o 12 lt r ll 200 Jtabu l 35jfJ SltAP COP� 1 OP t Page 1 SECRET KA BU� 03S94 01 OP 02 or 3 PTPSU 0916562 �IHFO SRAPIOll SSOX Oll SSXIOl SXIOll •••••••••••••••••••• 091239L NOV 09 GPM TOTAL COPI£S OO �COMMENT EYES ONLY for PRINCIPAL EYES ONLY for PRINCIPAt �IHFO SWOIOOI •••••••••••••••••••• 091 02Z NOV ot STePS TOTAL COPIES 000 AC'TtON OOl S·OO JNFO LOO·OO CCO ·OO SAS•OO OOOW ·DSSJSC 0 091638Z NOV o f H A lEMBASSY KABUJ TO S£CS'l'ATE ffASKDC rKMEOIAT£ 2990 S £C R 2 T SECTION 01 OP 02 AABUL 003S94 NOOIS ARies • • • • • - • • - •• • • • • • 09170SZ 38 e o 12958 0£ L ll 10 2039 TAGS POOV AF SUBJ £C1'1 LOOKING BEYONO C'OUm'llRINSVRGENCY IN AFCAANISTAN REF RABUL 3S12 SECTtON 01 OF 02 Kebul 3594 - Claasified By Alrlbasaador Karl w Eikenberry Reason 1 4 � and d Madame Secretary Ky previous cabl� addree1ed eoneerne about taking a decision too 00n on a propoa ed counterinsurgency strategy that reliee troope I now o n a large all�or-nothi f increaoe in U S pi opoae that the Whito Houeo connieoion a deliberate proceea to lay out the range of etrategic option• on AfghJnietan and Paki1tan broade ni� the ami lyaia �yond �ilitary counterinsurgency doctrine There are three puxpoHB tor doing ■o Firet to make aure that we have teated evory aaeuq tion behind the Afghan•focuoed military counterinourgency proposal Second to exa�ine non-�ilitary alternatives or c�anion requirefflente to a major troop ln creace Thirdt to develop U S political understanding and 1upport1 u we l •• Afghan and allied � Uc coml itment • After auch a proeeaa the atanding COMISA P prop ••l may prove exactly what tbe Preeident will decide ia needed but the tiN and effort put into thie further deliberation will yield benefito fa r offee tti r v the coete in•� judgment l •�rt CONISAfe ailitary anal eia and r•cocrmendatione a■ logical and compelling within h ra narrow mi ndatc to define the ne-ed8 for a•ilitary c®nt•rinourgency campaign within Afghaniat•n· But tbe probleN confron�ing our own •t rategic pw poaea ae laid out by the Preaident on March 27 are bro■d•r and we eN et con■ider • wider set ot variables before re•ching a final decision Th••e un addreaoed vari ablec includ� P�k1Qtan tanetu�ri•o weak Afghan lead•rehip and �vernancc N�T civil·crdlit6ry inte gracion and our national - ill to bea r the hum an and fi■c•l coete over raAny yeara Tho current military propoeal properly eet• ••ide each of these ieeuea and many 11110re bec auee th•r are outeide COHlSAFa eouneerlnaurge ncy 1111 ndate Yet in rea i�y each h aa the Potential to bloc��• from achieving our strategic goats r�•rdlc•• of the n�r of f¢f J lrq llj ·�- i - Hov o 12 1 11 200 IXobul 1st• SIIAP COPY 1 or• •av- 1 or 1 • •ddi tional troopo e 111ay 1end � �-����-�� ' � SOIIIO argue that we must decide on the full• IP troop sr iJf➔St t deploynent now The military a long lead tintee the requiremctnt to bring along our NATO allies a nd the need to •• compelling aignal deci•ivene•• and r 1olve are adduced re•1 m1 to announce the full troop reque1t quickly I disagree we have th• titne we need•eortainly into early next year Ho must take that ti111e to decide on the right course As eeriouo ae the occurity picture in Afghanistan is today it 11 not 10 dire that �e need to announce or commit oureelve• to eweeping ehangea i1DCM di1cely either in our �ilitary or civilian poetu re For e xaa ple addition al combat brigade• could be de1l9nated tor po11ible deplo 'fflent and begin training without requiring an ilh'llediate deciaion on whethe r to send thf fll all Th•�• would b e arriving in incremento in any caee To ehov resolve the Preeid ent cO lld announce that hew•• irwried iately ordering• omaller contingent ot U S fore•• to monto r AHSF and to protect tbe population while emphasizing that turther de plo yments would b e conditioned on epccitic etepe by the A ghAn government 1uch ae a commitnaent and a plan to take full reaponaibilit r tor national def en ee on a •�eific timelinc Afghan• all ee ar d othere in the re gio n vould eee thie not a a indecieion but rather a 1eriouanes■ of purpoae Why He Must Take the Ti111e we hav e not yet cor'ldueted a compreh�noive interdiaciplinary analyoio of all ou r otrate gic option Nor tt v e we brought all the real-world variable to bear in testing the propoeed count erinaurgeney plan Me �rtt th it cnore troopa will yield '°re 1eeurity wherever they deploy for •• long ae they etay But the laat ti ve lent eubetantial additional fore••-• deplo�nt totalin9 J3 000 in 2ooe-200 •overall violence and inatability in Afgttanietan intenaitied Aleo neither ANSF nor the Afghan government hae ditm natrated the will or ability to take over lead a eeurity responaibility•lf Uch leee governance•-in any area cleared and held by NATO·tSAP £xp eri•nce with troop increaae■ tMroforei offer• 1cant reaaon to expect that further incre4eea wi 1 p e rmanently advanc• our atr�tegic puzpoeH instead they will dig ua in more deeply We alto ne ed tirae to vork with Preaident JCar2ai and hla new teaa many of whocn eay not be in place for ••v ral monthe to teat whether they are both able and COl llO'litted t o lead the COW'lterinaur�ncy m isaio n we are d efining to r the� In fact K rzoi explicitly rejected the eounterin1urgency8 baoia SSCRBT SECTION 02 OP 02 Kabul 3594 and purpoae of the COMISAF propoaal when fir•t briefed on it in detall tvo r nontha 69'9• and he haa not C ll'lbraced it eince then Rather in a PBS interview on Novellber 7 Kan at aounded bizarrely cautionary notes about bia willingneea to addreaa governance and corruptio n Thi• track with hie record of inaction or g�ing compliance in thia area We ne-e d an intenae hig-h•levcl dialogue to 1udge vhcther we can gain enforceable COftl'Uta enta tr0111 the A ghan government co build their olffl capacity And to as� - reap0naibility for aecu rity and governanc e in clear ed • reae Absent aue h a iuclgnwnt cannot pre8'WH that another large infueion of O s troops n eceasarlly will give ua leverage over thet 1 Recomnr endation N' r � ti i - 3t1lJ 2009 UtU 11 35tt BRAP COPY l OP 4 P 9 • J OP 3 �� t � �� �� i � ��� - - �• · JJ il�ence we re-eoromend compre eneive delibcu·•te nd -� 'ffiil'� l-ti interdiaciplinary rt•oxaraination of O lr atrategic optiono c �' carried out by tht- end of the yell' to decide ho'W beot to �tl�t� aceorr pli•h the Preoide nt a Harch 21 at t atcgy Thie ahould go bciiyoncl a wt r gamo8 or red team e yet not be co e a 'IOt tha-long 8a ker•K milton•etyle coiPaai 1•ion for Afghanistan And Pakistan Rather the White Kou ae could appoint• panel ot c ivilian a nd IUlHary expert• to eum fne the Af9hani1tan•Pakiotan ocrategy and the full range of optiona It could include e�ine nt bipartiaan political figunc GUCh •• toimer ■enior U S government and congreaaional leadero Azrnong the 1asuee thia panel ahould e Mllline are -· the _potential tbat reintegration reconciliation program Mis for takif i inaur gcnts off the bt ttle field Cthe only appxoach hold�ng •ttr•ction for Kuaai and the JDAaa ot Afghane ··the p roa c t• for the Pakistani aecurit y aervieeo putting - eaningtul pressure against the Afghan Taliban the insurgent aanctu ariea and leaderohip and al Qaeda the in pact of increaaing u s and incernattonol aid ind developroent programs on lon g•term stability in Afghanistan and Pakiatan -•the 1e00nd- and third-o 'der effects witbin Afghanistan and the region ot •�nding �re U S troop1 ••the o s and allieo williJ' '9'n••• to bear the coots in live• and treasure over the tlr elinea in the SAP propooal -•and whether our definition of the atr�tegie problecn in purely •ilitary terme of countarinaurgancy within Afgheniotan l• 1ufficient t o addre a the Preaident a etrategic focua on al Qaeda with both Afghani•tan and Pak i■tan Thie etrategic ro•eumination could either include or ltad to high-lev•l 0 S talka Yith the Af�au the Pakiatanlo the Saud is and other i�rtant r�ional playere including poatibly Iran ••well •• NATO ita eomponont nationo and evan the U'nited Nation Such a proc••• of rigorouo internal U S 90vern11ent deliberation• leading to deeper politlcal-iailitary conaultationo with all1e• and other etakeholden e iuld powerfully build aup�rt It bonte and abroa d for the Pteaident a eventual dieci•ion a about the w•y forvard The Ri•ka 4 - COH SAF h•• laid out the riak w face in not sending the full corq lement of additional troop• right now But there ar• c ompetin g riaka •tor exa111Jle that w e will become more deeply enga9'd ere vich n o way to extricate our•clvee ahort of allowing the country to de cend again into lawle11nea1 and chaos Ill so the demand for U S i nd allied civili•n efforts in Atghanietan will only 9rov witb the CH'ployir ent of l3rge nwabera of additio nal U S troopa To mitigate aucb countervailing ri•�•• I believe there 1• no option b lt to widen the it 00P4 ot our analyai• to eonaider alt•rn t tivea �� a •trictty 'Ulitary ¢0u nt•rincurgency effort within�Atgtlaniacan rtfully BIICB IB£RRY SECRET ✓