Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction SIGAR Testimony Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs U S House of Representatives U S Lessons Learned in Afghanistan Statement of John F Sopko Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction January 15 2020 Chairman Engel Ranking Member McCaul Members of the Committee It is a pleasure and an honor to testify before you today This is the 22nd time I have presented testimony to Congress since I was appointed the Special Inspector General nearly eight years ago SIGAR was created by the Congress in 2008 to combat waste fraud and abuse in the U S reconstruction effort in Afghanistan We are the only one of the 73 independent federal inspectors general that is not housed within a larger government agency We have the authority to oversee any federal agency that has played a role in the Afghanistan reconstruction effort So far we have published nearly 600 audits inspections and other reports SIGAR’s law enforcement agents have conducted more than 1 000 criminal and civil investigations that have led to more than 130 convictions of individuals who have committed crimes Combined SIGAR’s audit investigative and other work has resulted in cost savings to the taxpayer of over $3 billion Although I have testified numerous times before Congress today is the first time that I have been asked to directly address SIGAR’s unique Lessons Learned Program and what we have learned from it and the rest of our work In light of recent attention I am particularly pleased to have this opportunity to discuss some of our significant findings about the reconstruction efforts in what has become our nation’s longest war But before I talk about what our Lessons Learned Program does I want to clear up any misconceptions by defining what it does not do The Genesis and Purpose of the Lessons Learned Program As with everything produced by SIGAR the Lessons Learned Program’s mandate is limited to the reconstruction of Afghanistan Our Lessons Learned program is not and never was intended to be a new version of the Pentagon Papers or to turn snappy one-liners and quotes into headlines or sound bites We do not make broad assessments of U S diplomatic and military strategies or warfighting nor are we producing an oral history of the United States’ involvement in Afghanistan More important our Lessons Learned Program does not address the broader policy debate of whether or not our country should be in Afghanistan Our Lessons Learned Program produces unclassified publically available balanced and thoroughly researched appraisals of various aspects of U S reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan Unlike recent press reporting it also makes actionable recommendations for the Congress and executive branch agencies and where appropriate offers matters for consideration for the Afghan government and our coalition allies Some may criticize us for using “dense bureaucratic prose” in our Lessons Learned reports but we are not trying to win a Pulitzer Prize Rather we are focused on conducting original research and analysis aimed at providing an independent and objective examination of U S reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and to make practical recommendations to Congress and the executive branch agencies SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 2 Put simply we are striving to distill something of lasting and useful significance from our 18 years of engagement in Afghanistan Considering the over 2 300 American service members who have died there and the $133 billion and counting taxpayer dollars spent on reconstruction alone it would be a dereliction of duty not to try to learn from this experience With our unique interagency jurisdiction Congress gave SIGAR an extraordinary opportunity to do this work Moreover the need is urgent in Afghanistan most military embassy and civilian personnel rotate out of country after a year or less This means that new people are constantly arriving all with the best of intentions but with little or no knowledge of what their predecessors were doing the problems they faced or what worked and what didn’t work SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program is a unique source of institutional memory to help address this “annual lobotomy ” Given this reality it is understandably difficult for individual agencies to see the forest for the trees—and even if they could such efforts have a way of sinking into obscurity For example shortly after I became the Inspector General my staff uncovered a USAID-commissioned lessons learned study from 1988 entitled “A Retrospective Review of U S Assistance to Afghanistan 1950 to 1979 ” Many of the report’s lessons were still relevant and could have made a real impact if they had been taken into account in the early 2000s Unfortunately we could not find anyone at USAID or the Department of State who was even aware of the report’s existence let alone its findings The genesis of our Lessons Learned Program occurred almost as soon as I was appointed Inspector General in 2012 Early in my tenure it became apparent that the problems we were finding in our audits and inspections—whether it was poorly constructed infrastructure rampant corruption inadequately trained Afghan soldiers or a growing narcotics economy—elicited the same basic response from members of Congress agency officials and policymakers alike “What does it mean ” they would ask me “What can we learn from this ” In an attempt to answer these questions and to make our audits and other reports more relevant to policymakers in Washington and our military and civilian staff in Afghanistan I asked my staff in 2013 to develop a series of guiding queries aimed at helping Congress and the Administration improve reconstruction operations These questions—SIGAR’s first attempt to develop lessons from the U S reconstruction effort—were incorporated by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015 as a requirement for initiating infrastructure projects in areas of Afghanistan inaccessible to U S government personnel They continue to inform our work • Does the project or program clearly contribute to our national interests or strategic objectives • Does the recipient country want it or need it SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 3 • Has the project been coordinated with other U S agencies with the recipient government and with other international donors • Do security conditions permit effective implementation and oversight • Does the project have adequate safeguards to detect deter and mitigate corruption • Does the recipient government have the financial resources technical capacity and political will to sustain the project • Have implementing agencies established meaningful measurable metrics for determining successful project outcomes These questions were useful and they remain relevant But the agencies named in our reports complained that we were too critical Our reports failed to put their efforts in context they said and therefore we were not acknowledging their successes Accordingly on March 25 2013 I sent letters to the Secretary of State the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the U S Agency for International Development asking them to each provide me with a list of their agency’s ten most successful Afghanistan reconstruction projects and programs as well as a list of the ten least successful along with a detailed explanation of how these projects and programs were evaluated and the specific criteria used for each The answers we received from the agencies were informative but—as you can see from Appendix I—they failed to list or discuss each agency’s 10 most and 10 least successful projects or programs As my letter of July 5 2013 noted this failure limited our understanding of how government agencies evaluated and perceived both success and failure which was critical for formulating lessons learned from past reconstruction projects and programs It is perhaps understandable that agencies would want to show their programs in the best possible light—and it is certainly understandable that the private firms nongovernmental organizations and multilateral institutions that implemented those programs would want to demonstrate success Yet a recurring challenge to any accurate assessment has been the pervasive tendency to overstate positive results with little if any evidence to back up those claims Unfortunately many of the claims that State USAID and others have made over time simply do not stand up to scrutiny For example in a 2014 agency newsletter the then-USAID administrator stated that “today 3 million girls and 5 million boys are enrolled in school— compared to just 900 000 when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan ” But when SIGAR subsequently conducted an audit of U S efforts to support primary and secondary education in Afghanistan we found that USAID was receiving its enrollment data from the Afghan government and had taken few if any steps to attempt to verify the data’s accuracy even though independent third parties and even the Afghan Ministry of Education had called the numbers into question And because USAID education support programs lacked effective metrics it could not show how U S taxpayer dollars had contributed to the increased enrollment it claimed SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 4 In that same agency newsletter the then-USAID administrator said that since the fall of the Taliban “child mortality has been cut in Afghanistan by 60 percent maternal mortality has declined by 80 percent and access to health services has been increased by 90 percent As a result Afghanistan has experienced the largest increase in life expectancy and the largest decreases in maternal and child deaths of any country in the world ” However when SIGAR issued an audit of Afghanistan’s health sector in 2017 we found that while USAID publicly reported a 22-year increase in Afghan life expectancy from 2002 to 2010 USAID did not disclose that the baseline it used for comparison came from a World Health Organization WHO report that could only make an estimate because of limited data A later WHO report showed only a 6-year increase in Afghan life expectancy for males and an 8-year increase for females between 2002 and 2010—a far cry from the 22 years that USAID claimed As for the maternal mortality claims SIGAR’s audit found that USAID’s 2002 baseline data was from a survey that was conducted in only four of Afghanistan’s then-360 districts Likewise a SIGAR audit into U S government programs to assist women in Afghanistan found that “although the Department of Defense Department of State and USAID reported gains and improvements in the status of Afghan women SIGAR found that there was no comprehensive assessment available to confirm that these gains were the direct result of specific U S efforts ” And while State and USAID collectively reported spending $850 million on 17 projects that were designed in whole or in part to support Afghan women they could not tell our auditors how much of that money actually went to programs that supported Afghan women Another SIGAR audit looked into the more than $1 billion that the United States had spent supporting rule-of-law programs in Afghanistan Shockingly we found that the U S actually seemed to be moving backwards as time went along Our audit found that while the 2009 U S rule-of-law strategy for Afghanistan contained 27 specific performance measures the 2013 strategy contained no performance measures at all If you have no metrics for success how can you tell if you’re succeeding While honesty and transparency are always important when government agencies overstate the positive and overlook flaws in their methodologies or accountability mechanisms it has real public policy implications The American people and their elected representatives eventually start asking why if things are going so well are we still there Why do we continue to spend so much money While it may not be as headline-worthy in the long run honesty gives a development undertaking a far better chance at success People can understand it will take time patience and continued effort to make a real difference If there was no SIGAR one may wonder how many of these discrepancies would have ever come to light In some ways I would argue that the agencies’ reluctance to list their successes and failures is understandable As the old saying goes success has many parents but failure is an orphan Nowhere is this more true than in Afghanistan where success is fleeting and failure is common That is all the more reason why it is crucial to be honest with ourselves and to recognize that not SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 5 everything is successful In other words for honest analysis failure may be an orphan but it also can be a great teacher It was in response to this refusal by the agencies to be candid about their successes and failures and at the suggestion of a number of prominent officials including Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General John Allen that SIGAR formally launched its Lessons Learned Program in 2014 with the blessing of the National Security Council staff The Lessons Learned Program’s mandate is to • • • • • • • Show what has and has not worked over the course of the U S reconstruction experience in Afghanistan Offer detailed and actionable recommendations to policymakers and executive agencies that are relevant to current and future reconstruction efforts Present unbiased fact-based and accessible reports to the public and key stakeholders Respond to the needs of U S implementing agencies both in terms of accurately capturing their efforts and providing timely and actionable guidance for future efforts Share our findings with policymakers senior executive branch officials members of the Congress and their staffs Provide subject matter expertise to SIGAR senior leaders and other SIGAR directorates Share our findings in conferences and workshops convened by U S government agencies foreign governments international organizations NGOs think tanks and academic institutions By doing so SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program also fulfills our statutory obligation set forth in the very first section of our authorizing statute “to provide recommendations on policies designed to promote economy efficiency and effectiveness of reconstruction programs in Afghanistan and to prevent and detect waste fraud and abuse in such programs and operations ” SIGAR is also required to inform the Secretaries of State and Defense about “problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations and the necessity for and progress on corrective action ” 1 In addition the Inspector General Act authorizes SIGAR “to make such investigations and reports as are in the judgment of the Inspector General necessary or desirable ” 2 How SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program Works The Lessons Learned team is composed of subject-matter experts with considerable experience working and living in Afghanistan as well as a staff of experienced research analysts Our National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 Pub Law No 112-181 Jan 28 2008 § 1229 a 2 A similar mandate that applies to all inspectors general is contained in Section 2 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 as amended See 5 U S C App 3 § 2 1 2 Inspector General Act of 1978 as amended § 6 a 2 5 U S C App § 6 a 2 SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 6 analysts come from a variety of backgrounds some have served in the U S military while others have worked at State USAID in the intelligence community with other federal agencies or with implementing partners or policy research groups As the program was starting in 2014 our Lessons Learned team consulted with a range of experts and current and former U S officials to determine what topics we should first explore We decided to focus on two areas of the reconstruction effort that had the largest price tags building the Afghan security forces now more than $70 billion and counternarcotics now about $9 billion We also chose to examine a crosscutting problem that SIGAR already had plenty of experience in uncovering and which senior officials consistently urged us to tackle corruption and its corrosive effects on the entire U S mission The fourth topic was private sector development and economic growth—because we know that a stronger Afghan economy is necessary to lasting peace and stability and without it U S reconstruction efforts are largely unsustainable The topics of other reports have sometimes flowed logically from previous reports For instance our 2019 investigation of the tangled military chain of command Divided Responsibility had its origin in what we had learned two years earlier in our report on reconstructing the Afghan security and national defense forces Other report topics come from brainstorming sessions with groups of subject matter experts and information my staff and I glean from our frequent trips to Afghanistan For example our latest lessons learned report on reintegration of enemy combatants as well as our soon-to-be-released report on elections were specifically suggested by the prior Resolute Support commander and the outgoing U S Ambassador in Afghanistan SIGAR’s lessons learned reports are not drawn from merely anecdotal evidence or based solely on our personal areas of expertise Our Lessons Learned Program staff has access to the largest single source of information and expertise on Afghanistan reconstruction—namely the information and expertise provided by other SIGAR departments our Audits and Inspections Directorate Investigations Directorate the Office of Special Projects and our Research and Analysis Directorate RAD For example RAD is responsible for compiling the quarterly reports we are required by law to submit to Congress It serves as our in-house think tank collecting and analyzing vital data on a quarterly basis to keep Congress and the American public current on reconstruction in Afghanistan To date SIGAR has produced 45 publicly available quarterly reports which provide detailed descriptions of all reconstruction-related obligations expenditures and revenues as well as an overview of the reconstruction effort as a whole SIGAR’s quarterly reports constitute the largest and most detailed collection of data and analysis on reconstruction activities in Afghanistan and are viewed by experts both in and out of government as the go-to source for information on reconstruction SIGAR’s quarterly reports were the first to question the accuracy of various claims of progress in Afghanistan ranging from the accuracy of Afghan troop numbers to the number of children actually attending school to the state of the Afghan economy SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 7 Our Audits and Inspections Directorate is another extraordinary source of information and assistance to our Lessons Learned Program Since 2009 SIGAR has issued 358 audits inspections and other reports and has more auditors inspectors and engineers on the ground in Afghanistan than USAID OIG State OIG and DOD OIG combined In a unique innovation SIGAR also has a cooperative agreement to work with an independent Afghan oversight organization giving SIGAR an unparalleled ability to go “outside the wire” to places where travel is unsafe for U S government employees SIGAR’s auditors and inspectors determine whether infrastructure projects have been properly constructed used and maintained and also conduct forensic reviews of reconstruction funds managed by State DOD and USAID to identify anomalies that may indicate fraud Our Investigations Directorate conducts criminal and civil investigations of waste fraud and abuse relating to programs and operations supported with U S funds SIGAR has full federal law enforcement authority and pursues criminal prosecutions civil actions forfeitures monetary recoveries and suspension and debarments SIGAR has more investigators on the ground in Afghanistan than any other oversight agency Our investigators regularly work with other law enforcement organizations including other IG offices the Drug Enforcement Administration the FBI and others Major investigations conducted by the Investigations Directorate include contract fraud diversion of U S government loans money laundering and corruption A very significant part of this work has been focused on fuel the “liquid gold” of Afghanistan The Investigations Directorate has provided valuable information to our Lessons Learned Program analysts a prime example being the Corruption in Conflict report Lastly our Office of Special Projects examines emerging issues and delivers prompt actionable reports to federal agencies and Congress This office was created in response to requests by agencies operating in Afghanistan for actionable insights and information on important issues that could be produced more quickly than a formal audit Special Projects reports cover a wide range of programs and activities to fulfill SIGAR’s legislative mandate to protect taxpayers and have proven useful to the Lessons Learned Program For example its examination of programs run by DOD’s now-defunct Task Force for Business and Stability Operations was a major impetus for the Lessons Learned Program report on Private Sector Development and Economic Growth While the documentary evidence in our lessons learned reports tells a story it cannot substitute for the experience knowledge and wisdom of people who participated in the Afghanistan reconstruction effort For that reason our analysts have conducted well over 600 interviews at last count—with experts in academia and research institutions current and former civilian and military officials in our own government the Afghan government and other donor country governments implementing partners and contractors and members of civil society Interviewees have ranged from ambassadors to airmen These interviews provide valuable insights into the rationale behind decisions debates within and between agencies and frustrations that spanned the years The information we glean from them is used to guide us in our inquiry and we strive SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 8 to cross-reference interviewees’ claims with the documentary evidence or if that is not possible with other interviews Our choice of which interviews or quotes to use is based on our analysts’ judgment of whether it captures an observation or insight that is more broadly representative and consistent with the weight of evidence from various sources—not whether it is simply a colorful expression of opinion Lessons Learned Program analysts must adhere to strict professional guidelines regarding the sourcing of their findings in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency’s Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation commonly referred to as “the Blue Book ” 3 While some of our interviewees do not mind being quoted others have a well-founded fear of retribution from political or tribal enemies employers governments or international donors who are paying their salaries These persons often request that we not reveal their names Honoring those requests for confidentiality is a bedrock principle at SIGAR for three reasons First it is required by law—specifically by the Inspector General Act of 1978 as amended 4 Second there are obvious humanitarian and security concerns Finally without the ability to shield our sources we simply would not be able to do our work In fact at our last tally more than 80 percent of those interviewed for the Lessons Learned Program reports requested their names not be disclosed Another important part of the quality control process used by SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program is an external peer review For each of our reports we seek and receive feedback on the draft report from a group of subject matter experts who often have significant experience working in Afghanistan These experts are drawn from universities think tanks and the private sector and often include retired senior military officers and diplomats Each group of experts is tailored to a particular topic and they provide thoughtful detailed comments Over the course of producing any one report Lessons Learned Program analysts also routinely engage with officials at USAID State DOD and other agencies to familiarize them with the team’s preliminary findings lessons and recommendations Our analysts also solicit formal and informal feedback to improve our understanding of the key issues and recommendations as viewed by each agency The agencies are then given an opportunity to formally review and comment on the final draft of every report after which the team usually meets with agency representatives to discuss their feedback firsthand Our purpose here is not to avoid all points of conflict with the agencies we write about but to make sure we are presenting issues fairly and in context Although Lessons Learned Program teams incorporate agencies’ comments where 3 The Blue Book standards can be found at https www ignet gov content quality-standards 4 Section 7 b of the Inspector General Act of 1978 as amended prohibits SIGAR from disclosing the identity of a source who provides information to SIGAR Section 8M b 2 B of the Act prohibits SIGAR from disclosing the identity of anyone who reports waste fraud and abuse SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 9 appropriate the analysis conclusions and recommendations of our reports remain SIGAR’s own When our reports are published our next job is vitally important getting the word out We have no intention of producing reports that would suffer the same fate as that well-informed but sadly unread 1988 USAID report our staff discovered in Kabul Until our findings and recommendations circulate widely to relevant decision-makers and result in action and change we know we are not producing lessons learned we are merely recording lessons observed Each of our reports is the subject of a major launch event usually at a research institution or think tank designed to draw attention to reach policymakers practitioners and the public Our reports are also posted online both as a downloadable PDF and in a user-friendly interactive format Our analysts follow up by providing lectures and briefings to civilian and military reconstruction practitioners researchers and students at schools and training institutions worldwide Our reports have become course material at the U S Army War College our analysts have lectured or led workshops at the Foreign Service Institute Davidson College the National Defense University Yale and Princeton A more extensive discussion of our ongoing outreach program and the successful use of the reports by U S agencies is found in the next section What We Have Accomplished Seven Lessons Learned Reports To date the Lessons Learned Program has published seven reports Two more reports—one on elections in Afghanistan and another on the monitoring and evaluation of U S government contracts there—will be published in the early part of 2020 After those we expect to issue a report on women’s empowerment in Afghanistan and another on policing and corrections later in 2020 or early 2021 at the latest Following are brief summaries of our published reports the full versions of which can be found on SIGAR’s website 5 • 5 Corruption in Conflict Lessons from the U S Experience in Afghanistan published in September 2016 examined how the U S government understood the risks of corruption in Afghanistan how the U S response to corruption evolved and the effectiveness of that response We found that corruption substantially undermined the U S mission in Afghanistan from the very beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom We concluded that failure to effectively address the problem means U S reconstruction programs will at best continue to be subverted by systemic corruption and at worst will fail The lesson is that anticorruption efforts need to be at the center of planning and policymaking for contingencies The U S government should not exacerbate corruption by flooding a weak economy with too much money too quickly with too little oversight U S agencies should know whom they are doing business with and avoid empowering highly corrupt actors Strong monitoring and evaluation systems must be in place for assistance and the https www sigar mil lessonslearned SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 10 • • • U S government should maintain consistent pressure on the host government for critical reforms Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces Lessons from the U S Experience in Afghanistan published in September 2017 examined how the U S government—primarily the DOD State and the Department of Justice—developed and executed security sector assistance in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2016 Our analysis revealed that the U S government was ill-prepared to help build an Afghan army and police force capable of protecting Afghanistan from internal or external threats and preventing the country from becoming a terrorist safe haven U S personnel also struggled to implement a dual strategy of attempting to rapidly improve security while simultaneously developing self-sufficient Afghan military and police capabilities all on short politically-driven timelines We found that the U S government lacked a comprehensive approach and coordinating body to successfully implement the whole-ofgovernment programs necessary to develop a capable and self-sustaining ANDSF Ultimately the United States—after expending over $70 billion—designed a force that was not able to provide nationwide security especially as the force faced a larger threat than anticipated after the drawdown of coalition military forces The report identifies lessons to inform U S policies and actions for future security sector assistance missions and provides recommendations to improve performance of security sector assistance programs Private Sector Development and Economic Growth Lessons from the U S Experience in Afghanistan published in April 2018 examined efforts by the U S government to stimulate and build the Afghan economy after the initial defeat of the Taliban in 2001 While Afghanistan achieved significant early success in telecommunications transportation and construction and in laying the foundations of a modern economic system the goal of establishing long-term broad-based and sustainable economic growth has proved elusive The primary reason the report concluded was persistent uncertainty created by ongoing physical insecurity and political instability which discouraged investment and other economic activity and undermined efforts to reduce pervasive corruption Other reasons were the inadequate understanding and mitigation of relationships among corrupt strongmen and other power holders and the inability to help Afghanistan to develop the physical and institutional infrastructure that would allow it to be regionally competitive in trade and agriculture Two of the report's major recommendations are that future economic development assistance in Afghanistan or elsewhere should be based on a deeper understanding of the economy and society and that needed governance institutions be allowed to proceed at an appropriate pace Stabilization Lessons from the U S Experience in Afghanistan published in May 2018 detailed how USAID State and DOD tried to support and legitimize the Afghan government in contested districts from 2002 through 2017 Our analysis revealed the U S government greatly overestimated its ability to build and reform government institutions SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 11 • • • in Afghanistan as part of its stabilization strategy We found that the stabilization strategy and the programs used to achieve it were not properly tailored to the Afghan context and successes in stabilizing Afghan districts rarely lasted longer than the physical presence of coalition troops and civilians As a result by the time all prioritized districts had transitioned from coalition to Afghan control in 2014 the services and protection provided by Afghan forces and civil servants often could not compete with a resurgent Taliban as it filled the void in newly vacated territory Counternarcotics Lessons from the U S Experience in Afghanistan published in June 2018 examined how U S agencies tried to deter farmers and traffickers from participating in the cultivation and trade of opium build Afghan government counterdrug capacity and develop the country’s licit economy We found that no counterdrug program led to lasting reductions in poppy cultivation or opium production—and without a stable security environment there was little possibility of success The U S government failed to develop and implement counternarcotics strategies that outlined or effectively directed U S agencies toward shared goals Eradication efforts ultimately had no lasting impact on opium cultivation and alienated rural populations Even though U S strategies said eradication and development aid should target the same areas on the ground we found—by using new geospatial imagery—that frequently this did not happen Development programs failed to provide farmers with sustainable alternatives to poppy Two positive takeaways are that 1 some provinces and districts saw temporary reductions in poppy cultivation and 2 U S support and mentorship helped stand up well-trained capable Afghan counterdrug units that became trusted partners We concluded however that until there is greater security in Afghanistan it will be nearly impossible to bring about lasting reductions in poppy cultivation and drug production In the meantime the United States should aim to cut off drug money going to insurgent groups promote licit livelihood options for rural communities and fight drug-related government corruption Divided Responsibility Lessons from U S Security Sector Assistance Efforts in Afghanistan published in June 2019 highlighted the difficulty of coordinating security sector assistance during active combat and under the umbrella of a 39-member NATO coalition when no specific DOD organization or military service was assigned ultimate responsibility for U S efforts The report explored the problems created by this balkanized command structure in the training of Afghan army and police units strategiclevel advising at the ministries of defense and interior procuring military equipment and running U S -based training programs for the Afghan military Its findings are relevant for ongoing efforts in Afghanistan as well as for future efforts to rebuild security forces in states emerging from protracted conflict Reintegration of Ex-Combatants Lessons from the U S Experience in Afghanistan published in September 2019 examined the five main post-2001 efforts to reintegrate former combatants into Afghan society and assessed their effectiveness We found that SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 12 these efforts did not help any significant number of former fighters to reintegrate did not weaken the insurgency and did not reduce violence We concluded that as long as the Taliban insurgency is ongoing the United States should not support a program to reintegrate former fighters However the United States should consider supporting a reintegration effort if certain conditions are in place a the Afghan government and the Taliban sign a peace agreement that provides a framework for reintegration of excombatants b a significant reduction in overall violence occurs and c a strong monitoring and evaluation system is established for reintegration efforts If U S agencies support a reintegration program policymakers and practitioners should anticipate and plan for serious challenges to implementation—including ongoing insecurity political instability corruption determining who is eligible and the difficulty of monitoring and evaluation Broader development assistance that stimulates the private sector and creates jobs can also help ex-combatants to reintegrate into society Impacts of the Lessons Learned Program To date SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program has offered nearly 120 recommendations to executive branch agencies and the Congress To the best of our knowledge 13 of those have been implemented and at least 20 are in progress In evaluating these numbers it is important to note that some recommendations can only be implemented as part of future contingency operations and some recommendations rely on outcomes that have not yet happened such as an intra-Afghan peace deal Going forward SIGAR plans to work closely with agencies to get periodic updates to the status of its lessons learned recommendations Congress has already taken action on some of these recommendations For example Section 1279 of the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act calls for the Secretary of State the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the U S Agency for International Development to develop an anti-corruption strategy for reconstruction efforts This amendment is in keeping with a recommendation in Corruption in Conflict Lessons from the U S Experience in Afghanistan Additionally the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act includes amendments related to two recommendations from our 2017 report entitled Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces Lessons from the U S Experience in Afghanistan Section 1201 of the Act required that during the development and planning of a program to build the capacity of the national security forces of a foreign country the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State jointly consider political social economic diplomatic and historical factors of the foreign country that may impact the effectiveness of the program Section 1211 required the incorporation of lessons learned from prior security cooperation programs and activities of DOD that were carried out any time on or after September 11 2001 into future operations SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 13 The Lessons Learned Program has also had significant institutional impact Staff from the Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces report participated in the Quadrennial Review of Security Sector Assistance in 2018 and the report was cited by the NATO Stability Police Center of Excellence in its Joint Analysis Report SIGAR Lessons Learned Program staff contributed to—and were explicitly recognized as experts in—the 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review the first interagency policy document outlining how the U S government will conduct stabilization missions The acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations later instructed his entire bureau to read the report During Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s testimony before the United States Senate Senator Todd Young asked him to respond in writing indicating which of the report’s recommendations he would implement Each of our reports has led to briefings or requests for information from members of Congress The lead analyst for the Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces report testified before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform in 2017 At the request of the chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee our analysts compiled a list of potential oversight areas relating to the train advise and assist mission in Afghanistan and to appropriations for the Afghan Security Forces Fund In September 2018 after publication of the Counternarcotics report the Senate Drug Caucus wrote a letter to SIGAR requesting an inquiry into the U S government’s current counternarcotics efforts including the extent to which a whole-of-government approach exists the effectiveness of U S and Afghan law enforcement efforts the impact of the drug lab bombing campaign and the extent to which money laundering and corruption undermine counterdrug efforts Prior to the publication of Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces SIGAR Lessons Learned Program staff participated in a multiday session convened by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford on reconstruction-related activities in Afghanistan They also participated in a failure analysis session led by the Secretary of Defense and run by the Joint Chiefs of Staff this session was used to help develop the president’s South Asia Strategy in 2017 In addition Lessons Learned Program staff have given briefings on Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces to the Commander of U S Central Command the Commandant of the U S Marine Corps National Security Council staff the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Europe the Acting Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan the Commander of the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan and multiple U S general officers in Afghanistan Our analysts have given briefings on the Stabilization report to the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs DOD’s Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment Group the U S Army’s 95th Civil Affairs Brigade senior officials responsible for stabilization in Syria at the U S State Department’s Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs and high-ranking officials at USAID SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 14 At the request of the State Department’s Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations SIGAR analysts drafted a memo on the business case for deploying civilians alongside the U S military on stabilization missions The Deputy Assistant Administrator for Democracy Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs at USAID said the report is already affecting stabilization efforts and planning in Syria and elsewhere Lessons Learned Program staff who worked on the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants report have heard informally from contacts at USAID and State that the report has been well received and is seen as a resource for future policies or programs related to reintegration Our reports have also assisted NATO and other coalition partners Following the publication of the Divided Responsibility report NATO hosted an all-day event on the topic of the report at its headquarters in Brussels The team lead from the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants report also briefed officials at the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development on the report in November 2019 SIGAR Lessons Learned Program staff who worked on the Private Sector Development and Economic Growth report participated in a closed-door roundtable with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s senior economic advisor focusing on recent reforms in Afghanistan’s economic governance Following the publication of the Stabilization report Lessons Learned Program staff briefed the senior United Nations Development Programme official responsible for stabilization efforts in Iraq and answered requests for briefings from Germany’s Foreign Office the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GIZ Although not a complete list of our staff’s activities suffice it to say that the Lessons Learned Program has created for itself a reputation as a reliable source of expertise and analysis on our nation’s longest war—the first step in the process of learning from our successes and failures Key Lessons from SIGAR’s Ten Years of Work Now the question becomes after all this what enduring lessons have we learned Here are a few overarching conclusions from our Lessons Learned Program and SIGAR’s other work • Successful reconstruction is incompatible with continuing insecurity To have successful reconstruction in any given area the fighting in that area must be largely contained When that happens U S agencies should be prepared to move quickly in partnership with the host nation to take advantage of the narrow window of opportunity before an insurgency can emerge or reconstitute itself This holds true at both the national and local levels In general U S agencies should consider carrying out reconstruction SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 15 • • activities in more secure areas first and limit reconstruction in insecure areas to carefully tailored small-scale efforts and humanitarian relief Unchecked corruption in Afghanistan undermined U S strategic goals—and we helped to foster that corruption The U S government’s persistent belief that throwing more money at a problem automatically leads to better results created a feedback loop in which the success of reconstruction efforts was measured by the amount of money spent—which in turn created requests for more money The United States also inadvertently aided the Taliban’s resurgence by forming alliances of convenience with warlords who had been pushed out of power by the Taliban The coalition paid warlords to provide security and in many cases to run provincial and district administrations on the assumption that the United States would eventually hold those warlords to account when they committed acts of corruption or brutality That accounting rarely took place— and the abuses committed by coalition-aligned warlords drove many Afghans into the arms of the resurgent Taliban The insecurity that resulted has harmed virtually every U S and coalition initiative in Afghanistan to this day—discouraging trade investment and other economic activity and making it harder to build the government institutions needed to support the private sector In the future we need to recognize the vital importance of addressing corruption from the outset This means taking into account the amount of assistance a host country can absorb being careful not to flood a small weak economy with too much money too fast and ensuring that U S agencies can more effectively monitor assistance It would also mean limiting U S alliances with malign powerbrokers holding highly corrupt actors to account and incorporating anticorruption objectives into security and stability goals After the Taliban’s initial defeat there was no clear reconstruction strategy and no single military service agency or nation in charge of reconstruction Between 2001 and 2006 the reconstruction effort was woefully underfunded and understaffed in Afghanistan Then as the Taliban became resurgent the U S overcorrected and poured billions of dollars into a weak economy that was unable to absorb it Some studies suggest that the generally accepted amount of foreign aid a country’s economy can absorb at any given time is 15 to 45 percent of the country’s gross domestic product or GDP In Afghanistan’s weak economy the percentage would be on the low end of that scale Yet by 2004 U S aid to Afghanistan exceeded the 45 percent threshold In 2007 and 2010 it totaled more than 100 percent This massive influx of dollars distorted the Afghan economy fueled corruption bought a lot of real estate in Dubai and the United States and built the many “poppy palaces” you can see today in Kabul Another example of unintended consequences were efforts to rebuild the Afghan police—a job that neither State nor DOD was fully prepared to do State lacked the in-house expertise and was unable to safely operate in insecure environments like Afghanistan the U S military could operate in an insecure environment but had limited expertise in training civilian police forces Our research found instances where Black Hawk helicopter pilots were SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 16 • • assigned to train police while other soldiers turned to TV shows such as “NCIS” and “COPS” as sources for police training program curricula SIGAR believes that Congress needs to review this tangled web of conflicting priorities and authorities with the aim of designating a single agency to be in charge of future reconstruction efforts At the very least there should be a comprehensive review of funding authorities and agency responsibilities for planning and conducting reconstruction activities Politically driven timelines undermine the reconstruction effort The U S military is an awesome weapon when our soldiers are ordered to do something they do it—whether or not they are best suited to the task One example of this was DOD’s $675 million effort to jumpstart the Afghan economy DOD is not known for being particularly skilled at economic development Frustrated by the belief that USAID’s development efforts would not bring significant economic benefit to Afghanistan quickly enough to be helpful in 2009 DOD expanded its Iraq Task Force for Business and Stability Operations “TFBSO” to Afghanistan TFBSO initiated a number of diverse and well-intentioned but often speculative projects in areas for which it had little or no real expertise For example TFBSO spent millions to construct a compressed natural gas station in Sheberghan Afghanistan in an effort to create a compressed natural gas market in Afghanistan It was a noble goal—but there were no other compressed natural gas stations in Afghanistan so for obvious reasons any cars running on that fuel could not travel more than half a tank from the only place they could refuel In the end the U S taxpayer paid to convert a number of local Afghan taxis to run on compressed natural gas in order to create a market for the station—which to SIGAR’s knowledge remains the only one of its kind in Afghanistan My point here is not to hold DOD up to ridicule it was simply doing the best it could in the time it had with the orders it was given The real problem was a timeline driven by political considerations and divorced from reality implemented by an agency that lacked the required expertise and had little to no oversight If we cannot end the “annual lobotomy ” we should at least mitigate its impact I assumed my current post in 2012 I’m now working with my fifth U S Ambassador to Afghanistan my sixth NATO and U S Commanding General and eighth head of the U S train advise and assist command Some 80 percent of the U S embassy departs each summer and most of the U S military assigned to Afghanistan is deployed for a year or less The lack of institutional memory caused by personnel turnover in Afghanistan is widely known Even so the U S government continues to routinely defer to the on-theground experience of deployed personnel to assess progress and evaluate their own work The result is assessments that are often considerably rosier than they should be or totally irrelevant—for example when trainers were asked to evaluate their own training of Afghan units they gave themselves high marks for instruction—a metric that had little to do with reflecting the units’ actual battlefield readiness The constant turnover of SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 17 • personnel in Afghanistan highlights the need for more rigorous oversight and scrutiny not less To be effective reconstruction efforts must be based on a deep understanding of the historical social legal and political traditions of the host nation The United States sent personnel into Afghanistan who did not know the difference between al-Qaeda and the Taliban and who lacked any substantive knowledge of Afghan society local dynamics and power relationships In the short term SIGAR believes Congress should mandate more rigorous in-depth pre-deployment training that exposes U S personnel to the history of U S involvement in Afghanistan at the very least In the long term we need to find ways of ramping up our knowledge base in the event of future contingency operations perhaps by identifying academic experts willing to lend their expertise on short notice as a contingency emerges There is also a dearth of staff at U S agencies with the vital combination of long-term institutional memory and recent experience In the case of Afghanistan we should listen more to people who have developed expertise over time—most notably Afghan officials who have greater institutional and historical knowledge than their U S counterparts Matters for Congressional Consideration In addition to the prior list of key lessons from SIGAR’s work at the request of committee staff we have also compiled a list of six recommendations for immediate consideration for the Congress 1 In light of the ongoing peace negotiations the Congress should consider the urgent need for the Administration to plan for what happens after the United States reaches a peace deal with the Taliban There are a number of serious threats to a sustainable peace in Afghanistan that will not miraculously disappear with signing a peace agreement Any such agreement is likely to involve dramatic reductions of U S forces and with that comes the need to plan for transferring the management of security-related assistance from DOD to State leadership DOD manages some $4 billion per year in security sector assistance to Afghanistan and State is wholly unprepared at this moment to take on management of that enormous budget Any peace agreement and drawdown of U S forces raises a number of other issues that could put the U S -funded reconstruction effort at risk As SIGAR reported last year in its High Risk List report these include—but are not limited to—the capability of Afghan security forces to conduct counterterrorism operations protecting the hardwon rights of Afghan women upholding the rule of law suppressing corruption promoting alternative livelihoods for farmers currently engaged in growing poppy for the opium trade—and not least the problem of reintegrating an estimated 60 000 Taliban fighters their families and other illegal armed groups into civil society SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 18 2 To ensure Congress and the taxpayers are properly apprised in a timely manner of significant events that pose a threat to the U S reconstruction mission in Afghanistan Congress should consider requiring all federal agencies operating in country to provide reports to the Congress disclosing risks to major reconstruction projects and programs and disclosing important events or developments as they occur These reports would be analogous to the reports publically traded companies in the United States are now required to file with the Securities Exchange Commission to keep investors informed about important events 6 3 In light of the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and decreasing staffing there will be a natural tendency for U S agencies to increase their use of on-budget assistance or international organizations and trust funds to accomplish reconstruction and development goals Congress should consider conditioning such on-budget assistance on rigorous assessments of the Afghan ministries and international trust funds having strong accountability measures and internal controls in place 4 Oversight is mission critical to any successful reconstruction and development program in Afghanistan The Congress should consider requiring DOD State USAID and other relevant executive agencies to ensure adequate oversight monitoring and evaluation efforts continue and not be dramatically reduced as part of a right-sizing program as witnessed recently by State’s personnel reductions at the Kabul embassy Without adequate oversight staffing levels and the ability to physically inspect monitor and evaluate programs Congress should consider the efficacy of continuing assistance 5 The Congress should consider requiring U S government agencies supporting U S reconstruction missions to “rack and stack” their programs and projects by identifying their best- and worst-performing activities so that the Congress can more quickly identify whether and how to reallocate resources to projects that are proving successful The ambiguous responses to SIGAR’s 2013 request of DOD State and USAID that they identify their best- and worst-performing projects and programs see Appendix I in Afghanistan indicate that the agencies may not routinely engage in the self-evaluation necessary to honestly evaluate what is working and what is not 6 The Congress should request that State DOD and USAID submit a finalized anticorruption strategy for reconstruction efforts in U S contingency operations This requirement was part of the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act which set a 6 Every publically traded company in the United States is required to file annual and quarterly reports with the SEC about the company’s operations including a detailed disclosure of the risks the company faces known as “10-K” and “10-Q” reports Public companies are also required to file more current 8-K reports disclosing “material events” as they occur i e major events or developments that shareholders should know about SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 19 deadline of May 2018 for the strategy to be submitted to various congressional committees including this one In December 2019 State told SIGAR that the strategy is still under development Further the NDAA language did not state that anticorruption is a national security priority in a contingency operation or require annual reporting on implementation The Congress should consider incorporating these elements into its renewed request to agencies Conclusion As anybody who has served in government knows when you undertake an effort such as our Lessons Learned Program you will inevitably gore somebody’s ox The programs policies and strategies SIGAR has reviewed were all the result of decisions made by people who for the most part were doing the best they could While our lessons learned reports identify failures missed opportunities bad judgment and the occasional success the response to our reports within the U S government has generally been positive It is to the credit of many of the government officials we have worked with—and in some cases criticized—that they see the value of SIGAR’s lessons learned work and are suggesting new topics for us to explore Our work is far from done For all the lives and treasure the United States and its coalition partners have expended in Afghanistan and for Afghans themselves who have suffered the most from decades of violence the very least we can do is to learn from our successes and failures SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program is our attempt to do that and in my opinion its work will be our agency’s most important legacy Thank you for the opportunity to testify today I look forward to answering your questions SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 20 Appendix I – Correspondence Between SIGAR and U S Government Agencies Regarding Most and Least Successful Reconstruction Projects and Programs in Afghanistan Ct Office of the Special Inspector General SIGAR I for Afghanistan Reconstruction March S 0 13 The Honorable John F Ke rry Secretary of State Dear ecrelar · Kerry yo u now my omce is charged by Congress with ll1e responsibility for leading coo rdinat ing and recomm ending policies ro promote economy efficiency and effeclivene s of progTarns and operations for the reconstr11ction of Afghan i tan T he audits inspectio ns and in vesti gations that SIGAR conducts form rhe ba i for our exec uti on of this responsibility In a recen t conver a1io11 wit h the S Ambassador 10 Afghan i tan I mentioned ll1at we would be looking al the most and least successful reconstruction proJect as identified by U • agencies Tbelieve that thi 'ill be a val uable exercise It is important 10 understand how U S agencies evaluate and perceive both their ucce ses and fa ilures uch an understanding is cri ti cal for formula ting less ns learned from our unprecedented recon rruction effon l herefore I forma ll request that yo u pro 1de • a li t of1 he ten Afghanistan reconstruction projects pr grams funded and deemed mosr successful b the Department of State list f1he ten fghani stan reconstruction projects programs funded and deemed least successful b the Department of State and a detailed explanation of how these projects programs were evaluated and se lected as 1he ten mo t and least uccessfu l projects includi ng the specific criteria used for each 11 I am ubmitt in g thi request pursuant to my authority under Public Law No 110-18 1 a amen ded and the In spector Genera l Act of 1978 as amended Please direct your staff Lo provide thi s infonnation by April 25 2013 10 Monica Brym SIGAR Director of Spec ial Projects at monicaJ brym civ@ mail mil If you have an quc ·ti ns or concerns please do not hes itate to con tact me at' 703 545-6000 or Ms Brym al 703 54 -6003 Thank ou for your prompt anent ion to thi matter y · I he I le n rllhle lames B Cunningham U S 1550 Crystal Drive 9th Floor Arlington Virginia 22202 SIGAR 20-19-TY mbassador to Afghani tan Malling 2530 Crystal Drive Arlington Virginia 22202-3940 Tai 703 545 6000 www slgar mll Page 21 Q s1GAR I Office of the Special Inspector General for A lghanlstan Reconstrucllon March 25 2013 The Honorable Raji hah Administrator l ' · gene_ f r lnlemauonal Development Dear Dr Shah As you know my ortice is charged by Congress with the res ponsibility for leading coordinatin g and reco111 1nending policies 10 promote economy efficiency and effectiveness of programs and operations for tJ1e recon truction or Afghanistan The audits inspections and investi gations that SlGAR conducts form lhe basi tor our execution of this responsibi li ty In a re ent conver ation witJ1 the U S Ambassador to Afghani tan I mentioned that we would be looking at the most and leaSl successful reconstruction projects as identified by U agencies I believe that this ill be a valuable exerci e It is important to understand how agencies evaluate and perceive both their succe ses and fai lures uch an understanding is critical for formu la1ing lesson learned from our unprecedented re on truction effort fhen forc I t'ormally request that you provide • • • a list f the ten Afghanistan reconstruction project program funde d and deemed most succe sful b l J ' IIJ a list of the ten Afghanistan reconstructi on projects program funded and deemed least s uccessful by U AID and a detai led e planat ion of how these projects programs were va luated and elected as the ten most and leas successfu l projects inc luding the speci fie criteria used for each I am submittin g this request pursuant to my authority under Public Law No 110-181 as amended and the Inspector General Act of 1978 as ame nded Please direct your staff lo provide th is infonnation by April 25 1013 10 Monica Brym SIGA R Director of Special Projects at mo11ica j bry111 civ@mail mi l If ou have an ' que lions or oncems please do not he itate to contact me at 703 545-6000 or Ms Brym at 703 545-l 003 Than - you for your prompt attention to thi matter cc Dr L- en 11 1nas hita U AfD Mission Director for Afghanistan 1550 Crystal Drlve 9th Floor Arll gton Virginia 22202 SIGAR 20-19-TY Joh n F opl Specia l lnspeclor eneral for Afghani 1an Recon truction Malllng 2530 Ctyslal Drive Arlington Virginia 22202-3940 Tel 703 545 6000 I www slgar mil Page 22 @ s1GAR I Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction March 25 2013 ll1e llonorable C huck Hagel Secretary of Defense Dear Secretary Hagel As you know my office is charged by Congress with the responsibi lity for leading coordinating and recommending policies to promote economy efficiency and effectiveness of programs and operations for the reconstruction of Afghanistan The audits in pections and investigations that S IGAR conducts form the basis for our execution of this responsibility In a recent conversation with the U S Ambassador to Afghanistan I mentioned that we woul d be looking at the most and least successful reconstruction project as identified by U S agencies l believe that this will be a valuab le ex ercise It is important to understand how U S agencies evaluate and perceive both their successes and fai lures Such an understanding is critical for formulating lessons learned from our unprecedented reconstruction effort Therefore I formally request that you provide • • • a li st of the ten Afghanistan reconstruction projects programs funded and deemed most successful by the Department of Defense a list of the ten Afghanistan reconstruction projects programs funded and deemed least successful by the Department of Defense and a detailed explanation of how these projects programs were evaluated and selected as th e ten most and least successfll l projects inc luding th e spec ific criteria used for each I am submitting this request pursuant to my authority under Public Law No 110-181 as amended and the Lnspector General Act of 1978 as amended Please direct your staff to provide this information by April 25 2013 to Monica Brym SIGAR Director of Special Projects at monica j brym civ@ mail mil If you have any questions or concerns please do not hesitate to contact me at 703 545-6000 or Ms Brym al 703 545-6003 Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter cc General Joseph F Dunford Jr Commander U S Forces-Afghanistan and Commander International Secu rity Assistance Force General James N Mattis Commander U S Central Command 1550 Crystal Drive 9th Floor Arlington Virginia 22202 SIGAR 20-19-TY I Malling 2530 Crystal Drive Arlington Virginia 22202-3940 I T e I 703 545 6000 www slgar mll Page 23 @ s1GAR I Office ohtie SpecTal Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction July 5 2013 The Honorable John F Kerry U S Secretary Of State The Honorable Chuck Hagel U S Secretary of Defense The Honorable Rajiv Sha'h Administt'ator U S Agency for I·r'lternational Development Dear Secretary Kerry Secretary Haget and Aclmtnistrator Shah On March 25 2013 I wrote to you asking that your agencies provide SIGAR with 1nformation on what each of you considers to be the 10 most successfu I -and 10 least successful projects or programs within your agency in the U S effort for reconstruction of Afghanistan supplementecl with explanations of selection and evaluation criteria for your choices A copy of that letter is attached Comparing outcomes is in addition to being good practice for managers and part of the job for inspectors general the subject of formal guidance for Executive Branch departments and c1gencies In May 2012 the Office of Management and Budget issued a memorandum on Use of Evidence and Evaluation in the 2014 Budget That document said in part Agencies are encouraged to include measurement of costs and costs per outcome as part of the routine reporting of funded programs to allow for useful comparison of costeffectiveness across programs Once evidenoe--bi lsed programs have been identified such a return-0n-investment analysis can Tmprove agency resource allocation and inform public understanding 0MB invites agencies to identify areas where research provides strong evidence regarding the comparatfve cost-effectiveness of agency investments • rEmphasis added l I recognize that applying cost-effectiveness and comparative analysis to programs and projects in a contingency-operation zone like Afghanistan where benefits m lY include soft outcomes like public opinion and where multiple programs support similar goals can be difficult But the importance of the mission and the billions of dollars supporting it demand that comparisons be made as best we can That consideration-and the well-documented flaws and disappointments in mony U S -funded initiotives-was the motive for my March 25 letter to you I have the responses to that letter submitted by your 9esignees Mr Daniel Feldman Deputy Special Representative for AfghBnistan ind f ekistan and Mr J Alexander Thier Assistant to the Administ rator for Afghanistan and Pal istan supplied a joint State USAID response dated May 9 2013 Mr Mike Dumont Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs submitted a response dated June 18 2013 1sso c ysial Dnve 9th r100 Arllngt011 Virginia 22202 SIGAR 20-19-TY Mall 2- i30Virginia Crystal22202-39 0 011' a Arlington I e1·• 703 545 6000 I www slgai mlI Page 24 Both response letters are thoughtful and informative and include pertinent observations of the difficulty of executing reconstruc Jon progrems 1n a setting like Afgt anistan plagued as 1lls by v1ole11 poverty 1ll1taracy corruption l 'ladequate infrastructure and other probten1s In three trips to AfghanJstan during my firstyear as Special Inspector Gerieral I nave seen and tieard much el idence of the difficulties racJng program and project planners managers and oversight officials both civilian and military I have pectal respect for the dedication and bravery of your staff working 1ri that dangerous part of the world and agiee that they have contributed slgnlficant1y to produo1ngsome Indicators of genuine progress lnsecunty governance development rule of law human rights and other areas that will benefit the people af Afghanistan and Ame11ca s poj cy interests Nonetheless I have some dlff cultJI $ with the respc ns1veness of your agencies lettefb Arst State and USAID made a Jomt response despite separate requests having been made to them I understand-and am delighted as a citizen and ta x payer-that the agencies a e in ' close cooperation on matters affeclJngAfghan reconstruction However each agency has tis own tnt ernal organization and practices Its own in-house Inspect or General evaluating that agency's projects and programs clnd ts own li t of programs on Its own website Because State and l JSAJD are legally d1st 1nctent1tJes and because they have operational autonomy w1th1n the ambit of theil missions however closely they cooperate I ask that the two agencies provrde sepa ate responses to this letter I speculate that State pursued r he path of a Joint response because of the llm1t ed number of lts programs 1n Afghamstan that point Witt t e addressed later in this letter via shghtly modified request language Saccnd neither response letter complied with my request fot a J1st1ngand discussion or each agency's 10 most and 10 least successful projects or programs The State USAID response explJc1tJy said we do not com pa re indivldual projects against others • Yet the same letter later notes that not every program has succeeded as 011ginally intended which I 113ad as evidence that someone has exarruned the results of 1ndiv1dual programs and obser11ed that some succeeded and others did not Defense stated that many reconswction programs are conducted m cooperanon wlth partners and are · evaluated on a proJeot spectfic basis• rather than compared That may well be but I note that my March 25 letter asKed about ' projects programs not exclusively one or the other Progtarn evaluation inevitably entails or at least facilitates comparisons of projects If noL what basis would agency managers h1Jve for dec1d1ng-sqy 1n the face of budge t cuts sequestrations or new mission d1rect1ves-Wh1cll proJects to priontize expand contract terminate transfer 01 redesign How do they decide Which project managers deserve greater respons1b1ley 01 career advancement or the obverse Without companng outcomes How do they capture lessons learned to improve agency performance without making comparisons Nonetheless even If a formal process of oompanng program or proiect outcomes does not exist within yoU1 agencies hope it will not seem unreasonable if I ask you to make at minimum a hmtted judgmental comparison to help SIGAR with ts official duhes My third concern with the agency response lette1s involves theoonce ptof 1nd1cators The letters con many 1nt erest ing and encouraging data points 1llustratmg or suggesting overall progress In Afghanistan teconsrrucuon Unfortunately many of them show no obvious aausal nexus with a particular U S program 01 prQject or p1esent an output as a prima facie indicator o-f success lJSAID proJects and programs are assigned performance ind10qtors that are the basis for tam SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 25 observing progress and measuring actual results compared to ex pected results of the program Yet the joint State USAIO letter does not identify discrete program-specific indicatocs necessary to identify characteristics and outcomes or io inform decisions about currem and future programming Similarty he Departmentof Defense mandated that proJects executed through the Commander's Emergency Response Progrart CERP have performance metrics for all projects ovet $50 000 to be tracked up to 365 days after -a 13roject has been completed 11 CERP performance metrics include the issue of sustatnab1hty These are worthy requirements but not all metrics are equally salient or useful For an example of a possibly ambiguous ind1cato lhe Stats USAID letta1 notes that the proportion of the Afghan population w1th1n an hour's walk of a health-care facility has nsen from 9 percent n 2001 to more than 60 peroent today However Afgnan stan ha-s been slowly urbamzing for decades w th estimates of 4 7 pera nt annual growth in urban populations in lhe 2010-2015 period• So some part of the observed IncIease In the one hour's waH parameter simply reflects a demographic trend As urbanization continues the indicator would Improve even 11 heall h-facihty construct Jon stopped completely Fo1 that matter lhe ind1cato1 could also improve If more director better-surfaced roads and paths were built ldentlfy1J'lg reasonable and measurable Indicators for specific ffotts is admlttedly not an e actsc1ence but the causal haziness around the edges of this 1ndioator suggests that careful attentron to selectron logic and rneasurement protocol is 1varranted In addllJOO the health IndIcators cited In ttie lette1 aIe foI Ute country as a whole and are not specific to the 13 of 3 4 provinces supported by USAID The USAID Inspector General found In 01 e 2011 audit that measurement of the magn1wdeof USAJD's contribution to the national objectives could be made only Indirectly using proxy Indicators because no current demographic information or health statistics were available to measure health outcomes directly The Afghanistan Moroihty Survey of 20 10 cited in the Joint State USAID letter does not address mis issue as there s slltl no clear connection between United States government efforts and overall health improvements I hat have undoubtedly occurred since 2001 For example the survey reports that the sample design had d1sproportronate e cluston particularly of rural areas In the southem region that woold affect five of the thirteen provinces spec flcally SllPPQfted by USAID Some of these data points also appear to have been selectively chosen iri order to emphasize progress as W1th the life-expectancy improvement cited n the State USAID fetter with a reported increase from 114 years to more than 60 years In the past decade The World Bani however purposely drd not Include the Mortalny Survey results in a recentre port becaus e the siJrvey does not have bme-senes data for the last 10 years for comparative ana1Ysls they argue It Is essential to use stat Jsl cs from a sir1gle international database ' According co the World Bank figure Afghan life e peC1Bncy Is 48 years The mdlcato S for edllcation s1mIlarly appear to tal e credit for progress across the country as a whole Without clear attnbution to specrfic united States government efforts The numbet of students enrolled 1s presented as the national total blrt 1t IS not clear wha t if any corlnecoon there 1s with the -schools bullt and isachers trained through USAID efforts I would have expected Information such as the utilrz ation rates of USAID supported schools as thls would more clearly connect the United States government effort to the reported-student nun bers and additionally SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 26 would provide evidence of Afghan governmentcapac ty to mal e use of assets transferred to them The Department of Defense 1esponse offers some information wlth regard to Afghan government s1 JSta1nment but the examples are restricted to one province and cover only three of 4 000 education projects totaling $230 mtlhon obligated The World Bank has raised the issue of sustainment noting that school construction the same indicator touted m both letters has crowded out operations end mamtenance with allocations falling far below requirements and areJY reaching schools · The lolnt State USAID and Dei artment of Defense resPQnses to education h1gt hghtmy ssue with the md cators presented wrth theState USAID 1esponse disconnected from USAID efforts and 01e Department of Defense retying on anecdot il evidence For another example the DefeC1Se JetU r notes that more than 194- 000 Afghan National SecuritY Force personnel had some lever of llteraCY and numeracy training That rs encouraging but given that the 2009 rate of ANSF illiteracy was 86 percent• and that theANSF has fairly high turnover It does not tell us whether the ef1ort has matarrally improved the overall ANSF htaracy rate and more Importantly lrop oved t to the eitent or bolstenng admin stralJlle and operatronal success In addition the datum does not tell us whether the hteracy prograrn itself 1s efficfently conducted and monl tored Flnal y on the rule or law I was d sappo1nted to note that the indicators offered 1t1 the iornt State USAIO response d d not address two ma1or areas of concern high-level corruption and opium produe11on The letter r otes that State aqd USAIO have provided tra1n1ngand support to Afghan antJ orr1 iptlon bodies bUt unhke the pnscn statistics does not give any ndlcatron of the effect such as types and numbers of successhJI prosecutions Sending 13 Judges on an educational trip and putting court personnel through training cou1Ses are presumably useful actJVitJes but such outputs need credlble Unkages to outcomes Similarly the lndtcators provided in reference to 1he drug trade note the scale of the problem with Afghanistan accountlngfo roughly 90 percent of lero1n worldwrde but does not connect improvements 1n the licit economy With decreases 1n the 1U1cfteconomy In 2012 VSAID Inspector General found that a key USAID a1ternatJve-clevelopment program was d irected by USAID to focus only on expanding the licit economy 111 order to suppon indicators for the agriculture secwr such as those touted 1n the 1etter and to ignore goals mat dealt Wrth assistance to voluntary poppy eradlcaoon and to farms in the aftermath of opium poppy eradicat1on dest uct 1on programs ·• The reportf1Jrther states that there was ncreased poppy growth in the provinces covered by the prog1am with two of the covered provinces losing their pop •-free status and rive provinces 1nc eas1ng opium cultivation The rnpact of USAID s agricultural programs on the hcit economy are certainly laudable but 1f tl1ey do not tesult rn decreased opium oultivatlon then positive impacts a a eroded me Nat1ona I-level indicators may suggest a pos bve aggrega ts impac t for U S programs but individual r esults certainly va1y w1th1n program portfolios of proJect and positive aggregare outcomes may mask indiv1dua I failures or sub-par performance At times It is even dlfficult to 1denti yan lnd1vidual result Unfortunate the letters dtd not rdent1fy specific programs or the indicators and targets tor those specific programs Just last month the State Department's Office of lnspectm General published an audit of the Bureau of Adtn1ntstratlon A Bureau Office of Logistics Manageme n Office of Acqu1sltlons Management A LM AQMJ which directs Department acquisition program sand manages a 1 percent fee for ts services Those services include operations m1ss1ons and programs of the Page · SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 27 Bureau of lntarnatJonal Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs the Bureau of Overseas Butldirigs Operal ons the Bureau of D1plomatJc Secun ' as well as gr 1nts contracts and agreements with other nations non-governmental organizations and commercial enoties A portion of that State OIG audit mirrors my concern and 1s wort 1 not mg tie re A LM AQM was tracking some metrics to assess program performance However these performance meuics also generally did not tie to the goals 10 the Bus•ness Plan Without measu11ng its performance A LM AQM cannot ensure 1t1s mal lng progress on its overall obJecuve of providing consistent and to prove I procurement servtces to the Departme 1t Performance management 1s a systematic process of monitoring the achievements of program actJvltJes which includes collecting and ana lyz ng performarice data in order to track progress toward a defined goal and then using the analyzed data to make informed dec1s1ons 1ncludfng allocaung resources fo1 the program Measu11ng performance atalf st program goals is an assential part of performance management ' As for Defense GAO has been carrying DOD contractmaJ'lagementon its High-Risk bst since 1992 1 an audit of a m1l1tary construcuon thatcrea1ed llfe ar1d-safety electrical and fire naza ds fo U S and other c oahtlon personnel the DOD Hound the 1esponsible A1t Force construcbonmanagementoff1c1als did not develop a formal process to monitor assess and document the Quality of work penormed bY contractor personnel for four proJectS valued at $36 9 m1I11on · Such voids 1n basic data make proJectcompansons even more difficult As you l now SIGAR sown audits investigations and spe1 1al proJects have-also addressed aspects of reconstruction program or p10Ject success and failure But as the preceding c1tat1ons to other IGs' work Illustrate we are not alone m spotting rssues The lat'ge body of work by' SIGAR GAO and you1 agency Inspectors General-not to mention numerous ageJ'CY concurrences 1n the findings and recommendations in that WQrk-mply documents that 1T1any programs and projects have systematic weaknesses in framlng plano1ng eiecution and oversight that call out for improvement Pursuant to our statutory mandate and as p 1rtof our participation in the Jomt Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan Reconstruction we are prepanng add1t1ona1products for release a11d will be launching new Initiatives touching on these concerns as the reconstruction effort proceeds As I explained in 11' Y March 25 2013 letter an important part of our work Is understanding how U S agencies evaluate and perceive both their successes and failures That understanding 1s cntical for formulating lessons learned from our uqprecedented reco11st1uction effort rn Afghanistan-an effort already accounting for nearly $89 billion ill appropriauons US government agencies need to 1aentify and act on lessons learned from past reconstruction projects and programs Ttmelyaction can help 1mplementmgagenc1es and Congress adjust reconstruction programs to protect taxpayer runds and Improve outcomes before It is too late My letter of March 25 therefore formally requested lhatyou proV de • a list of the 10 Afghar 1stan reconstruction proJects programs funded and deemed most successful by u e agency • a list of the 10 At'ghanisi an econstrucbon proJects programs funded and deemed least successful by the agency' • a detailed explanation of how ihese projects programs were evaluated and selected as the 10 most and leastsuceessful projects including the specific criteria used for each Page5 SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 28 Upon considering your responses to that request I appreciate that 1dentJfy1ng the 10 most- and 10 ecist uccessful programs or projects 1n Afghanistan may entail an unreasonable benefiVcost burden of research and analytical rigor In compansons across many lnftiatJves We have no wish to impose unproductive burdens upon your staff especially when many may be inconvenienced by the 1mp1ngernent of sequestration-furloughs on their worlt hours nieretore I will mod1ty my request and now ask you to provide the following • a list of 10 of the more successful Afghanistan re-construction projects pro8 8ms funded by your agency • a list of 10 of Uie less successful Afgt amstan reconstruction projects programs tunded by y0ur agency • an explanation or how you selected the pro ects 1n each ltst and your view of what made them more or less successful e g goal framing requirernenta identlficatJon acquiring actJvlty agent performance management oversight and technical assessment coordination than intended Note In view o States more ltm1ted program act1vIty 111 Afghanistan a reasonable response 01 fewer than 10 items 111 each catego v Will be satisfactory Based on yout responses we will 1dent fy 1ndIv1dual p ograms and pro1ects to possible further examination through reviews or audits This could lead us lo look at programs or projects deemed to have achieved their objectives as well as less successful undertakings In addition to nobng the cotena your agency used to evaluate the pro1ects the results of those evaluations and any documented lessons learned we could assess h ow well the projects achieved their stated obJecoves and Whether they contributerl to the lar r strategrc goats underlying the U S government's Atgtian reconstruction effo 1S In addition for each program examined we will seek to answer the seven questions laid out in SIGAR s January 2013 Quarterly Report to Congress These are seven questions that dec1s1on makers Includ1ng Congress should ask as they consider whether and how best to use remaIn Ing reconstruction funds The questions are· i Does the projector program make a clear and Identifiable contribution to our national Interests or strategic obJectJVes 2 Do the Afghans want 1t or oeed it 3 Has 1t been coordinated with other U S ImplementJng agencies with the Afghan governmenl and with other 1nternat1onal donors 4 Do secunty conditions permit effective 1mpternentat1on and oversight 5 Does 1t have adequate safeguards to detecc deter and mitJgare corruptJOn 6 Do the Afghans have the fInanc1al resources technical capaclt ' and political Will to sustain rt 7 Have implementing partners establlshed meaningful measurable metries for determinmg successful project outcomes We belteve our reviews and audits by t elp1ng to understand and document how ag1 nc1es are planning strategically for reconstruction pending estabhsh1ng program objectives evaluating p rograms and identifymg lessons learned will conmbute lD improving the efficiency and Pagef SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 29 effecuveness of c111Jcal reconstruction programs and mitigate fraud waste and abuse_SIGAR will conunue to make every effort to see that Congress and the implementing agencies are fully informed about the progress of the reconsrruet1on effort-lnclud1ngd1scussions of agency policy and practice that have led to good outcomes-and have the information Uiey need to safeguard US funds and ensure that taxpayerdo lars are spent wisely I trust this letter clarifies U'le reasons for my March 25 request and that my modlficat1on of terms fairly and reasonably addresses the concerns voiced 1n your previous responses I look fo1ward to you r respcnse and our conbi'lued cooperation 1n support of tl e naoo 1a1 mIss10111n Afghanistan Sincerely Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconsuucuon Enclosures cc The Honorable James B Cunningham U S Ambassado1 to Atghan1stB11 Notes Office of Management and Budget Memorandum to the Heads of Exeaut1ve Departments and Agencies Use of evidence and Evaluabon m the 2014 Budg- l' May 18 2012 p 2 Unittld States Agency fOf lnten atJonal Developrnenl ADS Chap 203 - Assessing and Learning November 2012 p 18 11 ' lJSFOfl·A Money as a Weepoo System-Comrrender's Emergency Response Program SOP Match 2012 pp 177-178 Ibid p 40 · CIA 'Worl I f lct - 00111 e ace June 19 20113 USAID OIG Audit Of USAID Mghanistan s On-Budget Fundi11gASS1stanoe to the M mstry of Public Health in Support of the Part ne S lip Contracts for Health Services Program Audit Repon F-306 -U-004·P September 29 2011 p 3 ' Afghan Pubhc Hec1lth Institute Afghanistan Mortality Survey 2010 p 10 ' ' World Bani Af ghanrstan in Transit on Lookmg Beyond 2014 Volume 2 May 2012 p 12 World Ban A1ghan1scan In Transition Lool lng EJeyohd 20 ia Volume 2 Ma_y 2012 pp_ 88·89 · The WOfld Bank rep01t further notes that the lack or operations and maintenance funds has caused education infra tructure to det e11orate and that the current chool population 1s also heavily oonoentrated In grades 1-4 w u t Ig l d OPoUl rates In h1g ler grades The World Bank states that widespread concerns e xist Y ef education qual1ty owing to the poor qualifications of some teachers lack of a standardized SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 30 curriculum lack of evaluatiOC standards and iosuffic1ency of basicscnool supplies Statistics collected 1n 2009-10 by a national teachei-registration system mdloate mat only 27 pe1cent of the 1-62 000 registered generai-6ducation teachers are educated at a grade 14 level the otf1oial minimum requirement for teaching or higher Statement of Lt Gen Willlaori 8 Caldwell IV Commande1 United states AfmY North Fifth Army before the U S House Subcommittee O l fllattonal Securit y Kometand Defense and Faeign Ope auons heanng Sepl 12 2012 • 1 IJSAID OIG Audit OfUSAID Afgnan $1 n s lncentNes Dnvmg Econom1cAlternatlVesforrhe North East and West PrQgram Audit Report F-306-12-004-P June 29 201 2 p 5 ' State OIG AllD-fM·13-29 Aud t of Depai tment of St ate Application of the ProctJremeot Fee to Accomp 1511 Key Goals of Procurem mtServic i s May 2013 p 50 DOD 1G Repoit No DODIG-2013-052 Inadequate Contraot O ers gnt o Military Construction Projeccs In Afghanistan Resulted in Increased Hazards to Life and Umb of Ooalttlon Fou es March S 2013 I SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 33 Un11t d SUJt ' Depnrtmcm o f S1at i111 1111 Jtill 05 11 August 5 2013 John F Sopko Special f nspector General for Afghanistan Reconstrnction SIOAR Dear Mr Sopko Thank you for your feedback on our March 25 response to your que1y regarding our top l O most and least successful projects and programs ln Afghanistan We found this to be a useful exercise Lhat sparked productive conversations and enhanced coordination both within the Depa1tment of State an d with the U S Agency for lntemational Development USAID with whom we answered jointJ y Our agencies chose to respond jointly to l1ighlight our close interagency cooperation in achieving measurable results from our assistance efforts in Afghanistan in support of our national security goal of ensuring Afghanistan can no longer be a safe haven for te1rorists that threaten U S interests We were pleased to report on some of the accomplishments of tI1e Department of State and USAlD in Afghanistan in recent years as well as on some of the problems that we have faced in imple nenting foreign assistance We highlighted assistance programs in the education sector in tbe field of public health in public fmancial management and with respect to promoting the empowered role of women access to electricity and good governance and the rule oflaw These programs have contributed to measurable rositive impacts on Afgharistan 's development and stabiJity with achievements- based objective indicators of progress including improvement on international indices for human economic and dem0cratic development We al'so acknowledged that operating in a war-time environment means it is inevitable that not every program has succeeded as originaUy intended Delays frau poor performance security challenges and contractor overcharges have been an unfortunate feature of trying to achieve our national priorities in Afghanistan that we have ccmstantly battled against Many of the obstacles we have encountered have been well documented and have benefited from SIGAR·s oversight SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 31 1n noting in the March response those areas where continuing attention is warranted given the challenges of operating in Afghanistan we emphasized that we share Sl GAR 's goal of safeguarding U S taxpayer resources from fraud waste and abuse while seeking the most effoctive uses of those resoun es in advancing our national security through assistance programs in Afghanistan We look forward to working t0gether to find ways to improve our oversight mechanisms As we explained in our March letter however we monitor and evaluate individual projects against the detailed standards and outcomes established in the initial performance doc-uments Gi veo_ the wide range of assistance projects and programs our agencies have can-ied out we do not compare individual projects against others particularly over a decade o f intensive rebuilding eJ'fo11s which result in constantly changing conditions for each project We also recognize that achieving our strategic goals in any particular sector in Afghanistan requires a number of projects working together in time or over time -- including those using other donors· funds While we rec gnize the value of many of the points emphasized in your follow lip letter upon reviewing the modified request we helieve we have no additional inlormntion 10 supplement our response to your original requesL We welcome further discussion and oversight of any of our existing or past reconstruction projects and programs in Alghanistan l iincerely I l l J rrctt Blanc Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan nnd Pakistan SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 32 May9 2013 Joho F Sopko Special lnspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction SlGAR SUBJECT SIGAR Letter to the Department ofState llSAID and Department of Defense Requesting Top Most Successful and Least Successful Projects In response to your letter of March 25 we arc pleased 10 report on some of the accomplishments of the De-partment of State and the U S Agency for International Develupmenl USAID in Afghanlstan in recem years as well as on some of the problems I hat we have faced in implementing foreian assistance Our agencies have chosen to respond jointly to highlight our close cooperation in achieving measurable results from our assistance effons in Afgbanis1a11 in support of our national securitY goal of' ensuring Afghanistan can no longer be a safe haven for terrorists that threaten U S interests Fcom a society shattered by more than three decades of war and after more than a decade of rtbw1dmg there is now significant statistical daia ouiliulag Afghanistan's steady progress despite the political economic and security challenges prescnt ed by that Mbulcnt pasL We monitor and evaluate individual projects against the detailed standards and outcomes established in the io itial performance documenlS Given the wide range of assistance proj ectS and programs our agencies have carried out we do not compare u idhidual projects against others particularly over a decade of intensive rebuilding efforts which result in constantly changing conditions for each project We also recognize th tl achieving our strategic goals in any particular sector in Afghanistan requires a number of projects working together over time including those using other donors• funds lo Parr I below we highlight assistance programs that have contributed to measurable positive impacts on Afghanisum·s development and stability The achievements u-e based on objective indicators of progress inclllding improvement on i ntcmational indices for human economic and ccroocratic development In Pan U we highlight the problems we have encountered in ensuring tbe musl c ost-e Tecuve use ofta ' paycr dollars in e chieving these gains and the methods we use lo o erc ome them Part l Measurable Resul ID the education sector there are clcarindicators ofprogress ln 2002 only an estimated 900 000 boys and vinually no girls were in scbooL Now there arc 8 million students emolled in school more than a thml of whom are gills University enrollment has increased _from 8 000 in 2001 LO 77 000 in 2011 USAID bas suppon e d these gains by builchnJ 605 whools training SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 34 -2 - teachers and developing univecsity teaching de cc programs Multiple implementers donois and coordinated projecrs are responsible for these achievements Addilionally r he Embassy's Public Affairs Section funded the Bagch-i-simsim Sesame Street radio project This project builds upon the successoftbe television project with the same name and targets millions of young roral Afghan children who do not bave access to a television The program's themes spread the values of lolt rance fairness and peaceful resolution ofconfi1ct Twenty-six diffC'TClll cpf$0des of30 minwes each in Dari and Pasbto are broadcast on multiple radio S1ations throughout the country Each show includes original mnlent that is alignea wrth the Ministry•of Educarion·s early childhood educational framework Otl1ec U S Government-sponsored education programs targe1 other equally imp rtant audiencs and are designed to build capacity in critical govemmen1 sectors and achieve fore gn policy goals In November 2012 the State Oepar1meat bosted a two-week training program in Washington for 13 Afghan diplomats in partnership with the Publfo Diplomacy Council and the Unive 'Sity of Maryland Through fonnal training sessions lectures irueractivc simlllarioas and site Visits the Afghan visitors developed their practical skills as diplomats and gained better understanding of United Sunes culrure and policy panicularly lhe importance of women's ngh1s and human rights The importance of regular ioleract1on with a free and independent media in a democracy was also hig hligbted The program wa the second phase of a jornr trarning program for Afghan diplomats the 6rs1 phase was sponsored by the Govenunent of China and took place in Beijing in May By building lhe capacity oftbe staff of the Afgban Ministry of'Foreign Affairs we-enhanced its professionalism and its ability co work oooperat ivel · and effoctiveJy '- ith lhe U S gc1Vemment and other couotries as werl as GOs media outlets univers ties businesses and religious institutions Jo the titld ofpublk health since the displacement orlhe Taliban the Af ha n Ministry of Public Health has been successful in rebuilding lbe healthcare syStem with low cost high impact interventions to improve the health of Afghans prim rily women and children With substantial suppon from the United Stares and other donors access to basic b lth services defi n ed as a person·s ability to reach a facility within one hour by fool has risen from 9 percent in 200 l tet more than 60 percent today alld more th an 22 000 health workers have been trained through multiple projects According to the Afghanistan Monality SU Vey 2010 Afghanistan has seen a rise in life expectancy from 44 years 10 cnore than 60 or an lncrease of 15-20 years in the lasr decade The Jlder-five mortality rate has been reduced from 172 to 97 deaths per t 000 live births The estimated maternal mortality ratio declined significantly from I 600 per 100 000 births to 327 r er 100 000 binhs TI1e number of functioning primary health care facilities increased from 498 in 2002 ro over 1 970 in 2010 The gains made in I he health sectorare due to a c Ordinated effort by the donor coaunWl ity io the early stages of tile rebuilding effort5 a focus on providing low-cost basic health services and a determination by the Afl -hans lo ogthen the Ministry orPublic Health These are long-u-rm SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 35 - - programs that span mulriple donors and various contractors and grantees over a decade of determined focus by the health 1eams al USAID and the international community in concert with the Afghan Government In public fin8llcial management USAID·s support has helped the Afghan government grow ics internal revenue collectioo by almost 20 percent pitr year since 2002 Domestic revenue is critical to reduce the Afghan govemmenfs reliance on foreign ass1s '3f Ce and to promote longterm sustainable growth through investment in infrastructure and service-s Tn 2010 11 domestic revenue reached $1 7 billion or 11 percent of GDP excecdin g the IMF rarget of9 2 pe rcent per year Revenue from Customs is the fastest-growing segment increasing mure than 400 percent since 2006 USAID's prog-rams have assistl d the Afgh m goveroment w develop a centrali7 ed Customs collection system contributing to tl1e sharp increases in annual Customs reven11es Afghan domestic revenue collection underperformed in 2012 and US D is working with the Ministry of Finance to identify tcptiaJ reasons and remedial actions to address the shortfall has To promote me r ole of women ill Afghan politics culture J1nd bu$lness our work has helped Afghan women take on larger roles in society Today almost 20 percent of Afghans enrolled in higher education are women Twenty seven percent of seats in the Parliament one governor three cabinet and 120 judicial positions are now held by wame n Hundreds of women's organi7'8 tions are work ing to end violence and discrimination against women and the Afghan Government has committed to ensuring that by 2013 at leasl 30 percent of government employees are women The Department of Staie's 8ur u of lntemational Narcotics and Law Enforcement INL funds Women for Afghan Women to operate Children's Support Centers CSCs in Kabul Mazar-e Sharif and Kunduz The CSCs provide b ousing and educational services for children who would otherwise be in prison with their incarcerated mothers The majority ofthe se chilcren have bad little to no formal education prior to arriving_ CSC-educated cbildre n are at the top of tbeit classes and some have been placed in advanced s1udy programs abroad Children are allowed to stay at the CSC until they rum 18 years of age even after their mothers are re ll -ased allowing their mothers to have tne time needed to construct a stable home environment INl 's commitment to helping these children improve t11eir lives has been key to the overall success o this program 'IL also supports the operations of nine women·s shelterS across AfghaniStan and the Afghan Women s Shelter Net work which brings together Afghan sheller providers to discu best practices and advocate for victims NL' s sup rt has expanded the number of provinces where S t Vices are-available to victims of gender-based violence and discrimination and facilitated an Afghan-led campaign to increase public acceptance ofwomen·s snelters We have seen an increase l'n government referrals to and political support for the shelters indicating that the Afghan government is starting lo accept shelters as legitimate resources for women seeking legal and protective services Shelters have been provided multi-year funding that ex tends into 201S In 2012 INL-funded shelters benefited approximately 2 000 women and children in 30 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 36 To promote acc_ess to reliJtble electricity USA ID assistance has included hYdro-eleclric and solar facilities and ha focused on making lbe Afghan national power corrrpany OABS selt SUStaiaing through increased revenue collectio n and increased efficiency In 2002 only 6 per-0t-nt of Afghans had access to reliable electricity Today nearly JO percent do inofoding more than 2 million people in Kabul ho now benefit from elecuk power 24 hours a day DABS h11S increased revenues cowiny--wide by roughly 50 _pen enr from 20 IO lo 2012 This represents hundreds of millions of dollars saved io s1Jbsidid from U S taxpayers and other donors The suecess DA BS O 'e suoh a shon period of time four years is a remarkable achl1 vcmcnt or Tu p romote good goveroaoce sod the rule of la w in Afghanis1a tNLhas lhtougb its L-nplementin_g partner assisted the General Directorate of Prisons and Detention C--enters ODPDC' ill improving its ca bilicy 10 operaJi safe secu e and humane Afghan currectional facilities This is particularly important gh cn the shnrp increases in anests and prosecutioll8 which c aused tbe prisno population 10 grow dramatically ftom 600 prison rs In 2001 to more than 27 000 in 2013 Despite poor inlrasrrucrure comparatively low staff salaries and a 17 percent annual inmate growth rate the GDPDC has built and maintained humane facilities worked to separate National Securicy Threai I ST inmates from common criminals and implemented Statldard ope1atiog procedures in line with intematior al standards in an expanding number of pn lunS al U det eotion centers These illlpro -ements can be attnouted in part to comprehertsive hancb-on mentoring and tr-ainingby1N ·s Corrections Sys em Suppon Program CSSP CSSf adviso s have trained 8 000 corrections officers since 2006 under ti orous oversight from INL's program managers and contracting personoeL IN L's focus on training Afghan Government trainers not only created sustainable training capacity but bas resulted in the successftil LtanSfc r of 90 percent of all corrections training activities to the Afghan government an important milestone in the development ofGDPDC's capab-ilities The State Department and USAID also provide training to the judicial scctoc and other elements of Afghan cri minalj lStjce institutions for example through the State Department's work wilh the Jus ice Center i n Parwao JCIP The JCTP is a special Afghan court for th1 adjudil atlon under Afghan law and by Afghan judges prosecutors and defense counsel • t f criminal d1arges filed by Afghan authoritfos against former U S Law of Anned Conflict LOAC detainees The JCD' is 1 pannershlp oftheAfg ian Supreme Court Attomey GeaeraJ's Office Ministry of Justice Ministry nftbe nterior National Directorate ofSecurity and Ministr • of Defense with support from Combined 1oi nt nteragem y Task Fqrce 435 the Australian A imcy for l01ernational Development arui INL Coordinated U S Government support enal les he JO to hear thousands of cases and huilds bath the adjudicative capacity of the court and its personnel The JOP did not exist three years 1go it hca nl its first case in June 20 I0 The JCIP tried 3 I primary court cases in 201 0 288 ia 20 11 974 ln 2012 and 780 inj ust the first four months of2013 Even with its growing caseli ad Afghan defense attorneys who have worked at the JCIP consistently describe the coun as providing among the fairest trials in Afghanistan NL provides fonnal training dai y l'Jlcntoring and operatiooal support to nearly 100 Afghanjudges prosecutors defunsc counsel and invest'igatQfs in evidence-based criminal investigations and prosecutions In addition to SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 37 -5strengthening the Afghans' ability to Ir the important national security cases at the JCil' INL 's capacity building support allows these legal professionals to take the skills experiences and lessons leamed from the JCIP to their next assignments expanding the impact of JNL 's support across the Afg lian justice system The Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance ATA program has built and eveloped the Presidential Protective Service PPS into an cffecti ve digrutary protection unit Beginning with the inception ofthe unit a year after 9 11 the ATA program bas provided training equipmt nt and menlorship to several buudredPPS officers at the unit's camp facility Not only ha PPS rccci ved extensive training in tactical skills such as protection of national leaden hip counter-assault aad defensive marksmanship it bas also institutionalized the wealth of infonnation in those courses into its own training structure Through participation in instructor development courses and ongoing work with ATA advisors PPS bas developed the ability to train its own officers in these specialized protective skills In addition Depat1rnen1 of Statefunded implementing partners have cleared more than 343 414 869 square meters of land and removed or destroyed approximately 8 049 260 landmines and other explosive remnants of war such as unexploded ordnance abandoned ordnance stockpiled munitions and home-made explosives Part D Problems and Solution§ The programmatic achievemen'5 noted above repreSent just part of the progress achieved by Afghanistan with the support and sacrifice of the United States and other donors over lhe past decade Operating in a war-time environment means it is inevitable that not every program has succeeded as originally intended Delays fraud poor performance security cl iallengcs contractor oven harges have bet Il a too-constant feature of doing business in Afghanistan --and many of lhe obstacles we have encountered have been well documented and have benefited from SIGAR·s oversight To figbt corruption we have worked aggressively 10 provide trd iniog and pressed the Afghan government to address corruption on a systematic basis USAID is supporting the fight against corruption both in the wa v we do busine such as cncoura ging the use of mobile money to ensure wages are paid directly into personal accounts and through projects like the Assistance for Afghanistan-s Anticorruption Authority 4A which supports the High Office of Oversight hi the Afg han government to combat corruption Te improve tJte rule oflaw and fight criminal activities USAID and the Department of State work together in several areas Afghanistan' s role in the intematiopal drug tmde - accounting for roughly 90 percent of heroin worldY-ide - contributes to increased crime degrades the esrablishmenr of govcmance and the rule of law undercuts the licit economy and undermines public health USAID and Department of Staie are working to reduce poppy cultivation by strengthening the Afghan Government's capacity to combat the drug trade and countering the link between_narcotics and the insurgency USA D's agriculturaJ programs have helped establish 314 268 hectares with altemafr e crops increased sales of licit farm and non fann SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 38 -6- products by $271 3' 3 642 benefited 2 519 420 families and created 192 686 full-time cquivahmt jobs bet ween FY 2008 - 2012 Growth of the nation's licit economy is impeded by a largely illiterate workforce that lacks vjtal technical skills as well as c edit and banking systems that are underdeveloped and fragile Meanwhile porous borders encourage unlawful trade These challenges plus corruption and security concerns continue to hinder physical and capital inveso nenl especially by the private sector Inadequate security and a shortagc_of skilled technicians engineers and construction workers hinder the construction and maintenance ofcritical infrastructure Construction supplies often have to be imported significantly increasing project coSlS Across sectors a persistent insurgency and difficult security environment b ave made the mission much harder despite the strong presence of the international Security Assistance Force ISAF As an example on um USA ID road project 19 people v1 cre killed while working on construction and 364 security incidents were reported Security dangers often slow progress and daily activities are made more complicated by an aLrnosph e of opportunism corruption and lawlessness To e fec th•ely monitor the use of1axpayers' fun ds where there is a lack of capacity USAID and $tale empl9y n-umerous oversight mechanisms at every project phase - fr9m awarding the contract to reviewing payment claims to overseeing the performance of our implementing partners The Afghanistan mission uses these and more In emote insecure areas USA1D's monitoring and evaluation efforts are supp lemcnted by third-pany evaluators As you arc aware in add ii ion LU our work with your office we also work with a variety of independent m'ersigbt entities includini the State and USAfD Offices of the inspectors General and the li S Government Accountability Office and share the goal of ensuring U S funding is not wasted or abused In addition by monitoring and yaluating omcomes we are oosrantly seeking new ways to ensure taxpayer dollars are being used most effectively focusing on the return on our project im•estment Administrator Shah issued Sustainability Guidance to ensure that every USAID program supports increased Afghan ownership contributes to stability and makes the most of limited funds Department of State programs co nduct similar analyses in developing pro1ects In Afghanistan USA1D is strengi hening award mechanisms vetting financial controls and project oversight working closely ltith our Afghan and ISAF counterparts On an interagency k •el databases such as FACTS Info and Afghan Info allow USAID and the Department of State to share project infunnation metrics best practices and more With Afghans we nave also launched the Assistance for Afghanis1an's Anti-Corru_ptiou Authority series of initiatives to encourage transparency and accountability This includes helping the Afghan government develop a strong anti-co eruption policy and establishfall a joint committee with U S ForcesAfghanistan and TSAF on contractor vetting and corruption SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 39 - 7To ensure accountability some projt'cts a -e drastically altered ur funding stoppl--d USAID's rigorous emphasis on evaluation led us to take a hard look at the Strategic Provincial Roads project in eastern and southern Afghanistan After three years project outcomes were falling far short of project objectives To avoid continued investment of taxpayer funds into an under performing program_ USAlD ended the project in fall 20 I I In other cases program benefits merit ed continued investment-with stracegic recommendations for improvements The National Solidarity Programme in Afghanistan had reached thousands of communities but payment delays and opcratmg risks in inscourc areas threatened to limit future outreach Today tl1e program tracks indicato of good governance Sllch as mmspa rency and accoumabilicy and an inter-ministerial committee is exploring the role existing community oevelopmentcouncils can play for expansion into insecure areas In June 2009 after the Afghan Go -emment took back central of its central prison from asurgent inmates NL began a comprehensive renovation Poor contractor performance- and corruption led the Depacunent tQ halt renovations and terminate lhe contract The prob t ms 1th this project highlighted the need to have an adequate number of Contracting Officer Representatives CORs Governmental Technical Monitors GTMs engineers and program officers on the ground to provide oversight Recognizing the need 10 improve oversight of co nsiruction projects £NL has significantly increased the number of U S and locally engaged LE engineers in Afghanistan and l1as strengthened its re iew and management policies To promote dialogue among tribal elders aod the Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs a State public diplomacy project planned to conduct ji g lS· and shuras with govecnment and local leaders However the implementing panner Afghan Community Consulting was unable to obtain adequate cooperation from the Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs particularly with gard to oversight of funds or evidence of the number of participants and outcomes When it was determined that adequate oversight could n ot be achieved qo spending or outcomes PAS Kabul terminated the granr suspclJded future jirgas and dctcnnined the amount of funds owed to the embassy fot incomplete work which were all retumc d We appreciate this opportunity to highlight a number of our programmatic achievements with the Afghan govem ment and people over the past decade as well as to note those areas where oonti nuing attention is warranted given the challenges of operating in Afghanistan We share SIGAK s goal of safeguarding O S taxpayer resources from fiautl waste and abuse and advance while seeking the most effective uses ofthose resources in advancing our nalion 's r ational security through assislallce progrllIDs in Afghanistan We look forward to working · sms together to find ways 10 improve our oversight mec SD 1- Daniel Feldman Deputy Special Representative J Th tt A istant to the Admirustrator for Afghanist an and Pakil itan for Afghanisum and Pakistan SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 40 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 2700 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON O C 20301-2700 • A e A N ANO A C1'1C SWURITY An'IIIM June 18 2013 Mr John Sopko Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction SIGAR 1550 Crystal Drive Arlington VA 22202 Dear Mr Sopko Ln response to your letter of March 25 2013 the Dcpanmem of Defense DoD reviewed reconstruction activities in Afghanistan and prepared the enclosed overview ofsuccesses and challenges The U S Coalition and Afghan partners have reached a decisive milesione in the campaign Later this month the Afghan government and lhe ANSF will formally assume lead security responsibility across all ofAfghanistan This is the Afghans' greatest demonstration to date of real progress towards stability and sovereignty The enclosed response provides an overview of what we have done to get lo this point and some of the things we are focused on to sustain these gains The DoD reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan aim to expWld securil and stability in order to acrueve our core objectives to ensure al Qaeda never again uses it as a safe haven to conduct imemolional terrorists attacks and to ensure the Taliban do not overthrow the Afghan GovemmenL Since the initiation of I he campaign in Afghanistan the DoD has p rovided support to a wide range ofrecoostruction activities with impuct on the security economic and governance sectors Many reconstruction programs are conducted together with other U S agencies and Coalition partners as part of the integrated civil-miJitary campaign Typically reconsnuction programs are evaluated on an individual basis according to program-specific criteria and their contribution towards our broader objectives in Afghanistan Our main metrics for how we are achieving these objectives are specified in statute and are reported on in our semi-annual ·•Report oo Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan '' We also provide extensive infonnation for your quarterly reports to Congress on these efforts The enclosed information on the DoD priority reconstruction activities highlights progress and challenges experienced in the development of the Afghan National Security Forces 1 NSr and select infrastructure programs The response reviews the positive impact ofDoD efforts to grow train and equip the ANSF and identifies capability shortfalls that persist It also highlights the social economic and security benefits that accrue from a multitude ofDoD-funded infrastructure projeclS while acknowledging the challenges that remain including growing the capacity of the Afghan government to sustain critical infrastructure SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 41 Thank you for the opportunity to provide this assessment ofongoing reconstruction projects and programs in Afghanistan We want to ensure that American taxpayers are getting the results they expect from our recons1ruc1ion effons in Afghanistan We appreciate lhe impor1an1 role that the Special Inspector General plays to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of those programs and operations and we will continue to work together to ensure proper oversight and accountability of government funds k9 Mil Dumont Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Asian Pacific Security Affairs Attachments Dcpanment of Defense Response to SIGAR March 25 lnquiry SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 42 Department ut' Uefcose Res ponse to SlGAR March 25 Inquiry Security Sector ReconstnlClloo Among the multiple lines ofeffort in Afghanistan the Department of Defense' s cenlral l ffort has been the development of the Afghan National Security Forces NSF into a force capable of assumir1 lead security responsibility lhroughou1 Afghanistan and providing for i1s own internal security As a res11II of the concerted effort by 1hc Afghans U S and Coalition partners we have seen a significant turnaround in the security sector in Afghanistan As oflate 2002 the Afghan government did not have legitimate control of any oflhe security elements in Afghanistan The Afghan National Army ANA was established in early 2003 followed In 2005 by the Afghan National Police ANP but for years both suffered from poor leadership low training standards inadequate equipment and the absence of a sustainment sys1em As of2009 the ANSF stilJ Jacked combat capability to meet its internal security requirements The combined military and police forces totaled approximately 200 000 and the mission was largely confined lo guard d1 1ty at static cheek-points The ANSF lacked hardened vehicles po sessed limited fire support with oo indirect engagement capability and had rudimentary aircraft with no casualty evacuation capability They were further constrained by insufficient ammunition small anns and a minimal ability 10 resupply The ANSF throughout Afghanistan were understrength fragmented and devoid oftbe basic skills necessary to coordinate operations at echelons above the kandak or battalion level The ANSf were not capable ofsecuring Afgnanis1an and U S and CoaUtion forces bore almost all the burden- and casoalties--of1his mission In late 2009 '11th President Obama's announcement of the U S troop surge a concerted Coalition effort to grow the ANSF was lnidated with the goa1 of generating and fielding trained and equipped Afghan combat elements capable of pushing back the Taliban and establishingsccurity in popul«tcd areas A combined ANSI' and fntemational ccurity Assistance Force lSAF partnership established training programs and an equipping plan lo rapidly develop NSF combat capabilities Unit partnering between Afghan and ISAF forces enabled by the lroop surge provided the space to develop ANSF capabilities and leadership skills from lhe tactical level up This resulted in a current force of over 340 000 military and police personnel with proven capabilities in counterinsurgency operations with increasing coordination across the Anny Police and intelligence personnel Although nascenl the ANA bas demonstrated an emerging ability 10 conduct more complex combined arms operations by synchronizing infan1ry artillery and other combat capabilities at the Corps Origade level In some areas the ANSF have implemented a layered security concept that decreases vulnerabilities in any single arm of the force by leveraging the capabilities of the entire force e g Afghan Local Police tALP ANA Special Operations Forces ANASOF ANA ANP Afghan Border Police ABP National Directorate of Security NDS etc providing security to the Afg_h m people with minimal or no assistance from the Coalition The ANSF• and especially 1be ANA have made remarkable progress particularly since early 2012 ln late 2012 the ANA had no corps division headq11arters and only one ofthe 23 Afghan National Anny ANA brigade headquarters capable of conducting independent operations Today the ANA SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 43 has one corps division headquaners five brigade headquaners and 27 battalions capable ofoperating indcpcu lently Another six ANA Corps Divisions 16 ANA Bcigades and 71 battalions are rated as Effective with Advisors '' ANP units have also improved with 44 units rated es ·•Independent with Advisors and a further 86 units rated as Effective with Advisors ' The growing ANA Special Operations Command ANASOC has also made strides towards becoming ar1 independent and effective force-with the vast majority of ANA special operntions forces SOF missions to include night opcrmicns being Afghan-led The ANSF are now leading over 80 percent of total operations and carrying out many unilaterally lSAF unilateral operations account for less than 10 percent of total operations nationwide and in many provinces lSAF unilateral operations account for less than 1 percent The Afghan government will soon announce Milestone 2013 recognizing the Afghan assumption of security lead tor 100 percent of the population and the International Security Assistance Force JSAF will shift to an advisor-support role A few areas of development are highlighted below to show the impact oflhe combined U S and Coalition forces security force assistance programs to the ANSF • Build The ANSP have grown 73 percent in overall numbers since 2009 This growth is extraordinary given that the-ANSF have been actively engaged in combat operations while building the force In addition the Afghan Local Police a village-based sccurily program administered by Ministry of Interior Mal and aimed at expanding security and governance has also grown at a steady pace from 3 100 in January 2011 to over 21 000 in March 2013 An emerging ANSI' maneuver capability is lbe Mobile Slrike Force MSF an armored whee'l-based platform conceived to rapidly reinforce infantry units The fielding of seven MSF kandaks has begun and is projected to be complete by December 2014 • Equipping The total Afghan security forces consisl of six ANA combat corps an ANASOC which includes an Afghan Special Mission Wing hundreds of ANP units and an ALP equipped with more than 14 700 up-armored vehicles 68 900 other combat suppon vehicles half a million pieces of weaponry including more than I 500 indirect-fire weapons 193 000 pieces of communications equipment I0 500 night-vision devices and a growing counter-lED capability consisting of24 Route Clearance Company units with 457 mine rollers • Training development Through professional development branch schools Including the National Military J cademy of Afghanistan and institutional raining centers including the premier Kabul Military Treining Center l MTC the ANSF have received leadership and technical training to develop the capabilities needed 10 sustain the force To augment training capacity I he ANA and ANP are using mobile training teams to provide professional raining to personnel fielded without training at branch schools ln accordance with the overall Transition the ANSF developed a self-training capability via the Train the 1 ''Jndcpcnde nt with Advisor '' is defined 4S tlic unit being able to plan and execute its mission and if necessary can coll for and integrate joim effects from Coulition ro es '·Effective with Advisors means that the Coalition provid only limited occasionnl guidMcc 10 swlT ond may provu fe enablers thlll are missing from higher or lower ANS unJts SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 44 Instructor program and have grown their number ofinsLructors by 60% since 2010 The ANSF now conducts 85 percent of all training including all basic courses • Sustainment The ability ofthe Afghan forces to supply and sustain themselves remains a significant challenge and is a focus ofcurrent DoD assistance As their capabilities develop the ANSF are gradually caking responsibility for combat servict support and sustainment responsibilities including distribution maintenance ammunition management fuel and other classes of supply at the national and regional logistics nodes and institutions Several classes of supply including Class I Subsistence food and water Class 11 Individual Equipment clothing Class IV construction materiel and Class Vl personal items bave already been fully transitioned to ANSP control For the MoD the Central Movement Agt ncy tCMA conduct monthly resupply missions to the ANA forces on their own from the Central Supply Depot CSD • Literacy Widespread Afghan illiteracy also poses a challenge for developing the ANSF into a sustainabk force with the requisite technical and leadership skills Literacy training eITons for the ANSF have been expansive to cackle this issue Between November 2009 and April 2013 over 194 000 ANSF personnel passed some level of Dari and or Pashto literacy and numeracy raining including over 57 000 who have achieved Level 3 literacy As of April 2013 over 73 000 ANSF personnel are in some fonn ofliteracy raining • Ministerial developme nt The Ministries of Defense and Interior must bave the capacity to organiZI ' resource train and sustain- thcir forces and to exercise command and con1rol over them With the ANSF force structure nearly complete the DoD is focused on ministerial development and is adjusting an exisling program to deploy DoD functional experts to help develop crucial minis1ry capabiliLies such as resource management acquisition contracting strategy and policy development and human resources management While the ANSF have demonstrated remarkable progress shortfalls persist in some enabler areas including command and control intelligence fusion logistics counter-lED fire support and air support Having realized the goal of growing and equipping the ANSF into a force capable of assuming the lead security role we have shifted emphasis to increasing the quality and professionalism of the ANSF As we move beyond combat operation capabiliry 10 more technical areas we are building off the literacy improvement to increase professionalism upgrade intelligence capability and improve the sustainment systems including logistics and maintenance Many of the units that remain to be fielded are specialty units and critical enablers and will require more time to receive training that is more technical in nature The OoD developed a plan to accelerate the development ofenabler capabilities including expanded training in logistics maintenance engineering and intelligence The FY14 DoD budget request for Afghan Se urity Forces Pund includes $2 68 to support this effort The progress made by the lSAF-led surge has put the Afghan government in control ofall Afghanistan's major cities and 34 provincial capitals lSAF's focus is now shifting from directly fighting the insurgency to supporting the ANSF in holding these gains Through the SAP Security Force Assis1ance Team SFAn concept of train advise and assist we expect the SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 45 ANSF will take full security responsibility for J tghanistan while simultan ously gaining proficiency in cornbat enablers and combat service support systems Construction and lnfrasrructure Deveropment The Departmem of Defense has also provided support to numerous projects and programs focused on developing civilian and military infrastructure that enable social economic governance and security improvements that bring stability to Afghanistan These efforts help strengthen the connection between the Afghan population and the district provincial and national governments facilitate access to security healthcare and commerce and help maintain security and stability gains Below are some illustrative project and program highlights of the impact these activities have had and the benefit they provide to the overaJJ mission Security SecJor lnfrastrucmre ISAF is nearing completion ofits infrastructure building program for the ANSF which will deli ver U1e final 429 projects by December 2014 and result in a program end state or more than 3 900 separate structures valued at $9 4 billion built for both the Ministry of Defense and Minist ry of Interior These include national and regional headquarters military hospitals training centers and schools and forward operating bases and have helped expand the reach of the security governmental and medical services This program is continuously reviewed to ensure that the current infrastructure projects are sfill valid requirements and has resulted in the reduction in total cost of the ANSF program from the originally planned $11 38 billion to $9 41 billion As these projects come to completion facility maintenance will be a challenge Both ANSF organic capability and comracling support to maintain facilities are still nascent and the number of assigned facility engineers for both MoD and Mol are below targets As a bridging strategy the U S Anny Corps of Engineers USACE provides facility maintenance and training for a period ofup to six months following construction completion allowing time to build the capabilities of assigned Afghan engineers Civil Sector Reconstruction The OoD recognizes education as a priority for inureasing security and stability ru1d continues to use the Commander's Emergency Response Fund CE RP to advance development in this area The DoD has obli·gated more than $230 million in CERP funds co suppon more than 4000 projects aimed at improving the education of Afgban students including building and refurbishing schools and the purchase and distribution or millions of textbooks for matll science language civics his ory and cultural studies CERP projects in Farah ltighliglit these contributions A series ofschools were built in Farah province over the past few yearS and are successfully staffed and maintained by the Afghan ministry of education including Zehkeo Schoo Lash Juwain High School Qala Zaman High School Mirman Nazo High School Runaakha School and the P r Kunder School - SIGAR 20-19-TY Zehken Girls School ProjecL A school built speciliCl lll ' for the education of girls in the northwestem districl or Anar Dara in Farah province was completed in July of2009 and bns Page 46 been educating girls in Anar Dara ever since Teachers and building maintenance are supplied by the Ministry of Education - Lash Juwain High School Project This secondary school huill in rhe soulhwes1em district of Lash Juwain is one of the few High Schools in the region 11 was completed in 2008 and has continuously educated students s ince then - Runaakha Girls School Project TI1is girls' school Wll$ built in the First District of Farah City ln 2006 and has been continuously used and maintained since then ln the first quaner of2013 the DoD funded the procurement and delivery ofdesks and chairs for students in Mazar-e-Sharifwho would otherwise sit on classroom floors due to overctowding As the operational environment has matured with more emphasis on stabilization and enabling governance support for education programs ls even more critical especially for increasing the role of women within the Afghan government and society The DoD bas also provided substantial support to building and refurbishing he lthcare facilities throughout Afghanistan and recently completed the consu'llction of a small district hospital in Shindand that brings a higher level of medical care lo over 240 000 Afghans The DoD has played a key role in providing increased electrical power lo the reS ive areas or Kandahar and Hel mand provinces The Kandahar Bridging Solution initiated through CERP and maintained with the Afghanistan Infrastructure fund rapidly provided additional electricity to the Kandahar City area helping to increase stability and security in the area The power project increased the availability and reliability of electricity to hundreds of thousands of residents and facilitates employment communication healthcare education and industry While in 20 0 there were only three factones in the Shorandam Industrial Park powered by theirown small generators there are now roughly 66 factories in Shorandam with the additional power made available through the Kandahar Bridging Solution finally the DoD supports the development of road infrastrucn ire Improving the Afg han·s ability to move freely around the country both civilians and military via paved road network is an imponant part of establishing and maintaining stability and security enhancing economic levelopment and improving the lives oflhe Afghan populace The DoD has successfully built and refurbished a number of roads throughout Afghanistan One prime example is the Nawa lo Lashknr Gab road paving project in the southwest funded by the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund which provides an imponant link between Nawa and the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah The highly successful paved road has increased security for the populution and improved access for many residents to the more sophisticated health care offered in Lashkar Gah The road is also bolstering commerce between the two cj1ies decreasing the delivery time for perishable goods and facilitating increased overall economic acttvity throughout the region While the Afghan government continues to develop the capability and capacity to sustain transportation networks and power infrastructW1 the ministries responsible for maintaining this critical infrastructure still require continued training and assh tance to ade quately execute an Operations and Maintenance plan on the scale required for Afghanistan ldentlfication SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 47 budgeting and financing of e xtcmally financed assets will be a challenge facing transition The Afghan government will have to maintain the political will for reforms to grow internal capacity in order to sustain existing infrastructure Improvements in capacity will support both the budgeting processes for O M costs as well as the disbursement of the budget throughoul the year i ncreasing the likelihood of sustuinability for assets and service delivery SIGAR 20-19-TY Page 48