S T Ff llM t 64 · Via Chief of Nava l Operations Vice Chief of Nava l Operations FROM DCNO Plans and Policy TO 1 DATE 1 ___ -- Op-O6 jg 1 February 1957 O IJ L Of1 fJ03 _ I y SUBJECT Railroad running of Ref a Op-O9 Second Memorandum Endorsement ser 0002MQi __ _ 31 Jan 1957 subject Guide d missile si tes i n t he Middle East OP-O l b Op-O6 ser 00038 P0 6 2 5 Jan 1 957 same subject on ' 0 dQ4 1 I believe t hat the dim view of re f erence b expresse d the Vice Chief of Naval - Operations in re f erence a i s not who lly warrante d and may be due t o some misunderstanding of the intent o f refer ence b Without any de s ire t o initiate an exchange of memoranda which c ou ld last a ll wi nter l am neverthe l ess impelle d to submit this one in order to set the record s traight 2 I t is not the int ent of my memorandum t o recommend t ha t the sea- borne IRBM capabil ity be s uperimposed on the SAC capability but t hat it s l ant it i n subs tant i al mea ure· The whol e idea i s t o f r ee thi s r 1 atory capa t y from xed shore bases in t he United S tates and in Alli e d t er ri tory t her e by removing a maj or threat t o our a llies and to the continental United States resulting from t h e me r e presena e of SAC bases and missile bases in t hese l ocations I am in agr eemen t with the thought imp lici t i n paragraph 2 of re f erence a that t he reta l i atory capa ili ty of t he Unite d States expressed in weight of bombs is mor e than adequate now I 3 I am stil l of the opinion that i f we had a substantia l number of I R BM submar i nes de ploye d as a ma t t er of r outine around Eurasia n per iphery we would have a retal ia t ory capa bi lity which wou ld be difficul t i f not i mpossibl e for the Soviets to neutralize-cer t ai n ly more difficult to neu tralize than our existi ng capabil ity whi ch re l i es upon fixed bases at loca t i ons which we must pres ume are known t o t he enemy 4 Thi s no t a ma t t er of casti ng envious eyes on the SAC s i de of t he fen cen- - The Navy does not need the I RBM the IRBM needs the Na vy When this capabili ty mater ializes I think the United Sta t es would be bet advised to c ha nnel fu nds a nd manpower in this direction rather than to mor e B-52s more a irf ields mor e tankers and mor e overseas bas- s in somebody els ' s front yard ther eby i ncreas ing the number of No 1 prior ity Sovii t targets in the Uni t ed Sta t e s and Allied t e rr ito ry Copy to Op- 61 -1 -