THE WHITE HOUSE W A S H IN G T O N —■GONFTD’ENTIALi - S ep tem ber 1 1967 WA Y e s te r d a y I attended an A R A - IR G C O IN s e s s io n to r e v ie w the paper SIG req u ested a n alyzin g why our m ilit a r y p ro g r a m in B o liv ia did not have the B o liv ia n m ilit a r y in a b e tte r position to cope w ith the g u e r r illa s The paper was the next thing to a w hitew ash and is being re w ritte n A u toc r it ic is m is som etim es hard to take A g re a t d eal of the fault lie s with the B olivia n s But th ere a r e ar e as w h ere we c le a r ly fa ll down T h ese a re being brought out in the re d ra ft d e c l a s s if ie d W G B ow d ler E 0 12356 Sec 3 4 1 D 1UN I I A L COPY LBJ LIBRARY I ' Thk i t k H ousk I — SCORCH — T u esd ay August 8 1967 5 20 p m i M r P re s id e n t D ick H e lm s w ish es you to rea d this r e p o r t on the o rig in s and c h a ra c te r o f the B o liv ia n g u e r r illa m ovem en t ostow - CBOftET- DECLASSIFIED E 0 12356 See 3 4 ntj B y A 't-ff COPY LBJ LIBRARY NARA D ate Ce n t r al In ug bnc b O m c i or T h s D ir Ag e nc y ic t o b d e c l a ss if ie d E O 12958 Sec 3 6 1M 1 1 tZ a _ NARA Date J-V -9 7 8 August 1967 MEMORANDUM FOR The President We made this study in order to point up the nature of the guerrilla movements which Castro is generating throughout Latin America Also Stokely Carmichael's visit to Cuba and his excessive statements there about nguerrilla activity” in American cities outlines the de sirability of a better understanding among us of what these revolutionaries are talking about Ricnara Helms Director Attachment - 1 Copy No 1 - No 137U 67 The Bolivian Guerrilla Movement An Interim Assessment _ __ d‘ M tjlJl ■ -‘ H1- -----ltMf tai MEMORANDUM FOR DECLASS it Honorable Wal •41 We made this study in order to point up the nature of the guerrilla movements which Castro is generating throughout Latin America Also Stokely Carmichael's visit to Cuba and his ex cessive statements there about guerrilla activity in American cities outlines the desirability of a better understanding among us of what these revolutionaries are talking about 7 Attachment- -'' CCo p v No 2 J N o 137l» 67 The Richard Helms Bolivian Guerrilla Movement An Interim Assessment 8 August 1967 DATE FORM NO 1 AUt S4 101 RC#tAC S FORM to 101 VHICH MAY I I USKO f t P C L A SfilFIED- d e c l a ss if ie d E O 12958 Sec 3 © JSARA D»tQ k3 7 t47 -Secret— No Foreign Dissem DI R E C T O R A T E OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Memorandum The Bolivian Guerrilla Movement An Interim Assessment DECLASSIFIED E O 12958 Sec 3 6 N U By NARA Date J w »9 7 COPY LBJ LIBRARY W • vV-V ' 'f j - NG This document ctmUkfsiinmhmtion affecting the national defense of the Ufaffed States Nvfrtmi the meaning of Title 18 sections Ttw and 794 of the uSsCode a amended Its transmission or revelation of its cb tents to or rec e ip t h f an unauthorized person is prohibited by law LBJ LIBRARY tto F i f p n 11 -1 P i 11n mii CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 8 August 1967 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM The Bolivian Guerrilla M o v e m e n t An Interim Assessment Summary A guerrilla movement discovered in Bolivia in March 1967 appears through its genesis nature and tactics to be a concentra£ec Castro-s tyle revolu tion ary e ffort tKafc appears lore'sophis treated arid more professional than similar efforts elsewhere in Latin A m e r i c a J The insurgents success to date however is due largely to the ineptitude of the Bo l i v i a n m i l i t a r y The army's poor showing is fur ther diminishing the prestige of the government and is spurring Bolivia's neighbors into developing c o n tingency plans for military intervention should the situation deteriorate drastically The guerrillas adhere closely to the revolu tionary theories espoused at various times by F idel Castro Ernesto Che Guevara and French M a r x ist theoretician Jules Regis Debray fKe insurgents ' have received training propaganda support and some arms and equipment from Cuba N o t e lr his memorandum was produced solely by CIA It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Clandestine Services Ifir r uie iyn DlBBBiu CunLiullcd- Disgem— -S E C R E T Mo P n g e i g n P i -S F e R E T t r o l l e d -D ia a m g a a r» Q o n Additional propaganda assistance is now being provided by the Havana-based Latin American Solidarity Organization LASO which is championing armed rev olutionary activity throughout the hemisphere Fur thermore because worldwide publicity has been given both to the alleged presence of Che Guevara with the guerrillas and to the capture of Debray this insurgency movement will be kept in the public eye It could become a focus for the continuing polemical debate in the Communist wor l d over the wi s d o m of political versus militant revolutionary action - wu F u i b i y i i 2- D la m a ffl cu n t r u l l u d - S E C R gF -' D i a a e m- BOLIVIA Area of Guerrilla Activity CIA COPY LBJ LIBRARY -S E e t t E T — Foara ign Di-gaem Gontrrcjllad Digram 1 Bolivia is a relative newcomer to the list of Latin American nations where Communist-inspired insurgency has become an acute problem Prepara tions to begin guerrilla operations there first b e gan to be reported in late 1966 Such reports were initially received with skepticism by foreign and domestic observers largely because of the known u n reliability of the Bolivian Government's intelligence apparatus the prevalence of bandits in the tradi tionally w i l d and lawless frontier area where the guerrillas were reported to be located and the g o v ernment's propensity for trying to distract public attention from its more pressing internal problems 2 After considerable prodding army patrols in early March began to follow up reports of groups of bearded strangers in southeast Bolivia On 23 March a patrol stumbled into a guerrilla camp and in the resulting battle seven army personnel were killed and five wounded In addition the guer rillas took 21 prisoners who were released after they were treated for wounds and interrogated In subsequent clashes the army fared little better Effectiveness and Orientation of the Guerrilla Movement 3 Although much has been written and reported about the Bolivian guerrillas since their discovery much more remains to be learned about them Few r e liable accounts of their activities have been obtained from the guerrillas themselves and the extreme i sola tion of the areas where the guerrillas have been ac tive prohibits coverage by ordinary news media Even the number and nationality of the guerrillas remain uncertain The last estimate indicates that there are about 100 of them mostly Bolivians and Cubans with a few Peruvians More than one group may exist They are apparently supplied with arms that have been smuggled into the country through Chile Peru and Brazil 4 One major point is clear The Bolivian guerrillas are a well trained and disciplined group The insurgents are better led and better eq uipped than the untrained poorly organized B o lTvian m i l i t ary -3N o F o r e i gn D i 9 Scm eoiiLiullyd DHja'STTT —flB € R E T ------- -SfceitET---W U FU'f ign Disselll Luiltiiulluil D i a s e m f o r c e s M o r e o v e r it is e v i d e n t that C u b a n - s t y l e t r a i n i n g t e c h n i q u e s h a v e bee n u s e d to p r e p a r e the g u e r r i l l a s for action M a n y of t h e m h a v e b e e n t r a i n e d in Cuba and there is g o o d e v i d e n c e t h at a s m all cadr$ of juban g u e r r i l l a w a r far e x p e r t s i n a c t i v e ly fig h t in g w i t h the i n s u r g e n t s In c o n t r a s t to t ne p r o C a s t r o i n s u r g e n t s a c t i v q n Ve n e z u e l a G u a t e m a l a an d C o l o m b i a the B o l i v i a n s s t a n d o u t b e c a u s e t h e y u s u alily n a v e b e e n able fco s e i z e the initiative Tin e n c o u n t e r a w i t h the m i l i t a r y 5 A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n has b e e n H a v a n a ' s w i l l i n g n e s s to b e c o m e m o r e d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d in p r o v i d i n g t a n g i b l e s u p p o r t to Lat i n A m e r i c a n g u e r r i l l a groups The C u b a n i n v o l v e m e n t in the l a n d i n g of V e n e z u e l a on 8 M a y d e m o n s t r a t e s that this r e c e n t C u b a n e s c a l a t i o n has n o t been c o n f i n e d to Bolivia T h e B o l i v i a n group however p r o b a b l y r e c e i v e d a m o r e p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a r t b e c a u s e of a m o r e d i r e c t C u b a n role f r o m the beginning 6 As a r e sult of Cuban i nvolvement this p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m along w i t h car e f u l p r e p a r a t i o n and i m a g i n a t i v e leadership is r eadily apparent Con s i d e r a b l e e m p h a s i s has o b v i o u s l y bee n giv e n to t r a i n ing e x e r c i s e s ideology and tactics A l l of this is r e f l e c t e d in i n d i c a t i o n s that the g u e r r i l l a s are h i g h l y m o t i v a t e d and that their m o r a l e is good M o r e o v e r this p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m has bee n a t t a i n e d e v e n t h o u g h the g u e r r i l l a s w e r e d i s c o v e r e d by a c c i d e n t w e l l b e f o r e they felt themselves ready to b e gin actual operations L e a d e r s h i p and D o c t r i n a l G u i d e l i n e s of the M o v e m e n t 7 A few k n o w n B o l i v i a n C o m m u n i s t s h a v e b een i d e n t i f i e d as leaders of the insurgents Other re ports from w i t h i n B o l i v i a and e l s e w h e r e al lege that one or tne leaders is E r n e s t o Che Guevara the Arg e n t i n e - b o r n r e v o l u t i o n a r y w h o was a key figure in the c a s t r o g o v e r n m e n £ rin OuHa unfelTHfuT d r o p p e d out of sight in M a r c h 1965 T h e s e reports w h i c h come from sources of v ar y i n g c r e d ibility are In e s s e n t i a l a g r e e men t on fche getails oiT'wfiere and w h e n G u e v a r a is s u p posed to have b een w i t h the guerrillas but con c l u s i v e -4-Uo- Foroign D i s s m n C U n T T U l l c d Diftbum _ S K C R I f f ----- -SECRET— No-Po o4gB Diaoom eonfc-rol-ttrd DiuL«3fc evidence of Che's direct participation has not been obtained W h e t h e r G u evara is a participant or i n de e d w h e t h e r he is even alive it is plain m any case that the guerrilla leaders are w e l l - s c h o o l e d in the i n s u r g e n cy techniques and doctrines previously e s p o u s e d by Guevara 8 These techniques and doctrines are basically common to both Che Guevara and Fidel Castro Recently they have been given fresh emphasis with their p u b lication in handbook form by Jules Regis Debray a y o u n g French M a r x i s t protege of Castro Debray's book Revolution Within the R e v o l u t i o n was written after conversations with Castro and was published last J a nuary with Cuban Government backing The book's preface points out that Debray has shared the life of the guerrillas in various Latin American countries This assertion was underlined in late A pril 1967 when Debray and two other foreigners were c a p t u r e d by the Bolivian Army shortly after leaving the guerrilla camp Debray is still awaiting m i l i tary trial 9 T h e C a s t r o - G u e v a r a - D e b r a y t h e o r i e s w h i c h c h a l l e n g e the role of n a t i o n a l C o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s can be b r i e f l y s t a t e d as four m a i n r e v o l u t i o n a r y tenets a L a t i n A m e r i c a ne e d s a dynamic o f f e n s i v e r u r a l o r i e n t e d g u e r r i l l a action b th e r e s h o u l d be only one m a j o r g u e r r i l l a m ov e m e n t d i r e c t e d by a u n i t e d l e a d e r s h i p and g u i d e d by one clear strategy c g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s s h o u l d be initiated d e v e l o p e d d i r ected and c o n t r o l l e d fro m rural areas and d the g u e r r i l l a uni t p r e c e d e s the u r b a n - b a s e d p a r t y and in fact u l t i m a t e l y e vo l v e s into the authentic party C a s t r o Guevara and Debray all h a v e c o n t e n d e d tha t g i v e n the un i q u e p o l i t i c a l social e c o n o m l c T g e o g r a p h i c and c u l t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l i n g in L a t i n A m e r i c a C u b a ' s r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e is much m o r e r e l e v a n t to the s i t u a t i o n than the e x p e r i e n c e of the S o v i e t Union and d o m m u n l s t C h i n a 10 The recen t i n t e r r o g a t i o n of C i r o R o b e r t o Bustos an A r g e n t i n e f re e - l a n c e j o u r n a l i s t w h o was w i t h the B o l i v i a n g u e r r i l l a s from 6 M a r c h u n t i l his -5n o F oreign D i s s e m C o n t r o i l e d Ulbsem— SECRET ■ N n -J m r i gn -SEeiaST - n i f8 S P T n C P i fr g o llo d - capture along with Debray by the Bolivian Army on 20 April directly supports other indications that these Castroite revolutionary theories are being implemented in Bolivia Both Bustos and Debray have claimed that Che Guevara was personally directing this implementation Indeed Bustos has given a rather full account of an alleged conversation with Guevara on this subject in late March 11 According to Bustos Guevara defined his strategic objective as the capture of political power in one or more soutn American countries after insur rectional armed struggle had flevelopecT Paraphras ing the Castro-Debray thesis Guevara “ “ is said to have explained that the guerrilla band must be the nucleus of revolutionary impetus It must be developed con solidated and expanded by its own activity in order to proliferate Amplyifing the current attacks of the Latin American Solidarity Organization LASO on imperialism as the real enemy of the people and the organization's international revolutionary flavor Bustos claims Guevara told him that external political support is necessary for any successful Latin American revolution although initially the struggle should ap pear to be strictly internal As the revolution pro gresses the theory goes its proletarian-revolutionary-intemational character will become a simple fact or in other words outside assistance to the revolutionaries need not and cannot be hidden or ob scured for long 12 LASO delegates who are now meeting in Havana ostensibly to coordinate hemlpshere revolutionary ac tivity have apparently adopted the Cuban tenet that reactionary oppression must be met with patriotic revolutionary violence 1 following'this reasoning the Bolivian delegate Aldo Flores a member of the central committee of the pro-Moscow Communist Party implied that the Bolivian guerrillas were merely ex erting their patriotic duty in opposing US advisers and materiel that had been sent to oppressive forces in Bolivia 13 The conference itself is basically serving as a forum for Castro to appeal to Latin Americans to band together in Red Beret groups in order to begin - No- F o r e ig n ni 6r r tll H D -i a a pm Typical tetrain where guerrilla activity is reported Oven found at original guerrilla campsite at Nacahuasu Dense undergrowth in area of guerrilla activity 6742S t 67 CIA COPY LBJ LIBRARY COMflOftmAT „ „ C -9-ECKK1 ■ Mo P o g Q i g f t n i s s o m Confer o l l e a E H o u gy a true revolutionary struggle The spectre of Che Guevara who was elected honorary chairman of the conference in absentia personifies the militant a pproach C astro wants the meeting to take and creates w o r l d w i d e sensational publicity No particular em phasis has been p laced on the success of the Bolivian g u errillas during the proceedings their continuing progress however has certainly raised the morale and a f f ected the outlook of the delegates The w o r l d w i d e play be i n g given to the Guevara theme and the Debray capture moreover will help to maintain the B o l i v i a n g u errillas in the public eye long after the LASO Conference ends The Bolivian experience may w e l l become an important element in the continuing debase in the Communist world over the w i s d o m oi armed action versus peacefull' meEfiocsas ti e best means of achieving power The M i l i t a r y ' s Role Against the Guerrillas 14 Most of the insurgents' success to date re sults from the fact that the flolivian armed forces are almost totally inept in counterinsurgency op e r a tions in contrast to the military establishments fighting guerrilla groups elsewhere in Latin America the Bolivian military reaction to the guerrillas has been generally panicky Most army officers have been trained in traditional warfare and have no compre h ension of guerrilla tactics The enlisted men are mostly illiterate raw recruits who have received little or no training All are unfamiliar with the terrain Soldiers are demoralized by the faulty weapons is sued them— mostly single-action Mauser rifles left over from the Chaco War 1932-1935 — and the lack of adequate logistic and medical facilities and com munications No one in the army command seems to have an accurate understanding of events in the guerrilla area and the Armed Forces High Command in La Paz continues to seek a miraculous solution to the p r o b lem emphasizing to US officials the need for auto matic weapons to raise the soldiers' morale 15 Perhaps more significant than the armed forces' ineptness and inefficiency in military matters is their apparent failure to adopt essential safeguards -7•— Mo Fuic iuii Diasciu CUrreiUllcd Diooom ----- SECRET____ COPY LBJ LIBRARY -S K ftR K T W - F n m lgn ni rspti n rn -m i 1e„ lnnm a g a i n s t the a l i e n a t i o n of the local population Lo cal g a r r i s o n s o f t e n t e r r o r i z e the local inhabitants m o l e s t i n g the w o m e n and o p e n i n g t h e m s e l v e s up to unf a v o r a b l e c o m p a r i s o n w i t h the w e l l - d i s c i p l i n e d g u e r r illas 16 In s p ite of the p o t e n t i a l l y v o l a t i l e s i t u a t i o n p r e v a i l i n g in the m a j o r u r b a n and m i n i n g regions P r e s i d e n t B a r r i e n t o s has s e n t s e v e r a l M A P - s u p p o r t e d u n i t s s e r v i n g in t h ose regions into the g u e r r i l l a area B o l i v i a n A r m y e f f o r t s to r e i n f o r c e the c o u n t e r g u e r r i l l a units however hav e b een h a m p e r e d by ad h o c o r g a n i z a t i o n of units w i t h o u t r e g a r d to unit i n t e g r i t y a n d s t a t e of combat efficiency a s s i g n m e n t t o the g u e r r i l l a zone of a few o f f i c e r s and NCO s t r a i n e d in c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y tactics and e m p l o y m e n t o f the B o l i v i a n A i r Force in w h a t a p p e a r to be i n d i s c r i m i n a t e b o m b i n g and s t r a f i n g operations The t y p e o f a r m y r e i n f o r c e m e n t s to date s u p p l i e d to the g u e r r i l l a zone has n o t m a t e r i a l l y e n h a n c e d c o m b a t e f fectiveness A t best therefore these troops l o c a l l y c o m m i t t e d to the area are able only to harass and m a k e s p o r a d i c c o n t a c t w i t h the g u e r r i l l a forces 17 P r e s s e d by the p u b l i c and by his a d v i s e r s to o b t a i n i m m e d i a t e favorable results in the g u e r r i l l a area P r e s i d e nt B a r rientos Ts at present m a i n l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h s e e k i n g an i m m e d i a t e s p e c t a c u lar v i c t o r y o v e r the g u e rrillas All his plans rest m a inly on the h o p e ot o b t a i n i n g m o d e r n firepower f r o m the US w i t h o u t r e g a r d to the n e e d for c o n c u r r ent t r a i n i n g and o t h e r l o g i s t i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s D o m e s t i c I m p a c t of the I n s u r g e n c y 18 Thus far the g u e r r i l l a m o v e m e n t has e l i c i t e d o nly m i n o r support w i t h i n Bolivia w i t h m o s t tangible a s s i s t a n c e h a y i n g come from the far left Leaders and i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n the p r o - M o s c o w B o l i v i a n C o m m u n i s t Party PCB S are d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d in the insurgency and some i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s of the party are w o r k i n g in liaison w i t h the guerrillas The rank and file of PCB S as w e l l as ot h e r C o m m u n i s t and radical leftist groups s eem to have been taken by surprise by the insurgency E x c e p t for the C o m m u n i s t Y o u t h sector of the P r o - C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t - 8- N o - Purelyii B i s a c m C u n tro lled D i a eem — s t i c k in COPY LBJ LIBRARY - SECRETi H n F o g e t y n Plbbm lL'ttftEroiiua Uluacifr P a r t y of B o l i v i a JCB C w h i c h r e p o r t e d l y o f f e r e d a c t i v e s u p p o r t t o the g u e r r i l l a m o v e m e n t t w o mo n t h s ago t h e o t h e r s h a v e o n l y r e c e n t l y b e g u n to m a k e t e n a t i v e g e s t u r e s of m a t e r i a l support S ome e x t r e m e l e f t i s t lea d e r s of B o l i v i a s c h r o n i c a l l y d i s c o n t e n t e d tin m i n e r s h a v e t r i e d h a r d to e s t a b l i s h ties b e t w e e n the m i n e r s a n d the g u e r r i l l a s They h a v e h a d l i t t l e suc c e s s a l t h o u g h a few u n e m p l o y e d m i n e r s h a v e r e p o r t e d l y b e e n r e c r u i t e d to join the guerrillas Many university and high school students u n d o u b t e d l y s y m p a t h i z e w i t h the i n s u r g e n t s b u t so f a r h a v e n o t d e m o n s t r a t e d this s u p p o r t to any s i g n i f i c a n t d egree T h e r e are no i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t the B o l i v i a n n o n - C o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s of the lef t are g r e a t l y i n t e r e s t e d in the m o v e m e n t o t h e r t han as the s o u r c e o f p o s s i b l e o p p o r t u n i t i e s to i m p r o v e t h e i r own position The e x t e n t of p e a s a n t s u p p o r t for the g u e r r i l l a s is unknown It is known however that th e g u e r r i l l a s have b e e n c i r c u m s p e c t in t h e i r t r e a t m e n t of the i n d i g e n o u s p o p u l a t i o n In t h o s e i n s t a n c e s w h e r e t h e y h a v e f o u n d it n e c e s s a r y to go i n t o tow n for f o o d and supplies they have been s c r u p u l o u s in t h e i r d e a l i n g w i t h the t o w n s p e o p l e of t e n p a y i n g m o r e t h a n t h e g o i n g rate for supplies Doct o r s a t t a c h e d to the b a n d s o f t e n ha v e t r e a t e d local v il l a g e r s at the s a m e time p r o p a g a n d i z i n g for the in s u r g e n t s 19 G u e r r i l l a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s are r e p o r t e d l y in c o n t a c t w i t h one of the l a r g e r p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s in Bol i v i a the o p p o r t u n i s t i c B o l i v i a n S o c i a l i s t F a l a n g e F S B w h i c h r e c e i v e d 12 p e r c e n t of the v o t e in 1966 T h e g u e r r i l l a s h a v e r e p o r t e d l y o f f e r e d to c o l l a b o r a t e w i t h the FSB if the l a t t e r w o u l d b e g i n g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s in the cities FSB c h i e f t a i n M a r i o G u t i e r r e z G u t i e r r e z has o r d e r e d that three p a r t y m e m b e r s be sent to talk w i t h the g u e r r i l l a s and find out the exact terms of c o o p e r a tion and w h a t a s s u r a n c e the FSB w o u l d h a v e of c o m i n g to p o w e r if the g u e r r i l l a s w e r e s u c c e s s f u l At the same time however the p o w e r - h u n g r y FSB has h e l d i n f o r m a l talks w i t h g o v e r n m e n t leaders w i t h a v i e w t o w a r d j o i n i n g the government -9- NU F o r e i g n Diss«m C ontiull iQ Diaaem ----- S E C R E T — - COPY LBJ LIBRARY - 3 E C P pnr1 No flnrpjgn D is s u i P f Pi □ami Impact o f Insurgency on Bolivia's Neighbors There is considerable doubt among Bolivia's neighbors especially Paraguay Argentina C hi l e and Peru that the Barrientos government can cope with the insurgency problem Presidents Ongania of Argen tina aqd Stroessner of Paraguay are reportedly agreed that if Barrientos T s overthrown they mav nave to intervene militarily The Argentine Government has provided Barrientos with food clothing and small arms There is no confirmation of recent press re ports that Bolivia has requested the assistance of Argentine military troops Argentina has sent military and police reinforcements to the Bolivian border however and a speedup in antiguerrilla training has been ordered Outlook 21 The sponsors and prime movers of the Bolivian guerrilla movement— including Bolivians and Cubans— have had a measure of success that will encourage them to keep the movement on an active footing Noth ing on the horizon would indicate that the guer rilla problem will ease soon or that the Bolivian armed forces can quickly improve their capabilities This seems bound to lead to increasing tension and in stability within the country and more concern on the part of Bolivia's neighbors lest the contagion spread across their own borders 22 The longer-run outlook may be a little brighter if the Barrientos government manages to sur vive Although this government like its predecessors has had its political ups and downs there is no sig nificant threat to the government at present The guerrilla activity has encouraged dissident political groups somewhat but the firm measures taken by Bar rientos late in June to quell the violence that broke out at the tin mines may have served to show such ele ments that the government will crack down on them just as firmly if need be At present these opposi tion groups are even less united and less effective than the government is and as long as this situation prevails Barrientos will retain the upper hand - 10 - - N o F o r e i gn D i s-aetn Gonfego-l l o d QEeRET - COPY LBJ LIBRARY - SE C R E T — Mo F n r ig n ni r aam Ounl'ml 1 j D1UV UU U 23 Bolivia’ s military capabilities may gr a d u a l l y improve Forces in the operational zone are u n d e r g o i n g intensive retraining in anti g u e r r i l l a tactics and a 600-man ranger battalion n o w training in Santa' Cruz is expected to be added to the forces in the field in late September or Octob e r G u e r r i l l a successes thus far have come against ill-trained raw troops and it remains to be seen if they are as effective against a welld i s c i p l i n e d and organized force Although the lessons the guerrillas are teaching the Bolivians are p a i n f u l o n e s they could be b e n e ficial if they help the B o l i v i a n s and other Latin Americans undex a£an£ the n e e d to devise new defenses against an el usive e n e m y in a difficult terrain testing revolutionary d octrine and t a c t i c s On the other hand should the guerrillas continue succeeding in Bolivia their e x p e r i e n c e s and methods are certain to be emulated in o t h e r Latin American countries - 11 - t f o Itovm Lun P i • seia Cuiii L r o l l e d Diaaew SECRETF- COPY LBJ LIBRARY LBJL NSF Country File Latin America Box 8 Folder “Bolivia vol 4 1 66 – 12 68 3 of 3 ” This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Che Guevara and the CIA in the Mountains of Bolivia 2020-10-09