- · ·' i DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington D C 20520 ES SENSITIVE 7820461 November 22 1978 SEpttT SENSITIVE I MEMORANDUM FOR DR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI THE WHITE HOUSE Subject --- Pakistani Nuclear Programs Attached is the paper requested in your memorandum of October 18 1978 This paper is intended to identify critical benchmarks in Pakistan's nuclear program and outline our strategy -- both multilateral and bilateral -- for inhibiting Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear explosive capability The CIA will be addressing your last question in a separate memorandum c f gf ···4·· - - - -· ' ____ _ ' II iL t _ Peter Tarnoff Executive Secretary Attachment Paper on Pakistani Nuclear Programs - - XGDS 3 if 5 I I SEQRET SENSITIVE 7 PAKISTANI NUCLEAR PROGRAMS Despite the cessation of French cooperation with Pakistan on the reprocessing plant intelligence reports indicate that Pakistan is continuing with its program to obtain a nuclear weapons option Its motivation remains unchanged namely its fear of India's intentions and its desire to off-set India's conventional military superiority and nuclear advantage Pakistan probably also believes that such capability would greatly enhance its stature in the Moslem world Pakistan has considerable but not complete technical competence and is exploring various ways to obtain fissile material for an explosive program The Pakistanis are looking into the gas centrifuge process for enrichment of uranium and are shopping around for related equipment There are also reports that the Pakistanis may seek to complete the French reprocessing plant on their own Finally there are indications that Pakistan may be working on an expanded lab scale reprocessing facility at PINSTECH the principal nuclear research center We have no indica- tion that Pakistan is working on a so-called quick and C dirty 11 reprocessing facility which might be a fast though OECLASSIFIED ' ' -------------- -----' ------ - - --- ' I I _ ------ SENSITIVE - 2 - probably insecure route for acquiring fissile material but this possibility cannot be disregarded There is also evidence the Pakistanis are engaged in research and design work for the other components of a nuclear device which would be used together with fissile material obtained through reprocessing or enrichment to create a nuclear explosion An IIM describing and evaluating these efforts in more detail will soon be available BENCHMARKS ¼LS ' In a continuing and complex program of resear ch and development we can identify a few obvious benchmarks but we will need to keep the entire program under constant review This is an inexact science at best and much of our intelligence information is ambiguous It is not possible to predict when or if Pakistan will arrive at one of these benchmarks Among the critical indicators or benchmarks in four broad areas are 1 Acquisition of Fissile Material Public suspension or detected covert v iolation of safeguards on the KANUPP Power reactors and spent fuel storage facilities at KANUPP and PINSTECH the only •·-·· S SENSITIVE - 3 - current source of significant quantities of spent fuel Restrictions on the activities of IAEA inspectors or irregularities in the application safeguards of KANUPP or at PINSTECH -- Evidence of a quick and dirty reprocessing facility which could permit separation of sufficeint quantities or plutonium for a few devices within 1-3 years -- Acquisition from abroad of trigger list or gray area materials or technology for enrichment or reprocessing -- Fabrication and irradiation of indigenous fuel at KANUPP which the GOP might claim is not subject to a Canadian reprocessing veto Evidence from sampling that reprocessing of spent fuel or enrichment or uranium had been undertaken Seizure and reprocessing of irradiated 93% HEU which has been provided by the us and used in the PINSTECH research reactor 2 Research and Design of Explosive Devices Shopping abroad for materials or components related to development or manufacture of a nuclear explosive device such as specialized high-speed cameras a hot isostatic press neutron sources specialized electronics etc I sE CRET SENSITIVE ✓ - 4 - -- Testing of a high explosive- package for a nuclear device using natural or depleted uranium Evidence that natural or depleted uranium has been used in explosive tests 3 Preparations for Testing Preparations of a site for nuclear testing e g drilling of wide diameter bore holes provision for cabling and instrumentation monitoring for test security preparations etc 4 Evidence of Work on Delivery Systems or Delivery Techniques Practice by Pakistani aircraft of nuclear weapons delivery techniques Attempts to acquire specialized electronics for fighter aircraft Acquisition of long-range missile parts technology or guidance systems U S STRATEGY Our strategy to inhibit Pakistan from moving successfully toward nuclear capability should utilize both multilateral tools as well as bilateral pressures and inducements S SENSITIVE 7 - 5 - 1 Multilateral We have already alerted 11 supplier countries to Pakistan's intentions and urged them to restrict exports to Pakistan of equipment and technology related to reprocessing The British have done the same thing with respect to enrichment materials and technology and are themselves acting to prevent the export of electrical inverters recently ordered by the Pakistanis We will continue to keep in close touch with the supplier countries and share intelligence as appropriate -- We have alerted the IAEA too and they are cognizant of the need for careful inspection of all the Pakistani nuclear facilities We intend to share our concerns about Pakistan as a potential proliferator with both the Soviets and the PRC in order to lay the ground work should we wish at a later date to enlist their cooperation in bringing to bear greater influence on Islamabad -- We will look for appropriate opportunities to engage Iran and Saudi Arabia in our efforts to deflect Pakistan from its present course - I J SENSITIVE 1'JZJ · f - 6 - -- Should Pakistan appear to reach a critical benchmark we would consult with other concerned countries and particularly members of the aid consortium on ways to bring to bear concerted economic pressure keeping in mind however the possibility that one or more oil-rich Muslim countries could conceivably take up the slack 2 Bilateral Provided that Pakistan does not initiate action which triggers extreme sanctions i e suspend military sales and economic aid we should not over estimate our bilateral Jf1 leverage on the nuclear problem Our suspension of economic aid in 1978 did not dissuade Pakistan from pursuing the reprocessing contract with the French it was probably more useful in terms of signaling the seriousness of our concern to the French Even substantially increased military sales and economic aid would probably not give us decisive leverage On the other hand a sharp curtailment would only increase Pakistan's sense of insecurity and thus its motivation for going nuclear Nevertheless military sales and economic assistance can help us reknit our relations with Pakistan reduce its sense of isolation and provide some degree of influence It will however take some time to rebuild and expand this relationship S SENSITIVE 7 - 7 - It should also be noted that unlike the Taiwan or South Korean situations neither we nor other suppliers have any decisive leverage derived from cooperation in a major nuclear power program In 1975 Canada ceased virtually all cooperation on Pakistan's only power reactor KANUPP and early plans for an additional power reactor at Chasma have not advanced We have provided HEU through the IAEA for the research reactor at PINSTECH Refueling in the next year or two by us or another supplier may permit the application of some pressure Other potential sources of HEU at this time are the UK France USSR and China Recognizing the limits on our bilateral influence the following steps have been taken and or are being considered -- Ambassador Hummel when informing the GOP of our resumption of aid put the Pakistanis on notice that we are concerned about their nuclear intentions and will follow Pakistan's activities in this field closely He made clear that should Pakistan develop an indigenous nuclear capability or acquire reprocessing technology or equipment we would have to review immediately our overall - S ENSITIVE - relationship 8 - He also provided the GOP with a paper summarizing all pertinent legislative considerations relating to our non-proliferation concerns -- If the Pakistanis acquire from abroad triggerlist items for their enrichment or reprocessing programs the Symington Glenn Amendment would require us to terminate economic and military assistance IMET Such Pakistani acquisitions would almost certainly adversely affect our military sales program although the legislation does not so require -- At some point it might be useful to put the GOP on notice that we are aware of their covert activity in the nuclear field In this connection we will wish to avoid compromising intelligence sources which could affect adversely our collection efforts Moreover it may be useful f brs L·to restore our economic and military relationship so that the costs of proceeding would be more apparent to the Pakistanis Beyond this the timing content and nature bilateral or multilateral of further approaches will necessarily depend on both overt and covert developments in Pakistan's nuclear program - There are too many imponderable factors to define specifically in advance how we would react when - ·· S SENSITIVE - 9 - and if Pakistan approaches any given benchmark We continue to be fully aware that one of our primary goals is to prevent Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons capability -