DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFF CE JF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WASHtNGTON 2 3 D C COMMAND FILE POST l JAN 46 lN A EPLY EFER iO 5 March 1958 PERSONAL - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CNO PERSONAL NO 35 To Flag and General Officers Subj Dope ITEM 1 - SECRET - FLAG OFFICERS ONLY Recent Submarine Contacts During 21-26 February at least one new SOSUS contact was developed each day and on 24 February there were three new contacts one each off Nantucket Cape Hatteras and Cape May P2V aircraft provided most of the air search effort with assistance from Lakehurst ZP until LEYTE was ordered out of Mayport the evening of 24 February She commenced operating early on the 25th as did P5M seaplanes After the third SOSUS contact one DDR and DE joined the search Another DD and one SS were assigned to the first con- tact on the 24th When the total SOSUS count reached six nine DDs from Norfolk six DDs from Newport and five DEs from Newport were ordered to report to COMEASTSEAFRON for OpCon 1'hls latter group plus LEYTE and six DDs from Mayport were not available for search until the 25th By the 28th all hut two SOSUS contacts were closed out The rule of thumb is that a SOSUS contact is · ¥orked over for SECRET JECLASSIFIED JAW E O 12958 OPNA rrNST 5513 16 SERIES • SECRET ninety-six hours after t he last contact Forces were gradually reduced to the HUK group plus one DD with air cover on each of the two remaining contacts off Cape May and Cape Hatteras The results of these contacts were as follows a No detection made by surface forces b One tenuous visual sighting for 20 seconds by P2V co-pilot and lookout of a snorkel and feather range five miles sea state two c One LOFAR - sonobuoy contact by a specially equipped P2V project a l rc raft from NADC Johnsville This con- tact was held for four hours until relieved by a standard configured P2V The Data Processing Unit is making a detailed analysis of the Lotargrams which will be combined with our rehash of operations to let us get all the information out of this incident that can be gotten These contacts give rise to a number 0£ very serious possibilities The Russians may he conducting surveys for future operations They could certainly benefit from hydrographic acoustic magnetic electro-magnetic gravitational and bathythermal data They may he seeklug operational experience navigation cruising and e asion practice Or they may be seeking intelligence reaction to contacts dete lnq apablltti new 1ietection systems and hold-down tactics JECLASSIFIED IAW E O 12958 OPNA '1 1 NST 5513 16 SERIES · ·· -•- -- -•---- A••-•---- •-m• -- ---•• •• •- -- ---- SECRET They could be creating a diversion for any number of reasons Our schedules have been disrupted and extra money was spent in the attempts to gain contact and identify They may be seeking the location of our SOSUS arrays Recent proximity of contacts to arrays could mean that they already know the locations They might be developing the pattern of our operations and merchant ship movements These contacts have pointed up several significant things a Communications are not rapid enough b There are not enough readily available search forces c Reaction time to get forces on station is too great A HUK group has now been ordered on station in the area at all times d The SOSUS art is in its infancy Growing pains include accumulating a signature library training operators completing the net including shallow water closure and getting additional intelligence on Russian submarine characteristics e The Sound Surveillance System must be developed as a bona fide tactical location and tracking capability It was designed simply to give warning when a sub is in the area The increased unidentified submarine activity in recent weeks is very serious If there are submarines in our waters it is essential that we make contact maintain contact and 3 ECLASSIFIEolA W E o 12958 ·--- o N S T - s s -1 - -16- S- - E-_R_I_E_S_ _ ----- ---- _J SE REl relatively small now The problem is still Russian submarine to hold to exhaustion Until we can hold a but it could grow respects to the and pay our ke it surface f the exhaustion ma 1 ot have control o we wil n assistance i and offer h m problem ' I ECLASSIFIED IAW E O 12958 OPNA -'JNST 55ti l6 SERIES ITEM 5 - OFFICIAL USE ONLY Polaris The potentialities of the Fleet Ballistic Missile system POLARIS have captured the imagination of many people as a very significant contribution to the deterrent posture of the United States in the missile age Two points of caution on this system however should be injected at this point before it becomes a run away band wagon First the Navy should make no wild claims as to what the POLARIS will do We think it will be good and we have reat confidence in the program and in the way things are proceeding But it has not been fully tested it has not flown yet in its final configuration there are aany problems yet to be solved in the program and we want to aake sure we do not make a series of claims we cannot back up when the chip go down and POLARIS actually goes to ea SPcond the Navy does not believe in putting all the nation's e gs in one basket for deterrence Other retaliatory systems are essential to spread the enemy's efforts over several possibilities in defending himself and figuring out countermeasures We do not propose to take over someone else's function The Navy has a lot to do with minimum forces now We i ill however continue to exploit the seas to the maximum in strengthening the nation's power throughout the It is at the extreme entire spectrum of war possibilities end of this spectrum in all-out nuclear war that POI ARIS fits However since there is increased public interest in the POLARIS system we do want to be able to give straight answers to queries from all sources on what advantages are viRualized in this system To this end the following very brief summary is furnished for information 1 POLARIS will be a mobile system not just movable 2 It will be a ready system mobile at the same time It will be ready and We won't need several hours to rig for battle 3 It will be difficult to locate at sea hence has greater survival potential than any fixed system 4 Attempts to locate it at sea for surprise destruction will give us vitally needed warning of enemy intentions 5 features Because of its mobility it has built-in dispersal To change its location to change its dispersal pattern takes only an order nothing else 6 It will be constantly under U S jurisdiction No property probleme are involved for miseile-launching sites 7 Being at sea it will not draw the fire of enemy attack upon our land areas or populated centers This applies to those of our allies as well 14 JECLASSIFIED IA W E O 129 - ------ _ _ - - 8 _ _ NA ' lIN srrr sist J 1 6- SE - RI E-S- ----- ✓ _ ___J _ _ B system Being mobile lt •ill not be a provocative weapon lt 111 not be aimed at anything in particular it will simply be ready lt will thus not suggest preventive war to the enemy 9 Vie can build only •hat ls needed to supplement other retaliatory systems up to the size needed to do the job hence no arms race is involved An arms race can develop in fixed systems in which tor every site we build the enemy can ouild one to neutralize it A mobile systea eliminates thiS one-for- one race 10 There is no need for mass production leading to sheer quantity •ithout regard tor •hat is needed to do the Job 11 P LARIS will not lead to the build-up of psychological pressures to push the button first in tear that our reprisal capability might be knocked out by surprise 12 This ts important to permit stabilitY during periods of international tension which come and go 13 Vlith its solid fuel it can be fired 1mmediatelY These point can be used in speeches or in response to qt esttons at out pOLARlS However the most important objective of the NavY today is to maintain balance to have adequate capabltittee to do all the things Navies are required for in peace and ar pOLARIS 111 do onlY one of those many job 'I 15 I JECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12 58 OPNA·vINST 5513 16 SERIES