- U T § rb E P A R T M E N T -rrrueM- F S T A T E PECRM DIR ECTOR O F IN TELLIGENCE A N D RESEARCH Jrj ft t ' V o te I O c to b er n-' i j OAs r - To Through From The Secretary S S INR - Thomas L Hughes Subject Guevara's Death— The Meaning for Latin America s ijdmsn •• - 'J 1 4 __BUDGET — DAVIS —FRIED — GINSBURGH 19 0 7 7 T_3TJ WTCTO -JttWP— __I0HNS0N __I0RDEN ±E0N HART — ROCHE _SAUNDERS u O H _ TAYlor Che” Guevara's death was a crip p lin g— perhaps fa t a l— blew to the Bolivian guferrllla movement and may prove a serious setback for Fidel Castro's hopes to foment violent revolution In all or almost all Latin American countries Those Communists and others who might have been prepared to initiate Cuban-style guerrilla warfare will be discouraged at least for a time by the defeat of the foremost tactician of the Cuban revolutionary strategy at the hands of one of the weakest armies in the hemisphere However there is little likelihood that Castro and his followers throughout Latin America will cease their efforts to foment and support insurgency albeit perhaps with some tactical modifications The mystery of Guevara Argentine-born Ernesto Che Guevara Fidel Castro's rlghthand man and chief lieutenant In the Sierra Maestra author of a book on guerrilla tactics one-time president of Cuba's National Bank under Castro and later Minister of Industries mysteriously disappeared In March 1965 Rumor said that he was 111 or that he had been put to death by Castro or that he was In the Dominican Republic during Its civil war or in Vietnam or in the Congo In October 1965 Castro finally announced that Guevara had renounced his Cuban citizenship and set off to devote his services to the revolutionary cause in other lands Rumors as to his whereabouts continued but until recently there was no substantial evidence to prove even that he was alive 1 Guevarismo makes a strong comeback The March 1965 disappearance of Guevara I Thtx rrport was prodrn rd by the Burv tu • Ni h Astd ffom normal Mibstantivc rxrhiMgc with othrt ju r ie s at the working level It h ix nut hrrn oto«lin »t«'ii rl ho when ►ECLASsimao ru“ J-u E O 12356 Sec 3 4 N il f i o r yXar L NAKA f W S - M - 7 COPY LBJ LIBRARY GFOUP 1 from a u t o m a t i c downgrading an d Ex c J u r t e d t c a l a n M f i c a t i o n —SMRBT NU FGHhlCw UISSEM— - 2 - occurred during a period when F id el Castro was toning down his emphasis on v io len t i revolution and tryin g to compose his d ifferen ces with the tra d itio n a l pro-Soviet communist parties in Latin America But i t was not long before Castro again began to favor openly the independent revolutionary theory which he and Guevara had developed based on th e ir view o f the Cuban revolu tion Since the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in January 1966 Castro has advocated with Increasing stridency the thesis which is set forth most c le a rly in a book e n title d Revolution within the Revolution by Castro's p rin cip al th eoretica l a p ologist French Marxist In te lle c tu a l Jules Regis Debray now on t r i a l in B o liv ia Disgusted with the peaceful path-to-power arguments o f the Latin American o ld -lin e communist p a rtles i e s p e c ia lly the Venezuelan CP— and th e ir Soviet supporters F id el and Debray have asserted that Latin America is ripe fo r insurgency now and have s p e c ifie d that the ruralguerrl11a movement rather than any urban-based communist party or other group must be the focal point and the headquarters o f the insurgency They have declared that action must take precedence over Ideology and that the g u e r r illa movement— as th nucleus o f a M arxist-Leninist party—w ill create the o b jective conditions fo r It s ultimate success and a ttra ct the lo c a l peasantry On A p ril 17 this year Cuban media gave great play to an a r t ic le supposedly w ritten by Guevara re ite ra tin g the Castro-Guevara-Debray thesis Two days la te r Fidel praised the a r t ic le and eulogized Guevara elim inating any lin gerin g impression that the romantic Che had been removed from the Cuban pantheon LASO Conference highlights disagreement of orthodox coirmunlsts The first Latin American Solidarity Organization meeting in Havana this summer served to underscore disagreement with the Castro thesis by the old line coimtunlst parties SECPBT NO- FOREIGN DIOOUH---- COPY LBJ LIBRARY f 3 They argue that conditions for violent revolution exist only in very few Latin American countries at present and that the local communist parties— not Cubans or other foreigners— should be the only ones to determine in accordance with traditional Marxist theory what tactics are called for Despite an outward show of harmony among the delegates the LASO conference of which Guevara was named honorary present in absentia widened the breach between the pro-Moscow communists and those who want revolution now Bolivia testing ground for the theory The guerrilla insurgency in Bolivia which came to light in March 1967 rekindled international interest in Latin American insurgencies and especially in the movements then underway in Latin America The Guatemalan guerrillas seemed to be on the ropes guerrilla forces in Venezuela and Colombia were making no headway The new Bolivian insurgency on the other hand seemed to be the most promising In an effort to maintain unity with Castro and within the Latin American extreme left even traditional communist parties agreed to endorse the Bolivian guerrillas Interest was further heightened when in April Debray himself was captured by the Bolivian armed forces and he indicated that Che Guevara had organized and was leading the guerrillas Initial battles between the guerrillas and the Bolivian army last March and April proved almost disastrous to the poorly trained ill-equipped troops who suffered heavy losses in every encounter a The failure of the army to deal effectively with handful of insurrectionists shook the entire Bolivian government and led to desperate appeals for US assistance action might be required by them infallible Neighboring countries began to consider what But the guerrillas proved neither invincible nor By July aided by testimony from Debray and other captives who were -9BCIUST MU 1’ URfllUU UlbSEfl-- COPY LBJ LIBRARY v - 6ECRE1 NITTUREHW msSfiM - 4 - members of the guerrilla force or had contact with it as well as by peasants who demonstrated more loyalty to the armed forces than to the guerrillas despite the latters' efforts to woo them Bolivian army units were able to inflict some damage on the guerrillas albeit with fairly heavy casualties In late August a significant victory took place when the guerrilla rear guard was wiped out in a well-executed ambush Still a successful encounter with the main body of the guerrilla force did not occur until October 8 when the army recouped its » reputation by the action which resulted in the death of Guevara Effects in Bolivia Guevara's death is a feather in the cap of Bolivian President Rene Barrientos « threat to stability It may signal the end of the guerrilla movement as a If so the Bolivian military which is a major element of Barrientos' support will enjoy a sense of self-confidence and strength that it has long lacked However victory could also stir political ambitions among army officers who were directly Involved in the anti-guerrilla campaign and who may now see themselves as the saviors of the republic Castro's reaction public rededication and private reassessment Cuban domestic media have thus far limited their reporting on Guevara's death to mention ing insistent statements to this effect in the international press which Cuban authorities can neither confirm or deny However the broad outlines of Havana's public position are generally predictable revolutionary who met a heroic death Guevara will be eulogized as the model His exemplary conduct will be contrasted to the do-nothing cowardly theorizing of the old line communist parties and other p8eudo-revolutionaries in Latin America and elsewhere The C as tro-Guevara-Debray thesis will be upheld as still valid and the protracted nature of the struggle will MTlTnyriu i r m g T m COPY LBJ LIBRARY SBOnDT llO FUK 1UN lUS'SBi - 5 be emphasized Blame for Guevara's death will be attributed to the usual villains- US imperialism the Green Berets the CIA— with only passing contemptuous reference to the Bolivian ’ ’ lackeys A call will no doubt be made for new Che's’ ' to pick up the banner of the fallen leader and optimistic predictions will be made as to the inevitability of the final triumph In private however Castro and his associates will have to reappraise the ptospects for exported revolution Castro might up his commitment of Cuban men and resources to foreign Insurgency in order to demonstrate that the death of one the combatant— even illustrious Che — makes little difference to the eventual success of guerrilla struggle in the hemisphere Castro'8 characteristic Such response would fit with refusal to accept failure in a major undertaking Or he might curtail Cuba's efforts to foster Insurgency abroad pending further assessment and stocktaking on the prospects for potential and existing insurgencies Or on analysing the Guevara effort in Bolivia he might adopt some new tactical approaches for guerrilla movements On balance it seems most likely that he will continue to commit about the same level of resources as at present to promising revolutionaries while utilizing the memory of the martyred Guevara and perhaps some tactical changes in approach i Probable Latin American reaction to Guevara's death News of Guevara's death will relieve most non-leftist Latin Americans who feared that sooner or later he t might foment insurgencies in their countries The demise of the most glamorous and reputedly effective revolutionary may even cause some Latin Americans to down grade the seriousness of insurgency and the social factors which breed it On the other hand communists of whatever striae and other leftists are likely to 3ECRET HU COPY LBJ LIBRARY JfUKfllUM L11SSEM— - # •» l SBOHBT HO FORfilUTD iSSEh - eulogize the revolutionary revolution 6 - martyr-especially for Its contribution to the Cuban and to maintain that revolutions will continue until their causes are eradicated If the Bolivian guerrilla movement is soon eliminated as a serious subversive threat the death of Guevara will have even more important repercussions among Latin American communists The dominant peaceful line groups who were either in total disagreement with Castro or paid only lip-service to the guerrilla struggle will be able to argue with more authority against the Castro-GuevaraDebray thesis They can point out that even a movement led by the foremost revolutionary tactician in a country which apparently provided conditions suitable for revolution had failed entirely While these parties are unlikely to denigrate Che's importance and abilities they will be able to accuse the Cubans of adventurism and point out that the presence of so many Cubans and other foreigners among the leaders of the Bolivian guerrillas tended to alienate the peasants upon whose support they ultimately depended They will be able to argue that any Insurgency must be indigenous and that only local parties know when local conditions are ripe for revolution Castro certainly will not be able to disassociate himself from Guevara's Bolivian efforts and will be subject to we told you soM criticism from the old line parties Although leftist groups which may have marginally accepted the Cuban theory probably will reevaluate their policies Castro's spell on the more youthful leftist elements in the hemisphere will not be broken — SECRET Ntf FOREIGN DISSECT COPY LBJ LIBRARY LBJL NSF Country File Latin America Box 8 Folder “Bolivia vol 4 1 66 – 12 68 2 of 3 ” This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Che Guevara and the CIA in the Mountains of Bolivia 2020-10-09