SECRETI Xl UNCLASSIFIED RELEASED IN PART Bl 1 4 C INR• US Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Assessment J0i0I 2001 U Afghanistan Al-Qaida Military Contribution to the Taleban · S With the decline in military aid by Pakistan over the last year the Taleban have increasingly relied on Usama bin Laden and the al-Qaida organization for support Bin Laden provides money recruits materiel and training for the fight against the Northern Alliance U Funding S Bin Laden probably contributes several million dollars a year from both personal and network funds to the Taleban A small percentage of this money is earmarked for civic infrastructure the rest probably is intended for military use Bin La n's largess is such that the press reported in late August that Ta1eban leader MuUah Omar had appointed him as Afghanistan's Defense Minister but apparently there was no formal announcement U Recruits S Bin Laden's global network for funneling recruits into Afghanistan for training has existed since the 1980s Some of the volunteers are sent to fight in Afghanistan It is unlikely that the Taleban could sustain themselves without the fresh supply of foreign volunteers that bin Laden provides unless they were to increase their highly unpopu ar forced recruitment of fighters from the local population U Fighters · S The so-called 55th or 055 Brigade is made up-predominately of e patriate mujahidin forces loya1 to bin Laden Members of the brigade generally are employed in small groups where they are most useful on the battlefield rather than as a single large unit The strength of the 55th probably ranges between 500 and 2 500 AJ-Qaida probably r9tates personnel through this brigade to gain combat experience prior to their dispatch abroad S The unit has a reputation for tenaci in battle and seems less susceptible to the defection and bribery that plague Taleba n ranks r- - - t r-- -T T7' n ' oted that bin Laden and a senior Taleban official had visite a ron me ra umt no o a u rigade members are frequently employed·as shock troops or to stiffen the line against the Northern Alliance UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REV W AUTHORITY ARCHIE M BOLSTER DATE CASE ID 20 SEP 2007 200500800 UNCLASSIFIED B1 ' UNCLASSIFIED _ l U Equipment S Bin Laden's supply network parallels his recruiting structure Sympathizers obtain supplies abroad and smuggle them to Afghanistan Al-Qaida's reach and scope is impressive extending across several continents U Camps S Almost a11 tile training camps in Afghanistan are ·associated with both al-Qaida and the Taleban Some camps are associated with specific nationalities a few are designated specifically for al-Qaida use There probably is significant overlap and interaction between Taleban troops and the foreign mujahidin during initial training sessions Taleban forces have provided logistical and security support to bin Laden-financed camps Both groups have collaborated in providing basic combat training for militants fighting against the Northern Alliance This cooperation includes specialized training at certain camps where militants are instructed in using poisons sniping manufacturing explosives and handling specialized weapons for guenilla warfare in Chechnya Kashmir and other countries SlECRET XJ Reason for Classification 1 5 c d Declassify on 1 6Xl Derived from · multiple sources INR Home Pl ge IBriefs Intel Assessments pJ ints I Producttl yAate I Productsbysountry UNCLASSIFIED