'l ACTION SCA-00 E3 UMCUSS HEO DEAE-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 EB-00 OIG0-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 PERC -00 DS-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 I0-00 NEA-00 NSAE-00 ISN-00 PM-00 GIWI-00 P-00 SCT-00 ISNE-00 DOHS-00 SS0-00 SS-00 ASDS-00 EPAE-00 SCRS-00 PMB-00 PRM-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 OOOW ------------------95BAA1 210641Z 38 P 210630Z FEB 06 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL ·DENIED IN FULb TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8423 Bl l 4 D BSINFO AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY OSD WASHDC PRIORITY INFO LOG-00 DOTE-00 H-00 NIMA-00 FMPC-00 DSCC-00 SECRET KABUL 000746 E O 12958 DECL 02 22 2016 TAGS PREL MOPS PTER SNAR AF PK SUBJECT POLICY ON TRACK BUT VIOLENCE WILL RISE REF KABUL 611 Classified By Ambassador Ronald E Neumann for reasons 1 4 b and d 1 t SUMMARY I believe violence will rise through the next several months It will likely be directed at ISAF as well as the Coalition in addition to more traditional targets such as pro-government officials and religious figures in the Provinces We should anticipate more suicide bombs in Kabul and other major cities As the troop density of NATO in the south increases and we conduct aggressive operations the total number of incidents will also rise We need to understand it analytically in a regional context The violence does not indicate a failing policy on the contrary we need to persevere in what we are doing We will however need to anticipate and plan for increased media scrutiny and possibly increased concern from Europe its Parliaments and certainly its media END SUMMARY WHY THE VIOLENCE WILL RISE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY JOHNS BLODGETT DATE CASE ID 07 SEP 2007 200700599 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY APPEALS REVIEW PANEL APPEAL ACTION ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED REASON S Bl 1 4 D DATE CASE ID 09 JUN 2010 200700599 NClASSIFIED 2 Several threads are coming together is ex anding its mandate NATO ISAF UNCllSS HEU Bl Targeting of ISAF has already increased with resulting casualties among the Germans Poles and Swedes and it seems likely that the enemy will do its utmost to make the ISAF deployment politically costly The increased use of IED's and suicide bombs is as much perhaps even more the result of the failure of the Taliban's large unit force-on-force engagement tactics in the first part of 2005 as it is a sign of an increased threat But the Taliban now seems to understand the propaganda value of the bQmb and will use it to maximum advantage 3 Additionally - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ the Afghan government is much more focused on narcotics eradication Bl this will pus t em into areas o nig er Helmand province Embassy and CFC-A are maximum energy and attention on ensuring government gets the security fundamentals for these operations right but incident levels will nonetheless rise That said the same strategic pressures will be on the Taliban if it cannot resist in the high-threat areas it will lose some credibility and hence the Taliban may be forced to fight where i t might otherwise prefer to dodge Thus both sides may find that the narcotics and the strategic military imperatives intersect THE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGE 4 t Afghanistan's notable success in the development of the elected government is apparent Economic progress is beginning It is very clear that the task now is to build governance in the provinces where Kabul's reach is still very limited If this process works well over the next few years the government will be s1gnificantly stronger But the Taliban need not be intellectual giants to understand that their long-_term strategy depends on keeping the government weak in the provinces The key will be to UNCUSSIFIEO continue aggressively our work with the GOA to extend and deepen its reach nationwide and to counteract any Taliban strategy aimed at waiting us out while preventing NGO access to the countryside This challenge will probably increase as the Taliban seeks to get ahead of our progress in deploying Afghan army and police in order to disrupt our programmatic and development schedules The Taliban will also look to contest GOA progress on disarmament and rural police deployments by increasing provincial violence We anticipate and are considering with the GOA how best to balance calls for army and police deployments with the need to ensure that the forces sent are fullymanned equipped and trained THE REGIONAL CONTEXT 5 We tend to think in terms of Afghanistan and Pakistan Bl In the wake of President Karzai's recent visit to Islamabad there is a growing potential for working with both governments within this construct We do not see intelligence indicating vast popular support for the Taliban or a large recruiting increase Therefore I believe that what we are seeing is largely the result of four years that the Taliban has had to reorganize and think about their approach in a sanctuary beyond the reach of either Government This will lead to the increasing violence this summer it will lead to a long-term continuation of the insurgency as long as they can resupply from their current areas and if left unaddressed it will also lead to the re-emergence of the same strategic threat to the United States that prompted our OEF intervention over 4 years ago 6 There is more pressure - and intent - from Pakistan against the Taliban and the Tripartite process is successfully building operational and strategic links between the Pakistan Afghan and USled Coalition militaries But there are concerns about Pakistani capabiliti sj action to date Bl UNClASSlfIED c--- -- - - - - ' Bl UIICUSSlflfO Better governance on the Afghan side of-£ e or er will steadily decrease the Taliban threat but achieving a cohesive government at the level required is a long term project We will continue to do our utmost to show every-day Afghans tangible progress in their provinces to reinforce growing GOA authority POLICY CONTINUITY 7 -Si' Rising v iolence will spark some calls for policy evaluation That is normal There will certainly and always be something that can be adjusted at the margin But we are on the right track The combination of economic rehabilitation narcotics confrontation alternative livelihoods development and provincial governance support are all the correct policies More money could drive reconstruction faster but the international community not just the US needs to do more The lack of roads and energy will continue to delay our efforts and these are slow to build even when resources are available Security and infrastructure development increasingly are two sides of the same coin here We are building a better army and that takes time We are reforming the police but the comprehensive reform program was only approved and resourced six months ago The Afghan National Security Forces will get there but not this year 8• - We are expanding PRTs I Bl __ r-'fhe PRTs will make an important difference but not one that will stem this year's violence 1 -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 9 l w To avoid appearing to be playing catch-up to the violence we must craft and quickly deploy for Afghans as well for the international audience a strategic overview that accommodates expanded violence with progress the GOA is making in creating a stable and viable state and lays out a vision for what lies beyond We should consider Bl working directly with NATO on this There are plenty of positives to draw on from the Parliament to the rondon N EUMANN NNNN C° 'a_c_t_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - UNCUSSlflfD Bl