• ' to the JODrr CHIDS OF Si'AFF on The enclosed memorandum by the Chairman Jo tnt Chief's of Statr dated 11 August 1959 is c1 rculated tor information J H L • HILLYARD 1 J o OOBB Joint Secretariat N v 0 - t- - ' Oen Tw1 ninf C JOS Gen Lemn1 'CSA Adm Burke trer Oen Adm Oen Gen ONO Oen Wh1te OW Gen Pate OMO OPSL Austin DCNO-P P Gen Moore Adm J -2 Oen Greene DC S-P MO JCS 2056 131 Picher D JS Well1nge DD JS 08Jnpbell NSO Rep Hillyard S JOS Capt Cobb DS JOS DO s Gen Gel'hart DOis P - _ DISTRl BUTION J -3 3 5 - 1143 X • I w - -- - - -- r -'l • r lf IE £1 ·r - • i S CRIT pn SLCAiri' ENCLOSURE THE JOINT CRIEPS OP STAFF CM-38O-59 17 Auguet 1959 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY O P DEFENSE SUbJect Target Coordination and Aeaooiated Problem U 1 On 28 July 1959 at the ed Forces Polic y council meet1ng you asked for my views on procedures tor coordination or atomic etr1lce p ane e llemorandwn presentr for your intormation a rer iume of what we a re currently do1ng and a d1scueeion ot controversial issues which must be resolved in order to improve our ettectiveneee · It the Joint Chiefs of - statt are unable to reach agreement on any aspect of this problem' area you will be advised 2 Target coordination and associated problems have received more and more attention during the past few years not because of unacceptable weaknesses 1n our present position -but rather because ot the impact of decisions 1n this area on future Service programs and on the allocation of resources available to the Department of Defenr e We do have weaknesses in our i ystem today and these weaknesses should be eliminated as rapidly as possible However the maJor impact of our current examination ot this problem will be on future posture and future capability and we 111Ust expect that attitudes and Judginents on these issues will be solll8what intl enced by the budgetary implications BACKGROUND 3 Before 1952 there were so few atomic weapons in the stockpile and such 11m1ted capability outside the A1r Force er 921118·-tfJ SECJ J - JCS 2056 131 - l i44 - SECRIT Enclosure ·ro'tt ···i tffln t •' f' · - • SECREl tha t ooord1nat1 on pre sen tea no a1gn1f oant d11'i 1cul t1 e a ana in 1952 ae the stock p1le came larger Early deliveey capability ot other than Air li'orce forces increased the Joint Chiefs ot Staff set Up maoh1nery to COOrd1nate atom1c taiiget1ng • Two types of procedures evolved planntng c oord1nat1on and ope rat 1 onal coordination 4 Flamu ng cooNJ nation stems the· eqid remen by the Joint Chiefs or Start that conunanders c eveiop and dove-tail with other colmmlndere the 1rn11 idual spelled out in their atomic annexes trike plans which are lfhich are- pre-pare d 1n support ot the JSOP ·Up to the pres t t1me tbia in1t1a 1 OCOrd1nat1 on of plans between commanders has been somewhat spotty It is rather good between flOllle comm ande inadequate between others i'ollowing Udivtdual ool 'd 1na t1on between comnands the plans QJ'e· rurtber coordinated at conferences at which all commanc Jers are· l'epreeented • 5 Prlo to 1955 this coord1nat1on fae accomplished at Since 1955 t flis co0Minat1on has cont'eNnces held at SAO • taken plaoe at World-Wide COordina t1oi i conrerences · WWCC'a last' two of these were monitored by a senior member ot the Joint sta tf an 4 the next conference is held at tha Pentagon ' 'he - scheduled to be n1tore t by J-3 s i s in 11ne wit h the new operational respona1 b il1 ties or the Joint Cb ie ts ot Statt 6 FolloWing the World•Wide Coordination Conferences the· plans an subm 1ttec 1 to the Joln t Ohiet's ot Staff tor review and approval at Which t e the Joint start reviews each plan and the combined plane as a whole 'i Qil eB8ftE iL JCS 2056 131 S CRIT - 1145 • Enclosure i • • • 41 TOP 2em 7 so ·ta r I have been de al onl y with planning coordinat1on • To eft ect operat1onal coo t'dina1ton the Joint Chiefs ot Stai'f nave establlehed Jo1nt War Rooia Annexes Fentagon and Port Ri tch e and the Joint ooo ion Centers the muted ltingdo m anC aawafil Jcc•s iooated 1n 'these centers screen all a tome atr11te pl and basect on targets and routes theretoj 1 dent 11' ' potential conn1at s1 fNat1ons l Actual conflicts develop onlr When actual s Und ns is made known • Representatives of the comma nds'• f pe rma nentJy stationed at tbe JCC 1 s ue· charged With mon1to execution ot the- plans and L 1 r e s o 3 as they deve lop COmmunicat1ons ex1st so that re commend a t ione on contlicts w bjch cannot be resolved _ _ __ can be referred to the Joint Obie fa or Starr and agreed - resolutions can be flashed to c e r s for 1mpleme ntat1on Joint ex rc1aee are held per1od1oall y to teat the etf'ee-tj veness • and exerc1se_ the procedures ot- fib1s u-stem The last ot these exerc1aes DlOJJ CUP was he1d betweGn 27 J e and 2 March oc thie year While tbeae exe rc1see have resulted in some 1mprovmenta they have also det1ned more clearly- certa1n fundamentaJ weaknesses tn our rent procedures - - 8 flle procedures outlined above a re elaborate well- eatabliehec l and soph1at1oated systems Which oveXt the years have etfeoted a aubetantial eaaure ot ta re et coorcu nat1on Out o f' a total ot about 2 IK O targets somethins over 309 Ol' about 13 have °'eri labeUed tiduplicationst •• ltlheth ei- or not tbeee a re 1n f a ct dupl1 oat1ona is a tt ot J ldsment entailing such eona3 d erat1ons as the depee 9t destruction NQU1red on a target the Naction time o ·the va n oua forces the attrit10n ot delive-17 veh1 cles and other opere tiohal ractors Furthel IUOre an overlap 1n soheduJ1l'lg because two or more SECRET • 1146 - Enclosure 9211 18 -1 OY W I $1£il li 11 • - • S CREl commands cona1der the destructiQn ot a single target essential to the aocompl1stwent ot the1r· as1ons does not necessarily mean that there W1ll ' 1n act lie a duplication 1n execution '• 'J Once it has been determined that · a target has been neutralized or destroyed the procedure is thg t messages W1ll i to preclude a second and unneoea ary attack · • be dispatched However an elaborate· world-Wide « mnmi 1Qat19na system 1a requ1red to · effect the cooro1nation I l'1 man uvera and exercises co1J111Un1ca t1ona trequently lag too tar bel4J14 tJndercombat conditions ' the sy tem woUld undoubtedly be 4egraded and might function with considerably reduced etfect veness ' 9 Prom our experience in this' area to date we can derive at least one fundamental principle Thie principle 1s that atomic operations must be pre-planned tor automatic execution to the msx mum extent possible afil1 with m1n1mum reliance on post-H-hour commun1cations A How ver with respect to the Joint Coordination Centers I believe that we llhoUld continue their functioning even 1£ we make other changes wlUch will be discussed hereinafter The Joint Cool'dination Centers are an extremely usetui maneuver tool Even 1t they never functioned in war during exe r-c1ses they isolate problem areas and develop valuable data which 1s fed back 1nw 'our operational plans ' 10 Prom our experience to date I have also arrived at the conclusion that not much more progress C Ul be achieved under the present arrangements for target cool'dination improvements can or course be 1118de_ but any Some minor s1gnificant progress will require fundamental changes 1n our present system some ot these changes ahoUld be made immediately action on others be deterr Without ae ous oorisequences iiP H Oft r JCS 2056 l · SECRET · Enclosure ··· 92 1118 ·l frrt - I • SECRET E CTIONS CUJUUSNll'LY IN fROC'ES ll In add1t1on ·t o the rout1nf a taffi ng ot atom10 annexes as deecr1bed 1n the preced 1 ng par rapha two aot1one are now in process wb 1ch J11a¥ eonbibutt tmlJ l d improvement -a eae are The Opt1mum M1X Study'' being conducted by General Hickey rs staff u e date 31 O otobe r 1959 ' l • JOs study or prooedural enw nts 1 or target system analya1s and war ca mini • 'f UNDE RtYDn ISSUE§ 12 kaving described J i'Ooedurea' cunEHl tly 1n ertect and noted add1t1onal actions J n process we should now examine the underlyins 1 seu es In terms or these issues the problem breaks down into thrff c ategor Les Tneae categories are a prooees or ta rs tt1ng wh1ch leads directly to cons1derat1on ot rorce adeqUacy • DJ QI • The development 0£ integrated S• flle Q1 1est1on toroea involved or operat1onal plans operational control o r the strike 13 l i the past theN have been basic ditterenoes of v1ewpoint W1th1n the Joint cn1ers or statf' on au three or these oates or1es Unfo rtuna teiy i t 1a not possible to Nsolve the issues by ma themat1os or precise techn1ques DJ agnos t1o studies and mathematical treatment can provide illpu J s Which asstst 1 n tacklil1g these problems - bUt suoh analytical work oanno·t produce a det1n1 ti ve answer Ultimately a m 111 tar and execut1ve Judgment must be eurc t sed in d etem1n1n s specifi c pol icies and programs9 14 'rhe resolution ot the underlyillg issues calls f or command dec2 a1on and we Will never make much DiOt'e progress In TW SECRD JCS 2056 131 S£CR£T • 114 EMloeure 921118-WZ this area untU SE RIJ are Diaii these decJ iona ' t and entorced order to 1aolate the speo11 1o deo1a1c i which 1n I In judgment Jf1 I are requued I W1ll tnat W1th eaoh tesory o the problem in some d e tail 15 The pl'Ocea ct tarset1Ilg is tbe fu ost complicated of a11 the isau e s It involves speaU'ib Ub-lrssuel'J M probleas which aN d1acussed 1n the followJ ns parttgral bs f 16 The t1rst pro-bl em is -- How many- targets should be dest1 0Jel2 'l'he area is exceedingly wiele ten what k1nd of or d-1sag -eement here Op1n1ons vary possi bl7 by a factor o ' The real question 1s - lQlat constitutes an adequate deterrent and an ef'teot1ve counter-toree if detemnce fails What should our targeting losophy be Sho lld plan only l'or the ·deatnic tion Of p0pulat1on centers and ntrol cent rs Or ahould we keep 1n beinS- a strong counter-force eapability What conat-J tutea an optiulum mx 9r- targete or various o ategoriee 17 ThOae Who prop0se a bae1 cally p0pulation center ta rset system for the future insist that 1t ·w111 be a n impo aible task to neut raUze the soviet ICBM syate1n that we will not Ja ow wber the JD1sa1les are lOQated and even U' we did know we would never st ike the 1 1rat blow benee the Soviet Dl1ss1lea would be on the wa · bei'ore· we coul d oounter-a ttack On the other hand 1t we were to atr1Jte oerta1n urban and control centers the SovJ ots woUld be incapable of proaeauting the war and ·t he United States wUld emerge on top according to th1a line of thinking 1t 1s a waste or erefore money to build a strateg1c de11very syetem capable ·or attacking more than a tew hundred targets JCS 2056 131 SECRET _ 1149 Enclosure 921118 -Y f II • 18 'l'hose who propose a strong counter-force ca pab111 ty • insist that we must develop the ne-qe8SU'1' ' Intelligence that it will be easier to destroy a m1se1 1 e bet'oN 1 t 1s 1au nc·h ed than after that tbe soviets will not anything like 1 ot the 1r m1ss1le be able to launch w the t1T st s alVOJ that in arw oase we must destroy- _t So'tiet oapab1l1t o re attack in order to m1n1mize damege to the ym ted Statea that a force geared to a few hWldred targets cannot survive a surprise attaok in atrength and thu WQulcl n ot provl Cle a deterrent to Sov1et Bgsi'e Sio n amJ •that we will have no strength in tor-elgn pol1cy if we 10 e t le capab 111 t y tor pre-emptive action based on strategic Intelligence 19 My own Judgment on this 1ssue is intluenced some'What by our past experience and b'J' 1lI3' estimate ot Soviet philosophy We have aeveloped a etrateg1o capab1llty to launch under good to opt1mUm cond ttions possibly' 2 000 'to 4 000 strategic ' weapons with manned e tro raft · and we bava tbus general war t deterred Soviet m111tuy doctrine is based on the Pr1nc1ple of Maas and I believe that the Soviets will respect OnlY a very powerful torce · P'urth r J believe that they wl 11 attempt over the next sever-al years to augment their present ror-ce ot about 1 000 medium and heavy Jet bombers with a u m1ted numb r ot manned bombere ·ot advanced design and w1th an IOSM toree numbered 1n tciur tigu Ns We have developed our present ions-range strategic to e durUlg a period o t relat 1 ve Soviet weakness - I would see no pgic -alloWing our own v atrateg1c torce to deeline 1n power - actually o relatively when we ha e certun knowledge that the Soviet strategic t oroe is g 1n 1ng 1n pow Moreover l CO l ider that the necessity of prevailing J n general w 1s of' such v1 1 import that any error 1n Juds Dent should be on the' safe s1ae I therefore lean to the heavy side on th1s 1sl JU8 SECRET 1150 - 921118 Jf Enclosure S ft£l 20 Prom preV1oua experience atudy I have always ·oe1 1 ·ved tha t we Bhoulcl adopt a pol1ey along the ro11owing linee · e ehou 1d oon t1nue · to develop am keep u p to -date a tuget 7st t'•o • s t nteglc a ttl ck which 1nclu d ea ihe crit lca l c ompo n enta1 o f Soviet long•ran e nuclear le liver capahi11ty · 2 Governmental and m111tary control centers • 3 war-suatai zu ng resources l'Opulat on '°'e ntera 21 o n compl -t1on or General H1 ckey I e stud¥ we may have moi_ e o e finlte· 1nf'omat1'on on this aubJec·t ·Once we have adopted a t argeti ng pol 1QY sucb aa the o•n e bov _ or e ny o tbe r as f 1nall¥ d etefld ned 'Q1 the sec reta r •Ot Def _nae we 111 nav1e made a1gn1t1oant progresa 'tb qu _ stiana we next r ace Eme s f' o llowa Who or what asenor· 1a go tng tc apply thia pol1oy • ciev·e lop tbe taq e t BJstem and keep it u_p - to-da te·'i A ' What agency td 11 review the t a rg e t ayatem to r conm1stency With Policy and g1ve it the stamp ot 1'1nal app rov· l 'l 22 Mr th1nld ng on tbJ u 1 a that the comnender respo n a1ble for tbe strategic miss i on should take the 1n1 t ial a tep•D to develop the nat1onal e trates 10 target a1atem -- regardless of and w1ctnou t pNJml1oe to wllat fo Nea m 1ght attack what targets I' Fo the d velopment o t th1 11 t1ona1 etmtegto tarset system the reePoneib•l e coaaander Bhou J d be provid · d with an app r oved ·t -n -t ' Q 1'1W and oe t f l lno _ •-o - - i v l tf Y _ C-••f ·d e • _ B S - u · n9 w--11 i4 1 ·O_f' COU l Be rely heav1 cy on the work o t the tarsetlnS section ot the Air Intell1senoe start and the anaJ yt1cal work wh1¢h h a been produced ibf such agencies a s a n acmmande r ID fl¥ be wsm DASA and Fiand Since expeoted a t ·t1mee to en on tho uaf e SECR T 1151 ' - ' S Cfttl side 1n detersnim ng his re-QU1rements h1gher level non part isan fhip review 1s obv1oual y necesaar - k1nd ot a higber level review ot the target syatem per se 1 s 1n1t1alJ y an Intelligence tunct1Qn 11 lntell 1ge-n e ir 1n tbiB 1nit 1al rev1 w of the target tJYatem recomnencled by _1 the commander should detersn l ne it the system const1tutea a suitable 'b asis for further analysis Is the target eyetem in consonance with approved targeting policy W1ll tbtt system 1f destroyed accomplish th cOtt'IDlander•a m1ss1on as pRBcr1 bed bf the Jo lnt Cb1efs of staf' i'' Based on paet e rien ce and Judgment does the l1st1 ng ot targets appeu exces 1ve 1nsutf1c1ent or ge- n era lly in the ball park In m y Judgment this 1n1tia l review 1s a Joint starr J-2 1 lnct1on What J-2 should do here is to conie out th one of the problem elements Whiob is required in tbe succeeding steps of operat1 oJtB l plann1ng operati o nal recommended target system should of course rece1 ve t'1nal review by the Jo1nt Ohiefs of staff fefore the BUoceeding steps are taken Develgpment o r Int§rated qpel at1onal Plans 2 3 The next maJor issue with respect to targeting and assooiated problems 1nvolvee both 1ntell1gence and perations once you na ve an approved target liat for rurther analysts the queat1on arises ae to how launched against each tai get nover ldll 1r controversy iaany bombs- or m 1 suilea should be Re re we get into tbe area or the Operational factors such as eat1mated - attrition or the attacking f'orce weapon yiela CEP level or destruction requ tNd and surface verR air-burst weapons enter into this aspect or the problem Do we want a 1 probability o t 1 destructton o r a 9 probab1U ty or 90%° destructiQn or aometbing in between rs•¼¥ JCS 2056 131 fr PCT - 1152 · ShQuld we surface bur-at Enclosure 921118 SE Rll wh1cb g1ves a higher level of looa l cJeetruot 1on and 1'all- 0ut 1 wt requires more bomb a or ehouid w• air bmtstt i hes'e are complicated problems and the anew-era u -e not tb e same for ·t he vanous oate sorie a of' targets ' The seograph J 0f' the proble 11 1 also important be oause it atteota l r i __ lY o r neutral o pule ' tions HOwever 1n general it can ·ce stated that the· Al'fflll and ·na yy tavo r a lower level ot destr l ot1on w b1le the Ai r Force ravor a h gb er level or deatmct1 on higber level The Air Force favors a ' 0 r rJeetrtaot1o n becmm o t their· experience that 1 it 1a almost lwa a elleaper to 6 e ·s troJ a target 1n the 1n1t1al at tack even it 1 1 1 re qu 1 rea DION force than to have to re- attack tbe same target 24 Fortuna t ell' th1e aepeot o t the prabl e m can be bett r handled by' anal ytioaJ and mathematical tealm1ques than can the 0 th e r a sip ta of tb e ·n o blem However handllng t h1s aape·ct or the prob1em goes beyond the Intell t ienoe runct1on of tuaet Lns Zt nq d 1-e a that there be deve cl an o utli·ne ope-rational pian which pro v1de e a geneNJ plan oil ttack to 1nolud e t2 m1 ng and the cbaraoterl s'b lca ot del1 ver v·e hicle and wea pons World ng With the operational plan 1t 1s posa1bl to apply war· gam ng techniques o abed some light ort the quest om o t how many bcmbe or· mis1s11ea should be laun -ched aga1nst the var1 oue el --enta o t the art ra teg 1e ·t arget aystem 25 I n the paa t and at the pre e ent t Ime var1o u s coaaands have been 1n vo 1 ved in the planned attac of the atratag Lc target system Hence the agene 1 es which have conducted war g ame a have had no single integrated operat tonal plan w1 tn whicb tG wcrk e bave bac to piece togethei'' the operational plans of the f1elcl oonnanders and utilize the results ot world-Wide ocordl n a Uon Conf _ renc ee as a problems then ls· baBJ 8 tor lo we ne d a wu gamt ng One of th · sngle lntegr ated o pera t1 ona 1 SECRIT 1153 Enclosure A 921118 7 SECRIT plan tor the atrateg1o attiaclct rn a plan 3'udgment we do need such flnoe CINCSAC is asa1gnet1 tho major portion or rorces _ _spons tble tor the atria teg1o m 1ae11 n I wo u ld th1nk that he obould be charged w1 th tbe a plan N His plan Bhould ot' 0n1ere or pona11 1 11t t-or developing such courae l e r ev1ewed by th e Jo1nt atarr 2 6 In the deve L o pnent or thia integrated -o perati onal pilan we would have to t aoe up to two queationa now and one- at ·1 ater· date • The two questio na tozw 1nmea1ate 4eo1s1'0ll woUld be 1 1 ShoU ld any· torce w1thout an all-weather capability be allocatecl e thtegS o targe'tat 2 Should the ai ra tt carri e r fore e be taken otf' strates1e targets 'because ot uncerta Lnt aa ·t o ·t heir location at the outbreak of general ·w ar ' l · The add1ttonal problem no reqw r1ng 1-ed le te dec1a1 on but e ont md ng tit 1ntc th1-B s cheme £• With respect ot attenitlon is whe do e POLARIS tlUm gs 7' to the quest 1 0 or au-weather -de·l lv e r c apa b111 ty I would strongly recommend that v1tal a t rateg1c ta19e-t s auob EUJ erie mv 10- range nuclear delivery capabil l ty and con'trol ce11tera be a 1gnad ·O nly to i'o rces havtcg ell we athe r· capaM11tJ W1tb re u pect to tb e BJ Nratt c ier torroes1 the ro1low1ng factors and ar ements should be cona1dered 1 In order to proiv f de maxinnlm aecur ty to the i'le e t 1t should not be tied •down to an 8 Z'ea llm tted by the requiNment to n ma m within a 1 craft range of' pN-Belected taz s e ts mobility The tleet should l e tree ·t o exp3 olt ita 1nhere nt In addi t 1on ·t be usef'ulnese ot ·t he -a arrier forces 1n 11m1ted war s1tuat1ona should not be d e grad e d W the requ lr ement to remain on station on a c o nt1nu1ng ba 1a 1n o r der to cove tars ate of v ltal •wates1c W SSSRZ' 'tPt iW' CiC f t - tff RET 921118 tl • - - - • I M • L · I bcU'lf SECRET 2 fllese conclus1one s est that tne earner force a should not be aas1gned H-ho reaponsib1l1ey for any pre--planned strategic targefs• I 3 Possibly ttte c arrier torces should be cons1dered as havi lg three primary tunc t 1ons One As a atrate g1c res rve ror tollow u p attack as required TwQ As a mobile l1m1 te war t oroe a Aa an element of' uni1'1ed eommander •e 'orces when on station w1 th target _respona1t 1l1t1es 1n support 'rhre-ei 01' the local commaruhn• • B plane - but not to include any targets on the national stra eg1o target 11st ' su ine force I would Wit h re s pect to the leave th1s force under naval control unt Ll a proven weapon system has been developed It the POLARIS su 1ne rorce develo-pes a st n1fj_can t combat qapab111ty 1n telim-S or rella b111ty and we1ght of e1't'ort wh1cb can be d ivered on i Om tied strategic Command •I target we may then rind that is reqU1red SUob a command eventually might have eubord 1 nate component coDJman s f r aircrart ror land-baeed m1es1lea and tor sea-ba s d m1as11ee It a TJn1f1ed st ategi o Command 1a not established eventually as a m1n1mum the ta eta to be a t tacked by POLARIS and the t1m tng ot attack should be de nvecJ t'rom a s1n le int egrated operational plan I there-f'ore bel1eve that an ap p ropr1ate nucl eus or Naval orr10 e rs should be assigned at an early date to CINCSAC rs operational pl ng statt For tbe immediate tuture these ottioera would aseiat 1n the development of an integrated operat1ona1 plan and they would constitut'J a nucleus of Naval personnel it latel' dee1e1on were made to establish a Unified Strateg 10 - ll55 • Enolos 921118 · I Uf'p SIHf iI tra• '• i SE RIT 27 Assuming that for the 11rmed1ate ruture we are to take no action on the proposal tor the ' establlsbment Str-ategic COmmand but a s that we or a Unif'1ed do take a ct1on to develop a ain gle integrated opera Uonal plan we -would then be in a poa1t1on to do more etreo ve operat Lonal analysis and war gaming and these exeroiaea c°'4 CI be conducted under varying assumptions 28 War gam1ng does two principal th ngs • tt prov1dea add1t1onal iJJto r nation wh1cn tends to vaUdate 1nval1date or mo lit Y a tuget system and It 1nd1cates the feas1b1litt or 1nteasib111ty 0£ the o p erations plan and the resulye wh1ch could be eXl eoted rrom execut10n or the plan 29 ' he policy direction or this type of war gaming Bhould be above Service or ·eo amand level ' here 1a no capability within the Joint Starr at the present ttme tor this kind or analysis and war gami pg It has been done 1n the pas t by Rand by SAC by the Air Start Pla la and Intellisence orga n1zat1on and by the NISC wh1oh rel1es heavily toJ suppo on the· Sen1oes an d DASA ' be Joint Chiefs or statr are ourrent y oon s 1 dering methOds by which this type of war sClins could be perrormed ror them I t has been auggested that DASA m ight perfol'Sll the runot10n or that it t be perromed by the A1r Battle Analys1e D1v1s lon ot the Directorate ot Plans Air start Undel' either eolutio n the JCS organization hould provide the policy guidance and terms of referenee f'or e h analytical study or war game which 1 s conctucted The agency rna lQ ng the study for the JOS would not make polio -- but would provide electronic computers and trained personnel for doing the mechanical Job of anal rs1e Wherever th 1s tunot-1on 1a a•signed the Joint Chief's ' f 8ffl JCS 2056 131 1156 Encl osure • -- _ I 1fSJ 1 - r Q •' · • •r · _ 'i' I • • SECRET or Sta tr need a wu pm1ng 0-apabilS ty which lu respone1ve to Jo1nt Oh1efs large new or Staff policy oontl'Ol agency It does require Th1a does not require a dec1a1on as to What existing agency will do this work 30 Up to this point thia memor8 J¥1um bas been focused ' entiNly on solvins the 1aaues ass ooiated With the national strategic target system Howeve r when we get into the ques-t1on o t operational control we must bl'Oade n tbe prol lem to include an examination ot employment ·of atomio weapons by u nit'ied commanders having an area re naib ility These commanders traditionally have 1ns1s·t d that certain strategic taJ 'Sets wer of such jmportance to accomplishment of the1 local Dl1ss1ons that they should have the respons1 b 1 lity tor seeing that the r ·were neutralized or destroyed To el1m1 nate dupl1cat1on 1n target i n brought about by' this situation the '011owing dec1s1on 1s requ1rea As a eeneral policy target a on the nat-1onal atrateg1c target stem 11st n11 not 'b e included as H hour 0bJeet ves m anders and or the tol Ces o un1r1ed com- forces will not be Juetit1ed nor prosranme-d for such attack 31 However the local area commander has a legitimate concern and reapons1bility w lth respeot to enemy m111ta ry roroea which c8lln0t strike tmmed l atel y at the United statea but which have the range and 1netal lations and capability to threaten local t orces The·z e - y be one or several strategic ta rseta interspe-reed in the ea me geographic area The problem is therefoiie one ot possible mutual tnterterenoe not on a single ta ts t bas1a but on an area baa1s SECRET JCS 2050 131 - 1157 Enclosure tl iii V I SECRO 32 • Assuming that the se riee ot 4eo1s1ona wh1oh I have outlined wsre t•en the quest ion or· o p erational control ot th e ot· av o id ng mutual be rea t1Y impun ea Thev ·w ould be various stl t ke rordea and the p rob interi' -renoe Nluld grea tl y s1mpl1t1ed beaaue mutuai 1nteT£erenoa neulting f rom attack wouJ d be l ugel y el Jn1natecl •· · We would J ave an approv•ed mat1o·n al str ategla target 11 s t and a eirlgle integra t ed operational plan tor stl ategto ttack These doouments would prov1 de a sound bae1a torr the neaeB BUW coomi nation ot the ' with CDJCSAO 1 a plan- opera tJ onal plans o t lo e al commande rs POtentlal conf'l1cte coUld b e worked ·out between the command ers concerned b5 anal 1B1s at routes to enc t fl O•m tuget by agree men t on Jm uig 8Jid rr tnns t er s ot tarse -a between commands aa d1c tated - good Judgment COnfl1cts not reconoUable betwe e n commanders would have to be so l ved bu the Jo11 nt Cbiiet 0£ Staf'f' 'b ut th1s would be a manageable p roblem agalnat the 'b ackground of policy d eo181o Js wJ11 c h t ha v e dleeus s ed SJ In JIG Judgment we should resolve the 1saues -wh1ch I have 1souased 1 soon ae po s aible To that end I am circulating a c ow of' I I memi rand um to the Joint Chte fs ot St a tt B N · P 'lWDlING Cbairman Jo tnt Cntets or st rr tcRrr Bnclosve 921118 yJi-