UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2010-03412 Doc No C05192751 Date 02 21 2013 U Afghanistan Al-Qaida Military Contribution to the Taleban Page 1 of 2 REVIEW AUTHORITY Archie Bolster Senior Reviewed SECRET Xl RELEASED IN PART B1 1 4 D 1 4 C US Department of State Bureau oflntelligence and Research Intelligence Assessment 10 01 2001 U Afghanistan Al-Qaida Military Contribution to the Taleban S With the decline in military aid by Pakistan over the last year the Taleban have increasingly relied on Usama bin Laden and the al-Qaida organization for support Bin Laden provides money recruits materiel and training for the fight against the Northern Alliance U Funding S Bin Laden probably contributes several million dollars a year from both personal and network funds to the Taleban A small percentage of this money is earmarked for civic infrastructure the rest probably is intended for military use Bin Laden's largess is such that the press reported in late August that Taleban leader Mullah Omar had appointed him as Afghanistan's Defense Minister but apparently there was no formal announcement U Recruits S Bin Laden's global network for funneling recruits into Afghanistan for training has existed since the 1980s Some of the volunteers are sent to fight in Afghanistan It is unlikely that the Taleban could sustain themselves without the fresh supply of foreign volunteers that bin Laden provides unless they were to increase their highly unpopular forced recruitment of fighters from the local population i U Fighters S The so-called 55th or 055 Brigade is made up predominately of expatriate mujahidin forces loyal to bin Laden Members of the brigade generally are employed in small groups where they are most useful on the battlefield rather than as a single large unit The strength of the 55th probably ranges between 500 and 2 500 Al-Qaida probably rotates personnel through this brigade to gain combat experience prior to their dispatch abroad S The unit has a reputation for tenaci that plague Taleban ranks in battle and seems less susceptible to the defection and bribe Classification Extended on 02 21 2013 - Class SECRET - Authority DSCG 11-1 - Declassify on 10 0112021 UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State CaseNo F-2010-03412 Doc No C05192751 Date 02 2172013 UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2010-03412 Doc No 005192751 Date 02 21 2013 LJ Afghanistan Al-Qaida Military Contribution to the Taleban Page 2 of 2 7 U Equipment S Bin Laden's supply network parallels his recruiting structure Sympathizers obtain supplies abroad and smuggle them to Afghanistan Al-Qaida's reach and scope is impressive extending across several continents U Camps B1 1 4 C 1 4 D SECRET XI Reason for Classification 1 5 c d Declassify on 1 6X1 Derived from multiple sources UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2010-03412 Doc No 005192751 Date 02 21 2013