DECLA_SSIFIE� a' _ Authority o V IJ DEPARTMENT OF STATE AMBASSADOR AT LARGE WASHINGTON �NDUM CV� 'ro From Subject S P - Mr Kreisberg t March 14 S AS - Gerard Smith � Pakistan - Comments on S P P er • The S P paper seems to me not com tehensive � �•6 • c I enough For example � - · 0 P '1 l N -- It does not consider a do thinq extreme • A position under which we would wait to e s if the � _ - ------ Indians or some other country wou d ask us to do o s mething I -- � action 1 11 �· t does not consider thr �ossibilityof UN vu --� A� � �- • � $ � __ • -- It does not consider e possibility of a longterm public information prog to put heat on the �l Paks not to be mavericks - _ � � -- It only glancingly ouches on how hich �----' _ �he Indians and the Paks ould sign woul�e the gent that we agree on a roblern making it more TB without loopholes ¼ -- It does not cons der the possibility of some sort of nuclear guaran to relieve the pressure on Pakistan to go o f r nu ear weapons question of security guarantees Perhaps under the NPT shoul be reviewed If the Paks joined NPT would the nucl ar powers be willing to earmark some I have spelled o tin the annex to this memo some reasons why thr wing the glare of world attention on the Pakista i covert program possibly through a Security Co cil meeting should be considered GDS � · I -------------------- r I units - -- - threats to Pakistan will be hard over the long run to keep Germany an •• _ Japan away frqm PPG ear weapons ta 5ay nothing of o Libya When that day comes the case for an earmarked anti-Libyan deterrent force will be strong Maybe we should bite the bullet now and start thinking in that direction Perhaps such a device could be made more general and any non-nuclear party to the NPT could be the beneficiary of such a commitment For example if we and the Soviets and the British earmark one submarine for NPT guarantee purposes it would not affect the strategic balance with the Soviets at all The paper hardly touches on the relationship of the Israeli problem If a major concern here is that what starts as a Pakistan bomb would end Moslem bomb should we not be considerin free zone Sout Asia If there is to be peace in the Middle East it's just possible that the Israelis could do without the nuclear weapons potential which they presently have and which is apparently exercising pressure on the Moslems to imitate We should also examine whether we should tell the Paks that if they develop nuclear weapons they are just too hot a nation for us to be associated with You will recall that at one time the French were thinking about their weapons program as a trigger capable of forcing the United States to use nuclear weapons in the event of Soviet invasion of Western Europe -- even if we didn't want to do that I would like to see some discussion on whether American policy should not be - Let the Chinese and the Soviets handle this on the basis that it's their part of the world and their security which is most directly involved The case for doing nothing has historical roots Think back to the absence of international action in 1949 when the Soviets developed a nuclear weapon to the Fifties when the British and French went into the S CRE'f -· ---· ··• - ---- - ' if _ · _- i iJ' _ Zr I I I I 11 1'10 r - - --- --- •• -· · - 3 - nuclear weapons business to the Sixties when Israel and China followed suit and to the Seventies when India exploded a nuclear device If none of those cases led to sharp American reactions what is the case for action now If the Indians are acquies-1 cent in a nuclear wea on · in South Asia why _ rw• s e n s i t i · ve If our fear is of a Moslem bomb isn't that something that the Israelis should be taking the lead on cj On a more brutal plane should we not be sider ing the possibility likelihoo d of some other country sabotaging or destroying the Pakistani plants We might also consider convening an international planning group to develop possible courses of action There are precedents for this e g the exercises during the Berlin crises of 1958-1961 in which experts met to develop options to counter expected Soviet moves Live oak You asked whether the IAEA ought to be involved If the Paks proceed to develop a weapon capability claiming that they are pursuing a peaceful program it will have large implications for the acceptability of nuclear power around the world The IAEa having responsibility for the promotion of nuclear power under safeguards should have a direct ' terest in Pak develo ments the first instance Director General Eklund s ould be advised in eneral terms o a 1s ani eve opments and consu te as o what if any role IAEA could play -- e g if tfie matter were raised in the Board of Governors would that lead to Pakistan leaving the agency · Keep in mind that next December the IAEA General Conference is to be held in New Delhi DECLA SSIFIE f Authority o C' - 4 - Finally I would stress the desirability o f - - - early cgpsultation wjth the USSR Morozov who we work with described our nonproliferation interests last month as identical Attachment Annex Copy to n p T PM NEA L OES INR - Mrs Lucy Benson Mr O'Donohue Mr Miklos Ms Coon Mr Lande Mr Michel Ambassador Pickering Mr Gallucci I DECLASSIFIED Authority___J o C f L UN Security Council Option It was Justice Brandeis who said Sunlight is the best disinfectant For the several reasons below we should consider the option of throwing the full glare of world attention on the Pakistani covert nuclear weapons program possibly through a special meeting of the UN Security Council or some other world forum 1 The 3 options now on the able - anctions utual Pak-Indian renunciation oJd'a US-Pak security arrangement -- do not a ear either feasible or likely to s 1 i cceed 2 The Pak action puts at risk the peace and security of South Asia and the world Mobilizing the opinion of governments and publics against their action as was done in August 1977 to South Africa may be the best and perhaps only way to stop them 3 Even if exposure alone does not work it may galvanize those involved into the effort that will produce a solution The underlying problem is an extremely complex mix of power rivalry deep and realistic feelings of insecurity as well as other factors We will need time and thought to treat these And we may need to first demonstrate the problem and convince concerned governments and opinion that there are grave dangers before we can get them to take new steps toward a solution The solution as in many things may not be available or knowable at the outset But to let the Pakistanis go forward without exposure will only make the eventual answer more difficult 4 There is no way Pakistan can defend its action under a peaceful use of nuclear energy rationale The U S is usually in a minority arguing against transfer of sensitive technology particularly where the technology fits plausibly in a civil nuclear power program In the Pakistan case we would be able to turn the tables on the Group of 77 and others who demand the fullest flow of technology and profess to see no risk A year before the NPT Review Conference where we are likely to suffer severe attack for frustrating technology exchange rights under Article IV of the NPT we could establish the merit of our position in an indisputable way I I I 71 I 1