SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS DO NOT ACK UP ERE TIRE AMAGE JUL 30 2021 The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 Pub L No 110181 established the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction SIGAR SIGAR’s oversight mission as defined by the legislation is to provide for the independent and objective • conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan • leadership and coordination of and recommendations on policies designed to promote economy efficiency and effectiveness in the administration of the programs and operations and to prevent and detect waste fraud and abuse in such programs and operations • means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operation and the necessity for and progress on corrective action Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract grant agreement or other funding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the U S government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018 Pub L No 115-91 this quarterly report has been prepared in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Source Pub L No 110-181 National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 1 28 2008 Pub L No 115-91 National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018 12 12 2017 For a list of the congressionally mandated contents of this report see Appendix A Cover photo Afghan soldiers sit inside Bagram Airfield north of Kabul after the July 2021 departure of U S and Coalition soldiers AFP photo by Wakil Kohsar PUBLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CIGIE QUALITY STANDARDS FOR INSPECTION AND EVALUATION JOWZJAN BALKH SAMANGAN FARYAB SAR-E PUL BADGHIS HERAT GHOR KUNDUZ BADAKHSHAN BAGHLAN PANJSHIR NURISTAN KAPISA PARWAN KUNAR BAMYAN LAGHMAN KABUL WARDAK NANGARHAR LOGAR DAYKUNDI PAKTIYA GHAZNI KHOST URUZGAN FARAH ZABUL NIMROZ TAKHAR HELMAND KANDAHAR PAKTIKA Provinces where SIGAR has conducted or commissioned audit inspection special project and or investigation work as of June 30 2021 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION I am pleased to submit to Congress the Secretaries of State and Defense and the American people SIGAR’s 52nd quarterly report on the status of reconstruction in Afghanistan This quarter the United States and its allies withdrew nearly all of their troops from Afghanistan after almost 20 years of war Fewer than a thousand U S military personnel remain there compared to 110 000 a decade ago President Joseph R Biden has said that the United States will continue to provide support for Afghanistan including for its military and police The President’s proposed FY 2022 budget includes $3 33 billion for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ANDSF as well as $364 million in civilian assistance If appropriated by Congress these funds would come in addition to the approximately $6 68 billion already appropriated but yet to be disbursed for Afghanistan The news coming out of Afghanistan this quarter has been bleak The Taliban offensive that began early in the quarter accelerated in June and July General Mark Milley chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified on June 23 that the Taliban controlled about 81 districts Less than a month later on July 21 he told reporters the group now controlled about half of Afghanistan’s 419 districts or more than twice as many as before According to media reporting the Taliban also controlled large stretches of multiple major highways and at least six international border crossings as this report went to press The ANDSF has retaken some districts and the Afghan government still controls all 34 provincial capitals including Kabul but from public reporting the ANDSF appeared surprised and unready and is now on its back foot Civilian casualties hit a record high in May and June according to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan The overall trend is clearly unfavorable to the Afghan government which could face an existential crisis if it isn’t addressed and reversed SIGAR’s oversight mission has become both more consequential and more challenging in the absence of a major U S troop presence and in light of the growing insurgent pressure on the Afghan government Despite repeated reductions in American staff at the U S embassy SIGAR remains the only U S oversight agency on the ground in Afghanistan so maximizing the reach and impact of our statutory duty takes on increased importance SIGAR issued a letter this quarter to the Administration and Congress proposing four changes that we believe based on our 13 years of experience would enhance the protection of continued U S taxpayer assistance to Afghanistan SIGAR’s recommendations and its plans for continued oversight are discussed on page 18 of this report A lessons-learned report released this quarter—The Risk of Doing the Wrong Thing Perfectly Monitoring and Evaluation of Reconstruction Contracting in Afghanistan— explores the now two-decade-long challenge of how to properly assess the effectiveness of reconstruction  The report’s key finding is that as implemented monitoring and evaluation M E created the risk of doing the wrong thing perfectly That is programs could be deemed “successful” even if they had not achieved or contributed to broader more important goals—such as creating an effective Afghan security force and a stable Afghanistan Closely related to this finding is one of the report’s central themes the pervasiveness of overoptimism Overall M E displayed a tendency to elevate good news and anecdotes over data suggesting a lack of progress To that extent the report is especially useful for 2530 CRYSTAL DRIVE ARLINGTON VIRGINIA 22202 policymakers and practitioners seeking to understand why the Afghan security forces have continued to struggle despite the U S assertions of success that have been hallmarks of reconstruction On a more positive note  the report found that agencies generally have developed over the last 20 years relatively robust M E—or M E-like—policies Key aspects of these policies have the potential to improve both programmatic and strategic outcomes provided that they are meaningfully implemented We believe the lessons and recommendations presented in the report are relevant not only to Afghanistan but also to U S efforts to promote stability elsewhere around the world This lessons-learned report was one of 12 products SIGAR issued this quarter SIGAR work to date has identified approximately $3 84 billion in savings for the U S  taxpayer SIGAR issued three evaluation reports this quarter One evaluation reviewed the status of 467 recommendations from SIGAR’s nine-year financial audit program It found that the Departments of Defense and State the U S Agency for International Development USAID and the U S Department of Agriculture had closed or implemented 376 or 81% of these recommendations as of December 31 2020 SIGAR’s reports also called into question the allowability of $494 million in costs incurred by these agencies The second evaluation examined USAID’s $10 million Goldozi job-creation project and the reasons it has not achieved its goals  The third evaluation assessed the transition of ANDSF fuel-management responsibilities to the Afghan government and CSTC-A’s lack of implementation of prior SIGAR recommendations regarding ANDSF fuel SIGAR completed seven financial audits of U S -funded projects to rebuild Afghanistan that identified $739 105 in questioned costs as a result of internal-control deficiencies and noncompliance issues  These financial audits covered a range of topics including USAID’s Civic Engagement Program the State Department’s Legal Aid through Legal Education Program and the U S Air Force’s support for operation and maintenance of the Afghan Air Force’s A-29 ground-attack aircraft During the reporting period SIGAR criminal investigations resulted in two criminal informations a prosecutor’s allegation of a crime as distinct from a grand-jury indictment  two guilty pleas  one sentencing  $179 708 in restitutions and an impressive $11 9 million in civil settlements   As the situation in Afghanistan changes SIGAR is adapting to the new reality My colleagues and I look forward to working together with Congress and the Administration to continue to protect U S taxpayer funds in Afghanistan from waste fraud and abuse and to improve the overall operations of the U S government in overseas contingency operations Sincerely John F Sopko 2530 CRYSTAL DRIVE ARLINGTON VIRGINIA 22202 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report summarizes SIGAR’s oversight work and updates developments in four major areas of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan from April 1 to June 30 2021 During this reporting period SIGAR issued 12 audits evaluations and other products assessing U S efforts to build the Afghan security forces improve governance facilitate economic and social development and combat the production and sale of narcotics In this period SIGAR criminal investigations resulted in two criminal informations two guilty pleas one sentencing $179 708 in restitutions and $11 9 million in civil settlements SIGAR OVERVIEW AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS This quarter SIGAR issued three evaluation reports and seven financial-audit reports The evaluation reports examine • the status of recommendations from SIGAR’s nine-year financial audit program which found $494 million in questioned costs resulting from insufficient supporting documentation or noncompliance with laws and regulations • USAID’s $10 million Goldozi job-creation project and the reasons it has not achieved its goals • the transition of Afghan National Defense and Security Forces fuel-management responsibilities to the Afghan government and persistent challenges stemming from the Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan not implementing prior SIGAR recommendations regarding fuel accountability and oversight The seven financial-audit reports identify $739 105 in questioned costs as a result of internalcontrol deficiencies and noncompliance issues KEY EVENTS MAY–JULY April 21 Secretary of State Blinken says Administration is working with Congress to provide $300 million more civilian assistance to Afghanistan in 2021 May 1 U S Central Command formally begins military drawdown from Afghanistan May 13–15 Afghan government and Taliban declare three-day ceasefires for Eid al-Fitr holiday June NATO transfers full control of Mazar-e Sharif and Herat airports to Afghan government May Jun May 3 UNODC summary of 2020 Afghanistan Opium Survey indicates 37% increase in opium-poppy cultivation since 2019 May 29 Afghan government closes schools for third time in COVID-19 pandemic iv SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL June 4 State Department announces additional $266 million in humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY LESSONS LEARNED SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program released its tenth lessons-learned report this quarter The Risk of Doing the Wrong Thing Perfectly Monitoring and Evaluation of Reconstruction Contracting in Afghanistan This report reviews how reconstruction contracts have been monitored and evaluated in Afghanistan since 2001 It also analyzes how multiple contracts—for example portfolios of contracts in sectors like health or education—were assessed to determine their net effect and overall impact The Lessons Learned Program has two projects in development a 20-year retrospective on the reconstruction effort and the broader war in Afghanistan and a report on the role of police in conflict Investigations highlights include • the guilty plea of a U S defense contractor for perpetrating a scheme to defraud the Afghan government of $100 million in USAID-provided funds for construction of an electrical grid • an $11 million settlement from a U S contractor alleged to have made false claims when executing a $500 million airlift-services contract • the sentencing of a U S contractor to 51 months’ imprisonment three years’ probation and $179 708 in restitutions for organizing a theft ring that allowed unknown and unvetted Afghan nationals to enter a U S military installation and steal property INVESTIGATIONS RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS During the reporting period SIGAR investigations resulted in two criminal informations a prosecutor’s allegation of a crime as distinct from a grand-jury indictment two guilty pleas one sentencing $179 708 in restitutions and $11 9 million in civil settlements SIGAR initiated six new cases and closed eight bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 94 SIGAR’s Research and Analysis Directorate issued its 52nd Quarterly Report to the United States Congress As provided in its authorizing statute SIGAR may also report on products and events issued or occurring after June 30 2021 up to the publication date of this report Unless otherwise noted all afghani-to-U S dollar conversions used in this report are derived by averaging the last six months of exchange-rate data available through Da Afghanistan Bank www dab gov af then rounding to the nearest afghani Data as of June 28 2021 June 17 Joint Chiefs chair General Mark Milley says USA intends to continue funding Afghan security forces Jun 25 President Biden meets with President Ghani and High Council for National Reconciliation Chairman Abdullah in Washington DC July 8 Taliban capture Islam Qala border crossing in Herat Province key trade route to Iran July 12 General Austin Miller relinquishes command of U S Forces-Afghanistan and NATO Resolute Support Mission July 14 Taliban capture border crossing at Kandahar Province’s Spin Boldak connecting Afghanistan and Pakistan --- J J r---1-'I I ' F'l 7 ' July 21 General Milley says Taliban control more than 210 districts Jul June 22 Taliban seize Sher Khan border crossing to Tajikistan I June 23 General Milley says 81 district centers are under Taliban control REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS July 1 Bagram Airfield turned over to Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense I JULY 30 2021 July 9 First 1 4 million doses of U S -provided Johnson Johnson COVID-19 vaccine arrive in Kabul July 12–15 Four media outlets publish maps indicating Taliban control majority of Afghan districts with many taken since May 1 v July 17 High-level Afghan delegation meets with Taliban in Doha to expedite stalled peace talks I ii TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 1 3 SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES 3 Audits 13 Inspections 13 Lessons Learned 15 Investigations 19 SIGAR Budget 19 SIGAR Staff SECTION 2 21 RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE 23 Reconstruction In Brief 25 Status of Funds 49 Security 83 Governance 111 Economic and Social Development SECTION 3 149 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT 151 Completed Oversight Activities 154 Ongoing Oversight Activities APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES 160 Appendix A Cross-Reference of Report to Statute 166 Appendix B U S Funds for Afghanistan Reconstruction 168 Appendix C SIGAR Written Products 172 Appendix D SIGAR Investigations and Hotline 180 Appendix E SIGAR Data Call Questions that Received Classified or Unclassified But Not Publicly Releasable Responses 182 Appendix F Abbreviations and Acronyms 189 Endnotes “The partnership between Afghanistan and the United States is not ending It’s going to be sustained And you know our troops may be leaving but support for Afghanistan is not ending in terms of support and maintenance of their military as well as economic and political support ” —President Joseph R Biden Source The White House “Remarks by President Biden and President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Before Bilateral Meeting ” 6 25 2021 1 SIGAR OVERSIGHT 1 SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES GOVERNANCE OVERSIGHT CONTENTS CONTENTS KEY ISSUES EVENTS H4 TOC Audits 3 3 Inspections 13 Lessons Learned 13 Investigations 15 Quarterly Highlight SIGAR Looks Ahead To Oversight After The U S Troop Withdrawal 18 SIGAR Budget 19 SIGAR Staff 19 Photo on previous page Army Gen Austin Scott Miller transfers responsibility for U S Forces-Afghanistan to Marine Corps Gen Kenneth McKenzie commander of U S Central Command in a July 12 ceremony in Kabul as the U S troop withdrawal from Afghanistan continues DOD photo 2 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES - - - - - - -SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES This quarter SIGAR issued 12 products SIGAR work to date has identified approximately $3 84 billion in savings for the U S taxpayer SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program issued its tenth report The Risk of Doing the Wrong Thing Perfectly Monitoring and Evaluation of Reconstruction Contracting in Afghanistan The report examines how reconstruction contracts have been monitored and evaluated in Afghanistan since 2001 It also analyzes how multiple contracts—for example portfolios of contracts in sectors like health or education—were assessed to determine their net effect and overall impact SIGAR issued three evaluation reports this quarter One evaluation reviewed the status of recommendations from SIGAR’s nine-year financial audit program which found $494 million in questioned costs resulting from insufficient supporting documentation or noncompliance with laws and regulations The second evaluation examined USAID’s $10 million Goldozi job creation project and the reasons it has not achieved its goals The third evaluation assessed the transition of Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ANDSF fuel-management responsibilities to the Afghan government and persistent challenges stemming from the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan CSTC-A not implementing prior SIGAR recommendations regarding fuel accountability and oversight SIGAR completed seven financial audits of U S -funded projects to rebuild Afghanistan that identified $739 105 in questioned costs as a result of internal-control deficiencies and noncompliance issues These financial audits covered a range of topics including USAID’s Civic Engagement Program the State Department’s Legal Aid through Legal Education Program and the U S Air Force’s support for operation and maintenance of Afghan Air Force A-29 aircraft During the reporting period SIGAR criminal investigations resulted in two criminal informations a prosecutor’s allegation of a crime as distinct from a grand-jury indictment two guilty pleas one sentencing $179 708 in restitutions and $11 9 million in civil settlements AUDITS SIGAR conducts performance and financial audits of programs and projects connected to the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan This quarter SIGAR REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 3 ISSUED EVALUATION REPORTS • SIGAR 21-33-IP SIGAR Financial Audits $494 Million Questioned Because of Insufficient Supporting Documentation or Noncompliance with Laws and Regulations • SIGAR 21-37-IP USAID’s Goldozi Project in Afghanistan Project Has Not Achieved Its Goals and COVID-19 Further Curtailed Project Implementation • SIGAR 21-43-IP Fuel for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces Additional Steps Required to Successfully Transition Fuel Responsibilities to the Afghan Government ISSUED FINANCIAL AUDIT REPORTS • Financial Audit 21-34-FA U S Air Force Support for Operation and Maintenance of A-29 Aircraft for the Afghan Air Force Audit of Costs Incurred by Sierra Nevada Corp • Financial Audit 21-35-FA USAID’s Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians Program in Afghanistan Audit of Costs Incurred by Blumont Global Development Inc • Financial Audit 21-36-FA USAID’s Afghan Civic Engagement Program Audit of Costs Incurred by Counterpart International Inc • Financial Audit 21-38-FA Department of State’s Cluster Munitions Clearance Projects Audit of Costs Incurred by the Demining Agency for Afghanistan • Financial Audit 21-39-FA USAID’s Strengthening Civic Engagement in Elections in Afghanistan Program Audit of Costs Incurred by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening Continued on the next page SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES Continued from the previous page • Financial Audit 21-40-FA USAID’s Emergency Water Sanitation and Hygiene Assistance to Disaster Affected Populations in Afghanistan Audit of Costs Incurred by the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development • Financial Audit 21-42-FA Department of State’s Legal Aid through Legal Education Program Audit of Costs Incurred by The Asia Foundation ISSUED LESSONS-LEARNED REPORT • SIGAR 21-41-LL The Risk of Doing the Wrong Thing Perfectly Monitoring and Evaluation of Reconstruction Contracting in Afghanistan ISSUED QUARTERLY REPORT • SIGAR 2021-QR-3 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress ISSUED EVALUATION REPORTS • SIGAR 21-33-IP SIGAR Financial Audits $494 Million Questioned Because of Insufficient Supporting Documentation or Noncompliance with Laws and Regulations • SIGAR 21-37-IP USAID’s Goldozi Project in Afghanistan Project Has Not Achieved Its Goals and COVID-19 Further Curtailed Project Implementation • SIGAR 21-43-IP Fuel for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces Additional Steps Required to Successfully Transition Fuel Responsibilities to the Afghan Government has 20 ongoing performance audits and evaluations and 35 ongoing financial audits Evaluation Reports Issued This quarter SIGAR issued three evaluation reports The first reviewed the status of recommendations from SIGAR’s nine-year financial audit program The second examined USAID’s $10 million Goldozi job-creation project The third assessed the transition of Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ANDSF fuel-management responsibilities to the Afghan government A list of completed and ongoing evaluation reports and performance audits can be found in Appendix C of this quarterly report Evaluation 21-33-IP SIGAR Financial Audits $494 Million Questioned Because of Insufficient Supporting Documentation or Noncompliance with Laws and Regulations SIGAR launched its financial audit program in 2012 to address Congressional and oversight community concerns about oversight gaps and the growing backlog of incurred-cost audits for contracts cooperative agreements and grants awarded in support of overseas contingency operations Between January 1 2012 and December 31 2020 SIGAR issued 176 financial-audit reports covering $8 5 billion in costs incurred on awards funded by DOD State USAID and USDA for Afghanistan reconstruction In those reports SIGAR made 467 recommendations of which DOD State USAID and USDA have closed and implemented 376 or 81% as of December 31 2020 Further as of December 31 2020 42 recommendations remained open awaiting action from the respective agency These open recommendations include $77 million in questioned costs SIGAR’s reports called into question the allowability of over $494 million in costs incurred by DOD State USAID and USDA These reports included recommendations that agency contracting officers and agreement officers CO AO determine the allowability of questioned costs and recover them when appropriate These reports questioned incurred costs for three reasons 1 insufficient supporting documentation 2 noncompliance with laws and or regulations and 3 costs incurred outside of the award terms Federal guidelines require implementing partners as award recipients to comply with these audits including by preparing a schedule of incurred costs for their award and providing supporting documentation related to those costs and access to their accounting records However the costs SIGAR questioned resulted from implementing partners’ failure to provide sufficient documentation to show that costs were allowable and in compliance with federal laws regulations and award terms Forty-one percent of SIGAR financial audits included either a disclaimer or modified opinion on the implementing partner’s Special Purpose Financial Statements 4 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES - - - - - - -meaning their financial data was grossly misstated not prepared according to accounting standards or could not be deemed accurate DOD and USAID awards accounted for 87% of the questioned costs As of December 31 2020 contracting officers and agreement officers at DOD State USAID and USDA made determinations on $417 million of the $494 million in questioned costs identified in SIGAR’s financial audits disallowing $28 million and allowing $389 million In determining the allowability of those questioned costs the CO AO generally requests supporting documentation from the implementing partner While agency CO AO determination letters state the basis for their decisions i e that they received sufficient support the letters do not specify what supporting documentation COs AOs reviewed in making their determinations To determine the reason funding agencies allowed or disallowed questioned costs SIGAR examined all its financial audits that questioned more than $5 million of costs and where the CO AO made a determination on the allowability of those costs SIGAR identified 12 such reports which accounted for 71% of all the costs questioned in its financial audits Agency COs AOs wrote 18 determination letters examining the questioned costs wherein they made 67 determinations that generally fell into the following four categories 1 implementing partners subsequently provided sufficient supporting documentation for questioned costs 2 services were provided to the government 3 costs were determined to comply with federal law regulations and award terms and 4 costs were shown to have been approved prior to being incurred SIGAR made no recommendations in this report because clear criteria already exist that require implementing partners to provide all documentation to federal auditors related to costs incurred on federal awards Nevertheless given the issues it identified this report urges contracting officers and agreement officers at DOD State USAID and USDA to reemphasize to implementing partners the importance of these requirements at the outset of awards Evaluation 21-37-AR USAID’s Goldozi Project in Afghanistan Project Has Not Achieved Its Goals and COVID-19 Further Curtailed Project Implementation In June 2017 USAID initiated the Afghanistan Job Creation Program to generate revenue for the Afghan government and to create sustainable jobs by supporting value-chain development This program funded multiple project awards with values ranging from $2 million to $10 million On April 5 2018 as part of this Afghanistan Job Creation Program USAID awarded Family Health International 360 FHI 360 a U S -based non-profit organization a four-year cooperative agreement valued at about $9 7 million to initiate and support the Goldozi Project Goldozi the Dari word for embroidery has a long history in Afghanistan and is a source of revenue for many low-income REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 5 SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES Afghan households FHI 360 was responsible for launching the Goldozi Project achieving project objectives and administering USAID funding USAID provided FHI 360 about $4 96 million to fund the first two years of the Goldozi Project the remaining $4 76 million was to be provided incrementally pending approval by the USAID agreement officer’s representative As of February 10 2021 USAID had disbursed nearly $5 1 million for FHI 360 to fund Goldozi Project activities leaving $4 6 million in remaining program funds The project is scheduled for completion on April 4 2022 During the Goldozi Project’s first three years SIGAR found that FHI 360 did not achieve its targets for training sales agents improving employment opportunities and conditions or increasing incomes of embroiderers Although FHI 360 was successful in training 140 certified sales agents from FY 2018 through FY 2020 the target was 430 agents In addition FHI 360 has provided new or better employment to only 870 program participants falling 80% short of the project’s target for the first three years Further the Goldozi Project never had a year in which it reported improved incomes for program participants and at the end of FY 2020 the overall incomes of participating embroiders had decreased While the Goldozi Project has not met any of these targets USAID noted that achieving targets was made more difficult when project activities were severely curtailed by the COVID-19 pandemic beginning in March 2020 In addition the Goldozi Project monitoring plan established two performance indicators to help monitor progress toward meeting its objective of supporting trade promotion and increasing exports of embroidered products The first performance indicator the number of private sector engagement initiatives established tracked the number of private organizations that joined the Goldozi Partnership Network and would be available to raise the profile of Afghan embroidery The Goldozi Partnership Network is a collection of private businesses trade and financial organizations and non-governmental organizations that assist FHI 360 in promoting the embroidery trade and improving the lives of Afghan embroiderers The second performance indicator tracked the sales of embroiderers assisted by the Goldozi Project FHI 360 met neither performance indicator for FY 2018 through FY 2020 Specifically the Goldozi Project conducted 81% of the targeted number of private-sector engagements for FY 2018 through FY 2020 and achieved only 17% of its sales target in FY 2020 the only year that included a specific target According to USAID the COVID-19 pandemic severely impacted the Goldozi Project’s activities in 2020 activities were suspended from midMarch 2020 through October 2020 In August 2020 FHI 360 submitted a revised monitoring plan to USAID that proposed lowering the total sales target for the program’s life to $5 2 million a difference of about 68% because of the Goldozi Project’s inability to meet the established sales target In 6 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES - - - - - - -March 2021 USAID told SIGAR that it was in the process of determining if the current monitoring plan’s sales target was “binding and realistic ” SIGAR made one recommendation to help ensure that the Goldozi Project achieves its program objectives while safeguarding USAID funding SIGAR recommended that the USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan consider withholding or delaying future funding disbursements until USAID makes a determination whether to continue funding the Goldozi Project thereby potentially saving $4 6 million in taxpayer funds Evaluation 21-43-IP Fuel for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces Additional Steps Required to Successfully Transition Fuel Responsibilities to the Afghan Government In 2005 Congress appropriated funds for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ASFF to train equip and provide related assistance to the ANDSF supporting its development effectiveness and sustainability Within DOD CSTC-A had primary responsibility for managing the ASFF CSTC-A used ASFF funds to among other things purchase equipment construct and repair infrastructure pay personnel and purchase fuel for the ANDSF DOD also tasked CSTC-A to help train and advise the ANDSF on fuel management including requesting fuel in an emergency and using consumption reports to identify the amount of fuel used as a way to help forecast future fuel needs From FY 2010 through FY 2020 DOD spent $3 74 billion on fuel for the ANDSF DOD plans to spend an additional $1 45 billion through FY 2025 This fuel was required to operate more than $9 82 billion in vehicles and aircraft DOD procured for the ANDSF and to provide power to ANDSF bases and installations In April 2018 a SIGAR report highlighted serious issues with DOD’s management and oversight of the fuel provided to the ANDSF SIGAR made six recommendations to CSTC-A’s commanding general to address its concerns However in October 2019 CSTC-A told SIGAR that it was transitioning responsibility for ANDSF fuel to the Afghan government within three years CSTC-A did not explain how the Afghan government’s inability to effectively manage and oversee ANDSF fuel activities which SIGAR identified in 2018 had been mitigated Although CSTC-A developed a timeline for transitioning fuel responsibility to the Afghan government SIGAR found that CSTC-A did not develop a transition plan in accordance with DOD guidance to ensure adequate controls and systems were in place so the Afghan government could effectively manage and oversee the ANDSF’s fuel activities Despite recommendations in DOD guidance CSTC-A’s timeline did not specify efforts for monitoring and collecting information on the transition’s status evaluating progress toward achieving objectives or recommending and directing action for REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 7 SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES improvement In addition CSTC-A’s timeline was not accompanied by any analysis of the Afghan government’s ability to manage and oversee ANDSF fuel activities CSTC-A is relying on multiple factors for transition success—increased economic growth in Afghanistan leading to the Afghan government spending more on its national defense connection to the electrical grid and processes to protect against fuel corruption However each of these factors faces challenges that threaten transition success In addition SIGAR found that CSTC-A has made little progress in addressing its prior ANDSF fuel recommendations Specifically in April 2018 SIGAR reported on oversight and accountability weaknesses associated with CSTC-A’s provision of fuel to the ANDSF SIGAR made six recommendations to help improve accountability and safeguard U S funded fuel for the ANDSF However CSTC-A did not implement five of the six recommendations and did not fully address issues SIGAR identified CSTC-A’s implementation of only one of SIGAR’s six recommendations from 2018 further threatens the successful transition of fuel responsibilities to the Afghan government CSTC-A’s successor has time to take action but must act with a greater sense of urgency if the transition is to be complete by 2025 DOD shut CSTC-A down in June 2021 and transferred many of its responsibilities to DOD’s newly created Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan DSCMO-A SIGAR made seven recommendations in the 2021 report To enhance accountability and help ensure transition of responsibility for U S -funded fuel to the ANDSF SIGAR recommended that the commanding general of DSCMO-A 1 develop a transition plan that includes metrics for assessing performance the risks associated with different courses of action and cost-benefit analysis for the transition of fuel responsibility to the Afghan government In addition because previous CSTC-A leadership did not implement SIGAR’s 2018 report recommendations to improve fuel accountability oversight and the transition of fuel responsibilities to the ANDSF and the issues prompting those recommendations remain largely unchanged SIGAR recommended that the commanding general of DSCMO-A 2 develop a plan for using remote monitoring methods or other technology-based solutions to provide visibility and accountability throughout the fuel process 3 establish a formal agreement with the Ministry of Defense MOD and Ministry of Interior MOI requiring the ANDSF to regularly submit accurate fuel consumption data to DSCMO-A 4 develop a plan to expand and standardize the trainings for ANDSF fuel personnel below the corps level on fuel quality testing methods and fuel handling procedures 5 reconsider the feasibility of working with the MOD and MOI to develop and implement a plan to upgrade and repair infrastructure and equipment at ANDSF fuel sites 6 document actions DSCMO-A takes with the MOD and MOI to help 8 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES - - - - - - -improve fuel accountability and oversight Lastly to enhance oversight for the current fuel responsibility until responsibilities fully transition to the Afghan government SIGAR recommends that the commanding general Army Contracting Command 7 reinforce reporting requirements to Army Contracting Command contracting officials to help ensure that contract terms are followed and required documents are included in the file Financial Audits SIGAR launched its financial-audit program in 2012 after Congress and the oversight community expressed concerns about oversight gaps and the growing backlog of incurred-cost audits for contracts and grants awarded in support of overseas contingency operations SIGAR competitively selects independent accounting firms to conduct the financial audits and ensures that the audit work is performed in accordance with U S government auditing standards Financial audits are coordinated with the federal inspector-general community to maximize financial-audit coverage and avoid duplicative efforts This quarter SIGAR completed seven financial audits of U S -funded projects to rebuild Afghanistan in addition to 35 ongoing financial audits with over $522 million in auditable costs as shown in Table 1 1 A list of completed and ongoing financial audits can be found in Appendix C of this quarterly report SIGAR issues each financial-audit report to the funding agency that made the award s The funding agency is responsible for making the final determination on questioned amounts identified in the report’s audit findings Since the program’s inception SIGAR’s financial audits have identified nearly $502 million in questioned costs and $366 718 in unremitted interest on advanced federal funds or other revenue amounts payable to the government As of June 30 2021 funding agencies had disallowed $28 million in questioned amounts which are thereby subject to collection It takes time for funding agencies to carefully consider audit findings and recommendations As a result final disallowed-cost determinations remain to be made for several of SIGAR’s issued financial audits SIGAR’s financial audits also have identified and reported 608 compliance findings and 665 internal-control findings to the auditees and funding agencies Financial Audit Reports Issued The seven financial audits completed this quarter identified $739 105 in questioned costs as a result of internal-control deficiencies and noncompliance issues REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 9 TABLE 1 1 SIGAR’S FINANCIAL AUDIT COVERAGE $ BILLIONS 193 completed audits $8 66 35 ongoing audits Total 0 52 $9 17 Note Numbers have been rounded Coverage includes auditable costs incurred by implementers through U S funded Afghanistan reconstruction contracts grants and cooperative agreements Source SIGAR Audits and Inspections Directorate Questioned amounts The sum of potentially unallowable questioned costs and unremitted interest on advanced federal funds or other revenue amounts payable to the government Questioned costs Costs determined to be potentially unallowable The two types of questioned costs are 1 ineligible costs violation of a law regulation contract grant cooperative agreement etc or an unnecessary or unreasonable expenditure of funds and 2 unsupported costs those not supported by adequate documentation or proper approvals at the time of an audit SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES ISSUED FINANCIAL AUDIT REPORTS • Financial Audit 21-36-FA USAID’s Afghan Civic Engagement Program Audit of Costs Incurred by Counterpart International Inc • Financial Audit 21-42-FA Department of State’s Legal Aid through Legal Education Program Audit of Costs Incurred by The Asia Foundation • Financial Audit 21-38-FA Department of State’s Cluster Munitions Clearance Projects Audit of Costs Incurred by the Demining Agency for Afghanistan • Financial Audit 21-40-FA USAID’s Emergency Water Sanitation and Hygiene Assistance to Disaster Affected Populations in Afghanistan Audit of Costs Incurred by the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development • Financial Audit 21-34-FA U S Air Force Support for Operation and Maintenance of A-29 Aircraft for the Afghan Air Force Audit of Costs Incurred by Sierra Nevada Corp • Financial Audit 21-35-FA USAID’s Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians Program in Afghanistan Audit of Costs Incurred by Blumont Global Development Inc • Financial Audit 21-39-FA USAID’s Strengthening Civic Engagement in Elections in Afghanistan Program Audit of Costs Incurred by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening Financial Audit 21-36-FA USAID’s Afghan Civic Engagement Program Audit of Costs Incurred by Counterpart International Inc On December 4 2013 USAID awarded a $70 million cooperative agreement to Counterpart International Inc to support the Promoting Afghan Civic Engagement Program the name of the program was later changed to the Afghan Civic Engagement program The program’s objective was to promote Afghan civil-society and media engagement to influence public policy government accountability and political reform After 18 modifications the agreement’s total funding increased to $79 120 000 and the period of performance was extended from December 3 2018 through February 15 2020 The original agreement also included a cost-share component requiring Counterpart to provide $2 461 116 for the program subsequent modifications to the agreement decreased the cost share to $2 389 495 SIGAR’s financial audit performed by Davis Farr LLP reviewed $13 270 330 in costs charged to the agreement and $731 781 in Counterpart’s shared costs from October 1 2018 through February 15 2020 The auditors identified three significant deficiencies in Counterpart’s internal controls and three instances of noncompliance with the terms of the agreement Davis Farr identified $630 418 in questioned costs charged to the agreement related to these issues Financial Audit 21-42-FA Department of State’s Legal Aid through Legal Education Program Audit of Costs Incurred by The Asia Foundation On April 1 2015 the U S Department of State awarded a $3 million cooperative agreement to The Asia Foundation to support the Legal Aid through Legal Education program The program’s objectives were to increase access to justice support the Practical Legal Education Program and to ensure sustainability of the increasing access to the justice system After seven modifications the agreement’s total funding increased to $10 535 003 and the period of performance was extended from September 30 2016 to February 29 2020 SIGAR’s financial audit performed by Conrad LLP reviewed $10 056 772 in costs charged to the agreement from April 1 2015 through February 29 2020 The auditors identified three significant deficiencies in The Asia Foundation’s internal controls and three instances of noncompliance with the terms of the agreement Conrad identified $101 378 in questioned costs charged to the agreement related to these issues Financial Audit 21-38-FA Department of State’s Cluster Munitions Clearance Projects Audit of Costs Incurred by the Demining Agency for Afghanistan The U S Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement awarded the Demining Agency for 10 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES - - - - - - -Afghanistan DAFA four grants between 2017 and 2020 in support of cluster-munitions clearance projects throughout Afghanistan The grants’ objectives were among other things to prevent the loss of life and limb and return land and infrastructure to productive use by clearing land mines and other explosive remnants of war The combined budget for the grants totaled $5 165 000 with a period of performance from September 25 2017 through June 19 2020 After five modifications to the grants total funding increased to $6 332 146 and the period of performance was extended to July 31 2020 SIGAR’s financial audit performed by Conrad LLP reviewed $5 292 192 in costs charged to the grants from April 1 2018 through July 31 2020 The auditors identified three deficiencies in DAFA’s internal controls and four instances of noncompliance with the terms of the grants Conrad identified $6 888 in questioned costs charged to the grants related to these issues Financial Audit 21-40-FA USAID’s Emergency Water Sanitation and Hygiene Assistance to Disaster Affected Populations in Afghanistan Audit of Costs Incurred by the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development On January 19 2018 USAID’s Office of U S Foreign Disaster Assistance awarded a $3 million cooperative agreement to the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development ACTED to provide emergency water sanitation and hygiene assistance to populations affected by disaster and conflict in Afghanistan’s Balkh Takhar and Badakhshan Provinces The agreement’s initial period of performance was from December 1 2017 over a month before USAID OFDA issued the award through May 31 2019 After two modifications the agreement’s scope of services expanded to include Faryab and Jawzjan Provinces the total funding increased to $4 million and the end date was extended from May 31 2019 to August 31 2019 SIGAR’s financial audit performed by Crowe LLP reviewed $4 million in costs charged to the award from December 1 2017 through August 31 2019 The auditors identified four deficiencies in ACTED’s internal controls and three instances of noncompliance with the terms of the cooperative agreement Crowe identified $421 in questioned costs charged to the agreement related to these issues Financial Audit 21-34-FA U S Air Force Support for Operation and Maintenance of A-29 Aircraft for the Afghan Air Force Audit of Costs Incurred by Sierra Nevada Corp On April 1 2019 the Department of Defense’s Air Force Life Cycle Management Center awarded Sierra Nevada Corp a task order for $53 998 440 to supply logistics and engineering support for the Afghan Air Force to operate and maintain its A-29 attack aircraft The task order’s period of performance was from April 1 2019 through September 30 2019 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 11 SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES It was modified three times ultimately decreasing the contract value to $50 507 052 with no change to the period of performance SIGAR’s financial audit performed by Castro Company LLC reviewed $27 853 454 in reimbursable costs and fixed fees from April 1 2019 through September 30 2019 The auditors found one deficiency in IAP’s internal controls and two instances of noncompliance with the terms of the task order Castro did not identify any questioned costs charged to the task order related to these issues Financial Audit 21-35-FA USAID’s Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians Program in Afghanistan Audit of Costs Incurred by Blumont Global Development Inc On March 12 2018 USAID awarded a cooperative agreement to Blumont Global Development Inc to support the Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians program in Afghanistan The program provides assistance to support Afghan families suffering from military operations to conduct advocacy and outreach and for other related activities The award’s initial amount was $8 5 million but after four modifications the amount increased to over $26 million The period of performance for the award was unchanged by the modifications The program is ongoing with a planned end date of March 11 2023 SIGAR’s financial audit performed by Crowe LLP reviewed $9 120 738 in costs charged to the agreement from January 1 2019 through December 31 2019 The auditors found five material weaknesses and one significant deficiency in Blumont’s internal controls as well as two instances of noncompliance with the terms of the agreement Crowe did not identify any questioned costs charged to the agreement related to these issues Financial Audit 21-39-FA USAID’s Strengthening Civic Engagement in Elections in Afghanistan Program Audit of Costs Incurred by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening On August 8 2018 USAID awarded a $14 million cooperative agreement to the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening CEPPS to support the Strengthening Civic Engagement in Elections in Afghanistan program The program’s objective is to promote the integrity of Afghan elections by improving the understanding and application of international standards and by enhancing coordination and engagement among Afghan civil society organizations and election management entities The period of performance for the agreement was from August 9 2018 through August 8 2021 After four modifications the agreement’s total funding increased to $18 253 000 but its period of performance was unchanged SIGAR’s financial audit performed by Conrad LLP reviewed $5 190 993 in total revenue and incurred costs charged to the agreement from October 12 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES - - - - - - -1 2019 through September 30 2020 The auditors identified two material weaknesses and two significant deficiencies in CEPPS’s internal controls and two instances of noncompliance with the terms of the agreement Crowe identified Crowe identified $67 311 in questioned costs However SIGAR did not recommend that the responsible agreement officer consider disallowing the $67 311 questioned in Crowe’s report because CEPPS had already made appropriate adjustments with USAID INSPECTIONS SIGAR issued no inspection reports this quarter A list of ongoing inspections can be found in Appendix C of this quarterly report Status of SIGAR Recommendations The Inspector General Act of 1978 as amended requires SIGAR to report on the status of its recommendations This quarter SIGAR closed 18 recommendations contained in 11 performance-audit inspection and financial-audit reports From 2009 through June 2021 SIGAR issued 420 audits alert letters and inspection reports and made 1 176 recommendations to recover funds improve agency oversight and increase program effectiveness SIGAR has closed 1 073 of these recommendations about 91% Closing a recommendation generally indicates SIGAR’s assessment that the audited agency either has implemented the recommendation or has otherwise appropriately addressed the issue In some cases where the agency has failed to act SIGAR will close the recommendation as “Not Implemented” SIGAR closed a total of 241 recommendations in this manner In some cases these recommendations will be the subject of follow-up audit or inspection work SIGAR is also required to report on any significant recommendations from prior reports on which corrective action has not been completed This quarter SIGAR continued to monitor agency actions on 103 open recommendations Of these recommendations 33 have been open for more than 12 months because the agency involved has not yet produced a correctiveaction plan that SIGAR believes would resolve the identified problem or has otherwise failed to appropriately respond to the recommendation s For a complete list of open recommendations see www sigar mil ISSUED LESSONS-LEARNED REPORT LESSONS LEARNED SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program LLP was created to identify lessons and make recommendations to Congress and executive agencies on ways to improve current and future reconstruction efforts REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 13 • SIGAR 21-41-LL The Risk of Doing the Wrong Thing Perfectly Monitoring and Evaluation of Reconstruction Contracting in Afghanistan SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES The program has issued 10 lessons-learned reports to date including one report this quarter The Risk of Doing the Wrong Thing Perfectly Monitoring and Evaluation of Reconstruction Contracting in Afghanistan In addition the program will issue its eleventh report in August a 20-year retrospective on the reconstruction effort and broader war in Afghanistan Another report which focuses on the role of police in conflict is currently scheduled to be released later this year On May 10 LLP staff briefed their recently issued elections report to nearly 30 officials within the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNAMA representing diverse parts of the mission including Political Affairs the Elections Division the Office of the Special Representative to the Secretary General Donor Coordination Judicial Affairs and Human Rights The briefing was tailored to UNAMA’s interest in constraints and opportunities concerning donor influence over elections On May 19 LLP staff briefed their recently issued gender-equality report to 10 officials from UNAMA the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime On June 3 LLP staff briefed the gender report’s findings program analysis lessons and recommendations to 10 Ottawa-based officials from Global Affairs Canada These discussions also focused on what donor entities could do to safeguard women’s rights after the U S troop withdrawal SIGAR 21-41-LL The Risk of Doing the Wrong Thing Perfectly Monitoring and Evaluation of Reconstruction Contracting in Afghanistan On July 15 SIGAR issued its tenth Lessons Learned Program report The Risk of Doing the Wrong Thing Perfectly Monitoring and Evaluation of Reconstruction Contracting in Afghanistan The report examines how reconstruction contracts have been monitored and evaluated in Afghanistan since 2001 It also analyzes how multiple contracts—for example portfolios of contracts in sectors like health or education—were assessed to determine their net effect and overall impact As U S efforts to reconstruct Afghanistan evolved contractors became a prominent feature of the reconstruction landscape substantially augmenting U S government capacity However heavy reliance on contracts also presented significant challenges Widely documented by SIGAR and others contingency contracting is notoriously vulnerable to waste fraud and abuse In unpredictable and chaotic environments such as Afghanistan poor oversight or improper implementation can threaten relationships with local communities endanger the lives of U S and Afghan government personnel and civilians and undermine strategic goals Consequently proper monitoring and evaluation M E —broadly defined as the processes used 14 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES to determine the performance and effectiveness of programs and projects— are vital SIGAR found that agencies placed far more emphasis on tracking program activities and outputs than on assessing outcomes and impacts Although monitoring and evaluation processes generally evolved and improved over time in response to widespread concerns about corruption and a lack of reconstruction progress M E systems that existed on paper were not always put into practice In many cases M E became a “workmaker” that generated an excess of data not all of which were relevant to the broader goals contracts were supposed to advance Moreover although agencies developed processes to change course on projects that were not working these processes were not always fully used This shortcoming undermined the basic purpose of M E Most importantly the report found that M E systems were not always used in ways that allowed agencies to periodically revalidate the theories and assumptions underlying their programs The absence of periodic reality checks created the risk of doing the wrong thing perfectly A project that met contracted deliverables and performance-indicator targets would be considered “successful ” whether or not it had achieved or contributed to broader more important goals On a more positive note SIGAR found that agencies generally have relatively robust M E—or M E-like—policies in place Consequently key aspects of these extensive M E systems have the potential to improve both programmatic and strategic outcomes if they are fully embraced and implemented INVESTIGATIONS FIGURE 1 1 During the reporting period SIGAR’s criminal investigations resulted in two criminal informations a prosecutor’s allegation of a crime as distinct from a grand-jury indictment two guilty pleas one sentencing $179 708 in restitutions and $11 9 million in civil settlements SIGAR initiated six new cases and closed eight bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 94 To date SIGAR investigations have resulted in 160 criminal convictions Criminal fines restitutions forfeitures civil settlements and U S government cost savings and recoveries total over $1 6 billion U S Contractor Pleads Guilty in Scheme to Defraud Afghan Government on Contract to Build Power Substations On April 27 2021 in the Central District of California Saed Ismail Amiri pleaded guilty to a criminal information charging wire fraud in connection to a scheme to defraud the government of Afghanistan of more than $100 million The funds were provided by USAID for the purpose of constructing an electric grid in Afghanistan in connection with U S efforts to strengthen the country’s infrastructure REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 15 SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS NUMBER OF OPEN INVESTIGATIONS Total 94 Corruption and Bribery 25 Procurement and Contract Fraud 29 Other Miscellaneous 22 Theft 7 Money _J Laundering 11 Source SIGAR Investigations Directorate 6 30 2021 SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES Amiri was at various times either the owner or senior consultant of Assist Consultants Incorporated ACI In 2015 USAID authorized the national power utility of Afghanistan Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat DABS to solicit contract bids for the construction of five electric-power substations to connect Afghanistan’s Northeastern and Southeastern electric grid systems The contract criteria required bidders such as ACI to have previously worked on two electric substations of 220 kilovolts or more Amiri ACI employees and others engaged in a scheme to obtain the contract by submitting a false work history and fraudulent supporting documents to deceive DABS into believing that ACI met the required contract criteria When Amiri met with U S law enforcement at the U S Embassy in Kabul he falsely stated among other things that he had learned ACI had bid on the contract during the prior month Shortly thereafter Amiri withdrew ACI’s bid In a subsequent interview with law enforcement Amiri also stated that another ACI employee had submitted the false documents to DABS when in fact Amiri had emailed the false documents himself SIGAR is leading the investigation Army National Guardsman Pleads Guilty to Theft of U S Government Property On May 12 2021 in the Western District of Tennessee Michael Jason McCaslin pleaded guilty to a one-count criminal information charging theft of government property In 2017 and 2018 McCaslin was a senior supply sergeant with the Tennessee Army National Guard based in Humboldt Tennessee While deployed to Kandahar Airfield Afghanistan McCaslin’s duties included ordering supplies for U S troops Military personnel discovered that McCaslin had ordered multiple items that were never received at Kandahar When military personnel intercepted a Conex shipping container sent from Kandahar and addressed to McCaslin’s unit in Humboldt it was discovered that McCaslin had signed the shipping forms and arranged for the delivery Various items were inside the container including computers tools headsets and furniture Further investigation revealed McCaslin had used U S government funds to purchase other items that were never received at Kandahar SIGAR and Defense Criminal Investigative Service DCIS are jointly conducting the investigation U S Contractor Agrees to Pay $11 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations and to Pay Penalties Assessed by the FAA On June 30 2021 AAR Corporation based in Wood Dale Illinois and its subsidiary AAR Airlift Group Inc Airlift in Melbourne Florida agreed to 16 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES - - - - - - -pay the United States $11 088 000 to resolve False Claims Act allegations in connection with aircraft maintenance services on U S Transportation Command TRANSCOM contracts in Afghanistan and elsewhere  The contracts valued at over $500 million were for major intra-theater airlift services for the U S military including supplies and mail AAR and Airlift also agreed to pay $429 273 to resolve a separate Federal Aviation Administration FAA matter citing deficiencies in Airlift’s helicopter maintenance The investigation initiated in 2015 revealed that AAR claimed and submitted invoices indicating its aircraft were “fully mission capable” when in fact they were not due to AAR’s failure to fulfill certain maintenance requirements The primary investigative focus relative to Afghanistan was the neglected use or acquisition of critical equipment required by aircraft manufacturers to achieve mission-ready status The investigation was led by Air Force OSI and supported by SIGAR FAA DCIS U S Army Criminal Investigation Command CID Naval Criminal Investigative Service Department of Transportation OIG and the Defense Contract Audit Agency U S Contractor Sentenced for Theft of Government Equipment on Military Base in Afghanistan On April 27 2021 in the Eastern District of Virginia Varita V Quincy was sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised probation and ordered to pay $179 708 in restitutions In October 2020 Quincy pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and commit theft of property of value to the United States one count of theft of property of value to the United States and one count of false statements During 2015 Quincy and her co-conspirator Larry Green participated in an organized theft ring responsible for the theft of equipment including generators and vehicles from Kandahar Airfield Afghanistan Quincy used her position as a security badging and escort pass supervisor to create or cause to be made false official documents The false official documents facilitated both the entry of unknown and unvetted Afghan nationals and their vehicles onto the military installation and effectuated the removal of the stolen property from the installation The falsified documents were used to deceive security officers and gate guards thereby compromising the security of U S military and civilian personnel on the installation Green was sentenced on November 19 2020 to 41 months’ imprisonment and two years’ supervised probation He was ordered to forfeit $11 480 and pay restitutions totaling $179 708 SIGAR led this investigation with assistance from the CID REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 17 QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT SIGAR LOOKS AHEAD TO OVERSIGHT AFTER THE U S TROOP WITHDRAWAL The withdrawal of U S and Coalition military forces and reductions in other U S personnel in Afghanistan complicate the critical task of overseeing U S funds still intended for reconstruction programs in that country Some $6 7 billion is currently appropriated and awaiting disbursement with additional billions expected to follow Conducting oversight against waste fraud and abuse of taxpayer funds “will be much more difficult ” SIGAR said in a June 1 2021 letter to Congress but it can be done “SIGAR has been conducting oversight in Afghanistan since 2009 and operating ‘outside the wire’ for years including after major troop drawdowns began in 2014 ” The letter titled “Protecting U S Assistance to Afghanistan Following the Withdrawal of U S and Coalition Forces ” offered four recommendations for Congress and the Administration to maintain effective oversight after the military withdrawal in keeping with the watchdog mission mandated by SIGAR’s 2008 authorizing statute Summarized the four recommendations are 1 Congress and the Administration should strictly condition U S funding and other assistance to Afghanistan on the Afghan government’s granting SIGAR and other oversight organizations access to Afghan government ministries and their records 2 Congress and the Administration should strictly condition U S funding and other assistance funneled through trust funds administered by international organizations like the World Bank on their granting SIGAR and other oversight organizations access to all records pertaining to the use of such funds Some such intermediaries have resisted SIGAR data requests 3 Congress should direct the Administration to reestablish an Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell to identify disrupt and eliminate illicit financial networks in Afghanistan particularly those involved in narcotics trafficking illicit financial transactions and terrorist networks 4 DOD and the State Department should consider establishing a traditional Security Cooperation Office at the U S Embassy in Kabul to provide security assistance to the Afghan government 18 The U S House Appropriations Committee has already taken a step forward on the first recommendation The committee report accompanying the proposed State Foreign Relations and Related Appropriations Bill 2022 contains language requiring State to submit within 90 days of final bill enactment a strategy on conditionality in granting or withholding aid based on three factors One of the factors is whether the Afghan government provides “access to data and information on the implementation of U S assistance for independent oversight entities such as SIGAR and GAO ” SIGAR is both the only oversight agency with auditors and law enforcement investigators stationed in Afghanistan and the only one with whole-of-government statutory authority to examine any federal agency using U S funds for Afghanistan reconstruction In addition to its own in-country staff of auditors and investigators SIGAR makes use of informants contract accounting firms nongovernmental organizations and contacts with Afghan government officials to gather information on U S -funded reconstruction activities SIGAR intends to expand its use of these ancillary information sources SIGAR will also continue using geospatial imaging and GPS-location technology to help monitor development projects in insecure areas and is prepared to co-locate a small staff with any “over the horizon” security-assistance office for Afghanistan that the Department of Defense may establish after the military withdrawal from the country is complete In addition SIGAR will increase the timeliness and utility of its audits and evaluations narrowing objectives and scopes and by focusing on ongoing rather than completed programs thereby offering immediately actionable findings and recommendations Meanwhile SIGAR investigators will expand their work with U S -based Afghans and international law-enforcement officials to fight activities like corruption narcotics production and trafficking and money laundering SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES - - - - - - -SIGAR BUDGET SIGAR is funded through September 30 2021 under H R 133 Consolidated Appropriations Act 2021 signed into law on December 27 2020 This Act provides $54 9 million to support SIGAR’s oversight activities and products by funding SIGAR’s Audits and Inspections Investigations Management and Support and Research and Analysis Directorates and the Lessons Learned Program SIGAR STAFF SIGAR’s staff count has remained steady since the last report to Congress with 174 employees on board at the end of the quarter SIGAR currently has five staff members assigned to the U S Embassy Kabul Afghanistan SIGAR also employed five Afghan nationals in its Kabul office to support the Forward Operations Investigations and Audits Directorates SIGAR supplemented its resident staff this quarter with one employee on shortterm temporary duty in Afghanistan REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 19 “There are risks entailed to the decision of ending NATO’s military mission in Afghanistan We have been very transparent and clear-eyed about that ” —NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Source Associated Press “NATO chief says Afghan forces can cope alone ” 5 27 2021 2 RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE 21 GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE CONTENTS RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE CONTENTS KEY ISSUES EVENTS Reconstruction in Brief H4 TOC 23 3 Status of Funds 25 Security 49 Governance 83 Economic and Social Development 111 Photo on previous page Secretary of Defense Lloyd J Austin III second from right meets with President Ashraf Ghani second from left and High Council for National Reconciliation Chairman Abdullah Abdullah left at the Pentagon in late June 2021 DOD photo by Sgt Taryn Escott USMC 22 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION RECONSTRUCTION IN BRIEF Section 2 of this quarterly report summarizes the key events of the reporting period as well as the programs and projects concerning Afghanistan reconstruction across four areas Funding Security Governance and Economic and Social Development U S AND COALITION FORCES WITHDRAW AS THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT FACES A SECURITY CRISIS • NATO’s Resolute Support Mission significantly reduced its presence in Afghanistan as U S and international forces withdrew • General Austin Scott Miller NATO Resolute Support Mission and U S Forces-Afghanistan USFOR-A commander transferred responsibility of USFOR-A to CENTCOM commander General Kenneth F McKenzie on July 12 2021 • Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan’s mission to train advise and assist the Afghan forces ended and transitioned to providing “over-the-horizon” security assistance as the new Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan • The Taliban launched an offensive against the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces overrunning numerous district centers but continued to avoid attacking U S and Coalition forces BIDEN COMMITS TO CONTINUED ASSISTANCE • President Biden committed to “maintaining significant humanitarian and development assistance” to Afghanistan following the U S and Coalition troop withdrawal • The Taliban seized a string of key border crossings with the potential to deny the Afghan government significant customs revenue • Afghanistan has struggled with a third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic as infection rates skyrocketed by around 2 400% • The Afghan government’s domestic revenues have increased by 22 6% over the first six months of the current fiscal year versus the same period of the previous year but remain below pre-pandemic levels JULY 30 2021 PEACE TALKS REMAIN STALLED • Talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban remained stalled this quarter • Three-day ceasefires declared by the Afghan government and Taliban for the Eid al-Fitr religious holiday failed to have an enduring effect 2020 INCREASE IN OPIUM-POPPY CULTIVATION • UNODC reports a 37% increase in 2020 opium-poppy cultivation over 2019 • The southwestern region to include Helmand and Kandahar Provinces accounted for the largest portion of national cultivation U S RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING • Cumulative appropriations for reconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan since FY 2002 rose to $144 98 billion in the quarter • Of the $120 32 billion 83% of total appropriated to the eight largest active reconstruction funds about $6 68 billion remained for possible disbursement • DOD’s latest Cost of War Report dated March 31 2021 said its cumulative obligations for Afghanistan including U S warfighting and reconstruction had reached $837 3 billion Cumulative Afghanistan reconstruction and related obligations reported by State USAID and other civilian agencies reached $49 6 billion • The Costs of War Project at Brown University’s Watson Institute estimated Afghanistan war costs at $2 26 trillion far in excess of DOD’s estimate The Costs of War Project includes DOD and civilian agency costs in Afghanistan and Pakistan a portion of DOD costs since 9 11 above a baseline amount veterans’ medical and disability costs and interest costs on war-related borrowing SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE STATUS OF FUNDS GOVERNANCE STATUS OF FUNDS CONTENTS CONTENTS KEY ISSUES U S Reconstruction EVENTS Funding H4 TOC for Afghanistan 26 3 U S Cost of War and Reconstruction in Afghanistan 28 Afghanistan Reconstruction Funding Pipeline 29 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund 30 Commanders’ Emergency Response Program 34 Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities 35 Economic Support Fund 36 International Disaster Assistance 37 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 38 Migration and Refugee Assistance 39 Nonproliferation Antiterrorism Demining and Related Programs 40 International Reconstruction Funding for Afghanistan 41 24 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION STATUS OF FUNDS - - - - - - -STATUS OF FUNDS In accord with SIGAR’s legislative mandate this section details the status of U S funds appropriated obligated and disbursed for reconstruction activities in Afghanistan As of June 30 2021 the United States government had appropriated or otherwise made available approximately $144 98 billion in funds for reconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan since FY 2002 Total Afghanistan reconstruction funding has been allocated as follows • $88 61 billion for security including $4 60 billion for counternarcotics initiatives • $36 29 billion for governance and development including $4 37 billion for counternarcotics initiatives • $4 18 billion for humanitarian aid • $15 91 billion for agency operations ASFF Afghanistan Security Forces Fund CERP Commanders’ Emergency Response Program DICDA Drug Interdiction and CounterDrug Activities ESF Economic Support Fund IDA International Disaster Assistance INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement MRA Migration and Refugee Assistance NADR Non-Proliferation Antiterrorism Demining and Related Programs Figure 2 1 shows the eight largest active U S funds that contribute to these efforts SIGAR previously reported on the nine largest active funds but one of these funds the Public Law 480 Title II account is no longer used to provide food aid to Afghanistan so has been removed from this section of SIGAR’s reporting FIGURE 2 1 U S APPROPRIATIONS SUPPORTING AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS $ BILLIONS EIGHT LARGEST ACTIVE RECONSTRUCTION ACCOUNTS – $120 32 BILLION DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE USAID OTHER AGENCIES DEPARTMENT OF STATE ASFF CERP DICDA ESF IDA INCLE MRA NADR $82 90 $3 71 $3 28 $21 24 $1 15 $5 50 $1 60 $0 93 OTHER RECONSTRUCTION ACCOUNTS – $8 75 BILLION $3 08 $3 89 $1 78 AGENCY OPERATIONS – $15 91 BILLION N A $2 32 $13 59 TOTAL AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION – $144 98 BILLION $92 98 $28 60 $23 41 Note Numbers have been rounded Source Details of accounts including sources of data are provided in Appendix B to this report REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 25 STATUS OF FUNDS ASFF •• •• ••• DICDA CERP DOD ESF INCLE IDA USAID OTHER II I MRA NADR STATE The amount provided to the eight largest active U S funds represents nearly 83 0% nearly $120 32 billion of total reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan ASFF since FY 2002 Of this amount more than 91 8% nearly $110 46 billion has been obligated and more than 89 1% more DOD than $107 22 billion has been disbursed An estimated $6 41 billion of the amount appropriated for these funds has expired and will therefore not be disbursed CERP U S RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN As of June 30 2021 cumulative appropriations for reconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan totaled approximately $144 98 billion as shown in Figure 2 2 This total comprises four major categories of reconstruction and related funding security governance and development humanitarian and agency operations Approximately $8 97 billion of these funds support counternarcotics initiatives that crosscut the categories of security $4 60 billion and governance and development $4 37 billion For complete information regarding U S appropriations see Appendix B President Donald J Trump signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2021 H R 133 into law on December 27 2020 providing appropriations for all agencies active in Afghanistan including the Departments of Defense State and Justice the U S Agency for International Development the U S Agency for Global Media the U S International Development Finance Corporation and SIGAR Three appropriations were specifically targeted for Afghanistan consisting of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ASFF the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program CERP and the SIGAR appropriation together totaling $3 10 billion In the quarter ending June 30 2021 State and Congress agreed through the Section 653 a DOD FIGURE 2 2 CUMULATIVE APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY AS OF JUNE 30 2021 $ BILLIONS $150 USAID OTHER 120 116 81 111 02 104 37 130 40 123 53 90 140 84 136 20 144 98 IDA 60 USAID OTHER 30 0 FY 2014 FY 2015 INCLE • Security FY 2016 • FY 2017 Governance Development FY 2018 • Humanitarian FY 2019 • FY 2020 • Agency Operations FY 2021 Total Note Numbers have been rounded Source Details of accounts including sources STATE of data are provided in Appendix B to this report DICDA 26 DOD SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION STATUS OF FUNDS process to allocate FY 2021 appropriated foreign assistance funding to specific countries and accounts including $282 50 million to Afghanistan for five accounts principally the Economic Support Fund ESF and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement INCLE account These two actions combined with $0 76 billion from other Congressional and agency actions make up the FY 2021 appropriations of $4 14 billion through June 30 2021 as shown in Figure 2 3 Additional funds will become available for Afghanistan reconstruction during the next quarter of FY 2021 Since 2002 the United States has provided nearly $17 28 billion in onbudget assistance to the government of Afghanistan This includes nearly $11 31 billion provided to Afghan government ministries and institutions and nearly $5 97 billion to three multilateral trust funds—the World Bankmanaged Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund ARTF the United Nations Development Programme-managed Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan LOTFA and the Asian Development Bank-managed Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund AITF Table 2 1 shows U S on-budget assistance disbursed to the Afghan government and multilateral trust funds and Table 2 6 on page 46 shows the increasing share of U S civilian sector assistance being provided to multilateral institutions TABLE 2 1 U S ON-BUDGET ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN SINCE 2002 $ MILLIONS Disbursements Total On-Budget Assistance Government-to-Government DOD $17 275 44 11 309 66 10 447 68 USAID 776 79 State 85 19 Multilateral Trust Funds 5 965 77 ARTF 4 127 68 LOTFA 1 684 42 AITF 153 67 Note Numbers have been rounded Source USAID response to SIGAR data call 7 14 2021 State response to SIGAR data call 10 18 2018 DOD response to SIGAR data call 7 23 2021 World Bank ARTF Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of April 20 2021 end of 4th month of FY 1400 accessed 7 10 2021 UNDP LOTFA Receipts 2002–2021 Combined Bilateral and MPTF updated 6 30 2021 in response to SIGAR data call 7 8 2021 FIGURE 2 3 ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY $ BILLIONS $8 0 6 93 6 87 6 72 6 65 6 0 5 80 5 79 4 64 4 14 4 0 2 0 0 0 FY 2014 FY 2015 • Security FY 2016 • FY 2017 Governance Development FY 2018 • Humanitarian FY 2019 • Note Numbers have been rounded Source Details of accounts including sources of data are provided in Appendix B to this report REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 27 Agency Operations FY 2020 • Total FY 2021 STATUS OF FUNDS U S COST OF WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN DOD’s latest Cost of War Report dated March 31 2021 said its cumulative obligations for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel in Afghanistan including U S warfighting and reconstruction had reached $837 3 billion 1 DOD and SIGAR jointly provide oversight for security-related reconstruction funding amounting to $83 3 billion of this amount State USAID and other civilian agencies report cumulative obligations of $49 6 billion for Afghanistan reconstruction which when added to the DOD amount results in $132 9 billion obligated for Afghanistan reconstruction through that date as shown in Figure 2 4 These reconstruction costs equal approximately 16% of all funds obligated by DOD for Afghanistan since 2001 Costs of War Project Sees Higher Costs than DOD A nongovernmental estimate of U S costs for the 20-year war in Afghanistan is more than double DOD’s calculation FIGURE 2 4 AFGHANISTAN COST OF WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ANNUAL AND CUMULATIVE OBLIGATIONS FY 2002 TO FY 2021 Q2 $ BILLIONS $100 98 97 CUMULATIVE OBLIGATIONS THROUGH MARCH 31 2021 • • 80 60 COST OF WAR $837 3 78 77 Department of Defense COST OF RECONSTRUCTION $132 9 Department of Defense USAID Department of State Other Agencies 83 3 25 2 22 8 1 6 60 47 47 SIGAR-reported Cost of Reconstruction amount is also included in DOD-reported Cost of War amount 40 41 38 40 38 36 32 20 20 20 12 1 1 2 5 15 14 12 10 10 10 3 6 15 13 9 6 6 6 7 7 22 5 3 0 1 FY 02 FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 FY 09 FY 10 FY 11 FY 12 FY 13 FY 14 FY 15 FY 16 FY 17 FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21 Note Numbers have been rounded Cumulative obligations reported by DOD for the Cost of War through March 31 2021 differ markedly from cumulative appropriations through June 30 2021 as presented elsewhere in the Status of Funds section because the former figures do not include unobligated appropriations and DOD Cost of War reporting lags by one quarter Source DOD Cost of War Monthly Report Total War-related Obligations by Year Incurred data as of March 31 2021 Obligation data shown against year funds obligated SIGAR analysis of annual obligation of reconstruction accounts as presented in SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 4 30 2021 Obligation data shown against year funds appropriated 28 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION STATUS OF FUNDS The Costs of War Project sponsored by the Watson Institute at Brown University recently issued U S Costs to Date for the War in Afghanistan 2001–2021 putting total costs at $2 26 trillion 2 The Watson Institute’s independently produced report builds on DOD’s $933 billion Overseas Contingency Operations OCO budgets and State’s $59 billion OCO budgets for Afghanistan and Pakistan Unlike the DOD Cost of War Report the Watson report adds what it considers to be Afghanistanrelated costs of $433 billion above DOD baseline costs $296 billion in medical and disability costs for veterans and $530 billion in interest costs on related Treasury borrowing SIGAR takes no position on the reasonableness on the Watson report’s assumptions or the accuracy of its calculations AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING PIPELINE Since 2002 Congress has appropriated more than $144 98 billion for reconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan of which nearly $120 32 billion was appropriated to the eight largest active reconstruction accounts As of June 30 2021 approximately $6 68 billion of the amount appropriated to the eight largest active reconstruction funds remained for possible disbursement as shown in Table 2 2 and Figure 2 5 FIGURE 2 5 TABLE 2 2 CUMULATIVE AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED OBLIGATED DISBURSED AND REMAINING FY 2002 TO JUNE 30 2021 $ BILLIONS I   Appropriated Obligated Disbursed Remaining $82 90 $76 19 $75 20 $4 01 21 24 20 03 18 34 2 02 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement INCLE 5 50 5 16 4 69 0 57 Commanders’ Emergency Response Program CERP 3 71 2 29 2 29 0 00 Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities DICDA 3 28 3 28 3 28 0 00 Migration and Refugee Assistance MRA 1 60 1 60 1 56 0 03 International Disaster Assistance IDA 1 15 1 12 1 06 0 06 Non-Proliferation Antiterrorism Demining and Related NADR 0 93 0 79 0 79 0 00 I Total Eight Largest Active Accounts 120 32 110 46 107 22 6 68 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ASFF Economic Support Fund ESF Other Reconstruction Funds 8 75 Agency Operations Total 15 91 $144 98 Note Numbers have been rounded The amount remaining reflects the total disbursement potential of the eight largest active reconstruction accounts after deducting approximately $6 41 billion that has expired Expired funds equal the amount appropriated but not obligated after the period of availability for obligation has ended and thereafter includes amounts deobligated and canceled The amount remaining for potential disbursement for Other Reconstruction Funds is less than $50 million for Agency Operations the amount can not be determined from the data provided by the agencies but is most often less than the most recent annual appropriation Source SIGAR analysis of appropriation laws and obligation and disbursement data provided by DOD State and USAID 7 19 2021 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 29 STATUS OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS EIGHT LARGEST ACTIVE ACCOUNTS AS OF JUNE 30 2021 $ BILLIONS Total Appropriated $120 32 Billion Disbursed $107 22 Remaining $6 68 Expired $6 41 ASFF DICDA CERP IDA INCLE USAID OTHER DOD ASFF ESF MRA NADR STATE •• •• ••• l DOD STATUS OF FUNDS ASFF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY Appropriations Total monies available for commitments CERP Obligations Commitments to pay monies Disbursements Monies that have been expended DOD Rescission Legislation enacted by Congress that cancels the availability of budget authority previously enacted before the authority would otherwise expire USAID OTHER Reprogramming Shifting funds within an appropriation or fund to use them for purposes other than those contemplated at the time of appropriation AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND Congress has created the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ASFF to provide the ANDSF with equipment supplies services training and funding for salaries as well as facility and infrastructure repair renovation and construction The primary organization responsible for building the ANDSF has been the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan CSTC-A this quarter CSTC-A transitioned to the Qatar-based Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan DSCMO-A President Donald J Trump signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2021 into law on December 27 2020 which under Division C-Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2021 provided an appropriation of $3 05 billion for ASFF FY 2021 and a rescission of $1 10 billion for ASFF FY 2020 This funding decrease for ASFF FY 2020 reduced the original appropriation from $4 20 billion to an adjusted appropriation of $3 10 billion as shown in Figure 2 6 3 As of June 30 2021 cumulative appropriations for ASFF stood at nearly $82 90 billion with more than $76 19 billion having been obligated and more than $75 20 billion disbursed as shown in Figure 2 7 DOD reported that cumulative obligations increased by nearly $900 29 million during the quarter ending June 30 2021 and that cumulative disbursements increased by nearly $778 15 million 4 FIGURE 2 6 FIGURE 2 7 ASFF APPROPRIATED FUNDS BY FISCAL YEAR ASFF FUNDS CUMULATIVE COMPARISON $ BILLIONS $ BILLIONS $12 $80 9 60 6 40 IDA Source GAO Glossary USAID of Terms in the Federal Budget Used OTHER Process 9 2005 INCLE STATE 7 3 0 DICDA • •v ••••••• ·•••• •·••••·••••••••••·••••••••••····•··· 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 Appropriated $82 90 Obligated $75 29 Disbursed $74 42 7 Appropriated $82 90 Obligated $76 19 Disbursed $75 20 20 0 As of Mar 31 2021 As of Jun 30 2021 Note Numbers have been rounded Data reflects reprogramming actions and rescissions DOD reprogrammed $1 billion from FY 2011 ASFF $1 billion from FY 2012 ASFF $178 million from FY 2013 ASFF and $604 million from FY 2019 ASFF to fund other DOD requirements DOD reprogrammed $230 million into FY 2015 ASFF ASFF data reflect the following rescissions $1 billion from FY 2012 in Pub L No 113-6 $764 38 million from FY 2014 in Pub L No 113-235 $400 million from FY 2015 in Pub L No 114-113 $150 million from FY 2016 in Pub L No 115-31 $396 million from FY 2019 in Pub L No 116-93 and $1 10 billion from FY 2020 in Pub L No 116-260 DOD ESF USAID OTHER Source DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts March 2021 ” 4 16 2021 Pub L Nos 116-260 116-93 115-141 115-31 114-113 113-235 113-76 and 113-6 OSD Comptroller 16-22 PA Omnibus 2016 Prior Approval Request 6 30 2016 30 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION STATUS OF FUNDS - - - - - - -ASFF Budget Categories DOD budgeted and reported on ASFF by three Budget Activity Groups BAGs through the FY 2018 appropriation These BAGs consisted of Defense Forces Afghan National Army ANA Interior Forces Afghan National Police ANP and Related Activities primarily Detainee Operations DOD revised its budgeting and reporting framework for ASFF beginning with its ASFF budget request for FY 2019 submitted to Congress in February 2018 and with its reporting beginning on October 1 2018 The new framework restructures the ANA and ANP BAGs to better reflect the ANDSF force structure and new budget priorities In FY 2018 and previous years all costs associated with the Afghan Air Force AAF fell under the ANA BAG and costs for the Afghan Special Security Forces ASSF were split between the ANA and ANP BAGs Beginning with the ASFF FY 2019 appropriation the ANDSF consists of the ANA ANP AAF and ASSF BAGs As shown in Figure 2 8 ASFF disbursements for the new AAF and ASSF BAGs amounting to $1 78 billion and $0 88 billion respectively over the FY 2019 to FY 2021 period through June 30 2021 together account for $2 67 billion or 47% of total disbursements of $5 73 billion over this period Funds for each BAG are further allocated to four subactivity groups SAGs Sustainment Infrastructure Equipment and Transportation and Training and Operations As shown in Figure 2 9 ASFF disbursements of $37 69 billion for ANDSF Sustainment constituted 50% of total cumulative ASFF expenditures of $74 68 billion through June 30 2021 FIGURE 2 8 FIGURE 2 9 ASFF DISBURSEMENTS BY BUDGET ACTIVITY GROUP OLD FY 2005 TO FY 2018 AND NEW FY 2019 TO FY 2021 Q3 $ BILLIONS ASFF DISBURSEMENTS BY SUBACTIVITY GROUP FY 2005 TO FY 2021 Q3 $ BILLIONS Total $74 68 Billion Infrastructure $9 20 Old ANP $21 49 Old ANA $47 45 New ANA New ANP New AAF New ASSF $2 27 $0 79 $1 78 $0 88 Equipment and Transportation $18 56 Training and Operations $9 22 Sustainment $37 69 Note Numbers have been rounded ASFF Disbursements by Budget Activity Group and Subactivity Group both exclude disbursements for Related Activities and undistributed disbursements amounting to $0 53 billion that are included in total ASFF disbursements of $75 20 billion as presented in Figure 2 7 Source DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 31 Budget Activity Groups Categories within each appropriation or fund account that identify the purposes projects or types of activities financed by the appropriation or fund Subactivity Groups Accounting groups that break down the command’s disbursements into functional areas Source DOD Manual 7110 1-M Department of Defense Budget Guidance Manual accessed 9 28 2009 Department of the Navy Medical Facility Manager Handbook p 5 accessed 10 2 2009 STATUS OF FUNDS ASFF Budgeting Requirements Financial and Activity Plan DOD notification to Congress of its plan for obligating the ASFF appropriation as well as updates to that plan involving any proposed new projects or transfer of funds between budget subactivity groups in excess of $20 million as required by the annual DOD appropriation act Source DOD response to SIGAR data call 1 23 2020 The annual DOD appropriation act sets forth a number of ASFF budgeting requirements Prior to the obligation of newly appropriated funds for ASFF a Financial and Activity Plan FAP with details of proposed obligations must be approved by the DOD Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council AROC concurred by the Department of State and notified to the Congressional defense committees Thereafter the AROC must approve the requirement and acquisition plan for any service requirements in excess of $50 million annually and for any nonstandard equipment requirement in excess of $100 million In addition the DOD is required to notify Congress prior to obligating funds for any new projects or transfer of funds between budget subactivity groups in excess of $20 million 5 The DOD’s execution of its spending plans for the ASFF FY 2020 and ASFF FY 2021 appropriations based on FAP 20-3 and FAP 21-1 notified to Congress in the quarter ending March 31 2021 is presented below in Table 2 3 The details of DOD’s budgets for the ASFF FY 2020 and ASFF FY 2021 appropriations and for the President’s Budget Request for the ASFF FY 2022 appropriation are presented on the opposite page in Table 2 4 TABLE 2 3 ASFF FY 2020 AND ASFF FY 2021 BUDGET EXECUTION THROUGH JUNE 30 2021 $ MILLIONS ASFF FY 2020 Budget Activity Groups Budget FAP 20-3 Obligations Afghan National Army ASFF FY 2021 Disbursements Budget FAP 21-1 Obligations Disbursements $1 257 18 $902 96 $739 96 $994 15 $158 42 $137 14 Afghan National Police 439 25 312 32 260 29 448 38 45 62 13 67 Afghan Air Force 988 83 943 37 840 96 818 05 293 87 59 13 293 96 242 32 787 03 177 77 43 37 $2 452 62 $2 083 52 $3 047 61 $675 67 $253 30 Afghan Spec Sec Forces Total 414 73 $3 099 98 Note Numbers have been rounded The ASFF FY 2020 budget reflects the $1 10 billion rescinded from the account in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act 2021 enacted on December 27 2020 Totals exclude undistributed obligations and disbursements Source DOD AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts June 2021 7 16 2021 and Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ASFF Financial and Activity Plan Fiscal Year 2020 20-3 March 2021 and Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ASFF Financial and Activity Plan Fiscal Year 2021 21-1 January 2021 4 8 2021 NATO ANA Trust Fund The NATO-managed Afghan National Army ANA Trust Fund NATF has contributed nearly $1 70 billion to ASFF for specific projects funded by donor nations through June 30 2021 ASFF has returned nearly $456 94 million of these funds following the cancellation or completion of these projects DOD has disbursed more than $1 16 billion of NATF-contributed funds through ASFF through June 30 2021 6 These amounts are not reflected in the U S government-funded ASFF obligation and disbursement numbers presented in Figures 2 6 and 2 7 on page 30 32 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION STATUS OF FUNDS - - - - - - -TABLE 2 4 ASFF FY 2020 BUDGET ASFF FY 2021 BUDGET AND ASFF FY 2022 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET REQUEST $ MILLIONS ASFF FY 2020 Budget FAP 20-3 March 2021 ASFF FY 2021 Budget FAP 21-1 January 2021 ASFF FY 2022 President’s Budget Request May 2021 $3 099 98 $3 047 61 $3 327 83 1 257 18 994 15 1 110 23 1 132 53 963 57 1 053 67 413 93 561 69 539 82 93 69 46 12 52 15 Communications and Intelligence 121 94 70 40 99 58 Petroleum Oil and Lubricants 146 24 76 59 146 59 All Other 215 54 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund Total Afghan National Army Total Sustainment Total Personnel Ammunition 356 73 208 77 Infrastructure Total 37 91 0 22 1 82 Equipment and Transportation Total 52 88 4 70 22 91 Training and Operations Total Afghan National Police Total Sustainment Total Petroleum Oil and Lubricants All Other Infrastructure Total Equipment and Transportation Total Training and Operations Total 33 86 25 66 31 84 439 25 448 38 517 33 384 40 392 98 440 63 80 00 57 05 109 32 304 40 335 93 331 30 6 13 448 00 0 00 13 44 28 03 38 55 35 27 26 92 38 15 Afghan Air Force Total 988 83 818 05 758 34 Sustainment Total 562 06 555 86 537 76 Personnel 19 70 41 56 30 83 Ammunition 46 63 65 80 45 56 Petroleum Oil and Lubricants Aircraft Contracted Support All Other Infrastructure Total Equipment and Transportation Total Aircraft 48 23 37 83 29 60 425 77 370 00 422 77 15 53 22 59 33 30 3 44 0 00 0 00 56 28 45 98 26 60 21 40 50 84 40 00 Other Equipment and Tools 5 44 5 98 5 20 Training and Operations Total 373 25 234 30 169 68 414 73 787 03 941 93 Afghan Special Security Forces Total Sustainment Total Aircraft Sustainment 305 68 597 90 685 18 159 52 260 14 247 58 Personnel 68 61 132 30 130 54 All Other 77 55 205 46 307 06 9 91 1 53 0 00 Equipment and Transportation Total Infrastructure Total 71 98 18 69 78 98 Training and Operations Total 27 15 168 91 177 77 Source DOD ASFF FAP 20-3 and ASFF FAP 21-1 response to SIGAR data call 4 8 2021 ASFF FY 2022 President’s Budget Request response to SIGAR data call 7 7 2021 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 33 STATUS OF FUNDS ASFF DOD •· COMMANDERS’ EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM CERP DOD I I CERP FUNDS TERMINOLOGY Appropriations Total monies available for commitments Obligations Commitments to pay monies Disbursements Monies that have USAID OTHER been expended IDA USAID OTHER INCLE STATE The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program CERP enables U S commanders in Afghanistan to respond to urgent small-scale humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements in their areas of responsibility by supporting programs that will immediately assist the local population Funding under this program is restricted to small projects whose cost may not exceed $500 000 7 The Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2021 decreased the annual appropriation for CERP from $5 00 million in FY 2020 to $2 00 million in FY 2021 bringing total cumulative funding to more than $3 71 billion House Report 116-453 accompanying the Appropriations Act states that “the Committee believes that after nearly two decades the time has come to wind down this program CERP The Committee directs the Secretary of Defense to transition activities to the Afghanistan Security Forces and other agencies of the United States government as appropriate and to phase out this program during fiscal year 2021 ”8 Notably CERP annual appropriations had equaled or exceeded $400 00 million per year during the FY 2008–FY 2012 period as shown in Figure 2 10 and nearly $1 12 billion in appropriations from this period were realigned to other Operation and Maintenance Army account requirements or expired without being disbursed DOD reported that CERP cumulative appropriations obligations and disbursements stood at approximately $3 71 billion $2 29 billion and $2 29 billion respectively at June 30 2021 as shown in Figure 2 11 9 FIGURE 2 10 FIGURE 2 11 CERP APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR CERP FUNDS CUMULATIVE COMPARISON $ MILLIONS $ BILLIONS $1 000 $4 DICDA 800 Appropriated $3 71 Appropriated $3 71 Obligated and Disbursed $2 29 Obligated and Disbursed $2 29 3 DOD 600 2 400 ESF 1 200 USAID OTHER 0 MRA 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 0 As of Mar 31 2021 As of Jun 30 2021 Note Numbers have been rounded Data may include interagency transfers Analysis includes data from a draft DOD financial report because the final version had not been completed when this report went to press Source DOD response to SIGAR data call 7 19 2021 and 4 19 2021 OMB response to SIGAR data call 1 4 2013 Pub L Nos 115-141 115-31 114-113 113-235 113-76 113-6 112-74 and 112-10 STATE 34 NADR SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION USAID OTHER STATUS OF FUNDS INCLE STATE DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER-DRUG ACTIVITIES The Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities DICDA Defense appropriation provided funding for efforts intended to stabilize Afghanistan by combating the drug trade and related activities The DOD Counterdrug group allocated this funding to support the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan units mentored by the DEA and U S Army Special Forces who investigate high-value targets and conduct drug-interdiction operations Funding was also provided to the Afghanistan Special Mission Wing SMW to support their fleet of rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft The SMW’s aircraft provide air mobility to conduct intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance operations supporting in-country counterdrug activity 10 The DOD Counterdrug group allocated modest amounts of funding to Afghanistan programs in recent years as the number of counterdrug missions performed by the SMW decreased falling from $118 01 million in FY 2018 to $10 18 million in FY 2019 and $24 30 million in FY 2020 The Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2021 provided no DICDA Overseas Contingency Operations OCO funding for FY 2021 a departure from historical practice and a decrease of $153 00 million from the FY 2020 enacted level The DOD Counterdrug group has no plans to fund activities in Afghanistan in FY 2021 and the appropriation for FY 2021 stands at zero as shown in Figure 2 12 11 Cumulative amounts appropriated and transferred from the Central Transfer Account remain unchanged between September 30 2020 and June 30 2021 at $3 28 billion as shown in Figure 2 13 12 FIGURE 2 12 FIGURE 2 13 DICDA APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR DICDA FUNDS CUMULATIVE COMPARISON $500 $3 5 400 2 8 300 2 1 200 1 4 100 0 7 $ MILLIONS 0 0 Appropriated and Transferreda $3 28 Appropriated and Transferreda $3 28 As of Mar 31 2021 As of Jun 30 2021 Note Numbers have been rounded DOD reprogrammed $125 13 million out of FY 2015 DICDA and $122 18 million out of FY 2019 DICDA due to requirements for the Afghanistan Special Mission Wing being funded from the ASFF instead of DICDA a DOD reprograms all DICDA funds to the military services and defense agencies for obligation and disbursement Source DOD response to SIGAR data call 7 9 2021 and 4 9 2021 OSD Comptroller 15-23 PA Omnibus 15 Prior Approval Request 6 30 2015 p 42 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 DICDA DOD DICDA FUNDS TERMINOLOGY Appropriations Total ESFmonies available for commitments Obligations Commitments to pay monies USAID OTHER Disbursements Monies that have been expended MRA STATE NADR STATE $ BILLIONS 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 ·• 35 STATE STATUS OF FUNDS DICDA DOD •· ESF I USAID OTHER I ESF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY Appropriations Total monies available MRA for commitments Obligations Commitments to pay monies Disbursements Monies that have been expended STATE NADR STATE ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND Economic Support Fund ESF programs are intended to advance U S interests by helping countries meet short- and long-term political economic and security needs ESF programs support counterterrorism bolster national economies and assist in the development of effective accessible and independent legal systems for a more transparent and accountable government 13 The ESF was allocated $136 45 million for Afghanistan for FY 2021 through the Section 653 a consultation process that was concluded between State and the U S Congress in the quarter ending June 30 2021 This allocation represents a 32% decrease from the $200 00 million that was allocated through the Section 653 a process for FY 2020 which itself represented a 43% decrease from the $350 00 million that was allocated in FY 2019 as shown in Figure 2 14 below While these annual declines in allocations appear steep actual disbursements from ESF have remained above allocated levels in recent years as shown in Table 2 6 on page 46 due to the utilization of relatively high levels of undisbursed balances from prior-year appropriations Also of note the President’s Budget Request for FY 2022 foreign assistance appropriations includes $250 00 million allocated to ESF for Afghanistan 14 Cumulative appropriations for the ESF now stand at nearly $21 24 billion of which nearly $20 03 billion had been obligated but only slightly more than $18 34 billion had been disbursed as of June 30 2021 as shown in Figure 2 15 below 15 FIGURE 2 14 FIGURE 2 15 ESF APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR ESF FUNDS CUMULATIVE COMPARISON $4 $24 $ BILLIONS $ BILLIONS 3 18 2 12 1 6 0 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 0 Appropriated $21 10 Obligated $20 03 Disbursed $18 23 Appropriated $21 24 Obligated $20 03 Disbursed $18 34 As of Mar 31 2021 As of Jun 30 2021 Note Numbers have been rounded Data reflects the following transfers from AIF to the ESF $101 million for FY 2011 $179 5 million for FY 2013 and $55 million for FY 2014 FY 2016 ESF for Afghanistan was reduced by $179 million and put toward the U S commitment to the Green Climate Fund Source USAID response to SIGAR data call 7 14 2021 and 4 13 2021 State response to SIGAR data call 7 2 2021 7 13 2020 1 3 2020 10 5 2018 10 11 2017 5 4 2016 10 20 2015 4 15 2015 and 4 15 2014 36 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION DOD STATUS OF FUNDS USAID OTHER INTERNATIONAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance BHA created through the combination of its Offices of U S Foreign Disaster Assistance OFDA and Food for Peace FFP in June 2020 administers International Disaster Assistance IDA funds BHA is responsible for leading and coordinating the U S government response to disasters overseas and obligates funding for emergency food-assistance projects when there is an identified need and local authorities lack the capacity to respond BHA works closely with international partners such as the United Nations Children’s Fund UNICEF the UN’s World Food Programme WFP and the UN’s World Health Organization WHO to deliver goods and services to assist conflictand disaster-affected populations in Afghanistan 16 USAID reported more than $1 15 billion in IDA funds had been allocated to Afghanistan from 2002 through June 30 2021 with obligations of nearly $1 12 billion and disbursements of more than $1 01 billion reported as of that date USAID obligated nearly $177 84 million in IDA funds in FY 2020 the highest level of IDA obligations that it has recorded in Afghanistan 17 Figure 2 16 presents annual appropriations of IDA funds to Afghanistan Figure 2 17 presents cumulative appropriations obligations and disbursements IDA USAID OTHER IDA FUNDS TERMINOLOGY Appropriations Total monies available INCLE for commitments Obligations Commitments to pay monies Disbursements Monies that have STATE been expended DICDA DOD ESF FIGURE 2 16 FIGURE 2 17 IDA APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR IDA FUNDS CUMULATIVE COMPARISON $ MILLIONS ·• $ BILLIONS $200 150 100 50 0 FY 2021 ALLOCATIONS TO AFGHANISTAN ARE NOT FINALIZED USAID OTHER 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 $1 25 Appropriated $1 15 Obligated $1 12 Disbursed $1 01 1 00 Appropriated $1 15 Obligated $1 12 Disbursed $1 06 0 75 STATE 0 50 NADR 0 25 0 00 STATE As of Mar 31 2021 As of Jun 30 2021 Note Numbers have been rounded Data may include interagency transfers Source USAID response to SIGAR data call 7 14 2021 and 4 13 2021 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I MRA JULY 30 2021 37 USAID OTHER STATUS OF FUNDS IDA USAID OTHER • ·· INCLE STATE INCLE FUNDS TERMINOLOGY DICDATotal monies available Appropriations for commitments Obligations Commitments to pay monies DOD Disbursements Monies that have been expended ESF USAID OTHER MRA STATE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs INL manages the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement INCLE account which funds projects and programs for advancing the rule of law and combating narcotics production and trafficking INCLE supports several INL program groups including police counternarcotics and rule of law and justice 18 The INCLE account was allocated $82 20 million for Afghanistan for FY 2021 through the Section 653 a consultation process that was concluded between State and the U S Congress in the quarter ending June 30 2021 This allocation represents a 7% decrease from the $88 00 million that was allocated through the Section 653 a process for FY 2020 which itself was relatively flat from the $87 80 million that was allocated in FY 2019 as shown in Figure 2 18 below 19 Actual disbursements from INCLE have remained at or above allocated levels in recent years as shown in Table 2 6 on page 46 due to the utilization of relatively high levels of undisbursed balances from prior-year appropriations Cumulative funding for INCLE stands at more than $5 50 billion of which more than $5 16 billion has been obligated and more than $4 69 billion has been disbursed as of June 30 2021 as shown in Figure 2 19 20 FIGURE 2 18 FIGURE 2 19 INCLE APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR INCLE FUNDS CUMULATIVE COMPARISON $800 $6 $ MILLIONS $ BILLIONS NADR 700 STATE 5 600 4 500 Appropriated $5 45 Appropriated $5 50 Obligated $5 16 Disbursed $4 67 Obligated $5 16 Disbursed $4 69 3 400 300 2 200 1 100 0 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 0 As of Mar 31 2021 As of Jun 30 2021 Note Numbers have been rounded Data may include interagency transfers Source State response to SIGAR data call 7 9 2021 7 2 2021 and 4 19 2021 38 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION DOD STATUS OF FUNDS ESF USAID OTHER MIGRATION AND REFUGEE ASSISTANCE The Department of State’s Bureau of Population Refugees and Migration PRM administers the Migration and Refugee Assistance MRA account that funds programs to protect and assist refugees conflict victims internally displaced persons stateless persons and vulnerable migrants Through MRA PRM supports the work of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR other international organizations and various nongovernmental organizations NGOs in Afghanistan to support Afghan refugees throughout the region and upon their return to Afghanistan 21 The MRA allocation for Afghan refugees internally displaced persons and returnees has increased for the past two fiscal years rising from nearly $77 19 million in FY 2018 to more than $86 69 million in FY 2019 and nearly $100 53 million in FY 2020 as shown in Figure 2 20 Allocations for the nine months of FY 2021 ending June 30 2021 have reached $51 80 million with supplemental obligations of $19 00 million provided from the American Rescue Plan Act 2021 Cumulative appropriations since FY 2002 have totaled more than $1 60 billion through June 30 2021 with cumulative obligations and disbursements reaching nearly $1 60 billion and more than $1 56 billion respectively on that date as shown in Figure 2 21 22 FIGURE 2 20 FIGURE 2 21 MRA APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR MRA FUNDS CUMULATIVE COMPARISON $150 $1 6 120 90 60 30 0 $ BILLIONS FY 2021 ALLOCATIONS TO AFGHANISTAN ARE NOT FINALIZED $ MILLIONS 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 Appropriated $1 56 Obligated $1 56 1 2 Disbursed $1 53 Appropriated $1 60 Obligated $1 60 Disbursed $1 56 0 8 0 4 0 0 As of Mar 31 2021 As of Jun 30 2021 Note Numbers have been rounded Data may include interagency transfers MRA balances include funds provided from the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance ERMA Fund of $25 00 million in FY 2002 and $0 20 million in FY 2009 obligated and disbursed and funds from the American Rescue Plan Act 2021 appropriated to supplement MRA funds of $19 00 million obligated and $14 10 million disbursed through June 30 2021 All other MRA balances shown have been allocated from the annual Migration and Refugee Assistance appropriation Source State response to SIGAR data call 7 13 2021 7 9 2021 and 4 9 2021 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 39 ·•· MRA STATE MRA FUNDS TERMINOLOGY Appropriations Total monies available NADR for commitments Obligations Commitments to pay monies Disbursements Monies that have STATE been expended USAID OTHER STATUS OF FUNDS MRA STATE ··• NADR I I STATE NADR FUNDS TERMINOLOGY Appropriations Total monies available for commitments Obligations Commitments to pay monies Disbursements Monies that have been expended NONPROLIFERATION ANTITERRORISM DEMINING AND RELATED PROGRAMS The Non-Proliferation Antiterrorism Demining and Related Programs NADR account plays a critical role in improving the Afghan government’s capacity to address terrorist threats protect its borders and remove dangerous explosive remnants of war 23 The majority of NADR funding for Afghanistan is funneled through two subaccounts Antiterrorist Assistance ATA and Conventional Weapons Destruction CWD with additional funds going to Export Control and Related Border Security EXBS and Counterterrorism Financing CTF The Office of Foreign Assistance Resources makes allocated funding available to relevant bureaus and offices that obligate and disburse these funds 24 The NADR account was allocated $45 80 million for Afghanistan for FY 2021 through the Section 653 a consultation process that was concluded among State and the U S Congress in the quarter ending June 30 2021 This allocation represents an increase of 19% from the $38 50 million that was allocated through the Section 653 a process for FY 2020 which itself was relatively flat from the $38 30 million that was allocated in FY 2019 as shown in Figure 2 22 Figure 2 23 shows that the cumulative total of NADR funds appropriated and transferred rose from $881 34 million at March 31 2021 to $927 14 million at June 30 2021 25 FIGURE 2 22 FIGURE 2 23 NADR APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR NADR FUNDS CUMULATIVE COMPARISON $100 $1 000 $ MILLIONS $ MILLIONS 80 800 60 600 40 400 20 200 0 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 0 Appropriated and Transferreda $881 34 Appropriated and Transferreda $927 14 As of Mar 31 2021 As of Jun 30 2021 Note Numbers have been rounded State and Congress agree on the country-by-country allocation of annual appropriations for the foreign assistance accounts including NADR through the Section 653 a process The Office of Foreign Assistance Resources makes allocated funding available to relevant bureaus at State that obligate and disburse these funds a Source State response to SIGAR data call 7 2 2021 7 13 2020 1 3 2020 and 10 5 2018 40 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION STATUS OF FUNDS INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN The international community provides significant funding to support Afghanistan relief and reconstruction efforts through multilateral institutions These institutions include multilateral trust funds United Nations and nongovernmental humanitarian assistance organizations two multilateral development finance institutions the World Bank Group and the Asian Development Bank ADB two special purpose United Nations organizations the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNAMA and the UN Development Programme UNDP and the NATO Resolute Support Mission The four main multilateral trust funds are the World Bank-managed Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund ARTF the UNDP-managed Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan LOTFA the NATO-managed Afghan National Army ANA Trust Fund NATF and the ADB-managed Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund AITF These four multilateral trust funds as well as the humanitarian assistance organizations reported by the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UN OCHA the NATO Resolute Support Mission and UNAMA all report donor or member contributions for their Afghanistan programs as shown in Figure 2 24 FIGURE 2 24 CUMULATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS BY 10 LARGEST DONORS AND OTHERS TO MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN ARTF UN OCHA-REPORTED PROGRAMS LOTFA NATO ANATF NATO RSM UNAMA AND AITF SINCE 2002 $ BILLIONS United States 4 13 Japan 0 49 United Kingdom 2 17 Germany 1 11 European Union 1 17 Canada 0 89 Australia 0 46 Italy 3 06 1 17 1 74 0 75 0 52 0 61 Norway 0 60 All Others 1 28 $0 0 66 0 72 • • • • • 3 49 2 94 1 94 0 41 0 68 1 68 3 85 3 82 0 41 1 00 1 05 0 62 Netherlands 0 40 1 46 1 30 1 29 0 37 0 68 9 87 ARTF - $13 07 Billion as of Apr 20 2021 UN OCHA - $10 81 Billion as of Jun 30 2021 LOTFA - $6 38 Billion as of Jun 30 2021 NATO - $4 72 Billion Various Dates Other - $2 97 Billion Various Dates Total - $37 96 Billion 1 23 2 87 1 14 $2 $4 1 19 $6 6 77 $8 $10 Note Amounts under $350 million are not labeled Numbers may not add due to rounding “NATO” consists of NATO ANA Trust Fund contributions of $3 45 billion through May 31 2021 and NATO member assessments for Resolute Support Mission costs of $1 27 billlion for 2015–2019 2020 and 2021 remain unaudited “Other” consists of UN member assessments for UNAMA costs of $2 38 billion for 2007–2020 and AITF contributions of $0 59 billion at 12 31 2020 Source World Bank ARTF Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of April 20 2021 end of 4th month of FY 1400 at www artf af accessed 7 10 2021 UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service at https fts unocha org accessed 6 30 2021 UNDP LOTFA Receipts 2002–2021 6 30 2021 response to SIGAR data call 7 8 2021 NATO Afghan National Army ANA Trust Fund Status of Contributions Made as of 31 May 2021 at www nato int accessed 7 10 2021 NATO IBAN Audits of Allied Command Operations and Cost Share Arrangements for Military Budgets at www nato int and web archive org web 20150910123523 http www nato int accessed 7 16 2021 ADB AITF 2020 Annual Report response to SIGAR data call 5 26 2021 State UNAMA approved budgets and notified funding plans in response to SIGAR data calls 2 19 2021 and 7 13 2020 UN Country Assessments at www un org en ga contributions scale accessed 10 9 2020 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 41 STATUS OF FUNDS FIGURE 2 25 ARTF CONTRIBUTIONS BY DONOR AFGHAN FY 1399 PERCENT Total Paid In $718 63 Million United States 50% Others 8% Netherlands 3% Norway 4% Sweden 7% EU 11% UK 16% Note Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding “Others” includes nine national government donors Source World Bank ARTF Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of April 20 2021 end of 4th month of FY 1400 at www artf af accessed 7 10 2021 Cumulative contributions to these seven organizations since 2002 have amounted to $37 96 billion with the United States contributing $9 87 billion of this amount The World Bank and the ADB are funded through general member assessments that cannot be readily identified as allocated to Afghanistan These two institutions have collectively made financial commitments of $12 1 billion to Afghanistan since 2002 as discussed in the sections that follow Contributions to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund The largest share of international contributions to the Afghan government’s operational and development budgets comes through the ARTF From 2002 to April 20 2021 the World Bank reported that 34 donors had paid in more than $13 07 billion Figure 2 24 shows the three largest donors over this period as the United States the United Kingdom and the European Union Figure 2 25 shows that these three were also the largest donors to the ARTF for Afghan FY 1399 December 21 2019–December 20 2020 The ARTF received paid in contributions of $718 63 million in Afghan FY 1399 which represents an 8% decrease from the $780 38 million it received in Afghan FY 1398 26 Contributions to the ARTF are divided into two funding channels the Recurrent Cost RC Window and the Investment Window As of April 20 2021 according to the World Bank more than $6 05 billion of ARTF funds had been disbursed to the Afghan government through the RC Window including the Recurrent and Capital Cost Component to assist with recurrent costs such as civil servants’ salaries 27 To ensure that the RC Window receives adequate funding donors to the ARTF may not “preference” earmark more than half of their annual contributions 28 The Investment Window supports development programs As of April 20 2021 according to the World Bank more than $6 19 billion had been committed through the Investment Window and nearly $5 20 billion had been disbursed The Bank reported 32 active projects with a combined commitment value of more than $2 51 billion of which more than $1 52 billion had been disbursed 29 Contributions to UN OCHA-Coordinated Humanitarian Assistance Programs The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA leads emergency appeals and annual or multiyear humanitarian-response plans for Afghanistan and provides timely reporting of humanitarian assistance provided by donors to facilitate funding of targeted needs Donors have contributed more than $10 81 billion to humanitarian-assistance organizations from 2002 through June 30 2021 as reported by OCHA OCHA-led annual humanitarian-response plans and emergency appeals for Afghanistan accounted for more than $7 15 billion or 66 1% of these contributions The United States Japan and the European Union have been the largest contributors to humanitarian assistance organizations in Afghanistan since 42 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION STATUS OF FUNDS 2002 as shown in Figure 2 24 while the United States United Kingdom and the European Union were the largest contributors in 2020 when the international community contributed $744 56 million to these organizations as shown in Figure 2 26 The UN World Food Programme WFP the UN High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR the International Committee of the Red Cross the UN Children’s Fund UNICEF and the UN Mine Action Service UNMAS have been the largest recipients of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan as shown in Table 2 5 30 TABLE 2 5 LARGEST RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR AFGHANISTAN UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS OCHA CUMULATIVE RECEIPTS 2002 TO JUNE 30 2021 $ MILLIONS Largest Recipients FIGURE 2 26 UN OCHA-COORDINATED CONTRIBUTIONS BY DONOR CALENDAR YEAR 2020 PERCENT Total Paid In $744 56 Million Germany 4% UN CERF 4% World Bank 5% Others 26% EU 13% United States 32% UK 16% Receipts United Nations Organizations World Food Programme WFP $3 285 65 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR 1 260 31 United Nations Children’s Fund UNICEF 587 02 United Nations Mine Action Service UNMAS 337 22 International Organization for Migration IOM 285 89 Food and Agricultural Organization FAO 252 49 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UN OCHA 148 21 World Health Organization WHO 159 06 Nongovernmental Organizations International Committee of the Red Cross 796 60 Norwegian Refugee Council 201 24 HALO Trust 119 16 Save the Children 116 58 ACTED formerly Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development 102 77 All Other and Unallocated 3 162 10 Total Humanitarian Assistance Reported by OCHA $10 814 30 Note Numbers may not add due to rounding Source UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service at https fts unocha org accessed 6 30 2021 Contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan The UNDP had historically administered the LOTFA to pay ANP salaries and build the capacity of the Ministry of Interior MOI 31 Beginning in 2015 UNDP divided LOTFA support between two projects Support to Payroll Management SPM and MOI and Police Development MPD The SPM project has aimed to develop the capacity of the Afghan government to independently manage all nonfiduciary aspects of its payroll REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 43 Note Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding “Others” includes 23 national governments and 14 other entities UN CERF refers to the UN’s Central Emergency Response Fund Source UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service at https fts unocha org accessed 6 30 2021 STATUS OF FUNDS FIGURE 2 27 LOTFA CONTRIBUTIONS BY DONOR CALENDAR YEAR 2020 PERCENT Total Paid In $385 23 Million Germany 19% Others 11% Canada 12% EU 18% Japan 16% UK 12% Italy 12% Note Numbers may not add due to rounding “Others” includes the United States 10 other countries and the UNDP that made contributions to the two LOTFA funds Source UNDP LOTFA Receipts 2002–2021 Combined Bilateral and MPTF updated 6 30 2021 in response to SIGAR data call 7 8 2021 function for the ANP and Central Prisons Directorate CPD staff Almost 99% of SPM project funding goes toward ANP and CPD staff remuneration The MPD project focused on institutional development of the MOI and police professionalization of the ANP The project concluded on June 30 2018 The LOTFA Steering Committee composed of Afghan ministries international donors and the UNDP approved restructuring the fund and changing its scope of operations on November 25 2018 The organization has expanded its mission beyond the management of the SPM project to include the entire justice chain police courts and corrections and thereby cover all security and justice institutions with an increased focus on anticorruption A new multilateral trust fund the LOTFA Multi-Partner Trust Fund MPTF was launched to fund this expanded mission alongside the original LOTFA 32 Donors have paid in nearly $6 38 billion to the two LOTFA funds from 2002 through June 30 2021 The new LOTFA MPTF has raised nearly $362 72 million with the UK and Canada its largest donors Figure 2 24 shows the two LOTFA funds’ largest donors to have been the United States and Japan on a cumulative basis Figure 2 27 shows the largest donors to the two LOTFA funds in 2020 The United States has significantly reduced its support to LOTFA since 2018 with annual contributions ranging between $0 95 million and $8 84 million for the original LOTFA and no funds for the LOTFA MPTF 33 Contributions to the NATO Resolute Support Mission NATO members are assessed annual contributions for the NATO Civil Budget Military Budget and Security Investment Program based on audited program costs and agreed annual cost-sharing formulas The NATO Military Budget includes Allied Command Operations ACO whose largest cost component is the NATO Resolute Support Mission RSM in Afghanistan NATO has assessed member contributions of $1 27 billion for costs of the Resolute Support Mission from 2015 the first year of the mission through 2019 the most recent year for which ACO audited statements detailing RSM costs have been made publicly available The United States share of commonly funded budgets has ranged from 22 20% to 22 14% over the 2015 to 2019 period resulting in contributions of $281 87 million Figure 2 24 shows the United States Germany and the United Kingdom as the largest contributors to the costs of the NATO Resolute Support Mission 34 Although all international troops operating under the aegis of RSM are to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2021 NATO has indicated that RSM will enter a “new chapter” there focusing on financial support and out-of-country training to Afghan security forces a diplomatic presence in Kabul and funding for operation of Hamid Karzai International Airport 35 Contributions to the NATO ANA Trust Fund The NATO-managed Afghan National Army ANA Trust Fund NATF supports the Afghan National Army and other elements of the Afghan National 44 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION STATUS OF FUNDS - - - - - - -Defense and Security Forces through procurements by the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ASFF and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency NSPA 36 The Fund has received contributions from 25 of the 30 current NATO members including the United States and from 12 other Coalition partners totaling nearly $3 45 billion through May 31 2021 37 Figure 2 24 shows Germany Australia and Italy as the three largest contributors to the fund The United States made its first contribution in FY 2018 to support two projects under an existing procurement contract 38 World Bank Group in Afghanistan The World Bank’s International Development Association IDA has committed nearly $5 3 billion for development emergency reconstruction projects and eight budget support operations in Afghanistan from 2002 through February 3 2021 This support consists of over $4 8 billion in grants and $436 million in no-interest loans known as “credits ” The Bank as of February 3 2021 has 12 active IDA-only projects $940 million and 15 active projects jointly funded with the ARTF with a combined commitment value of nearly $1 2 billion from IDA In addition the International Finance Corporation IFC maintains a committed portfolio valued at over $300 million and its Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency MIGA has a gross exposure exceeding $116 million on projects in Afghanistan 39 The United States is the World Bank Group’s largest shareholder with ownership stakes of 10–25% of shares in the IDA IBRD MIGA and IFC 40 Asian Development Bank in Afghanistan The Asian Development Bank ADB has committed over $6 41 billion for 168 development projects and technical-assistance programs in Afghanistan from 2002 through June 2021 This support has consisted of $5 43 billion in grants of which the Asian Development Fund or ADF provided $4 33 billion and the ADB provided $1 10 billion in co-financing $0 872 billion in concessional loans and $111 2 million in technical assistance ADB has provided $2 67 billion for 20 key road projects $2 12 billion to support energy infrastructure and $1 08 billion for irrigation and agricultural infrastructure projects and $190 million for the health and PSM sectors The United States and Japan are the largest shareholders of the ADB with each country holding 15 57% of total shares 41 The ADB manages the Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund AITF a multidonor platform that provides on-budget financing for technical assistance and investment principally in the transport energy and water management sectors The AITF has received contributions of $590 54 million from the NATO ANA Trust Fund Canada Germany Japan the United Kingdom and the United States and had disbursed $331 05 million through December 31 2020 42 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 45 STATUS OF FUNDS United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNAMA is a political UN mission established at the request of the government of Afghanistan UNAMA maintains its headquarters in Kabul and an extensive field presence across Afghanistan and is organized around its development and political affairs pillars The Department of State has notified the U S Congress of its annual plan to fund UNAMA along with other UN political missions based on mission budgets since FY 2008 The U S contribution to UNAMA based on its fixed 22 0% share of UN budgets and funded through the Contribution to International Organizations CIO account has totaled $523 45 million from FY 2008 through FY 2021 Other UN member governments have funded the remainder of UNAMA’s budget of $2 38 billion over this period 43 Share of U S Civilian Assistance Provided to Multilateral Institutions The United States provides significant financial support to the numerous multilateral institutions that are active in the civilian sector in Afghanistan As the international donor community including the United States has reduced its physical presence in Afghanistan the relative importance of these multilateral institutions compared to donors’ assistance missions in Afghanistan has increased The share of U S civilian assistance provided to multilateral institutions can be seen in Table 2 6 to have increased in recent years with over 50% of its assistance disbursed in 2018 and 2020 from the TABLE 2 6 SHARE OF U S CIVILIAN ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS 2014–2020 $ MILLIONS 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 $433 47 $275 95 $261 03 $185 40 $400 00 $240 00 $360 00 171 17 168 51 149 72 113 52 190 90 212 44 240 63 43 17 41 79 49 35 80 98 36 12 32 72 30 28 $647 81 $486 25 $460 10 $379 90 $627 02 $485 16 $630 91 $986 37 $1 234 07 $1 091 06 $878 51 $555 49 $1 118 59 $631 20 443 89 310 15 265 28 232 94 147 07 196 76 148 27 International Disaster Assistance IDA and Title II 88 65 79 94 63 81 49 88 102 09 100 32 170 43 Migration and Refugee Assistance MRA 94 54 96 95 90 35 119 20 82 97 84 47 96 89 Non-Proliferation Antiterrorism Demining Related NADR 43 20 43 50 37 96 37 00 35 60 38 30 38 50 Contributions to International Organizations CIO 43 17 41 79 41 35 40 31 36 12 32 72 30 28 $1 699 82 $1 806 40 $1 589 81 $1 357 84 $959 34 $1 571 16 $1 115 57 38 1% 26 9% 28 9% 28 0% 65 4% 30 9% 56 6% U S Contributions to Civilian Sector Multilateral Institutions Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund ARTF UN OCHA-Reported Programs UN OCHA UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNAMA and AITF Total Disbursements from the Principal U S Civilian Sector Assistance Accounts Economic Support Fund ESF International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement INCLE Total U S Civilian Assistance Provided to Multilateral Institutions Total Disbursements from U S Civilian Assistance Accounts Note Numbers may not add due to rounding Calendar year reporting is used for UN OCHA UNAMA AITF ESF IDA MRA and CIO Afghan fiscal year reporting is used for ARTF and U S fiscal year reporting is used for Title II and NADR The Principal U S Civilian Sector Assistance Accounts presented above exclude DOD civilian sector accounts CERP AIF and TFBSO and a group of civilian agency accounts that were active in the FY 2014 to FY 2020 period IMET DA GHP CCC USAID-Other HRDF ECE DFC USAGM DEA and TI but whose combined annual disbursements only approximate $50 00 million per year See Appendix B to this report for additional information Source SIGAR analysis of the SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 1 30 2021 1 30 2020 1 30 2019 1 30 2018 1 30 2017 1 30 2016 1 30 2015 1 30 2014 and 1 30 2013 46 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION STATUS OF FUNDS principal civilian-sector assistance accounts being provided to the principal civilian-sector multilateral institutions covered in Figure 2 24 Table 2 7 provides additional details on the sources of U S funding for the multilateral assistance programs and organizations active in Afghanistan ASFF •• •• ••• CERP DICDA ESF IDA INCLE USAID OTHER DOD MRA STATE TABLE 2 7 SOURCES OF U S FUNDING FOR MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND ORGANIZATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN Multilateral Assistance Programs and Organizations Sources of U S Funding Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund ARTF ESF Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan LOTFA ASFF and INCLE Afghan National Army ANA Trust Fund NATF ASFF Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund AITF ESF ASFF DOD UN OCHA Coordinated Programs UN World Food Programme WFP IDA and Title II UN High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR MRA UN Children’s Fund UNICEF GHP IDA MRA and Title II UN Mine Action Service UNMAS ESF and NADR International Organization for Migration IOM ESF IDA and MRA UN Food and Agriculture Organization FAO ESF and IDA UN OCHA and its Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund IDA UN World Health Organization WHO GHP ESF and IDA CERP DOD ESF IDA MRA and NADR Nongovernmental Organizations NGOs a NATO Resolute Support Mission RSM Army O Mb The Asia Foundation TAF SFOPS TAFb ESF and INCLE UN Development Programme UNDP ESF and INCLE UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNAMA CIOb World Bank Group IBRD IDA IFC and MIGA Treasury IPb Asian Development Bank ADB and ADF Treasury IPb USAID OTHER IDA a State and USAID have requested that SIGAR not disclose the names of NGOs with whom they contract in Afghanistan and have cited various authorities that underlie their requests State has cited OMB Bulletin 12-01 Collection of U S Foreign Assistance Data 2012 which provides an exemption to federal agency foreign assistance reporting requirements “when public disclosure is likely to jeopardize the personal safety of U S personnel or recipients of U S resources ” USAID has cited the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act FFATA of 2006 Pub L No 109-282 which provides a waiver to federal agency contractor and grantee reporting requirements when necessary “to avoid jeopardizing the personal safety of the applicant or recipient’s staff or clients ” The so-called FFATA “masking waiver” is not available for Public International Organizations PIOs Both State and USAID provide “branding waivers” to NGOs with whom they contract in Afghanistan USAID OTHER b The Army O M SFOPS TAF CIO and Treasury IP accounts provide funding to organizations that are active in Afghanistan All other accounts provide programmatic funding to organizations that are active in Afghanistan INCLE Note Army O M refers to the Support of Other Nations subaccount in the Operation Maintenance Army account in the Department of Defense appropriation SFOPS TAF refers to The Asia Foundation account in the Department of State Foreign Operations and Related Programs SFOPS appropriation and Treasury IP refers to the International Programs account in the Department of the Treasury appropriation STATE Source DOD response to SIGAR data call 1 18 2019 State responses to SIGAR data call 7 14 2021 1 13 2021 4 17 2020 4 9 2020 and 8 21 2019 Department of Defense FY 2022 President’s Budget Exhibit O-1 at https comptroller defense gov accessed 7 17 2021 SFOPS Congressional Budget Justification FY 2021 at www state gov cj accessed 1 15 2021 Treasury response to SIGAR data call 4 20 2020 UNDP response to SIGAR data call 4 5 2020 USAID response to SIGAR data calls 1 10 2021 4 3 2020 and 1 13 2020 and USAID Afghanistan-Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #4 FY 2017 at www usaid gov accessed 4 9 2020 DICDA REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 47 DOD NADR SECURITY SECURITY CONTENTS Key Issues Events 49 Tracking District Control 54 Who Controls Afghanistan’s Districts 55 United States Forces-Afghanistan 59 Afghan National Defense And Security Forces 63 Afghan National Army 66 Afghan Air Force 70 Afghan Special Security Forces 75 Afghan National Police 76 Deadly Attack Hinders Mine Clearing Efforts 80 48 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SECURITY SECURITY NATO’s Resolute Support Mission significantly reduced its presence in Afghanistan as U S and international forces withdrew KEY ISSUES EVENTS General Austin Scott Miller NATO Resolute Support Mission and U S Forces-Afghanistan USFOR-A commander transferred responsibility of USFOR-A to CENTCOM commander General Kenneth F McKenzie on July 12 2021 Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan’s mission to train advise and assist the Afghan forces ended and transitioned to providing “over-the-horizon” security assistance as the new Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan The Taliban launched an offensive against the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces overrunning numerous district centers and several border crossings but avoided attacking U S and Coalition forces Formal Withdrawal of U S Forces to be Complete by the End of August In accordance with President Joseph R Biden’s April 14 announcement that U S troops will withdraw from Afghanistan by September 11 2021 U S Central Command CENTCOM formally began its military drawdown from Afghanistan on May 1 2021 in what officials described as “a safe and orderly way ”44 The drawdown includes redeploying U S troops turning facilities over to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ANDSF retrograding equipment and either giving excess equipment to the ANDSF or turning it over to DOD’s Defense Logistics Agency DLA 45 General Austin Scott Miller NATO Resolute Support Mission and U S Forces-Afghanistan USFOR-A commander transferred responsibility of USFOR-A to CENTCOM commander General Kenneth F McKenzie in a small ceremony on July 12 2021 in Kabul 46 All U S troops except those assigned to duty at the U S Embassy compound in Kabul will leave Afghanistan by the end of August 47 Secretary of Defense Lloyd J Austin III established U S Forces Afghanistan Forward to be led by Navy Rear Admiral Peter Vasely who REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 49 Retrograde The movement of non-unit equipment and materiel from a forward location to a reset replenishment repair or recapitalization program or to another directed area of operations to replenish unit stocks or to satisfy stock requirements Source DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 1 2021 p 187 SECURITY Over-The-Horizon OTH An “over-thehorizon amphibious operation” is “an operation launched from beyond visual and radar range of the shoreline ” In the Afghanistan context DOD also uses the term to refer to U S capabilities located outside Afghanistan Source DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 1 2021 p 164 OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 7 16 2021 will remain in Kabul Supporting U S Forces Afghanistan Forward from Qatar will be the new Defense Security Cooperation Management OfficeAfghanistan DSCMO-A led by Army Brigadier General Curtis Buzzard DSCMO-A will be responsible for providing security assistance to the ANDSF including over-the-horizon OTH aircraft-maintenance support to sustain ANDSF combat operations against the Taliban 48 Coalition Forces Withdraw from Afghanistan Along with U S  Forces NATO Resolute Support RS informed SIGAR this quarter that Coalition forces have been reducing their footprint in Afghanistan in concert with U S forces 49 As of June 12 2021 some U S capabilities shifted to an “overthe-horizon location ”50 Other Coalition forces also withdrew with Germany and Italy ending their Afghanistan missions in the last week of June the United Kingdom announcing the end of their mission July 8 and Australia announcing on July 11 that their last personnel had left Afghanistan “in recent weeks ” At least 16 smaller contingents reportedly withdrew earlier in June or May 51 Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan CSTC-A Ends Transitions to Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan DSCMO-A CSTC-A the command that executed much of the mission to train advise and assist TAA the Afghan forces officially ended on July 12 2021 when General Miller transferred responsibility to General McKenzie 52 CSTC-A transitioned to the Defense Security Cooperation Management OfficeAfghanistan DSCMO-A based in Qatar 53 In early May RS ended its TAA missions with Afghan forces at the corps and provincial chief of police levels and CSTC-A significantly reduced TAA staffing at the Ministries of Defense and Interior This included the dissolution of the regional Train Advise and Assist Commands TAACs at the corps and provincial chief of police levels the first week of May and closure of both the Ministerial Advisory Group-Defense MAG-D and Ministerial Advisory Group-Interior MAG-I the last week of May 54 Before its dissolution CSTC-A’s main focus this quarter was the safe withdrawal of personnel from Afghanistan 55 Accordingly Resolute Support advised SIGAR that with reduced staffing and a focus on the withdrawal process they had limited capacity to respond to several of SIGAR’s questions for this report 56 For more information on what reconstruction data is no longer available see page 61 50 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SECURITY - - - - - - -The Taliban Overrun Numerous District Capitals but Avoid Attacks on U S and Coalition Forces After U S and Coalition forces officially began drawing down in May the Taliban launched an offensive overrunning numerous ANDSF checkpoints bases and district centers For more on the deteriorating security situation and district control see pages 54–55 In some districts ANDSF forces put up some level of resistance and conducted a tactical fighting retreat while in others they surrendered or fled in disorder 57 According to news reports about 1 600 ANDSF personnel fled into neighboring Tajikistan in July to avoid Taliban advances in Badakhshan Province 58 In other instances local elders reportedly mediated truces that allowed the ANDSF defenders to leave abandoning their U S -supplied equipment which the Taliban then displayed on social media as propaganda to tout its victories 59 The Taliban have not yet taken any of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial capitals but several were reportedly surrounded 60 Particularly concerning was the speed and ease with which the Taliban seemingly wrested control of districts in Afghanistan’s northern provinces once a bastion of anti-Taliban sentiment The deteriorating situation caused the commander of the NATO Resolute Support Mission General Miller to tell reporters on June 29 that “a civil war path is visualizable ”61 Miller added in a later interview “We should be concerned The loss of terrain and the rapidity of that loss of terrain has to be concerning ”62 Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Affairs David F Helvey testified on May 5 2021 before the Senate Armed Services Committee SASC that since the U S -Taliban agreement was signed on February 29 2020 the Taliban “did comply with their agreement not to conduct attacks against the U S or Coalition forces … with some very minor exceptions ”63 More detailed information on the security situation in Afghanistan can be found in SIGAR’s classified supplement to this report Senior U S Officials Explain the New Defense Relationship with Afghan Security Forces Testifying before the SASC on May 5 Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Helvey said “We will continue funding key capabilities such as the Afghan Air Force and Special Mission Wing we will continue paying salaries for Afghan security forces and we will continue delivering certain military supplies and we are developing the mechanisms to provide appropriate oversight for the use of these funds most of which will continue to be executed through DOD contracts ”64 On June 17 Secretary of Defense Austin testified to the Senate Appropriations Committee “We will now transition to a new bilateral relationship with our Afghan partners … but one that will not require a U S footprint larger than what’s necessary to protect our diplomats ”65 Chairman REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 51 SECURITY of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley added “It’s the president’s “The plan right now intent to keep an embassy open to keep our security forces around the would be to make a seam- embassy and to continue to work with the Afghan government to continue less transition from what to fund the Afghan security forces and to keep that situation from devolving into the worst case and that’s what we’re planning on and that’s what we’re we have currently in 66 Afghanistan to other loca- working toward There are not guarantees in any of this ” tions that would be able How the ANDSF Especially the Afghan Air Force Will Function to meet our overarching Without U S Soldier and Contractor Support Remains Unclear objectives of ensuring U S military contractors are also being withdrawn from Afghanistan as stipulated in the February 29 2020 U S -Taliban agreement 67 These conthat Afghanistan doesn’t tractors provide an array of functions including logistics maintenance become a safe haven for and training support for ANDSF ground vehicles and aircraft security base terrorists that would attack support and transportation services 68 Their loss could significantly impact the U S or our allies ” ANDSF sustainability in particular their ability to maintain aircraft and — Brig Gen Matthew G Trollinger Source Brig Gen Matthew G Trollinger Deputy Director of Political and Military Affairs J5 in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee 5 20 2021 vehicles Secretary Austin said in a June 23 2021 House Armed Services Committee hearing that “Some of the aircraft maintenance is taking place in … one of the Gulf countries one of our partners … and we may be able to contract other types of capabilities going forward That’s still a work in progress ”69 For more information on contractors in Afghanistan see page 61 Turkey Tentatively Agrees to Continue Securing Hamid Karzai International Airport After U S Forces Depart Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan announced on July 9 2021 that Turkey and the United States had agreed on the scope of how to secure Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport HKIA after U S forces withdraw though details remain to be finalized 70 Turkey currently provides security at HKIA an essential transport facility for the diplomatic missions that will remain in Afghanistan A Taliban spokesman said that “If foreign forces want to retain a military presence here in the name of airport security Afghans will not allow it and will view them as invaders be it Turkey or any other country ”71 More information on the challenge of transferring control of Afghanistan’s airports can be found on pages 117–121 and in SIGAR’s classified supplement to this quarterly report Ministers of Defense and Interior Replaced On June 19 2021 Afghan President Ashraf Ghani announced that he was replacing his ministers of defense and of interior Ghani named General Bismillah Khan Mohammadi as his new defense minister replacing Asadullah Khalid Khalid had been in the position since 2018 but required ongoing treatment for injuries suffered in a 2012 suicide bombing Mohammadi is no stranger to the position having previously served 52 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SECURITY - - - - - - -as Minister of Defense as well as Minister of the Interior and Army chief of staff 72 Ghani named General Abdul Sattar Mirzakwal as the new interior minister Both men will serve in an acting role until the Afghan parliament approves their appointments 73 U S Reconstruction Funding for Security As of June 30 2021 the U S Congress had appropriated nearly $88 61 billion to help the Afghan government provide security in Afghanistan This accounts for 61% of all U S reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since fiscal year FY 2002 Of the nearly $3 1 billion appropriated for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ASFF in FY 2020 over $2 4 billion had been obligated and more than $2 1 billion disbursed as of June 30 2021 About $675 6 million of FY 2021 ASFF has been obligated and $247 4 million disbursed as of June 30 2021 74 Congress established the ASFF in 2005 to build equip train and sustain the ANDSF which comprises all forces under the Ministry of Defense MOD and Ministry of Interior MOI A significant portion of ASFF money is used for Afghan Air Force AAF aircraft maintenance and for ANA AAF and Afghan Special Security Forces ASSF salaries The rest of ASFF is used for fuel ammunition vehicle facility and equipment maintenance and various communications and intelligence infrastructure Detailed ASFF budget breakdowns are presented in Table 2 4 on page 33 75 Going forward ASFF monies will be obligated by either the DSCMO-A or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency ASFF obligations remain the same for DSCMO-A as for CSTC-A 76 Funds that DSCMO-A provides to the Afghan government to manage on-budget now go directly to the Ministry of Finance which then transfers them to the MOD and MOI based on submitted funding requests 77 While the United States funds most ANA salaries a significant share of Afghan National Police ANP personnel costs is paid by international donors through the United Nations Development Programme’s multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan LOTFA 78 The United States has significantly reduced its support to LOTFA since 2018 with annual contributions ranging between $0 95 million and $8 84 million 79 A discussion of on-budget Afghan-managed and offbudget U S -managed expenditures of ASFF is found on page 90 The Taliban Overrun Dozens of District Centers and Seize Multiple Border Crossings This quarter a Taliban offensive that began slowly in May accelerated in June and early July On June 22 2021 Deborah Lyons the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan reported that “more than 50” districts had fallen to the Taliban “since the beginning of May ”80 A day later General Milley testified before the House Armed Services Committee HASC that “There’s 81 district centers … underneath REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 53 SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction TRACKING DISTRICT CONTROL SIGAR tracked Afghan government population district and territorial control from November 2015 until October 2018 using unclassified data provided by Resolute Support In March 2019 Resolute Support notified SIGAR that it no longer produced its districtlevel stability assessment of Afghan government and insurgent control and influence claiming they were “of limited decision-making value to the RS Commander ” The last time SIGAR published district control assessments was for its January 2019 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress RS reported then that as of October 2018 of Afghanistan’s then-407 districts 50 were under insurgent control or influence 12 controlled 38 influenced In the conference report for the William M Mac Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 Congress required DOD to include a section in their semiannual Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan report providing a district-level stability assessment displaying insurgent control versus Afghan government control and influence of districts to include district population and territorial control data The next DOD report covering the previous six months ending June 30 had not yet been issued as this report went to press Whether the Afghan government or the insurgents had “control” of a district was a subjective determination based on a number of factors such as degree of effective Afghan government local governance security infrastructure economic control and communications that RS took into consideration for more detail on metrics Resolute Support used to determine district population and territorial control see the April 30 2016 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress p 96 Regardless of how Resolute Support once measured district control that level of detailed subjective analysis from on-theground U S or Coalition soldiers no longer exists The ongoing withdrawal of U S and Coalition forces has left open sources such as the Afghanistan Analysts Network AAN the Long War Journal LWJ British Broadcasting Corporation BBC and Gandhara Radio Free Afghanistan to fill the void on what is happening in Afghanistan’s districts especially those furthest from Kabul These organizations define and determine “district control” in various ways including press reports government agency statements their own reporters and contacts and the Taliban often through social media The latest CENTCOM assessments of district control are available in the classified supplement to this report THE NUMBER OF DISTRICTS IN AFGHANISTAN Different organizations use different figures for the number of Afghanistan districts which have changed over time For example Deborah Lyons the United Nations SecretaryGeneral’s Special Representative for Afghanistan reported 370 General Milley used 419 in his June 22 HASC testimony the Wall Street Journal recently used 387 the Long War Journal uses 407 and other open sources use vaguer terms such as “roughly” 400 SIGAR has in the past used 407 districts the number provided by Resolute Support as well as 399 the number in USAID’s third-party dataset In 2018 Afghanistan’s Central Statistics Organization now called the National Statistic and Information Authority and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance compiled a joint consolidated list of 387 districts plus 34 provincial capitals that it used to prepare for upcoming elections Source SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 4 30 2016 and 1 30 2019 RS response to SIGAR data call 3 3 2018 RS response to SIGAR data call 12 20 2018 U S Congress “William M Mac Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 ” Section 1219 1 3 2020 USFOR-A response to SIGAR data call 5 15 2017 Long War Journal “Mapping Taliban Contested and Controlled Districts in Afghanistan ” Afghanistan Analysts Network “A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to Taleban amid Calls for a ‘Second Resistance ’” 7 2 2021 UNAMA “Briefing to the United Nations Security Council by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan Ms Deborah Lyons ” 6 22 2021 House Armed Services Committee “House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Fiscal 2022 Budget Request for the Defense Department ” transcript 6 23 2021 Wall Street Journal “Taliban Advances Test Afghan Forces’ Morale as the U S Leaves ” 6 20 2021 Long War Journal “Taliban doubles number of controlled Afghan districts since May 1 ” 6 29 2021 New York Times “Taliban Enter Key Cities in Afghanistan’s North After Swift Offensive 6 20 2021 Afghanistan Analysts Network “The Afghanistan Election Conundrum 12 _ Good news and bad news about district numbers ” 7 16 2018 54 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION Who Controls Afghanistan’s Districts Long War Journal as of July 13 2021 British Broadcasting Corporation BBC as of July 12 2021 Abu Nasar Farahi Pon LEGEND LEGEND Government C lntr01 Coll SSted Taliban Control • • Ma orClty o Bor 1er Crossing • Go 'nment Control Contested' Taliban Con ol • MaJorCity o Borde crossing Note the above map contains 398 of Afghanistan's 407 districts this Is the only shape file of an Afghanistan d1stnct•level map available for use at this t me Nine distncts are not displayed on the map Contested Is where fighting Is ongomg or strong Taliban presence in districts according to 2005 Afghanistan government boundaries Source https www longwariournal org mapp1ng-tal1ban-control-m·afghan1stan Source htlps www bbc com news world•as1a•5 7 767067 Gandhara Radio Free Afghanistan as of July 15 2021 Abu Nasar Afghanistan Analysts Network AAN as of July 15 2021 ic - - Farahi Pon LEGEND • • Go emment C lntrol C lntested Taliban controlled as of Aprll 8 Taliban sei ed since May 1 LEGEND · Changes In District Center Control • MaJorClty o Borde Crossing • toDlslJlct wllose admlnlstrauve cente was taken bY Taliban paor May 1 2021 • Taken by Taliban May t to July 14 2021 • Taken by Taliban Since May t but recovere I gove nment • MajorClty o Border Closslng by Note Updated July 19 2021 The number of districts in Afghanistan has vaned in recent decades and Is disputed A ·controlled district means tha1 the government Taliban controls a district and there Is negligible Taliban government activity Data based on reponmg by Radio Azad1 correspondents In Kabul and the provinces Note Based on 1nformat1on compiled by Fazl Rahman Muzhary Khad1Ja Hussaini and Roger Helms from reports by the media 1he Afghan government the Taliban and where needed follow•up phone calls to local sources by members of the AAN team through July 15 2021 Data preparation and graphics by Roger Helms using the NSIA 421 district set Source https ga nd hara rf erl o rg a tal 1ba n-control-a fgh an ista n 31360050 html Source tlt1ps www afgMn1stan·analys1s orgten repans war·and·peace menace·negot1at10n·attack· the•taleban•take-more-district-centres-across-afgharnstan Note SIGAR provides these maps for information only and takes no position on the accuracy methodologies or analysis used by their creators These maps were recreated by SIGAR for simple map-to-map comparisons otherwise they are reproduced from the source Each source may have used a different number of districts so there may not be an exact district-to-district comparison between maps For more on the methodologies used to create these maps please see the sources SECURITY Security-Incident Data For the first time since December 2019 CSTC-A reported for public release some details of enemy-initiated attacks EIAs and effective enemy-initiated attacks EEIAs CSTC-A cautioned that they cannot confirm the accuracy and completeness of the data for it is based on Afghan operational reporting and there is often a time lag from the event to the report CSTC-A believed that the data “can be used to substantiate broad inferences and trends over time ” RS-reported enemy-initiated attack data does not include U S and Coalition-initiated attacks on the enemy USFOR-A notified SIGAR that the last date for security-incident data that they could provide is May 31 2021 as the database used for tracking such information ended in conjunction with the Resolute Support Mission DOD noted they are “exploring options” for the continued reporting of this data Source CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 10 2021 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 10 2021 OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 7 16 2021 Taliban control ”81 On July 2 the Afghanistan Analysts Network AAN claimed that the Taliban had captured 127 district centers about 25% of the total “adding to those they already controlled ”82 In a July 21 press conference General Milley updated his previous estimate of Taliban control to “about half of the 419 that are out there ” He also noted that the Taliban is putting pressure on 17 of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial capitals and the ANDSF was consolidating their forces to protect those population centers and Kabul General Milley further added that while “strategic momentum appears to be sort of with the Taliban … I don’t think the end game is yet written ”83 The online Long War Journal LWJ painted an even bleaker picture of the extent and swiftness of Afghan government district losses claiming that the Taliban controlled 157 districts on June 29 then 204 on July 9 and 221 by July 15 84 According to LWJ this was more than three times the number of districts the Taliban controlled on April 14 from 73 to 221 or more than half the number of total districts in Afghanistan see page 55 85 The numbers fluctuate as government forces have retaken some districts 86 In addition to capturing districts the Taliban have taken at least six international border crossings and hold long stretches of highways throughout the country according to the AAN This not only denies the Afghan government significant revenue from taxes on international trade but also provides far more opportunities for the Taliban to raise their own revenue by taxing traders and extorting travelers at checkpoints 87 For more information on the potential revenue impact from the loss of border crossings see page 131 and the classified supplement to this report The Afghan government still holds Kabul and all 34 provincial capitals though many appear threatened 88 Both the Taliban and the ANDSF report inflicting significant casualties on each other 89 In one incident 23 Afghan special forces soldiers were surrounded and killed in northern Faryab Province on June 16 Among the dead was Colonel Sohrab Azimi a renowned field commander who was mourned across Afghanistan 90 On June 29 the Afghan government claimed they had killed over 6 000 Taliban fighters and wounded another 3 485 in the past month 91 Violence Trends Some Violence Trend Data Unavailable as Resolute Support Mission Withdraws SIGAR analyzes different types of data to obtain a better understanding of the violence trends in Afghanistan These data sources when available include RS-provided data on enemy-initiated attacks against the ANDSF RS and UNAMA-provided data on civilian casualties and USFOR-A data on ANDSF casualties and insider attacks 56 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SECURITY FIGURE 2 28 ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS BY QUARTER FROM MARCH 2019−MAY 2021 15 000 13 242 12 000 10 959 10 006 9 651 9 000 6 755 7 293 10 383 9 163 6 700 6 000 3 000 3 027 3 457 3 741 3 155 3 836 3 925 3 583 3 268 2 257 0 Mar−May Jun−Aug Sep−Nov Dec 2019 Mar−May Jun−Aug Sep−Nov Dec 2020 Mar−May 2019 2019 2019 −Feb 2020 2020 2020 2020 −Feb 2021 2021 • • EIA EEIA Note EIA Enemy-Initiated Attacks EEIA Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks referring to a subset of enemy-initiated attacks that produced casualties Source RS response to SIGAR data call 4 1 2021 and 6 12 2021 SIGAR analysis of RS-provided data 7 2021 This quarter RS informed SIGAR that due to the drawdown especially the end of the train advise and assist missions several key elements of violence trend data were incomplete and will no longer be available In addition unclassified information about ANDSF casualty trends may not be available 92 For details on what information may no longer be available see the callout box on page 61 Enemy Attacks Increased Significantly Since the U S -Taliban Agreement of February 2020 Despite continued calls from U S officials for the Taliban to reduce its levels of violence in line with their commitments in the U S -Taliban agreement USFOR-A’s enemy-initiated attacks EIA data the past three months March–May 2021 show that the Taliban have not done so 93 Figure 2 28 shows that each three-month period since the February 29 2020 U S Taliban agreement has had significantly more EIAs than their corresponding quarters the previous year 94 Figure 2 29 on the following page shows the dramatic increase in enemy-initiated attacks last quarter January–March 2021 especially when compared to previous first quarters USFOR-A believed that ANDSF reporting of EIAs and effective enemy-initiated attacks EEIA decreased this quarter due to the train advise and assist missions ending the data ended altogether on May 31 2021 95 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 57 Enemy-initiated attacks EIA All attacks direct fire surface to air fire IED and mine explosions etc initiated by insurgents that the ANDSF and RC consider to be significant activities SIGACTs ” Effective enemy-initiated attacks EEIA A subset of enemy-initiated attacks that result in ANDSF Coalition or civilian casualties Source CSTC-A response to SIGAR vetting 4 12 2019 SECURITY FIGURE 2 29 RS reported that due to the end of the Resolute Support Mission the Casualty Mitigation Team retrograded and the remaining military personnel in Afghanistan will not be able to support the tracking and collection of civilian casualty data Therefore RS was able to provide final civilian casualty data for only April and May 2021 FIRST-QUARTER ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS SINCE 2010 15 000 12 000 10 469 9 000 7 620 6 702 Source RS response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 5 564 6 000 4 323 4 847 5 305 5 034 4 717 5 982 6 358 4 815 3 702 3 000 0 915 1 094 899 2010 2011 2012 1 520 1 722 2013 2014 • EIA 2 345 2015 2 199 2 308 2 495 2 596 2 546 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 • 2021 EEIA Note EIA Enemy-Initiated Attacks EEIA Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks referring to a subset of enemy-initiated attacks that produced casualties Source RS response to SIGAR data call 4 1 2021 and 6 10 2021 SIGAR analysis of RS-provided data 7 2021 FIGURE 2 30 RS CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY PARTY ATTRIBUTION APRIL−MAY 2021 Total 2 035 Antigovernment Forces 93% Progovernment Forces 2% Unknown Forces 5% Note These data cover the period April 1–May 31 2021 Casualties include dead and wounded Antigovernment forces here include the Taliban IS-K the Haqqani Network and Unknown Insurgents progovernment forces include the ANDSF and Coalition forces and unknown forces include the RS “Other Unknown” category of civilian casualties caused by undetermined elements local militia and the Pakistani military Source RS response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 SIGAR analysis of RS-provided data 7 2021 Civilian Casualties Intensify RS Reports Increasing Civilian Casualties in 2021 Civilian casualties continued to rise this quarter including deadly urban attacks In one of the worst incidents on May 8 2021 a car-bomb exploded along with two other blasts killing 85 and wounding 275 students at Sayed– ul-Shuhada High School a predominantly Shia girls school in Kabul 96 While no group claimed responsibility—the Taliban disavowed any involvement— U S officials believe that IS-K carried out the attack 97 RS reported 2 035 civilian casualties in April and May 2021 which included 705 deaths and 1 330 injuries This total is nearly as high as the three months from January through March 2021 2 149 98 According to RS the top two causes of civilian casualties were improvised explosive devices and direct fire e g rifle or machine-gun fire 99 As seen in Figure 2 31 these civilian casualties were nearly as high as the entire three month period last year April–June 2020 100 RS attributed about 93% of this quarter’s civilian casualties to antigovernment forces 40% to the Taliban 38% to unknown insurgents 14% to IS-K and less than 1% to the Haqqani Network as seen in Figure 2 30 About 2% were attributed to progovernment forces 2% to ANDSF and about 5% to other or unknown forces These percentages are roughly similar to longterm trends reported by RS 101 58 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SECURITY FIGURE 2 31 RS-REPORTED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY QUARTER 4 029 4 000 3 064 3 017 3 000 1 959 2 000 1 878 1 764 1 518 1 251 1 228 1 116 2 085 2 149 1 374 1 476 Q1 2019 • I Injuries 2 035 1 330 799 1 058 965 0 1 951 Deaths 1 309 1 000 402 2 883 I• 627 510 711 Q4 2019 Q1 2020 Q2 2020 536 Q2 2019 Q3 2019 Q3 2020 932 Q4 2020 Q2 2021 data includes ONLY April 1−May 31 2021 Note Figures for last quarter have been updated by RS this quarter Source RS response to SIGAR data call 1 7 2020 10 7 2019 1 6 2021 4 6 2021 and 6 16 2021 SIGAR analysis of RS-provided data 7 2021 UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN Oversight and Advising Capabilities and Limitations During the Drawdown At the end of the drawdown an estimated 650 U S troops will remain to assist with security at U S Embassy Kabul 102 This is down from 2 500 last quarter 103 Figure 2 32 on the following page shows the American troop levels in Afghanistan from 2002–2021 Retrograde Process Mostly Complete by Early July CENTCOM estimated it had completed more than half of the retrograde process by June 14 and more than 90% by July 5 This process included 984 C-17 transport aircraft loads out of Afghanistan more than 17 000 pieces of equipment turned over to DLA for disposition and 10 facilities including Bagram Airfield handed over to Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense 104 Included in the retrograde are thousands of vehicles and other equipment including over 400 pieces of rolling stock and more than 6 600 pieces of non-rolling stock The two most expensive retrograded items were 14 air-defense artillery pieces valued at more than $144 million and five “Enhanced Sentinel FMTVs Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles ” valued at more than $16 million 105 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 59 673 705 Q1 2021 Q2 2021 SECURITY FIGURE 2 32 U S TROOP LEVELS IN AFGHANISTAN 2002–2021 120 000 110 325 103 727 90 000 76 000 66 000 60 000 30 000 5 200 10 400 20 400 23 700 15 200 19 100 30 100 64 000 25 000 14 000 15 500 14 000 8 550 9 000 8 600 0 650 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018a 2019 2020 2021b a Projected for 2018 based on public statements of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg According to USFOR-A the publicly releasable U S troop level as of March 1 2018 remains 14 000 b On January 15 2021 the number of U S troops in Afghanistan was 2 500 650 is projected for the end of the drawdown Source CRS Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars FY2002–FY2012 7 2 2009 DOD Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan 10 2009 p 18 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 10 30 2010 p 73 7 30 2011 p 71 10 30 2012 p 95 10 30 2013 p 87 10 30 2014 p 91 10 30 2015 p 92 OSD-P response to SIGAR data call 6 30 2016 and 12 27 2016 USFOR-A response to SIGAR data call 9 10 2017 11 27 2017 and 3 1 2018 Reuters “Despite NATO Pledge to Increase Afghan Support Troop Shortfall Remains U S ” 11 9 2017 DOD Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan 6 2019 DOD Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan 6 2020 p 1 DOD Statement by Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller on Force Levels in Afghanistan 1 15 2021 Associated Press “US to keep about 650 troops in Afghanistan after withdrawal ” 6 24 2021 “Over-The-Horizon” Support to ANDSF Similar to COVID-19Restricted Support Security assistance to Afghanistan is now conducted “over-the-horizon” from Qatar by the Defense Security Cooperation Management OfficeAfghanistan DSCMO-A Resolute Support cautioned that “OTH does not equal over-the-shoulder” oversight and acknowledged that the reduced presence of U S forces in Afghanistan will constrain DSCMO-A’s capacity to monitor ANDSF use of ASFF funds and procured materials DSCMO-A now provides security assistance through videoconference meetings at both the senior-leader level and at the directorate and branch levels “to ensure sustained pay maintenance logistics and Foreign Military Sales FMS support ” much as they did the past year under COVID-19 restrictions In addition DSCMO-A said they will mitigate misuse of ASFF funds through end-use monitoring EUM of critical equipment using local national contractors as the “on-ground eyes and ears for the U S government ” and remote monitoring of pay and logistics databases 106 DSCMO-A explained that the local national contractors “send pictures and write-ups as deliverables to enable the projects to stay on schedule ” This was also standard procedure before the retrograde 107 Over-the-horizon DSCMO-A support has some advantages despite the elimination of face-to-face contact with their Afghan counterparts according to Resolute Support RS claimed that in some cases they provide “the 60 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SECURITY - - - - - - -DOD Unable to Provide Some Information This Quarter The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy OUSD-P and CSTC-A advised SIGAR this quarter that because of the drawdown of U S and Coalition forces in Afghanistan they were unable to supply much of the reconstruction-related data usually provided for SIGAR quarterly reports CSTC-A explained that many of their sources for this information were no longer in Afghanistan For example train advise and assist missions in Afghanistan at both the corps level and below as well as at the ministerial level ended in early May Specifically DOD said they could not provide information this quarter about • ANDSF and ministerial operational performance • Afghan ground-vehicle maintenance efforts • the impact of COVID-19 on ANDSF recruitment and attrition DOD provided incomplete data for key security metrics such as EIA EEIA data ended May 31 2021 though they noted they are “exploring options” for the continued reporting of this data In other cases answers to questions such as what assets DOD will maintain in Afghanistan and details of how counterterrorism will be conducted over-the-horizon were still considered “predecisional” and therefore not provided to SIGAR in time for this report More details on these issues are found in the classified supplement to this report Source OUSD-P and CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 5 19 2021 DOD OIG Pre-conference spreadsheet with DOD responses 5 27 2021 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 7 16 2021 exact same level of support to the ANDSF from over-the-horizon that was provided while in Afghanistan ”108 For example DSCMO-A Human Resources Management continues with the same scheduled meetings over the same communications platforms they used in Afghanistan and still maintains system configuration control management and oversight of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System APPS RS claimed that some advantages of over-the-horizon support include a longer personnel transition time seven to 10 days as opposed to two to three days between incumbent and replacement due to the elimination of transit time into Afghanistan better connectivity with contacts in the continental United States and potentially more personnel continuity due to longer tours of duty 109 DOD Contractor Personnel As of early June 2021 there were 7 795 DOD contractor personnel supporting agency operations in Afghanistan This includes 2 656 U S citizens 2 491 third-country nationals and 2 648 Afghan nationals 110 The contractor count last quarter was 16 832 6 147 U S 6 399 third-country nationals and 4 286 Afghans 111 This represents a decrease of 9 037 total contractors about 54% including 3 491 U S contractors about 57% from the previous quarter However DOD noted that since the numbers were taken from a census in early June they “have since decreased due to ongoing redeployment and related drawdown activities in accordance with the President’s direction ”112 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 61 SECURITY U S and Coalition Forces Casualties and Insider Attacks There were no additional U S or Coalition casualties this quarter From October 7 2001 through July 19 2021 1 897 U S military personnel were killed in action in Afghanistan Another 415 died as a result of non-hostile causes A total of 20 666 military personnel have been wounded in action 113 From April 1 2021 through June 30 2021 there were no insider attacks against U S and Coalition military personnel 114 A NEW SIGAR LESSONS-LEARNED REPORT EXPLORES THE CORE CHALLENGE OF PROPERLY ASSESSING RECONSTRUCTION’S EFFECTIVENESS This quarter SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program issued a report on the monitoring and evaluation M E of contracting The report’s most important finding is that as implemented M E created the risk of “doing the wrong thing perfectly” Programs could be deemed “successful” regardless of whether they had achieved or contributed to broader more important goals—including most prominently a stable Afghanistan With the ANDSF struggling to check the Taliban’s ongoing offensive the current situation in Afghanistan makes this lessons-learned report especially relevant A central theme of the report is the tendency for M E to be overoptimistic—that is to favor good news over data suggesting a lack of progress For years U S taxpayers were told that although circumstances were difficult success was achievable Optimistic assertions of progress have not been limited to the overall campaign A similar pattern is evident in assessments of ANDSF FIGURE effectiveness In 2011 General David Petraeus stated “Investments in leader development literacy marksmanship and institutions have yielded significant dividends In fact in the hard fighting west of Kandahar in late 2010 Afghan forces comprised some 60% of the overall force and they fought with skill and courage ” In 2015 General John Campbell said that the ANDSF had “proven themselves to be increasingly capable ” that they had “grown and matured in less than a decade into a modern professional force ” and further that they had “proven that they can and will take the tactical fight from here ” Similarly in 2017 General John Nicholson stated that Afghan security forces had “prevailed in combat against an externally enabled enemy ” and that the ANDSF’s “ability to face simultaneity and complexity on the battlefield signals growth in capability ” More recently on July 11 2021 Pentagon press secretary John Kirby said that the ANDSF “have much more capacity than they’ve ever had before much more capability ” and asserted “they know how to defend their country ” Over the years however other data points or the lack thereof recommended greater skepticism SIGAR has expressed serious concerns about the corrosive effects of corruption within the ANDSF including the existence of ghost soldiers and police the questionable accuracy of data on the actual strength of the force the inability of assessment methodologies to account for the influence on combat readiness of intangible factors such as the will to fight the shaky sustainability of the ANDSF given its dependencies on advanced equipment and the initial lack of focus on ministerial-level capabilities and the discontinuation of critical data such as assessments of district control that could be used to help measure the ANDSF’s performance in recent years More than $88 billion has been appropriated to support Afghanistan’s security sector The question of whether that money was well spent will ultimately be answered by the outcome of the fighting on the ground perhaps the purest M E exercise Source General David Petraeus “The Situation in Afghanistan ” testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services 112th Cong 3 15 2011 p 16 Congressional Quarterly transcripts General John F Campbell “Operation Freedom’s Sentinel and our continued security investment in Afghanistan ” 10 5 2015 p 1 General John W Nicholson written statement before the Senate Committee on Armed Services 115th Cong 2 9 2017 p 1 Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby interview with Chris Wallace “Fox News Sunday ” 7 11 2021 SIGAR Corruption in Conflict Lessons from the U S Experience in Afghanistan SIGAR 16-58-LL 9 2016 p 10 Sinclair Broadcast Group “‘Full Measure’ Ghost soldiers ” 4 23 2017 SIGAR Despite Improvements in MOI’s Personnel Systems Additional Actions Are Needed to Completely Verify ANP Payroll Costs and Workforce Strength SIGAR 11-10-AR 4 25 2011 ii SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 7 30 2020 p 3 SIGAR Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces Lessons from the U S Experience in Afghanistan SIGAR 17-62-LL 9 2017 pp 168–170 John F Sopko “Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s 2019 High-Risk List ” testimony before the House Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security Hearing 4 3 2019 John Sopko “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Lessons Learned in Afghanistan ” testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Congressional Quarterly transcripts 1 15 2020 62 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SECURITY AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES ANDSF Strength As of April 29 2021 CSTC-A reported 300 699 ANDSF personnel 182 071 MOD and 118 628 MOI biometrically enrolled and eligible for pay in the Afghan Personnel and Pay System APPS There are an additional 7 066 civilians 3 015 MOD and 4 051 MOI 115 Figure 2 33 shows that ANDSF total strength decreased slightly 2 3% this quarter compared to last quarter but included some 12 281 personnel 4 3% more than a year ago These ANDSF strength figures include 6 312 female personnel enrolled in APPS as of May 29 2021 This reflects an increase of 270 female personnel since February 25 2021 The majority of ANDSF women continue to serve in the Afghan National Police ANP 4 253 personnel with the other 1 913 in the Afghan National Army ANA and 146 in the Afghan Air Force AAF These numbers include 419 civilians as well as 29 female cadets at the Afghan National Military Academy and 42 female cadets at the Afghan National Army Officer Academy 116 FIGURE 2 33 REPORTED ANDSF ASSIGNED STRENGTH FROM APPS 350 000 300 000 250 000 305 021 307 947 300 699 118 122 121 088 118 628 185 478 186 899 186 859 182 071 7 2020 10 2020 1 2021 4 2021 281 548 288 418 288 702 99 375 105 671 103 224 176 019 182 173 182 747 10 2019 1 2020 4 2020 272 807 96 788 200 000 150 000 100 000 50 000 0 • ANA including AAF • ANP Note This quarter’s data is as of April 29 2021 The “as of” date of the data each quarter is between the 25th and 31st of the indicated month APPS Afghan Personnel and Pay System ANA Afghan National Army AAF Afghan Air Force ANP Afghan National Police ANDSF Afghan National Defense and Security Forces No civilians are included in the strength numbers Source CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 3 17 2021 12 16 2020 9 22 2020 6 18 2020 3 17 2020 and 12 19 2019 SIGAR analysis of CSTC-A-provided data 7 2021 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 63 ANA soldiers prepare for a vehicle patrol CENTCOM photo SECURITY ANDSF personnel strength reported for this quarter does not reflect the loss of personnel to casualties surrender capture or fleeing to other countries that occurred during the Taliban offensive from May through July Popular Uprising and People’s Mobilization Forces As the security situation in Afghanistan’s northern provinces deteriorated some district leaders began mobilizing their own local forces to evict the Taliban Despite government promises to provide training and include them in Afghan army organizations there were fears that local power brokers and warlords would form their own militias loyal to them as occurred in Afghanistan’s civil war in the 1990s 117 Afghan Personnel and Pay System ONGOING SIGAR AUDIT An ongoing SIGAR audit is reviewing DOD’s efforts to ensure the accuracy of APPS records and the accountability for funds provided to the MOD This audit will determine the extent to which DOD since the beginning of FY 2019 has ensured 1 the accuracy and completeness of data used in APPS and 2 the funds it provides to the Afghan government to pay MOD salaries are disbursed to intended recipients CSTC-A developed the computerized personnel and payroll system APPS to reduce opportunities for corruption and fraud—such as fake personnel records that corrupt actors used to pocket salaries for “ghost” police—and to create better accountability transparency and auditability in ANDSF payroll processes The United States initially spent $35 8 million on the development contract for APPS in 2016 An additional $29 million has been spent since 2019 when a sustainment contract for the system began This brings the total amount spent on APPS to $64 8 million as of June 1 2021 118 DSCMO-A continues its efforts to transition to the Afghan government some of the roles and responsibilities for management of APPS CSTC-A told SIGAR that Afghan government “ownership of APPS” means the ANDSF are responsible for operating APPS including program management and funding the contract The ANDSF can have “full ownership” of APPS even if the U S continues to fund the program from ASFF and or LOTFA APPS sustainment is expected to cost roughly $9 6 million per year 119 After the U S troop withdrawal is complete CSTC-A said DSCMO-A will remain in regular contact with the MOD and MOI program offices DSCMO-A will also continue to maintain “configuration control” of APPS meaning that all requests from ANA or ANP units will pass through the DSCMO-A Human Resources Management Program Manager for quality checks before flowing to the MOD or MOI APPS program management offices 120 While retrograding CSTC-A could no longer monitor many details about the phased transfer of APPS management to the Afghan MOD and MOI but CSTC-A told SIGAR that the ANDSF took several significant steps this quarter in their long march toward this goal These included • On May 12 2021 APPS began connecting to the Afghan Automated Biometric Information System AABIS a separate database that holds ANDSF biometric information as a requirement for pay CSTC-A believes that this will be a significant step in the effort to 64 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SECURITY - - - - - - -• • • • reduce fraud and corruption in the ANDSF personnel system such as “ghost” police 121 An additional measure to reduce fraud and corruption connecting APPS to the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System AFMIS —the country’s government-wide accounting system—remains on track to be completed for the MOD in September 2021 122 As of June 23 2021 the MOD has 15 military and three civilian personnel hired and actively employed to manage APPS The MOI has its APPS program manager and a small team of subject matter experts onboard while it waits approval for the remaining 25 civilian personnel 123 As of May 29 2021 97% of MOD personnel were biometrically enrolled and validated up slightly from 96% last quarter 124 The MOI made significant progress biometrically enrolling its personnel As of June 12 2021 116 755 MOI personnel have been biometrically verified an increase of more than 8 400 in the first two weeks of June and 97 8% of total MOI personnel up from 90% last quarter 125 For more details on the APPS transition including the biometric and validation process see SIGAR’s April 30 2021 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress ANDSF Attrition – Some Data Classified USFOR-A continued to classify detailed ANDSF attrition information this quarter because the Afghan government classifies it 126 SIGAR’s questions about ANDSF attrition can be found in Appendix E This quarter CSTC-A reported that overall ANA monthly attrition averaged about 3% in February–April 2021 and that ANP’s attrition increased from 2 5% to 3 5% 127 ANDSF Casualties SIGAR asked USFOR-A to provide an unclassified description of the data’s trends USFOR-A said “ANA KIAs reported in APPS have shown an upward trend especially during the month of June ANP KIAs have also trended upward but not as notably as the ANA ”128 Detailed information on ANDSF casualties can be found in SIGAR’s classified supplement to this quarterly report ANDSF Insider Attacks USFOR-A reported at least 26 insider attacks against the ANDSF from April 1 2021 through June 30 2021 These attacks resulted in at least 81 ANDSF personnel killed and 37 wounded USFOR-A added however that “due to ongoing retrograde operations ” the number of insider attacks that their analysts were tracking against the ANDSF was incomplete 129 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 65 SECURITY AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY U S Funding Afghan soldiers overlook a village CENTCOM photo As of June 30 2021 the United States had obligated more than $2 5 billion and disbursed nearly $2 27 billion of ASFF appropriated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 to build train equip and sustain the ANA Also as of June 30 2021 the United States had finished obligating and nearly finished disbursing roughly $47 5 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2005 through FY 2018 to build train equip and sustain the ANA AAF and parts of the Afghan Special Security Forces ASSF These force elements constituted the ANA budget activity group for reporting purposes through the 2018 appropriation 130 ANA Sustainment As of June 30 2021 the United States had obligated more than $2 3 billion and disbursed roughly $2 15 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANA sustainment Also as of June 30 2021 the United States had finished obligating $23 6 billion and nearly finished disbursing roughly $23 5 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANA AAF and some ASSF sustainment These costs include salary and incentive pay fuel transportation services and equipment-maintenance costs including aircraft and other expenses 131 For Afghan fiscal year FY 1400 December 2020–December 2021 DSCMO-A plans to provide the Afghan government the equivalent of up to $841 6 million to support the MOD Of this amount approximately $653 0 million 78% is for salaries 132 As of June 12 CSTC-A provided the Afghan government the equivalent of $289 4 million to support the MOD for FY 1400 December 2020–December 2021 The majority of these funds 87% paid for salaries 133 ANA Equipment and Transportation As of June 30 2021 the United States had obligated nearly $34 million and disbursed more than $20 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANA equipment and transportation costs Also as of June 30 2021 the United States had finished obligating and nearly finished disbursing roughly $13 6 billion of FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANA AAF and some ASFF equipment and transportation costs 134 Table 2 8 lists the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANA this quarter April 1 2021 to June 30 2021 which included six A-29 light attack aircraft valued at more than $133 million 174 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles HMMWVs commonly known as “Humvees” valued at about $41 5 million and 9 696 2 75 inch high-explosive rockets valued at roughly $18 4 million 135 66 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SECURITY - - - - - - -TABLE 2 8 MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS PROVIDED TO ANA Equipment Type Equipment Description Units Issued in Quarter Unit Cost Total Cost Aircraft A-29 light attack aircraft 6 $22 252 120 00 $133 512 720 174 238 500 00 41 499 000 99 696 1 906 00 18 480 479 Vehicle M1151 HMMWV Ammunition 2 75 inch rockets Ammunition 40mm high-explosive rounds 60 840 75 00 4 563 000 Uniform Shirts various sizes 88 709 41 00 3 597 150 Ammunition 50 caliber cartridges Parts Hydraulic vehicle transmissions 884 880 3 20 2 703 616 304 7 697 00 2 339 584 Parts Diesel engines 84 37 443 00 3 145 233 Ammunition 7 62 mm cartridges 2 015 600 0 75 1 511 700 Ammunition 5 56 blank training cartridges 4 723 248 0 22 Total 1 039 115 $212 391 597 Note The above list reflects only the 10 highest-value equipment provided to the ANA this quarter April 30–June 30 2021 The “unit costs” listed reflect the average costs paid for items procured under multiple Foreign Military Sales cases Source CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 ANA Infrastructure As of June 30 2021 the United States had obligated more than $48 million and disbursed about $15 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANA infrastructure projects Also as of June 30 2021 the United States had finished obligating and nearly finished disbursing roughly $6 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANA AAF and some ASFF infrastructure projects 136 This quarter U S Forces-Afghanistan transferred a total of 4 836 unique real property items from 10 locations in Afghanistan valued at roughly $805 million to the Afghan MOD These items included 137 • Contingency Location New Antonik was turned over to MOD on May 4 2021 42 unique real-property items valued at $3 246 526 • New Camp Brown Kandahar Airfield was turned over to the MOD on May 11 2021 2 832 unique real-property items valued at $130 188 595 • Camp Morehead was turned over to MOD on May 12 2021 132 unique real-property items valued at $1 318 756 • New Kabul Complex was turned over to MOD on May 28 2021 75 unique real-property items valued at $52 463 004 • Blockhouse was turned over to MOD on May 28 2021 25 unique realproperty items valued at $1 750 012 • Camp Stevenson was turned over to the MOD on June 1 2021 34 unique real-property items valued at $9 784 497 • Camp Dwyer was turned over to the MOD on June 15 2021 120 unique real-property items values at $38 588 407 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 67 Real property items Includes one or more of the following a building structure utility system pavement and or underlying land Source CSTC-A response to SIGAR vetting 4 8 2021 SECURITY • Camp Lincoln Camp Marmal was turned over to the MOD on June 29 2021 10 unique real-property items valued at $1 698 087 • Camp Arena was turned over to the MOD on 28 June 2021 Six unique real-property items valued at $322 341 • Bagram Airfield was turned over to the MOD on July 1 2021 1 558 unique real-property items valued at $565 840 912 In addition Resolute Support headquarters RSHQ was handed over to the Afghan government on June 6 2021 It was then handed over to U S Embassy Kabul on the same day RSHQ was valued at $4 2 million 138 As of June 12 2021 CSTC-A was managing five ongoing DOD-funded ANA infrastructure projects costing roughly $22 7 million in total In addition CSTC-A completed two projects totaling $3 3 million and was planning two projects costing an estimated $5 7 million No DOD-funded ANA infrastructure projects were descoped or terminated this quarter 139 The two projects completed this quarter were a roughly $1 8 million Special Mission Wing SMW “Ramp6S Supporting Structures” and a $1 5 million ANA Special Operations Corps ANASOC building renovation and construction in Kabul 140 Of the ongoing and planned projects the costliest include an ongoing electrical-grid connection project for the ANA in Baghlan Province about $9 5 million one phase of an ongoing SMW facilities-expansion plan for its airbase at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul $5 6 million and a planned electrical-grid connection project for the ANA in Parwan Province costing roughly $8 5 million of which the U S ASFF contribution is $5 2 million with the rest pledged by another donor nation 141 Four of the five ongoing infrastructure projects for MOD elements are slated for completion after September 2021 when U S forces plan to complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan 142 As for continued oversight of construction projects after the U S withdrawal DSCMO-A confirmed the same plan that CSTC-A said in January We are keenly aware of the need to provide proper oversight of projects and protect taxpayer dollars Therefore in order to meet our fiscal oversight responsibilities CSTC-A and USACE have established construction verification and quality assurance contracts with local national engineers These contractors conduct regular and reoccurring site visits and provide detailed photographic and written reports back to us This allows CSTC-A and USACE to effectively oversee construction completion regardless of U S or Coalition troop levels 143 CSTC-A reported that the estimated annual facilities-sustainment costs funded by the United States for all ANA facility-sustainment requirements remain $108 8 million as in the previous two quarters Of this $74 7 million is provided directly to the Afghan government and $34 1 million is spent by DSCMO-A for the Afghan government 144 68 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SECURITY - - - - - - -ANA Training and Operations As of June 30 2021 the United States had obligated over $104 million and disbursed nearly $84 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANA training and operations Also as of June 30 2021 the United States had finished obligating and nearly finished disbursing about $4 3 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 for ANA AAF some ASSF and MOD training and operations 145 According to CSTC-A ASFF funds currently pay for a number of highcost mission-critical training programs for MOD force elements The costliest is a roughly $110 million training program for the ASSF supporting NSOCC-A-partnered units as they further develop critical operational and institutionalized special operations training and build sufficient capacity This is followed by a nearly $80 million contract to train entry-level AAF and SMW aircraft maintainers and another roughly $80 million entry-level rotary and fixed-wing pilot training contract for the AAF and SMW 146 Shown in Table 2 9 just the 10 most costly U S -funded contracts to train ANA AAF and ANASOC personnel could total roughly $517 million by the time the current contracts’ terms end Seven of the 10 are scheduled to run into the late summer or early fall of 2021 the other three end in 2022 147 TABLE 2 9 TRAINING CONTRACTS FOR MOD ELEMENTS Contract Base Current Period of Performance ASSF Training Program Base 10 1 2019–9 1 2020 Current OY1 9 1 2020–9 30 2021 Initial Entry Rotary Wing and Initial Entry Fixed Wing Outside Continental United States AAF Pilot Training Current Base 4 1 2020–10 31 2022 AAF Aviation Maintenance Development Center Base 4 15 2019–4 14 2020 Current OY1 4 15 2020–9 30 2021 No-cost extension due to COVID-19 delays ASSF Training Support Services Base 4 15 2019–4 14 2020 Current OY1 4 15 2020–9 30 2021 National Maintenance Strategy-Ground Vehicle Services ANA AAF ASSF Base 5 23 2017–5 23 2018 Current OY3 9 1 2020–8 31 2021 Operations Support Squadron Advisors Base 7 1 2019–4 30 2020 Current OY2 10 1 2020–9 30 2021 A-29 Pilot and Maintenance Training AAF Base 10 1 2019–9 30 2020 Current OY1 10 1 2020–9 30 2021 C-208 Contractor Logistics Support and Maintenance Training Base 5 20 2017–1 31 2018 AAF Current OY3 2 1 2020–1 31 2022 A-29 Lead-In High Power Turbo Propeller Pilot Training AAF Current Base 8 15 2020–8 14 2021 AAF English Language Training Base 7 1 2019–6 30 2020 Current OY1 8 15 2020–8 14 2021 Note The above list reflects only the 10 highest-value training contracts supporting MOD force elements The case contract value dollar amounts were not approved for public release this quarter ASSF Afghan Special Security Forces AAF Afghan Air Force ANA Afghan National Army Source CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 7 17 2021 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 69 SIGAR EVALUATION REPORT ISSUED U S -FUNDED CAPITAL ASSETS IN AFGHANISTAN A February 2021 SIGAR evaluation determined that the U S government spent more than $2 4 billion on capital assets that were unused or abandoned were not used for their intended purposes had deteriorated or were destroyed SECURITY DOD noted that many contracts are already executed outside Afghanistan so contract oversight will continue as it was before the U S withdrawal began For those contracts executed in Afghanistan a small DSCMO-A element will remain co-located with U S Embassy Kabul and monitor the contracts through interactions with the MOD and MOI 148 AFGHAN AIR FORCE U S Funding As of June 30 2021 the United States had obligated nearly $2 13 billion and disbursed about $1 78 billion of ASFF appropriated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 to build train equip and sustain the AAF The authorized ASFF funds for the AAF from FY 2019 through FY 2021 total approximately $2 8 billion 149 As in most previous years sustainment remains the costliest funding category for the AAF 59% of FY 2020 and 69% of FY 2019 obligated funds followed by training 35% and 24% respectively equipment and transportation 7% and 5% and infrastructure 1% of both fiscal years’ funds AAF sustainment and equipment costs primarily include contractor-provided maintenance major and minor repairs and aircraft upgrades and procurement of parts supplies and training equipment for the AAF’s in-country inventory of seven air platforms UH-60 MD-530 and Mi-17 helicopters A-29 C-130 C-208 and AC-208 fixed-wing aircraft 150 TABLE 2 10 AAF AVIATION SUMMARY AS OF JUNE 30 2021 Authorized Total Inventory Usable In-Country Authorized Aircrews Assigned Aircrews A-29 26 23 23 38 18 AC-208 10 10 10 15 15 C-208 24 23 23 28 15 C-130 4 4 3 5 5 n a 56 32 — — MD-530 60 50 43 58 34 UH-60 53 45 33 49 28 177 211 167 193 115 Aircraft Fixed Wing Rotary Wing Mi-17 Total Note The AAF is phasing out its Russian-made Mi-17s FY 2022 is the last year DOD will seek sustainment funding for the Mi-17s Some will remain in the fleet to provide operational capability until the UH-60 capability matures and the transition to CH-47s is completed TAAC-Air did not provide data for Mi-17 aircrews because it does not provide train advise and assist support for the AAF’s Mi-17s Source TAAC-Air response to SIGAR data call 7 15 2021 and response to SIGAR vetting 4 16 2021 OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 7 22 2021 SIGAR analysis of TAAC-Air-provided data 7 2021 70 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SECURITY - - - - - - -AAF Inventory and Aircrew Inventory and Status As of June 30 2021 the AAF had 167 available aircraft among the 211 aircraft in its total inventory As Table 2 10 shows three of seven of the AAF’s airframes had fully usable aircraft inventories this quarter A-29 AC-208 and C-208 151 In addition to the AAF’s current fleet in Afghanistan 37 UH-60s previously purchased for the AAF are currently held in strategic reserve in the United States Secretary Austin told Afghan President Ghani that DOD will begin to provide these aircraft to the AAF He added that three UH-60’s would be delivered by July 23 2021 but no further details are publicly available Four MD-530s have been purchased to replace battle damaged aircraft The timeline for their delivery to the AAF has yet to be determined 152 Afghan Air Force Still Lacking Qualified Aircrew DSCMO-A reported no changes this quarter to the number of authorized AAF aircrews but several changes to assigned aircrews from last quarter These changes included three fewer A-29 crews from 21 to 18 two more AC-208 crews 13 to 15 and 16 less C-208 crews from 31 to 15 and two more C-130 crews from three to five 153 As TAAC-Air did last quarter this quarter DSCMO-A provided data on qualified and trained aircrew by position and airframe instructor pilots copilots mission system operators etc As seen in Table 2 11 only 15 of 42 total positions were filled with qualified personnel as of June 30 2021 a decrease of three from last quarter Only the C-130 had more than half of its aircrew positions filled four of seven with the required number of qualified personnel The C-208 and MD-530 fared worst with only one of five positions filled with the required number of qualified personnel 154 OUSD-P explained why so many aircrew positions lacked qualified personnel After the initial break in training caused by COVID training was further slowed by COVID-related delays in obtaining student visas and quarantine requirements at the training locations Students who returned to Afghanistan after completing initial training and aircraft qualification training were not able to fly with contracted or T10 instructors due to COVID restrictions which caused a “bubble” of aircraftqualified pilots who are still waiting to complete mission qualification training 155 I JULY 30 2021 Usable aircraft Aircraft in the AAF’s inventory that are located in Afghanistan and are either operational and available for tasking or are in short-term maintenance Authorized The total number of aircraft approved for the force Source TAAC-Air response to SIGAR vetting 4 16 2021 TABLE 2 11 AIRCREW POSITIONS FILLED WITH QUALIFIED PERSONNEL AS OF JUNE 2021 Number of Aircrew Positions Aircrew Positions Filled with Qualified Personnel A-29 4 2 AC-208 7 2 C-208 5 1 C-130 7 4 Mi-17 6 3 MD-530 5 1 UH-60 8 2 42 15 Aircraft Fixed Wing Rotary Wing Total DSCMO-A plans to shift contracted pilot and maintainer training that was previously provided in Afghanistan to third-country locations and will supplement other pilot and maintenance training that is already provided in third countries Training challenges include finding suitable live-fire REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS Total inventory The number of aircraft either usable or in long-term maintenance either at a third country location or in the United States It does not include aircraft that were destroyed and have not yet been replaced 71 Note These figures represent the number of positions not personnel that constitute an aircrew for each airframe vs how many of those positions are filled with the required number of qualified personnel Source TAAC-Air response to SIGAR data call 7 15 2021 SIGAR analysis of TAAC-Air-provided data 7 2021 SECURITY locations for some Afghan aircraft and ensuring that training at these various locations is accomplished to standard 156 Another worrisome development concerning AAF aircrew was a media report that the Taliban is deliberately targeting Afghan pilots According to Reuters at least seven Afghan pilots have been assassinated off-base in recent months 157 AAF Operations and Readiness Afghan Air Force Readiness Dips in June Five of the seven airframes experienced decreases in readiness the last month of the quarter June This coincided with the Taliban offensive and the withdrawal of U S and Coalition forces including aircraft-maintenance contractors The combined effect of the two appeared to reduce aircraft readiness rates The AC-208 fleet for example had maintained a 93% readiness rate in April and May but dropped to 63% in June the UH-60 fleet was at 77% in April and May but dropped to 39% in June 158 The AAF’s flight hours this quarter April–June were slightly higher than seasonal norms but almost identical to last quarter’s flight hours and lower than the third and fourth quarters of 2020 as shown in Figure 2 34 159 Two of seven AAF airframes flew more than their recommended flight hours this quarter one fewer than last quarter Three of seven airframes met their readiness benchmarks this quarter compared to four last quarter January–March 2021 The four airframes that failed to meet readiness benchmarks were the A-29 C-208 MD-530 and UH-60 160 FIGURE 2 34 AAF FLIGHT HOURS BY QUARTER SINCE 2019 15 000 12 000 9 000 12 641 10 586 13 933 11 957 11 533 10 302 11 302 11 346 8 567 6 000 3 000 0 Q2 2019 Q3 2019 Q4 2019 Q1 2020 Q2 2020 Q3 2020 Q4 2020 Q1 2021 Q2 2021 Note Flight hours have been rounded to the nearest hour Source TAAC-Air response to SIGAR data call 7 15 2021 SIGAR analysis of RS-provided data 7 2021 72 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SECURITY - - - - - - -Aircraft Overtaxed and Crews Overtasked According to Training Advisory Assistance Command-Air TAAC-Air all aircraft platforms are overtaxed due to increased requests for close air support intelligence surveillance reconnaissance missions and aerial resupply now that the ANDSF largely lacks U S air support All airframes are flying at least 25% over their recommended scheduled-maintenance intervals This is exacerbating supply-chain issues and delaying scheduled maintenance and battle-damage repair Meanwhile “crews remain overtasked due to the security situation in Afghanistan and the OPSTEMPO has only increased ” according to TAAC-Air 161 The Afghan government claimed on June 29 2021 that the AAF carried out 491 attacks on Taliban positions in the past month 162 The UH-60 fleet of helicopters provided by the United States is meeting the operational needs of the AAF However accidents battle damage the withdrawal of U S and contractor logistics support CLS personnel and the resultant consolidation of CLS in Kabul as the main maintenance hub for almost all aircraft repair is damaging the health of the UH-60 fleet With reduced personnel due to the withdrawal of contractors as well as the increased operational tempo UH-60 CLS has temporarily shifted from training and mentoring the AAF to aircraft maintenance in an attempt to improve aircraft availability 163 In one positive development after the contractors began withdrawing and those that remained focused on mentorship versus maintenance the AAF signed for equipment and supplies accepted responsibility of the various equipment accounts and increased work and class attendance This resulted in “a delay in reaching the dire predicted aircraft availability rates ” according to TAAC-Air 164 TAAC-Air will transition to the Aviation Division AD within DSCMO-A The AD will be the requirements owner for all aviation-related equipment supplies maintenance and training in support of both the AAF and Special Missions Wing including aviation CLS and contract training programs 165 Qualified Afghan Maintainers Even More Critical with the Loss of U S Maintenance Contractors As SIGAR highlighted in its 2021 High-Risk List and as IG Sopko testified to Congress on March 16 2021 building a qualified maintainer cadre is critical for the AAF’s ability to independently maintain its own aircraft and work toward eventually no longer requiring costly U S -funded contractor logistic support for aircraft maintenance TAAC-Air assessed in January 2021 that without continued contractor support none of the AAF’s airframes can be sustained as combat effective for more than a few months depending on the stock of equipment parts in-country the maintenance capability on each airframe and the timing of contractor support withdrawal 166 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 73 SECURITY According to AAF data provided by DSCMO-A three of seven AAF airframes C-208 AC-208 and Mi-17s have enough qualified maintainers at all three levels of certification Level 3 basic maintenance duties through Level 1 the most advanced maintenance duties required to maintain their aircraft as seen in Table 2 12 Some of the progress the AAF made filling its ranks with qualified mechanics appeared to slip this quarter with the A-29 losing required mechanics at all three levels of certification 167 Afghan mechanics will be forced to perform with far fewer maintenance contractors who not only provided training and mentorship but also could repair aircraft in emergencies As Table 2 12 shows the number of contracted mechanics dropped dramatically this quarter Not including Mi-17 maintenance contractors the number of aircraft maintenance contractors went from 409 in April 2021 to 101 in June 2021 168 In addition to virtual training and maintenance meetings DSCMO-A DA is also establishing a third-country supply depot to control parts flow and fly aircraft parts to Afghanistan as required Afghan aircraft requiring depotlevel and battle damage repairs are transported to maintenance facilities outside Afghanistan On June 29 Afghan media reported that 25 helicopters are out of country for repair 169 TABLE 2 12 PERCENTAGE OF QUALIFIED AAF MAINTAINERS REQUIRED PLUS CONTRACTED MAINTAINERS Aircraft Maintainer Level 3 Maintainer Level 2 Maintainer Level 1 Contracted Maintainers April 2021 Contracted Maintainers June 2021 39 3 41 12 25 4 Fixed Wing A-29 58% 45% 88% AC-208 233% 120% 125% C-208 190% 151% 286% C-130 28% 0% 33% Rotary Wing Mi-17 781% 372% 579% n a 66 MD-530 84% 56% 110% 106 26 UH-60 90% 0% 0% 198 56 409 101 Total Total does not include 66 Mi-17 contractors to allow an accurate quarter-to-quarter comparison Note Data is as of June 2021 Percentages are the percent of positions filled with the required number of qualified maintainers at each level of maintenance qualification Maintainer levels with percentages over 100% have an excess number of qualified maintainers versus the number required Source TAAC-Air response to SIGAR data call 7 15 2021 74 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SECURITY - - - - - - -AFGHAN SPECIAL SECURITY FORCES The Afghan Special Security Forces ASSF are the ANDSF’s primary offensive forces The ASSF include a number of elements such as the ANA Special Operations Corps ANASOC the General Command Police Special Units GCPSU and the Special Mission Wing SMW SIGAR tracks ASSF operations data because DOD has said the ASSF’s growing size and capabilities are important both for the ANDSF’s overall performance and for the United States to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of its over-thehorizon counterterrorism efforts 170 U S Funding As of June 30 2021 the United States had obligated roughly $1 15 billion and disbursed nearly $885 million of ASFF appropriated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 to build train equip and sustain the ASSF 171 ASSF Operations Like the rest of Resolute Support NATO’s Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan NSOCC-A also retrograded and closed their bases NSOCC-A transitioned to over-the-horizon support at the end of June 2021 172 Additionally NSOCC-A claimed they “repositioned forces for over-the-horizon operations in anticipation of orders to monitor and disrupt al-Qaeda and Islamic State-Khorasan operations originating from Afghanistan ”173 According to NSOCC-A most ANA corps refuse to execute missions without ANASOC support When ANASOC forces arrive they are misused to perform tasks intended for conventional forces such as route clearance checkpoint security and quick-reaction force NSOCC-A reported that misuse of the SMW also increased significantly this quarter compared to both last quarter and a year ago NSOCC-A cautioned however that “it is difficult to assess ASSF ‘misuse’ in an environment where the Afghan government is fighting for its existence ”174 Despite the increasing misuse of the ASSF NSOCC-A added that the “ASSF quickly became largely independent as a result of our retrograde ” For example the integration of Afghan Air Force and ground force planning for the ASSF continues to improve Areas needing improvement include the repetitive use of flight routes and helicopter landing zones and the need to improve communication between ground units and the SMW 175 In a press conference on June 29 an Afghan special operations corps commander claimed his unit’s activity had increased 30% following the start of the withdrawal two months ago 176 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 75 “It is difficult to assess ASSF ‘misuse’ in an environment where the Afghan government is fighting for its existence ” Source NSOCC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 8 2021 SECURITY Special Mission Wing Integrates UH-60 “Black Hawk” Helicopters into Operations NSOCC-A told SIGAR this quarter that the Special Mission Wing SMW which conducts special-operations aviation missions and provides capabilities not found in the AAF has begun integrating UH-60 aircraft into their operations now that their first UH-60-rated crew and Level-3 mechanics basic maintenance duties have been certified Integration of the UH-60s reduces the need to overwork the older Mi-17 aircraft still in the AAF inventory However the SMW can field no more than one UH-60 per night for helicopter missions 177 Also because of the withdrawal “the SMW has begun to transition from contract logistics support maintenance at each squadron location to a centralized hub-and-spoke maintenance posture” centered in Kabul 178 NSOCC-A explained that from now on aircraft from around the country will be flown or transported to HKIA for maintenance Should an aircraft be unable to move an Afghan team of mechanics will go to the location and repair the aircraft for a one-time flight to HKIA for further repair Contractor logistic support provides both on-site maintenance support and over-the-horizon maintenance support to the SMW In addition DSCMO-A claimed to be standing up out-ofcountry locations to conduct major maintenance and overhauls 179 More information on the ASSF including updates about ASSF components and their performance this quarter the number of operational aircraft and the number of authorized and assigned aircraft maintainers in the Special Mission Wing is available in the SIGAR’s classified supplement to this quarterly report AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE U S Funding As of June 30 2021 the United States had obligated nearly $900 million and disbursed more than $794 million of ASFF appropriated from FY 2019 through FY 2021 to build train equip and sustain the ANP 180 As of June 30 2021 the United States had obligated $21 7 billion and disbursed nearly $21 5 billion of ASFF appropriated from FY 2005 through FY 2018 to build train equip and sustain ANP elements including police special forces These force elements constituted the ANP budget activity group for reporting purposes through the FY 2018 appropriation 181 ANP Sustainment As of June 30 2021 the United States had obligated more than $756 3 million and disbursed more than $671 4 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANP sustainment As of June 30 2021 the United States had finished obligating and disbursing about $9 6 billion from 76 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SECURITY - - - - - - -FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations to sustain ANP elements including police special forces 182 Unlike the ANA a significant share of ANP personnel costs including ANP salaries is paid by international donors through the United Nations Development Programme’s UNDP multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan LOTFA 183 To support the MOI CSTC-A planned to provide up to $174 4 million in FY 1400 Of these funds approximately $6 9 million 4% was for salaries with the remaining funds for purchase of goods services or assets 184 As of June 12 DOD had disbursed $9 5 million directly to the Afghan government to support MOI for FY 1400 185 ANP Equipment and Transportation As of June 30 2021 the United States had obligated more than $3 7 million and disbursed about $3 5 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANP equipment and transportation costs As of June 30 2021 the United States had finished obligating and disbursing about $4 8 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANP elements including police special forces equipment and transportation costs 186 Although CSTC-A has moved away from new procurements of major equipment and systems items already procured are still being delivered to the ANP 187 Table 2 13 lists the highest-cost items of equipment provided to the ANP this quarter March 1 2021 through May 31 2021 Of these items the costliest was the delivery of over 11 million 7 62 mm cartridges $8 5 million total Additionally the costliest defense article transferred from USFOR-A equipment to the ANP via foreign military sales from stock were 374 pistols  $97 079 188 TABLE 2 13 MAJOR EQUIPMENT PROVIDED TO ANP Equipment Type Equipment Description Units Issued in Quarter Average Unit Cost Total Cost Ammunition 7 62 mm cartridges 11 290 310 $0 75 $8 467 733 Ammunition 40 mm high-explosive grenades Ammunition 50 caliber linked cartridges Clothing Clothing 72 856 69 89 5 091 906 384 000 3 20 1 228 800 Trousers various sizes 33 611 34 00 1 142 774 Gloves various sizes 31 000 28 75 891 250 Clothing Shirts various sizes 27 600 31 98 882 648 Vehicle Parts Transmissions hydraulic vehicular 103 7 007 00 721 721 Vehicle Parts Batteries 1 517 392 48 595 392 Clothing Drawers various sizes 53 248 2 56 136 315 Vehicle Parts Control assemblies 157 297 03 Total Cost of Equipment 46 634 $19 205 172 Note The above list reflects only the 10 highest-value equipment provided to the ANP this quarter March 1–May 31 2021 The “unit costs” listed reflect the average costs paid for items procured under multiple Foreign Military Sales cases Source CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 77 SECURITY Police checkpoint in Tang-e-Farkhar Taloqan UNAMA photo ANP Infrastructure As of June 30 2021 the United States had obligated more than $4 1 million and disbursed about $2 3 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANP infrastructure projects As of June 30 2021 the United States had obligated and disbursed about $3 2 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for infrastructure projects for ANP elements including police special forces 189 As of June 12 2021 CSTC-A was managing one ongoing DOD-funded ANP infrastructure project—the joint NATO ANA Trust Fund NATF and ASFF-funded closed-circuit television surveillance system in Kabul $19 million of this funded by ASFF 190 CSTC-A reported that no projects were completed cancelled or terminated this quarter 191 Ongoing projects will continue and progress will be monitored as long as the security environment permits 192 CSTC-A continued to report this quarter that the estimated annual facilities-sustainment costs funded by the United States for all ANP facility and electrical-generator requirements is $68 8 million Of this $42 4 million will be provided directly to the Afghan government and $26 4 million will be spent by CSTC-A for the Afghan government 193 ANP Training and Operations As of June 30 2021 the United States had obligated more than $135 6 million and disbursed about $117 2 million of ASFF appropriations from FY 2019 through FY 2021 for ANP training and operations As of June 30 2021 the United States had finished obligating about $4 billion and disbursing roughly $3 9 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations for ANP elements including police special forces training and operations 194 78 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SECURITY - - - - - - -SIGAR RELEASES 2021 HIGH-RISK LIST CONTINUES WORK ON “POLICE IN CONFLICT” LESSONS LEARNED REPORT SIGAR released the 2021 High-Risk List in March to alert legislators and policymakers of major areas of the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan at risk of waste fraud abuse mismanagement or mission failure The 2021 High-Risk List focuses on program areas and elements of the reconstruction effort that are 1 essential to success 2 at risk of significant and large-scale failure due to waste fraud or abuse and 3 subject to the control or influence of the U S government One risk area is developing Afghan police SIGAR found that after two decades of international support Afghanistan currently has a small number of highly trained specialized police forces that have emerged under the tutelage of international advisors At the same time the Afghan government still lacks a police force that can legitimately enforce the rule of law on a day-to-day basis The Afghan Uniformed Police AUP responsible for this civilian policing mission are largely illiterate and poorly trained Further many AUP are considered abusive predatory and corrupt Additionally SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program LLP has begun briefing some of its preliminary findings from its ongoing Police in Conflict report Most recently in response to current political discussions on the future of U S and international donor assistance to the Afghan National Police LLP staff briefed Resolute Support U S Embassy Kabul UK Embassy Kabul and the Netherlands Embassy Kabul on SIGAR’s ongoing study identifying lessons from U S and international police assistance from 2001 to 2021 This quarter DOD provided SIGAR an update on the two current U S funded ANP training contracts One is a $14 million contract to train the ANP to maintain its ground vehicles as part of the 2018 National Maintenance Strategy-Ground Vehicle Support contract the current contract extends through August 31 2021 although another year can be supported 195 The other is a contract to support training MOI and MOD women in occupational skills as part of the Gender Occupational Opportunity Development Program the roughly $1 million contract runs until April 30 2022 196 Operations and training efforts include reducing the numbers of the most vulnerable checkpoints and reevaluating the training pipeline and training curriculum for police personnel Specifically MOI revised the curriculum of initial-entry police training to better align with a civil lawenforcement mission But MOI lacks institutional training that reinforces civil law enforcement Furthermore beyond early training the ANP also lacks an institutionalized leadership-development program at the district and local levels 197 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 79 SECURITY DEADLY ATTACK HINDERS MINE CLEARING EFFORTS On June 8 2021 at least 10 people were killed and 16 others wounded in an attack on the British-American HALO Trust demining charity Islamic StateKhorasan claimed responsibility for the assault on the camp in northeastern Baghlan Province The HALO Trust began working in Afghanistan in 1988 shortly before the Soviet withdrawal and employs more than 2 600 local staff members 198 Afghanistan is riddled with land mines and “explosive remnants of war” ERW such as live shells and bombs according to the United Nations UN 199 Although contamination includes legacy mines laid before 2001 most casualties today are caused by mines and other ERW that have accumulated since 2002 200 In recent years casualties have been reported from ordnance exploding in areas formerly used as firing ranges by Coalition forces The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNAMA also has documented a direct correlation between civilian casualties and ERW in areas following heavy fighting 201 State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement PM WRA manages the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan Since FY 2002 State has allocated $427 million in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan an additional $11 6 million was obligated between 1997 and 2001 before the start of the U S reconstruction effort As of May 31 2021 PM WRA had released $7 million in FY 2020 funds 202 State directly funds six Afghan nongovernmental organizations NGOs four international NGOs and one Afghan government organization to help clear areas in Afghanistan contaminated by ERW and conventional weapons e g unexploded mortar rounds which insurgents can use to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices IEDs 203 From 1997 through May 31 2021 State-funded implementing partners have cleared approximately 317 2 square kilometers of land 117 square miles and removed or destroyed nearly 8 5 million land mines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance UXO abandoned ordnance AO stockpiled munitions and homemade explosives Table 2 14 shows conventional-weapons destruction figures FY 2011–2021 204 The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate clearance activities reduce the extent of hazardous areas but ongoing surveys find new contaminated land As of May 31 2021 the total known contaminated area was 809 4 square kilometers 312 5 square miles in 4 152 hazard areas PM WRA defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines a battlefield can include land mines and other improvised explosives and an initial hazardous area will include an indeterminate amount and type of explosive hazards 205 80 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SECURITY TABLE 2 14 IDEMINING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE FISCAL YEARS 2011–2021 Fiscal Year Minefields Cleared m2 AT AP Destroyed UXO Destroyed SAA Destroyed Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining m2  a 2011 31 644 360 10 504 345 029 2 393 725 602 000 000 2012 46 783 527 11 830 344 363 1 058 760 550 000 000 2013 25 059 918 6 431 203 024 275 697 521 000 000 2014 22 071 212 12 397 287 331 346 484 511 600 000 2015 12 101 386 2 134 33 078 88 798 570 800 000 2016 27 856 346 6 493 6 289 91 563 607 600 000 2017 31 897 313 6 646 37 632 88 261 547 000 000 2018 25 233 844 5 299 30 924 158 850 558 700 000 2019 13 104 094 3 102 26 791 162 727 657 693 033 2020 23 966 967 2 879 7 197 85 250 843 517 435 2021 18 155 152 6 064 4 051 31 644 809 437 386 I Total 277 874 119 73 779 1 325 709 4 781 759 Note AT AP antitank antipersonnel ordnance UXO unexploded ordnance SAA small-arms ammunition There are about 4 047 square meters m2 to an acre a Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey work identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action IMSMA database FY 2021 data covers October 1 2020 through May 31 2021 Source PM WRA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 81 GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE CONTENTS Key Issues Events 83 U S Reconstruction Funding for Governance 83 Peace and Reconciliation 83 U S Assistance to the Afghan Government Budget 86 Quarterly Highlight Successful Service Delivery Did Not Bolster Afghan Government Legitimacy World Bank Concludes Quarterly Highlight World Bank Programming Faces Increased Pressures From Taliban 89 Subnational Governance 92 Rule of Law and Anticorruption 94 91 Counternarcotics 98 Refugees and Internal Displacement 105 Women’s Advancement 106 Human Rights 109 82 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE President Ashraf Ghani and Chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation Abdullah Abdullah visited Washington DC to discuss enduring U S support for Afghanistan with President Joseph R Biden and other senior Administration officials KEY ISSUES EVENTS After peace talks largely stalled this quarter a high-level delegation of Afghan government officials and politicians met with the Taliban to expedite negotiations _ _ _ __ _ _ J a-'111-- c r IL hll - The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees said the escalating conflict in Afghanistan presents a “looming humanitarian crisis” for those displaced by the fighting I The Afghan government reported that the Taliban has destroyed 260 government administrative buildings in 106 Taliban-held districts U S RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR GOVERNANCE As of June 30 2021 the United States had provided nearly $36 3 billion to support governance and economic development in Afghanistan Most of this funding more than $21 2 billion was appropriated to the Economic Support Fund ESF administered by the State Department State and the U S Agency for International Development USAID 206 PEACE AND RECONCILIATION Senior Afghan Delegation Attempts to Revive Stalled Peace Negotiations On June 22 the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan Deborah Lyons said the peace process between the Afghan government and the Taliban was stalled “The drivers of conflict seem for now to overwhelm the reasonable and hoped-for modalities of negotiation ” Lyons said She described the major trends in Afghanistan—including REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 83 U S Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad speaking with members of the Afghan government negotiating team in Doha Afghan government photo GOVERNANCE A high-level delegation of Afghan government officials and political leaders met with the Taliban in Doha on July 17 Afghan government photo The Afghan nation is in its 1861 moment like President Lincoln rallying to the defense of the republic determined that the republic is defended It’s a choice of values—the values of an exclusionary system or an inclusionary system —President Ashraf Ghani Source White House Remarks by President Biden and President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Before Bilateral Meeting 6 25 2021 the political security and peace situation—as either negative or stagnant 207 According to one Afghan government negotiator the Taliban lacks the “sense of urgency” of the Afghan government side to reach a political settlement 208 Despite the unfruitful Doha talks Taliban and Afghan delegations met in Iran for two days declaring that continuing the war was dangerous for the country and all efforts must be made to find a peaceful solution The Afghan government described this meeting as “a complementary initiative” to the main talks in Doha 209 Further a spokesperson for the State Ministry for Peace was quoted in Afghan media on July 10 saying there have been a couple of meetings at night between the parties in Doha “on a number of important issues ”210 In an effort to revive the stalled Afghan peace negotiations on July 16 a delegation of Afghan government officials and politicians including Chairman Abdullah Abdullah traveled to Doha for talks with the Taliban Abdullah described the team as authoritative This “High-Level Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” met with the Taliban for two days In a joint statement the two teams agreed to expedite the peace efforts and continue high-level talks 211 According to State the Afghan government has not officially shared a unified peace plan with the Taliban but made “remarkable” progress this quarter in formulating its positions on power sharing 212 In early May President Ashraf Ghani blamed the Taliban for the lack of progress in the peace process saying “a political settlement and the integration of the Taliban into society and government is the only way forward But the ball is in their court ”213 Ghani proposed that the talks could benefit from a “credible and neutral mediator ” such as the United Nations and that a ceasefire would require international monitoring 214 The Taliban however have not taken steps to address core issues of power sharing or to develop their own vision of a political settlement State said Instead the Taliban reportedly engaged the Afghan government team this quarter on other issues of mutual concern such as the treatment of detainees and roadside abductions Further the Taliban said that progress in prisoner releases and sanctions relief needed to be addressed adequately for peace negotiations to move forward 215 For example on July 15 an Afghan government negotiator described the previous months’ talks as a limited number of “informal” meetings that failed to discuss serious issues such as ending the war or a peaceful settlement for a shared future 216 Afghanistan’s foreign minister Mohammad Haneef Atmar told the UN Security Council on June 22 2021 that for nearly 10 months the Taliban have not engaged with the Afghan government’s plan for a ceasefire powersharing arrangements and early elections 217 State attributed the pause in peace talks partially to the extensive consultations this quarter between the Doha-based Taliban Political Commission TPC and the Pakistan-based Taliban leadership Toward 84 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION GOVERNANCE the latter half of May TPC leaders returned to Doha and have reportedly claimed to be prepared to present ideas on power sharing to their Afghan government counterparts 218 However and especially given its recent success on the battlefield the Taliban may simply believe they can achieve military victory—a perspective President Ghani and Abdullah head of Afghanistan’s National Reconciliation Council have said would be a “miscalculation ”219 USAIDfunded monitoring of Taliban public communications found the Taliban’s tone to be resoundingly triumphant in April and May following the announced withdrawal of U S military forces 220 According to Abdullah the Taliban have sought to use the withdrawal of international military forces to win on the battlefield 221 In comments on July 8 President Biden said a Taliban military takeover or the collapse of the Afghan government was not inevitable pointing to continued U S financial assistance to Afghanistan and the disparity between the capacity of 300 000 Afghan security forces and the 75 000 estimated Taliban fighters Further he called on Afghan leaders to “come together” and said the “only way there’s ultimately going to be peace and security in Afghanistan is that they work out a modus vivendi arrangement with the Taliban ”222 According to State it is unclear how the U S military drawdown has affected the peace process State noted that some say the Taliban are less likely to engage meaningfully in peace talks with the full troop withdrawal imminent 223 For example one Afghan government negotiator said this quarter that the “Taliban are just waiting to get everything by military force and waiting for the collapse of the government of Afghanistan ”224 On the other hand the prospect of instability and a long war could motivate the two sides to try to truly reach a political settlement State said 225 Local and National Ceasefires Have Limited Impact The Taliban and the Afghan government each declared unilateral three-day ceasefires this quarter to coincide with the Eid al-Fitr religious holiday According to the UN violence decreased during the May 13–15 ceasefire 226 The reduction does not appear to have had much enduring effect the UN reported on June 22 2021 that the Taliban had captured 50 of the country’s 370 districts since the start of May 227 Shortly after the Eid ceasefire concluded Reuters reported on a districtlevel month-long ceasefire in Alingar District Laghman Province The agreement was reportedly negotiated by local elders and agreed to by Afghan government and Taliban officials 228 This bottom-up attempted ceasefire however fell apart the next day with a local elder blaming the Taliban for attacking Afghan security forces 229 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 85 President Joseph R Biden meeting with President Ashraf Ghani center and Chairman Abdullah Abdullah at the White House on June 25 White House photo SIGAR AUDIT On September 26 2019 the Senate Appropriations Committee issued S Rept 116-126 accompanying the Department of State Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Bill 2020 The report directed SIGAR to assess “the extent to which the Department of State and USAID have developed strategies and plans for the provision of continued reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan in the event of a peace agreement including a review of any strategies and plans for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of such assistance and for protecting the rights of Afghan women and girls ” SIGAR initiated this work in May 2020 GOVERNANCE We want peace from the bottom of the heart but we are in a situation where we are saying peace and the Taliban are nearing the capital of Afghanistan —Chairman Abdullah Abdullah Source TOLOnews “Afghanistan’s Survival in Jeopardy Abdullah ” 6 30 2021 On-budget assistance Encompasses donor funds that are aligned with Afghan government plans included in Afghan government budget documents and included in the budget approved by the parliament and managed by the Afghan treasury system On-budget assistance is primarily delivered either bilaterally from a donor to Afghan government entities or through multidonor trust funds DOD prefers the term “direct contributions” when referring to Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ASFF monies executed via Afghan government contracts or Afghan spending on personnel Off-budget assistance Encompasses donor funds that are excluded from the Afghan national budget and not managed through Afghan government systems Source SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 7 30 2014 p 130 Ministry of Finance “Aid Management Policy for Transition and Beyond ” 12 10 2012 p 8 State response to SIGAR vetting 1 14 2016 DOD OSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 1 15 2018 U S Funding for Peace and Reconciliation In July 2020 USAID Afghanistan made an initial $2 5 million available to the Office of Transition Initiatives OTI for its Peace Support Initiative 230 According to USAID this short-term effort will help ensure that key stakeholders can participate in the Afghan peace negotiations build awareness and support for the peace process among Afghans and equip USAID and others with the tools and information to successfully promote peace at a local level 231 USAID reported that while the initiative did not directly support the stalled peace talks this quarter it did begin procuring equipment for the State Ministry for Peace to help connect the ministry’s offices and strengthen their strategic communications capacity 232 In 2015 USAID and the United States Institute of Peace USIP entered a $16 million partnership named “Strengthening Peace Building Conflict Resolution and Governance in Afghanistan ”233 This partnership was modified in October 2019 to support new activities for the peace process 234 According to USIP many Afghans doubt America’s commitment to ensuring a sustainable peace To inspire local peace activities and demonstrate how average Afghan citizens can promote peace at the grassroots level as a complement to top‐down peace efforts USIP commissioned a documentary on the People’s Peace Movement PPM The now finalized film will be submitted to a few international film festivals 235 PPM began in March 2018 as a series of sit-ins and a hunger strike in Helmand Province that eventually led to 70 marchers demanding that both the Afghan government and Taliban implement a ceasefire According to USIP reporting from 2018 the movement garnered significant international and domestic Afghan attention 236 USIP’s current documentary effort is meant to “revive the PPM story” and change the peace discourse at the grassroots 237 U S ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT BUDGET Summary of Assistance Agreements Security aid makes up the vast majority of current U S -funded assistance to the Afghan government Participants in the NATO Brussels Summit on July 11 2018 had previously committed to extend “financial sustainment of the Afghan forces through 2024 ” The public declaration from that meeting did not however specify an amount of money or targets for the on-budget share of security assistance 238 At the November 2020 Afghanistan Conference donors pledged at least $3 3 billion in civilian development assistance for the first year of the 2021–2024 period with annual commitments expected to stay at the same level year-on-year 239 The resulting conference communiqué and the 86 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION GOVERNANCE - - - - - - -Afghanistan Partnership Framework—a set of foundational principles to underpin a peaceful and democratic Afghan society and drive inclusive growth—included no reference to specific funding targets for the on-budget Afghan-managed share of civilian assistance 240 On June 25 2021 President Biden met with President Ghani and High Council for National Reconciliation Chairman Abdullah in Washington DC President Biden promised the United States will sustain its support of Afghanistan through security assistance to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces development and humanitarian assistance and diplomatic engagement in support of peace 241 Civilian On-Budget Assistance USAID provides on-budget civilian assistance in two ways bilaterally to Afghan government entities and through contributions to two multidonor trust funds—the World Bank-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund ARTF and the Asian Development Bankadministered Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund AITF 242 The ARTF provides funds to the Afghan government’s operating and development budgets in support of Afghan government operations policy reforms and national-priority programs 243 The AITF coordinates donor assistance for infrastructure projects 244 According to USAID all bilateral-assistance funds are deposited in separate bank accounts established by the Ministry of Finance MOF for each program 245 As shown in Table 2 15 USAID’s active direct bilateral-assistance programs have a total estimated cost of $352 million USAID also expects to contribute $700 million to the ARTF from 2020 through 2025 in addition to SIGAR AUDIT On September 26 2019 the Senate Appropriations Committee issued S Rept 116-126 accompanying the Department of State Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Bill 2020 The report directed SIGAR to assess “the internal controls of multilateral trust funds for Afghanistan reconstruction that receive U S contributions to include any third-party evaluations of the internal controls of the Afghan government ministries receiving assistance from multilateral trust funds and SIGAR is directed to report to the Committee if access to records is restricted for programs funded with U S contributions ” SIGAR has initiated this work and plans to issue multiple public reports in 2021 each examining a different trust fund TABLE 2 15 USAID ON-BUDGET PROGRAMS Project Trust Fund Title Afghan Government On-Budget Partner Cumulative Disbursements as of 7 8 2021 Start Date End Date Total Estimated Cost 1 1 2013 12 31 2023 $316 713 724 $272 477 914 Bilateral Government-to-Government Projects Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity PTEC Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat Textbook Printing and Distribution Ministry of Education 9 15 2017 12 31 2021 35 000 000 4 333 950 Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund ARTF current award Multiple 9 29 2020 12 31 2025 $700 000 000 $55 686 333 Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund AITF Multiple 3 7 2013 3 6 2023 153 670 184 153 670 184 Multilateral Trust Funds USAID had previous awards to the ARTF that concluded in March 2012 and totaled $1 371 991 195 in disbursements and in September 2020 and totaled $2 555 686 333 in disbursements Cumulative disbursements from all ARTF awards is currently $4 127 677 528 Source USAID response to SIGAR data call 7 14 2021 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 87 GOVERNANCE $3 9 billion disbursed under the previous grant agreements between USAID and the World Bank 2002–2020 USAID’s new ARTF grant of $133 million per year is less than half the estimated total equivalent of $300 million per year in the previous grant 246 As shown in Figure 2 35 USAID’s disbursements to the ARTF are a significant percentage of its overall USAID Afghanistan assistance portfolio 247 USAID has also cumulatively disbursed $154 million to the AITF 248 As of September 2020 the United States was the second-largest cumulative donor to the AITF 26% of contributions the largest cumulative donor is the NATO Afghanistan National Army Trust Fund 34% of contributions 249 The last U S disbursement to the AITF was in April 2017 250 FIGURE 2 35 USAID’S YEARLY ARTF CONTRIBUTIONS PERCENT OF TOTAL USAID DISBURSEMENTS FOR AFGHANISTAN BY YEAR 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 0 - 59 62 5 8 7 7 17 6 18 39 0 31 31 39 35 19 50 36 42 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% Source SIGAR analysis of USAID response to SIGAR data call 7 17 2021 88 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT SUCCESSFUL SERVICE DELIVERY DID NOT BOLSTER AFGHAN GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY WORLD BANK CONCLUDES In a recent evaluation of the ARTF’s $5 billion in recurrent and capital costs support to Afghanistan from 2002–2018 the World Bank said the trust fund failed to achieve its objective to foster Afghan state legitimacy despite improvements in service delivery and social outcomes According to the evaluators Afghanistan has made little progress in building state legitimacy and conflict intensity remains at record levels 251 The World Bank evaluators do not consider it reasonable to have expected ARTF support to have significantly impacted overall state legitimacy but note that records from the period under review assumed a direct and unproblematic relationship between financing service delivery and increased state legitimacy 252 Success in delivery of services was assumed to be sufficient to establish state legitimacy and therefore to contribute to the broader statebuilding project 253 The evaluators called for “realism” in achieving state-building objectives through foreign assistance starting with a clearly articulated more sophisticated and empirically verified intervention logic between service delivery and state-building goals 254 They did not elaborate on how to best implement these suggestions The Bank’s conclusion that service delivery does not necessarily improve state legitimacy raises important questions for donors particularly when governmental legitimacy remains an overarching objective justifying generous outlays of foreign assistance As USAID OIG reported in 2017 the “ultimate goal of USAID’s on-budget commitments principally channeled through the ARTF was to build up the legitimacy of the Afghan Government and diminish the insurgency ”255 USAID’s current Afghanistan country strategy also uncritically links service delivery to stability asserting that all USAID efforts in Afghanistan “address key drivers of conflict that have enabled the Taliban to make gains including corruption unemployment and a lack of government legitimacy ”256 Beyond Afghanistan the United States continues to value governmental legitimacy as an ultimate objective for foreign assistance For example the 2020 interagency United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability calls for strategic investments to anticipate and prevent violent conflict with foreign assistance meant to reinforce “inclusive participatory and legitimate governance ”257 The Afghanistan experience has challenged foundational assumptions on service delivery and state legitimacy in fragile and conflict-affected environments In light of these findings donors would do well to further elaborate the specific mechanisms and empirically test the limits of these assumptions in such environments So long as donors describe their assistance as uncritically advancing recipient state legitimacy the burden of proof rests on them REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 89 GOVERNANCE On-Budget Assistance to the ANDSF Approximately 70% of total U S on-budget assistance goes toward the requirements of the Afghan security forces 258 DOD provides on-budget assistance through direct contributions from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ASFF to the Afghan government to fund a portion of Ministry of Defense MOD and Ministry of Interior MOI requirements 259 For the multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan LOTFA total U S contributions have decreased significantly from 2016 $114 4 million and 2017 $26 7 million to between $950 000 to $8 8 million for the years 2018 to 2021 260 The United Nations Development Programme UNDP administers LOTFA primarily to fund Afghan National Police salaries and incentives 261 DOD provides direct-contribution funding to the MOF which allots it incrementally to the MOD and MOI 262 For Afghan fiscal year FY 1400 December 2020–December 2021 DOD plans to provide the Afghan government the equivalent of up to $841 6 million to support the MOD Of this amount approximately $653 0 million 78% is for salaries 263 As of June 12 DOD provided the equivalent of $289 4 million for FY 1400 most of which 87% paid for salaries 264 To support the MOI DOD plans to provide up to $174 4 million in FY 1400 Of these funds approximately $6 9 million 4% is for salaries with the remaining funds for purchase of goods services or assets 265 As of June 12 DOD had disbursed the equivalent of $9 5 million directly to the Afghan government to support the MOI for FY 1400 266 LOTFA received $8 8 million from DOD in 2021 principally to support the dissolution of the Afghan Local Police 267 DOD Withholds Approximately $13 000 for Gross Violation of Human Rights In August 2020 DOD told the MOD that the 215th Corps in Helmand Province had violated the Leahy Laws Federal statues 10 U S C § 362 and 22 U S C § 2378d commonly referred to as the “Leahy Laws ” generally prohibit the Departments of Defense and State from providing assistance to a unit of a foreign security force if there is credible information that the unit committed a gross violation of human rights 268 DOD is withholding approximately $12 590 from the FY 1400 MOD budget pending resolution of this matter 269 In its 2017 Congressionally mandated report on the implementation of the Leahy Laws SIGAR questioned whether minimal monetary withholdings constituted sufficient incentive for the Afghan government to fully comply with Afghan and international law on human rights 270 As SIGAR reported in 2017 DOD has previously withheld or threatened to withhold some of its funding when the Afghan government took insufficient efforts to investigate reports of gross violations of human rights For example in 2016 DOD withheld the MOI’s travel budget and recommended the withholding of general officer and senior ministerial officials’ pay until MOI provided more complete reporting on 24 reported cases of gross human rights violations 271 90 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT WORLD BANK PROGRAMMING FACES INCREASED PRESSURES FROM TALIBAN The Taliban and other antigovernment armed groups have escalated their demands on World Bank-funded health services in Afghanistan in recent months World Bank officials told ARTF donors this quarter The Taliban demands and deteriorating security caused 20% of all health facilities supported by the Bank’s Sehatmandi program to close 272 Sehatmandi funds Afghan government-contracted health services in 31 provinces 273 According to one World Bank official the Taliban accused some Sehatmandi health care providers of failing to meet their contractual obligations to fully staff and supply health facilities delaying payment to health workers and not maintaining health facilities Further the Taliban demanded that all health facilities have surgeons and ambulances—impossible achievements the official said The Taliban warned that if their demands are not met they will take action against the service providers in what they call their judicial system 274 In order to ensure that health-care service providers are not making payments to antigovernment elements the World Bank tasked its ARTF third-party monitor to review service provider financial transactions in at-risk provinces 275 Another World Bank official told donors that Taliban demands have impacted a number of other World Bank-supported programs including the $280 million COVID-19 Relief Effort for Afghan Communities and Households REACH project the $628 million Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Project CCAP and the $100 million Emergency Agriculture and Food Supply Project EATS 276 Representatives from the Ministry of Women’s Affairs implementing the $100 million Women’s Economic Empowerment Rural Development Project WEE-RDP told donors this quarter that armed opposition groups controlled a significant number of community council sites in Baghlan Badakhshan Zabul Uruzgan Wardak Logar Ghazni Paktika and Kunduz Provinces 277 Of the planned 1 293 community councils for these nine provinces 59% have not been established because the communities are controlled by armed opposition groups Worryingly these proposed community council sites are not concentrated in the remote districts of these provinces Instead 78% of the community council sites that were under the control of armed opposition groups are located in districts containing the province capital 278 The armed groups prevented the free movement of female project staff and opposed the creation of female self-help groups Efforts to negotiate a solution through local leaders have thus far failed as the armed groups do not support these women’s mobilization and empowerment activities 279 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 91 GOVERNANCE SUBNATIONAL GOVERNANCE On July 15 Afghanistan’s Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission IARCSC said that the Taliban had seized control of government office buildings in 29 provinces destroying or setting fire to buildings in 106 Taliban-held districts and looting government assets in 149 districts According to the IARCSC 50 000 Afghan civil servants are unable to perform their duties and nearly 4 000 have been harmed or displaced 280 Provincial and Municipal Programs The Taliban recently destroyed 260 government administrative buildings according to the Afghan government Afghan government photo USAID recently concluded its two subnational programs focused on provincial centers and municipalities Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations ISLA and Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience SHAHAR Table 3 16 summarizes total program costs and disbursements TABLE 3 16 USAID SUBNATIONAL PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL PROGRAMS Project Title End Date Total Estimated Cost Cumulative Disbursements as of 7 8 2021 11 30 2014 3 31 2021 $73 499 999 $73 232 987 2 1 2015 3 31 2021 52 500 000 52 436 746 3 31 2012 12 31 2025 N A 97 110 000 Start Date ---_ -- ------- - Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience SHAHAR Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations ISLA Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Project CCAP This includes USAID contributions to ARTF with an express preference for the Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Project Data as of 4 20 2021 Source USAID response to SIGAR data call 7 14 2021 World Bank Administrator’s Report on Financial Status 4 20 2021 p 5 Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations The concluded $53 million ISLA program sought to help the Afghan government improve provincial governance through fiscal and development planning citizen representation and enhanced delivery of public services 281 According to the final report ISLA’s claimed to have created more systemic inclusive and evidence-based provincial planning and budget processes as well as improved service delivery in Afghanistan 282 ISLA highlighted a number of lessons learned such as how close coordination with Afghan government ministries helped program implementation the need for ministries to provide formal instruction and pressure on provincial entities to ensure better project implementation and the need to continue serving as an interlocutor between government entities at the central and provincial levels 283 While ISLA-supported provinces demonstrated better budget execution and project completion compared to non-ISLA-supported provinces the program faced a number of challenges 284 The project faced difficulties in aligning ISLA to Afghan government priorities particularly as the Afghan government continually revised its subnational governance policies during 92 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION GOVERNANCE - - - - - - -the life of the project For example in May 2018 the Afghan government released its updated subnational governance policy that appeared to remove provinces from development planning 285 According to ISLA while key Afghan government policy documents kept changing ISLA remained bound to its scope of work and contract ISLA said there was a clear disconnect between the central and provincial government entities and there was no common understanding of policies among government counterparts or even development partners Decentralization was also slowly implemented at times leaving provinces seeking more information direction and even motivation 286 At the provincial level the main challenge ISLA faced was the Afghans’ lack of motivation to participate in trainings fora and workshops unless there was monetary compensation When multiple donor-funded projects conducted similar trainings or workshops participants would go to events where they would get higher per diem or transportation allowance Unless lunch was served at town halls people would not participate 287 Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience The objective of the $74 million SHAHAR program was to create wellgoverned fiscally sustainable Afghan municipalities capable of meeting the needs of a growing urban population SHAHAR partnered with municipalities to deliver capacity-building for outreach and citizen consultation improve financial management and enhance urban service delivery 288 One challenge SHAHAR experienced over its six and a half years of implementation was attracting and retaining qualified staff According to SHAHAR the Special Immigrant Visa SIV program for individuals employed by or on behalf of the U S government resulted in staff-retention difficulties for SHAHAR as Afghan personnel employed by the program left after receiving the visa In total 65 SIV-related resignations occurred during the program’s lifetime including those of the Kabul-based senior technical director senior advisors and four senior technical directors In addition USAID’s requirement that implementing partners compensate staff in line with the Ministry of Finance’s National Technical Assistance NTA salary scale implemented in late FY 2016 made attraction and retention even more difficult In combination the SIV program and the NTA requirement resulted in numerous open staff positions and multiple rounds of recruitment for positions 289 Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Project In October 2018 USAID began explicitly contributing a portion of its ARTF funds $34 million of its $300 million contribution to the Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Project CCAP The Afghan government said CCAP which began in 2016 is the centerpiece of its national inclusive-development strategy for rural and urban areas CCAP works through Community REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 93 GOVERNANCE Development Councils CDCs to implement community projects CCAP defines a suite of minimum basic services for each community covering health education and their choice of an infrastructure investment such as road access electricity or small-scale irrigation for rural communities 290 Both the World Bank and Afghan government have proposed expanding CCAP in the event of peace 291 In November 2020 the World Bank proposed to donors that CCAP initiate peace pilot programs involving local conflict analyses local-level peace dialogues peace grants and conflict and disputeresolution training activities 292 The Afghanistan Partnership Framework target for rolling out the CCAP peace pilot to 300 communities is 2022 293 The World Bank says the peace pilots have made considerable progress The urban team will work in 75 communities in two of Jalalabad City’s districts the rural team will work in 304 communities in Nangarhar Laghman and Kunar Provinces In addition to the regular CCAP budget to build infrastructure and strengthen local institutions peace pilot communities will also receive a $10 000 grant to be used for peace-related subprojects such as sports competitions cultural events art competitions and small infrastructure construction and or repairs for community wide projects 294 As of March 2021 CCAP has reached 13 028 rural and urban communities the end target was 11 750 communities across Afghanistan covering 13 6 million beneficiaries and with almost 50% participation of women in CDC elections 295 RULE OF LAW AND ANTICORRUPTION Summary of rule-of-law and anticorruption programs As shown in Table 2 17 the United States supports a number of active ruleof-law and anticorruption programs in Afghanistan TABLE 2 17 RULE OF LAW AND ANTICORRUPTION PROGRAMS Project Title Assistance for Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency ADALAT Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency AMANAT Start Date 4 18 2016 8 23 2017 End Date 4 17 2022 8 22 2022 Total Estimated Cost $68 163 468 31 986 588 Corrections System Support Program OASIS CSSP Option Year 3 Justice Sector Support Program OASIS Contract Transferring Professional Development Capacity TPDC 6 1 2020 8 28 2017 8 31 2020 5 31 2021 8 27 2022 8 31 2023 18 021 588 49 616 576 12 500 000 Cumulative Disbursements as of 7 8 2021 $48 800 689 15 281 234 10 048 581 44 633 851 12 500 000 Disbursements as of 6 17 2021 Source State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 17 2021 USAID response to SIGAR data call 7 14 2021 94 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION GOVERNANCE - - - - - - -Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency  AMANAT In August 2017 USAID awarded a $32 million contract for Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency AMANAT program to support the Afghan government’s efforts to reduce and prevent corruption in government public services 296 According to USAID AMANAT supports select Afghan government institutions with technical assistance to plan for and implement recommended procedural reforms 297 In September 2020 the program was modified to remove certain anticorruption-related program tasks such as conducting vulnerabilityto-corruption assessments of Afghan government bodies and assisting Afghan government institutions to self-identify their corruption risks Instead AMANAT is now tasked with assisting the Access to Information Commission AIC in the implementation of the Access to Information Law 298 Access to information is supposed to enable citizens to exercise their voice and to monitor and hold the government to account Afghanistan’s Access to Information Law came into effect in 2014 but has faced challenges in its implementation and enforcement 299 On December 14 the AMANAT program and the AIC signed a letter of agreement to facilitate capacity-building activities 300 AMANAT cited numerous challenges this quarter as it operated in uncertain security conditions lack of progress of intra-Afghan peace talks as well as targeted killings that have prevented programs from operating at their optimum capacity 301 AMANAT continued to adjust its activities as COVID-19 variants as well as vaccine skepticism resulted in an increase in COVID-19 cases 302 AMANAT worked on institutional development capacity building streamlining processes as well as holding meetings to obtain more in-depth information about any problems regarding projects 303 While carrying out activities AMANAT has had multiple proposed grants rejected by USAID and was asked to provide significant justification regarding interventions for a specific activity 304 According to USAID the intended purpose of the rejected grants was mainly to conduct anticorruption awareness-raising campaigns through radio messages brochures billboards civic education research surveys and training Although awareness raising is an element in fighting corruption the grant proposals did not clearly explain how these interventions will reduce corruption USAID said AMANAT seeks more tangible outcomes and results instead of outputs most of the rejected grants produced output-level results Meanwhile the lack of a mechanism to measure results was another key reason USAID rejected these grant applications 305 AMANAT is working with its local nongovernmental partners to improve project descriptions and reassess activities to ensure tangible outcomes resulting in sustainable impact are possible AMANAT staff review the program description line-by-line to ensure these local partners understand REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 95 GOVERNANCE what improvements and changes need to be made to meet USAID’s rigorous approval standards These efforts are time-consuming and have slowed down the number of grants submitted to USAID for approval 306 Justice Sector Support Program JSSP State’s Justice Sector Support Program is the largest rule-of-law program in Afghanistan JSSP was established in 2005 to provide capacity-building support to the Afghan justice system through training mentoring and advisory services The current JSSP contract began in August 2017 and has an estimated annual cost of $24 million The previous JSSP contract which began in 2010 cost $280 million 307 JSSP provides technical assistance to Afghan justice-sector institutions to 1 build the capacity of justice institutions to be professional transparent and accountable 2 assist the development of statutes that are clearly drafted constitutional and the product of effective consultative drafting processes and 3 support the case-management system so that Afghan justice institutions work in a harmonized and interlinked manner and resolve cases in a transparent and legally sufficient manner 308 JSSP advises various Afghan government offices on how to use its Case Management System CMS CMS is an online database that tracks the status of criminal and civil cases in Afghanistan across all criminal justice institutions from the moment a case is initiated to the end of a subject’s confinement 309 This quarter the Attorney General’s Office AGO independently established a CMS office for the first time including office space furniture equipment and staff JSSP will provide training and mentoring to the staff Separately the JSSP development team completed foundational classes necessary for Afghan staff to manage CMS technology Plans for piloting CMS 2 0 moved forward with agreement from relevant Afghan ministries 310 JSSP local Afghan staff members are currently working from home due to increasing COVID-19 rates in Afghanistan and on the compound where the JSSP offices are located At least five JSSP staff members have tested positive for COVID‐19 311 Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency ADALAT In April 2016 USAID launched the $68 million Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency ADALAT program ADALAT aims to 1 increase the effectiveness and reach of the formal justice sector 2 strengthen the linkages between the formal and traditional justice sectors and 3 increase “citizen demand for quality legal services ”312 ADALAT collaborates with the Ministry of Justice MOJ Department of the Huquq “rights” Huquq offices provide citizens the 96 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION GOVERNANCE - - - - - - -opportunity to settle civil cases within the formal system before beginning a potentially lengthy court case 313 During the most recent reporting quarter ADALAT continued working with numerous MOJ directorates including the training and human resources sections 314 However ADALAT faced numerous challenges such as lack of coordination between MOJ directorates slow approval of staff participation in trainings as well inefficient recruiting leading to fewer staff being available to be trained 315 Despite these challenges ADALAT updated its Huquq Reference Manual HRM to accommodate certain legal and regulatory revisions These revisions were endorsed by the minister of justice 316 ADALAT also developed a gender-based violence GBV manual to carry out trainings on GBV and children’s rights 317 ADALAT canceled activities such as Afghan Women Judges Association due to changing Afghan government priorities and lack of interest as well as the COVID-19 pandemic 318 Other initiatives such as increasing the number of female legal aid providers was discontinued as there was no interest in including the female legal aid providers in MOJ’s organizational structure 319 ADALAT has learned a number of lessons from its program activities such as the need to develop alternative methods of conducting training when holding in-person training was not possible due the COVID-19 pandemic 320 Transferring Professional Development Capacity TPDC In August 2020 State launched Transferring Professional Development Capacity TPDC program a follow-on to their Continuing Professional Development Support CPDS program that ended the same month CPDS was itself a follow-on to the 2013–2016 Justice Training Transition Program All three programs have used the same implementing partner the nongovernmental International Development Law Organization headquartered in Rome The TPDC program continues efforts to build the capacity of Afghan justice institutions to provide continuing professional development to their staff with a special emphasis on Afghanistan’s revised penal code 321 In April 2021 TPDC collaborated with the AGO to conduct a second training for the AGO’s International Crimes Department Additionally TPDC is working with the Supreme Court to extend similar training to its staff and judges IDLO also assisted the Supreme Court in finalizing its annual training plan which will consist of 29 TPDC‐assisted penal code training courses Similarly TPDC is working towards transitioning training of master trainers to the AGO Supreme Court and MOJ’s professional training departments According to State this will allow these institutional trainers to become master trainers and enhance the institutions’ capacity to independently deliver training‐of‐trainer courses to their Kabul‐based and provincial participants 322 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 97 GOVERNANCE Corrections System Support Program CSSP SIGAR AUDIT S Rept 116-126 accompanying the Department of State Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Bill 2020 directed SIGAR to assess “the Government of Afghanistan’s implementation resourcing and administration of the ‘Afghanistan National Strategy for Combating Corruption ’ including whether such government is making progress toward achieving its anti-corruption objectives addressing impunity of powerful individuals and meeting international commitments ” SIGAR has initiated this work and anticipates issuing a public report in 2021 State’s Corrections System Support Program CSSP provides mentoring and advising support training assistance leadership capacity-building initiatives infrastructure assistance and nationwide case management for correctional facilities 323 According to State a major accomplishment this quarter was inaugurating the first primary school in a female prison The school at the Kabul Female Prison and Detention Center and will provide educational and social programs for 98 children of female inmates State will fund five female teachers for the first year with Afghanistan’s Office of Prison Administration OPA committing to funding the school by April 2022 324 During the most recent quarter State observed four prison hunger strikes including 1 700 inmates of the Special Narcotics Prisons protesting their continued incarceration while COVID-19 cases have increased and 600 inmates of the Khost prison demanding no prisoner transfers to Pul-e Charkhi Prison lower canteen prices and an end to cell searches 325 As of May 31 2021 a total of 5 330 national-security threat inmates are incarcerated in prisons run by the OPA INL does not have access to data for such inmates incarcerated at prisons run by the National Directorate of Security 326 Anticorruption According to DOJ the Afghan government served 189 arrest warrants and summonses for corruption cases between April 1 and June 20 2021 Of these 22 corruption cases were referred to the Anti-Corruption Justice Center ACJC 327 During this same time period the ACJC investigated and prosecuted five generals three members of the upper house of parliament four mayors and two members of provincial councils All of these cases were high-profile DOJ said 328 This quarter Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Commission ACC submitted a draft anticorruption strategy an update to the previously expired strategy from 2017 to the High Council for Rule of Law and AntiCorruption The draft was rejected 329 COUNTERNARCOTICS UNODC Major Increase in 2020 Opium-Poppy Cultivation Afghan opium-poppy cultivation in 2020 increased by 37% over the previous year according to the executive summary for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s UNODC 2020 Afghanistan Opium Survey Cultivation and Production report released this quarter the full report had still not been issued as this report went to press The new cultivation estimate tied 98 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION GOVERNANCE with 2014 as the third-highest level since estimates began in 1994 330 No cause for the increase was given UNODC earlier attributed a 2019 cultivation decline to falling dry-opium prices yet the 2020 increase occurred despite record-low dry-opium prices down 13% from 2019 331 There was no indication that counternarcotics policy or other efforts influenced the increase According to the summary an estimated 224 000 hectares ha one ha is about 2 5 acres of opium poppy were cultivated in Afghanistan during 2020 up from 163 000 ha in 2019 332 As seen in Figure 2 36 Afghanistan’s southwestern region Helmand Kandahar Nimroz Uruzgan and Zabul Provinces continues to dominate opium-poppy cultivation and accounted for 68% 152 935 ha of the national total in 2020 In contrast to the southwestern region southern Afghanistan Ghazni Khost Paktika and Paktiya Provinces continued to have the least amount of opium-poppy cultivation with a mere 0 1% 290 ha of the national total 333 Although opium-poppy cultivation increased 37% from 2019 to 2020 the value of the overall opiate economy i e production refining and trafficking has likely remained stable since 2018 In February 2021 UNODC attributed the opiate economy’s 2018 and 2019 stability to traffickers’ access to abundant stored supply and record-low farm-gate prices the price a FIGURE 2 36 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF OPIUM-POPPY CULTIVATION 2020 KUNDUZ BALKH TAKHAR NORTHEASTERN BAGHLAN FARYAB SAR-E PUL BADGHIS PANJSHIR NURISTAN BAMYAN PARWAN KAPISA KABUL WARDAK HERAT DAYKUNDI KUNAR LAGHMAN NANGARHAR LOGAR GHOR SOUTHERN PAKTIKA ZABUL NIMROZ HELMAND CENTRAL KHOST URUZGAN FARAH EASTERN PAKTIYA GHAZNI Hectares cultivated as a % of national total • 0-9% • 10-19% • 20% and over KANDAHAR SOUTHWESTERN Source UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2020 Executive Summary 5 2021 pp 6 9 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 The new cultivation estimate tied with 2014 as the third-highest level since estimates began in 1994 The southwestern region Helmand Kandahar Nimroz Uruzgan and Zabul Provinces accounted for the largest portion of national cultivation 68% the southern region Ghazni Khost Paktika and Paktiya Provinces accounted for the least amount 0 1% Despite the increase in cultivation the overall opiate economy has remained stable since 2018 BADAKHSHAN WESTERN SAMANGAN UNODC reports Afghanistan’s opium-poppy cultivation increased in 2020 by 37% over 2019 Drug interdiction and arrests continue to have a minimal impact on the country’s opium-poppy cultivation NORTHERN JOWZJAN UNODC Reports Major Increase in Opium-Poppy Cultivation 99 Source UNODC “2019 Afghanistan Opium Survey Socio-economic report ” 2 2021 p 4 UNODC “World Drug Report 2020 booklet 1” 6 2020 p  42 UNODC “2020 Afghanistan Opium Survey Cultivation and Production-Executive Summary ” 4 2021 p 4 GOVERNANCE Afghan women and children walk through a field in Achin District Nangarhar Province U S Army photo farmer can expect to receive by selling directly from his farm 334 Although the full 2020 report is needed for more detailed analysis the 2020 season again witnessed record-low farm-gate prices and the potential opium production of 6 300 tons was close to estimates for both 2018 and 2019 6 400 tons each 335 The UNODC in partnership with the Afghan National Statistics and Information Authority NSIA released the 2020 Afghanistan Opium Survey Cultivation and Production report summary in May 2021 after multiple delays The full report is scheduled for release later in 2021 336 State INL attributed report delays to challenges that the UNODC and NSIA experienced as they jointly developed a new satellite-imagery approach to estimate 2020 opium production in the absence of field surveys 337 These challenges have now been overcome UNODC said that representative samples of previous years’ data in which both survey and satellite data were available were visually ranked according to the quality of the crops in the field The method was tested by using the visual rankings to predict average yields The visual prediction was then verified against actual survey data This method was then applied to 2020 satellite imagery to infer estimated yields in the absence of field survey data 338 INL reported that the UNODC’s current plan is to stay in Afghanistan and continue to implement INL projects despite the retrograde of U S military forces and contractors 339 INL has disbursed $24 2 million since 2006 for the annual surveys 340 100 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION GOVERNANCE Interdiction Results DEA reported this quarter that the value of narcotics intercepted from April 1 through June 14 2021 was over $20 million 341 In total interdiction activities resulted in seizures of 309 kilograms kg 681 lbs of opium 84 kg 185 lbs of heroin and 2 132 kg 4 700 lbs of methamphetamines Additionally 11 arrests were made and 525 kgs 1 157 lbs of precursor chemicals and approximately 271 kg 597 lbs of hashish were seized by Afghan security forces during this period 342 Table 2 18 contains interdiction results provided by DOD and DEA DEA reported that DEA-mentored -partnered or -supported counternarcotics interdiction activities by the National Interdiction Unit NIU and the Sensitive Investigative Unit SIU from April 1 through June 14 2021 included 17 operations 343 Despite the improved capabilities of Afghan specialized units over the years drug seizures and arrests have had minimal impact on the country’s opium-poppy cultivation and production For example total opium seizures since FY 2008 are equivalent to approximately 8% of the country’s 6 400 metric tons of opium production for the single year of 2019 as reported by UNODC 344 TABLE 2 18 IINTERDICTION RESULTS 2011–2021 Number of Operations 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 20201 20212 TOTAL 624 669 518 333 270 196 157 198 152 184 45 3 346 862 535 386 442 394 301 152 274 170 263 34 3 813 Hashish seized kg 182 213 183 776 37 826 19 088 24 785 123 063 227 327 42 842 148 604 422 658 111 934 1 524 116 Heroin seized kg 10 982 3 441 2 489 3 056 2 859 3 532 1 975 3 242 3 507 585 287 35 955 Morphine seized kg 18 040 10 042 11 067 5 925  505 13 041 106 369 10 127 11 859 2 – 181 052 Opium seized kg 98 327 70 814 41 350 38 379 27 600 10 487 24 263 23 180 13 751 325 886 349 362 122 150 130 846 36 250 53 184 234 981 42 314 89 878 22 863 81 182 30 849 56 075 900 572 50 – 11 23 11 14 31 143 1 308 672 284 2 547 Arrests Precursor chemicals seized kg Methamphetamine3 kg Note The significant difference in precursor chemicals total seizures between 2014 and 2015 is due to a 12 22 2014 seizure of 135 000 kg of precursor chemicals – Indicates no data reported 1 Data covers January 1–December 8 2020 2 Data covers January 1–March 13 2021 and from April 1–June 14 2021 3 In crystal or powder form Source DEA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 Counternarcotics High Commission Stagnates According to INL no Counternarcotics High Commission CNHC meetings have been held or scheduled since its inaugural meeting in February 2020 345 The CNHC is Afghanistan’s policymaking body and issues strategic directives while delegating day-to-day coordination and strategic development to the MOI 346 INL reported that CNHC directives remain in effect REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 101 GOVERNANCE and that ministries should provide progress reports at the next CNHC meeting date not yet announced 347 One topic for discussion is the new two-year National Drug Action Plan NDAP to replace the one that covered 2015–2019 348 The NDAP still needs presidential approval INL also said the president’s office has been holding senior staff accountable for results but provided no specific examples 349 CNPA Components and their Missions INL reported that on May 20 2021 leaders of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan CNPA participated in a virtual International Criminal Police Organization INTERPOL conference on methamphetamines as a global challenge The conference had participants from 225 countries and international organizations CNPA director General Abdul Sami Popalzai led Afghanistan’s discussion with INL-funded regional cooperation advisor Abdul Qayyum Samer Popalzai highlighted the rapid increase in methamphetamine production in Afghanistan and Afghanistan’s need for international counternarcotics support 350 CNPA personnel are located in all of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces and comprise regular police as well as specialized units The CNPA’s counternarcotics operations include controlling precursor chemicals airport interdiction operating the forensic laboratory crop eradication and managing mobile detection teams CNPA also coordinates with Afghan customs to stop drug trafficking 351 INL provides support to specialized units within the CNPA through an interagency agreement with the U S Drug Enforcement Administration DEA 352 INL will continue to provide support to the specialized units post-retrograde 353 CNPA specialized units consist of three major components the U S supported National Interdiction Unit NIU the Sensitive Investigative Unit SIU and the UK-supported Intelligence and Investigation Unit IIU 354 Additionally the U S -supported Technical Investigative Unit TIU provides support to the NIU and SIU components 355 The NIU conducts interdiction operations and seizures serves arrest warrants and executes search warrants in high-threat environments The NIU receives mentoring from DEA The NIU typically maintains forwardbased personnel in Kandahar and has access to facilities in Kunduz and Herat 356 The SIU’s mission is to identify significant drug-trafficking organizations operating in Afghanistan and dismantle them through the criminal-justice system The SIU receives mentoring from the DEA and consists of handpicked thoroughly vetted personnel 357 The SIU also has four officers responsible for administrative management of court orders obtained by SIU investigators to conduct Afghan judicially authorized intercepts 358 The Technical Investigative Unit TIU is a CNPA component consisting of 100 translators who work within the Judicial Wire Intercept Program 102 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION GOVERNANCE - - - - - - - JWIP The JWIP is a State-funded project to provide technical systems associated with the wiretap program and is executed by DEA through an interagency agreement with State JWIP supports DEA operations as well as SIU and NIU investigations 359 Other Afghan law-enforcement elements such as the special operations General Command of Police Special Units execute high-risk arrests and operations including counterterrorism counternarcotics and counter-organized crime 360 The Afghan Uniform Police and Afghan Border Police ABP also participate in counternarcotics activities 361 U S Training and Funding of Afghan Counternarcotics Elements INL reported that it has made no major adjustments to its implementation or oversight of projects and continues to monitor conditions in Afghanistan to determine if changes may be necessary due to the withdrawal of U S military and contractor personnel 362 INL did report this quarter that one funding adjustment included ending training-facility operations and maintenance support that assisted U S military teams to train and mentor the NIU Prior to May 16 2020 U S Special Forces were assigned to mentor the NIU at the Camp Bishop training facility At that time INL funded Camp Bishop operations and maintenance but did not otherwise fund U S Special Forces activities Following the military retrograde this INL support ceased 363 INL’s counternarcotics efforts continue to support the ongoing peace process between the Afghan government and the Taliban to achieve a political settlement and a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire 364 DEA likewise reported that it plans to maintain a long-term presence and mentoring role in Afghanistan even after all U S forces are withdrawn The only caveat DEA added was that a significant and permanent deterioration in the security situation may affect current intentions 365 DEA has noted that it has a long history in Afghanistan predating September 11 2001 and the arrival of U S forces and intends to remain engaged in Afghanistan for as long as the Afghan government permits 366 DEA indicated that going forward it will work with the U S Embassy in Kabul and relevant stakeholders on any required contingency plans to maintain its longer-term presence in the absence of U S military forces and contractors 367 Both INL and DEA noted that coordination continues within multilateral and bilateral formats in accord with guidelines for mitigating COVID-19 368 INL said there have been no major changes to program funding and estimates that it funds approximately $21 million per year in operations and maintenance for INL programming in Afghanistan including for the NIU and SIU 369 INL has disbursed $44 2 million to DEA through an interagency agreement to support the specialized units as of February 2021 370 Costs directly attributable to NIU and SIU include $6 million for two years of JWIP not including other costs DEA and DOD may incur REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 103 GOVERNANCE in support of the wiretap system $9 6 million for two years of other interagency-agreement support and $825 000 per year for NIU salary supplements 371 Salary supplements are used to attract and retain the most qualified and highly trained officers to join the specialized units rather than remain with the regular CNPA A graduated scale of supplements is provided to all NIU officers from police officers to unit commanders 372 INL said less significant funding changes this year included renewed support at a slightly reduced annual commitment of $5 6 million to the DEA interagency agreement on April 1 2021 down about $600 000 from the prior level On May 1 2021 INL entered into a new interagency agreement with DOD to fund the $1 4 million annual cost of JWIP linguist support INL also reported completion of the Counternarcotics Justice Center well water project in Kabul and completion of the Regional Law Enforcement Centers’ refurbishments in Herat and Kunduz 373 Eradication Update INL reported that the Afghan government undertook eradication efforts in five provinces including northern Jowzjan northeastern Badakhshan eastern Nangarhar southern Khost and southwestern Uruzgan but that the UNODC has only been able to verify very small amounts eradicated in Nangarhar Province 374 Since 2009 INL has reimbursed the cost of UNODCverified eradication at a flat rate of $250 per verified hectare eradicated 375 INL reported that although eradication planning occurred in 2021 the effects of that planning effort are unknown As in years past MOI reported that flooding and insecurity negatively impacted its eradication efforts 376 Prior to the 2019 dissolution of the Ministry of Counter Narcotics MCN INL provided direct eradication assistance through the Governor-Led Eradication GLE program According to INL the MOI now manages this ongoing program with the CNPA implementing independent Afghan eradication and GLE Since the MCN dissolution INL has been unable to provide funding for the GLE program because it is required to vet the CNPA’s financial-control mechanisms 377 INL reported that its financial-management risk assessment of the MOI was recently completed and the final report is pending The assessment was conducted based on USAID’s Public Financial Management Risk Assessment Framework 378 Earlier INL reported that the INL-funded MOI financial advisor hired in September 2020 is a key actor in the effort to improve the MOI’s and specifically the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan’s CNPA financial capacity These developments helped initiate MOI’s internal technical review and the associated INL-funded CNPA financial audit which is required for distribution of certain types of INL counternarcotics funding 379 In June 2021 INL received a draft assessment report that indicated no remediation was necessary to reimburse MOI and the CNPA for eradication 104 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION GOVERNANCE - - - - - - -in 2021 Based on this information INL prepared a draft agreement modeled on implementing instructions from prior years that would permit reimbursement to the CNPA for costs associated with UNODC-verified poppy eradication 380 REFUGEES AND INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT According to State the Afghan government has limited ability to absorb returning refugees and migrants While the government uses the Afghan Returnee Information System ARIS to register and collect data on returning refugees the government does not consistently track returning migrants State said In addition to challenges posed by the ongoing conflict refugee returnees and returning migrants have difficulty integrating into their communities of origin due to the high unemployment rate and a lack of sufficient services including health services and lack of access to land 381 Most communities are not prepared to absorb large numbers of returning refugees at one time Therefore State says the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR and the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and Returnees MORR encourage returning refugees to resettle in 40 localities identified as priority areas where UNHCR and other donors concentrate and coordinate humanitarian and development assistance 382 For internally displaced persons State says the Afghan government has limited to no capacity to respond to internal displacement independent of intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations 383 Afghan Refugees As of July 1 UNHCR reported that 1 150 refugees voluntarily returned to Afghanistan in 2021 Most of the refugees returned from Iran 708 and Pakistan 400 384 UNHCR estimated that approximately 2 6 million Afghans were refugees in other countries in 2020 385 This quarter the Pakistani government with the assistance of UNHCR launched the Document Renewal and Information Verification Exercise DRIVE a country-wide campaign in Pakistan to verify the 1 4 million registered Afghan refugees living there Taking place in areas across Pakistan that host large numbers of Afghan refugees DRIVE aims to provide all registered refugees in the country with a new government-issued biometric smartcard enhance protection enable access to critical services and increase the accuracy of population data 386 Besides providing legally recognized proof of identity and identity verification including in the banking sector this exercise will provide an opportunity to better understand the existing needs in the refugee community DRIVE also supports the collection of data on the educational and professional backgrounds of refugees in order to assist those who may REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 105 Refugees Persons who are outside their country of origin for reasons of feared persecution conflict generalized violence or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order and as a result require international protection According to the UNHCR refugees have the right to safe asylum and should receive at least the same rights and basic help as any other foreigner who is a legal resident Migrants Persons who change their country of usual residence irrespective of the reason for migration or legal status According to the UN there is no formal legal definition of an international migrant Source United Nations “Refugees and Migrants Definitions ” 2019 UNHCR “Protecting Refugees questions and answers ” 2 2002 GOVERNANCE decide to return to Afghanistan in the future The new biometric Proof of Registration POR cards will be valid from June 2021 to June 2023 387 Undocumented Afghan Migrant Returnees As of July 1 the International Organization of Migration IOM reported that 604 176 undocumented Afghan migrants spontaneous returnees and deportees returned from Iran and 6 824 undocumented from Pakistan in 2021 388 Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement As of July 1 2021 conflicts had induced 267 260 Afghans to flee their homes according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA That count of conflict-induced internally displaced persons recorded is 101% more than for the same period last year when OCHA reported 133 200 displaced persons 389 According to UNHCR the escalating conflict in Afghanistan presents a “looming humanitarian crisis ”390 WOMEN’S ADVANCEMENT Presently USAID has only one remaining Promote program which aims to strengthen women’s participation in civil society 391 Table 2 19 show the current Promote and women’s-focused programs Promote’s Musharikat Women’s Rights Groups and Coalitions program is focused on advancing women’s participation in the peace process political participation and addressing gender-based violence GBV 392 Musharikat’s Women in Peace Process Coalition WIP continued its activities this quarter with popular discussion topics revolving around the power of President Biden to preserve women’s rights the low number of women at the international peace conferences and delays in the peace talks 393 Musharikat hopes to continue surveying members to provide insights from participants to improve programmatic activities 394 Along with hosting these discussions Musharikat also hosted trainings to improve persuasion skills installing public murals and theatrical performances 395 Along with these activities Musharikat also arranged workshops to support Afghan women rights through advocacy and lobbying as well as working with USAID’s SHAHAR program to identify women who are TABLE 2 19 USAID GENDER PROGRAM Project Title Start Date End Date Total Estimated Cost Promote Women’s Rights Groups and Coalitions 9 2 2015 9 1 2021 $34 534 401 Cumulative Disbursements as of 7 8 2021 $30 104 678 Source USAID response to SIGAR data call 7 14 2021 106 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION GOVERNANCE Women in the southern province of Helmand discuss the ongoing peace negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban UNAMA Photo working in civil service positions to take part in programs 396 Musharikat also arranged negotiation workshops with trainees learning how to negotiate with the Taliban with a focus on preserving certain rights and values while showing flexibility in others such as being ready to wear a tighter head covering and “behaving accordingly” in negotiations with the Taliban in exchange for the recognition of due rights for women 397 According to USAID increased violence and threats to civil society organizations continue to negatively impact Musharikat resulting in the cancellation and postponement of several activities Additionally Musharikat civil society partners have reportedly been named as potential targets in the current trend of targeted killings causing some activists to move from Afghanistan to Europe and other countries in South Asia 398 Report Discusses Rural Women’s Hopes and Fears In July the Afghanistan Analysts Network AAN released a report on the hopes and fears of rural Afghan women that found varying perspectives on the security situation and what peace could mean The researchers interviewed 23 women across 20 districts between June and November 2020 around the start of the Afghan peace negotiations beginning in September 2020 399 According to AAN many of the women said they hoped peace would result in greater freedom of movement and enable work or education The interviewees hoped for greater peace of mind more income and better investment opportunities better health facilities and a greater feeling of safety 400 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 107 GOVERNANCE Perceptions of the security situation varied and were highly localized For example three of the four women who lived in areas completely under Taliban control said the security situation had improved at the time of the interview due to a decrease in night raids air strikes and drone attacks and or because Afghan government forces had retreated to more distant bases 401 Of the three women interviewed in Ghazni Province two said their areas suffered from violence due to ongoing skirmishes between the Afghan government and the Taliban while the third woman said the situation had recently become much calmer since the government no longer ventured into the area 402 Most women interviewed said they left their homes only when it was strictly necessary although their definition of “necessity” varied For those who lived in insecure or conservative areas necessity included family visits weddings and ceremonies and to a lesser extent medical reasons Others also went out for work shopping or to school although this usually depended on the security situation 403 When asked about their hopes for peace the responses were similarly varied Many of the interviewees hoped that peace would allow them to move around more freely pursue work or education and that the economy would improve Others however said they thought things would probably stay the same or even worsen if there was peace Several feared that an agreement could result in greater Taliban control and diminish their freedom to work study or leave the house This was particularly the case for the women who had experienced a recent transfer of power to the Taliban in their area and had the restrictions on their lives increase as well as those with personal or family memories of the Taliban’s previous rule 404 SIGAR EVALUATION REPORT On December 23 2015 a bipartisan group of 93 U S Senators and members of the House of Representatives requested that SIGAR conduct an inquiry into the U S government’s experience with allegations of sexual abuse of children committed by members of the Afghan security forces and the manner in which DOD and State implemented the Leahy laws in Afghanistan The Leahy laws prohibit the U S funding of units of foreign forces that commit gross violations of human rights SIGAR found that although DOD and State had received credible information regarding incidents of child sexual assault perpetrated by members of the Afghan security forces the Secretary of Defense had used an exemption authority granted by statute to continue providing select training equipment and other assistance to some of the Afghan security-force units implicated in those incidents Following SIGAR’s report Congress removed the exemption authority—known as the “notwithstanding clause”—from subsequent funding provisions for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund through which the United States provides funding for Afghan security forces 108 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION GOVERNANCE - - - - - - -HUMAN RIGHTS State Continues to Rate Afghanistan’s Human-Trafficking Efforts at Worst Level Last year State downgraded Afghanistan’s human-trafficking rating to the lowest level since State first rated the country in 2002 405 This year State maintained this low rating saying the Afghan government still does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and it is not making significant efforts to do so State observed a government pattern of sexual slavery in government compounds bacha bazi—a practice in which men exploit boys for social and sexual entertainment for recruitment and for use as child soldiers 406 Despite the lack of significant efforts the government took some notable steps to address trafficking State reported including prosecuting and convicting members of the security services for bacha bazi removing some child soldiers from the armed forces and indicting the chief of the Major Crimes Task Force for trafficking crimes the highest-ranking government official to face such charges A school headmaster was also indicted in connection with the 2019 Logar case which included bacha bazi he was the first government employee to be charged in relation to the case The government increased antitrafficking trainings for security officials the judiciary and prosecutors and finalized a national referral mechanism to increase the identification of trafficking victims and refer them to proper services 407 However State said the government did not investigate or prosecute many high-level security officials or government employees for bacha bazi despite continuing reports of complicity The government reported limited efforts to address other trafficking crimes that were not bacha bazi The government has never prosecuted any military or police officials for recruitment or use of child soldiers despite credible reporting of the practice Authorities continued to arrest detain penalize and abuse many trafficking victims including punishing sex-trafficking victims for “moral crimes” and sexually assaulting victims who attempted to report trafficking crimes to law-enforcement officials Due to inadequate victim protection some nongovernmental organizations would not assist trafficking victims in reporting their traffickers to law enforcement 408 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 109 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC CONTENTS Key Issues Events 111 U S Support for Economic and Social Development Objectives and Prospects 113 Quarterly Highlight The Challenge of Transferring Control of Afghanistan’s Airports 117 Economic Profile 122 Economic Growth 131 Agriculture 133 Infrastructure and Essential Services 136 Education 141 Health 144 110 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT President Joseph R Biden committed to “maintaining significant humanitarian and development assistance” to Afghanistan following the U S and Coalition troop withdrawal KEY ISSUES EVENTS The Taliban seized a string of key border crossings with the potential to deny the Afghan government significant customs revenue Afghanistan struggled with a third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic as the infection rates skyrocketed by around 2 400% The Afghan government’s domestic revenues increased by 22 6% over the first six months of the current fiscal year versus the same period last year but remain below prepandemic levels In his April 14 2021 announcement on the U S troop withdrawal President Joseph R Biden committed to “maintaining significant humanitarian and development assistance” to Afghanistan 409 Yet Afghanistan is experiencing compounding problems that limit the potential impact and sustainability of U S reconstruction programs in both the short and long term The increasing levels of violence pose a grave threat to the government’s social services delivery expansion of needed infrastructure and economic development This year has seen attacks targeting Afghan schools and healthcare workers most notably the May 8 bombing in front of a school in Kabul that killed at least 90 people largely female students 410 Militants also targeted Afghanistan’s energy infrastructure including a June 1 attack against electricity pylons in northern Kabul that cut off electricity to several parts of the country 411 The heightened violence is playing out against the backdrop of a deadly third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic Afghan doctors have expressed grave concern over the rapid spread of the COVID-19 Delta variant initially discovered in India which data suggests is approximately 60% more REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 111 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT Food Security All people within a society at all times having “physical social and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food to meet daily basic needs for a productive and healthy life ” without being forced to deplete household assets in order to meet minimum needs Source United Nations Press Release “World Food Summit Concludes in Rome ” 11 19 1996 transmissible than other variants and about twice as likely to land patients in the hospital many critically ill patients in Kabul had recently returned from India or had relatives who had recently returned 412 Since Afghanistan’s first confirmed case of COVID-19 in February 2020 the country’s public-health sector has had limited hospital capacity and resources to treat the disease Many Afghans reportedly continue to avoid seeking treatment when they show symptoms deterred by poor hospital conditions false rumors and various cultural stigmas associated with contracting COVID-19 413 As of July 1 2021 the number of confirmed cases had reached 120 216 with 4 962 deaths but a high test-positivity rate—42% as of June 30 2021—suggests the actual spread case numbers and deaths are far greater 414 As confirmed cases of COVID-19 spiked President Ashraf Ghani ruled out a complete lockdown since many Afghans rely on daily wages for subsistence Authorities did however temporarily close schools marriage halls gyms and swimming pools 415 In late April Afghanistan’s border crossings with Iran and Pakistan were temporarily closed to pedestrian traffic though left open to trade 416 As a result of the pandemic-induced economic contraction the World Bank estimated that Afghanistan’s overall urban poverty level increased from 41 6% to 45 5% in 2020 Yet according to the World Bank overall poverty levels actually decreased from 55% to 47 1% in 2020 because the pandemic had a less significant impact on the rural economy than originally projected 417 Food security in Afghanistan has also worsened mainly as a result of drought conditions in 2021 418 According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs food prices are already higher than normal due to COVID-19 and are likely to increase further given the dry spell’s projected impact on first and second crops in 2021 419 The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent’s Head of Delegation for Afghanistan Necephor Mghendi expressed his “grave fears” for the millions of Afghans “who will need humanitarian support in Afghanistan this year due to this drought-driven food crisis piled on top of the debilitating social and economic impacts of COVID-19 and the long-running conflict ”420 Around 12 2 million Afghans or approximately one-third of the country’s estimated population are currently facing “crisis” and “emergency” levels of food insecurity placing it among the three countries in the world alongside Yemen and South Sudan with the highest proportion of food insecure people Additionally almost half of Afghan children under five years old are projected to face acute malnutrition this year The number of Afghans facing food insecurity dropped from a high of 16 9 million early in 2021 in part due to the government’s and international organizations’ mitigation efforts to address the adverse effects of the pandemic on the country’s most vulnerable populations 421 112 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT - - - - - - -- A COVID-19 patient at the Afghan-Japan Hospital in Kabul receives oxygen As COVID-19 cases have increased in recent weeks Afghan hospitals have faced a critical shortage of oxygen Asian Development Bank photo U S SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES AND PROSPECTS On April 14 President Biden announced that all U S troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by September 11 2021 422 “While we will not stay involved in Afghanistan militarily our diplomatic and humanitarian work will continue ” he explained “We’ll continue to support the government of Afghanistan” and will maintain “significant humanitarian and development assistance” to Afghanistan after U S troops leave the country 423 Ahead of President Ashraf Ghani’s and Chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation Abdullah Abdullah’s late June visit to Washington DC the White House reiterated its commitment “to support the Afghan people by providing diplomatic economic and humanitarian assistance ”424 As part of this new phase of U S engagement with Afghanistan Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad stated during a May 18 2021 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing that “promoting economic activity trade and development between Central Asia Afghanistan and South Asia” remains one of the U S government’s primary objectives In that hearing the Acting USAID Assistant Administrator for Asia Karen Freeman reiterated USAID’s continued support to Afghanistan 425 As a demonstration of the United States’ “enduring support for the Afghan people ” the Biden administration has sought increased U S support for Afghanistan during the first half of 2021 U S Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced on April 21 that the Biden administration is working with Congress to provide an additional $300 million of civilian assistance to Afghanistan in 2021 that sum had been announced at the November 2020 international donors’ conference as potentially available at a future REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 113 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT date Secretary Blinken said “The funding will be targeted at sustaining and building on the gains of the past 20 years by improving access to essential services for Afghan citizens promoting economic growth fighting corruption and the narcotics trade improving health and education service delivery supporting women’s empowerment enhancing conflict resolution mechanisms and bolstering Afghan civil society and independent media ”426 On June 4 the State Department announced another $266 million in humanitarian aid to Afghanistan focused on food aid basic health care shelter water and sanitation and job opportunities 427 For FY 2022 President Biden also requested an additional $364 million for the State Department and USAID to be used for development assistance to Afghanistan 428 Even with the troop withdrawal the U S government’s ultimate goal remains to help Afghanistan shift from being an assistance recipient to an enduring and self-sufficient economic partner that is able to attract foreign investment and meet its own financial needs 429 While the intensity and focus of U S reconstruction programs in Afghanistan have changed over time the United States has consistently highlighted the importance of Afghanistan’s economic and social development to support U S nationalsecurity interests the Afghan peace process and broader political stability According to USAID Afghanistan has been the leading recipient of U S foreign assistance since 2008 receiving around 10% of the total amount of U S assistance including both development and security assistance in recent years 430 In February 2021 the U S government publicly released its updated Integrated Country Strategy ICS for Afghanistan The ICS continues to stress that “ a growing Afghan economy and job creation remain necessary predicates for stability and the development that makes it resilient ” The ICS also maintains the importance of strengthening economic prosperity through U S support of private sector-led export growth and job creation and accompanying gains in health education and women’s empowerment to help increase revenue generation and budget sustainability 431 USAID’s FY 2019–2023 Country Development Cooperation Strategy CDCS for Afghanistan which is part of the ICS further outlines the need to 432 • accelerate private-sector-driven export-led economic growth • advance social gains in health education and gender equality • increase the Afghan government’s accountability to its citizens In the CDCS USAID posits that progress in these three areas will in turn “increase Afghanistan’s economic viability and enable the country to become less reliant on donors” “enable the country to become more inclusive and stable as Afghans gain confidence in their government’s ability to achieve reforms and deliver services” and “help improve the country’s 114 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT Secretary of State Antony Blinken meets with President Ashraf Ghani to reiterate continued U S support to the Afghan government during a visit to Kabul in April 2021 State photo stability and inclusivity as Afghans’ trust in their government improves and civic participation expands ”433 Overall Afghanistan’s economic growth and social development as well as the United States’ ability to support it face many uncertainties These include the broader effects of the withdrawal of U S and NATO forces the ability of U S agencies to implement and monitor programs and funding the outcome of Afghan peace talks the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and future levels of international assistance Nevertheless USAID told SIGAR “Currently the planned withdrawal of U S troops has not impacted the implementation of USAID programming We and our implementing partners remain deeply engaged in the development of the Afghan economic sector and have continued to implement interventions ”434 In a number of ways the direct impact of the U S troop withdrawal on the administration of U S reconstruction programs could be minimal Given ongoing security-related challenges and COVID-19-related restrictions the movement of U S government personnel throughout Afghanistan is already severely limited Therefore the implementation and monitoring of USAID programming depends on contracting with implementing partners and third-party monitors and as USAID noted to SIGAR implementing partners are responsible for providing their own security 435 Regardless of the level of U S funding and the continued impact of COVID-19 the ability of the United States to continue carrying out reconstruction programs will still depend on the ability of its contracted implementing partners to operate in Afghanistan amid potentially further deteriorating security conditions In contrast to USAID’s proclamations as violence worsens in 2021 some USAID implementing partners have noted serious security incidents that have impeded project implementation and staff movements Recently REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 115 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT various USAID-funded project staff have been unable to freely access some implementation areas were forced to cancel project activities or generally limited project operations due to a variety of security-related incidents and challenges These include threats of violence and targeted killings explosive devices along main roads and highways increasingly common illegal vehicle checkpoints where the Taliban have been searching for individuals associated with international organizations and the government and largescale attacks 436 Therefore the near future of U S reconstruction in Afghanistan will not be threatened by the unwillingness of the United States and international partners to continue to fund and support economic and social development They will however likely be impacted by insecurity and political instability preventing contractors from effectively implementing internationally funded development projects As of June 30 2021 the U S government has provided approximately $36 3 billion to support governance and economic and social development in Afghanistan since 2002 Most of these funds—approximately $21 2 billion—were appropriated to USAID’s Economic Support Fund ESF Of this amount $20 billion has been obligated and $18 3 billion has been disbursed Figure 2 37 shows USAID assistance by sector FIGURE 2 37 USAID DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS AS OF JULY 8 2021 $ MILLIONS Infrastructure 4 602 Governance 3 618 Stabilization 2 432 Agriculture 2 374 Health 1 420 Unpreferenced 1 283 Economic Growth 1 281 Education 1 265 Program Support 466 Gender 266 $0 $1 000 $2 000 $3 000 $4 000 $5 000 Unpreferenced funds are U S contributions to the ARTF that can be used for any ARTF-supported initiatives Note USAID Mission-managed funds Numbers are rounded USAID gender programs managed by the agency’s Office of Gender are presented as a separate category Agriculture programs include Alternative Development Infrastructure programs include power roads extractives and programs that build health and education facilities OFM activities e g audits and pre-award assessments included under Program Support funds Source SIGAR analysis of USAID response to SIGAR data call 7 14 2021 SIGAR analysis of World Bank ARTF Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of April 20 2021 7 14 2021 116 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT A Kam Air flight readies for departure beneath the control tower of the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul NATO Resolute Support photo THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSFERRING CONTROL OF AFGHANISTAN’S AIRPORTS One of the most difficult problems facing the international community after the withdrawal of most international troops is the lack of an agreement to keep Hamid Karzai International Airport HKIA in Kabul open HKIA plays a particularly important role among Afghan airports by facilitating the international diplomatic presence within Kabul and international air links A State Department spokesperson said “We underscore that a functioning secure airport is essential to any international diplomatic presence and will benefit Afghan travelers and the Afghan economy ”437 NATO has been working on a plan to turn over full responsibility for all four of Afghanistan’s international airports to the Afghan government since 2020 but the plan poses risks to civil aviation and the reconstruction effort NATO has been transferring control of airports in Herat Kabul Kandahar and Mazar-e Sharif to the Ministry of Defense which in turn was expected to turn civilian operations over to the Afghanistan Civil Aviation Authority ACAA The ACAA is a government agency established in 2012 under the Civil Aviation Law to manage civil aviation activities in Afghanistan Afghanistan’s international airports have been officially under joint control of NATO and the ACAA since 2015 438 Kandahar airport was handed over to the ACAA on January 10 2021 According to State the timeline for transferring control of the remaining airports was set following President Biden’s April 2021 announcement on the impending U S troop withdrawal from Afghanistan In June 2021 NATO REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 117 QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT transferred control of the airports in Mazar-e Sharif and Herat the date of the transfer of HKIA in Kabul is still under review 439 Airport transfers have faced a number of financial operational and security challenges As the United States continues its diplomatic engagement and development work in Afghanistan following the troop withdrawal the country’s international airports in particular HKIA will be vital to maintaining Kabul’s international connections allowing for diplomats and other international personnel to move into and out of the country As U S NATO and Afghan officials have stressed an international diplomatic presence will not be possible without a secure and efficiently managed airport in Kabul 440 A properly functioning civil aviation infrastructure also can be a key driver for sustainable economic growth in Afghanistan by facilitating international trade and promoting private-sector investment in the country while a lack of civil-aviation capability can restrict growth Difficulty and Delay in Bolstering Afghan Aviation Capability Given the Afghan government’s limited capacity in the early 2000s and the importance of effective airspace management for military efforts the U S government provided technical assistance and financial support for the country’s civil-aviation sector disbursing over $562 million in civil-aviation-related activities between 2002 and 2015 DOD helped to reestablish Afghanistan’s airspace management and provided support for aviationrelated communication navigation and surveillance infrastructure and operations Their support focused on military operations but also benefited civil aviation 441 Until 2014 the U S Federal Aviation Administration FAA with financial support from State and USAID provided direct in-country support focused specifically on bolstering civil aviation and provided the ACAA with technical advice training and support for airspace operations and airport operations Despite sustained FAA involvement including limited air traffic control training the ACAA did not attain satisfactory proficiency to maintain its responsibilities under the International Civil Aviation Organization The FAA ceased direct in-country support in 2014 but concluded a memorandum of agreement for technical assistance in 2016 However the Afghan government made no requests for assistance until 2020 442 While USAID has not implemented specific programs to help the ACAA assume responsibility for civil-aviation services they have supported capacity-building at the ACAA as part of broader assistance programs all aimed at helping the ACAA “become a better partner for Afghan businesses ”443 USAID has provided approximately $6 1 million since 2015 to support ACAA capacity building and strengthen air-cargo infrastructure and export processes at HKIA 444 The United States government originally intended to transfer management of Afghanistan’s civil aviation to the Afghan government at the end 118 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT of 2014 with the drawdown of U S forces A SIGAR civil-aviation audit in 2015 found the transfer was delayed by a year in part due to the lack of certified Afghan air traffic controllers 445 Following the delay the Afghan government failed to award an airspace-management contract citing high costs which required State to fund an interim $29 5 million DOD-managed contract through September 2015 to avoid air-service disruptions 446 SIGAR’s audit further found that the Afghan government failed to use all of its overflight revenue for airspace management despite pledging to do so which contributed to the ACAA’s inability to independently manage civil aviation operations 447 In 2015 the ACAA took over control of airspace management from the U S government However NATO’s Resolute Support Mission continued to shoulder key civil-aviation responsibilities at Afghanistan’s international airports in particular the five essential aviation functions 1 air traffic control 2 fire crash and rescue 3 safety management 4 meteorological services and 5 communication navigation and surveillance 448 In July 2019 SIGAR reported that external donor support improved ACAA operations through better training regimes that allowed the agency to conduct limited operations at the four international airports SIGAR also observed that the ACAA remained reliant on donor support and was “not currently capable of conducting civil aviation operations without donor support including technical training and financial assistance—all of which were also identified as shortfalls in our 2015 audit ”449 SIGAR concluded “Although capacity development and increased revenues appear to have put the ACAA on a path toward civilian aviation independence the ACAA has yet to demonstrate its capacity to assume control over the five essential aviation functions ”450 In 2019 the ACAA director general noted that the ACAA remained roughly two to three years away from achieving the necessary personnel financial and regulatory capacity to independently manage all civil-aviation responsibilities within Afghanistan 451 Since then Afghan officials have continued to express concerns over the insufficient number of trained Afghan personnel able to take over functions currently handled by NATO COVID-19-related delays in recent NATO training of local Afghan civilaviation staff and the inability to manage the airports without continued international assistance 452 Former ACAA Director General Qasem Wafayezad recognized that the Afghan government faces a number of ongoing capacity and training issues presenting challenges to completing this transfer 453 In a November 2020 interview the director of civil aviation at Kandahar’s Ahmad Shab Baba International Airport also noted that local Afghans have not been trained to run critical tasks such as air traffic control or manning the radar He added “Our guys are not even able to start the fire trucks If the U S leaves the REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 119 “Our guys are not even able to start the fire trucks If the U S leaves the airport will be in trouble ” Source Stars and Stripes “With locals untrained on key functions US departure could mean trouble for Afghanistan’s airport ” 11 6 2020 QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT airport will be in trouble ”454 The airport was nonetheless transferred to Afghan control two months later 455 NATO training of local Afghan civil-aviation staff was delayed by COVID19 and then canceled after determining the Afghan trainees were “not capable of being trained ” according to Kandahar Governor Hayatullah Hayat An ACAA spokesperson however announced that the Afghan government would be able to take control of the international airports by May 2021 adding that “some of our foreign colleagues will still be coordinating with us in some of the sectors of the airports after the handover is finished ”456 Challenges in Transferring Control of Afghan Airports NATO’s turnover of airport management to the ACAA during 2021 has faced challenges that have hindered airport operations Following the transfer of the Kandahar airport on January 10 2021 the ACAA’s limited capacity to manage the aviation functions NATO previously ran has restricted civilian operations to daylight hours Airlines have complained that this inhibits their ability to satisfy passenger preferences for arrival and departure times 457 To support airport operations the ACAA issued two calls for proposals for contractors to operate air traffic control and ground services at the Kandahar airport but State informed SIGAR this quarter that the ACAA is still seeking a contractor that can effectively operate the airport within the ACAA’s budget constraints The ACAA maintains that it has ongoing challenges with retaining sufficient qualified personnel that can manage maintain and operate Afghanistan’s airports 458 Questions remain in particular for the future of HKIA which has been run and secured by Turkey under the auspices of NATO’s Resolute Support Mission Turkey has around 500 troops stationed in Afghanistan 459 ACAA representatives have raised concerns about their ability to maintain the runway and equipment at HKIA unassisted as well as their lack of mid-level managers to supervise technical staff 460 In early June 2021 the Turkish government agreed in principle to continue to run and secure HKIA The Turkish Defense Minister stated that this is subject to certain conditions including “political financial and logistical support” from its NATO allies On July 9 Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that the United States and Turkey had reached an agreement on the “scope” of Turkish assistance with the details about a future Turkish role in airport operations still being discussed 461 The Turkish government also said it would not send additional troops to Kabul 462 During a visit to Turkey later that month Afghan Foreign Minister Mohammad Haneef Atmar welcomed the Turkish and other international support for Afghanistan’s civil aviation sector 463 120 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT During the June 14 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels participants agreed to continue to provide financial support to HKIA at least in the interim as NATO forces withdraw 464 NATO’s North Atlantic Council instructed the NATO Support and Procurement Agency to continue funding existing contracts that support aviation operations at HKIA 465 In response to efforts to maintain the Turkish presence at HKIA the Taliban announced that this would be “unacceptable” and asserted that any continued Turkish military presence will violate the U S -Taliban agreement of February 2020—a view shared by the Russian presidential envoy for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov A Taliban spokesperson warned “If foreign forces want to retain a military presence here in the name of airport security Afghans will not allow it and will view them as invaders be it Turkey or any other country ”466 Afghanistan’s Civil Aviation Sector and the COVID-19 Pandemic The airport transfers come as the ACAA and the Afghan civil-aviation sector struggle to overcome the financial losses caused by the COVID-19 pandemic The Afghan government grounded domestic flights on April 21 2020 and resumed them on June 17 On June 13 however international airlines had suspended most air travel to Afghanistan due to the spread of COVID19 following a period of gradual reduction At the end of 2020 the revenue generated by the ACAA largely from fees for the use of Afghan airspace and airports declined by 28% compared to the previous year 467 In recent years ACAA’s revenue has on average made up around 4% of Afghanistan’s sustainable domestic revenues 468 The ACAA’s budget problems have further limited its ability to hire contractors and equipment to maintain the country’s international airports 469 In late 2020 international air travel slowly restarted with only three out of 11 carriers Air Arabia Emirates and Fly Dubai having resumed international flights by December 2020 470 As of June 2021 according to State eight airlines were operating international flights into and out of Kabul Pakistan International Airlines Mahan Air Emirates Fly Dubai Air Arabia Turkish Airlines Kam Air and Ariana Afghan Airlines 471 Afghan airlines have been banned from European Union airspace since 2010 due to safety concerns 472 The FAA maintains that U S civil aviation faces a number of potential and or indirect threats to operations in Afghan airspace especially at low altitudes largely due to indirect fire targeting airports and surface-to-air fire targeting aircraft operating at low altitudes including during the arrival and departure phases of flight The FAA also notes that civil aviation operations could be exposed to possible weaponized unmanned aircraft attacks ground assaults on or near the airports and the risk of insider attacks or facilitation of terrorist activity in the airports 473 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 121 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PROFILE Afghanistan remains poor aid-dependent and conflict-affected with any potential economic growth in the short term further limited by the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic Donor grants totaling at least $8 6 billion per year covering both security and civilian assistance currently finance over half of the government budget That proportion climbs to almost 80% of Afghanistan’s $11 billion in total public expenditures when off-budget U S -managed assistance is counted along with on-budget Afghanmanaged aid 474 Increased government service provision an economy fueled by donor funds and artificially inflated demand produced by the large international presence rapidly improved many of Afghanistan’s development outcomes until the 2014 drawdown of most international troops After the Afghan government assumed responsibility for the fight against the Taliban insurgency licit annual GDP growth of just under 10% dropped to low-single-digit rates 475 Since the transition to Afghan lead responsibility for security the afghani AFN has depreciated against the U S dollar from approximately 57 AFN to the dollar in 2014 to around 77 by the end of 2020 476 Prior to the pandemic an estimated 55% of Afghans lived below the poverty line defined as 2 064 afghanis per person per month or around $1 in daily income according to household survey data an increase from 34% in 2008 477 While the World Bank had projected that poverty levels would rise as high as 72% during 2020 due to the socioeconomic effects of the pandemic it now estimates that overall poverty levels actually decreased to 47 1% as the pandemic had a less severe economic impact in rural areas than originally projected In urban areas however the Bank estimated that poverty levels rose from 41 6% to 45 5% in 2020 478 Despite early projections that the effects of the pandemic would cause the Afghan economy to contract by 5% in 2020 the World Bank also estimated in April 2021 that the Afghan economy actually contracted by only 1 9% of GDP based on preliminary data from Afghanistan’s National Statistics and Information Authority NSIA The World Bank explains that the agricultural sector managed to grow by 5 3% as a result of favorable weather conditions and that COVID-19-related disruptions had limited impact in rural areas On the other hand the lockdowns and border closures severely contracted economic activity within urban and peri-urban areas in 2020 leading to contractions of 4 2% in the industrial sector and 4 8% in the service sector 479 Afghanistan has continued to receive significant levels of international assistance this quarter to mitigate the impact of the pandemic On June 7 2021 the International Monetary Fund IMF completed the first review of Afghanistan’s economic reform program supported by the 42-month Extended Credit Facility arrangement approved in November 2020 The completion of this review makes $149 4 million immediately available for 122 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT An Afghan woman gathers water in western Afghanistan Drought conditions in 2021 are contributing to the need for increased humanitarian assistance Norwegian Refugee Council photo disbursement These funds are intended to support Afghanistan’s recovery from the pandemic bolster economic reforms and help catalyze donor financing 480 On June 24 the World Bank also approved a $132 million grant to Afghanistan intended to support the country’s economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic 481 According to the UN the number of Afghans requiring humanitarian assistance in 2021 has reached approximately half of Afghanistan’s total estimated population This figure is nearly double that of 2020 and a six-fold increase compared to four years ago 482 In January 2021 the UN said Afghanistan’s Humanitarian Response Plan for 2021 would require an additional $1 3 billion to address the growing number of Afghans in need of humanitarian aid including around 10 million children stemming from a combination of ongoing conflict drought poverty and COVID19 483 Halfway through this year only 23% of the required funds have been distributed 484 The need for humanitarian assistance has been heightened by the recordbreaking number of Afghan migrants returning to Afghanistan In 2020 the intergovernmental International Organization for Migration IOM recorded the largest return of Afghan migrants in a single year approximately one million—almost double the count in 2019 485 Over 200 000 returned between January and March 2021 more than double the number from the same periods in 2019 and 2020 486 If the current security and political conditions hold and international support remains at the levels pledged during the 2020 Geneva Conference the World Bank projects that Afghanistan’s economy will grow by only 1% of GDP during 2021 Continued weak investor confidence and the effects of drought on the agricultural sector are hindering growth 487 Considering that REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 123 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT real GDP growth remains below the population growth rate real per capita GDP is likely to decline In 2020 Afghanistan’s Chamber of Commerce and Investment estimated that around 1 500 small-scale traders investors and businessmen left the country as a result of continued insecurity and corruption accounting for at least $1 5 billion of capital flight 488 In a number of geographic areas where the Taliban exerts some level of control many Afghan businesses also grapple with the challenge of double taxation—paying taxes to the Afghan government and to the Taliban who may impose higher levies than the government further inhibiting growth 489 Even if the Afghan government controls the pandemic and successfully negotiates a peace agreement with the Taliban—perhaps the best-case scenario for Afghanistan—this will not translate immediately into sustainable licit economic growth Many enduring barriers remain These include widespread corruption that undermines investor confidence in the Afghan government and economy limited skilled labor lingering effects of nearcontinuous conflict over four decades deficits in physical and institutional infrastructure a costly trade deficit and heavy reliance on donor support Following a peace agreement Afghanistan must also reintegrate into the economy ex-combatants and potentially large numbers of Afghans returning from abroad 490 Returnees could face a weak licit labor market unable to fully absorb the large influx of laborers in the short term potentially exacerbating already high unemployment and poverty figures Trade Update Transit Trade Agreement with Pakistan Further Extended After failing to revise the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement APTTA Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to extend the existing pact for another six months The two countries had already agreed to a temporary three-month extension for APTTA which originally was due to expire on February 11 2021 491 While the Pakistani government temporarily closed the border to pedestrian traffic May 5–20 due to rising COVID-19 infections the border crossings remained open to trade under bilateral trade and transit agreements 492 The APTTA was originally signed between Afghanistan and Pakistan on October 28 2010 replacing an outdated agreement from 1965 The bilateral trade agreement currently allows landlocked Afghanistan access to Pakistani sea and land transit routes for international trade in particular exporting goods to India one of Afghanistan’s main trading partners and allows Pakistan to use Afghan territory to move goods into Central Asia The current agreement does not however allow Pakistani territory to be used for Indian exports to Afghanistan Afghan trucks that carry Afghan goods to the Wagah border crossing between India and Pakistan are not permitted to return with Indian goods 493 At the end of April 2021 124 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT - - - - - - -Afghan exports to India dropped to near zero Indian border officials attributed this decline to India’s recent struggles with a devastating surge in COVID-19 cases 494 The key disagreement over a revised APTTA relates to Afghanistan’s insistence that it be signed under international law and the World Trade Organization WTO framework which Afghanistan joined in 2016 Under WTO rules Pakistan would be required to allow the free movement of goods through its territory between India and Afghanistan Pakistani officials have refused to agree to this point citing security concerns amid Pakistan’s enduring rivalry with India 495 Overall trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan has recently declined Pakistan has consistently been one of Afghanistan’s primary trading partners However over the first nine months of the current fiscal year Pakistani exports to Afghanistan declined by 5 5% according to data released by the State Bank of Pakistan 496 Trade between the two countries fell by 29% during 2020 due to the pandemic-related border closures 497 Since the first phase of its operations was inaugurated in December 2017 the Chabahar Port on Iran’s Arabian Coast developed jointly with India has been held up as a means for trade between Afghanistan and India to bypass Pakistan It was also expected to increase landlocked Afghanistan’s access to international maritime trade 498 For these reasons the State Department exempted Chabahar and its attached railway network from U S economic sanctions leveled against Iran in November 2018 499 Yet according to State Chabahar Port has had limited impact in increasing Afghan trade even amidst the constraints on trade with and through Pakistan Despite the exemption for Afghan trade through Chabahar many Afghan businesses remain hesitant to use the port facilities Afghan traders also have reported that insurance companies banks and other business service providers refuse to operate through the port for fear of U S  sanctions 500 Trade with Central Asian Neighbors While trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan has faltered Afghanistan has worked to improve its economic connectivity with Central Asian countries During this quarter Afghanistan and Uzbekistan marked the opening of a trans-Afghan shipping corridor between Uzbekistan and Pakistan On May 11 2021 Uzbek cargo trucks reached the Torkham border crossing between Afghanistan and Pakistan after crossing Afghan territory An initiative of the Uzbek government the opening of this route is intended to reduce the transportation costs of Uzbek goods moving through the region 501 Work also continued on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India TAPI gas pipeline On April 15 2021 Turkmenistan and Afghanistan signed a Safety Concept an annex to the agreement which includes the development of a Safety Plan and protocol for the 816-kilometer portion of the pipeline within Afghan territory Construction on the Asian REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 125 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT Development Bank-supported pipeline began in December 2015 with an estimated total cost of $8 billion and once complete will connect the Galkynysh gas field in Turkmenistan with India passing through Afghanistan and Pakistan 502 In addition Afghanistan began construction on a $5 million road through the difficult mountainous terrain of the Wakhan Corridor in Badakhshan Province connecting Afghanistan and China As of mid-June 2021 the Afghan government had constructed approximately 20% of the road which is financed entirely by the Afghan government 503 Once completed the 50-kilometer road “will be used for commerce imports and exports as well as transit” between Afghanistan and China according to a Public Works Ministry spokesperson who added “China has expressed a huge interest for investment in Afghanistan particularly in the mining sector and this road will be good for that too ”504 Afghanistan Maintains Large Trade Deficit Afghanistan’s economy remains highly dependent on imports generating a severe trade deficit that is almost entirely financed through external aid Afghanistan’s main imports include petroleum machinery and equipment food items and base metals and related articles 505 In 2019 Afghanistan imported goods totaling $7 33 billion while exporting only $975 million worth according to WTO data this produced a negative merchandise trade balance of $6 36 billion equivalent to 30 1% of GDP 506 In 2020 amid declining imports and exports exports fell by 2% and imports by 5% the negative trade balance narrowed to $5 1 billion equivalent to 26 7% of GDP 507 The trade deficit is in part caused by Afghanistan’s low manufacturing capacity and poor domestic infrastructure which results in a narrow export base—largely agricultural products and carpets—to limited destination markets 508 Recognizing this challenge the Afghan government’s National Procurement Authority signed an agreement with the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries in January 2021 that all government departments would rely on domestically produced products despite their being on average 25% more expensive than imports 509 Banking Update Afghan Banking Sector Slowly Recovers from COVID-19 Restrictions The pandemic-induced economic contraction has impacted the banking sector in a number of ways and helped induce shifts in the government’s banking policy—including substantially delaying the planned merger between the state-owned Bank-e-Millie Afghan and New Kabul Bank 510 The initial economic contraction associated with the pandemic decreased the banking sector’s overall deposits and increased nonperforming loans NPLs while broadly leading to a reduction in the demand for credit But Afghan banks’ small loan portfolios generally helped to minimize losses 126 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT - - - - - - -During the previous year Da Afghanistan Bank DAB Afghanistan’s central bank took several measures to mitigate COVID-related shocks to the banking sector including the monitoring of weaker banks a relaxation of loan classification a reduction in banks’ operational costs and suspension of administrative penalties and fees As a result the banking sector saw some modest improvements by the end of 2020 with increasing deposits 511 During the initial pandemic-induced economic decline bank deposits contracted as business firms increasingly drew upon their accounts in the face of declining revenues exacerbating the banking sector’s vulnerability 512 During the first four months of 2020 total bank deposits declined by 3% 513 But by the end of 2020 the World Bank found that bank deposits actually increased as more international grants and government expenditures fueled private-sector activities and individuals and firms sought to reduce their cash holdings amid increasing political uncertainty and insecurity In late 2020 bank deposits reached 292 6 billion afghanis or 19 9% of GDP an increase from 263 8 billion afghanis or 18% of GDP at the end of 2019 the loan to deposit ratio fell from 15 8% in 2019 to 13 8% in 2020 514 The banking sector also faced a declining demand for credit within the private sector driven by weak business confidence in Afghanistan’s economic conditions The World Bank estimated that credit to the private sector declined by 1 1% reaching around 3 03% of GDP by the end of 2020 515 After DAB ended the freeze on loan classification and resumed the enforcement of requirements for maintaining sufficient capital in July 2020 NPLs rose from 15 7% in 2019 to 21 9% of total loans by the end of 2020 reflecting the pandemic’s impact on borrowers’ debt servicing and repayment capacity Given the fact that NPLs are a lagging indicator the true figure is likely higher The ensuing increase in the provisioning of NPLs and a drop in returns on overseas assets which comprise one-third of the banking sector’s assets further weighed on profits 516 The small loan portfolio of Afghanistan’s banking sector approximately 12% of bank assets helped to limit potential losses from the pandemic-induced economic contraction As a result of the low lending levels and lack of investment opportunities banks’ liquidity generally remained high 517 The Afghan private sector’s reliance on banks as a source of credit remains weak with existing private sector credit largely directed towards the trade 41% and services 27% sectors 518 According to the Asian Development Bank Afghan banks only provide a line of credit to around 5% of micro small and medium-sized enterprises with the remainder seeking financing largely from informal sources 519 Even before the pandemic Afghanistan’s small banking sector was severely limited in its ability to finance private investment and support economic growth With an economy heavily reliant on the informal sector—85% of Afghan adults lack access to formal financial services—DAB estimates that only 3 9% of businesses rely on banks to finance capital expenses with only 0 8% using banks to finance REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 127 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT investments due to both demand and supply constraints Those constraints include high interest rates and collateral requirements lack of expertise and limited access in rural areas 520 Fiscal Update The Challenge of Insufficient Domestic Revenues Sustainable Domestic Revenues According to Afghan Ministry of Finance officials these are revenues such as customs taxes and non-tax fees Multilateral institutions including the World Bank and IMF use reports of these revenues to judge the Afghan government’s fiscal performance One-Off Domestic Revenues These are nonrecurring revenues arising from onetime transfers of funds such as central bank profits to the Afghan government The IMF excludes central bank transfers from its definition of domestic revenues for the purpose of monitoring Afghanistan’s fiscal performance under its Extended Credit Facility arrangement with the government Source SIGAR communications with MOF officials 8 21 2017 SIGAR communications with IMF officials 9 7 2017 This quarter Afghanistan’s domestic revenues continued to rebound following a decline in the previous fiscal year due to the COVID-19-induced economic downturn SIGAR analysis of Afghan government accounting data showed Through the first six months of FY 1400 December 2020– December 2021 Afghanistan’s sustainable domestic revenues increased by 22 6% year-on-year Figure 2 38 However domestic revenues remained 2 7% below revenue levels during the same period of FY 1398 521 Expenditures over the first six months of FY 1400 Figure 2 39 meanwhile decreased overall by 5 4% 522 The Ministry of Finance MOF informed SIGAR that the expenditure decline during the first quarter of FY 1400 was a result of delays in the Afghan parliament approving an FY 1400 national budget 523 In February 2021 following weeks of debate in which the draft budget was twice rejected the Afghan parliament approved a 473 billion afghani approximately $6 billion national budget for FY 1400 comprising some $4 billion for the regular budget covering government operations and $2 billion for the development budget Only 46% of the FY 1400 budget is funded by domestic revenue sources With the passage of the budget expenditures are anticipated to continue to increase in the coming months 524 Afghanistan consistently has insufficient domestic revenues to cover government expenditures offsetting deficits with international grants Figure 2 40 demonstrates this trend in recent years with sustainable domestic revenues covering on average only 43% of Afghan government expenditures This problem has only worsened as domestic revenues have stagnated while government expenditures have steadily increased 525 Donor grants totaling $8 5 billion per year covering both security and civilian assistance finance more than half the Afghan government budget and approximately 75–80% of total public expenditures including funds not channeled through government ministries 526 The pandemic has aggravated the Afghan government’s inability to generate sufficient domestic revenue and its heavy dependence on international assistance—long-standing challenges stemming from extreme poverty limited capacity persistent corruption tax evasion and the strength of the untaxed informal and illicit economies Amid increasing expenditures and declining revenues during the COVID-19 pandemic the Asian Development Bank reported that the fiscal deficit excluding grants increased from the equivalent of 13 9% of GDP in 2019 to 20 8% in 2020 527 In Afghanistan approximately 90% of the economy is informal and therefore largely escapes taxation hindering the government’s financial 128 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT FIGURE 2 38 CUMULATIVE SUSTAINABLE REVENUE GAINS FY 1399–1400 VERSUS SAME MONTH PRIOR YEAR 30% Revenues continued to recover following the previous fiscal year's pandemicinduced economic contraction 25 22 6% 20 16 4% 15 12 2% 11 5% 10 5 3 7% 0 6% 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 MONTH Source SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 7 12 2021 and 1 10 2021 FIGURE 2 39 CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE DECREASES FY 1399–1400 VERSUS SAME MONTH PRIOR YEAR 0% -5 ··•·· ·· - -5 4% -10 -14 4% -15 -20 · -20 8% -23 6% -25 -30 · ______ -35 -35 9% -34 4% … while expenditures decreased as compared to the previous year's following delays in the Afghan parliament approving the FY 1400 budget -40 1 2 3 4 5 6 MONTH Source SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 7 12 2021 and 1 10 2021 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 129 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT FIGURE 2 40 AFGHAN GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES BILLIONS OF AFGHANIS 500 455 424 387 400 358 300 200 167 167 182 201 190 175 170 183 100 0 FY 1396 2017 FY 1397 2018 • Sustainable Domestic Revenues • FY 1398 2019 Total Domestic Revenues including One-Off Revenues FY 1399 2020 • Government Expenditures Source SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 1 10 2018 1 12 2019 1 6 2020 and 1 10 2021 self-sufficiency 528 Members of parliament and cabinet ministers also assert that significant levels of government revenue are lost to corruption 529 The strength of the informal economy limits the Afghan government’s ability to benefit from the extractives sector which Afghan officials have highlighted as potentially a significant source of revenues A large percentage of mining activity in Afghanistan is conducted by informal or illegal small-scale operations in both government-controlled and insurgentcontrolled territory with their products smuggled out of the country 530 In March 2021 the Afghanistan Precious Stones Association claimed that around $1 billion in precious stones is smuggled out of Afghanistan each year 531 In contrast illegal mining has increasingly become a key source of revenue for the Taliban In areas under its control the Taliban issues mining licenses collects taxes and protection money from mining operations and controls the smuggling of quarried minerals and gems abroad in particular to Pakistan 532 In late January 2021 Minister of Mines and Petroleum Mohammad Haroon Chakhansuri stated “The Taliban are currently mining in 750 areas This group is using the money made from mining against the government ”533 As a result the formalized extractives sector has failed 130 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT - - - - - - -to materialize as a driver of economic growth and a source of sustainable domestic revenues for the Afghan government For revenue derived from trade such as customs more than half of the total value of goods that crosses the international border flows to the informal economy This is a substantial source of income for anti-state insurgents other non-government groups and corrupt officials resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in lost revenue for the Afghan government 534 As the Afghan economy has struggled to find areas of sustainable economic growth the country has increasingly relied in recent years on remittances from Afghans working abroad especially in neighboring Iran By 2019 remittances accounted for the equivalent of 4 3% of Afghanistan’s annual GDP an increase from 1 2% in 2014 according to World Bank data 535 However officials from the IOM estimate this figure could be as high as 15–20% given that many remittances are sent through the informal hawala money-transfer system 536 In 2020 remittances to Afghanistan dropped by 10% according to the World Bank 537 Afghans in Iran for instance have struggled to find work due to COVID-19 and economic sanctions forcing many to return to Afghanistan where they face rising levels of unemployment poverty and insecurity 538 ECONOMIC GROWTH Under the current CDCS USAID economic-growth programs seek to support and enhance export-led growth through direct interaction with Afghanistan’s private sector necessary for putting the country on the “road to self-reliance ”539 Specifically the strategy aims to 540 • strengthen trade connections between Afghanistan and neighboring countries • increase the competitiveness of Afghan private industry by supporting export-ready firms • create jobs via that firm-level support and by improving the enabling environment for businesses Even before the COVID-19 pandemic Afghanistan’s licit economic growth was too low to reduce the increasing poverty rates and improve living standards for most Afghans 541 Additionally licit export levels stagnated in 2019 despite the Afghan government’s providing a majority of the transit costs for exports through subsidized air corridors to incentivize regional trade 542 The pandemic intensified these economic challenges adding to existing uncertainties about Afghan peace talks deteriorating security conditions and the level of future donor support USAID’s active economic-growth programs have a total estimated cost of $307 million as shown in Table 2 20 on the following page REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 131 The Taliban Seize Key Border Crossings The Taliban seized six total border crossings this quarter including four major border crossings with the potential to deny the Afghan government significant customs revenue On June 22 2021 Taliban forces captured the U S -financed Sher Khan Bandar border crossing in Kunduz Province between Afghanistan and Tajikistan after 134 border guards and other Afghan troops fled into Tajikistan According to a Taliban spokesperson the Taliban have kept this crossing open to cross-border trade and have begun to collect customs revenue In early July Afghan officials acknowledged that the Taliban had captured the Torghundi border crossing with Turkmenistan and the Islam Qala border crossing in western Herat Province a main gateway for trade with Iran On July 14 there were also reports that Taliban forces seized the Spin Boldak crossing with Pakistan in Kandahar Province This crossing is one of the busiest entry points into the country and a primary trade link between southern Afghanistan and Pakistan The Taliban’s occupation of key border crossings could deny potentially significant levels of customs revenue to the Afghan government further inhibiting its ability to generate sufficient domestic revenues In FY 1399 the border crossings in Herat Kandahar and Kunduz Provinces generated 34 3% of the Afghan government’s total customs revenues according to Afghan government accounting data Source BBC News “Taliban capture key AfghanistanIran border crossing ” 7 9 2021 Reuters “Afghan Taliban seize border crossing with Pakistan in major advance ” 7 14 2021 SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 1 10 2021 Swiss Institute for Global Affairs “What Recent Taliban Advances in Afghanistan Do and Do Not Mean ” 7 8 2021 Wall Street Journal “Taliban Finds New Revenues as They Seize Afghanistan’s U S -built Border Gateway ” 7 5 2021 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT TABLE 2 20 USAID ACTIVE ECONOMIC-GROWTH PROGRAMS Cumulative Disbursements as of 7 8 2021 Start Date End Date Total Estimated Cost 1 28 2020 1 27 2025 $105 722 822 $11 862 961 Air Export Program AEP 5 1 2021 4 30 2026 85 526 068 0 Multi-Dimensional Economic Legal Reform Assistance MELRA 2 7 2018 9 30 2024 29 990 258 9 353 137 Extractive Technical Assistance by USGS 1 1 2018 12 31 2022 18 226 206 10 067 500 Project Title Afghanistan Competitiveness of Export-Oriented Businesses Activity ACEBA INVEST 9 28 2017 9 27 2021 15 000 000 9 910 701 Afghanistan Investment Climate Reform Program AICR 3 27 2015 3 26 2022 13 300 000 7 401 545 Carpet and Jewelry Value Chains 1 31 2019 4 30 2023 9 941 606 4 798 580 The Goldozi Project 4 5 2018 4 4 2022 9 718 763 5 762 818 Livelihood Advancement for Marginalized Population LAMP 8 1 2018 7 31 2022 9 491 153 4 996 172 Recycling Plant Value Chain in Northern Afghanistan 6 5 2019 6 4 2023 7 250 000 1 264 578 Development Credit Authority DCA with Ghazanfar Bank 9 1 2018 8 30 2025 2 163 000 40 015 9 27 2017 9 26 2023 665 820 732 $306 995 696 $65 458 739 Afghanistan Loan Portfolio Guarantee Total INVEST is a USAID initiative to mobilize and support private capital investment in development markets through technical assistance networking and capacity building Source USAID response to SIGAR data call 7 14 2021 USAID Seeks to Expand Afghanistan’s Air Exports Export Processing Zone An area established to enhance commercial and industrial exports and job creation by encouraging economic growth through investment from foreign entities with incentives including tax exemptions and a barrier-free investing environment Source Thomasnet com “What are Export Processing Zones EPZs ” 12 13 2019 USAID informed SIGAR this quarter that it is working to introduce a new Air Export Program in Afghanistan the program is currently under procurement Covering FYs 2021–2025 the program aims to improve air cargo policies and procedures and to attract private investment in developing and operating export-processing areas such as Export Processing Zones It also will support the modernization of Afghanistan’s five key airports in Kabul Kandahar Mazar-e Sharif Jalalabad and Herat The program’s targets for its base period include 543 • air exports increased by at least 30% • investment attracted for HKIA export-processing area • at least 2 000 new jobs created as a result of program interventions • at least three new air services agreements opened between Afghan carriers and international destinations • World Trade Organization compliance maintained • a Customs One-Stop-Shop implemented in one additional airport Over the past several years the Afghan government has taken steps to expand air exports with the ultimate goal of helping to increase private investment address the trade deficit and eventually wean the country off international largesse In 2015 for instance President Ghani established 132 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT - - - - - - -the Afghanistan Airfields Economic Development Commission to carry out the government’s plan to create Special Economic Zones SEZs —areas with more liberal and open investment and trade laws—at the country’s airports 544 The realities of persistent insecurity and political instability with their attendant economic effects have slowed this effort Afghanistan also began an export-promotion initiative by creating government-subsidized air corridors According to the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce Afghan government funds have covered around 83% of shipment costs for flights to New Delhi India 80% of shipment costs for flights to Mumbai India and 70% of shipping costs for flights to Europe 545 While trade across Afghanistan’s land borders was severely limited by periodic border closures and delays due to the pandemic the government-subsidized air corridors allowed exports sent through air cargo to remain steady or even increase For example exports to China increased by 78 5% in 2020 as compared to the previous year 546 The WTO which Afghanistan joined in 2016 prohibits export subsidies as they provide an unfair competitive advantage to recipients and therefore distort market dynamics The WTO does allow for exceptions in specified least-developed countries including Afghanistan but only temporarily until certain economic benchmarks are reached 547 While the purpose of the air corridor initiative has been to expand Afghanistan’s air exports it has had the effect of making export firms reliant on government subsidies to fund their transportation costs rather than facilitating the creation of a robust export market combined with the other economic challenges which businesses face Following delayed parliamentary approval of the FY 1400 budget and other financial difficulties the Afghan government fell behind on air corridor subsidy payments to freight transport companies effectively suspending the program By mid-April for instance carpet exports had fallen by approximately 90% according to participating businesses who argued that they cannot afford to send their products abroad without the Afghan government subsidizing their transportation costs 548 As of July 8 2021 the Afghan government had not yet resumed its air-corridor subsidy payments 549 AGRICULTURE Licit agriculture has served as the foundation for Afghanistan’s formal economy and one of its primary exports The agricultural sector directly employs approximately 40% of the country’s labor force and directly or indirectly supports an estimated 80% of the total population 550 The service sector has risen in prominence but agriculture has been a key driver of GDP growth and developing that sector remains a priority for external donors 551 In recent years Afghan farmers and agribusinesses have struggled with the effects of nearly four decades of conflict poor market conditions REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 133 SIGAR CONDUCTS EVALUATION OF USAID’S GOLDOZI PROJECT On June 8 2021 SIGAR issued an evaluation report on USAID’s Goldozi Project a four-year $9 7 million project aimed to support revenue generation job creation and trade promotion for Afghanistan’s textiles sector SIGAR found that the Goldozi Project failed to achieve several of its targets during its first three years including training sales agents increasing embroiderers’ incomes and improving sales The evaluation further noted that the COVID-19 pandemic severely curtailed the project’s activities in 2020 SIGAR recommended that USAID consider withholding or delaying future funding disbursements until USAID determines whether to continue funding the Goldozi Project potentially saving $4 6 million in U S taxpayer funds Source SIGAR USAID’s Goldozi Project in Afghanistan Project Has Not Achieved Its Goals and COVID-19 Further Curtailed Project Implementation SIGAR 21-37-IP 6 2021 ii ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT the lack of cold-storage facilities for their products and the increasing prevalence of extreme weather such as droughts and flash floods making Afghanistan increasingly reliant on agricultural imports to meet rising domestic demand for key crops 552 According to the Afghan Ministry of Energy and Water heightened temperatures combined with more frequent droughts have led to less rain and snow and to increasing evaporation of water sources As a result water levels in recent years have dropped by approximately 10 billion cubic meters causing desertification and making irrigation of agricultural land even more difficult 553 In 2018 Afghanistan experienced a devastating drought decreasing agricultural output by 45% It displaced more people than fighting between security forces and the Taliban and pushed an additional two million people into food insecurity according to the United Nations 554 USAID’s current CDCS highlights these risks “climate change-driven challenges generate deep food insecurity especially when compounded by food transport problems from poorly maintained or flood-damaged roads and adverse conditions at border crossings ” These challenges USAID adds have “far-reaching economic effects because Afghanistan’s economy remains primarily agricultural” and “can impact the success of USAID’s projects ”555 Since 2002 USAID has disbursed approximately $2 4 billion to improve licit agricultural production increase access to both domestic and international markets and develop income alternatives to growing poppy for opium production 556 USAID’s active agriculture programs have a total estimated cost of $296 7 million and can be found in Table 2 21 Total disbursements for State’s active alternative-livelihood programs Table 2 22 —which aim to transition opium-poppy farmers into licit agriculture—were $109 2 million Drought Threatens Afghanistan’s Agricultural Sector On June 22 2021 the Afghan government officially declared a drought 557 With less snow and rainfall through the winter months of 2020–2021 many farmers are feeling its impact A lack of snowmelt from the Hindu Kush mountains for instance has led to low water levels in the Panjshir River so that it no longer provides adequate irrigation for crops in Parwan Province In other regions the absence of late-winter rains has hurt the wheat harvest driving up wheat prices in some areas by as much as one-third 558 The 2021 wheat harvest is expected to fall by as much as 31% as compared to the previous year’s harvest 559 The lack of irrigation threatens to force farmers into a cycle of loans and debt to cover the costs of failed crops 560 The potential impact of drought on Afghanistan’s farmers has been a concern of USAID-supported agricultural programs which have incorporated mitigation steps During the second quarter of FY 2021 for instance 134 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT - - - - - - -TABLE 2 21 USAID ACTIVE AGRICULTURE PROGRAMS Cumulative Disbursements as of 7 8 2021 Start Date End Date Total Estimated Cost 12 7 2016 12 6 2021 $87 905 437 $49 022 379 Afghanistan Value Chains−Livestock 6 9 2018 6 8 2023 55 672 170 25 761 617 Afghanistan Value Chains−High Value Crops 8 2 2018 8 1 2023 54 958 860 24 367 450 Agricultural Marketing Program AMP 1 28 2020 1 27 2023 30 000 000 8 215 520 Regional Agriculture Development Program-East RADP-East 7 21 2016 7 20 2021 28 126 111 25 545 286 Grain Research and Innovation GRAIN 11 8 2012 9 30 2022 19 500 000 13 559 767 USDA PAPA 9 30 2016 9 29 2021 12 567 804 961 057 Catalyzing Afghan Agricultural Innovation 5 28 2018 5 27 2023 Project Title Strengthening Watershed and Irrigation Management SWIM Total 8 000 000 3 833 620 $296 730 382 $151 266 694 Source USAID response to SIGAR data call 7 14 2021 TABLE 2 22 STATE-INL ACTIVE ALTERNATIVE-DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS Start Date End Date Obligated and Disbursed Cumulative as of 6 16 2021 8 25 2020 5 25 2025 $30 000 000 Community-Based Agriculture and Alternative Development CBARD West 9 1 2016 4 30 2022 24 368 607 Community-Based Agriculture and Alternative Development CBARD East 11 11 2017 4 30 2022 22 128 683 8 12 2016 12 30 2021 20 000 000 Project Title Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development - Access to Licit Livelihoods CBARD-ALL Boost Alternative Development Intervention Through Licit Livelihoods BADILL Community-Based Agriculture and Alternative Development - Access to International Market CBARD-AIM 7 30 2019 4 30 2023 8 900 000 Monitoring and Impact Assessment of High-Value Agricultural Based Interventions 8 30 2016 12 30 2022 3 810 530 Total $109 207 820 Source State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 the Agriculture Marketing Program has emphasized improved irrigation and management techniques in its farmer trainings 561 Around 12 2 million Afghans or approximately one-third of the country’s estimated population are currently facing “crisis” and “emergency” levels of food insecurity with drought as a contributing factor alongside poverty and the pandemic 562 Amid high temperatures and drought conditions there also have been reports of scarcity in drinking water in a number of areas In Nimroz Province civil society organizations have complained that water shortages have increased the cost of safe drinking water making it unaffordable for many families 563 The worsening drought conditions and the impact on the agricultural sector could undermine the modest economic gains projected for 2021 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 135 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT USAID Agricultural Program Loses Subcontractor In the second quarter of FY 2021 the USAID-funded Regional Agricultural Development-East RADP-East terminated its contract with one of its subcontractors according to the implementing partner’s latest quarterly report RADP-East works to expand the sales of agricultural goods and services in selected value chains within eight target provinces Ghazni Kapisa Laghman Logar Nangarhar Parwan Wardak and Kabul The program provides technical services to the private sector—including farmers agricultural processing firms traders and buyers—with assistance from three subcontractors 564 On February 7 the RADP-East program terminated its contract with subcontractor Relief International RI which managed the project’s poultry value chain after it had been suspended by USAID due to “strong indications” that the organization had breached antiterrorism legislation donor rules and other policies intended to guard against bribery corruption and terrorist financing RI’s five employees were immediately released in early February bringing their activities to a halt Four new short-term specialists were recruited and joined the project in April with activities beginning again by the end of the quarter 565 INFRASTRUCTURE AND ESSENTIAL SERVICES A major objective of U S -led reconstruction efforts has been to support and expand Afghanistan’s physical infrastructure base with the purpose of supporting economic development and bolstering stability in the country and confidence in the government Since 2002 the U S government has built and expanded electricity infrastructure roads and education and health facilities 566 USAID is still working to complete several large capital projects involving the construction of transmission lines and substations—legacy projects underpinned by the assumption that the best way to expand electricity access in Afghanistan was to build a nationwide power grid 567 By late 2020 according to data provided by Afghanistan Inter-Ministerial Commission for Energy Afghanistan’s total installed capacity for domestic power production is approximately 699 MW versus the 2000 MW the Afghan Ministry of Water and Energy estimates the country needs Domestic power production consists of 280 5 MW of hydroelectric power 353 5 MW of thermal oil plants and 65 MW from renewable energy 568 Afghanistan’s domestic energy consumption relies heavily on electricity imports from neighboring countries To address shortfalls in domestic power production the Afghan government spends approximately $280 million annually to import energy associated with roughly 670 MW of electric generating capacity in neighboring Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Turkmenistan according to the national power utility Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat DABS 569 This makes Afghans’ access to reliable 136 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT - - - - - - -electricity vulnerable to changes seasonal domestic demands energy output levels etc within other countries On July 7 2021 for instance Iran’s Energy Ministry announced it would be halting electricity exports to neighboring countries due to rising domestic power consumption amid high summer temperatures 570 Afghans’ access to the power grid has increased since 2002 but only to about 30% of the population 571 This limited access to reliable grid-based power remains an obstacle to economic growth To expand access to grid-based power DOD and USAID have worked to connect the country’s Northeast Power System NEPS with its southeastern counterpart the Southeast Power System SEPS An approximately 500-kilometer transmission line financed by USAID will eventually link them 572 However an expansive power infrastructure remains vulnerable to persistent insecurity in many parts of the country contributing to blackouts that undermine the reliability of Afghanistan’s power production This quarter militants have increasingly targeted electricity pylons causing power disruptions across the country 573 This is compounded by the aggregated 34% technical and commercial energy losses in transmission lines and distribution networks of the national power grid 574 In recent years U S reconstruction efforts have shifted away from large capital projects like roads and transmission lines toward smallerscale projects including solar and wind power plants To incentivize more private-sector investments in the energy sector in line with the broader U S economic growth strategy USAID has shared the upfront costs of constructing solar and wind power plants with independent power producers IPPs The profitability and commercial viability of such projects is premised on power-purchase agreements PPA with DABS that allow IPPs to recover their upfront costs for construction and support their ongoing operations and maintenance costs 575 With the Afghan government heavily reliant on international aid DABS’ long-term financial stability depends on either a continuation of the current level of donor assistance or on the Afghan government’s ability to generate far greater domestic revenues—both areas of great uncertainty In particular DABS has faced lingering challenges in billing and collecting payments from its customers which have affected its cash flow 576 This problem is in part due to security issues There have been recent reports that DABS is unable to collect payment in Taliban-controlled areas of Faryab Kunduz Baghlan Helmand Badghis and Herat Provinces the Taliban collected those fees DABS’s limited ability to collect payment from all of its customers contributes to rate increases 577 In late June 2021 Kabul residents complained of increasing electric bills even as service worsened with electricity available for only limited hours per day and frequent blackouts 578 The resulting rate increases inhibit many Afghans’ ability to pay their electric bills further cutting into DABS’s revenue and threatens the REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 137 NEPS Imports electricity from Central Asia to provide power to Kabul and the communities north of Kabul SEPS Draws most of its power from the Kajaki Dam and from diesel generators in Kandahar City to provide power in the Helmand and Kandahar areas Source DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan 11 2013 p 107 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SIGAR OVERSIGHT OF AFGHANISTAN’S ENERGY SECTOR Given the U S government’s significant investment in Afghanistan’s energy sector and the importance of available reliable power to support the overall success of the reconstruction effort SIGAR has focused a considerable portion of its oversight portfolio on projects and programs in the sector An ongoing SIGAR audit is examining the broad scope of U S investment in the Afghan energy sector since 2009 including efforts to improve generation transmission and distribution sustainability of the IPPs—which are dependent upon DABS to purchase and distribute electricity produced—and the Afghan power sector Some USAID Power-Infrastructure Projects Face Continuing Delays USAID has seven ongoing power-infrastructure projects Current USAID projects include constructing 579 • a transmission line between Ghazni and Kandahar Provinces 87 9% complete as of May 29 2021 with an expected completion date of September 7 2021 • substations along the transmission line from Ghazni to Kandahar 68% complete as of April 19 2021 with an expected completion date of July 30 2023 • transmission lines and substations in SEPS 41% complete as of April 19 2021 expected completion date of July 30 2023 • a 25 MW wind farm in Herat Province the notice to proceed was issued on October 28 2020 and mobilization work began in March 2021 the contractor 77 Construction Corporation submitted their 95% design package to USAID for review and approval with an expected completion date of November 7 2022 • a 20 MW floating solar-power plant to be constructed on the Naghlu Dam Reservoir in Kabul Province the notice to proceed was issued on January 4 2021 the contractor Phelan Energy Group PEG submitted its design package to USAID for review and approval with the project having an expected completion date of July 4 2022 • a 40 MW bifacial solar plant to be constructed in Balkh Province this activity was awarded in July 2021 the PPA between the contractor PEG and DABS was signed in September 2020 • a 25 MW sun-tracking solar plant to be constructed in Herat Province this activity was awarded in July 2021 the PPA between the contractor PEG and DABS was signed in September 2020 Three of USAID’s seven active projects are delayed 580 USAID’s work on SEPS evolved from a separate contract that was to be completed by November 2013—meaning it is now almost seven and a half years behind schedule 581 The NEPS-SEPS connecting transmission lines and substations between Ghazni and Kandahar were to be completed by the end of 2016— meaning they are over four and a half years behind schedule 582 Construction on the Ghazni-to-Kandahar transmission line was halted in May 2020 as a result of the demining and reclearance contract expiring As of May 29 2021 construction remained halted as the demining and reclearance contract was still under procurement with DABS According to USAID the procurement process has been delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic 138 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT - - - - - - -As a result of this delay the completion date for the transmission line was extended from December 31 2020 to September 7 2021 583 Cumulatively USAID has disbursed approximately $2 05 billion since 2002 to build power plants substations and transmission lines and to provide technical assistance in the power sector 584 USAID’s active powerinfrastructure projects have a total estimated cost of $864 9 million and are presented in Table 2 23 TABLE 2 23 USAID ACTIVE ENERGY PROJECTS Cumulative Disbursements as of 7 8 2021 Project Title Start Date End Date Total Estimated Cost Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity PTEC 1 1 2013 12 31 2023 $316 713 724 $272 477 914 Design and Construct of SEPS Completion and NEPS-SEPS Connector Substations 7 3 2019 7 30 2023 175 527 284 93 415 533 Contribution to AITF Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund 3 7 2013 3 6 2023 153 670 184 153 670 184 7 23 2016 1 22 2022 125 000 000 99 768 283 4 1 2021 3 31 2022 24 150 000 0 10 22 2019 11 27 2021 22 994 029 0 Engineering Support Program Bifacial Solar Photovoltaic Power Plant 25 MW Wind Farm in Herat Province Design and Acquisition of SEPS Completion and NEPS-SEPS Connector 3 7 2018 6 27 2022 20 151 240 9 668 086 20 MW Floating Solar Installation-Naghlu 1 27 2020 7 4 2022 19 630 174 3 569 975 Partnerships for Enhanced Engagement in Research PEER grants 7 25 2011 7 23 2021 5 440 647 5 440 647 Energy Loss Management Visualization Platform Activity 1 25 2020 1 24 2022 1 579 973 789 986 $864 857 255 $638 800 608 Total Source USAID response to SIGAR data call 7 14 2021 Power Generation at Kandahar Solar Power Plant at Risk On October 16 2019 the 10 MW Kandahar Solar Power Plant the first private-sector investment in Afghanistan’s renewable energy sector began commercial operations USAID provided $10 million in incentive funds for Dynasty Oil Gas Private Limited to build own and operate the plant In addition Dynasty signed a 15-year PPA with DABS which constructed a 6 5 kilometer transmission line connecting the plant to the national power grid USAID commended the construction of this power plant as establishing “a model approach for the Ministry of Energy and Water and DABS to successfully attract additional private sector investments in energy projects in Afghanistan ” This model is currently being applied to other USAID investments in Afghanistan’s renewable energy sector 585 While the Kandahar Solar Power Plant has been generating electricity DABS is not using all of the electricity generated and has outstanding payments of approximately $1 1 million owed to Dynasty Dynasty REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 139 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT The USAID-supported 10 MW solar power plant in Kandahar Province USAID photo SIGAR CONDUCTS INSPECTION OF KANDAHAR SOLAR POWER PLANT On April 5 2021 SIGAR released an inspection report on Kandahar Solar Power Plant Based on site visits to the power plant from August 31 to September 3 2020 SIGAR found that the construction of the plant by Dynasty Oil Gas Private Limited generally met the contract requirements and the plant is producing electricity Yet the inspection uncovered a number of problems with the plant SIGAR found Dynasty had installed prohibited piping from Iran some of the electrical workmanship was substandard and created a firesafety hazard and several maintenance issues had appeared including nonfunctional security cameras cracks in the boundary wall and the control building’s roof and missing mortar in the boundary wall’s foundation Source SIGAR Kandahar Solar Power Plant Project Was Generally Completed According to Contract Requirements SIGAR 21-30-IP 4 5 2021 iii representatives informed SIGAR that there have been technical difficulties and instability in the power grid preventing DABS from accepting and using all of the solar power generated necessitating frequent plant shut downs Between October 2019 and September 2020 the amount of electricity which was unable to be delivered exceeded 50% of all electricity generated at the plant for five of the 12 months In December 2019 the amount of undistributed electricity peaked at 93 7% of electricity produced by the plant In order to mitigate electricity delivery issues DABS has procured additional reactive capacitor banks 586 However DABS has refused to pay for all the electricity generated DABS was unable to distribute energy from the plant due to technical problems with the grid although the PPA stipulates that the Afghan utility must purchase all electricity regardless of whether it was distributed DABS asserts that Dynasty was 180 days late in completing construction of the plant and bringing it online Therefore DABS officials believe that Dynasty owes financial damages incurred by this delay This dispute has been referred to the Afghan courts Until the courts settle the matter DABS will not pay any energy invoices for electricity produced but not distributed 587 By September 2020 these outstanding payments added up to $825 011 Combined with other delayed payments the total amount owed to Dynasty is approximately $1 1 million Not only is almost half of the electricity generated wasted due to technical problems with the grid but Dynasty officials informed SIGAR that the unpaid invoices contribute to cash-flow problems that put the viability of the solar power plant at risk 588 While the PPA and plant operations are outside of the scope of USAID’s support for the Kandahar Solar Power Plant the problems that have arisen between Dynasty and DABS threaten to undermine the sustainability of USAID’s investment in Afghanistan’s power infrastructure especially with this model of financial support being used for new renewable energy projects 589 Escalating Violence Threatens Afghanistan’s Power Infrastructure According to DABS at least 35 electricity pylons have been damaged or destroyed in explosions over the previous six months 590 In early May Kabul was plunged into a blackout after two power pylons 30 kilometers outside of the capital city were destroyed in an explosion 591 In early June unknown assailants blew up another electricity tower in northern Kabul cutting off the electricity to several parts of the country 592 On June 8 DABS officials announced that an electricity tower in Herat’s Kohsan City near the Iran border exploded cutting off electricity imports from Iran to Herat Province 593 In late June Kabul once again suffered severe power outages when unknown attackers destroyed a pylon in Parwan Province 594 USAID 140 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT - - - - - - -informed SIGAR this quarter that no U S -funded power infrastructure has been affected by these attacks 595 The targeting of pylons and transmission lines has disrupted the electricity supply in Kabul and seven other provinces and raised concerns over the stability of both domestically produced and imported power 596 The resulting power outages continue to inflate the operational costs of many Afghan companies which are forced to rely on generators for electricity 597 In a June 9 statement USAID Mission Director in Afghanistan Dr Tina Dooley-Jones stated “Destroying infrastructure helps no one It creates untold suffering The Government of Afghanistan knows we all lose when the lights go out when people cannot move from one district or province to another or when parents cannot send their children to school because the building no longer exists ”598 EDUCATION USAID-funded education programs aim to increase access to and improve the quality of both basic and higher education while also building the management capacity of the Ministry of Education MOE to develop a self-sustaining national education system in the long term The premise of USAID’s strategy is that gains in social development including a strong education system will help to bolster Afghan confidence in the government improve the overall “stability and inclusivity” of the country expand “civic participation ” and “create the conditions necessary for peace ”599 With one of the youngest populations in the world—more than 40% of the Afghan population is aged 14 or younger—developing a quality education system serves as a long-term investment in human capital for the Afghan economy and for a democratic system of government as well as individual self-reliance Despite donor assistance Afghanistan has struggled to improve its education outcomes in recent years in the face of MOE’s capacity issues and continued insecurity many students particularly girls remain out of school Reports indicate that the Taliban have threatened people within areas under their control saying girls should not attend school beyond the seventh grade which limits their prospects 600 Since 2002 USAID has disbursed approximately $1 3 billion for education programs as of July 8 2021 601 The agency’s active education programs have a total estimated cost of $183 8 million and can be found in Table 2 24 on the following page Afghan Schools Close Again Amid Surge in COVID-19 Cases Due to the surging COVID-19 cases the Ministry of Public Health MOPH closed all schools in 16 provinces on May 29 2021 for the third time since the beginning of the pandemic The MOPH conducted no contact tracing or other specific analysis to measure the relationship between schools and REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 141 “Destroying infrastructure helps no one It creates untold suffering The Government of Afghanistan knows we all lose when the lights go out when people cannot move from one district or province to another or when parents cannot send their children to school because the building no longer exists ” —Dr Tina Dooley-Jones USAID Mission Director in Afghanistan ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT TABLE 2 24 USAID ACTIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS Project Title Start Date Advancing Higher Education for Afghanistan Development AHEAD End Date Total Estimated Cost Cumulative Disbursements as of 7 8 2021 8 5 2020 8 4 2025 $49 999 917 $2 606 464 Strengthening Education in Afghanistan SEA II 5 19 2014 3 31 2022 49 828 942 43 337 905 Textbook Printing and Distribution II 9 15 2017 12 31 2021 35 000 000 4 333 950 Capacity Building Activity at the Ministry of Education 2 1 2017 1 31 2022 23 042 634 20 783 640 Technical Capacity Building for AUAF 2 1 2021 1 31 2022 18 947 149 4 177 757 Financial and Operational Capacity Building for an Afghan Higher Education Institution 4 8 2021 4 7 2022 7 000 000 24 936 $183 818 642 $75 264 653 Total Source USAID response to SIGAR data call 7 14 2021 COVID-19 transmission 602 As part of the vaccination campaign launched in February 2021 the Afghan government had included teachers on the list of professions prioritized to receive the vaccine in an effort to ensure that schools remained open and teachers stayed safe As of June 1 2021 79 734 teachers had been vaccinated out of around 400 000 603 To reduce the spread of COVID-19 the Afghan government initially closed schools on March 14 2020 Schools had a phased reopening from August to October 2020 but as Afghanistan faced a second wave of COVID-19 the Afghan government announced in late November 2020 that schools would once again close with final exams postponed until the following year 604 Afghan schools reopened and held their postponed exams this quarter Beginning on February 28 2021 grades 4–12 held their end-of-year exams and on March 10 grade 1–3 exams were held In some highly populated cities like Kabul schools opened on February 28 2021 in colder areas the new school year began on March 23 2021 605 Universities resumed classes on March 6 2021 Following the reopening of schools there were reports that many students were not observing health-care guidelines regarding wearing masks and social distancing In late March 2021 the MOE announced it was launching an awareness program among teachers to ensure these guidelines are followed 606 Despite the MOE working to ensure students have remote access to educational material and coursework during the school closures such efforts have been hampered by lack of electricity electrical load shedding and limited internet access Only 14% of Afghans use the internet according to World Bank data 607 In September 2020 the nongovernmental organization Save the Children found that 64% of children had no contact with teachers during the school 142 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT - - - - - - -closures and eight in 10 children believed that they had learned little or nothing during school closures 608 Save the Children further reported that with limited access to remote-learning options only 28 6% of enrolled students were able to access distance-learning programs through television 13 8% through radio and just 0 2% through the internet 609 To better understand the impact of the pandemic on the education sector USAID’s mission in Afghanistan is implementing a Loss of Learning and Associated Factors assessment to gauge the impact of COVID-19 and resulting school closures on students in Afghanistan at a total estimated cost of $450 000 610 The assessment is being conducted by the Research Triangle Institute RTI which was originally scheduled to begin collecting data in Herat Province in June 2021 This has been delayed due to further COVIDrelated school closings After collecting this initial data once schools reopen RTI will present its preliminary findings In September 2021 at the beginning of the new school year RTI will begin collecting data in Nangarhar Province USAID informed SIGAR that data collection is planned only for Herat and Nangarhar Provinces 611 The assessment will look at how severely different subgroups of children experience the impact of lost time in school and how likely those different subgroups are to return to school The assessment will also look at the associated factors that may help or hinder students’ return to school Results will be used to formulate recommendations for the Afghan government and its developing partners to consider and adequately support student learning following the protracted disruptions caused by the global pandemic 612 Troubled USAID Program Begins Printing Remaining Textbooks USAID informed SIGAR this quarter that letters of credit have been issued for printing a portion of the textbooks in its Textbook Printing and Distribution II project 613 This on-budget project with the Ministry of Education launched in September 2017 originally planned to print and distribute 135 million textbooks to Afghan schools through three phases at a total cost of $75 million 614 So far a total of 12 2 million textbooks have been printed and distributed to provincial and district education departments 615 However after printing 12 2 million Dari and Pashto textbooks for primary education as part of the first phase of the project the original contractor Baheer Printing and Packaging in Kabul had its contract cancelled for falsifying certification documents during the bidding process In January 2020 the MOE and National Procurement Authority awarded new contracts to three international firms for the remaining 37 million textbooks of the first phase 616 They also made the decision to limit the project to its first phase only which at 49 2 million textbooks total was less than half the number originally planned and subsequently extended the contract until December 31 2021 617 USAID informed SIGAR that it expects all remaining REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 143 Escalating Violence Targets Female Students in Kabul In the afternoon of May 8 2021 a series of explosions outside of Sayed ul-Shuhada High School in western Kabul killed at least 90 people and injured more than 100 many of them female students leaving class The school hosts classes for girls in the afternoon boys’ classes are held in the morning The attack occurred in the same neighborhood a predominantly Hazara area as an October 2020 suicide bombing of an education center that killed 24 people most of them students The Afghan government blamed the Taliban for the attack though the Taliban denied involvement No group claimed responsibility Afghan National Security Advisor Hamdullah Mohib stated “Right now the Taliban are not fighting us in conventional warfare They attack us where we’re weakest Our front line are our mosques they’re our streets they’re our schools they’re our universities Any place the Taliban can attack is a front line for us now ” On May 16 parents of the victims in the attack demonstrated in Kabul demanding that the Afghan government provide greater security for schools Source Associated Press “Victims’ Families Ask Afghan Govt for School Security ” 5 16 2021 CBS News “As U S leaves Afghanistan emboldened extremists lash out at the softest targets ” 5 17 2021 New York Times “Bombing Outside Afghan School Kills At Least 90 With Girls as Targets ” 5 8 2021 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT textbooks to be printed and distributed to provincial education directorates by November 30 2021 subject to the books meeting the technical specifications of the contract with the printers 618 Teachers students and members of parliament have complained of the lack of textbooks in Afghan schools a challenge which students say has hindered their ability to study Combined with insufficient educational materials schools also face a teacher shortage An MOE spokesperson stated that the country’s schools require at least 50 000 more teachers there are currently around 400 000 teachers for approximately 9 7 million students 619 In May 2021 the MOE announced that the government is recruiting additional temporary contract-based teachers to address the teacher shortage 620 An Afghan classroom uses USAIDsupported textbooks and teaching materials USAID photo HEALTH Since late February 2020 Afghanistan’s already weak and still fledgling health system has been overwhelmed by the COVID-19 pandemic like those of many other countries Even before the pandemic Afghanistan’s health-care system was hampered by a lack of resources and struggled to contain outbreaks of treatable diseases due to poor access to health-care services stemming from continued insecurity repeated population displacement and insufficient resources Afghanistan and Pakistan are the only two countries in the world in which polio remains endemic In 2019 Abdullah Abdullah then serving as Afghanistan’s chief executive said “With what we spend on a single day of war we could build a state-of-the-art hospital ” Afghans who can afford it often seek medical treatment abroad particularly in Pakistan India and Turkey Afghans spend around $300 million a year for medical care outside the country 621 Health-care services also continue to be affected by the escalating violence 622 On May 5 a bombing targeted a minibus of health-care workers in Kabul killing one and wounding three and on June 15 five polio vaccinators were shot and killed in Nangarhar Province These attacks this quarter followed a March attack against three polio vaccinators in Jalalabad 623 On June 23 militants targeted a hospital in Kunar Province firing rockets into it while there were no casualties in the attack the resulting fire destroyed key medical supplies including COVID-19 and polio vaccines 624 During 2020 the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNAMA verified 90 attacks 71 attributed to the Taliban which impacted health-care service delivery both direct attacks against health-care facilities and providers and indiscriminate attacks causing incidental damage to health-care facilities and their personnel This figure was a 20% increase from the previous year Additionally the Taliban continue to threaten health-care facilities and abduct health-care workers to force them to provide medical care to its fighters provide medicines pay special taxes or to close down and relocate to other areas Due to the security-related closure 144 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT - - - - - - -of health facilities UNAMA estimates that up to three million Afghans were deprived of essential health-care services 625 U S on- and off-budget assistance to Afghanistan’s health sector totaled more than $1 4 billion as of July 8 2021 626 USAID’s active health programs have a total estimated cost of $305 2 million and are listed in Table 2 25 TABLE 2 25 USAID ACTIVE HEALTH PROGRAMS Cumulative Disbursements as of 7 8 2021 Start Date End Date Total Estimated Cost 7 10 2020 7 9 2025 $117 000 000 $8 155 501 10 14 2020 10 13 2025 104 000 000 5 547 051 7 1 2014 6 30 2022 54 288 615 34 588 615 10 11 2015 9 30 2021 13 025 000 12 014 261 Afghanistan Demographic and Health Survey ADHS Follow-On 10 9 2018 9 9 2023 10 500 000 5 548 814 Central Contraceptive Procurement CCP 4 20 2015 11 28 2023 3 599 998 1 599 999 5 1 2018 9 30 2023 2 186 357 1 100 362 9 24 2018 9 24 2023 600 000 596 946 $305 199 970 $69 151 549 Project Title Assistance for Families and Indigent Afghans to Thrive AFIAT Urban Health Initiative UHI Disease Early Warning System Plus DEWS Plus Sustaining Health Outcomes through the Private Sector SHOPS Plus Sustaining Technical and Analytic Resources STAR TB Data Impact Assessment and Communications Hub TB DIAH Total Source USAID response to SIGAR data call 7 14 2021 Afghanistan Struggles with Third Wave of the COVID-19 Pandemic Beginning in early May 2021 COVID-19 cases in Afghanistan began to rapidly increase triggering grave concerns that the COVID-19 Delta variant first identified in India is spreading among the population many critically ill patients in Kabul had recently returned from India or had relatives who had recently returned 627 By mid-June the infection rates had skyrocketed by approximately 2 400% according to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 628 Afghan public-health officials estimated that the Delta variant is responsible for approximately 60% of new infections 629 As of July 1 2021 the number of confirmed cases had reached 120 216 with 4 962 deaths Yet a test-positivity rate of 42% suggests the actual spread case numbers and deaths are far higher 630 Afghanistan has increased its testing capacity By the end of March 2021 the number of public-health labs had been expanded to 23 in 19 provinces 631 Yet testing capacity remains limited making it difficult to determine with any accuracy the spread of COVID-19 The capacity and management problems that have hampered the publichealth sector’s ability to treat COVID-19 patients and limit the spread of the disease persist as the country experiences this deadly third wave of the REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 145 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT pandemic As COVID-19 cases spiked in Kabul in early June the two primary hospitals in the city treating patients—Afghan Japan Communicable Disease Hospital and the Muhammad Ali Jinnah Hospital—were forced to close their doors to new patients because they had run out of beds The Ali Jinnah Hospital for instance only has 50 beds allocated for COVID-19 patients 632 Doctors also have warned of acute shortages of oxygen and other medical supplies for COVID-19 patients in Afghanistan’s hospitals 633 Acting Minister of Public Health Wahid Majroh stated “The third wave is as high as it is out of control The oxygen processing equipment is not enough for today’s needs ”634 The population’s access to basic health equipment has also become strained as prices have drastically increased with large quantities of available supplies reportedly diverted to the black market by June 2021 the price of a box of face masks increased from $1 a year ago to $15 635 On June 17 the U S Embassy in Kabul went into an immediate lockdown amid surging cases on the embassy compound with ICU resources at full capacity Some 95% of the cases at the embassy are among unvaccinated or partially vaccinated individuals The U S Embassy also issued a health alert urging Americans to leave Afghanistan “as soon as possible” due to the surge in COVID-19 cases and the inability of the health sector to handle the increased caseload 636 The U S government sent 100 ventilators to Afghanistan in October 2020 to treat COVID-19 patients However the supply of associated consumables such as ventilation tubes and plastic attachments included in this shipment was expected to last only until June 2021 and Afghanistan cannot procure replacement parts 637 USAID informed SIGAR this quarter that the requisition and purchase orders for the replacement consumables were finalized and that shipments arrived in Kabul in late June 2021 638 The USAID mission in Afghanistan and the Bureau of Global Health also are coordinating on installing four oxygen pressure swing adsorption PSA plants in hospitals in Kabul Kandahar Mazar-e Sharif and Jalalabad USAID informed SIGAR this quarter that the installation and operationalization of these PSA plants have been delayed to the second quarter of FY 2022 639 In total the U S government has provided over $40 million in additional direct support for Afghanistan’s COVID-19 response and has expedited $90 million out of which $10 million was COVID reprogrammed funds in development assistance through the World Bank and reoriented other reconstruction programs to deal with the effects of the pandemic The additional funding has come from the Economic Support Fund International Counter Narcotics and Law Enforcement and Migration Refugee Assistance accounts 640 146 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT U S -Funded COVID-19 Vaccines Arrive in Kabul On June 25 2021 the White House announced plans to donate 3 3 million doses of the Johnson Johnson vaccine to Afghanistan through COVAX an international program to assist with equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines therapeutics and tests for developing countries The Johnson Johnson vaccine requires only a single shot and can be stored at normal refrigeration temperatures 35 6 to 46 4 degrees Fahrenheit On July 9 the first 1 4 million doses arrived in Kabul 641 Afghanistan’s vaccination campaign kicked off at a February 23 ceremony at the presidential palace two weeks after receiving 500 000 doses enough for 250 000 people of the AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine from the Indian government This vaccine can be stored and transported at normal refrigeration temperatures 642 On March 8 Afghanistan received a second shipment of 468 000 doses enough for 234 000 people of the AstraZeneca vaccine through COVAX this shipment also included 470 000 syringes and 4 700 safety boxes to safely dispose of used needles 643 On April 20 2021 the Asian Development Bank approved a $50 million grant to assist the Afghan government in purchasing and transporting up to 2 6 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines in addition to supporting the capacity of the Ministry of Public Health to implement the government’s vaccination program 644 After Afghanistan used up its initial supply of vaccines in late May China sent 700 000 doses enough for 350 000 people of its Sinopharm COVID-19 vaccine on June 10 The Ministry of Public Health announced that it would prioritize individuals with chronic diseases or who are over the age of 50 with comorbidities to receive the vaccine 645 Like the AstraZeneca vaccine the Sinopharm vaccine can be stored and transported at normal refrigeration temperatures as opposed to the deep cold storage required for some other vaccines 646 The efficacy of China’s vaccines however especially against the Delta variant is uncertain 647 In addition to the Chinese-provided vaccines the Afghan government expects the World Health Organization WHO to deliver a further three million vaccines doses by August 2021 after supply problems led to a delay from the original promised delivery date in May 648 Foreign Minister Mohammad Haneef Atmar has also announced that Afghan health officials are in discussions with the Russian government to distribute the Russian-produced Sputnik V vaccine despite its current lack of WHO approval 649 As of July 3 2021 the Afghan government had administered the vaccine to 909 829 individuals with 188 847 people fully vaccinated with both doses 650 By early June 2021 up to 500 000 first and second doses were allocated to military personnel limiting the supply available to civilians 651 In some parts of the country there have been reports of vaccine hesitancy among the population with vaccinators struggling to administer doses before the vaccine supplies expire 652 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 147 U S -funded COVID-19 vaccines arrive in Kabul July 9 2021 U S Embassy Kabul photo 3 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT 149 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT GOVERNANCE OTHER AGENCYCONTENTS OVERSIGHT CONTENTS KEY ISSUESOversight Completed EVENTSActivities H4 TOC 151 3 Ongoing Oversight Activities 154 Photo on previous page A New Mexico National Guard staff sergeant unpacks a pallet of munitions withdrawn from Afghanistan to a supply point in Kuwait for refurbishing U S Army photo by Staff Sgt Neil W McCabe 150 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT SIGAR’s enabling legislation requires it to keep the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully informed about problems relating to the administration of Afghanistan reconstruction programs and to submit a report to Congress on SIGAR’s oversight work and on the status of the U S reconstruction effort no later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal quarter The statute also instructs SIGAR to include to the extent possible relevant matters from the end of the quarter up to the submission date of its report Each quarter SIGAR requests updates from other agencies on completed and ongoing oversight activities This section compiles these updates Copies of completed reports are posted on the agencies’ respective public websites The descriptions appear as submitted with minor changes to maintain consistency with other sections of this report acronyms and abbreviations in place of full organizational names standardized capitalization punctuation and preferred spellings and third-person instead of first-person construction These agencies perform oversight activities in Afghanistan and provide results to SIGAR • Department of Defense Office of Inspector General DOD OIG • Department of State Office of Inspector General State OIG • Government Accountability Office GAO • U S Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General USAID OIG COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES Table 4 1 lists the 16 oversight reports related to Afghanistan reconstruction that participating agencies issued this quarter U S Department of Defense Office of Inspector General During this quarter DOD OIG issued two reports related to Afghanistan reconstruction REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 151 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT TABLE 4 1 RECENTLY ISSUED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER U S AGENCIES AS OF JUNE 30 2021 Agency Report Number Date Issued Report Title DOD OIG DODIG-2021-084 5 18 2021 Evaluation of Combatant Command Counter-Threat Finance Operations DOD OIG DODIG-2021-082 5 18 2021 Kinetic Targeting in the U S CENTCOM Area of Responsibility GAO N A 4 23 2021 Budget Justification Review Afghanistan Security Forces Fund Execution USAID OIG 8-306-21-034-N 6 9 2021 Closeout Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of International Finance Corporation Afghanistan Investment Climate Reform Program Award AID-EGEE-G-15-00001 IFC TF072383 March 27 2015 to March 26 2020 USAID OIG 8-306-21-033-N 6 2 2021 Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of FHI 360 Under Multiple Awards in Afghanistan October 1 2019 to September 30 2020 USAID OIG 8-306-21-031-N 5 20 2021 Financial Audit of Costs Incurred by Management Systems International Inc Under the Afghanistan Monitoring Evaluation and Learning Activity Program Award Number 72030619C00004 March 13 2019 to June 30 2020 USAID OIG 8-306-21-030-N 5 20 2021 Closeout Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of Internews Network Inc RASANA Media Program in Afghanistan Cooperative Agreement AID-306-A-17-00001 January 1 2019 to March 28 2020 USAID OIG 8-306-21-029-N 5 10 2021 Close-Out Audit of International Organization for Migration Under Support for the USAID Construction of Health and Education Facilities Program in Afghanistan Cooperative Agreement AID-306-A-00-08-00512 January 1 2015 to June 30 2016 USAID OIG 8-306-21-028-N 5 10 2021 Fund Accountability Statement Audit of Creative Associates International Inc Under Afghan Children Read Program in Afghanistan Task Order AID-306-TO-16-00003 October 1 2018 to September 30 2019 USAID OIG 8-306-21-027-N 4 28 2021 Fund Accountability Statement Audit of Chemonics International Inc Under Multiple Awards in Afghanistan Year Ended 2019 USAID OIG 8-306-21-026-N 4 28 2021 Financial Audit of Costs Incurred by Consortium For Elections and Political Process Strengthening Under the Strengthening Civic Engagement in Elections Program in Afghanistan Cooperative Agreement 72030618LA00004 January 1 to September 30 2019 USAID OIG 8-306-21-025-N 4 26 2021 Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of American University of Afghanistan Support to the American University of Afghanistan Project Cooperative Agreement AID-306-A-13-00004 July 1 2019 to May 31 2020 USAID OIG 8-306-21-024-N 4 22 2021 Audit of Fund Accountability Statement of The Asia Foundation Under Multiple Awards in Afghanistan 2018–2020 USAID OIG 8-306-21-022-N 4 19 2021 Close-out Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of Palladium International LLC Health Sector Resiliency Project in Afghanistan Contract AID-306-C-15-00009 July 1 2019 to September 30 2020 USAID OIG 8-306-21-021-N 4 19 2021 Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Catalyzing Afghan Agricultural Innovation Program in Afghanistan Cooperative Agreement 306-72030618LA00002 May 28 2018 to December 31 2019 USAID OIG 8-306-21-020-N 4 19 2021 Fund Accountability Statement Audit of Checchi and Company Consulting Inc Under the Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency Program in Afghanistan Task Order AID-306-TO-16-00007 July 1 2019 to June 30 2020 Source DOD OIG response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 State OIG response to SIGAR data call 6 14 2021 GAO response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 USAID OIG response to SIGAR data call 6 14 2021 Evaluation of Combatant Command Counter-Threat Finance Activities The U S Africa Command U S Central Command U S European Command and U S Indo-Pacific Command planned and executed counter-threat finance CTF activities to support their respective missions However this report found that they did not establish and maintain formalized command procedures This occurred because command personnel relied primarily upon their own experience and knowledge to conduct CTF activities As a result the combatant command CTF offices did not have 152 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT established standardized procedures for conducting CTF activities at the combatant command level with interagency partners or with partnered nations Additionally DOD did not oversee the full implementation of CTF policy DOD did not ensure that its components fulfilled their CTF programrelated roles and responsibilities and was still in the process of developing and releasing an overarching CTF policy framework As a result DOD was unable to ensure CTF personnel conducted CTF activities in accordance with DOD policy and guidance Kinetic Targeting in the U S Central Command Area of Responsibility The results of this evaluation are classified U S Department of State Office of Inspector General–Middle East Regional Operations State OIG completed no audits related to Afghanistan reconstruction this quarter Government Accountability Office During this quarter the GAO issued one oversight product related to Afghanistan reconstruction Budget Justification Review Afghanistan Security Forces Fund Execution Congress established the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ASFF in 2005 to build equip train and sustain the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces which comprise all forces under the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior DOD data indicate that Congress has appropriated more than $83 1 billion in ASFF funding since 2005 In previous technical assistance provided to the congressional defense committees GAO found that over $4 billion in funds for prior fiscal years were unexpended Appropriations for the ASFF are available for obligation for two years with five additional years available for disbursements Since fiscal year 2019 the ASFF has included four budget activity groups BAG Afghan National Army Afghan National Police Afghan Air Force and Afghan Special Security Forces Each BAG is further divided into four subactivity groups SAG sustainment infrastructure equipment and transportation and training and operations GAO reviewed 1 how much has been appropriated for Afghanistan Security Forces Funds ASFF since the fund’s inception in 2005 2 the extent to which ASFF funds remain unobligated and how that compares with obligations since the fund’s inception in 2005 and 3 the extent to which ASFF funds have been cancelled since the fund’s inception in 2005 The findings of this budget review were deemed not publicly releasable REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 153 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT U S Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General During this quarter USAID OIG released 13 financial-audit reports related to Afghanistan reconstruction Financial audits of USAID Afghanistan programs are performed by public accounting firms USAID OIG performs desk reviews onsite supervisory reviews and random quality-control reviews of the audits and transmits the reports to USAID for action Summaries for financial-audit reports can be found on the agency’s website ONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES As of June 30 2021 the participating agencies reported eight ongoing oversight activities related to reconstruction in Afghanistan These activities are listed in Table 4 2 and described in the following sections by agency TABLE 4 2 ONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER U S AGENCIES AS OF JUNE 30 2021 Agency Report Number Date Initiated Report Title DOD OIG D2021-DEV0PD-0045 000 1 25 2021 DOD OIG D2021-D000RJ-0056 000 1 5 2021 DOD OIG D2020-DEV0PD-0121 000 7 20 2020 Evaluation of Traumatic Brain Injury Screening in the U S Central Command Area of Responsibility State OIG 21AUD011 12 3 2020 Audit of Selected Grants and Cooperative Agreements Administered by the Public Affairs Section at U S Embassy Kabul Afghanistan State OIG 20AUD111 9 30 2020 Audit of the Use of Non-Competitive Contracts in Support of Overseas Contingency Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq State OIG 20AUD098 9 10 2020 Audit of Department of State Compliance with Requirements Relating to Undefinitized Contract Actions GAO 104132 3 4 2020 Review of DOD’s Contingency Contracting GAO 104151 3 3 2020 DOD Oversight of Private Security Contractors Evaluation of U S Central Command and U S Special Operations Command Implementation of DOD's Law of War Program Follow-Up Audit of Army Oversight of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program IV Government-Furnished Property in Afghanistan Source DOD OIG response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 State OIG response to SIGAR data call 6 14 2021 GAO response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 USAID OIG response to SIGAR data call 6 14 2021 U S Department of Defense Office of Inspector General DOD OIG has three ongoing projects this quarter that relate to reconstruction or security operations in Afghanistan Evaluation of U S Central Command and U S Special Operations Command Implementation of DOD’s Law of War Program DOD OIG is evaluating the extent to which U S Central Command and U S Special Operations Command developed and implemented programs in accordance with DOD Law of War requirements to reduce potential law-ofwar violations when conducting operations DOD OIG will also determine whether potential U S Central Command and U S Special Operations 154 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT Command law-of-war violations were reported and reviewed in accordance with DOD policy Follow-Up Audit of Army Oversight of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program IV Government-Furnished Property in Afghanistan The objective of this follow-up audit is to determine whether the U S Army implemented the recommendations identified in DODIG-2018-040 “Army Oversight of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Government-Furnished Property in Afghanistan ” December 11 2017 to improve the accountability of government-furnished property Evaluation of Traumatic Brain Injury Screening in the U S Central Command Area of Responsibility DOD OIG is determining whether U S Central Command screened documented and tracked DOD service members suspected of sustaining a traumatic brain injury to determine whether a return-to-duty status for current operations was acceptable or whether evacuation and additional care was required U S Department of State Office of Inspector General–Middle East Regional Operations State OIG has three ongoing projects this quarter related to Afghanistan reconstruction Audit of Selected Grants and Cooperative Agreements Administered by the Public Affairs Section at U S Embassy Kabul Afghanistan The audit will examine grants and cooperative agreements administered by the public affairs section at U S Embassy Kabul Audit of the Use of Non-Competitive Contracts in Support of Overseas Contingency Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq The audit will examine the use of noncompetitive contracts in support of Overseas Contingency Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq This project will culminate in two reports to be issued this year Audit of Department of State Compliance with Requirements Relating to Undefinitized Contract Actions The audit will examine the Department of State’s compliance with requirements relating to undefinitized contract actions REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 155 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT Government Accountability Office GAO has two ongoing projects this quarter related to Afghanistan reconstruction Review of DOD’s Contingency Contracting DOD has long relied on contractors to support a wide range of worldwide operations in a contingency environment including military and stability operations and recovery from natural disasters humanitarian crises and other calamitous events Contracting in the contingency environment includes logistics and base-operations support equipment processing construction and transportation During recent U S military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan contractors frequently accounted for more than half of the total DOD presence In 2008 Congress established in law the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan CWC to review and make recommendations on DOD’s contracting process for current and future contingency environments The CWC issued its final report in August 2011 GAO will review 1 the extent to which DOD has addressed the recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in policy guidance education and training 2 how DOD has used contractors to support contingency operations from January 1 2009 to December 31 2019 and 3 the extent to which DOD has established processes to track and report contractor personnel to support contingency operations DOD Oversight of Private Security Contractors In 2007 private security contractors PSCs working for the U S government killed and injured a number of Iraqi civilians bringing attention to the increased use of PSCs supporting the military in contingency environments such as ongoing operations in Iraq or Afghanistan In 2020 DOD reported that almost one-fifth of the roughly 27 000 contractors in Afghanistan were performing security functions including some 3 000 armed PSCs DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Geographic Combatant Commands are responsible for guiding and monitoring the department’s use of PSCs GAO has previously reported on and made several recommendations to improve DOD’s tracking and oversight of PSCs GAO will review the extent to which since calendar year 2009 1 DOD has tracked and reported on the use of PSCs in support of contingency humanitarian and peacekeeping operations and exercises and 2 whether laws regulations and requirements on the use of PSCs changed and how DOD has implemented them into its processes to improve oversight 156 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT U S Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General USAID OIG has no ongoing audits this quarter related to Afghanistan reconstruction REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 157 APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES CONTENTS Appendix A 160 Appendix B 166 Appendix C 168 Appendix D 172 Appendix E 180 Appendix F 182 Endnotes 189 The Official Seal of SIGAR The official seal of SIGAR represents the coordination of efforts between the United States and Afghanistan to provide accountability and oversight of reconstruction activities The phrases in Dari top and Pashto bottom on the seal are translations of SIGAR’s name APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES 159 APPENDICES - -------------- APPENDIX A CROSS-REFERENCE OF REPORT TO STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS This appendix cross-references the sections of this report to the quarterly reporting and related requirements under SIGAR’s enabling legislation the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 Pub L No 110-181 § 1229 Table A 1 and to the semiannual reporting requirements prescribed for inspectors general more generally under the Inspector General Act of 1978 as amended 5 U S C App 3 Table A 2 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 Pub L No 115-91 §1521 Table A 3 TABLE A 1 CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB L NO 110-181 § 1229 Public Law Section SIGAR Enabling Language SIGAR Action Report Section To provide for an independent and objective means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations and the necessity for and progress on corrective action Ongoing quarterly report Full report The Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the general supervision of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense Report to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense Full report OVERSIGHT OF AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION — It shall be the duty of the Inspector General to conduct supervise and coordinate audits and investigations of the treatment handling and expenditure of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and of the programs operations and contracts carried out utilizing such funds including subsections A through G below Review appropriated available funds Full report Section 1229 f 1 A The oversight and accounting of the obligation and expenditure of such funds Review obligations and expenditures of appropriated available funds SIGAR Oversight Funding Section 1229 f 1 B The monitoring and review of reconstruction activities funded by such funds Review reconstruction activities funded by appropriations and donations SIGAR Oversight Section 1229 f 1 C The monitoring and review of contracts funded by such funds Review contracts using appropriated and available funds Note Section 1229 f 1 D The monitoring and review of the transfer of such funds and associated information between and among departments agencies and entities of the United States and private and nongovernmental entities Review internal and external transfers of appropriated available funds Appendix B Purpose Section 1229 a 3 Supervision Section 1229 e 1 Duties Section 1229 f 1 Review programs operations contracts using appropriated available funds Continued on the next page 160 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION APPENDICES TABLE A 1 CONTINUED CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB L NO 110-181 § 1229 Public Law Section SIGAR Enabling Language SIGAR Action Report Section Section 1229 f 1 E The maintenance of records on the use of such funds to facilitate future audits and investigations of the use of such fund s Maintain audit records SIGAR Oversight Appendix C Appendix D Section 1229 f 1 F The monitoring and review of the effectiveness of United States coordination with the Governments of Afghanistan and other donor countries in the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy Monitoring and review as described Audits Section 1229 f 1 G The investigation of overpayments such as duplicate payments or duplicate billing and any potential unethical or illegal actions of Federal employees contractors or affiliated entities and the referral of such reports as necessary to the Department of Justice to ensure further investigations prosecutions recovery of further funds or other remedies Conduct and reporting of investigations as described Investigations Section 1229 f 2 OTHER DUTIES RELATED TO OVERSIGHT — The Inspector General shall establish maintain and oversee such systems procedures and controls as the Inspector General considers appropriate to discharge the duties under paragraph 1 Establish maintain and oversee systems procedures and controls Full report Section 1229 f 3 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978 — In addition … the Inspector General shall also have the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978 Duties as specified in Inspector General Act Full report Section 1229 f 4 COORDINATION OF EFFORTS — The Inspector General shall coordinate with and receive the cooperation of each of the following A the Inspector General of the Department of Defense B the Inspector General of the Department of State and C the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development Coordination with the inspectors general of DOD State and USAID Other Agency Oversight Federal Support and Other Resources Section 1229 h 5 A ASSISTANCE FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES — Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance from any department agency or other entity of the Federal Government the head of such entity shall insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing law furnish such information or assistance to the Inspector General or an authorized designee Expect support as requested Full report Section 1229 h 5 B REPORTING OF REFUSED ASSISTANCE — Whenever information or assistance requested by the Inspector General is in the judgment of the Inspector General unreasonably refused or not provided the Inspector General shall report the circumstances to the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense as appropriate and to the appropriate congressional committees without delay Monitor cooperation N A Continued on the next page REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 161 APPENDICES - -------------- TABLE A 1 CONTINUED CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB L NO 110-181 § 1229 Public Law Section SIGAR Enabling Language SIGAR Action Report Section QUARTERLY REPORTS — Not later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal-year quarter the Inspector General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report summarizing for the period of that quarter and to the extent possible the period from the end of such quarter to the time of the submission of the report the activities during such period of the Inspector General and the activities under programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan Each report shall include for the period covered by such report a detailed statement of all obligations expenditures and revenues associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Afghanistan including the following – Report – 30 days after the end of each calendar quarter Full report Appendix B Section 1229 i 1 A Obligations and expenditures of appropriated donated funds Obligations and expenditures of appropriated donated funds Appendix B Section 1229 i 1 B A project-by-project and program-by-program accounting of the costs incurred to date for the reconstruction of Afghanistan together with the estimate of the Department of Defense the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development as applicable of the costs to complete each project and each program Project-by-project and program-by-program accounting of costs List unexpended funds for each project or program Funding Note Section 1229 i 1 C Revenues attributable to or consisting of funds provided by foreign nations or international organizations to programs and projects funded by any department or agency of the United States Government and any obligations or expenditures of such revenues Revenues obligations and expenditures of donor funds Funding Section 1229 i 1 D Revenues attributable to or consisting of foreign assets seized or frozen that contribute to programs and projects funded by any U S government department or agency and any obligations or expenditures of such revenues Revenues obligations and expenditures of funds from seized or frozen assets Funding Section 1229 i 1 E Operating expenses of agencies or entities receiving amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan Operating expenses of agencies or any organization receiving appropriated funds Funding Appendix B Section 1229 i 1 F In the case of any contract grant agreement or other funding mechanism described in paragraph 2 — i The amount of the contract or other funding mechanism ii A brief discussion of the scope of the contract or other funding mechanism iii A discussion of how the department or agency of the United States Government involved in the contract grant agreement or other funding mechanism identified and solicited offers from potential contractors to perform the contract grant agreement or other funding mechanism together with a list of the potential individuals or entities that were issued solicitations for the offers and iv The justification and approval documents on which was based the determination to use procedures other than procedures that provide for full and open competition Describe contract details Note Reports Section 1229 i 1 Summarize activities of the Inspector General Detailed statement of all obligations expenditures and revenues Continued on the next page 162 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION APPENDICES TABLE A 1 CONTINUED CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB L NO 110-181 § 1229 Public Law Section SIGAR Enabling Language SIGAR Action Report Section Section 1229 i 3 PUBLIC AVAILABILITY — The Inspector General shall publish on a publicly available Internet website each report under paragraph 1 of this subsection in English and other languages that the Inspector General determines are widely used and understood in Afghanistan Publish report as directed at www sigar mil Full report Section 1229 i 4 FORM — Each report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex if the Inspector General considers it necessary Publish report as directed Full report Section 1229 j 1 Inspector General shall also submit each report required under subsection i to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense Submit quarterly report Full report Dari and Pashto translation in process Note Although this data is normally made available on SIGAR’s website www sigar mil the data SIGAR has received is in relatively raw form and is currently being reviewed analyzed and organized for future SIGAR use and publication Covered “contracts grants agreements and funding mechanisms” are defined in paragraph 2 of Section 1229 i of Pub L No 110-181 as being— “any major contract grant agreement or other funding mechanism that is entered into by any department or agency of the United States Government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan with any public or private sector entity for any of the following purposes To build or rebuild physical infrastructure of Afghanistan To establish or reestablish a political or societal institution of Afghanistan To provide products or services to the people of Afghanistan ” TABLE A 2 CROSS-REFERENCE TO SEMIANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE IG ACT OF 1978 AS AMENDED 5 U S C APP 3 “IG ACT” IG Act Section IG Act Language SIGAR Action Section Section 5 a 1 Description of significant problems abuses and deficiencies Extract pertinent information from SWA JPG member reports List problems abuses and deficiencies from SIGAR audit reports investigations and inspections Other Agency Oversight SIGAR Oversight See Letters of Inquiry at www sigar mil Section 5 a 2 Description of recommendations for corrective action … with respect to significant problems abuses or deficiencies Extract pertinent information from SWA JPG member l reports List recommendations from SIGAR audit reports Other Agency Oversight SIGAR Oversight See Letters of Inquiry at www sigar mil Section 5 a 3 Identification of each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports on which corrective action has not been completed List all instances of incomplete corrective action from previous semiannual reports Posted in full at www sigar mil Section 5 a 4 A summary of matters referred to prosecutive authorities and the prosecutions and convictions which have resulted Extract pertinent information from SWA JPG member reports Other Agency Oversight List SIGAR Investigations that have been referred SIGAR Oversight Section 5 a 5 A summary of each report made to the Secretary of Defense under section 6 b 2 instances where information requested was refused or not provided Extract pertinent information from SWA JPG member reports Other Agency Oversight List instances in which information was refused SIGAR auditors investigators or inspectors SIGAR Oversight A listing subdivided according to subject matter of each audit report inspection report and evaluation report issued showing dollar value of questioned costs and recommendations that funds be put to better use Extract pertinent information from SWA JPG member reports Other Agency Oversight List SIGAR reports SIGAR Oversight Section 5 a 6 Continued on the next page REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 163 APPENDICES - -------------- TABLE A 2 CONTINUED CROSS-REFERENCE TO SEMIANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE IG ACT OF 1978 AS AMENDED 5 U S C APP 3 “IG ACT” IG Act Section IG Act Language SIGAR Action Section 5 a 7 A summary of each particularly significant report Extract pertinent information from SWA JPG member reports Section 5 a 8 Statistical tables showing the total number of audit reports and the total dollar value of questioned costs Extract pertinent information from SWA JPG member reports See reports of SWA JPG members Develop statistical tables showing dollar value of questioned cost from SIGAR reports In process Statistical tables showing the total number of audit reports inspection reports and evaluation reports and the dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use by management Extract pertinent information from SWA JPG member reports See reports of SWA JPG members Develop statistical tables showing dollar value of funds put to better use by management from SIGAR reports In process A summary of each audit report inspection report and evaluation report issued before the commencement of the reporting period for which no management decision has been made by the end of reporting period an explanation of the reasons such management decision has not been made and a statement concerning the desired timetable for achieving a management decision Extract pertinent information from SWA JPG member reports See reports of SWA JPG members Provide a synopsis of SIGAR audit reports in which recommendations by SIGAR are still open Posted in full at www sigar mil A description and explanation of the reasons for any significant revised management decision Extract pertinent information from SWA JPG member reports See reports of SWA JPG members Explain SIGAR audit reports in which significant revisions have been made to management decisions None Extract pertinent information from SWA JPG member reports See reports of SWA JPG members Explain SIGAR audit reports in which SIGAR disagreed with management decision No disputed decisions during the reporting period Information described under Section 804 b of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 instances and reasons when an agency has not met target dates established in a remediation plan Extract pertinent information from SWA JPG member reports See reports of SWA JPG members Provide information where management has not met targets from a remediation plan No disputed decisions during the reporting period Section 5 a 14 A An Appendix containing the results of any peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General during the reporting period or None conducted during the reporting period None Section 5 a 14 B If no peer review was conducted within that reporting period a statement identifying the date of the last peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General SIGAR has posted in full the results of and Posted in full at reports from SIGAR’s last peer review by FDIC OIG www sigar mil for the period ending 4 29 2019 Section 5 a 9 Section 5 a 10 Section 5 a 11 Section 5 a 12 Section 5 a 13 Information concerning any significant management decision with which the Inspector General is in disagreement Section Other Agency Oversight A full list of significant reports can be found at Provide a synopsis of the significant SIGAR reports www sigar mil SIGAR received a rating of pass Continued on the next page 164 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION APPENDICES TABLE A 2 CONTINUED CROSS-REFERENCE TO SEMIANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE IG ACT OF 1978 AS AMENDED 5 U S C APP 3 “IG ACT” IG Act Section IG Act Language SIGAR Action Section Section 5 a 15 A list of any outstanding recommendations from any peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General that have not been fully implemented including a statement describing the status of the implementation and why implementation is not complete All peer review recommendations have been implemented Recommendations and related materials posted in full at www sigar mil Section 5 a 16 Any peer reviews conducted by SIGAR of another IG Office during the reporting period including a list of any outstanding recommendations made from any previous peer review that remain outstanding or have not been fully implemented SIGAR assisted the SBA OIG in conducting an inspection and evaluation peer review of the HUD OIG’s Office of Evaluation A report was issued May 12 2020 Final report published in full at www hudoig gov TABLE A 3 CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB L NO 115-91 §1521 Public Law Section NDAA Language SIGAR Action Report Section Section 1521 e 1 1 QUALITY STANDARDS FOR IG PRODUCTS—Except as provided in paragraph 3 each product published or issued by an Inspector General relating to the oversight of programs and activities funded under the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund shall be prepared— A in accordance with the Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards Government Auditing Standards GAGAS GAS as issued and updated by the Government Accountability Office or B if not prepared in accordance with the standards referred to in subparagraph A in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency commonly referred to as the ‘‘CIGIE Blue Book’’ Prepare quarterly report in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency CIGIE commonly referred to as the “CIGIE Blue Book ” for activities funded under the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund Section 1 Reconstruction Update Funding Section 1521 e 2 2 SPECIFICATION OF QUALITY STANDARDS FOLLOWED— Each product published or issued by an Inspector General relating to the oversight of programs and activities funded under the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund shall cite within such product the quality standards followed in conducting and reporting the work concerned Cite within the quarterly report the quality standards followed in conducting and reporting the work concerned The required quality standards are quality control planning data collection and analysis evidence records maintenance reporting and follow-up Inside front cover Appendix A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 165 APPENDICES - -------------- APPENDIX B U S FUNDS FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION Table B 1 lists funds appropriated for Afghanistan reconstruction by agency and fund per year and Table B 2 lists funds appropriated for counternarcotics initiatives as of June 30 2021 TABLE B 2 TABLE B 1 COUNTERNARCOTICS $ MILLIONS Fund ASFF U S FUNDS FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION $ MILLIONS Cumulative Appropriations Since FY 2002 1 311 92 DICDA 3 284 94 ESF 1 455 77 DA INCLE 77 72 2 347 32 DEAa 493 30 Total $8 970 96 Table B 2 Note Numbers have been rounded Counternarcotics funds cross-cut both the Security and Governance Development spending categories these funds are also captured in those categories in Table B 1 Figures represent cumulative amounts committed to counternarcotics initiatives in Afghanistan since 2002 Intitatives include eradication interdiction support to Afghanistan’s Special Mission Wing SMW counternarcoticsrelated capacity building and alternative agricultural development efforts ESF DA and INCLE figures show the cumulative amounts committed for counternarcotics intiatives from those funds SIGAR excluded ASFF funding for the SMW after FY 2013 from this analysis due to the decreasing number of counterternarcotics missions conducted by the SMW DEA receives funding from State’s Diplomatic Consular Programs account in addition to DEA’s direct line appropriation listed in Appendix B a Table B 2 Source SIGAR analysis of counternarcotics funding 7 15 2021 State response to SIGAR data call 7 9 2021 DOD response to SIGAR data call 7 9 2021 USAID response to SIGAR data call 7 14 2021 DEA response to SIGAR data call 7 6 2021 Note Numbers have been rounded DOD reprogrammed $1 billion from FY 2011 ASFF $1 billion from FY 2012 ASFF $178 million from FY 2013 ASFF and $604 million from FY 2019 ASFF to fund other DOD requirements DOD reprogrammed $230 million into FY 2015 ASFF ASFF data reflects the following rescissions $1 billion from FY 2012 in Pub L No 113-6 $764 38 million from FY 2014 in Pub L No 113-235 $400 million from FY 2015 in Pub L No 114-113 $150 million from FY 2016 in Pub L No 115-31 $396 million from FY 2019 in Pub L No 116-93 and $1 10 billion in FY 2020 in Pub L No 116-260 DOD transferred $101 million from FY 2011 AIF $179 5 million from FY 2013 AIF and $55 million from FY 2014 AIF to the ESF to fund infrastructure projects implemented by USAID Source DOD responses to SIGAR data calls 7 19 2021 7 16 2021 7 9 2021 10 12 2017 10 22 2012 10 14 2009 and 10 1 2009 State responses to SIGAR data calls 7 19 2021 7 9 2021 7 2 2021 4 11 2021 3 29 2021 2 19 2021 2 1 2021 10 13 2020 10 9 2020 10 8 2020 7 13 2020 6 11 2020 1 30 2020 10 5 2018 1 10 2018 10 13 2017 10 11 2017 5 4 2016 10 20 2015 4 15 2015 4 15 2014 6 27 2013 10 5 2012 and 6 27 2012 OMB responses to SIGAR data calls 4 16 2015 7 14 2014 7 19 2013 and 1 4 2013 USAID responses to SIGAR data calls 7 14 2021 7 2 2021 10 12 2020 10 7 2020 10 8 2018 10 15 2010 1 15 2010 and 10 9 2009 DOJ response to SIGAR data call 7 6 2021 and 7 7 2009 DFC response to SIGAR data call 4 19 2021 USAGM response to SIGAR data call 6 14 2021 USDA response to SIGAR data call 4 2009 OSD Comptroller 16-22 PA Omnibus 2016 Prior Approval Request 6 30 2016 Pub L Nos 116-93 115-31 114-113 113-235 113-76 113-6 112-74 112-10 111-212 111-118 U S Funding Sources Agency Security Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ASFF Train and Equip T E Foreign Military Financing FMF International Military Education and Training IMET Voluntary Peacekeeping PKO Afghanistan Freedom Support Act AFSA Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities DICDA NATO Resolute Support Mission RSM Total – Security Governance Development Commanders’ Emergency Response Program CERP Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund AIF Task Force for Business and Stability Operations TFBSO Economic Support Fund ESF Development Assistance DA Global Health Programs GHP Commodity Credit Corp CCC USAID-Other Other Non-Proliferation Antiterrorism Demining Related Programs NADR International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement INCLE Human Rights and Democracy Fund HRDF Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs ECE Contributions to International Organizations CIO U S International Development Finance Corporation DFC U S Agency for Global Media USAGM Drug Enforcement Administration DEA Total – Governance Development Humanitarian P L 480 Title II International Disaster Assistance IDA Transition Initiatives TI Migration and Refugee Assistance MRA USDA Programs Title I §416 b FFP FFE ET and PRTA Total – Humanitarian Agency Operations Diplomatic Programs including Worldwide Security Protection DP Embassy Security Construction Maintenance ESCM - Capital Costs Embassy Security Construction Maintenance ESCM - Operations USAID Operating Expenses OE Oversight SIGAR State OIG and USAID OIG Total – Agency Operations Total Funding 166 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I Total FY 2002–09 $82 899 77 440 00 1 059 13 20 37 69 33 550 00 3 284 94 281 87 88 605 40 18 666 47 440 00 1 059 13 7 41 69 33 550 00 1 118 23 0 00 21 910 58 DOD DOD DOD USAID USAID USAID USAID USAID State State State State State DFC USAGM DOJ 3 711 00 988 50 822 85 21 237 39 887 59 576 88 34 95 54 06 927 14 5 503 36 14 51 96 56 523 45 320 87 306 77 284 47 36 290 35 1 639 00 0 00 14 44 7 706 18 884 90 392 09 23 79 30 27 348 33 2 275 13 3 19 36 58 29 47 205 05 15 54 127 44 13 731 41 USAID USAID USAID State USDA 1 095 68 1 152 67 37 54 1 603 47 288 26 4 177 63 664 39 342 27 33 33 555 04 288 26 1 883 29 State State State USAID Multiple 11 839 28 1 544 32 157 27 1 665 18 704 00 15 910 05 1 481 50 294 95 4 00 309 70 42 00 2 132 14 $144 983 43 39 657 42 DOD DOD State State State DOD DOD DOD AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION APPENDICES FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 9 166 77 0 00 0 00 1 76 0 00 0 00 392 27 0 00 9 560 80 10 619 28 0 00 0 00 1 56 0 00 0 00 379 83 0 00 11 000 67 9 200 00 0 00 0 00 1 18 0 00 0 00 472 99 0 00 9 674 16 4 946 19 0 00 0 00 1 42 0 00 0 00 255 81 0 00 5 203 43 3 962 34 0 00 0 00 1 50 0 00 0 00 238 96 0 00 4 202 80 3 939 33 0 00 0 00 1 05 0 00 0 00 0 00 63 82 4 004 20 3 502 26 0 00 0 00 0 86 0 00 0 00 138 76 43 05 3 684 94 4 162 72 0 00 0 00 0 80 0 00 0 00 135 61 57 19 4 356 31 4 666 82 0 00 0 00 0 80 0 00 0 00 118 01 58 78 4 844 40 3 920 00 0 00 0 00 0 43 0 00 0 00 10 18 59 02 3 989 63 3 099 98 0 00 0 00 0 80 0 00 0 00 24 30 0 00 3 125 08 3 047 61 0 00 0 00 0 80 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 3 048 41 1 000 00 0 00 59 26 3 346 00 0 30 92 30 4 22 3 45 70 74 589 00 1 29 5 76 36 92 60 25 27 41 19 20 5 316 09 400 00 299 00 239 24 2 168 51 0 00 69 91 3 09 6 25 69 30 400 00 0 60 6 45 49 92 40 25 24 35 18 70 3 795 57 400 00 400 00 245 76 1 836 76 0 00 0 00 0 38 7 10 65 32 357 92 1 98 8 17 58 73 3 00 21 54 18 70 3 425 34 200 00 145 50 138 20 1 802 65 0 35 0 25 0 00 1 84 52 60 593 81 1 63 2 46 53 03 0 00 21 54 17 00 3 030 85 30 00 144 00 122 24 907 00 0 00 0 01 0 00 0 80 43 20 225 00 0 10 7 28 43 17 10 00 22 11 18 70 1 573 62 10 00 0 00 3 72 883 40 0 95 0 06 0 00 0 82 43 50 250 00 0 99 3 95 41 79 0 00 22 68 9 05 1 270 90 5 00 0 00 0 00 633 27 0 00 0 00 0 00 2 91 37 96 210 00 0 76 2 65 41 35 0 00 23 86 3 31 961 06 5 00 0 00 0 00 767 17 0 00 0 00 1 95 0 29 37 00 184 50 0 25 2 39 40 31 0 00 25 91 11 03 1 075 81 5 00 0 00 0 00 500 00 0 00 0 00 1 52 0 00 36 60 160 00 2 99 2 71 36 12 1 85 25 74 11 11 783 64 10 00 0 00 0 00 350 00 1 09 0 00 0 00 0 00 38 30 87 80 0 74 9 08 32 72 0 00 25 89 13 01 568 63 5 00 0 00 0 00 200 00 0 00 5 00 0 00 0 33 38 50 88 00 0 00 9 08 30 28 0 00 24 60 12 92 413 71 2 00 0 00 0 00 136 45 0 00 17 25 0 00 0 00 45 80 82 20 0 00 0 00 29 64 0 48 25 60 4 30 343 71 58 13 29 61 0 84 80 93 0 00 169 51 112 55 66 23 1 08 65 00 0 00 244 85 59 20 56 00 0 62 99 56 0 00 215 38 46 15 21 50 0 32 76 07 0 00 144 04 65 97 28 13 0 82 107 89 0 00 202 82 53 73 24 50 0 49 129 27 0 00 207 99 26 65 39 78 0 04 84 27 0 00 150 74 4 69 93 84 0 00 89 24 0 00 187 76 4 22 119 64 0 00 77 19 0 00 201 05 0 00 152 35 0 00 86 69 0 00 239 04 0 00 178 61 0 00 100 53 0 00 279 14 0 00 0 23 0 00 51 80 0 00 52 03 859 14 426 15 2 60 197 60 34 40 1 519 89 730 08 256 64 1 63 172 20 37 12 1 197 68 1 126 56 63 00 4 21 216 02 53 15 1 462 94 1 500 79 79 88 3 84 174 64 57 63 1 816 78 752 07 72 02 8 33 61 75 59 39 953 55 822 19 132 52 11 68 137 00 67 37 1 170 75 743 58 64 57 21 67 95 30 64 25 989 36 843 20 79 43 15 28 102 17 58 08 1 098 16 858 27 26 43 22 69 77 52 58 01 1 042 92 824 94 23 89 24 16 72 34 58 15 1 003 48 677 76 22 02 21 13 44 16 57 55 822 62 619 22 2 82 16 04 4 79 56 91 699 77 16 566 29 16 238 77 14 777 82 10 195 09 6 932 78 6 653 84 5 786 10 6 718 04 6 872 00 5 800 79 4 640 55 4 143 93 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 167 APPENDICES - -------------- APPENDIX C SIGAR AUDITS Evaluation Reports Issued SIGAR issued three evaluation reports during this reporting period SIGAR EVALUATION REPORTS ISSUED Report Identifier Report Title Date Issued SIGAR 21-43-IP Fuel for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces Additional Steps Required to Successfully Transition Fuel Responsibilities to the Afghan Government 7 2021 SIGAR 21-37-IP USAID’s Goldozi Project in Afghanistan Project Has Not Achieved Its Goals and COVID-19 Further Curtailed Project Implementation 6 2021 SIGAR 21-33-IP SIGAR Financial Audits $494 Million Questioned Because of Insufficient Supporting Documentation or Noncompliance with Laws and Regulations 5 2021 Ongoing Evaluations SIGAR had two ongoing evaluations during this reporting period SIGAR EVALUATIONS ONGOING AS OF JUNE 30 2021 Project Identifier Project Title Date Initiated SIGAR-E-009 RAID Towers 8 2020 SIGAR-E-007 ARTF-2 5 2020 New Performance Audit SIGAR initiated one new performance audit during this reporting period NEW SIGAR PERFORMANCE AUDITS Project Identifier SIGAR 150A Project Title Date Initiated State ATAP 5 2021 As provided in its authorizing statute SIGAR may also report on products and events occurring after June 30 2021 up to the publication date of this report 168 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION APPENDICES Ongoing Performance Audits SIGAR had 14 ongoing performance audits during this reporting period SIGAR PERFORMANCE AUDITS ONGOING AS OF JUNE 30 2021 Project Identifier Project Title Date Initiated SIGAR 149A USAID Termination of Awards in Afghanistan 3 2021 SIGAR 148A USAID Noncompetitive contracts in Afghanistan 3 2021 SIGAR 147A ANA Territorial Force SIGAR 146A APPS 11 2020 4 2021 SIGAR 145A State Conventional Weapons Destruction 10 2020 SIGAR 144A ANDSF Women’s Incentives 102020 SIGAR 143A No Contracting With The Enemy Follow-Up 6 2020 SIGAR 142A Vanquish NAT Contract 7 2020 SIGAR 141A Post-Peace Planning 5 2020 SIGAR 140A ACC-A BAF Base Security 4 2020 SIGAR 139A Anticorruption 3 SIGAR 138A-2 DOD Enforcement of Conditionality Full Report 11 2019 SIGAR 137A ANA Trust Fund 12 2019 SIGAR 135A U S Investments in Afghan Energy 2 2020 9 2019 Financial-Audit Reports Issued SIGAR issued seven financial-audit reports during this reporting period SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDITS ISSUED Report Identifier Report Title Date Issued SIGAR 21-42-FA Department of State’s Legal Aid through Legal Education Program Audit of Costs Incurred by The Asia Foundation 7 2021 SIGAR 21-40-FA USAID’s Emergency Water Sanitation and Hygiene Assistance to Disaster Affected Populations in Afghanistan Audit of Costs Incurred by the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development 6 2021 SIGAR 21-39-FA USAID’s Strengthening Civic Engagement in Elections in Afghanistan Program Audit of Costs Incurred by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening 6 2021 SIGAR 21-38-FA Department of State’s Cluster Munitions Clearance Projects Audit of Costs Incurred by the Demining Agency for Afghanistan 6 2021 SIGAR 21-36-FA USAID’s Afghan Civic Engagement Program Audit of Costs Incurred by Counterpart International Inc 6 2021 SIGAR 21-35-FA USAID’s Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians Program in Afghanistan Audit of Costs Incurred by Blumont Global Development Inc 6 2021 SIGAR 21-34-FA U S Air Force Support for Operation and Maintenance of A-29 Aircraft for the Afghan Air Force Audit of Costs Incurred by Sierra Nevada Corp 5 2021 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 169 APPENDICES - -------------- Ongoing Financial Audits SIGAR had 35 financial audits in progress during this reporting period SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDITS ONGOING AS OF JUNE 30 2021 Project Identifier Project Title Date Initiated SIGAR-F-235 Dyncorp 6 2021 SIGAR-F-234 Raytheon 6 2021 SIGAR-F-233 ITF Enhancing Human Security 6 2021 SIGAR-F-232 Norwegian People’s Aid 6 2021 SIGAR-F-231 Tetra Tech 6 2021 SIGAR-F-230 Save the Children Federation 4 2021 SIGAR-F-229 ACTED 4 2021 SIGAR-F-228 IRC 4 2021 SIGAR-F-227 DAI 4 2021 SIGAR-F-226 DAI 4 2021 SIGAR-F-225 Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 4 2021 SIGAR-F-224 FHI 360 4 2021 SIGAR-F-223 The Asia Foundation 4 2021 SIGAR-F-222 Management Systems International Inc 4 2021 SIGAR-F-221 International Legal Foundation 11 2020 SIGAR-F-219 Albany Associates International Inc 11 2020 SIGAR-F-218 MCPA 11 2020 SIGAR-F-217 Premiere Urgence Internationale 11 2020 SIGAR-F-216 International Medical Corps 11 2020 SIGAR-F-215 Medair 11 2020 SIGAR-F-214 Chemonics International Inc 11 2020 SIGAR-F-213 DAI 11 2020 SIGAR-F-212 Roots of Peace ROP 11 2020 SIGAR-F-211 Davis Management Group Inc 11 2020 SIGAR-F-210 MSI - Management Systems International Inc 11 2020 SIGAR-F-209 Engility LLC 9 2020 SIGAR-F-208 PAE Government Services 9 2020 SIGAR-F-207 Miracle Systems LLC 9 2020 SIGAR-F-202 The Asia Foundation 3 2020 SIGAR-F-201 DAI-Development Alternatives Inc 3 2020 SIGAR-F-200 Development Alternatives Inc 3 2020 SIGAR-F-199 Development Alternatives Inc 3 2020 SIGAR-F-197 Internews Network Inc SIGAR-F-195 IDLO 12 2019 SIGAR-F-194 AUAF 12 2019 170 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL 3 2020 I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION APPENDICES SIGAR INSPECTIONS Ongoing Inspections SIGAR had nine ongoing inspections during this reporting period SIGAR INSPECTIONS ONGOING AS OF JUNE 30 2021 Project Identifier Project Title Date Initiated SIGAR-I-073 ANA Upgrades at FOB Shank SIGAR-I-072 Salang Tunnel Substation 4 2021 SIGAR-I-071 KNMH Morgue 10 2020 SIGAR-I-070 ANP FPT Phase 1 10 2020 SIGAR-I-068 Pol-i Charkhi Substation Expansion 4 2020 SIGAR-I-067 MSOE at Camp Commando 4 2020 SIGAR-I-065 ANA NEI in Dashti Shadian 1 2020 SIGAR-I-063 Inspection of the ANA MOD HQ Infrastructure Security Improvements 11 2019 SIGAR-I-062 Inspection of the NEI Kunduz Expansion Project 11 2019 9 2020 SIGAR LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM Lessons-Learned Reports Issued SIGAR issued one lessons-learned report during this reporting period SIGAR LESSONS-LEARNED REPORT ISSUED Product Identifier SIGAR 21-41-LL Product Title Date Issued The Risk of Doing the Wrong Thing Perfectly Monitoring and Evaluation of Reconstruction Contracting in Afghanistan 7 2021 Ongoing Lessons-Learned Projects SIGAR has two ongoing lessons-learned projects this reporting period SIGAR LESSONS-LEARNED PROJECTS ONGOING AS OF JUNE 30 2021 Project Identifier Project Title Date Initiated SIGAR LL-16 20-Year Retrospective 1 2021 SIGAR LL-13 Police in Conflict 9 2019 SIGAR RESEARCH ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE Quarterly Report Issued SIGAR issued one quarterly report during this reporting period SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORT ISSUED Product Identifier SIGAR 2021-QR-3 Project Title Date Issued Quarterly Report to the United States Congress REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 7 2021 171 APPENDICES - -------------- APPENDIX D SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS AND HOTLINE SIGAR Investigations This quarter SIGAR opened six new investigations and closed eight bringing total ongoing investigations to 94 Six investigations were closed as a result of convictions while two were closed as a result of unfounded allegations as shown in Figure D 1 Two new investigations were related to procurement and contract fraud and another related to money laundering as shown in Figure D 2 FIGURE D 2 FIGURE D 1 SIGAR NEW INVESTIGATIONS APRIL 1–JUNE 30 2021 SIGAR’S CLOSED INVESTIGATIONS APRIL 1–JUNE 30 2021 Conviction Total 6 Allegations Unfounded Procurement Contract Fraud 2 Money Laundering 1 Other 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 8 Source SIGAR Investigations Directorate 6 30 2021 Source SIGAR Investigations Directorate 6 30 2021 172 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION APPENDICES SIGAR Hotline The SIGAR Hotline by e-mail sigar hotline@mail mil web submission www sigar mil investigations hotline report-fraud aspx phone 866-329-8893 in the USA or 0700107300 via cell phone in Afghanistan received 26 complaints this quarter as shown in Figure D 3 In addition to working on new complaints the Investigations Directorate continued work on complaints received prior to April 1 2021 The directorate processed 91 complaints this quarter most are under review or were closed as shown in Figure D 4 FIGURE D 4 FIGURE D 3 STATUS OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS APRIL 1–JUNE 30 2021 SOURCE OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS APRIL 1–JUNE 30 2021 Complaints Received 41 Complaints Open Total 41 15 Gen Info File Closed Electronic 38 34 Investigation Closed 1 0 10 20 30 40 50 Total 91 Walk-in 3 Source SIGAR Investigations Directorate 7 1 2021 Source SIGAR Investigations Directorate 7 1 2021 SIGAR SUSPENSIONS AND DEBARMENTS Table D 1 is a comprehensive list of finalized suspensions debarments and special-entity designations relating to SIGAR’s work in Afghanistan as of June 30 2021 SIGAR lists its suspensions debarments and special-entity designations for historical purposes only For the current status of any individual or entity listed herein as previously suspended debarred or listed as a special-entity designation please consult the federal System for Award Management www sam gov SAM Entries appearing in both the suspension and debarment sections are based upon their placement in suspended status following criminal indictment or determination of non-responsibility by an agency suspension and debarment official Final debarment was imposed following criminal conviction in U S Federal District Court and or final determination by an agency suspension and debarment official regarding term of debarment REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 173 APPENDICES - -------------- TABLE D 1 SPECIAL-ENTITY DESIGNATIONS SUSPENSIONS AND DEBARMENTS AS OF JUNE 30 2021 Special Entity Designations Arvin Kam Construction Company Arvin Kam Group LLC d b a “Arvin Kam Group Security ” d b a “Arvin Kam Group Foundation ” d b a “Arvin Global Logistics Services Company” Ayub Mohammad Fruzi Haji Khalil Muhammad Haji Amir Haji Dhost Mohammad Zurmat Construction Company Jan Nurullah Khan Haji Mohammad Almas Noh-E Safi Mining Company Noor Rahman Company Noor Rahman Construction Company Nur Rahman Group d b a “NUCCL Construction Company ” d b a “RUCCL Rahman Umar Construction Company ” d b a “Rahman Trading and General Logistics Company LLC Rahman Nur a k a “Noor Rahman a k a “Noor Rahman Safa” Rhaman Mohammad Saadat Vakil Triangle Technologies Wasim Abdul Wakil Zaland Yousef Zurmat Construction Company Zurmat Foundation Zurmat General Trading Zurmat Group of Companies d b a “Zurmat LLC” Zurmat Material Testing Laboratory Autry Cleo Brian Chamberlain William Todd Cook Jeffrey Arthur Harper Deric Tyron Walls Barry Lee Jr International Contracting and Development Sobh Adeeb Nagib a k a “Ali Sobh” Stallion Construction and Engineering Group Wazne Group Inc d b a “Wazne Wholesale” Wazne Ayman a k a “Ayman Ibrahim Wazne” Green George E Tran Anthony Don Vergez Norbert Eugene Bunch Donald P Kline David A Farouki Abul Huda Farouki Mazen Maarouf Salah ANHAM FZCO ANHAM USA Green George E Tran Anthony Don Vergez Norbert Eugene Bunch Donald P Kline David A Farouki Abul Huda Farouki Mazen Maarouf Salah ANHAM FZCO ANHAM USA Khalid Mohammad Khan Daro Mariano April Anne Perez McCabe Elton Maurice Mihalczo John Qasimi Mohammed Indress Radhi Mohammad Khalid Safi Fazal Ahmed Shin Gul Shaheen a k a “Sheen Gul Shaheen” Espinoza-Loor Pedro Alfredo Campbell Neil Patrick Navarro Wesley Hazrati Arash Midfield International Moore Robert G Noori Noor Alam a k a “Noor Alam” Northern Reconstruction Organization Shamal Pamir Building and Road Construction Company Wade Desi D Blue Planet Logistics Services Mahmodi Padres Mahmodi Shikab Saber Mohammed Watson Brian Erik Abbasi Shahpoor Amiri Waheedullah Atal Waheed Daud Abdulilah Dehati Abdul Majid Fazli Qais Hamdard Mohammad Yousuf Kunari Haji Pir Mohammad Mushfiq Muhammad Jaffar Mutallib Abdul Nasrat Sami National General Construction Company Passerly Ahmaad Saleem Rabi Fazal Rahman Atta Rahman Fazal Suspensions Al-Watan Construction Company Basirat Construction Firm Naqibullah Nadeem Rahman Obaidur Robinson Franz Martin Aaria Middle East Aaria Middle East Company LLC Aftech International Aftech International Pvt Ltd Albahar Logistics American Aaria Company LLC American Aaria LLC Sharpway Logistics United States California Logistics Company Brothers Richard S Rivera-Medina Franklin Delano Debarments Farooqi Hashmatullah Hamid Lais Construction Company Hamid Lais Group Lodin Rohullah Farooqi Bennett Fouch Associates LLC Brandon Gary K5 Global Ahmad Noor Noor Ahmad Yousufzai Construction Company Ayeni Sheryl Adenike Cannon Justin Constantino April Anne Constantino Dee Constantino Ramil Palmes Crilly Braam Drotleff Christopher Fil-Tech Engineering and Construction Company Handa Sdiharth Jabak Imad Jamally Rohullah Continued on the following page Indicates that the individual or entity was subject to two final agency actions by an agency suspension and debarment official resulting in a suspension followed by final debarment following the resolution of a criminal indictment or determination of non-responsibility by agency suspension and debarment official Entries without an asterisk indicate that the individual was subject to a suspension or debarment but not both 174 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION APPENDICES TABLE D 1 CONTINUED SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS SUSPENSIONS AND DEBARMENTS AS OF JUNE 30 2021 CONTINUED Debarments continued Roshandil Mohammad Ajmal Saber Mohammed Safi Azizur Rahman Safi Matiullah Sahak Sher Khan Shaheed Murad Shirzad Daulet Khan Uddin Mehrab Watson Brian Erik Wooten Philip Steven Espinoza Mauricio Alam Ahmed Farzad Greenlight General Trading Aaria Middle East Company LLC Aaria Middle East Company Ltd – Herat Aaria M E General Trading LLC Aaria Middle East Barakzai Nangialai Formid Supply and Services Aaria Supply Services and Consultancy Kabul Hackle Logistics Company Yousef Najeebullah Aaria Group Aaria Group Construction Company Aaria Supplies Company LTD Rahimi Mohammad Edris All Points International Distributors Inc Hercules Global Logistics Schroeder Robert Helmand Twinkle Construction Company Waziri Heward Omar Zadran Mohammad Afghan Mercury Construction Company d b a “Afghan Mercury Construction Logistics Co ” Mirzali Naseeb Construction Company Montes Diyana Naseeb Mirzali Martino Roberto F Logiotatos Peter R Glass Calvin Singleton Jacy P Robinson Franz Martin Smith Nancy Sultani Abdul Anas a k a “Abdul Anas” Faqiri Shir Hosmat Haji Jim Black Construction Company Arya Ariana Aryayee Logistics d b a “AAA Logistics ” d b a “Somo Logistics” Garst Donald Mukhtar Abdul a k a “Abdul Kubar” Noori Mahgir Construction Company Noori Sherin Agha Long Tonya Isranuddin Burhanuddin Matun Navidullah a k a “Javid Ahmad” Matun Wahidullah Navid Basir Construction Company Navid Basir JV Gagar Baba Construction Company NBCC GBCC JV Noori Navid Asmatullah Mahmood a k a “Mahmood” Khan Gul Khan Solomon Sherdad a k a “Solomon” Mursalin Ikramullah a k a “Ikramullah” Musafer Naseem a k a “Naseem” Ali Esrar Gul Ghanzi Luqman Engineering Construction Company d b a “Luqman Engineering” Safiullah a k a “Mr Safiullah” Sarfarez a k a “Mr Sarfarez” Wazir Khan Akbar Ali Crystal Construction Company d b a “Samitullah Road Construction Company” Samitullah Individual uses only one name Ashna Mohammad Ibrahim a k a “Ibrahim” Gurvinder Singh Jahan Shah Shahim Zakirullah a k a “Zakrullah Shahim” a k a “Zikrullah Shahim” Alyas Maiwand Ansunullah a k a “Engineer Maiwand Alyas” BMCSC Maiwand Haqmal Construction and Supply Company New Riders Construction Company d b a “Riders Construction Company ” d b a “New Riders Construction and Services Company” Riders Constructions Services Logistics and Transportation Company Riders Group of Companies Domineck Lavette Kaye Markwith James Martinez Rene Maroof Abdul Qara Yousef Royal Palace Construction Company Bradshaw Christopher Chase Zuhra Productions Zuhra Niazai Boulware Candice a k a “Candice Joy Dawkins” Dawkins John Mesopotamia Group LLC Nordloh Geoffrey Kieffer Jerry Johnson Angela CNH Development Company LLC Johnson Keith Military Logistic Support LLC Eisner John Taurus Holdings LLC Brophy Kenneth Michael Abdul Haq Foundation Adajar Adonis Calhoun Josh W Clark Logistic Services Company d b a “Clark Construction Company” Farkas Janos Flordeliz Alex F Knight Michael T II Lozado Gary Mijares Armando N Jr Mullakhiel Wadir Abdullahmatin Rainbow Construction Company Sardar Hassan a k a “Hassan Sardar Inqilab” Shah Mohammad Nadir a k a “Nader Shah” Tito Regor Brown Charles Phillip Sheren Fasela a k a “Sheren Fasela” Anderson Jesse Montel Charboneau Stephanie a k a “Stephanie Shankel” Hightower Jonathan Khan Noor Zali a k a “Wali Kahn Noor” Saheed a k a “Mr Saheed ” a k a “Sahill ” a k a “Ghazi-Rahman” Weaver Christopher Al Kaheel Oasis Services Al Kaheel Technical Service CLC Construction Company CLC Consulting LLC Complete Manpower Solutions Mohammed Masiuddin a k a “Masi Mohammed” Rhoden Bradley L a k a “Brad L Rhoden” Rhoden Lorraine Serena Royal Super Jet General Trading LLC Super Jet Construction Company Super Jet Fuel Services Super Jet Group Super Jet Tours LLC d b a “Super Jet Travel and Holidays LLC” Super Solutions LLC Abdullah Bilal Farmer Robert Scott Mudiyanselage Oliver Kelly Albert III Ethridge James Fernridge Strategic Partners AISC LLC American International Security Corporation David A Young Construction Renovation Inc Force Direct Solutions LLC Harris Christopher Hernando County Holdings LLC Continued on the following page REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 175 APPENDICES - -------------TABLE D 1 CONTINUED SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS SUSPENSIONS AND DEBARMENTS AS OF JUNE 30 2021 CONTINUED Debarments continued Hide-A-Wreck LLC Panthers LLC Paper Mill Village Inc Shroud Line LLC Spada Carol Welventure LLC World Wide Trainers LLC Young David Andrew Woodruff and Company Borcata Raul A Close Jarred Lee Logistical Operations Worldwide Taylor Zachery Dustin Travis James Edward Khairfullah Gul Agha Khalil Rahimi Construction Company Momand Jahanzeb a k a “Engineer Jahanzeb Momand” Yar-Mohammad Hazrat Nabi Walizada Abdul Masoud a k a “Masood Walizada” Alizai Zarghona Aman Abdul Anwari Laila Anwari Mezhgan Anwari Rafi Arghandiwal Zahra a k a “Sarah Arghandiwal” Azizi Farwad a k a “Farwad Mohammad Azizi” Bashizada Razia Coates Kenneth Gibani Marika Haidari Mahboob Latifi Abdul McCammon Christina Mohibzada Ahmadullah a k a “Ahmadullah Mohebzada” Neghat Mustafa Qurashi Abdul Raouf Ashmatullah Shah David Touba Kajim Zahir Khalid Aryubi Mohammad Raza Samim Atlas Sahil Construction Company Bab Al Jazeera LLC Emar-E-Sarey Construction Company Muhammad Pianda Sambros International d b a “Sambros International LTD ” d b a “Sambros-UK JV” Sambros JV Emar-E-Sarey Construction Company d b a “Sambros JV ESCC” Antes Bradley A Lakeshore Engineering Construction Afghanistan Inc d b a “Lakeshore General Contractors Inc ” Lakeshore Engineering Services Inc Lakeshore Engineering Services Toltest JV LLC Lakeshore Toltest – Rentenbach JV LLC Lakeshore Toltest Corporation d b a “Lakeshore Group ” d b a “LTC Newco d b a “LTC CORP Michigan ” d b a Lakeshore Toltest KK” Lakeshore Toltest Guam LLC Lakeshore Toltest JV LLC Lakeshore Toltest RRCC JV LLC Lakeshore Walsh JV LLC LakeshoreToltest METAG JV LLC LTC Metawater JV LLC LTC Holdings Inc LTC Italia SRL LTC Tower General Contractors LLC LTCCORP Commercial LLC LTCCORP E C Inc LTCCORP Government Services-OH Inc LTCCORP Government Services Inc LTCCORP Government Services-MI Inc LTCCORP O G LLC LTCCORP Renewables LLC LTCCORP Inc LTCCORP Kaya Dijbouti LLC LTCCORP Kaya East Africa LLC LTCCORP Kaya Romania LLC LTCCORP Kaya Rwanda LLC LTCORP Technology LLC Toltest Inc d b a “Wolverine Testing and Engineering ” d b a “Toledo Testing Laboratory ” d b a “LTC ” d b a “LTC Corp ” d b a “LTC Corp Ohio ” d b a “LTC Ohio” Toltest Desbuild Germany JV LLC Veterans Construction Lakeshore JV LLC Afghan Royal First Logistics d b a “Afghan Royal” American Barriers Arakozia Afghan Advertising Dubai Armored Cars Enayatullah son of Hafizullah Farhas Ahmad Inland Holdings Inc Intermaax FZE Intermaax Inc Karkar Shah Wali Sandman Security Services Siddiqi Atta Specialty Bunkering Spidle Chris Calvin Vulcan Amps Inc Worldwide Cargomasters Aziz Haji Abdul a k a “Abdul Aziz Shah Jan ” a k a “Aziz” Castillo Alfredo Jr Abbasi Asim Muturi Samuel Mwakio Shannel Ahmad Jaweed Ahmad Masood A J Total Landscapes Aryana Green Light Support Services Mohammad Sardar a k a “Sardar Mohammad Barakzai” Pittman James C a k a “Carl Pittman” Poaipuni Clayton Wiley Patrick Crystal Island Construction Company Bertolini Robert L Kahn Haroon Shams a k a “Haroon Shams” Shams Constructions Limited Shams General Services and Logistics Unlimited Shams Group International d b a “Shams Group International FZE” Shams London Academy Shams Production Shams Welfare Foundation Swim Alexander Norris James Edward Afghan Columbia Constructon Company Ahmadi Mohammad Omid Dashti Jamsheed Hamdard Eraj Hamidi Mahrokh Raising Wall Construction Company Artemis Global Inc d b a “Artemis Global Logistics and Solutions ” d b a “Artemis Global Trucking LLC” O’Brien James Michael a k a “James Michael Wienert” Tamerlane Global Services Inc d b a “Tamerlane Global LLC ” d b a “Tamerlane LLC ” d b a “Tamerlane Technologies LLC” Sherzai Akbar Ahmed Jean-Noel Dimitry Hampton Seneca Darnell Dennis Jimmy W Timor Karim Wardak Khalid Rahmat Siddiqi Transportation Company Siddiqi Rahmat Siddiqi Sayed Attaullah Umbrella Insurance Limited Company Taylor Michael Gardazi Syed Smarasinghage Sagara Security Assistance Group LLC Edmondson Jeffrey B Montague Geoffrey K Ciampa Christopher Lugo Emanuel Bailly Louis Matthew Kumar Krishan Marshal Afghan American Construction Company Marshal Sayed Abbas Shah Masraq Engineering and Construction Company Miakhil Azizullah Raj Janak Continued on the following page 176 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION APPENDICES TABLE D 1 CONTINUED SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS SUSPENSIONS AND DEBARMENTS AS OF JUNE 30 2021 CONTINUED Debarments continued Singh Roop Stratton William G Umeer Star Construction Company Zahir Mohammad Ayub Peace Thru Business Pudenz Adam Jeff Julias Green Robert Warren Mayberry Teresa Addas James Advanced Ability for U-PVC Al Bait Al Amer Al Iraq Al Waed Al Quraishi Bureau Al Zakoura Company Al-Amir Group LLC Al-Noor Contracting Company Al-Noor Industrial Technologies Company California for Project Company Civilian Technologies Limited Company Industrial Techniques Engineering Electromechanically Company Pena Ramiro Pulsars Company San Francisco for Housing Company Sura Al Mustakbal Top Techno Concrete Batch Albright Timothy H Insurance Group of Afghanistan Ratib Ahmad a k a “Nazari” Jamil Omar K Rawat Ashita Qadery Abdul Khalil Casellas Luis Ramon Saber Mohammad a k a “Saber ” a k a “Sabir” Zahir Shafiullah Mohammad a k a “Shafiullah ” a k a “Shafie” Achiever’s International Ministries Inc d b a “Center for Achievement and Development LLC” Bickersteth Diana Bonview Consulting Group Inc Fagbenro Oyetayo Ayoola a k a “Tayo Ayoola Fagbenro” Global Vision Consulting LLC HUDA Development Organization Strategic Impact Consulting d b a “Strategic Impact KarKon Afghanistan Material Testing Laboratory” Davies Simon Gannon Robert W Gillam Robert Mondial Defence Systems Ltd Mondial Defense Systems USA LLC Mondial Logistics Khan Adam Khan Amir a k a “Amir Khan Sahel” Sharq Afghan Logistics Company d b a “East Afghan Logistics Company” REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS Hafizullah Sayed a k a “Sadat Sayed Hafizullah ” a k a “Sayed Hafizullah Delsooz” Sadat Zohori Construction and Road Building Company d b a “Sadat Zohori Cons Co ” Abdullah Son of Lal Gul Ahmad Aziz Ahmad Zubir Aimal Son of Masom Ajmal Son of Mohammad Anwar Fareed Son of Shir Fayaz Afghan Logistics Services Fayaz Afghan a k a “Fayaz Alimi ” a k a “Fayaz Son of Mohammad” Gul Khuja Habibullah Son of Ainuddin Hamidullah Son of Abdul Rashid Haq Fazal Jahangir Son of Abdul Qadir Kaka Son of Ismail Khalil Son of Mohammad Ajan Khan Mirullah Khan Mukamal Khoshal Son of Sayed Hasan Malang Son of Qand Masom Son of Asad Gul Mateen Abdul Mohammad Asghar Mohammad Baqi Mohammad Khial Mohammad Sayed Mujahid Son of Abdul Qadir Nangiali Son of Alem Jan Nawid Son of Mashoq Noorullah Son of Noor Mohammad Qayoum Abdul Roz Gul Shafiq Mohammad Shah Ahmad Shah Mohammad Shah Rahim Sharif Mohammad Waheedullah Son of Sardar Mohammad Wahid Abdul Wais Gul Wali Khair Wali Sayed Wali Taj Yaseen Mohammad Yaseen Son of Mohammad Aajan Zakir Mohammad Zamir Son of Kabir Rogers Sean Slade Justin Morgan Sheldon J Dixon Regionald Emmons Larry Epps Willis Etihad Hamidi Group d b a “Etihad Hamidi Trading Transportation Logistics and Construction Company” Etihad Hamidi Logistics Company d b a “Etihad Hamidi Transportation Logistic Company Corporation” Hamidi Abdul Basit a k a Basit Hamidi Kakar Rohani a k a “Daro Khan Rohani” Mohammad Abdullah Nazar Nasir Mohammad Wali Eshaq Zada Logistics Company d b a “Wali Ashqa Zada Logistics Company” d b a “Nasert Nawazi Transportation Company” Ware Marvin Belgin Andrew Afghan Bamdad Construction Company d b a “Afghan Bamdad Development Construction Company” Areeb of East Company for Trade Farzam Construction Company JV Areeb of East for Engineering and General Trading Company Limited d b a “Areeb of East LLC” Areeb-BDCC JV Areebel Engineering and Logisitcs - Farzam Areebel Engineering and Logistics Areeb-Rixon Construction Company LLC d b a “AreebREC JV” Carver Elizabeth N Carver Paul W RAB JV Ullah Izat a k a “Ezatullah” a k a “Izatullah son of Shamsudeen” Saboor Baryalai Abdul a k a “Barry Gafuri” Stratex Logistic and Support d b a “Stratex Logistics” Jahanzeb Mohammad Nasir Nasrat Zaulhaq a k a “Zia Nasrat” Blevins Kenneth Preston Banks Michael Afghan Armor Vehicle Rental Company Hamdard Javid McAlpine Nebraska Meli Afghanistan Group Badgett Michael J Miller Mark E Anderson William Paul Kazemi Sayed Mustafa a k a “Said Mustafa Kazemi” Al Mostahan Construction Company Nazary Nasir Ahmad Nazanin a k a “Ms Nazanin” Ahmadzai Sajid Sajid Amin Gul Elham Yaser a k a “Najibullah Saadullah” Everest Faizy Logistics Services Faizy Elham Brothers Ltd Continued on the following page I JULY 30 2021 177 APPENDICES - -------------TABLE D 1 CONTINUED SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS SUSPENSIONS AND DEBARMENTS AS OF JUNE 30 2021 CONTINUED Debarments continued Faizy Rohullah Hekmat Shadman General Trading LLC Hekmat Shadman Ltd d b a “Hikmat Shadman Ltd ” Hikmat Shadman Construction and Supply Company Hikmat Himmat Logistics Services Company Hikmat Shadman Logistics Services Company d b a “Hikmat Shadman Commerce Construction and Supply Company ” d b a “Hikmat Shadman Commerce Construction Services” Saif Hikmat Construction Logistic Services and Supply Co Shadman Hikmatullah a k a “Hikmat Shadman ” a k a “Haji Hikmatullah Shadman ” a k a “Hikmatullah Saadulah” Omonobi-Newton Henry Hele Paul Highland Al Hujaz Co Ltd Supreme Ideas – Highland Al Hujaz Ltd Joint Venture d b a SI-HLH-JV BYA International Inc d b a BYA Inc Harper Deric Tyrone Walls Barry Lee Jr Cook Jeffrey Arthur McCray Christopher Jones Antonio Autry Cleo Brian Chamberlain William Todd JS International Inc Perry Jack Pugh James Hall Alan Paton Lynda Anne Farouki Abul Huda Farouki Mazen Maarouf Salah Unitrans International Inc Financial Instrument and Investment Corp d b a “FIIC” AIS-Unitrans OBO Facilities Inc d b a “American International Services” 178 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ' • ' • S •• · ··· ---r''-J · • ' ' · • • ' o 1Ll •• • APPENDICES - -------------- APPENDIX E SIGAR DATA CALL QUESTIONS THAT RECEIVED CLASSIFIED OR UNCLASSIFIED BUT NOT PUBLICLY RELEASABLE RESPONSES Every quarter SIGAR sends U S implementing agencies in Afghanistan a list of questions about their programs This quarter United States ForcesAfghanistan USFOR-A classified or designated unclassified but not publicly releasable its responses to the bolded portions of these questions from SIGAR’s data call below As authorized by its enabling statute SIGAR will publish a classified supplement containing the classified and publicly unreleasable data SECURITY Question ID Question Jul-Sec-01 1 Please provide the following classified information on ANA strength as of the latest available date month-end a the most recent ANA APPS month-end report with “as of” dates on each 2 Please provide the following unclassified information on ANA strength as of the latest available date month-end a the topline strength of the ANA with “as of” date provided b a description of general ANA attrition trends over the last quarter c Describe any effects COVID-19 has had on MOD elements’ recruitment attrition this quarter 3 Please provide the latest MOD tashkil that reflects the new authorized strength 208 000 for MOD Jul-Sec-03 1 If there are any changes from what was provided last quarter on MOD components’ training programs Please provide an Excel list of the top 10 most costly by total outlay ongoing U S -funded MOD components’ training programs Include contracts that provided CLS support when there is also a training component Please account for the ongoing and initiated contracts this quarter and include a program cost b name of the contractor c duration start end date value brief description and terms of the contract e g base year and any options d total funds disbursed for each training contract from the beginning of the contract to the latest available date 2 Given the drawdown order to depart before September 11 2021 please provide the following information with as much detail as possible or explain why you cannot provide it If some of these decisions have not yet been made please state so and when they are expected to be made a Who currently provides MOD components’ training contract oversight what type of oversight is provided at what level is oversight provided and is it done in-country remotely or both How will this oversight be performed after U S forces and contractors depart Afghanistan b With the continued reduction of U S forces and U S contractors is there a greater reliance on third-country national TCN local country national LCN contractor and or Afghan government partners to provide oversight over these contracts c Is DOD going to continue to fund TCN and LCN contractors assigned to MOD components’ training contracts after the U S withdrawal is completed on before September 11 2021 3 Please describe how CSTC-A and or the DOD entity listed in subquestion a will conduct training contract oversight and how this may impact the desired outcomes of U S -run and U S -funded but contractor-provided training programs for MOD components Describe how this entity plans to mitigate any challenges or negative consequences associated with the decrease and eventual withdrawal of U S forces or U S contractors formerly doing oversight work in Afghanistan 4 If any contracts that would have been amongst the 10 most costly this quarter were canceled or terminated please list them provide the same information for the contracts in question 1 and provide the reason the contract s was canceled terminated Continued on the next page 180 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION APPENDICES Jul-Sec-08 Jul-Sec-23 Jul-Sec-26 1 Please provide the following classified information on ANP strength as of the latest available date month-end a the most recent ANP APPS month-end report with “as of” dates on each 2 Please provide the following unclassified information on ANP strength as of the latest available date month-end a the topline strength of the ANP with “as of” date provided b a description of general ANP attrition trends over the last quarter 3 Please provide the latest MOI tashkil that reflects the new authorized strength 136 000 for MOI 1 Please provide information on insider attacks against Coalition Forces from April 1 2021 through the latest available date month end a the number of insider attacks against U S and Coalition military personnel b the number of U S and Coalition military personnel wounded or killed from insider attacks c the number of insider attacks against the ANDSF d the number of ANDSF personnel wounded or killed as a result of insider attacks 2 Please provide the classified CIDNE Excel file export of all ANDSF casualties from April 1 2021 through the latest available date month end It is not necessary to filter the CIDNE export but at a minimum these data should include the unit lowest level available location highest fidelity possible and date for all casualties If you are unable to provide it this quarter please say so as your response 3 Please provide us a response to the following In an unclassified publicly releasable format describe how ANDSF casualty rates during the quarter compare to casualty rates during the same quarter one year ago and last quarter Differentiate between casualties that occurred during offensive operations and those that occurred during defensive operations 4 If data is incomplete or quality has changed e g ANDSF self-reporting with no RS USFOR-A validation please explain why 1 Regarding USG support to the Special Mission Wing SMW a Please provide a recent comprehensive update of the SMW as of the latest possible date b Please identify each type of aircraft in the SMW inventory the number of each and how many are usable available operational If aircraft became unusable during this reporting period please indicate when and the reason for each c How many and what type of aircraft maintainers are currently assigned authorized Are these SMW personnel or contractors If contractors are they Afghan or international contractors d Provide the cost of aircraft maintenance being paid with ASFF or money from other countries REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 181 APPENDICES - -------------- APPENDIX F ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION DEFINITION AABIS Afghan Automated Biometric Information System AAF Afghan Air Force AAN Afghanistan Analysts Network ABP Afghan Border Police ACAA Afghanistan Civil Aviation Authority ACC Anti-Corruption Commission ACJC Anti-Corruption Justice Center ADALAT Assistance for Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency ADB Asian Development Bank AFMIS Afghan Financial Management Information System AFN afghani currency AGO Attorney General’s Office AIC Access to Information Commission AITF Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund AMANAT Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency ANA Afghan National Army ANASOC ANA Special Operations Corps ANDSF Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ANP Afghan National Police AO abandoned ordnance APPS Afghan Personnel and Pay System APTTA Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement AROC Afghan Resources Oversight Council ARIS Afghan Returnee Information System ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund ASFF Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ASSF Afghan Special Security Forces ATA Antiterrorist Assistance AUP Afghan Uniform Police AWOL absent without leave BAG Budget Activity Group Continued on the next page 182 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION APPENDICES ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION DEFINITION BHA Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance CATC Combined Arms Training Center CCAP Citizen’s Charter Afghanistan Project CDCS Country Development Cooperation Strategy CENTCOM U S Central Command CERP Commanders’ Emergency Response Program CID U S Army Criminal Investigation Command CIGIE Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency CIO Contributions to International Organizations CMS Case Management System CN counternarcotics CNHC Counternarcotics High Commission CNPA Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan COIN counterinsurgency COR contracting officer’s representative CPD Central Prisons Directorate CPDS Continuing Professional Development Support CSSP Corrections System Support Program CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan CTF Counterterrorism Financing CWD Conventional Weapons Destruction DAB Da Afghanistan Bank DABS Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat DEA Drug Enforcement Administration U S DFC Development Finance Corporation DHS Department of Homeland Security DICDA Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities U S DLA Defense Logistics Agency DOD Department of Defense U S DOD OIG Department of Defense Office of Inspector General DOJ Department of Justice U S DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency DSCMO-A Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan EEIA effective enemy initiated attacks EIA enemy-initiated attacks ERW explosive remnants of war Continued on the next page REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 183 APPENDICES - -------------- ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION DEFINITION ESF Economic Support Fund EU European Union EXBS Export Control and Related Border Security FAA Federal Aviation Authority FAO Food and Agriculture Organization UN FAP Financial and Activity Plan FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FFP Food for Peace FMS Foreign Military Sales FY fiscal year GAO Government Accountability Office U S GBV gender-based violence GCPSU General Command of Police Special Units GDP gross domestic product GIROA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan GLE Governor-Led Eradication HASC U S House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services HRM Huquq Reference Manual HKIA Hamid Karzai International Airport HMMWV high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle commonly known as a Humvee HQ headquarters IARCSC Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ICS Integrated Country Strategy IDA International Development Association IDP internally displaced persons IED improvised explosive device IFC International Finance Corporation IG inspector general IIU Intelligence and Investigation Unit Afghan IMF International Monetary Fund INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement U S INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs U S IOM International Organization for Migration IPP independent power producers IS-K Islamic State-Khorasan Continued on the next page 184 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION APPENDICES ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION DEFINITION ISLA Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations Program ISR Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISR IWA Integrity Watch Afghanistan JSSP Justice Sector Support Program JWIP judicial wire intercept program kg kilogram KIA killed in action LAMP Livelihood Advancement for Marginalized Population LLP Lessons Learned Program LOTFA Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan M E monitoring and evaluation MAIL Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Livestock Afghan MAG ministerial advisory group MCN Ministry of Counter-Narcotics Afghan MCTF Major Crimes Task Force MELRA Multi-Dimensional Legal Economic Reform Assistance MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency MOCI Ministry of Commerce and Industry Afghan MOD Ministry of Defense Afghan MOE Minister of Education Afghan MOEc Ministry of Economy Afghan MOF Ministry of Finance Afghan MOHE Ministry of Higher Education Afghan MOI Ministry of Interior Afghan MOIC Ministry of Industry and Commerce Afghan MOJ Ministry of Justice Afghan MOMP Ministry of Mines and Petroleum Afghan MOPH Ministry of Public Health Afghan MORR Ministry of Refugees and Returnees Afghan MOU memorandum of understanding MOWA Ministry of Women’s Affairs MPTF Multi-Partner Trust Fund MPD Ministry of Interior Affairs and Police Development Project MRA Migration and Refugee Assistance MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development Afghan MW megawatt Continued on the next page REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 185 APPENDICES - -------------- ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION DEFINITION NADR Non-Proliferation Antiterrorism Demining and Related Programs NATF NATO ANA Trust Fund NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDAA National Defense Authorization Act NDAP National Drug Action Plan NDS National Directorate of Security Afghan NEPS Northeast Power System NGO nongovernmental organization NIU National Interdiction Unit Afghan NSA national security advisor NSC national security council NSIA National Statistics and Information Authority Afghan NSOCC-A NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan NSPA NATO Support and Procurement Agency O M operations and maintenance OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UN OCO Overseas Contingency Operations OEG Office of Economic Growth USAID OFDA Office of U S Foreign Disaster Assistance OFS Operation Freedom’s Sentinel OIG Office of Inspector General OPA Office of Prisons Administration Afghan OUSD-P Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy OTA Office of Technical Assistance U S Treasury OTI Office of Transition Initiatives USAID PM WRA Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement State PPA power-purchase agreement PPM People’s Peace Movement PRM Bureau of Population Refugees and Migration State PTEC Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity RADP Regional Agriculture Development Program RC recurrent cost RFE RL Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty RS Resolute Support NATO RSM Resolute Support Mission NATO Continued on the next page 186 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION APPENDICES ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION DEFINITION SAG Subactivity Group SEPS Southeast Power System SEZ Special Economic Zone SHAHAR Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience SIGACT significant act violence against Coalition troops SIU Sensitive Investigative Unit Afghan SIV Special Immigrant Visa SPM Support to Payroll Management SME subject-matter expert SMW Special Mission Wing Afghan SOF Special Operations Forces SRAR Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation U S State OIG Department of State Office of Inspector General SWIM Strengthening Watershed and Irrigation Management TAA train advise and assist TAAC train advise and assist command TAAC-Air train advise and assist command-air TAF The Asia Foundation TAPI Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline TPC Taliban Political Commission TIU Technical Investigative Unit Afghan TPDC Transferring Professional Development Capacity UN United Nations UN WFP United Nations World Food Programme UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime USACE U S Army Corps of Engineers USAID U S Agency for International Development USAID OIG USAID Office of Inspector General USD U S dollar USFOR-A U S Forces-Afghanistan USIP United States Institute of Peace Continued on the next page REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 187 APPENDICES - -------------- ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION DEFINITION UXO unexploded ordnance WHO World Health Organization WIA wounded in action WIP Women in Peace Process WTO World Trade Organization 188 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ENDNOTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DOD Cost of War Monthly Report Data as of March 31 2021 response to SIGAR data call 7 7 2021 Costs of War Project Watson Institute Brown University at https watson brown edu costofwar figures 2021 us-costs-datewar-afghanistan-2001-2021 accessed 4 15 2021 Pub L No 116-260 12 27 2020 DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts March 2021 ” 4 16 2021 Pub L No 116-260 12 27 2020 DOD response to SIGAR data call 7 22 2021 and AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts Cumulative June 2021 accessed at www dfas mil dodbudgetaccountreports on 7 17 2021 Pub L No 116-260 12 27 2020 H Rept 116-453 12 27 2020 DOD response to SIGAR data call 7 19 2021 DOD response to SIGAR data call 1 18 2019 DOD response to SIGAR data call 1 15 2021 DOD response to SIGAR data call 7 9 2021 USAID U S Foreign Assistance Reference Guide 1 2005 p 6 State Congressional Budget Justification Department of State Foreign Operations and Related Programs Fiscal Year 2022 p 143 at https www state gov fy-2022-international-affairsbudget accessed on 7 13 2021 USAID response to SIGAR data call 7 14 2021 and 4 13 2021 State response to SIGAR data call 7 2 2021 USAID Office of U S Foreign Disaster Assistance “Afghanistan-Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #4 FY 2017 ” at www usaid gov accessed 4 9 2020 USAID response to SIGAR data call 7 14 2021 and 4 13 2021 State response to SIGAR data call 10 13 2009 State response to SIGAR data call 7 2 2021 7 13 2020 and 1 3 2020 State response to SIGAR data call 7 9 2021 and 7 2 2021 Department of State Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Operations Appendix 2 FY 2019 Released February 12 2018 pp 44–52 and State response to SIGAR data call 4 17 2019 State response to SIGAR data call 7 13 2021 7 9 2021 and 4 9 2021 Department of State Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Operations Appendix 2 FY 2019 Released February 12 2018 p 423 State response to SIGAR data call 3 29 2013 State response to SIGAR data call 7 2 2021 7 13 2020 1 3 2020 and 10 5 2018 World Bank ARTF Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of April 20 2021 end of 4th month of FY 1400 at www artf af accessed 7 10 2021 p 4 World Bank ARTF Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of April 20 2021 end of 4th month of FY 1400 at www artf af accessed 7 10 2021 pp 9 11 The World Bank Group in Afghanistan Country Update 4 2020 p 40 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 29 World Bank ARTF Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of April 20 2021 end of 4th month of FY 1400 at www artf af accessed 7 10 2021 pp 9–10 30 UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service https fts unocha org accessed 6 30 2021 31 EC “Afghanistan State of Play January 2011 ” 3 31 2011 p 7 32 UNDP “Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan Terms of Reference 22 November 2018 ” and “Trust Fund Factsheet Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan ” http mptf undp org factsheet fund LTF00 accessed 1 9 2020 33 UNDP LOTFA Receipts 2002–2021 Combined Bilateral and MPTF updated through 6 30 2021 in response to SIGAR data call 7 8 2021 34 NATO IBAN audits of Allied Command Operations and Cost Share Arrangements for Military Budgets at www nato int and web archive org web 20150910123523 http nato int accessed 7 16 2021 U S dollar-to-Eurozone euro exchange rates at www fiscal treasury gov accessed 7 8 2021 35 NATO “Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan ” 7 6 2021 at https www nato int cps en natohq topics_113694 htm 36 DOD response to SIGAR data call 10 12 2018 37 NATO Afghan National Army ANA Trust Fund Status of Contributions Made as of 31 May 2021 www nato int accessed 7 10 2021 NATO Member Countries Last Updated 31 Aug 2020 www nato int accessed 10 18 2020 38 DOD response to SIGAR data call 1 18 2019 39 The World Bank Group in Afghanistan Country Update April 2021 p 4 at https www worldbank org en country afghanistan accessed at 7 20 2021 40 The World Bank Group United States Shares and Voting Power https www worldbank org accessed 4 21 2020 41 Asian Development Bank response to SIGAR data call 7 7 2021 42 Asian Development Bank AITF 2020 Annual Report response to SIGAR data call 5 26 2021 43 State response to SIGAR data call 2 19 2021 and 7 13 2020 44 The White House “Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan ” 4 14 2021 Senate Armed Services Committee “The Transition of all United States and Coalition forces from Afghanistan and its Implications ” transcript 5 20 2021 House Armed Services Committee “An Update on Afghanistan ” transcript 5 12 2021 45 CENTCOM Press Release “Update on withdrawal of U S forces from Afghanistan May 11 2021 ” 5 11 2021 46 Defense News “Miller Transfers Command in Afghanistan to McKenzie ” 7 12 2021 47 DOD “Pentagon Press Secretary John F Kirby Holds a Press Conference ” 7 2 2021 48 Defense News “Austin Approves Plan to Transfer Authority Retrograde Should be Done by End of August ” 7 2 2021 DOD “Pentagon Press Secretary John F Kirby Holds a Press Conference ” 7 2 2021 OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 7 16 2021 49 The White House “Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan ” 4 14 2021 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 50 OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 7 16 2021 189 ENDNOTES - -------------- 51 Associated Press “Most European troops exit Afghanistan quietly after 20 years ” 6 30 2021 The Independent “British troops leave Afghanistan amid warnings ‘very bad things’ could happen to country ” 7 9 2021 Agence France-Presse “Australia Says Last Troops Withdrawn From Afghanistan ” 7 11 2021 52 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR vetting 7 16 2021 DOD “Miller Transfers Command in Afghanistan to McKenzie ” 7 12 2021 53 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 DOD “Pentagon Press Secretary John F Kirby Holds a Press Briefing ” 7 2 2021 54 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 DSCMO-A answer to SIGAR vetting 7 9 2021 55 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 56 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 57 Afghanistan Analysts Network “A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to the Taleban amid Calls for a ‘Second Resistance ’” 7 2 2021 58 VOAnews “US Troop Withdrawal from Afghanistan More Than 90% Complete ” 7 7 2021 59 Wall Street Journal “Taliban Advances Test Afghan Forces’ Morale as the U S Leaves ” 6 20 2021 Long War Journal “Taliban doubles number of controlled Afghan districts since May 1 ” 6 29 2021 60 UNAMA “Briefing to the United Nations Security Council by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan Ms Deborah Lyons ” 6 22 2021 61 The Washington Post “U S military commander in Afghanistan warns of chaotic civil war ” 6 29 2021 62 ABC News “‘This Week’ Transcript 7-4-21 Jeff Zients Gov Jim Justice Gen Austin ‘Scott’ Miller ” 7 4 2021 63 Senate Armed Services Committee “The Transition of all United States and Coalition forces from Afghanistan and its Implications ” transcript 5 20 2021 64 Senate Armed Services Committee “The Transition of all United States and Coalition forces from Afghanistan and its Implications ” transcript 5 20 2021 65 Senate Committee on Appropriations “Senate Appropriations Committee Holds Hearing on Fiscal 2022 Budget Request for the Defense Department ” transcript 6 17 2021 66 Senate Committee on Appropriations “Senate Appropriations Committee Holds Hearing on Fiscal 2022 Budget Request for the Defense Department ” transcript 6 17 2021 67 State “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America ” 2 29 2020 p  2 68 DOD “Contractor Support of U S Operations in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility ” 7 2021 p  2 69 House Armed Services Committee “House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Fiscal 2022 Budget Request for the Defense Department ” transcript 6 23 2021 70 Agence France Presse Barron’s “Turkey US Agree On ‘Scope’ Of Kabul Airport Security Erdogan ” 7 9 2021 71 Voice of America News “Taliban Tells Turkey Continued Troop Presence in Afghanistan Is ‘Unacceptable ’” 6 18 2021 72 Al Jazeera “Afghan president replaces security ministers amid Taliban advance ” 6 19 2021 190 73 DW “Afghanistan president Ashraf Ghani sacks ministers amid deteriorating security ” 6 19 2021 74 DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Programs and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 SIGAR analysis of DFASprovided data 7 2021 75 See Appendix B of this report and DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 2021 76 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR vetting 7 9 2021 77 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 8 27 2016 OSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 1 15 2018 1 12 2019 and 10 10 2019 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 4 30 2018 p  75 OUSD-P email to SIGAR 1 13 2017 78 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 8 27 2016 OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 1 15 2018 and 10 11 2020 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 4 30 2018 p  75 UNDP LOTFA Receipts 2002–2020 and LOTFA MPTF Receipts 2002–2020 updated 4 4 2020 in response to SIGAR data call 4 5 2020 79 UNDP response to SIGAR data call 7 8 2021 80 UNAMA “Briefing to the United Nations Security Council by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan Ms Deborah Lyons ” 6 22 2021 New York Times “Taliban Enter Key Cities in Afghanistan’s North After Swift Offensive ” 6 21 2021 81 House Armed Services Committee “House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Fiscal 2022 Budget Request for the Defense Department ” transcript 6 23 2021 82 Afghanistan Analysts Network “A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to the Taleban amid Calls for a ‘Second Resistance ’” 7 2 2021 83 DOD “Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Milley Press Briefing ” 7 21 2021 84 Long War Journal “Taliban doubles number of controlled Afghan districts since May 1 ” 6 29 2021 Long War Journal “Taliban squeezes Afghan government by Seizing key border towns ” 7 9 2021 Long War Journal “Half of Afghanistan’s provincial capitals under threat from Taliban ” 7 15 2021 85 Long War Journal “Half of Afghanistan’s provincial capitals under threat from Taliban ” 7 15 2021 86 Afghanistan Analysts Network “A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to the Taleban amid Calls for a ‘Second Resistance ’” 7 2 2021 Long War Journal “Taliban doubles number of controlled Afghan districts since May 1 ” 6 29 2021 87 Afghanistan Analysts Network “Menace Negotiation Attack The Taleban take more District Centres across Afghanistan ” 7 12 2021 88 Long War Journal “Half of Afghanistan’s provincial capitals under threat from Taliban ” 7 15 2021 89 Voice of America News “Taliban Tells Turkey Continued Troop Presence in Afghanistan Is ‘Unacceptable ’” 6 18 2021 90 Washington Post “Death of famed Afghan commander in Taliban massacre highlights the country’s struggles and fears ” 6 19 2021 91 TOLOnews “‘6 000 Taliban Killed in Past Month’ Govt ” 6 29 2021 92 OUSD-P and CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 5 19 21 DOD IG Pre-conference spreadsheet with DOD responses 5 27 21 CSTC-A Response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ENDNOTES 93 SIGAR analysis of RS-provided data 7 2021 94 USFOR-A response to SIGAR data call 6 10 2021 USFOR-A response to SIGAR data call 4 2021 95 USFOR-A response to SIGAR data call 6 10 2021 SIGAR analysis of USFOR-A-provided data 96 TOLOnews “Victims’ Families UN Must Probe Attack on Girls School in Kabul ” 6 17 2021 97 House Committee on Foreign Affairs “The U S -Afghanistan Relationship Following the Military Withdrawal ” transcript 5 18 2021 House Armed Services Committee “An Update on Afghanistan ” 5 12 2021 98 RS response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 SIGAR analysis of RS-provided data 4 2021 99 RS response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 SIGAR analysis of RS-provided data 4 2021 100 RS response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 SIGAR analysis of RS-provided data 4 2021 101 RS response to SIGAR data call 4 5 2021 SIGAR analysis of RS-provided data 4 2021 RS response to SIGAR vetting 4 16 2021 102 Associated Press “US to keep about 650 troops in Afghanistan after withdrawal ” 6 24 2021 DOD “Casualty Status ” 7 19 2021 103 USFOR-A response to SIGAR data call 4 5 2021 DOD “Statement by Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller on Force Levels in Afghanistan ” 1 15 2021 104 CENTCOM Press release “Update on withdrawal of U S forces from Afghanistan June 14 2021 ” 6 15 2021 CENTCOM Press release “Update on withdrawal of U S forces from Afghanistan July 5 2021 ” 6 15 2021 105 RS response to DODIG data call 6 13 2021 106 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 107 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR vetting 7 9 2021 108 RS response to DODIG data call 6 27 2021 109 RS response to DODIG data call 6 27 2021 110 DOD “Contractor Support of U S Operations in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility ” 7 2021 pp  1–2 111 DOD “Contractor Support of U S Operations in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility ” 4 2021 p  1 112 DOD “Contractor Support of U S Operations in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility ” 7 2021 pp  1–2 113 DOD “Casualty Status ” 7 19 2021 114 USFOR-A response to SIGAR data call 7 1 2021 115 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 116 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 117 Etilaatroz com “Shinwari People’s mobilization forces against the Taliban are merging with the local army ” 7 1 2021 New York Times “Taliban Enter Key Cities in Afghanistan’s North After Swift Offensive ” 6 20 2021 118 DOD OIG Audit of the Planning for and Implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System 8 15 2019 i DSCMO-A response to SIGAR vetting 7 9 2021 119 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 23 2021 CSTC-A response to SIGAR vetting 10 29 2020 120 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 23 2021 121 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 23 2021 CSTC-A response to SIGAR vetting 4 7 2021 122 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 23 2021 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 123 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 23 2021 124 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 23 2021 and 3 11 2021 125 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 3 11 2021 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR vetting 7 9 2021 126 OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 10 10 2019 127 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 and 3 11 2021 128 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR vetting 7 9 2021 129 USFOR-A response to SIGAR data call 7 1 2021 130 DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Programs and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 SIGAR analysis of DFASprovided data 7 2021 131 DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Programs and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 SIGAR analysis of DFASprovided data 7 2021 132 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 17 2021 133 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 17 2021 134 DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Programs and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 SIGAR analysis of DFASprovided data 7 2021 135 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 136 DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Programs and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 SIGAR analysis of DFASprovided data 7 2021 137 USFOR-A response to SIGAR data call 6 22 2021 OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 7 9 2021 138 OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 7 9 2021 139 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 140 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR vetting 7 16 2021 141 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 142 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 143 CSTC-A response to SIGAR vetting 1 6 2021 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR vetting 7 9 2021 144 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 12 2021 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 12 12 2020 145 DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Programs and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 SIGAR analysis of DFASprovided data 7 2021 146 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR data call 7 17 2021 147 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR data call 7 17 2021 148 OUSD-P response to SIGAR data call 7 17 2021 149 DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Programs and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 SIGAR analysis of DFASprovided data 7 2021 150 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 3 17 2020 and 12 16 2020 SIGAR analysis of CSTC-A-provided data 12 2020 DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Programs and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 SIGAR analysis of DFASprovided data 7 2021 151 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR data call 7 15 2021 TAAC-Air response to SIGAR data call 4 5 2021 152 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR data call 7 15 2021 OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 7 18 2021 OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 7 21 2021 DOD “Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Milley Press Briefing ” 7 21 2021 153 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR data call 7 15 2021 TAAC-Air response to SIGAR data call 4 5 2021 191 ENDNOTES - -------------- 154 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR data call 7 15 2021 TAAC-Air response to SIGAR data call 4 5 2021 155 OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 7 19 2021 156 OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 7 19 2021 157 Reuters “Special Report Afghan pilots assassinated by Taliban as U S withdraws ” 7 9 2021 158 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR data call 7 15 2021 159 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR data call 7 15 2021 SIGAR analysis of RS-provided data 7 2021 160 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR data call 7 15 2021 SIGAR analysis of DSCMO-A-provided data 7 2021 161 USFOR-A TAAC-Air response to DOD IG data call 6 24 2021 162 TOLOnews “‘6 000 Taliban Killed in Past Month’ Govt ” 6 29 2021 163 USFOR-A TAAC-Air response to DOD IG data call 6 24 2021 164 USFOR-A TAAC-Air response to DOD IG data call 6 24 2021 165 USFOR-A TAAC-Air response to DOD IG data call 6 24 2021 166 DOD OIG Operation Freedom’s Sentinel October 1 2020– December 31 2020 pp  29–30 167 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR data call 7 15 2021 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 4 5 2021 168 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR data call 7 15 2021 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 4 5 2021 TAAC-Air response to SIGAR vetting 4 16 2021 169 TOLOnews “‘6 000 Taliban Killed in Past Month’ Govt ” 6 29 2021 OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 7 19 2021 170 NSOCC-A response to SIGAR vetting 7 9 2021 171 DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Programs and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 SIGAR analysis of DFASprovided data 7 2021 172 NSOCC-A response to SIGAR vetting 7 9 2021 173 NSOCC-A response to DODIG data call 6 18 2021 174 NSOCC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 8 2021 DOD Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan 6 2020 p  75 175 NSOCC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 8 2021 176 TOLOnews “‘6 000 Taliban Killed in Past Month’ Govt ” 6 29 2021 177 NSOCC-A response to SIGAR vetting 7 9 2021 178 NSOCC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 8 2021 179 NSOCC-A response to SIGAR vetting 7 9 2021 180 DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Programs and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 SIGAR analysis of DFASprovided data 7 2021 181 See Appendix B of this report and DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 182 See Appendix B of this report DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts December 2020 ” 1 19 2021 and DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 183 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 8 27 2016 OUSD-P response to SIGAR vetting 1 15 2018 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 4 30 2018 p  75 184 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 3 18 2021 185 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 3 18 2021 186 See Appendix B of this report DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts 192 December 2020 ” 1 19 2021 and DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 187 SIGAR SIGAR meeting record with CSTC-A 12 9 2019 188 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR vetting 7 9 2021 189 See Appendix B of this report DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts December 2020 ” 1 19 2021 and DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 190 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 191 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 192 DSCMO-A response to SIGAR vetting 7 9 2021 193 CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 and 3 17 2021 194 See Appendix B of this report DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts December 2020 ” 1 19 2021 and DFAS “AR M 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts June 2021 ” 7 16 2021 195 CSTC-A response to SIGAR vetting 4 8 2021 DOD response to SIGAR data call 7 17 2021 196 CSTC-A response to SIGAR vetting 4 8 2021 DOD response to SIGAR data call 7 17 2021 197 DOD Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan 6 2020 pp  81 83 198 New York Times Najim Rahim and Mike Ives “Attack in Afghanistan Kills 10 From Charity that Clears Land Mines ” 6 9 2021 199 Fondation Suisse de Déminage website “Afghanistan ” https fsd ch en project afghanistan accessed 3 25 2020 200 E-Mine UN Mine Action website “Portfolio on Mine Action ” Afghanistan Country Portfolio 2018 https mineaction org en portfolio-of-mine-action-projects accessed 7 1 2019 201 New York Times Mujib Mashal “Left-Behind Explosives Taking Deadlier Toll on Afghan Children U N Says ” 2 6 2017 https www nytimes com 2017 02 06 world asia afghanistan-warcivilian-casualties-un-report html accessed 10 18 2019 Stuff Circuit Paula Penfold and Eugene Bingham “New Zealand documentary forces clean-up of deadly Afghanistan firing ranges ” https www stuff co nz national stuff-circuit 300099027 new-zealand-documentary-forces-cleanup-of-deadly-afghanistan-firing-ranges 9 3 2020 202 State PM WRA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 203 State PM WRA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 204 State PM WRA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 https www theunitconverter com area-conversion 205 State PM WRA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 206 See Appendix B 207 UN Briefing to the United Nations Security Council by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan Ms Deborah Lyons 6 22 2021 pp  1–2 208 Wall Street Journal “In Afghan Peace Talks the Taliban Gain Legitimacy While Pursuing War ” 7 6 2021 209 Voice of America “Iran Hosts Taliban Afghans for Talks ” 7 8 2021 210 TOLOnews “Negotiators in Doha Held Talks on Five Key Issues Sources ” 7 10 2021 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ENDNOTES 211 TOLOnews “Afghan Politicians Leave Kabul for Talks with Taliban in Doha ” 7 16 2021 High Council for National Reconciliation “Talking Points of H E Dr Abdullah Abdullah Chairman of The High Council For National Reconciliation ” 7 17 2021 TOLOnews “Republic Taliban Delegations Agree to Expedite Peace Efforts ” 7 19 2021 212 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 213 Ashraf Ghani “Afghanistan’s Moment of Risk and Opportunity A Path to Peace for the Country and the Region ” Foreign Affairs 5 4 2021 214 Ashraf Ghani “Afghanistan’s Moment of Risk and Opportunity A Path to Peace for the Country and the Region ” Foreign Affairs 5 4 2021 215 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 216 The National “Afghan government denies Taliban offered ceasefire plan ” 7 15 2021 217 UN Withdrawal of International Troops Sparks Widespread Fear in Afghanistan Experts Tell Security Council Sounding Alarm over Taliban Military Gains 6 22 2021 218 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 219 Ashraf Ghani “Afghanistan’s Moment of Risk and Opportunity A Path to Peace for the Country and the Region ” Foreign Affairs 5 4 2021 Associated Press “Afghan peace envoy fears pullout will embolden Taliban ” 6 18 2021 State SCA response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 220 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 11 April – 10 May 2021 5 17 2021 p  7 221 TOLOnews “Abdullah Taliban is Emboldened by US Pullout But Cannot Win ” 6 16 2021 222 White House Remarks by President Biden on the Drawdown of U S Forces in Afghanistan 7 8 2021 223 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 224 Wall Street Journal “In Afghan Peace Talks the Taliban Gain Legitimacy While Pursuing War ” 7 6 2021 225 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 226 UN The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security report of the Secretary-General 6 15 2021 p  5 227 UN Briefing to the United Nations Security Council by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan Ms Deborah Lyons 6 22 2021 p  1 228 Reuters “Tribal elders broker local Taliban Afghan government ceasefire ” 5 20 2021 229 Reuters “Taliban attacks end short-lived local ceasefire in eastern Afghanistan ” 5 21 2021 230 USAID OTI response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 231 USAID OTI response to SIGAR data call 9 21 2020 USAID response to SIGAR vetting 10 9 2020 232 USAID OTI response to SIGAR data call 6 17 2021 233 USIP 22nd Progress Report 1 31 2021 p  5 USAID response to SIGAR data call 4 13 2021 234 USIP 22nd Progress Report 1 31 2021 p  5 235 USIP 23rd Progress Report 4 30 2021 p  15 236 USIP War-Weary Afghans March for Peace 6 29 2018 237 USIP 23rd Progress Report 4 30 2021 p  15 238 NATO “Brussels Summit Declaration ” 7 11 2018 239 UN “Strong Support for Afghanistan at the 2020 Afghanistan Conference ” 11 24 2020 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 240 “Afghanistan Conference Communiqué ” 11 24 2020 “Afghanistan Partnership Framework ” 11 24 2020 241 White House Remarks by President Biden and President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Before Bilateral Meeting 6 25 2021 White House FACT SHEET Continued U S Support for a Peaceful Stable Afghanistan 6 25 2021 242 USAID OPPD response to SIGAR data call 12 30 2013 243 USAID “Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund ARTF ” 8 26 2013 244 USAID “U S government contributed $105 million to Asian Development Bank Infrastructure Fund for Afghanistan ” 3 18 2014 245 USAID OPPD response to SIGAR data call 6 30 2014 246 USAID response to SIGAR data call 4 13 2021 247 SIGAR analysis of USAID response to SIGAR data call 4 13 2021 248 USAID response to SIGAR data call 4 13 2021 249 ADB Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund Quarterly Report Q3 2020 n d p  10 250 USAID response to SIGAR data call 4 13 2021 251 World Bank “Evaluation of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund Recurrent and Capital Cost Operation ” 5 7 2021 i v–vii 252 World Bank “Evaluation of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund Recurrent and Capital Cost Operation ” 5 7 2021 i v–vii 253 World Bank “Evaluation of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund Recurrent and Capital Cost Operation ” 5 7 2021 p  16 254 World Bank “Evaluation of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund Recurrent and Capital Cost Operation ” 5 7 2021 vii 255 USAID OIG USAID Planning and Monitoring Gaps Weaken Accountability for Results Through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund Audit Report 8-306-17-004-P 8 16 2017 p  11 256 USAID Fiscal Year 2019–2023 Country Development Cooperation Strategy Afghanistan 9 2018 p  26 257 United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 2020 p  7 258 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 7 30 2020 p  43 259 DOD response to SIGAR vetting 1 12 2017 DOD response to SIGAR vetting 10 11 2018 260 UNDP response to SIGAR data call 7 8 2021 261 DOD CSTC-A response to SIGAR data calls 7 1 2014 262 DOD CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 4 4 2014 263 DOD CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 17 2021 264 DOD CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 17 2021 265 DOD CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 17 2021 266 DOD CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call 6 17 2021 267 State SCA response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 UNDP response to SIGAR data call 7 8 2021 268 SIGAR Child Sexual Assault in Afghanistan Implementation of the Leahy Laws and Reports of Assaults by Afghan Security Forces SIGAR 17-47-IP 6 9 2017 p  1 193 ENDNOTES - -------------- 269 DOD CSTC-A Letter to H E Yasin Zia and H E Mohammad Khalid Payenda 4 12 2021 270 SIGAR Child Sexual Assault in Afghanistan Implementation of the Leahy Laws and Reports of Assaults by Afghan Security Forces SIGAR 17-47-IP 6 9 2017 p  31 271 SIGAR Child Sexual Assault in Afghanistan Implementation of the Leahy Laws and Reports of Assaults by Afghan Security Forces SIGAR 17-47-IP 6 9 2017 p  24 272 World Bank Update on Sehatmandi Implementation Challenges and Opportunities n d pp  3 16 273 World Bank Project Appraisal Document - Sehatmandi 3 12 2018 pp  10 13 274 World Bank Strategy Group Meeting Readout 3 24 2021 p  1 275 World Bank Update on Sehatmandi Implementation Challenges and Opportunities n d pp  3 16 276 World Bank Strategy Group Meeting Readout 3 24 2021 p  1 World Bank COVID-19 Relief Effort for Afghan Communities and Households REACH Summary 4 2 2021 World Bank Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Project Summary 6 15 2021 World Bank Emergency Agriculture and Food Supply Project Summary 3 24 2021 277 Ministry of Women’s Affairs Note on Project Implementation in High-Risk Areas shared at the World Bank ARTF Gender Working Group GWG 5 11 2021 pp  2–3 World Bank Women’s Economic Empowerment Rural Development Project Summary 4 28 2021 278 Ministry of Women’s Affairs Note on Project Implementation in High-Risk Areas shared at the World Bank ARTF Gender Working Group GWG 5 11 2021 p  3 279 Ministry of Women’s Affairs Note on Project Implementation in High-Risk Areas shared at the World Bank ARTF Gender Working Group GWG 5 11 2021 pp  2–3 280 IARCSC “In Taliban-Controlled Areas Administrative Buildings were Destroyed and Equipment were Looted ” 7 15 2021 281 Tetra Tech ARD Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations in Afghanistan ISLA Project Monthly Report February 2015 3 15 2015 ii USAID ODG response to SIGAR data call 12 22 2016 USAID response to SIGAR data call 4 13 2021 282 Tetra Tech USAID Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations ISLA Final Completion Report 3 2021 vi 283 Tetra Tech USAID Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations ISLA Final Completion Report 3 2021 viii 284 Tetra Tech USAID Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations ISLA Final Completion Report 3 2021 pp  4 9 285 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 1 30 2019 pp  125–126 286 Tetra Tech USAID Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations ISLA Final Completion Report 3 2021 pp  27–29 287 Tetra Tech USAID Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations ISLA Final Completion Report 3 2021 p  28 288 Development Alternatives Inc Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience SHAHAR Monthly Report February 2015 3 15 2015 p  4 USAID response to SIGAR data call 4 13 2021 289 Development Alternatives Inc Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience SHAHAR Final Report 4 30 2021 pp  47 49 194 290 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 1 30 2019 p  124 291 World Bank Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan 3 26 2019 pp  10 28 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Afghanistan Day After Peace Program-Towards an Inclusive Sustainable Equitable Peace 7 2019 pp  8–10 292 World Bank Project Paper on a Restructuring and Proposed Additional Grant in the Amount of SDR24 8 Million US$35 Million Equivalent and a Proposed Additional Grant from the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund in the Amount of US$158 Million to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for a Second Additional Financing for Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Project n d p  60 293 “Afghanistan Partnership Framework ” 11 24 2020 p  6 294 World Bank Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Project CCAP and COVID-19 Relief Effort for Afghan Communities and Households REACH Project Virtual Implementation Support Mission ISM Aide Memoire 3 8 2021 p  12 295 World Bank Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Project CCAP and COVID-19 Relief Effort for Afghan Communities and Households REACH Project Virtual Implementation Support Mission ISM Aide Memoire 3 8 2021 p  2 296 Management Systems International Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency AMANAT Quarterly Performance Report FY 2018 Quarter 3 7 31 2018 p  1 297 USAID “Fact Sheet Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency AMANAT ” 3 11 2019 298 USAID Modification No 7 to Contract AID-306-H-17-00003 9 16 2020 p  2 299 Management Systems International Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency AMANAT Annual Work Plan - Year 4 8 31 2020 p  4 300 Management Systems International Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency AMANAT Weekly Report 12 19 2020 301 Management Systems International Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency AMANAT Quarterly Performance Report FY21 Q2 4 30 2021 p  2 302 Management Systems International Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency AMANAT Quarterly Performance Report FY21 Q2 4 30 2021 p  3 303 Management Systems International Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency AMANAT Quarterly Performance Report FY21 Q2 4 30 2021 p  3 304 Management Systems International Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency AMANAT Quarterly Performance Report FY21 Q2 4 30 2021 p  4 305 USAID ODG response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 306 Management Systems International Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency AMANAT Quarterly Performance Report FY21 Q2 4 30 2021 p  4 307 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 4 30 2019 pp  124–125 State INL response to SIGAR data call 12 16 2020 State INL response to SIGAR vetting 4 7 2021 State INL response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 308 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 4 30 2019 pp  124–125 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ENDNOTES 309 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 1 30 2018 p  142 310 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 17 2021 311 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 17 2021 312 USAID Contract AID-OAA-I-13-0034 AID-306-TO-16-00007 4 16 2016 pp  1 8 USAID Contract AID-OAA-I-13-0034 AID306-TO-16-00007 Modification 01 7 31 2016 p  3 USAID response to SIGAR data call 4 13 2021 313 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 1 30 2017 p  138 314 Checchi and Company Consulting Inc Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency ADALAT Quarterly Report 4 30 2021 p  7 315 Checchi and Company Consulting Inc Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency ADALAT Quarterly Report 4 30 2021 p  7 316 Checchi and Company Consulting Inc Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency ADALAT Quarterly Report 4 30 2021 p  27 317 Checchi and Company Consulting Inc Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency ADALAT Quarterly Report 4 30 2021 p  29 318 Checchi and Company Consulting Inc Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency ADALAT Quarterly Report 4 30 2021 p  10 319 Checchi and Company Consulting Inc Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency ADALAT Quarterly Report 4 30 2021 p  45 320 Checchi and Company Consulting Inc Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency ADALAT Quarterly Report 4 30 2021 p  40 321 International Development Law Organization Continuing Professional Development Support CPDS IDLO Final Report 12 3 2020 pp  4–5 7 29 322 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 17 2021 323 PAE CSSP Baseline Needs Assessment 6 16 2019 p  8 324 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 17 2021 325 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 17 2021 326 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 17 2021 327 DOJ response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 328 DOJ response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 329 UN The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security report of the Secretary-General 6 15 2021 p  10 Anti-Corruption Commission Presentation to the Anti-Corruption Stakeholders Meeting 5 23 2021 330 UNODC “2020 Afghanistan Opium Survey Cultivation and Production-Executive Summary ” 4 2021 pp  4–5 331 UNODC “2020 Afghanistan Opium Survey Cultivation and Production-Executive Summary ” 4 2021 p  4 332 UNODC “2020 Afghanistan Opium Survey Cultivation and Production-Executive Summary ” 4 2021 p  4 333 UNODC “2020 Afghanistan Opium Survey Cultivation and Production-Executive Summary ” 4 2021 p  6 334 UNODC “2019 Afghanistan Opium Survey Socio-economic report ” 2 2021 p  4 335 UNODC “World Drug Report 2020 booklet 1” 6 2020 p  42 UNODC “2020 Afghanistan Opium Survey Cultivation and Production-Executive Summary ” 4 2021 p  4 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 336 UNODC “2020 Afghanistan Opium Survey Cultivation and Production-Executive Summary ” 4 2021 p  4 337 State INL response to SIGAR data call 3 17 2021 338 UNODC “2020 Afghanistan Opium Survey Cultivation and Production-Executive Summary ” 4 2021 p  6 339 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 340 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 341 DEA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 342 DEA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 343 DEA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 344 UNODC “World Drug Report 2020 booklet 1” 6 2020 p  42 OSD-P DOD CN response to SIGAR data call 7 8 2020 SIGAR analysis of DOD data 7 2020 345 State INL response to SIGAR data call 12 16 2020 and 6 16 2021 346 State INL response to SIGAR data call 12 16 2020 347 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 348 State INL response to SIGAR data call 12 16 2020 State INL response to SIGAR vetting 1 6 2021 State INL response to SIGAR data call 3 17 2021 349 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 State INL response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 350 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 State INL response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 351 State INL response to SIGAR data call 3 18 2020 DOD Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan 6 2020 p  89 352 State INL response to SIGAR data call 9 21 2020 353 State INL response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 354 SIGAR Interview with MOI Official from Deputy Directorate of Counter Narcotics 9 1 2019 DOD Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan 6 2020 p  89 355 State INL response to SIGAR data call 3 20 2019 356 State INL response to SIGAR data call 3 20 2019 DOD Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan 6 2020 p  89 State INL response to SIGAR vetting 10 9 2020 DEA response to SIGAR data call 12 16 2020 357 State INL response to SIGAR data call 3 20 2019 358 DEA response to SIGAR vetting 4 11 2018 359 State INL response to SIGAR data call 3 20 2019 and 6 17 2020 DEA response to SIGAR vetting 4 11 2018 360 DOD Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan 6 2020 p  90 361 DOD Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan 6 2020 pp  88–89 362 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 363 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 State INL response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 364 State INL response to SIGAR data call 3 17 2021 365 DEA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 366 DEA response to SIGAR vetting 3 17 2021 367 DEA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 368 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 369 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 370 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 371 State INL response to SIGAR data call 3 17 2021 and 6 16 2021 372 State INL response to SIGAR vetting 10 12 2017 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 17 2020 195 ENDNOTES - -------------- 373 State INL response to SIGAR data call 3 17 2021 and 6 16 2021 State INL response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 374 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 375 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 376 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 377 State INL response to SIGAR vetting 1 6 2021 State INL response to SIGAR data call 12 18 2019 378 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 379 State INL response to SIGAR data call 3 17 2021 State INL response to SIGAR vetting 4 7 2021 380 State INL response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 State INL response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 381 State PRM response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 382 State PRM response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 383 State PRM response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 384 UNHCR “Number of Afghan refugees returning to Afghanistan 1 January to 10 July 2021 ” 7 10 2021 385 SIGAR analysis of UNHCR “Refugee Data Finder ” 7 14 2021 386 State PRM response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 387 State PRM response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 388 IOM “Return of Undocumented Afghans Weekly Situation Report ” 7 1 2021 pp  1–2 389 SIGAR analysis of UN OCHA “Summary of conflict induced displacements 01 Jan to 01 Jul 2021 ” 7 11 2021 SIGAR analysis of UN OCHA “Summary of conflict induced displacements 1 Jan to 30 Dec 2020 ” 3 30 2021 390 UNHCR “UNHCR warns of imminent humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan ” 7 13 2021 391 USAID “Promote ” 12 17 2018 392 USAID OG response to SIGAR data call 3 17 2021 393 DAI USAID Musharikat Quarterly Report 4 24 2021 p  9 394 DAI USAID Musharikat Quarterly Report 4 24 2021 p  10 395 DAI USAID Musharikat Quarterly Report 4 24 2021 pp  10 15 18 396 DAI USAID Musharikat Quarterly Report 4 24 2021 pp  23 27 397 DAI USAID Musharikat Quarterly Report 4 24 2021 p  27 398 USAID OG response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 399 Afghanistan Analysts Network “Between Hope and Fear Rural Afghan women talk about peace and war ” 7 6 2021 pp  5 13 400 Afghanistan Analysts Network “Between Hope and Fear Rural Afghan women talk about peace and war ” 7 6 2021 p  6 401 Afghanistan Analysts Network “Between Hope and Fear Rural Afghan women talk about peace and war ” 7 6 2021 p  18 402 Afghanistan Analysts Network “Between Hope and Fear Rural Afghan women talk about peace and war ” 7 6 2021 p  18 403 Afghanistan Analysts Network “Between Hope and Fear Rural Afghan women talk about peace and war ” 7 6 2021 p  25 404 Afghanistan Analysts Network “Between Hope and Fear Rural Afghan women talk about peace and war ” 7 6 2021 p  50 405 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 7 30 2020 p  127 406 State 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report 7 1 2021 p  76 407 State 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report 7 1 2021 pp  76–77 408 State 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report 7 1 2021 p  76 409 White House Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan 4 14 2021 410 Associated Press “Bomb targets health workers in Afghan capital killing 1 ” 5 5 2021 Associated Press “Attacks target polio 196 teams in east Afghanistan 5 killed ” 6 14 2021 New York Times “Bombing Outside Afghan School Kills At Least 90 With Girls as Targets ” 5 8 2021 411 Arab News “10 killed in twin Kabul blasts power supply disrupted across Afghanistan ” 6 2 2021 412 The Guardian “Afghanistan’s doctors braced for rapid spread of India Covid Variant ” 5 25 2021 Nature “Delta coronavirus variant scientists brace for impact ” 6 22 2021 413 Foreign Policy “Afghanistan Swamped by COVID-19’s Third Wave ” 6 7 2021 414 UN OCHA Afghanistan Strategic Situation Report No 100 7 1 2021 415 Gandhara “A Third Wave Of Covid Infections Ravages Afghanistan ” 6 9 2021 416 Anadolu Agency “Iran Afghanistan border closed amid COVID19 fears ” 4 29 2021 Geo News “Pak-Afghan friendship gate closed due to rising COVID-19 cases in Afghanistan ” 6 18 2021 417 World Bank Asian Development Update Setting Course to Recovery 4 2021 p  9 418 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 419 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 420 TOLOnews “IFRC 13 Million Afghans Lack Food Amid Drought Crisis ” 4 21 2021 421 Afghan Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Livestock UN and WFP Afghanistan La Niña looms large over one-third of Afghan population acutely food insecure today 4 30 2021 Norwegian Refugee Council “Running Out of Time A Looming Drought in Afghanistan ” 6 2021 p  1 UN The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security Report of the Secretary-General 3 25 2021 p  11 422 Washington Post “Biden will withdraw all U S forces from Afghanistan by Sept 11 2021 ” 4 13 2021 423 White House “Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan ” 4 14 2021 424 White House “Statement by White House Spokesperson Jen Psaki on the Visit of President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan and Dr Abdullah Abdullah Chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation ” 6 20 2021 425 Congressional Quarterly House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on US-Afghanistan Relations 5 18 2018 transcript pp  10 14 426 State “Press Statement Additional Civilian Assistance to Afghanistan ” 4 21 2021 427 Reuters “U S announces more than $266 million in new Afghanistan aid ” 6 4 2021 428 White House Fact Sheet Continued U S Support for a Peaceful Stable Afghanistan 6 25 2021 429 State Integrated Country Strategy Afghanistan 11 15 2020 p  8 430 In 2008 Afghanistan overtook Iraq as the leading recipient of total U S foreign assistance 2019 is the most recent year for which complete data is available to make this comparison SIGAR analysis of USAID U S Foreign Aid by Country 6 5 2021 Washington Post “The U S foreign aid budget visualized ” 10 18 2016 431 State Integrated Country Strategy Afghanistan 11 15 2020 pp  3 5 432 USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy 3 31 2019 p  26 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ENDNOTES 433 USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy 3 31 2019 pp  9–10 434 USAID OEG response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 435 USAID OED response to SIGAR data call draft 5 16 2021 USAID OEG response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 436 DAI Global Regional Agricultural Development-East RADPEast Quarterly Report Q2 FY2021 January-March 2021 4 28 2021 pp  39–40 FAO Promoting Value Chains-Western Afghanistan Year 4 – Semi-Annual Progress Report October 2020-March 2021 6 7 2021 FHI 360 Advancing Higher Education for Afghanistan’s Development AHEAD Quarterly Performance Report Q2 FY 2021 January 1 2021 to March 31 2021 4 29 2021 p  41 Tetra Tech AMELA Monitoring Report Textbooks II – DED Distribution December 2019 – October 2020 10 20 2020 p  4 437 Reuters “U S says diplomatic presence in Kabul requires ‘functioning secure airport ” 6 11 2021 438 ACAA History of Civil Aviation 9 24 2017 SIGAR Afghanistan’s Civil Aviation Capacity Has Improved But Challenges Remain Including Reliance on Donor Support For Operations SIGAR 19-46-SP 7 2019 p  8 439 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 State SCA response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 440 Hurriyet Daily News “Turkey’s presence at Kabul airport ‘necessary ’ says Afghan foreign minister ” 6 21 2021 NATO Brussels Summit Communique 6 14 2021 Reuters “U S says diplomatic presence in Kabul requires ‘functioning secure airport ’” 6 11 2021 441 SIGAR Civil Aviation U S Efforts Improved Afghan Capabilities but the Afghan Government Did Not Assume Airspace Management as Planned SIGAR 15-58-AR 5 2015 pp  2 4 442 FAA response to SIGAR vetting 7 9 2021 443 SIGAR Civil Aviation U S Efforts Improved Afghan Capabilities but the Afghan Government Did Not Assume Airspace Management as Planned SIGAR 15-58-AR 5 2015 pp  4–5 9 SIGAR Afghanistan’s Civil Aviation Capacity Has Improved But Challenges Remain Including Reliance on Donor Support For Operations SIGAR 19-46-SP 7 2019 pp  2–3 7 444 SIGAR Afghanistan’s Civil Aviation Capacity Has Improved But Challenges Remain Including Reliance on Donor Support For Operations SIGAR 19-46-SP 7 2019 p  8 USAID OEG response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 445 SIGAR Civil Aviation U S Efforts Improved Afghan Capabilities but the Afghan Government Did Not Assume Airspace Management as Planned SIGAR 15-58-AR 5 2015 pp  6 9 446 SIGAR Civil Aviation U S Efforts Improved Afghan Capabilities but the Afghan Government Did Not Assume Airspace Management as Planned SIGAR 15-58-AR 5 2015 p  9 447 SIGAR Afghanistan’s Civil Aviation Capacity Has Improved But Challenges Remain Including Reliance on Donor Support For Operations SIGAR 19-46-SP 7 2019 p  8 448 SIGAR Afghanistan’s Civil Aviation Capacity Has Improved But Challenges Remain Including Reliance on Donor Support For Operations SIGAR 19-46-SP 7 2019 p  8 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 449 SIGAR Afghanistan’s Civil Aviation Capacity Has Improved But Challenges Remain Including Reliance on Donor Support For Operations SIGAR 19-46-SP 7 2019 pp  3 10 12 450 SIGAR Afghanistan’s Civil Aviation Capacity Has Improved But Challenges Remain Including Reliance on Donor Support For Operations SIGAR 19-46-SP 7 2019 p  12 451 SIGAR Afghanistan’s Civil Aviation Capacity Has Improved But Challenges Remain Including Reliance on Donor Support For Operations SIGAR 19-46-SP 7 2019 p  12 452 Stars and Stripes “With locals untrained on key functions US departure could mean trouble for Afghanistan’s airport ” 11 6 2020 453 Khaama Press “NATO will hand over airport security responsibilities to the Afghan army ” 8 16 2020 454 Stars and Stripes “With locals untrained on key functions US departure could mean trouble for Afghanistan’s airport ” 11 6 2020 455 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 456 Stars and Stripes “With locals untrained on key functions US departure could mean trouble for Afghanistan’s airport ” 11 6 2020 457 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 458 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 459 Voice of America “Taliban Tells Turkey Continued Troop Presence in Afghanistan Is ‘Unacceptable’ ” 6 18 2021 460 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 461 Agence France-Presse “Turkey US agree on ‘scope’ of Kabul airport security says Erdogan ” 7 9 2021 Reuters “Turkey offers to run Kabul airport after NATO’s Afghan withdrawal – officials ” 6 8 2021 State “Department Press Briefing - July 12 2021 ” 7 12 2021 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 462 Reuters “Turkey says it will not send more troops to Afghanistan for airport security ” 6 23 2021 463 Hurriyet Daily News “Turkey’s presence at Kabul airport ‘necessary ’ says Afghan foreign minister ” 6 21 2021 464 NATO Brussels Summit Communique 6 14 2021 465 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 466 Voice of America “Taliban Tells Turkey Continued Troop Presence in Afghanistan Is ‘Unacceptable’ ” 6 18 2021 467 SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 1 10 2021 and 1 18 2020 SIGAR Afghanistan’s Civil Aviation Capacity Has Improved But Challenges Remain Including Reliance on Donor Support For Operations SIGAR 19-46-SP 7 2019 p  11 468 SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 1 10 2021 1 18 2020 and 1 12 2019 469 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 470 State SCA response to SIGAR vetting 1 6 2021 471 Pajhwok Afghan News “Covid-19 Afghan airlines incur millions of dollars loss ” 10 22 2020 State SCA response to SIGAR vetting 1 6 2021 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 472 European Commission List of airlines banned within the EU 3 27 2021 Reuters “Europe bans all Afghan airlines from its airspace ” 11 23 2020 197 ENDNOTES - -------------- 473 FAA FAA Background Information Regarding U S Civil Aviation in the Kabul Flight Information Region OAKX 3 28 2020 FAA response to SIGAR vetting 7 9 2021 474 World Bank Financing Peace Fiscal Challenges and Implications for a Post-Settlement Afghanistan 12 5 2019 i p  3 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update January 2020 Navigating a Sea of Uncertainty 1 2020 p  30 475 ODI Tobias Haque and Nigel Roberts Afghanistan’s Aid Requirements How much aid is required to maintain a stable state 10 2020 p  4 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update January 2020 Navigating a Sea of Uncertainty 1 2020 p  32 SIGAR Private Sector Development and Economic Growth Lessons from the U S Afghanistan Experience SIGAR 18-38-LL 4 2018 p  7 476 Moore Afghanistan formerly Afghanistan Holding Group “Afghani Exchange Rates ” table of monthly AFN USD averages https www moore af resources country-resources exchangerates accessed 6 25 2021 477 The poverty line reflects 2017 prices as the last household survey was completed in March 2017 Afghanistan’s statistical authority sets the poverty line by estimating and subsequently summing estimates of the amount of money required for Afghans to meet basic food and non-food needs The food poverty line is calculated by estimating the cost of obtaining 2 100 calories per person per day While prices change from year to year when the criteria for basic needs are held constant poverty levels can be compared over time NSIA Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016–17 8 2018 p  330 United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan Coronavirus SocioEconomic Impact Assessment 7 22 2020 p  12 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update January 2020 Navigating a Sea of Uncertainty 1 2020 pp  4 25 478 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 12 16 2020 World Bank Asian Development Update Setting Course to Recovery 4 2021 p  9 479 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 12 16 2020 World Bank Asian Development Update Setting Course to Recovery 4 2021 p  1 480 IMF IMF Executive Board Completes First Review of the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 6 7 2021 481 World Bank New Grant to Sustain Afghanistan’s Reforms toward COVID-19 Recovery 6 24 2021 482 UN OCHA Humanitarian Response Plan Afghanistan 2018– 2021 1 2021 p  5 483 Associated Press “Group Billion in aid needed to help Afghan kids in 2021 ” 1 19 2021 UN OCHA Humanitarian Response Plan Afghanistan 2018–2021 1 2021 p  5 484 UN OCHA Daily Noon Briefing Highlights Afghanistan 6 23 2021 485 The World “Afghan returnees struggle with unemployment violence at home ” 2 12 2021 486 IOM “Record Cross-Border Migrant Returns Contribute to Bleak Humanitarian Outlook for Afghanistan in 2021 ” 3 19 2021 487 World Bank Asian Development Update Setting Course to Recovery 4 2021 pp  2–3 198 488 Arab News “Violence insecurity threaten Afghan economy as investors flee war-torn country ” 4 18 2021 489 Stars and Stripes “Taliban collects nearly $1 billion from control of Afghan businesses ” 4 26 2021 490 SIGAR Re-Integration of Ex-Combatants Lessons from the U S Experience in Afghanistan SIGAR 19-58-LL 9 2019 x Arab News Naimat Khan “Afghan refugees hope peace talks will finally take them ‘home ’” 9 15 2020 USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy FY2019–2023 11 27 2018 p  13 491 The Express Tribune “APTTA extended as revised trade deal to take time ” 6 9 2021 492 Pajhwok Afghan News “Pakistan bans entry of pedestrians from Afghanistan ” 5 6 2021 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 493 Voice of America “Pakistan Approves Temporary Extension in Afghan Transit Trade Pact ” 2 9 2021 494 Hindustan Times “Virus surge brings import from Afghanistan via Attari border to a halt ” 4 27 2021 495 International Crisis Group Resetting Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan 10 28 2014 p  3 Voice of America “Pakistan Approves Temporary Extension in Afghan Transit Trade Pact ” 2 9 2021 496 Dawn “Dwindling Pak-Afghan trade ” 5 10 2021 497 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update Setting Course to Recovery 4 2021 p  14 498 Indian Express “Iran’s Chabahar Port opens allows India to bypass Pakistan on trade route to Afghanistan ” 12 4 2017 499 Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty “U S Exempts Iran’s Chabahar Port From Sanctions In Nod to Afghanistan ” 11 7 2018 500 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 9 22 2020 501 Pakistan Today “Pakistan-Uzbek transit trade marks historic launch ” 5 12 2021 502 Trend “Concept of ensuring security of Afghan section of TAPI signed ” 4 17 2021 503 9DASHLINE “High Road to China A Road to the AfghanChinese Border Is Now What It Might Seem ” 6 29 2021 504 Arab News “Set in concrete In a first Kabul builds $5m road via tough terrain to access China ” 5 23 2021 505 Trading Economics Afghanistan Imports 2003–2019 Data 3 26 2021 506 SIGAR analysis of World Trade Organization Afghanistan Trade Profile 2020 p  1 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update Surviving the Storm 7 2020 iii 507 Asian Development Bank Asian Development Outlook Financing a Green and Inclusive Recovery ” 4 2021 p  232 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 508 Afghan Ministry of Finance Fiscal Strategy Paper Medium Term Fiscal Framework 1399 2020 pp  38–39 509 Pajhwok Afghan News “Pact binding govt organs to use domestic products signed ” 1 23 2021 510 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 10 30 2020 pp  153–154 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update Setting Course to Recovery 4 2021 p  13 511 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update Setting Course to Recovery 4 2021 pp  10 12–13 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ENDNOTES 512 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update Surviving the Storm 7 2020 p  7 513 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update Setting Course to Recovery 4 2021 p  2 514 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update Setting Course to Recovery 4 2021 pp  2 10 515 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update Setting Course to Recovery 4 2021 p  2 516 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update Setting Course to Recovery 4 2021 p  12 517 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update Setting Course to Recovery 4 2021 p  11 518 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update Setting Course to Recovery 4 2021 p  11 519 Asian Development Bank Asian Development Outlook Financing a Green and Inclusive Recovery ” 4 2021 p  234 520 Da Afghanistan Bank National Financial Inclusion Strategy 2020–2024 9 2019 p  7 521 SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 7 12 2021 1 10 2021 and 1 18 2020 522 SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 7 12 2021 and 1 10 2021 523 SIGAR communication with MOF officials 4 15 2021 524 Khaama Press “Parliament approves fiscal budget for the year 1400 ” 2 22 2021 TOLOnews “A Closer Look at 3rd Draft for Current Fiscal Year’s Budget ” 2 6 2021 525 SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 1 10 2018 1 12 2019 1 6 2020 and 1 10 2021 526 World Bank Financing Peace Fiscal Challenges and Implications for a Post-Settlement Afghanistan 12 5 2019 i p  3 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update January 2020 Navigating a Sea of Uncertainty 1 2020 p  30 527 Asian Development Bank Asian Development Outlook Financing a Green and Inclusive Recovery 4 2021 p  232 528 United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan Coronavirus Socio-Economic Impact Assessment 7 22 2020 p  14 USAID Managing Local Resources and Conflict The Undeclared Economy 2021 p  2 529 TOLOnews “MP ‘$8 Million Embezzled Daily’ at Customs ” 5 19 2021 530 United Nations Development Programme Pitfalls and Promises Minerals Extraction in Afghanistan 8 2020 pp  5–6 531 Ariana News “$1 billion worth of precious stones smuggled out of the country annually ” 3 7 2021 532 BBC “Afghanistan How does the Taliban make money ” 12 22 2018 533 Ariana News “Minister of mines concerned over widespread illegal mining ” 1 28 2021 534 USAID Managing Local Resources and Conflict The Undeclared Economy 2021 pp  2 4 535 World Bank Personal remittances received % of GDP accessed 3 17 2021 536 The World “Afghan returnees struggle with unemployment violence at home ” 2 12 2021 537 World Bank Asian Development Update Setting Course to Recovery 4 2021 p  16 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 538 The New Humanitarian “As deportations soar Afghan returnees struggle on home soil ” 1 26 2021 539 USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy 3 31 2019 p  2 540 USAID OEG response to SIGAR data call 3 21 2019 SIGAR interview with USAID OEG official 11 8 2018 541 World Bank Financing Peace Fiscal Challenges and Implications for a Post-Settlement Afghanistan 12 5 2019 p  9 542 IMF Fifth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria 5 15 2019 p  6 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 4 30 2020 p  132 543 USAID OEG response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 544 The Diplomat “The Future of Special Economic Zones in Afghanistan ” 6 6 2018 Thomasnet com “What are Export Processing Zones EPZs ” 12 13 2019 545 USAID OEG response to SIGAR data call 3 21 2019 546 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update Setting Course to Recovery 4 2021 p  14 547 United States Trade Representative “United States Launches WTO Challenge to Indian Export Subsidy Programs ” 3 14 2018 WTO “Agriculture-Explanation of the Agreement ” 2019 WTO Understanding the WTO Developing Countries 2021 548 TOLOnews “Air Corridors’ Closure Affects Afghan Carpet Exports ” 4 19 2021 549 USAID OEG response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 550 World Bank Jobs from Agriculture in Afghanistan 2 2018 p  9 DAI Afghanistan Value Chains High Value Crops Quarterly Performance Report Quarter One FY2020 1 30 2020 p  4 SIGAR Private Sector Development and Economic Growth Lessons from the U S Afghanistan Experience SIGAR 18-38-LL 4 2018 p  7 551 SIGAR Private Sector Development and Economic Growth Lessons from the U S Afghanistan Experience SIGAR 18-38-LL 4 2018 p  7 USAID Country Development Strategy 3 31 2019 p  18 552 Action on Armed Violence “The reverberating effects of explosive violence on agriculture in Afghanistan ” 11 13 2019 The Observatory of Economic Complexity “Wheat Flours in Afghanistan ” 2019 United Nations Environment Programme “Climate Change in Afghanistan What Does it Mean for Rural Livelihoods and Food Insecurity ” 11 2016 p  8 553 Reuters Stefanie Glinksi “Water politics heat up in worsening climate in Afghanistan ” 6 9 2020 554 Reuters “More Afghans displaced by drought than conflict U N says ” 9 11 2018 555 USAID Afghanistan Country Development Cooperation Strategy FY2019-–2023 9 2019 pp  18 64 In recognition of the risks posed by climate change USAID is required to conduct a Climate Risk Screening for the development of all new USAID strategies under USAID’s operational and planning policies ADS Chapter 201 as of October 1 2015 556 This figure includes USAID funds provided to the ARTF for agricultural programs in Afghanistan 557 UN OCHA Daily Noon Briefing Highlights Afghanistan 6 23 2021 558 Gandhara “Drought Threatens Afghan Farmers During Uncertain Transition Year ” 3 16 2021 199 ENDNOTES - -------------- 559 Afghanistan Food Security Agriculture Cluster “Food Security and Agriculture Cluster FSAC in Afghanistan Calls for Funding to Scale Up Anticipatory Actions and Emergency Response for 14 1 Million People in IPC 3 and 4 Affected Areas ” 5 21 2021 560 The New Humanitarian “Another drought looms Is Afghanistan better prepared ” 6 2 2021 561 Roots of Peace Agriculture Marketing Program AMP Quarterly Report January–March 2021 5 20 2021 p  6 562 Afghan Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Livestock UN and WFP Afghanistan La Niña looms large over one-third of Afghan population acutely food insecure today 4 30 2021 Norwegian Refugee Council “Running Out of Time A Looming Drought in Afghanistan ” 6 2021 p  1 Reportedly “Millions of Afghanistan Will Face Famine Due to Drought This Year ” 2 15 2021 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 UN The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security Report of the Secretary-General 3 25 2021 p  11 563 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 8AM “Kamal Khan Drought and Drinking Water Shortage Crisis in Nimroz ” 6 13 2021 564 DAI Global Regional Agricultural Development-East RADPEast Quarterly Report Q2 FY2021 January–March 2021 4 28 2021 pp  6 37 565 DAI Global Regional Agricultural Development-East RADPEast Quarterly Report Q2 FY2021 January–March 2021 4 28 2021 p  37 566 USAID Afghanistan Energy Sector Technical Assessment Final Report 2 28 2018 p  1 USAID “Afghanistan Our Work ” n d https www usaid gov afghanistan our-work accessed 7 8 2018 567 SIGAR conclusion based on USAID OI response to SIGAR data call 6 19 2020 568 In March 2016 the Afghanistan Inter-Ministerial Commission for Energy using data from DABS reported the total installed domestic capacity as 623 MW Since then three new power plants have come online the first phase of Bayat-1 Thermal Plant 41 MW that came online in November 2019 the USAIDfunded Kandahar Solar PV Plant 10 MW that came online in October 2019 and the Salma hydroelectric dam 25 MW became fully operational in early October 2020 bringing the country’s total installed capacity to 699 MW While the numbers reported are representative of installed capacity many of the power plants do not operate at full capacity and thus domestic power production is in reality lower than the reported installed capacity In order to calculate Afghanistan’s energy production in MWh you would need to know the percentage of installed capacity at which the plants were running daily and for how long they were generating power See Afghanistan InterMinisterial Commission for Energy “Domestic Generation ” 3 2016 Diesel Gas Turbine Worldwide “Afghan’s First New Gas-Based Power Plant In 40 Years Running ” 11 14 2019 USAID “10 MW Kandahar Solar Power ” 12 11 2019 Afghanistan Times “Salma Dam resumes operations as reservoir fills up ” 10 4 2020 569 Khaama Press “Afghanistan Spends $280M on Imported Energy ” 8 31 2020 200 570 Tehran Times “Iran nearly zeroes electricity exports amid surging domestic demand ” 7 7 2021 571 USAID Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Project 5 2019 p  1 572 USAID Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Project 5 2019 p  1 573 TOLOnews “DABS 23 Power Pylons Destroyed Damaged in 1 Month ” 6 8 2021 574 Bayat Energy Group Energy Loss Management Visualization Platform ELMVP Project Monthly Progress Report 1-March until 31-March 2021 4 12 2021 p  2 575 USAID 25 MW Herat Wind Farm Factsheet 11 2019 p  1 576 SIGAR Kandahar Solar Power Plant Project Was Generally Completed According to Contract Requirements SIGAR 21-30IP 4 5 2021 p  6 577 TOLOnews “Where in Control Taliban Collects Electricity Payments ” 5 4 2021 578 MENAFN “Kabul Residents Bills Increase as Power Service Worsens ” 6 20 2021 579 USAID OI response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 580 USAID OI response to SIGAR data call 6 20 2019 SIGAR Afghanistan’s Energy Sector USAID and DOD Did Not Consistently Collect and Report Performance Data on Projects Related to Kajaki Dam and Concerns Exist Regarding Sustainability SIGAR 19-37-AR 5 2019 ii p  26 USAID Afghanistan Energy Sector Technical Assessment Final Report 2 28 2018 p  6 581 SIGAR Afghanistan’s Energy Sector USAID and DOD Did Not Consistently Collect and Report Performance Data on Projects Related to Kajaki Dam and Concerns Exist Regarding Sustainability 5 2019 pp  26 31–32 582 SIGAR USAID’s Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Project The Project is Behind Schedule and Questions Remain about the Afghan Government’s Ability to Use and Maintain the New Power Infrastructure SIGAR 19-57AR 9 2019 p  34 583 Tetra Tech Engineering Support Program ESP A-005 NEPSSEPS Connector Transmission Lines Monthly Report No 42 December 5 2020–January 4 2021 1 10 2021 pp  11–12 USAID OI response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 584 USAID OI response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 585 USAID 10 MW Kandahar Solar Power Plant Overview 12 11 2019 586 SIGAR Kandahar Solar Power Plant Project Was Generally Completed According to Contract Requirements SIGAR 21-30IP 4 5 2021 pp  4 9 587 SIGAR Kandahar Solar Power Plant Project Was Generally Completed According to Contract Requirements SIGAR 21-30-IP 4 5 2021 pp  4–5 SIGAR communications with DABS officials 2020 588 SIGAR Kandahar Solar Power Plant Project Was Generally Completed According to Contract Requirements SIGAR 21-30IP 4 5 2021 pp  5–6 9 589 USAID OI response to SIGAR draft data call 5 16 2021 590 Reuters “Violence intensifies across Afghanistan’s central and northern provinces ” 6 28 2021 591 MENAFN “Kabul hit by blackout as 2 power pylons damaged ” 5 7 2021 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ENDNOTES 592 Arab News “10 killed in twin Kabul blasts power supply disrupted across Afghanistan ” 6 2 2021 593 Mehr News Agency “Iran’s power export to Afghanistan disconnected report ” 6 8 2021 594 Reuters “Violence intensifies across Afghanistan’s central and northern provinces ” 6 28 2021 595 USAID OI response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 USAID OI response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 596 TOLOnews “DABS 23 Power Pylons Destroyed Damaged in 1 Month ” 6 8 2021 597 DAI Global Regional Agricultural Development-East RADPEast Quarterly Report Q2 FY2021 January–March 2021 4 28 2021 p  40 598 U S Embassy in Afghanistan “Without Infrastructure No One Wins By Dr Tina Dooley-Jones Mission Director at USAID Afghanistan June 2021 ” 6 9 2021 599 USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy 3 31 2019 pp  9–10 600 Reporterly “Taliban Banned Girls to Attend Secondary Schools in Takhar Officials ” 3 2 2021 601 This figure includes USAID funds provided to the ARTF for education programs in Afghanistan 602 USAID OHN response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 603 USAID OHN response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 WHO “Teachers in schools and universities set to receive the COVAX COVID-19 vaccine ” 3 16 2021 604 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 1 30 2021 p  146 605 USAID OED response to SIGAR data call 3 17 2020 606 Afghanistan Times “Healthcare instructions not observed in schools ” 3 27 2021 607 Human Rights Watch Heather Barr “School Closures Hurt Even More in Afghanistan ” 6 18 2020 USAID OED response to SIGAR vetting 10 9 2020 608 Save the Children “Afghanistan Eight in Ten Children Say They’ve Learnt Little or Nothing During COVID-19 Lockdown ” 9 14 2020 609 Save the Children “Afghanistan Eight in Ten Children Say They’ve Learnt Little or Nothing During COVID-19 Lockdown ” 9 14 2020 610 USAID OED response to SIGAR vetting 4 7 2021 611 USAID OED response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 USAID OED response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 612 USAID OED response to SIGAR data call 3 17 2021 613 USAID OED response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 614 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 4 30 2020 p  146 615 USAID OED response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 616 MOE correspondence with USAID 8 15 2018 Pajhwok Afghan News “MoE begins distributing 12 2m locally printed textbooks ” 8 29 2019 USAID correspondence with MOE IL-20-11-01 8 27 2018 USAID correspondence with MOE IL-2011-08 11 21 2019 617 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 4 30 2020 p  146 USAID OED response to SIGAR vetting 1 6 2021 618 USAID OED response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 USAID OED response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30 2021 619 TOLOnews “Afghan Schools Need at Least 50 000 Teachers Ministry ” 4 10 2021 USAID OHN response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 620 TOLOnews “Afghan Schools Lack Teachers Textbooks ” 5 17 2021 621 Al Jazeera “Years of war and poverty take toll on Afghanistan’s healthcare ” 5 25 2019 622 Infectious Hazard Preparedness WHE WHO Disease Early Warning System-Plus DEWS-Plus Afghanistan 3rd Quarter 1st July – 30 SEP 2020 11 5 2020 p  5 623 Associated Press “Bomb targets health workers in Afghan capital killing 1 ” 5 5 2021 Associated Press “Attacks target polio teams in east Afghanistan 5 killed ” 6 14 2021 624 Reuters “Covid vaccines destroyed in Afghan hospital attack Taleban seized border post in north ” 6 23 2021 625 UNAMA Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2020 2 2021 p  36 626 This figure includes USAID funds provided to the ARTF for health programs in Afghanistan 627 The Guardian “Afghanistan’s doctors braced for rapid spread of India Covid Variant ” 5 25 2021 628 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Afghanistan COVID-19 at crisis point as hospitals overflow 6 17 2021 629 Voice of America “Afghan Officials Delta Variant Accounts for Nearly 60% of New Infections ” 6 26 2021 630 WHO COVID-19 Epidemiological Bulletin Afghanistan Week 26 2021 27 June – 3 July 2021 7 8 2021 631 Infectious Hazard Preparedness WHE WHO Disease Early Warning System-Plus DEWS-Plus Afghanistan 1st Quarter 1st Jan–31st March 2021 4 30 2021 p  11 632 Reuters “Full hospitals in Afghanistan close doors to new patients as COVID-19 surges ” 6 14 2021 633 Gandhara “Third Wave Of Covid Infections Ravages Afghanistan ” 6 9 2021 Reuters “Full hospitals in Afghanistan close doors to new patients as COVID-19 surges ” 6 14 2021 634 TOLOnews “Hospitals Struggle to Treat COVID Patients Amid Oxygen Shortage ” 6 14 2021 635 Foreign Policy “Afghanistan Swamped by COVID-19’s Third Wave ” 6 7 2021 636 The Hill “U S urging Americans to leave Afghanistan due to sharp COVID-19 rise ” 6 3 21 The Hill “U S Embassy in Afghanistan on ‘immediate’ lockdown over COVID-19 surge ” 6 17 2021 637 SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 4 30 2021 p  156 638 USAID OHN response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 639 USAID OHN response to SIGAR data call 3 17 2021 USAID OHN response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 640 State SCA response to SIGAR data call 6 16 2021 White House Fact Sheet Continued U S Support for a Peaceful Stable Afghanistan 6 25 2021 USAID OHN response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 641 CDC Janssen COVID-19 Vaccine Johnson Johnson Storage and Handling Summary 4 22 2021 White House Fact Sheet Continued U S Support for a Peaceful Stable Afghanistan 6 25 2021 State SCA response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 201 ENDNOTES - -------------- 642 European Pharmaceutical Review Victoria Rees “Why cold chain requirements are not holding COVID-19 vaccines back ” 12 18 2020 Reuters “Afghanistan begins COVID-19 vaccination drive amid rising violence ” 2 23 2021 643 TOLOnews “Afghanistan Receives 468 000 Vaccine Doses From COVAX ” 3 8 2021 644 Asian Development Bank “$50 Million ADB Grant to Support COVID-19 Vaccine Rollout in Afghanistan ” 4 20 2021 645 Reuters “China to provide Afghanistan with 400 000 doses of COVID-19 vaccine ” 3 1 2021 New York Times “Afghanistan gets 700 000 doses of a Chinese vaccine amid a Covid surge overwhelming Kabul ” 6 10 2021 TOLOnews “First Round of COVID-19 Vaccination Campaign Completed ” 5 26 2021 USAID OHN response to SIGAR vetting 7 8 2021 646 Fortune “Cold storage requirements will create a vast logistical nightmare for distributing COVID-19 vaccine ”11 11 2020 647 CNN “COVAX signs deal for 550 million Chinese COVID-19 vaccines amid questions over efficacy ” 7 13 2021 648 Arab News “Afghanistan sets new curbs as jab supplies dwindle ”6 7 2021 ABC News “Amid brutal case surge Afghanistan hit by a vaccine delay ” 6 5 2021 649 Pajhwok Afghan News “Govt undecided about import of 20m Russian vaccine doses ” 6 29 2021 Reporterly “Afghanistan Russia to Discuss Russian Vaccine Supplies Soon FM Atmar ” 2 27 2021 650 WHO COVID-19 Epidemiological Bulletin Afghanistan Week 26 2021 27 June – 3 July 2021 7 8 2021 651 Foreign Policy “Afghanistan Swamped by COVID-19’s Third Wave ” 6 7 2021 652 Foreign Policy “Afghanistan Swamped by COVID-19’s Third Wave ” 6 7 2021 202 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION Well-watered farmland in Kunar Province UNAMA photo by Mujeeb Rahman Hotaki Quarterly Report Staff Atif Ahmad Research Assistant Vong Lim Senior Visual Information Specialist Harrison Akins Economic and Social Development Subject Matter Expert James Misencik Security Subject Matter Expert Michael Bindell Deputy Director of Research and Analysis Directorate Heather Robinson Security Subject Matter Expert Theodore Burns Funding Subject Matter Expert Deborah Scroggins Director of Research and Analysis Directorate Craig Collier Security Subject Matter Expert Omar Sharif Project Coordinator Jason Davis Visual Information Specialist Daniel Weggeland Governance Subject Matter Expert Clark Irwin Senior Writer Editor SIGAR SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION 2530 Crystal Drive Arlington VA 22202 www sigar mil SIGAR 2021-QR-3 WASTE FRAUD OR ABUSE MAY BE REPORTED TO SIGAR’S HOTLINE By phone Afghanistan Cell 0700107300 DSN 318-237-3912 ext 7303 All voicemail is in Dari Pashto and English By phone United States Toll-free 866-329-8893 DSN 312-664-0378 All voicemail is in English and answered during business hours By fax 703-601-4065 By e-mail sigar hotline@mail mil By Web submission www sigar mil investigations hotline report-fraud aspx SIGAR - Report Waste Fraud or Abuse