A ’ U S DEPARTMENT OF STATfc -SEQRBT tK DIRECTOR OF INTEUIGENCE AND RESEARCH FQRBIgtf DIOCgM « 52i June 23 1967 To i The Acting Secretary Through S S From J INK - George C Denney Subject Crisis Management in Bolivia Government Flounders but Keeps its Footing Bolivia1a crisis continues but it now seems evident that the unrest among western tin miners has not sparked a general movement of opposition to the government 0 President Barrientosf efforts to strengthen his political position by negotiations with the Bolivian Socialist Falange FSB have tome to naught and the Huanunl tin miners have declared the Huanunl area a free territory ' Nevertheless Barrientos has taken no drastic actions e g violent repression of the miners thus far and he has retained the support of the military Moreover there are no signs of a coalescence of the several elements in the population capable of seriously threatening public order the guerrillas in southeastern Bolivia the miners in the west students opposition political groupings of the left The cumulative total of adverse factors In the present crisis creates a somewhat wore somber iopression than do the same factors examined individually The crisis could clearly sharpen as a result of largely unpredicatable events but the general outlook Is no worse — and in some respects slightly more hopeful — than it was last week The guerrilla movement The Bolivian armed forces have found it difficult to retain contact with the guerrilla force and are still a long way from stamping out the movement There have been rumors of possible new guerrilla fronts 1 but such reports aeem somewhat overdrawn and unrealistic in view of the small size of the guerrilla taovement estimated to number about 60 members recruiting efforts by the guerrillas wn fmxtnrcdby heUuTCttu Rc c«»«rt» hxidc fw wit oth 1 tfcc iovet it not tew coo« »» k 4c cwfeeic of We have seen no evidence of successful The Soviet-oriented Bolivian Communist Party —SgeKK£ WQ- rOltCXOH DI66BHDECLASSIFIED E O 12356 Sec 3 4 NT i NARA Date Exoludod” automata dowti r dlnff and d eclassificatio n C P Y -H B U L B R A P lV t —OftCWH' MO m U U i 1U 8SBH— « 2 •» PCU I b reported to have set up classroom training for party menders in guerrilla' warfare but this is unlikely to add to the government's problems In the immediate future The present guerrilla movement can probably evade and haras the countering urgent forces for an Indefinite period but It does not in Itself and at its present size constitute a serious threat to the government The unrest In the mining areas» The best efforts of extreme leftist agitators have apparently failed to spark any massive violent move against the government or to weld the miners to the guerrillas The focus of miner discontent is situated in Huanunl where miners have declared a ’’free territory fl they made similar declarations during periods of unrest in 1964 and 1965 and are probably seeking leverage to get concessions from the government including lifting the state of siege Nevertheless the rank and file miners seem little inclined to cooperate with the guerrillas despite the urging of extremist leaders The miners are rumored to have received arms possibly from sources in Chile but the rumors ate unconfirmed Marxist parties in Chile have expressed support for the Bolivian guerrilla movement hut there is no evidence that the Chilean extreme left has attempted or Intends to provide material support either to the Insurgents or the miners The effective Chilean military and police forces would undoubtedly make every effort to block the movement of arms Into Bolivia Political opposition and students Leftist opposition groups would like to take advantage of the guerrilla movement and miner discontent to improve their own position ' However these groups are at odds among themselves generally ineffectual and subject to considerable harassment and some i epression by the government Bolivian university gBeRIME HO PORStCW-DISSBM--- OPY LBJ L IB R A R V 3RCRST W0 FOREIGN UI8CTH I - 3 and high school students sympathise with the tin miners and to some extent probably with the guerrillas but the students have remained quiet during the present crisis We see no indications of impending student moves to show solidarity with either the miners or guerrillas The short-run outlook President Barrientos reportedly hopes to engage in personal dialogue 1 with the tin miners later this month His chances of effecting a’ relaxation of die present tension seem good Making concessions on pay and working conditions to the miners would cause difficulties for the national mining corporation COMIBOL but at the same time would likely undercut the efforts of extremist mine leaders to radicalize miner discontent in the direction of support for the guerrillas The greatest danger in the short term would lie in the coalescence of groups or • movements capable of violence I f the government should take harshly repressive f measures against the miners t that coales cense might occur However Barrientos has not authorised such measures thus far and his chances of avoiding drastic action seem somewhat better than even ----- g gCKgT WO KJBJSICM PISSBfl COPY LBJ Source LBJL NSF Intel File Box 2 f “Guerrilla Problem in Latin America” This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Che Guevara and the CIA in the Mountains of Bolivia 2020-10-09