· econofuic'·and ·military· assistance from_ Iran· and the 'r K- _recti 'rocal ''rights_ · foi India through ' _-Pak1stan 'to' thefP Ara1 9PEq ' countries rests in the· near term-vri '· · We £Non thele the recently formed joint eci'onomic fJ --maril1 ·Zia's· treatment of Bhutto _The Saudis were t comrilissfon· should help increase bilateral Bangladesh lnstrumefi'faPifo the -J977- i nesoti tions i- between '' · _ Pakistani trade as ·well joint venture$ in industry tBniitto'stp tty 'i d the fbp 6sitio -'If i Bhutto is' fi'and agrlculture• Pakistari and Banglaclesh have severa ··exe6uted th Saudis ill be much less inclined to look · ' outs'tanding' issti s 't · ·settle including the ·res ttlem n ff Qf' plj rin _ji kistahi requests s c lt for assistance £J 6pht Ho'rf the problem or the 'ctiv1sion'o£ sse ·ii tln ncfn£'1rmsi ntic1e r vµfcH setto3iiuuo·s life' - - · riJfu i911t bu 'tli' se· matte'ri i robahh ill wb't s1¥ liiIJid f Pakisl1rijtJ'elatict11 With th' Middle· ·East ft ' ' themkl es out in time Otherwise ' dist nce ' thnic '' -· statei -win 'r m fo' good r ·no riase 'ho ever is Zia's ii _- r - idifferences -and the legacy of the past will prevent the··' - influence likely to gro w beyond that enjoyed by the a a on as n f r_· _ _ _ f• _ i l f1t1 ift f t 1 _ 1 __ _ · ·· ________ _____ • 0 ' ' t # i'fjf _ · if tfo • f' · · · I i tifii - J r kr fitfDtit Approved for Release 2018 06 28 C05330533 · ·· · · · it i i-1 · r r f 1 t f s 1o - l tVtft I i f J ¥ if ' f tti· 1 1 t i roved for Release 2018 06 28 C0533053 a ·o ·300 ·tons t a1i' t e ·200 tc ns c'iteci by·'o icla aktJta tsourccs and that production in 1978 ·ma licli lO fJ 600 ·tons · Until recently mucli j1f hls ·-aidsti-ntJp'ro luccd opium was co nsunicd w1thhi the f 16' WBuf ' aUstfor 1iic e·as d-·cu1tivat1 'n s -siJ1 sta ri UiHKore pituri' r oni Pakistan' s vell 'a Afg aiff 'c'c -'1 t y ' i ji i· st _ - - • an'1t'l10 ' believed to be enterin Western 'Europe 5 P kista'ri•srt436 000-man'• h1llitary forces are Ariothe'r 'new an l significant factor i the 'cxistcnctf 0 1 t oUtiquesHoiiahlv rfriferior tc thqse· of India '· which are i J t n leg t morPi1 nC se £pri rs_l9 9 lllbqra or 'f • · N orth West Frontle Provincc i1 f i ts $ii r J tf it f- ft jj f ti '' #Jl ler - l i l kt'•' ' ti J i S a e f yar e ' be o ing ' ' · rogresslvel better ' •F equippedi t The forces of· ·· · rghn Ji J aklst ·s oth r teglo l rtval r much 0 mall f t l12 09Q arid ixiorly'' ralned i_but are rcla' ' ' d - ot t _et nnrc ks cultivation l_lnd trnHlckln 1 Bveli' welleciuii ped S e table 2 Although the gap with eithe _r n mesti or for lgn licy probl m an t Indid'ffwilUfcontlriue ' fo t'ilro v i Pakistan's national unablE _ r 0 _will_ g _- _to do anything·' · ab t - _i i_t iecu rify s ri6l lik Jy to 1x ·• threatened f ron1 thn't border dditlo t rit n i st na c l f c lUv t on ls 1ri riba lri thc' fne' • e'wi ea rs Pakistan's ' political relations n ro 1 i' f i • · ' drattec 'fn ' Pakistan · but never ·enacted 'anl high __ __ - j _ s -F f startf imilita-ry fotces' ·are a ·_national tt government officials · Including General Zia h vef rfnsm tiprii1 oth respected and fea ed by the popula dailed fo make good on announced intcrition·s to 'i t· · ttoii l3 itisb_ i n ilitary traditions· are' slowly flli Qing but ' • ntrol th _ prob em - At ' least as long as there t·· the J circi Iif i_ll_'h s h im fessional ' cohe Jive and litica instability_ and a· _ weak central goy i-nm t ¥ i l 9 ilit r1 BJ ligationsI by ·• senior 1 0 11 1 - o tin e· ' -' f - • ' t i i I1 · Jh e 'current military governme·nt · hnt d - - ilitarvihhwevertTraining is likewise neglected and re ord ·i n human rights although_ i_t a ' ' hts iplus he' · sio down in acquisition' f new military co rt 4 tJle WOrs abusesi of thi Bhutt ··pt ri 4 qulprrt rit will venfoally reduce the level of military B u tto cl he advantages of ing' dem_ocr UcaUr pabilitfesl Middle gradc '-iofficers are reported y l ctoo if nd ng _a plllist iI age i19u rf fac issatisftid' ··' ith f'this i s'ituation If i martial law is ' implem'ertted · a' repressive regime' A ter'' tht 977 _ · n'iinti ci if taNJnciefinit 'peri d 'these· se timenls m ilitarv coup tht •emerge·ncy · was lifted J_a led_- vill · 1· _ sify · ' ' p _ ' ' ' _ • ·-_' · · _- ' ··_ t politicians'' were freed restrictions on· the press · were· - · £ 'r t ' - Jlt ' -_ ' r t ✓Eti I ti n s ak en n1 ' t er· dici_ar w f m ar IVO Mi 1 t ¢ p bitii_i i1 t · tesdrided· the· Federal Security Force was abolished -ft fJ· 1 ·• • • 5•· ''-'· 1 1 · · - '·' • · ·rr- • - · ahcffov tigationi ntc corruptfon ancl buse' of' i o ve f 'J L s feat'_ i di · in 'i fuli-sc le iv fe' begun t ·-i ' ' · · · · ·_ · - _ -_ · · j f -0 c I fe u S •· · e_veri - with subst_antial assistance t fs'if ' ·' ·•'•' ' ' ' - · l f5from'6therpowers in the region such as China or Iran - ' 74 Yet Zia•s decision to delay indefinitely ·thei tPakistani forces 'probably could resist Indian attack i Jebtions he had promised served lo tarnish his imag JtUor'n'few Jeks however and cbncede to India only a qhtcktv · tri the _west ·as did his· reintroduction o tt ii f veWt iben sive 'victory · India • · maintains sufficient Jslatnfo'i'bunishnients·· ind the arrest and rearrest· ofd f ' oibetf loitfi ' its rder·· with Tibet to counter n t inany Bhutto•s support rs The disJ Osition·'of th' J tf 'bonveri'HpnaUv a ed attack y J hina ··and would · Bhutto' _caoo however will · he of- ' the · greatesPtr pr bably' iiot turn - its full strength'_ to vard Pakistan ' 1i iniportanc e in 'setting the human- rights image of t e 3 3 b 1 · ditiirv' gdVeriiment 1 Ali hough the Pakistani· Judi iarY · 'faHiet IHncle ndeii knd the·· verdict ' was 'sut ' _liy som cfedibl1f·evidence Geriei atZiaSwilli m' 'gii ' tiis im ge· 'with £riendly' g verriments·'·i he i1 f illowf tli«r to be carried out Zia it 'earh '' --------------- e-n-er-a Z-ia s-__J t1978 lecla d a ind finite ba'n on politic activitvt-· knowledge • of the Sha s u ewarm attitticle··to vard nd·ln hll likelihood would be willing to implement · the· currents' military goyernment in Pakistan and signs ill 't restrictl e' mtfasure 'to •'conti-oi •add tfo'nK · _£itinif t8 rti @ fri Iiin' rel iions' vith India · will ' ·JiflcAf S urirest t fcime ted ' bv opl bsition' ·-1r - ea e' Palc'istah more doubtful· than ever that Iran t s anl f t 9ial CSPt' ally at the loca 8tfffi t 1 r - t I 1 - 1 tc t n ·' · - -·- · '• ei iti it r t i iir h f l 1 c1Jtrl t t 1 t 1 iitft ttiw ir ttYt tt 'Y - 1 ·f e - J W l # f' 1 an ot ' - · s' yf ' · •• ·' • · c c • • ' • • • • • ••• • • '- • ·-1 • • • - • • execution iti iftt ' t f · i ' · ' ·' '- - Jtit t i ·t ' Jc · Approved for Release 2018 06 28 C05330533 ' _ ·· -·· · • ·· ·• · ·'• · • · •J ••- ···iZ 'r n - - 1 £ - · tt t j t t'i 1t ' Approved for Release 2018 06 28 C05330533 _ -· · ·· ' ' ii i j · r · ·' · f J - •• ••--· j_ • ' • l e current imbalance·with India These would includei riniart1v·combnt aircraft with imvroved Jong fang • strik·e· capabilities to· rcplace'aging' F·86s nd n- s'ii-f w'el s mechantied equipment and diversified ait'fr de£ense· eaponst· Prospects' ·fot acquidrig 'thls f e 1uli ment' from abroad seem poor Pakistan recentll k · encountered difficulty· in meeting the payments for · tit Freiicl helicopters• and an offer by France to sell of gua rx - c es ' pis _unc_ertainty i s a deterrent to - cldit1011nJ Mirages after the· United States reft1seci fn h _ e t foref nJsta teJ- t t-'ml t ·vrovide arms or 977- to' sell A-7fcould 'noCbe'- accepted ror 1ack 1£ t rt 9 i l s1stN 9 ii _t0 l kis_t 1 • ntjd impairs the r ndl 'fh'eprospective 'deltve y of'somc' 230 ar'moted W r J-1n 1tnt ry r ad 11 essJ y ·_cr at ng the· need to 'E ersonricJ carriers from the United States beginning iii' J P J p9-ps xap bl fo r fn t rn t secuI tY duty and by t 1979 would permit increased ground force me ha nlza - iv r t1 ns tht3_a t entton s·of senior- offlcers from military ioiitni would · th possible· ·acquislUon of ifJimitQd aff Ji n r ai - g- to n ti _n al_ _ and l9caJ_ admin lstran J if ·new_'tan_ks £ron1· chtna A'maior i rog ran f P L 1 Jf lj_ ¥' P- lltical m tte r l _oreover · the · procta rif atr defense miss·ilcs in the next fe v ye t r wfp ct n I proble1 1 1 • of rec nt years have uaripeifrs°unlikelyf Pakistan now has_ only de slior llftP erf r s tr r t_ ·- Pak_lstan s·Jrf - m_- to d votc its t range surface to air missile launchers Also needed are imit ed lia 4i 'C r ency holdings to weapons imports · _ ·new ombata t ships with armament able to contest· I J sl ow_ingJhe·replacerrient of·aging or outmoded ' lndia S tltal' superiority in 'antiship missile-equipped _ ' rms ·1 all ' t rec fr 1 c s f ' · - · ' ' ombatants ' _Plans for ·_ installation' qf French· xocef _ f t 'f t 'f l fftf ' - •· _ f miss iles1bit•surface ships a'rid ·sonie'' 'of the recently NUCLEAR 'f ROGRAMSJf r J·' '·g ·'t · · 1 1 r t i 1 · ling' h l- r ove ' t k J e l sion i 7 · a recogni• ·· A· l _ · • • · ·' · · k hon by Pak1staniJeaders of their country s growing ' tffiiLsV Ucking significant defense industries Pakistaitt milifary inferiorityifo India have prompted Pakistan · - alltrig ·behind India in its own· ability to tipgrade i Jirt jir eqe tt y ar ' ic i adopf 'great r' unbitions for its xistingi foreign built 'equipment or -vrocltice · ne ' t j r h'ticleal'l ogfaffi1 Aithougl this program is· 'defended Wea1 0ni W1th Iranian help for ·example '·' Pakistaii' ff·' -s'ii tessa'tY' ' fo' m et Pak1sta n's lectri power needs it C i has begun to replace 90-nim guns _with 105-nim guns l ii vouldLSorisHtute Can · uneconomic ' 'solution to that --t i ' 'on some 12$ M48 tanks India however has alreadVJ ti' vro bleiri 1fsuggestiiig' that' the' government's principal· '· · Y·done this·with more tliari 300 T-55 tanks and has an·· ti h otive' is· tii''achieve- at le st the 'c b'acity to assemble ' additional fore _of more than· 800 ·similarlv· ·ai m d ' deifi xblosive de icei Foi midable economic JndiJn builtJanks Within· the ·next fe 'years'severaf ' trateliici ftecli'nfcal and · foreign'-'political constraints · faciliti s' the 'inairitenance and overhaul of f r igri' ' PernilMihl lc w progress t Ward achievement of weapon ystcms 'including tanks ind airc aft vilf be' ci ' l thfs'tcJi ibihtv but e heli vi that vh-t ally all completed in Pakistan Although operation of _ thesel JimiHtary' 'and civilian leaders favbr' continuation of the fl facilities will increase the level of indigenous _exper is lti rogra aki t n has not' signed the Nonproliferation '''' Pakistan will long _remain largely dependent on source· -Tr atv ' iti here is' iii i '_feeling in' 'the country that ounirles varts ·'arid' technical ·asststance Pakista i aklstii'n s' rt'iiclJa'Fqt roirai r slio id 'b nstrafoed in · ••· _f ·currenlly produces mmunition a d infantr 'weapons titdh ter stf of onproliferation · _ ' 1i i£ ' · · r t as· la'rg as recoilless rifles but progression to largef i f f i - ' · systems almost certainly will have to await accuniula ' 1 ' i -' Ttie· Political -Probiem _ 'f' J - don· _oL·exverience ·wtth· the new mainteriance ' ' - ' ·· - -- · - _-·· - I• ·f· - ·· ·- ·- '·· ' · ·· · · 1 ···-- r ·tr·t· · - • r J ·· ' '1 • · - · '· • _ • -- J'J ·_85 U 10 1Pro1 eratton poi y_1s·seen m Pakistan 11 ·_ 1 ' fi ' f _ ' • ··' · · '· ·· ' 0 --i '·· - · · · ·· · · ·•· - - · fi · · t as ·- · · ·a ttemp_ · t t o oeny sens11ve ·t· · llc1ear teehno Iogy to --· ac - f·· •_• · a l - n wlfme sure - to_· mpr e·-_· p ki a _·i1J fak ta lr a st¥ -fecogn z i t h tfoited States is_ milifaty YI Qst_iire 'fare _unlikely to- have· a significant Jhe ·i dnifiriovef ehind the· i' Ju leaf Suppliers Group •• • 4 1-• -- J _ _ hnviictduring th r next_two o'r three years J akistari f effoi tsJo ·li n_lit xwrts'of seiislHve naterial 'and that · ·inav b t able ·'lo ··-'acquire · som · relatively ·butdatea tht µ Ue'ft tst festliC''iiiJ sihi1·F aric h tcancel its · · · f fr w a'1 9ns'' from ·· bhina -·on easy' credit termshib#tf' tlori't a t t f lu pply ' repr issipg 'tp1arit' tc Pakistan · W-hecause··of the· lead times tor delive·rv or production ''of- i akistan hatioiiat · ride •iias· ·becom - inv'olved in the inbst of soi histidated Western· etiuivnient miib the· rei ro essirig ··vlant tirid addi• fmi r v m nt ir military Po tur wili ·iJrobabl ' 1 ti'lfi'pt1if 'f' r ictors ··tt •ifth refore mo t unlikely §it - '_ ' · _ _·_· cf ' · - _ •- '' j - ·•· - Y ' · ' event '• ' f c 1 j t f - i f f • •• · • v e ·•'t ' ••' - ·- 1'-i i' f' •' · - w • _ • •···• · • ·· 0 for riia for· ' J 0 I items· ' • • J • • I ' • • I• • ' '• • t ' · 1•' ' •' • • _¥ - • • rogram tofs cure - J j ' L ' · i ' Approved for Release 2018 06 28 C05330533 ' · · · • f 1 J j ' ·i' _ _ - -1 recen years Pakistan' has ·sought to purchase · romf Biold It reprocessing plant a heavy water plan'f iitfuel 'rabricatfori'' olan and ·additional nuclear i ow r i Jants m st of which '' would be located at the hi 'ffi niicl r 'com'pl i' on' the Indus River If these· ·' _ _ ff oitl WiteJb''·s·ucceed ' P akistan ould approach self• ufficJency ir its ··imclear Juel cycle and would thus · iiaie ta i crt ldible · nuclear · xpJosive· option Th most criticlilgsingle elemenf ' now being ··soug ht is the ' 't• - ✓' ' · • • · • • • 1• • • ' repr e ingfi iant' that' 'Paki tan has contracted to '' uich e rom Fra ce This i Jant 'which could go into ·' ' fffl ffiis 'efriy 1asti982 ith Fi-e' ch· engineering ssistarice would be ·capable 'o reprocessing the fuel ' 'rcifu'tht K a' ichf'r actor 'iiiid al o-the enriched fuel of • l i '11f _r _ i• • • 'l•• • • •• ' • • I I • • • l' • •• ' ' wlre r t fr tl i fff i i 1 1ii f ti fif _ ' i _ i· _ - · · _ t N ithet th international safeguards agreed to ' H E JW -the'French ' thll Pakis tanis 'and the Interna- ' ·- 'tionH ll Atoinic EnetgytAg ncy nor the coprocessing svstemt more_fr_e'cently 'propos d 1 by France would prili1aet wli'afttt thd1t' United cf Statesi would 'consider • ct ijtt t f· ·ss il - th·at · iutolliuiil· · ffoin uch a · _ 'ei r essiriili lant ·cd td Ii t ·bl• diverted for weapon 1rpases The' Internatio al 'Atomic Energy·Agency is ·riex rie ced i' in -it safegtiardhig _ reprocessing 3 3 b 1 i-' y -- ' r ·_1 · ' ··· ••' ··' ' '• · ' • ···• t' - f · ti 88 The iniclear· power reactor ·1ri Kara chi suppli anl-dueled_· by Canada begair· operati hnri i19 · ' 1 'j i1 t -A lth ugh the- susvension· of fuel shipment b C aria 32 ' '£ f t'' ' X j d Release 2018 06 28 C05330 3 C 3 3 b 1 • txg 'il'-- - ij£if t s1t tt'c s is3a i l j f i i ·• · •· · · e ' views -of_ foreign' 'governm tmts ·· vith the es1sns ·o sma ssibi ifeitception' 6ri Iran' j will i not be · primary ' -_ ···n j luton tin ec Very facilit_ies ·can' be fo m4 Jri the' e ermi aritS 'in• j aki tan's ' declsions ' on '· nuclear · --· ' • -er t re ' and Pakls t _an c o ld procure m s t ·' i_ _ J lit_ s _ __ · p f the· ·3 3 b 1_ not all of _the materials for constructing nd operatmg dK country s supporters especially· the 011-nch· Arab ·· · iuch1 'a a6i11ty _ The Pakistanis would have a reason lf tate i - 'to· s· nuclear ihte completing such a facility by the' earlv' Iffe f - ·- ' · - · · 1980s ' fA'' 'small crude ·reorocessing facUity_ wo ld _ f-' ' _ _ _'-l __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _3_ 3 b 1 ·· ···• - Hicient'' and· •sate lhan·'the 1 rench'·rptan -' '- · - - - - - - - - - ' imi ar y - neit er ·-t e t fil0 f t' fi1 t ij _ ' l p i _ ' iff t ·1 _i eJ _oo i it rawa o · U •econoniic assistance ·-weapons Option ' · -' · _ · - ·t ' - _ ·· · ' ' tfn'c v only· a fraction of Pakistan stotal nor the costs of At i E r c ni i i6 1 1 ' q i r i tb r • Jowever_ uge ill e prohibitive · 1 d' - i_ ' - -•- ·iJ - factoi'sJf Pakls ari that its - _- security · · • eu a weapons es gn group - -1n· 1·'·-97··4· t·'o ·•··t s u···d r-- ·-·· _ ·· - ·- determines · h h · d· 1· interests · 'develoxli vorkabie design for a· 11uclea·r device ictat _ it_· ustl '- - t' ' - ' - _ c _ · - -· _ · p r · n st chance of 2- i't1itP kt t - _ ' - 3 3 b 1 4 I •_ ttt•t _ · 95 Shdµ I'akistari de'cide· to proceed with produc· J resse ar to exp e a nuc ear ev ce a sta0 t Hon ·ofnijcl fr weapons it ' would still be extremely· -_-scientists probably_ could do so in the early 1980s using• _ t limited · -in' _ deltvery· capabilities · for · many years tutonium derived from the laboratory-scale reproc-JJ because ithas·no present'capability for the indigenous ' essing facility and or from a Pakistani-built ·crude ·' fi rodtictiori ' f either aircraft cir ballistic 'missiles The reprocessing facility Were the French plant to_· he _ n- 57 aircraft· ·currently in Pakistan's inventory could - completed Pakistan would have access to quantitie s i ftcarr1 a rude large nhclear° 'device but these aircraft · Fbf plutonium· sufficient _to take he additional step of J hiivii f r iw netration· capabilities Pakistan could · - r producing ' weapon s t'· · i i'1t i ·t 'cciuir afrcraftJr9m abroad or atterilpt ultimately to ' · 93 The --d isi Js on hether or n t e t f f rdeyel P·x lli_5tl f iniss iles • _on ts · 'own · _ but either ' _ nuclear device and to proceed on to the production···of lr ppr a _h 1 llld ntaxl the development of more · · - weaI Otis' with or· without such ·an' explosion _will_ be S9J lS t ca e4i n _-·compact nl lc_lear· bombs or wa - · determined largely by factors unrelated to Pakistan's - -- 1 yhi e not n efsa_n_l beyond P kistan s ' technical·abilities These will include 'the Pakistanis - o r t- L utu re capabilihes • _ wou_ld e tail gr at · - - um•tatera-1 assessmen· t of 1nd'1a•s nuc1ear m ·tent·ons investments of bme· and money 1 - of• tii ··· • · · h ·· · · and · ·put ·great - strams 1 _ -- w hich they · w1'II remam • h'1ghi y susp1c1ous-an ·· • • d of the 1 --on· its tee mca resources · • · • _ · _ -· · · · 1 fconventional military 'threat posed by India both to ·' ·'· •• J ' ti - - t ' · · · ·_ ·- '· - · ·- · _ be weighed ·against the· high likelihood that ·a nuclear'J 96 ·Althoi igh Pakistan_ has no· known program to exi l sion by Pakistan would stimulate India to pursue fclevelop -· ballistic missile it has ·already acquired -· · a nuclear weapons program virtually certain to bring _i sonie facilities and technologies applicable to such'· quicker·results _han Pakistan's Additionally a deci - t Ae_veiopm nt -In view of he additional facilities and t sion · by· ·Pakistan to ·violate existing-· international ·- tequipment 'that·'would be ·required · however arid the tsafeguards order to ' proceed with a weapons· ·_ · clifficulties certain to be encountered we ·consider it ·program probably would jeopardize the country's highly unlikely that _Pakistan could achieve a ballistic - nuclear power program by prompting the withdrawal_' _ missile 'capability within the next five to 10 years · _of such £oreign nucle1 1r _-assistance · a now exists_ or·· - i·_even f i cquired extensive technical issist nce from -'might be sought ·1n the future The cautious present abroad '-·The more likely strategy would be for the j milihfry_ · government ' which·· is · disinclined ·to take -Pakista 'nis o seek_ Arab funding for' _ the purchase of ·drainatic steps or make long-term commitments is not ··· · 'nevi aircraft perhaps Jaguars or·· Mirage F-1s that · likely to use a one-time capability to explode a device ·could serve as nuclear weapon delivery systems Were · purely for prestige purposes or as a symbolic deterrent ' ·funds availabie these aircraft could be deliverecl l ng tbut this·_ Possibility would be greater- if a· i adically _ - before Pakistan' could produce the compact weapon _ · nationalist military or civilian ·regime came to l Wer' they could accommodate __ · ··- ' _ · •· ' ' _ · - ' ' a in · · · · • ·•· •· · ' ilf'ii i1t1 1tt' ft C · A fit X1rt i 1t · • ' •· • 1 · -3 -- · J -i ' t · Approved for Release 2018 06 28 C05330533 ' - '· 2 t £ 1- £ f J 'd i tll r l _' -r 1 kt i @- $'f h '¥- 'k 4'w · pproved for Release 2018 06 28 C053305 f f Jtf l _ tl Ii jf1 1 • · 1 • This document was disseminated by the Nationa _ore gri ssessment Center 15°copy '· i ' r ' ' Is for the information and use· of the re ipierit and o pe o _s u der_ his jurlsdiction·· n a ed- f ··· ' e ft to-kn' ow basis Additional essei itial diss_eminatiori m ' · --aut 9riz d b th followi g officials j ' i_ r ' J - · i in _their- respectiv1 depcirt entst· _ · iti - '_ ' ·- t i rr - 071 it- -· • • - -_ l - i·t•· · ' 7'-f 1 ·-' i · i # · - ·_ - _ t l _· • · ' ' '·r _ '- ' a Director of lntellig ence and_ Researc o e epartme _of Stahl _ • _ · f 1 - _ _ _ '' ·· _ - t - · __ · · _ · ' __ · -· b Director Defense Intelligence Agency for the Office f Jhe Secretary of Defense' ' · - ·_ • - · · ' ' · ·' s • ·i _ _ · · _· - __ ·_· ·_- and t e organization of th_e Joint ta f ❖ j f f ' · ' tfi ' i '·' 'i i · · ' ' ' · ·t j • f• Assis_tant Chief C f Staff for' l ltel_l_ g nce J -Repar_tm o J e_ r my '- f ' _ t j ' t ·-1 1 ' 1 d Director of Naval Intelligence for_ the Departrnel' t of the __ Navy f J ' _ · ' - '' ''J · - ' i ' f •· -· ' · ' - '-• •- _J- • • • • t J -u · x - · - · - - '· o Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence for the Department of the Air Force r X ii_ · -' 'i-1 f De uty Ass stant_Administrator for· _N ati ecur ty fft e ep -t ent_ f nerg_ '•j - ·· - ·· ·-- '· · _· · ' - · _- ·· -'· -- ·-- g Assistant Director FBI for the Federal Bureau of lnveshgahon i 't -- - · -· · · - j _ • • • • •• • _ '· ' c •-¥Jc· • · 1 i ' -- •• - •• i - y c h Director of NSA for the National Security Agericy _ tft J1- tl ' · - ' -' ' · j '• • •• -••-• _ _'•f • • _ i t- tt fj I · Special Assistant to the Secretarf fof National ·sec·urity for ·th ·Departi-henfof the '- ___ fS _- - -' ·· ' _ · i-•fg ·- rreasury - if ' tib _ · _ ·· ··• · - · _ - ' ·I The DC l's Deputy for National ll' telligenc t r ant Other_ Departine_nt or _Ageric y' - Y - - ·_ ' _ · ' J C ief f 1 - ' '• · - · 1 fitl ·f _· _ _- t ·'' • • 1• - -t · f - ·_ ' -- ·-' - i - • r£ 1'••-• ' 11 '- r - •' · · ••- -- • - - 0 ••- ✓ ·- · -' i_ zt f t · ' u '-# II '• • I 4 • ' • J I'- • • •• • 1 -t t ' L · - - · _ f' t r t - · _· · · 1 t i % ql il ij hr til rti · xi1J When this documeiit Is' disseminateci overseasJhitovers t¥s r ecipients may'retain 'iffofa f J l_ J i • · ' 'i _ i- 7 not in excess of one year At the end _o Jhis pe i d thfdocument should be 'destroyed 2- i f ·- -- · ·- -' 1 or returned to the for arding agency permissici - ho id requested of the fo wci ding r1 tr· _ ' - · - -· ·· ' ---J •• ·ht - --·- ··· ··- ·· • · c - • 1 •1 • •· · - - · • - - 1 - t- -·· -- - ' - • · t agency to retain 1t in accordanc •t A p 69l Ju ' 3 J i' · s · · ·' P -- · -' ' ' · •t -_ j -· - _ - -- - ··r H· -· •« 1 1 · ' - 11 · - v - f _5 t· · · --- - • •·- -f_ - ·· - ·y '· i · - ·· · - _ --- _ ti · - he title of this document when used separately·frorn the text should be classified FOR · '• · ___ - · · ·• -· - ' _ _ ' • • • I •·• ' or ••·•••l ' · - •l ••r · • be· _ • • - ·• • - ___ •_ •• 1 0 0 u l 1' • • •• •1 1 - _••' • 1 _ 0 • •