· --- • DEPARTMENT OF STATE BRIEFING MEMORANDUM S S CRET SENSITP S January 20 1979 TO P - Mr Newsom THROUGH T - Mrs Benson FROM NEA - Harold 8 Saunders OES - Mr Pickering SUBJECT Mini-PRC Meeting on the Pakistan Nuclear Problem The purpose of this meeting is to engage the PRC in the Pakistan nuclear problem and obtain its endorsement for both our diplomatic and Congressional strategy We face two distinct but inter-related problems 1 how do we best prevent Pakistan from acquiring nuclear capability and 2 how do we deal with the problem of the Symington Amendment which could require us in the not too distant future to terminate aid and further complicate our position in the turbulent Persian Gulf region Those attending the PRC will have received the attached paper entitled •Pakistan Nuclear Program Policy and Legal Implications for the United States• There is no agenda I Introductory Remarks You may wish to open the meeting by briefly describing Pakistan's nuclear program and its implications for US policy Talking Points -- we face a critical dilemma in our relations with Pakistan which could have serious ramifications throughout the region ACRB'PfSBNSI'l'IVB- RDS 01 22 89 SAUNDERS Harold B ECRE' P SEN6Ii IVD - 2 - -- Pakistan is moving rapidly and secretly toward the construction of facilities which could give it nuclear explosive capability perhaps within two to four ' years It is obtaining some equipment necessary for he enrichment plant from abroad Although our analysis is not conclusive current indications suggest that a serious question is raised with regard to the Symington Amendment which could require us to cut off aid to Pakistan Although not legally affected military sales under these circumstances would be extremely difficult -- Given the situation in Iran a near rupture in our relations with Pakistan would further ad to regional instability and could pose serious political problems for us -- Our European allies and reginal moderates want us to move toward a more supportive relationship with Pakistan at this critical time and would be deeply disturbed by American withdrawal of support of Pakistan This concern could certainly be echoed by domestic observers of our policy in the region -- Pakistan might seek compensating assistance from other oil rich Arab countries and acquiesce in some accommodation with the Soviet Union -- A cut off of aid would confirm India's suspicions of Pakistan's nuclear intentions and increase domestic pressure in India for resumption of a nuclear explosive program II Proposed Strategy Background we do not believe US leverage alone is sufficient to turn the Pakistanis around Given the probable short time fuse on the Symington Amendment we need urgently to seek the diplomatic support of others who have influence is Islamabad We are not certain that our proposed multi-pronged strategy will work but believe we must make every effort to turn Pakistan around J ECRE'll SENSI'fIVB - 3 - Desired PRC Action Endorsement of our strategy of bringing diplomatic pressure to bear on Pakistan Talking Points -- China is Pakistan's most influential friend We recommend a strong approach to Teng Hsiao-Ping pointing out the danger that Pakistan's nuclear program will provoke India nu9lear weapons development and that our support of Pakistan depends on turning Pakistan off -- We propose to approach the Saudis who also have considerable influence in Islamabad urging them to weigh in -- We propose to suggest to Ambassador Dobrynin the desirability of a Russian demarche to Pakistan The USSR shares our non-proliferation concerns and presumably would not wish to see a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent We recognize that Pakistan might well consider that the Soviets were in collusion with India which could produce a negative reaction However Pakistan is currently very sensitive to the extension of Soviet influence through Afghanistan and we believe on balance that Soviet pressure would have a strong desirable impact -- Until now we have kept separate our nuclear problems with India and Pakistan Fundamentally however the two are linked and we risk in the near term the generation of domestic pressure in India which could force the Desai government to resume an explosives program We believe that Desai himself is genuinely opposed to such an Indian program and might be susceptible to a very quiet overture on the Pakistan problem If he were prepared to accept the joint declaration on non-use of nuclear weapons it might give President Zia an essential rationale for reversing his present course -- we propose to seek the political support of our major western allies in a coordinated approach to Pakistan QBCRE lSiN ITI tB ICRE 6E SI'l'I¥fi - 4 - -- We plan to work actively with other suppliers on ways to inhibit sensitive exports to Pakistan and we will need the cooperation of the intelligence community to utilize sensitive information in this effort -- Finally we recommend that President Zia be invited to Washington as soon as the dust has settled from the Bhutto case We would stress our willingness to be supportive of Pakistan but make it clear that constructive ties with the OS require assurances that Pakistan will forego its nuclear weapons program III Congressional Aspects Background • We believe that key members of the Congress will wish us to be helpful in managing the Pakistan problem if they receive a candid explanation of the situation taking into account overall US security interests in the region and the fact that we have a coherent strategy to deal with the Pakistanis proliferation threat within a reasonable time frame We plan to explore the possibility of a relatively minor change in the law would provide us with somewhat greater flexibility or at least more time than the Symington Amendment is likely to give us Desired PRC Action Endorsement of our proposal 'l'alking Point -- We kept key members of Congress informed while the French reprocessing drama was played out 'l'hey were concerned but consisently supportlve of our efforts We plan to brief key members on a highly confidential basis about the current problems and explore with them the possibility of changing the law to give us somewhat greater flexibility and time Drafted NEA PAB J dam Ol 20 79 -X20353 Cleared T LBrowi subs ij _ S S6Rl fSi ilTI Yi - DECI ASSIAED Nvl e1ail - 6 - 71 jltli1 SECRETfSENSITI't E · PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM POLICY AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U S I Nuclear Weapons Related Activity in Pakistan Pakistan is working actively on two ways to produce fis Slle material for a nuclear explosive device -- reprocessing spent fuel to produce plutonium and enriching natural uranium to produce highly enriched uranium BEU The Pakistanis are building a facility near Islamabad capable of small-scale reprocessing This installation is quite distinct from the much larger so-called French reprocessing plant which we very much doubt could be finished in less than 8 years since cessation of French cooperation The smaller facility could produce enough plutonium for an explosive device in 2-4 years but would not be capable of supporting a weapons program Reprocessing is also complicated by safeguards commitments to the IAEA and Canada Pakistan is also pressing ahead with a secret gas centrifuge program intended to yield significant quantities of BEU This program is technically more difficult but Pakistan could produce enough HEU for a nuclear device in 4-5 years and would then have the capacity to support a small nuclear weapons program In addition Pakistan has a very secret nuclear weapons design group working on the necessary detonation package II Legal Implications Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act proscribe certain economic or military assistance to a country which after August 1977 receives from abroad enrichment or reprocessing •equipment materials or technology• Some of the equipment necessary to Pakistan's enrichment program has been obtained from abroad or is on order While our analysis is not conclusive current indiGations on types of equipment involved and the timing of imports suggest that a serious question is raised with respect to the pertinent amendment Section 669 known as the Symington Amendment There is a waiver prov1s1on in the amendment that the President determine that the termination ance would have a serious adverse affect on vital and that he has received reliable assurances that which requires of our assistUS interests the country SE RB SBN6IT1Vi RDS 01 19 89 SAUNDERS Harold H SiCRE-T SENSI'PIVE - 2 - in question will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons If it is decided to pursue the steps leading to a waiver we could not delay application of the termination requirement in the amendment beyond the minimum time to arrange for a waiver See Tab 1 for a more detailed legal analysis III Policy Implications We clearly have a shorter time fuse on the Pakistan nuclear problem than we had anticipated both in terms of preventing Pakistan from developing nuclear capability and in terms of the legal problem The legal analysis suggests that we may find in the fairly near future that we are required to cut off aid to Pakistan and if it is decided to pursue the steps leading to a waiver we will have only a limited period in which to obtain reliable assurances from the Pakistanis We have not determined what would constitute •reliable assurances• but our overall objective would remain termination of Pakistan's' sensitive nuclear activities If we have to cut off aid we believe it would be extremely difficult to obtain Congressional acquiescense for significant military cash sales to Pakistan Such a disruption of our relations could have unpredictable consequences both internally in Pakistan and in the region Among other things Pakistan could seek compensating assistance from Libya or other oil-rich Arab countries on the grounds that the Muslim world needs a nuclear deterrent to Israel Given Pakistan's acute anxiety about potential Afghan subversion a withdrawal of U S support could lead Islamabad more actively to seek accommodation with the Soviet Union Our European allies as well as our friends in the region hope we will move toward a more supportive relationship with Pakistan in the context of the critical situation in the Persian Gulf The regional moderates in particular would be deeply disturbed by a withdrawal of American support for Pakistan and this concern would certainly be echoed by domestic observers of American policy -- including many in Congress Our position would be rendered more difficult by the fact that our knowledge of Pakistani activities is derived from extremely sensitive intelligence primarily of third-country origin which we presumably could not use publicly There could also be serious repercussions in India most immediately by undercutting our efforts to resolve the Indian safeguards question A cut off of aid would confirm publicly SECRi l' SENiITIVE SECRE 66N6ITIVi - 3 - GOI suspicions about Pakistan's nuclear intentions -- suspicions based on rather good Indian intelligence on the Pakistan enrichment program There would be growing domestic pressure in India for resumption of work on an explosives program perhaps leading to weaponization and development of delivery capability A nuclear arms race on the subcontinent could have a rofound effect on our overall non-proliferation policy IV Proposed Strategy We conclude that it is essential to move on a very urgent basis to bring pressure to bear on Pakistan to terminate its nuclear explosive pr gram including construction of sensitive facilities A Steps Already Taken We have already taken the following steps to counter Pakistan's nuclear ambitions We and the British have alerted 11 supplier countries to Pakistan's intentions and urged them to restrict exports of items related to reprocessing and enrichment We have alerted the IAEA on the need for very careful inspection of all safeguarded Pakistani nuclear facilities -- Ambassador Smith raised our concerns in a general way with his Soviet counterpart at IAEA in November -- Ambassador Hummel warned the Pakistanis when we resumed aid in October of the consequences of continued activity in the nuclear field We have reiterated this warning and have instructed Ambassador Hummel to put the GOP on notice that we are aware of their activity and that it will jeopardize our ability to assist Pakistan B Further Steps Proposed In our judgment U S leverage alone is not sufficient to deter the Pakistanis We had hoped to have time to rebuild our ties with Pakistan including significant sales of military equipment in order to increase the perceived cost of their proceeding on a nuclear course At the present juncture a cut-off of aid in fact risks enchancing Pakistan's sense of isolation and insecurity which are the primary motivating SECRG SBNSI lVB CRE4' SSNSI'FI¥S - 4 - factors prompting their search for a nuclear deterrent However we believe we must now move quickly to maximize the influence we can bring to bear by seeking the diplomatic support of others who have influence in Islamabad The timing and coordination of our efforts will be important ' 1 China The PRC is Pakistan's most influential friend We recommend a very strong approach to Teng Hsiao-Ping pointing out the danger that Pakistan's nuclear program will provoke Indian development of nuclear weapons and delivery capability We should also stress that continued U S ability to continue support for Pakistan depends on Pakistan's foregoing its nuclear weapons program 2 Saudi Arabia The Saudis also have very considerable leverage in Islamabad In the context of our shared concerns over regional stability we propose to clearly point out to the Saudis the disastrous consequences for US Pakistani relations if Pakistan pursues a nuclear weapons option and to urge the Saudis to press the Pakistanis 3 USSR We have raised the issue of Pakistan's nuclear intentions with the Soviet Union in the context of our common non-proliferation concerns In a meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin you may wish to suggest the desirability of a Russian demarche in Islamabad pointing to the destabilizing impact on the region of a nuclear-armed Pakistan We assume the Russians would have little sympathy for our Symington Amendment problem Given current Pakistani efforts to seek limited accommodation with Moscow a Russian demarche could have considerable impact • 0 4 India Up until now in our discussions with India on safeguards we have not linked that issue to the problem of Pakistan We now know that India is concerned about the Pakistani enrichment program Morarji Desai's principled stand against nuclear explosive testing will rapidly become untenable in domestic political terms if Pakistan approaches the nuclear threshold We suggest that a high level but low profile emmissary armed with a Presidential letter discuss the problem with Desai and suggest the need for Indo-Pak agreement in the form of a joint declaration on non-development and non-use of nuclear weapons -- a proposal made by the Pakistanis last year A joint declaration could provide Zia with some rationale permitting him to reverse his present course and terminate the enrichment and reprocessing programs 5 Other Suppliers we are developing a list of key identifiable components of the enrichment facility which we will circulate to other SBeRB'ftSENSIT Vg-- SECRET SBNSITIVS - 5 - suppliers and discuss with them the best means of controlling exports to Pakistan This effort could slow significantly Pakist n's enrichment program The degree to which we can effectively obstruct Pakistan's efforts to obtain equipment abroad will depend in large part on the extent to which we can share U S and third-country intelligence with these suppliers 6 Western Allies We should discuss quite frankly initially with the British and subsequently with the French and Germans our problem with the Symington Amendment its implications for our role in the reg on and the need for early action to turn the Pakistanis around We should recognize however that the French for example believe they have made a major contribution already by ceasing cooperation on the reprocessing plant and they look forward to re-couping some of their losses through increased military sales We doubt that these countries would be prepared to make a common front with U S by threatening to cut off economic assistance to Pakistan a number would argue that this would only isolate Pakistan and give further impetus to its weapons program However we should seek their political support in coordinated approaches to Pakistan 7 U S Ultimately if a waiver is contemplated we will need to confront the Pakistanis with the choice between providing reliable assurances that they will not continue with their nuclear explosives program or facing the consequences of a cut-off of aid probably including significant military supply we would like to delay this confrontation until some influence has been brought to bear from other quarters as suggested above We would recommend that President Zia be invited to Washington as soon as the dust has settled from the Bhutto case We would propose to discuss with Zia Pakistan's important role in the region and our desire to be supportive economically and with military sales at the same time making clear that the maintenance of constructive ties with the U S will require that Pakistan forego its nuclear explosives program Pakistan Reaction We are under no illusion that it will be easy to turn Pakistan around The GOP appears to be heavily committed to the nuclear explosive program presumably on the grounds that a nuclear deterrent to India would be cheaper and more effective than conventional forces We believe that a very small group of senior military and civilian policy makers are aware of and responsible for the current program Having observed international reaction to the Indian nuclear test in 1974 they may assume and be willing to risk a sharp short-lived international reaction in the expectation that they would benefit in the longer run by increased security vis-a-vis India and a much enhanced status in the Muslim world SKC i SiNSITlVi S£0RS'F SEHSI'FPIE - 6 - _on the othe hand Pakistani leaders have long been suscept1 le to outside pressures and are particularly sensitive to China and Saudi Arabia Moreover the current nuclear xplos ve program is entirely covert and thus not an emotional issue in domestic politics as was the French reprocessing plant This situation could change if elections are held next fall and a civilian government replaces the present regime At present President Zia is in charge but he must depend on the continuing support of his senior military commanders and could not alone make a decision on the nuclear program His position could be further weakened if he commutes Bhutto's sentence since the military leadership generally would like to see the Bhutto problem solved once and for all Thus we are unable to predict with any assurance that our proposed multi-pronged strategy will work but in view of the consequences we must make every effort to turn off Pakistan's nuclear explosive program v Congressional Aspects Before we resumed aid and military sales in October Mr Newsom Ambassador Hummel and Dr Nye consulted with Senator Glenn Congressman Zablocki and a handful of key Members and staffers with an interest in non-proliferation We told them that the French were not proceeding with the reprocessing plant contract but we quite frankly said that Pakistan is continuing to explore indigenous ways to acquire nuclear explosive capability Senator Glenn and his colleagues did not object to our proposal to resume normal relations with Pakistan and did not demur when Nye explained that we would try to deal with these other Pakistani efforts in the time gained by the French decision we believe Senator Glenn and other key members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Bouse International Relations committee e g Senators Church and Percy and Congressmen Zablocki Bingham and Findley will wish to be helpful if given a candid explanation of the situation the overall U S security interests in the region and the steps we intend to take to get Pakistan to stop its enrichment efforts we believe that key embers will concede that broader U S security interests in the region are not served by an across-the board cutoff now of AID and military relations with Pakistan but Glenn and others will not be willing to sacrifice non-proliferation goals to vaguer foreign policy objectives We will thus need to assure them that the priority we attach to our non-proliferation objectives with respect to Pakistan has not been diminished by the changed geo-political picture in the region SBCRET SBN ITIVB ECRET SENSI IVB - 7 - Members of Congress will not agree to go along with anything that appears to be ignoring the provisions of the law We suggest therefore that we explore with key members the possibility of a relatively minor change in the law which would provide us with somewhat greater flexibility or at least more time In seeking this type of change we would promise to 'provide Congress periodic reports on our efforts to change Pakistan policy It will be essential to present these legislative changes as designed to enhance our non-proliferation objectives and that we are proceeding energetically with a coherent strategy within a reasonable time frame to turn Pakistan around SB REi SENil4'1'1B - 6 - On the other hand Pakistani leader• have long been auaceptible to outside preaaurea and are particularly aenaitive to China and Saudi Arabia Moreover the current nuclear explosive prograa ia entirely covert and thua not an eaotional iaaue in d ••• ic p lltica •• vaa the Prench reprocessing Plant Th1a _a1tuat1on could change if elections are held nezt fall and• c1vilian governaent replaces the present r i•e At preaent_Preside11t Zia is in charge but he aust depend on tbe continuing support of hi• aenior ailitary co-anders and could not alone aake a decision on the nuclear progru Bis position could be further veakened if he co-utes Bhutto's sentence aince the • ilitary lead rahip generally vould like to see the Bhutto problem solved once and for all Thus we are unable to predict with any as surance th•t our proposed aulti-pronged strategy will work bu t in v iew o f the consequences we • ust aake every effort t o t urn of f P•ki stan' s nuc lear explosive program V Congressional Aspects Before ve reau• ed aid and ail1t •ry • • l • • in Oc t ot r Mr N•v s oa Arlbas sador Humme l and Or My• cons t•J with Senator Glenn Co ngre • •••n Zablocki and• handful t t•y Neabera a nd ataf f •r• v 1th an int•r••t in non-p r ol f • ration We t old the• t hat t h• French •r • not pr oc••J1 n9 vi th th• r•rroc•••1ng plant contract but v• quit • frankly aa d t h t ia cont1nu i n9 t o •xp l o r • t di 9•nou• way a t o a u r• nu l••r • • ploa ve c apabili t y s n•t o r Cl •nn and hi e co ll• •9ue a d l J no t obl• t to ou r p r oposa l t o r • • um no r a al r•latt on• wit h Pal1at a n a nd d d not d•aur wh•n Ny• e 1pl a1 n•d t h a t w• v uld t ry d•al _ th th••• other Pakiatani effo rt • in th• tlN 9 a1n•J b y t h• r r•n h d•cla 1on ••- ••t•n ••Y W• b l t v S•n• t r Cl•nn anJ oth•r • •brra of the Senat• r o r•i g n R• latl ona Coaa att•• af d lou•• ln t ern t t onal R• l ationa Coaai tt t• -9·• s n•t r• t Jr h a nd P•rcy and Congr•saa n labl ocki Bi nghaa •nd P lndl•y v lll v 1ah to tM hel p ful lf giv•n a c andid ••pl ana ta on f t h• a 1tua tion th• ov•r al l U S ••curi t y inter a t s i n t h• r • on and t h• it• • v• intend to t a ke to get P•ki at a n t a tor i t a en r a b nt • f forta we l 1e v t ha t ke ••• r • v1 ll conced• t hat broader U S ••cur i t int •r•s s in th r• t n a • not s•rved by an acro•a-th• board cutoff nov of AID nJ a1l1tary rel ations v th Pakist an b ut Gl n and ot h•rs v 1ll net bf v1ll1nq to a r1f1c• non-proltfer a ti o n goa l s t o vagu•r for•19n policy obJectavea Ne wall thus ne d t o a ssur• t hea th t the priority v e at ach t o our non-pr o lif•r a t1 on obJect1ves wath rea c t t o Pat at• h•• not be•n d i ain i abe-d by the chan e-d qeo-pol1 t ical p ctur• an the region - Jl etlbera of Con9r••• w11J not atr•• to 90 alont watb aayt lfHJ tb•l eppea e to be t9norift9 th• prov 1tona of th• Jev •• •vti••t that we e • plore wath key • •r• t • O• ltb1l1tr of a 1•lat1veli •1nor ch•ncJ• an tbe 1 - v ach would pr09tde va w1tb aoeewbat fle11t1J1ty or •t l•••t aor• t IM tr a e n lft1a ty of 1 r •111J• w• _ Jd prc ea•• to 'provld• Con r••• per1od1r report• on o •ftort• to ch•ll9• t a •n J lc t It w Jl o •••enta•l t p••••nt t n••• lat1ve de119ned to enhure o non-prollferat oft Ob e t w•• end tbat we are proe••d1n9 •n•r9•11c•lly wlth • coberent •tr•t i vlthln a ••••onaDl• tt•• to t urn ••••- • •••f f• ••••t•r rh• •• •• •tan aro aftd J• ••· c· •1A 1 u1n 1•11••••••• cclr L lha r u•r · · - aJOJtJ 01 ltl't IWI • '• Veac 1 f •Na Norton ACDA - Nr Van Doreft T • Nr allllD t M • lhallpftrlea a OIi - •s Noaeft O L • 11 Nte •l I Al • Nr i ' ••U•r ' -d•r•o LVPAOI I - IFleten a0I •1112 D tdW JctOfJ 2ffl uv1t __ - TAB ii QRS'f 'SENSI'PIVE Legal Analysis Sections 669 and 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended known as the Symington and Glenn Amendments respectively prohibit the furnishing of certain economic or military assistance to a country which after Aug st 4 1977 delivers to or receives from another country enrichment or reprocessing •equipment materials or technology • Section 669 concerning enrichment provides that the President may waive·the aid cut-off 1 if he certifies to the Congress that such action would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests and 2 that he has received reliable assurances that the country in question will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations in doing so Section 670 concerning reprocessing is not currently at issue given a lack of adequate evidence that reprocessing equipment material or technology has been transferred or received by Pakistan since August 4 1977 In applying Section 669 Tab 2 to the current situation in Pakistan there are two considerations whether the transfer or receipt has taken place after August 4 1977 and whether the nature of the equipment materials or technology transferred or received falls under the definition of the amendment With regard to the timing issue available information suggests that a significant quantity of items for the Pakistani enrichment plant has been exported to and received by Pakistan since August 4 1977 from a variety of Western European suppliers An intelligence estimate of which items have been sent or received after that date is attached at Tab 3 However the presently available information on the timing of all the transfers is not complete With regard to the nature of the equipment transferred we will have to make a judgment whether it is •nuclear enrichment equipment• within the meaning of Section 669 There is no precise definition of the phrase in the Symington amendment Accordingly in making such a judgment we we will have to look to standards that are internationally accepted as well as to any applicable guidance in other United States law SECRET SENSITPJE l 5-i CRST SiNSITI ti - 2 - The Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines define enrichment euipment as equipment •especially designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes of uranium• which is further clarified to include •each · of the major items of equipment especially designed or prepared for the separ a tion process n including gas centrifuge assemblies corrosion-resistant to UF6 A separate section of the guidelines defines as a •major critical component• a sensitive part of an enrichment facility as •gas centrifuge assemblies corrosion-resistant to UF-6• and further specifies that for facilities for which no major critical component is described the transfer nin the aggregate of a significant fraction of the items essential to the construction and operation of the facility • should be deemed a transfer of the facility Under the Non-Proliferation Act nuclear •equipment• incl4des both facilities and components that are licensed by the NRC in view of their significance for explosive purposes We understand that some of the particular items transferred to or received by Pakistan would be subject to licensing by Commerce rather than the NRC but may be subject to special interagency review procedures because of their potential non-proliferation significance Further some of these items are classified and could not be legally exported from the United States Current indications concerning both the timing of the transfers and the nature of the equipment transferred suggest that a serious question is raised under the Symington Amendment In this regard Section 669 was initially designed to prevent international transfers of essentially completed facilities the FRG-Brazil French-Pakistan deals were clearly in mind and did not seek to prevent indigenous development of these types of facilities The definitions which have been followed in implementing the law have been geared to the limited range of equipment and components which are subject to the export controls under the Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines and the later enacted United States Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act Pakistan appears to have imported items which are not necessarily within these guidelines It could be argued therefore that the plant or at least its post-August 1977 component is basically indigenous and thus beyond the ambit of this law Such SECRE'f SiNSUl'I tE- · CRE4' £SEHSI'fIVB - 3 - an interpretation however seems narrower than either th e ter s or the purpose of the Statute Even if none of the imported items is itself•nuclear enrichment equip ent it is clear nevertheless that the items are being imported for use in combination in the same facility and in a way that is only consistent with the construction of gas centrifuge for enrichment Most if not all of the critical items in the plant have been or are being imported to Pakistan It is because of these circumstances that there is a serious question regarding Section 669 If after further study of the evidence and perhaps the receipt of additional evidence it is decided that the Symington Amendment is applicable because of Pakistan's imports since August 1977 you could recommend a waiver to the President In order to waive termination 'the President would have to determine that 1 the termination of such assistance would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests and 2 he has received reliable assurances that the country in question will not acquire or de velop nuclear weapons or assist other nations in doing so • Obviously reaching this determination and obtaining these assurances would take some time However we could not delay application of the termination requirement in Section 669 beyond the minimum time necessary to arrange for a waiver iBCRiT iENSI IV · TAB 2 See 689 ' N iclear Enrichment Tranlfera _ a Ezcep u FOTl ed m 1Ubeection b no funds authorized to be appropnated by th11 Act or the Arms Export Control Act may be used for the purpose of p vi economic aas iBtanet providing military or 1ea1rity mpport assist an or gn nt military education and training or utendmg m 1tary crediu or making guarantees to any oount17 which on or after the date of enactment of the International Secunty Assistanee Act of 1977 deli era nuclear enrichment equipment materials or technology to other country or hJOeins such equipment materials or eclmology from ny other country unltss before such delivery the supplying country and reoei-ring country have reached agreement to place all such equipment materials or technology upon delivery under multilateral auspioes and man t wlien available and • 2 the ncipient C'lOUDt 'Y has entered into an e n t with the lDternational Atomic Energy Agency to place all such equipment materials technology •nd all huclear fuel and facilities m such country under the safeguards stem of such Agency b l Notwithstanding sub9ection a of this 11eetion the President may furnish LSSi st ance which wo d otherwise be prohibited 11nder 1Uch iubeection if he determines and certifies in writing to the Speahr of th House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Re lation s of thi Stmau that A the termination of wch usistanoe would han a aerious advene effect on Tit 1 UnitM States interests and B be has received reliable amurances that the eountry in queshon 1rill not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or UBist other nations in doing so Such otrti fication lhall et forth the reuons apport ing 1ach determination in each particular cue 2 kly joint re90lution which would terminate or restrict usistance described in 1Ub9ection a with respect to a country to which the prohibition in BUch subsection appliM shall if in roduced within thirty cla1s after the transmittal of a certification under 1 • ph 1 of th1S subsection with respect to web country be considered m the Senate in accordanot with the provisions of etetion 601 b of the International Security Awistanoe and Arms kport O ntrol A et of 1976 - TAB ECRET SEN ITI' S INTELLIGENCE RELEVANT TO THE TIMING OF PAKISTANI IMPORTS OP ITEMS FOR USE IN THEIR GAS CENTRIFUGE PROGRAM ' 1 Items reportedly sent or received after August 1977 200 stator bellows in transit as of l 19 79 40 stator bellows October 1978 100 m aluminium tubes probably to be used as rotors Nov 1978 Also membra e$ helium leak detector nylon bars elbows negatives for centrifugal bearing etching 2 Items which may have been aent after August 1977 centrifuge rotor drives reportedly •are'supplied• by a Swiss company connector bellows •have been imported from• a number of supplier countries 32 inverters supplied by UK sometime after 1976 Pakistani order FRG firm reportedly •is supplier• of inverters vacuum valves and K90 computers 3 A number of other items used in gas centrifuge assemblies were ordered with unknown delivery dates Pakistan reportedly has stocks of the following items all of which were received from foreign suppliers at some unknown time 809 stator assemblies -- 2 000 bearing cups 4 016 bearing shafts 8 262 stator bellows 308 top baffles 4 An eight machine cascade is reportedly operating1 a 64 machine cascade is planned for June 1979 and a 1 000 machine cascade for sometime in 1980 January 1979 SBCRB SBNSITI'JJB ACTION EMORANDUM S S Si CRET 'StNSITIVB January 18 1979 MEMORANDUM TO The Secretary THROUGH p T Under Secretary Newsom Under Secretary Benson FROM NEA OES Harold H Saunders Thomas R Pickering SUBJECT Pakistan's Nuclear Program Policy and Legal Implications for the United States You recently asked us to reexamine the status of Pakistan's nuclear programs and the policy implications for US Pakistan relations We have also reviewed steps already taken · to deflect the Pakistanis from efforts to acquire nuclear explosive capability Pakistan is moving rapidly and secretly toward the construction of facilities which will give it nuclear explosive capability perhaps within two to four years Some of the equipment necessary to these efforts has been obtained from abroad or is on order Current indications suggests that a serious question is raised under the Symington Amendment which prohibits furnishing aid to a country that receives nuclear enrichment equipment after August 1977 We all agree that our objective is to persuade Pakistan to terminate its enrichment and reprocessing program All also agree that termination of aid under the Symington Amendment would further complicate our position in_the turbule t Persian Gulf region and would not contribute to achievement of our non - proliferation objectives The actions recommended in the memorandum will take time to implement ECRET 6ENSITIVE RDS-4 1 18 99 8-BCR T SENSITIVB 2 We propose to explain the problem and our plan of action to key members of the relevant Senate and House co ittees in the context of seeking legislative changes which would assist us in carrying out our non-proliferation objectives In parallel with the above we would -also propose to do the following - on an urgent basis -- Continue direct U S approaches to the Pakistanis including an invitation to President Zia when the dust has settled on the Bhutto case to visit Washington with a view to using that visit for a direct Presidential demarche on the nuclear problem Use the Dung-Xiaoping visit to try to enlist China's help in turning off Pakistan's nuclear program -- Approach the Saudi Government to weigh in with Pakistan Suggest to Ambassador Dobrynin the desireability of a Russian demarche in Islamabad The delivery of a Presidential letter to Desai suggesting an Inda Pakistani agreement in the form of a joint declaration of non-development and non-nuclear weapons - Development and circulation to other nuclear suppliers a list of key components with a view to obtaining cooperation of these suppliers to prevent export of such components to Pakistan Attached is a paper that covers this subject in more detail We apologize for its length Recommendation That you approve the above action plan Approve Disapprove Sl iGR-iT S ·NS I i PIE SECRBT SEN6ITIVE 2 We propose to explain the problem and our plan of action to key members of the relevant Senate and House co ittees in the context of seeking legislative changes_ which would assist us in carrying out our non-proliferation objectives In parallel with the above we would -also propose to do the following-on an urgent basis -- Continue direct U S approaches to the Pakistanis including an invitation to President Zia when the dust has settled on the Bhutto case to visit Washington with a view to using that visit for a direct Presidential demarche on the nuclear problem I Use the Dung-Xiaoping visit to try to enlist China's help in turni g off Pakistan's nuclear program -- Approach the Saudi Government to weigh in with Pakistan Suggest to Ambassador Dobrynin the pesireability of a Russian demarche in Islamabad The delivery of a Presidential letter to Desai suggesting an Indo Pakistani agreement in the form of a joint declaration of non-development and non-nuclear weapons -- Development and circulation to other nuclear suppliers a list of key components with a view to obtaining cooperation of these suppliers to prevent export of such components to Pakistan Attached is a paper that covers this subject in more detail We apologize for its length Recommendation That you approve the above action plan Approve Disapprove Sl3CRET 8ENSITIVE 3 Clearances L - H - OES S AS INR PM ACDA - - - Mr Mr Mr Mr Mr Mr Mr Bettauer Flaten'$ Nosenzo Kelley A Gallucci Humphreys Van Doren OES LHBrown NEA JCoon mc 1 18 79 SiCRiT 8 N8ITIYB