• - ' COMMAND FILE • DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY - - OP'FICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS - POST 1 JAN 46 WASHINGTON 2S D C IN IH -'t 111 •1£11 TO 23 Dec ember 1960 SECRET PERSONAL - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY To Flag and Gene·ral Offic r-ft Subj Dope TRENDS AND FEELINGS ON FUTURE ARMY NAVY AND AIR FORCE PROGRAMS The basic issues on which the future of many Service programs will stand or fall are not new survivability of nuclear strike forces hardening vs mobility offensive vs defensive systems limited war general purpose forces vs general war single purpose forces and as always immediate readiness vs future capability Here are some of the major programs under discussion First presented are the views of the sponsoring service then the position and thinking of others NIKE ZEUS The Army view is that an A nti-Intercontinental Ballistic Missile system for defense of continental United States is essential to insure survival should deterrence fail They believe NIKE ZEUS wilt possess ignificant capability against ICBM and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile in 1965-70 period and that a 1tfirst 11 in this field would give the United States great psychological and strategic advantages Army firmly believes NIKE ZEUS is indispensable to an integrated force in this missile age and th·at it is the only AICBM system with assurance and availability DECLASSiF ED IAW E O 12958 OPNAVINST 5513 16 SERIES -✓ SECRET SECRET Air Force believes NIKE ZEUS is incapable of providing effective defense against ballistic missiles of 1 65-70 era that it tacks growth potential that its cost is too high to be absorbed in tight of alt other requirements It is the Alr Force position that RlrD should look toward more sophisticated systems wlth emphasis on alternates such as orbiting spac e defense system I f I I I We feel that R D should continue that effectiveness should be known prior to the decision to produce This decision now could cost 1-1 Z billion next year and the total program 9-1 Z billion Army feels such a system a national respom1ibiUty and should be funded outside its budget We don't DOD agrees to research no production ADVENT The Army view is that this communications satellite offers promise for retiabte high-capacity world-wide communications Atl Services and NASA are contributing to the program and all support the program CARIBOU CARIBOU h an Army program for a battlefield transport aircraft capable of operations from short unimproved runways to move troops weapons and supptie9 It witl increase mobility on atomic batttefietd where dhperdon must be the rule Air Force questions need for this aircraft and recommends JCS examine in detail th justification and requirement We support a moderate procurement program and DOD agrees to Hmited production 2 SECRET tDECLASSI FIED IAW E O 12958 OPNAVINST 5513 16 SERIES ' SECRET MOHAWK This Army combat surveillance aircraft operate from small unimproved airfields in battle zone Plans ca1l £or it to be equipped '4l'ith radar infra-red and photo surveillance gear for operations during darkness and low visibility Air Force claims MOHAWK dup 1 icates AF equipment is more vulnerable a nd has less capability and recommends phase out production as soon as possible we consider this an expen llive but effective replacement for exh ting Army aircraft DOD agreei to about 45 units B-52 The B-52 is the heart of the major Strategic Air Command manned bomber lyi ltem ' The Air Force says it complements the ICBM force by its ability to be launched and reca1led and that it may used a1so for military mis llions i n Hmited war It is the Air Force view that the 8-52 provides a positive retaliatory fo rce and it is the most effective sy 'ltf'm r urrently programmed which can be emptoyed feasibly ln Al rborne A'ert posture I 5 wing FY 'l i 3 The Army •rnpports the r' i r Force Tevel of We recommend holding to total of 14 ·wing a s d eqmi te mix of bomber with mi siles B-52 in tt 14 wi DOD recommends ose out J SECRET fI ECLASSIFIED IAW E O 12958 OPNAVINST 5513 16 SERIES SECRET Related to th s program i s HOUNDDOG GAM-77 vs SKYBOLT GAM-87 The B-52 will carry HOUNDDOG and SKYBOLT if produced as sta nd-off ' weapon SKY BOLT total program cost t hrough 1 65 estimated at 1 2 billion which basef 'oti past exp erit mce of - 11 estimates ' is about half enough for 15 squadron s 46 ml ssiles c ach is under fire all around We recommend terminate development effort It will come in servke too l ate and cost effectiveness offers no improvement ov er HOUNDDOG or MINUTEMAN It is inferior compared with POLARIS and POLARIS and MINUTEMAN will have replaced manned bomber as pri mary atomk strike weapons against likely targets for SKYBOLT HOUNDDOG is satisfactory for the interim Department of Defense R E says HOUNDDOG 1 s range can be extended if 11eeded We recommend limited p rocurement of HOUNDDOG to complete o pe rationat system evaluation with B- 52 t hen re-e·valuate B-70 The B-70 is the Air Force r1 placement for the B-47 and follow-on for B-5 2 It is designed for Mach 3 a n d Air Force predicts 75% of force can he launched in 3 to 8 minutes They say it can provide timely battle ·' progres s i nfo rmati on for planning foll ow-on s t rikes that it has effective penetra tion c apability and that with multiple weap ons load including SKYBOLT it t 11 pr o 7lde for accurate delivery The Army questions 4 SECRET CLASSIFIED IA W E O 12 58 OPNA VINST 5513 16 SERIES ' SECRET the B-70 survivability and considers it vulnerable to the SAMs of its era Army says it is too expensive and recommends funding be limited to prototype for development and test The Navy doubts that the cost of program estimated 4 Z billion - again - probably very tow is justified The task will have been taken over by missiles by ib operational date Its great speed ls not required if concept is to employ standoff GAM Hence we recommend no funding DOD goes along with follow-on funds for RDT E to provide 3 prototype aircraft ATLAS A 13-squadron ATLAS program has been approved by SecDef and President with production to terminate in FY 1 63 It appears that program will be funded The Navy feels the system is highly vulnerable bas tong reaction time and that radio-inertial guidance in the first 4 squadrons is susceptible to ECM We have recommended cancellation on as many of last six sites as economically feasible •i th commensurate reduction in program TITAN The Tltan ICBM was originally programmed as back-up for ATLAS miss Air Force reoriented the progr' m in 1 55 to provide a sizeable force by 63 with a large payload and inc rea sed survivability 5 SECRET f°DECLASSIFIED IAW E O 129 58 OPNAVINST 5513 16 SERIES SECRET hardening to surprise attack The National Security Council has recommended approval of 14 squadrons It appears a program aimed toward this goat wi 11 be funded at about 1 2Z bitlion in FY '6Z We consider the system vulnerable even with hardening as enemy missile accuracy improves The need for Titan in large number after 1 63 is superseded by POLARIS and MINUTEMAN We therefore recommended terminating procurement with those units operational by end FY '63 MINUTEMAN Air Force is requesting 805 MINUTEMAN missiles by end FY '64 due to Soviet ICBM threat The major portion of the force will be dispersed in hardened sites the remainder wllt be land-mobile to give a supposedly high degree of survivability According to the Air Force MINUTEMAN is superior from cost effectiveness standpoint to other baltistk missile systems Army recommends holding force level to 400 missltes pending complete review of the NSTI and SIOP in absence of supporting data firing We question cost effectiveness The missile h still a long way from lb survivability is p rog resslvely degraded as Soviet accuracy increases Furth r a large number of the le misi iles wlll draw more ICBMs into the United State We rec ommend major reliance on systems HET IDECLASSIF E IAW E O 12958 OPNAVINST SS13 l6 SERIES ' SECRET of high inherent survivability proven reliability and accuracy and that the FY '62 funding be withheld until Air Force furnished complete program cost and planning data The DOD initial markup provided 1 01 billion for the MINUTEMAN program which held production to half the AF planned rate The mark-up aimed toward a level of 9 hardened and 3 mobile squadrons 540 missiles at end FY '64 AIRBORNE ALERT This is the Air Force means of providing rapid reaction and survivability of significant strategic retaliatory force until a reliable warning system is operational The objective is to provide an on-the- shelf capability to fly 1 4 of the B-52 force on a continuous airbornl' alert for one year Army feels that since BMEWS ·will be operational by time Air Force can attain the l 4 capability end FY 1 63 only half of this should be in FY 1 6Z budget We kno• that flying a 1 4 alert would accelerate wear on personnel and equipment increase overhaul and maintenance time and believe result might be reduced number of ready aircraft and cost $1 billion per year The SSBN system wa s recommended al a more effective way of as9uring surviving retaliatory power DOD favors an airborne alert capability in the order of 1 8 of 10 wings 7 SECRET fDECl ASSiF ED IAW E O 12958 OPNAVINST 5513 16 SERIES ' ' SECRf T NUCCE AR PROPELLE D AIRCRAFT The Air Force states a nuclear propelled aircraft ANP with essentially unlimited endurt'l nce able ta carry a la rge payload has a potential to be used for such missions as AEW communications relay AS post fl patrol logistics carrt r and as a mobile command Army supports RDT E fonding wv e support research in this vital field but recommend at this ti me the airframe be deferred and that research be continued on the indirect cycle engine only deferring the direct cycle DOD Nan ts to go ahead but the rt just isn't money enough to keep b1lth indirect and dire ct cycle research going Indications art that the indit·ect cycle R D will be fund d and no ai rframe now POLARIS There are 5 SSBN's funded in our FY support of long lc ad time ltems for 5 more p rng ram rate to give 21 by 1965 off at a 20 total 1 62 SCN budget with Army supports the SSBN AiLr F'orce recommends leveling We fully recognize that the POLARIS vs MINUTEMAN cont roversy wiH be with us and be hot for a long time F'requ1ent recent articles in the press indicate MINUTEMAN campaign well underway We must be alert to counter statements 1 mdercutth1g POLARIS POLARIS is here it's proved it's reliable it's accurate it' on station IT'S NOT TARG E TED HY THE SOVIETS - - ind we can show what it co Sts We will go ahead • vi th de te lol ment of the A 3 mis slle SECRET 8 SECRET MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE All the Services have strong feelings on MRBMs Army proposes that an 1100-mile MRBM is required to counter the Soviet family of SSMs in ranges 700-1100 mile SACEUR CINCPAC and CINCAL have stated requirements for MRBM problem of an MRBM for NATO range PERSHING And there is the Army recommends an extended- They say that POLARIS is all right for sea-based portion but too large and not suited to operate from land environment The Air Force feels strike aircraft can perform missions better than PERSHING II Even so they propose modernization of MACE to give it MRBM capabilities They maintain that for any 3rd generation MRBM only one Service should be given the job They named themselves ff e submit that development of the A-3 POLARIS could be exploited to pro- vide a small version operational in 1964 as a 3rd generation missile adaptable to both land and sea at lower cost than any other proposed Whether we need a 3rd generation MRBM at alt is still undecided and it is probably too early to make a firm decbdon Research is continuing on an extended scale in the missile field so a r from now we witl have better information on the capabilities of an 3rd our missile programs Then may be a better time to decide on MRBM's 9 RET II ECLASSI F ED IAW E O 12958 OPNAVINST 5513 16 SERIES