·- ·- - - 0 - Ar 'r • - J-- - September 23 1961 APPEIIDIX I TO THE MZM0RAh1JUM FOR T dE PRESIDENT Recommended long Rs nge Nuclear D livery Forces 1963-1967 SUB i ECT This Appendix s rizes the ma in factors I have taken into consider tion in determining United States' requ rements for long Range Nuclear re1ivery Forces in the years 2 963-1967 The Appendix includes I II III Reco ended Force Levels and their Fiscal Implications The General Ee sis for My Reco endations on Force Levels The Bs sis for My Reco ends tions on Specific Weapon Systems I Recom nended Force Levels and Their Fiscal Implications I recommend that yo approve for inclusion in the FY 1963 budget the procurement of the follo lli ng operational missiles and aircraft to supplement our long Range Nuclear D livery Forces Total Purchase Cost to FY 1963 Be Funded NOA Millions of pollars a b c d e 100 Minutemen Hardened Dispersed 50 Mobile Minutemen 6 Polaris Submarines 92 Skybolt Missiles 100 KC-135 Tankers Total for FY 1963 D cisions Total Funding Requirement from Prior Years' recisions Total for FY 1963 461 $ 284 935 270 1 072 963 347 200 287 2IO $3- 102 $1 987 $ J g Moreover I recommend that re adopt for planning purposes the force structure summarized in the table on the next page In those cases in -which the forces I am recommending differ from those reco imended by the Navy and Air Force the latter are sho m in red beneath mine Excised Un ler th s s _ rcv1s· o o Freeuoof I ·• o • 'T' ae h nfo ca«cn Act l J f cc• · 0tr - c 7 Doc ent_ --_ _ of_ _ _rocu ents I ae r _ 9 E E C ro RC S ' - fi cal Ye 1961 1§ 1903 196 1966 ll-52 555 630 630 630 630 630 13-l 7 l l 2j i 855 585 f50 225 Bo Bo Bo 935 710 710 522 522 522 336-i ' 322 690 l 2l2 - Boz ' e r11 B-58 4o 8o Bo 8o l 720 1 565 l 295 1 166 Tottl 3c ers 1o67 Q30 -- kt r-L ci ied l issiles Rwnd Dog 216 450 522 216 450 52 2 522 36 75 51 235 78 135 114 135 114 126 ui 117 111 150 if JO 700 Boo c oo El 50 100 100 l 8o 56o 656 5 J bolt Tottl GA I s I e d Pole --is Jlissiles A Uu 6 Titan Y inuteit en m D IS rrr' e n M bile Bo 96 1 22 222 507 1 131 11 I KC-135 224 4oo 392 392 KC-97 6Qo li6o 45 1i - 34o 45 i Pale rll Total ICBM Palui s 1 4 288 887 roo l other· Quall EB-47 RC-135 Alert l'o e 'iiea oons No ot 'i7eapons getons 4llo 520 E f § _ Y 62o 392 6lio 24o 120 13 23 45 392 64o 392 23 23 640 E f 1 390 2 350 2 4 50 3 050 ·3 440 3 870 li- l 80 1 530 2 750 3 3ro 4 350 4- 74o 392 -- 5 o 5 450 lhmbers o r e ircraf't sni mssiles are cieriTed b7 m il ip s uthori od sqaAd ron 'llilit equip ient by the n i ears C J · • b er d o not 1 n J ude B D Cmba t LR'Pneh or inteDU Ce pi p tliDG 11siles or -cr mux'l r q port e irc -e tt E t ectiv-e J tcgut J 96J 1 a pp -otiJe tcJ 7 at tM • ba bcrs rllJ be on J 5 Jdmte gzWLd e1ert Ic BK z m cl u11 represent o pera ticn e l 1 mmebers Jhmber11 or Pol E i11 Jdssiles re111tl Il the total m cller or missiles 1n operation e l iml rines qJpro dl'lrs -el J' 1Sn ot these l'Clblllo l rl Des v1ll be cm r e tion or at aca he t alile e l'O' u s 17 Begul u s a usileis 1 n· opera t10D8 l aubl zrl 11 b-c m em-YI 6J to e rd-l'I 64 ani 5 a t eni-Fr 65 This di t'te rence 111 a c nce o r t dL 't ereo e 1n cxrieroed ll-52 tar 1 1 000 by eM-J'I 68 1 1 100 b end-YI 69 a id thcre tter Bombera ha-e O e xibility 1n choice o r veq Clt J Dd 1'ar p-a_n 0sea o r th ill ea a ricicn it vu a aa ued e--52r -ba ba plus a ir-J ironcb d c is111le · ·· · 1· 2 - The eGtimated Total Obligational Authority required to procure and operate these forces over thi6 period is sho'IIII in the follo rl ng table The difference between the Total Obligational Authority required to fine nee the forces I am reco ending and that required to finance the forces recommended by the individual Servicee is show on the second line Over the five yeiu·s 1963-67 the cost of the aircraft and missiles reco ended by the·Air Force and the Polaris reco ended by the 11avy exceeds the cost of the forces I am recol llllending by approxi c ately $10 billion As mll be show later in this paper the extra capability provided by the individual Service proposals runs up against strongly diminishing returns and yield very little in terms of target destruction In roy judgement it is an increment not worth the cost of $10 billion over the five year period Total Obl irational Authoritv FY 62 FY 63 FY 64 FY 62 FY b6 FY 67 FYll3-ll7 Billions of Dollars Secretary of I' efense Recommendations 8 o 4 1 8 9 5 6 4 7 31 3 9 3 Service Proposals over 1 6 3 0 Secretary I efe se 6 1 5 2 2 1 4 9 7 The forces I am reco ending for procurement in FY 1963 are compared nth the reco end tions of the Service Chiefs in the follcmng table T'ne n1 I1Lbers represent operational aircraft or I lissiles JCS Secretary Initial Reco endations of Chiefs Air Chairl an Navy of 9-11-61 JCS Est USJ C Force Recoms I' efense B-52 Aircraft Skybolts KC-135 c Titan Minuteman H D Minuteman Mobile Polaris i 0 92 100 0 100 50 96 0 21 oEI 0 0 92 100 100 100 18 0 0 3or# 1or# 1or# 0 0 50 16o 96 96 4'fY 92 120· 18 Goo 50 0 y· 45 92 100 18· 300 50 128· • 45 B-52's recomended by the M r Force for 1962 procurement The Chief of Staff USA agrees to a 1 1 Itlted procurement of the system to minimize engineering and economic risr s The CNO and Comandant '113M believe research and development should continue and budgetary planning should proceed but the decision to allocate substantial funds for productic should be delayed ••• £1 The Secretary of I' efense along vith the Chief of Staff t EA · the CNO · and Commandant USMC reco end a total strength of 64o aircraft the CJCS recommends 76o the Chief of Staff USAF Boo In each case co nd support aircraft would be in addition to the numbers show M_ These recommendations are for at most the stated number of missiles iJ During a discussion between the Secretary of I efense and the Chiefs on September 11 1961 they stressed their concern about the reduction in our nuclear capability as the B-47's were phased-out The Secretary of I' efense therefore added 5 Wings of B-47' to bis recom nendation for FY 1963 and FY 1964 bringing it to the level sho'III o page 2 Y The aircraft and missiles recoi imemi d fo - procuri oer t in F'Y 1963 hy the Air F'orce and the Polaris sub rjnes recom nenued for - rccurement 1I FY 1963 by the Navy would cost e pprc imate ly $ 1 billJ on t 'O -e -co buy than the aircraft and missiles I a n -eca mending Of this appro x i Jiatcly $2 billions would require funding 1n FY 1962 e nd FY 1963 As veil as these forces I will recor i nend at a later date that the Air Force be authorized to procure and operate a secure co nd and control· system for SAC Except for 20 KC-135 's vhich will be available for use · · as airborne c nd posts the cost of this system has not bee included· in the figures on page 3 II General Pe sis for Force Level Reco endations The forces I am recommending have been chosen to provide ·the United States with the capability in the event of a Soviet nuclear e ttack ' first to strike back against Soviet bomber bases missile sites and other installations associated with long-range nuclear forces in order to reduce Soviet po Wer and limit the damage that can be done to us by vulnerable Soviet follow-on forces 'While second holding in protected reserve forces capable of destroying the Soviet urban society if necessary in a controlled and deliberate ' 18 y With the reco ended forces I a m confident that we '111 be able at all times to deny the Soviet Union the prospect of either a military victory or of knocking out the U S retaliatory force Ii' the · most likely estimates of-Soviet forces prove to be correct the forces I am re oiiiin°nding should provide us a capability to achieve a substantial military superiority over the Soviets even after they have attacked us The reco ended forces are designed to avoid the extremes of a minimum deterrence posture on the one hand or a full first strike capability on the other A ''minimum deterrence posture is one in 'Which after a Soviet attack we 'Would have a capability to retaliate and with a high degree of assurance be able to destroy most of Soviet urban society but in which we would not have a capability to counter-attack against Soviet military forces A full first strike capability would be achieved if our forces vere so large and so effective in relation to those of the Soviet Union that we vculd be able to attack and reduce Soviet retaliatory poiler to the point at 'Which it could not cause severe da ge to U S population and industry •· We should reject the minimum deterrence extreme for the following· reasons - ·--- a Deterrence my fail or w r Y break out for accidental or unintended reasons and if it does a capability to counterattack against high-priority Soviet military targets can make a major contribution to the objectives of limiting damage and terminating the War on acceptable terms · · · · -- ·-· b By reducing to a minimum the possibility of a U S nuclear attack in response to Soviet aggression against our Allies a minimum deterrence posture -would -weaken our ability to deter such Soviet attacks On the other hand 'l 'e should rP J ec1 che id ten pt to acilieve a full frs at r l k e capability f'Jr t he fu1 lcwi r g reat iw a It is almost certainly infeasible The Soviets could defeat such an attempt at relatively lnw cost For example 'l 'e do IO'l no'I ' have any prospect of 1t i g i r l- v i dt atroy iu a sudden attack Soviet missile subroarinee at sea Nor would -we be able to destroy a smficiently high p rcent ag of large hard and dispersed ICIM force b It would put the Soviets in a p sition vbich they lould be likely to consider intolerable tbue risking the provocation of an anus race c It would be very costly in resour es that are needed to strengthen our theatre forces The forces I am recommending ill pr · ide ID6 jc r improvements in the qu ality of our strategic posture in its survlvabil ity its fl exibility and its ability to be used in a controlled a d deliberate way under a w ide range of contingencies Target Destruction Reauirements -The follo ling l ist of high priority i e rgtts aim pointe in the Soviet Union has been derived from studies perfcrmE-d in June 1961 by the Si aff of the Net Evaluation Subcommittet ur dl· r inF di r C'tion of Lieutenant General Thomas Hickey The estimste hevf- ·r - n r mded to t he nearest 50 in each category to avoid a - sleading impn ston of accU acy End-Fiscal Year 1 965 00 Urban-Industrial Aim Points 200 200 Bomber l e ses J 5t 150 50 50 31 300 Support Airfields Defense Suppression ··-· Nuclear Storage and Production 50 50 Naval and Sulmarine Bases 50 50 Soft IRIM Sites 4 miss_il per site 100 1 00 Soft ICIM Sites 2 missiles per eite 100-300 50-20 0 Hard ICIM Sites 1 missile per site 200 500 1 c i 7r·o 4oo-l 100 Total 1350-2200 - - -- - -· - - r e •- 'l tsinti M e 1pec1 tllJ bout d -tirll a T len lookillg 110 ft r 1r -to t bo t'd t -e li J 'N 't iU Wo n 5 I c z tiJsfi ed rtth t rl a tr J t rl IQika u a 'ts i a fr r orce pJcnn1nt ·· •• The 2 X Orb i -InmatriaJ tart ta and the 150 't cMa J sve tbe · highe1t priorit - in tha o t' required of u t • - · • et n de11troJ th u ilitT to deliitro7 the 'llrbzn-Irdoatricl - - · 1a oin- pc 161 t to deter at-tz cka on 01lr o c1tiel5 ' sr r r hua the part or the 6orl et i-orcea t a t can ca uae ua t le c t c12rmsa if not a ttaei K r nd al so tbe part at TuJ ne n ble to attack In the eTCnt of tberz aucl ear mr1 it i a th-it -e deatraT tm ar1r n ilCCS ibla n rt et · i msa 'bim icrs nie 150 1llte d b re a nir gi nerous tar th1 a purpoe e incl cie 1 out 50 buH n v bm n or eatilat ted to be su ipozting l czlg-n nge air ti cm 6o ncrY ba el ar e1timted to be suppoz Li as lx aber operat10 ul z ocst or wieh 1IIOUld be uqbJ e a reCCf'1erT be 5e11 the l oog-n zlG 'b 1 f ±1 S 1 and a bout 30 atag1ncr buea on wich the 'ba 2 el s d epe nd fer r n e enough to reach the United flt tea we ex I the other tcri ets are alao potenti llT eJd v irth att eking This 5'zl Jr1C11L1llg Airfields U Otenti l rec0ff%7 and d1 a per al bases lnrJev etorage lid Production 11ite1 and TSl Zl d Bul mi%IO bues- ll can L llTU'J' at nuclear on the bited Sta tea Tile IR3 aitea represent a thre t to our Allies end our theatre forcaa and are J1Dat er onrnrlc•JlT ttacl ed 'bT Q'lltell such u in I e t'en ae Su iFeaaicm t arseta air defem caatrol centen inte rceptClr ba11e11 and surhce-to- 1 r JWJaile aitea can be e rtectiye a ttacbd b7 tl ie a1r-1 unched IIU11ile11 Round D is and Sq x 1t 'l bl r deatruoticm vou1d dr stic llT reduce tbe detenae oppositiou faced 'b7 cur zi ned bombers The nu cr 3 0 aho m be -e 1a probs b al l alAmce tor the purpo111e 7ar e na q le SA 1a nov eat lnting t to destroy' 160 tense su preaaion targets 1n 1968 The size and 'bui Ilg 1 e de ree o t hsrd £ l i d of· tbe Soviet ICB force 1n 1965 nd 1967 a n 0lf o JZ Ltter or cc u116uul c UDCertaincy • 'Ve knOY aJx ut the Sa iet l cml - deliver - posture to ckte • sta th t the J10St J ke c t i o n tor r1r11t-generation ICl K 11ite11 Yill be 2 i asile• per site e d soft Such 11itea wou1d present attr ctive t rgeta tar our torcea B newer bard and dispera buirg far their n t seneration o t ' • 1fOlll4 be au ch a lop cal choice tor the Scrieta tlat the poca1b111t - mat 'be comidered reasonably lil ely eTen though there 1a no eT1 mee now to suggest that the Soviet• re b rden1ng their z l uilll•• -- 6 There are also uncertainties about the perfonnance of our forces in striking back after a Soviet attack--uncertainties associated 'W'ith the ight and effectiveness of possible Soviet attacks the ability of our forces to survive under attack the reliability of our missiles and the ability of our forces to penetrate Soviet defenses But these uncertainties are not unbounded One can place reasonable quantitative limits on them and estilllate the effectiveness of our forces under alternatively optimistic and pessimistic assumptions This is lbat has been done in the follo Wir g analysis The survival reliability and penetration factors used are all based on the general assumption that the begins '111th a well planned and vell executed Soviet attack vitb limited varning age inst our forces in a state of normal peacetime alert and that ve s re hitting back after being attacked T nus the follo'lling esti tes do not represent msxim1nn capabilities under the most favorable circ l DStances For example they exclude cases in Which ve strike first or cases in wich ve are attacked during a period of tension and alert These cases have been excluded because ve are testing the adequacy of our forces and therefore must look at unfavorable circumstances - Within the general assumption of a vell planned Soviet attack optimistic median and pessimistic survival reliability and penetration factors have been chosen to reflect the range of uncertainty It is possible to illlagine outcomes lying outside this range but their likelihood appears small The opt1mistic factors represent favorable but attainable perTi5i rIBnce The great veigbt of likelihood appears to be betveen the optimistic and median cases The co DbiDa tion of all of the pess1mistic factors describes a very unfavorable and relatively imJ robal le case For eY Beyle it is assumed that in 1967 only 1-1 4 per cent of the manned bOI 1bers reach the bomb release line end 90 per cent of the Titans and 70 per cent of the fixed Minuteman missiles are destroyed before launch These factors vere chosen to produce an ans-wer to the question What happens if everything goes badly 'l The details of the assumed factors together '111th an explanation of their choice can be found in Annex 1 to this Appendix The pessimistic factors do not include an allo -a ce for attrition by Soviet anti-ICR defenses We recog lize that the Soviets do have e large R D program in this area- Hovever ve are pursuing a vigorous program of development of penetration aids decoys and multiple -warheads and ve expect to be able to penetrate Soviet defenses in this period Moreover if attrition by Soviet ICR ciefensee appears at all likely -we '11'111 be able to compensate for •it in large measure by concentrc ting our forces on the top priority targets The folloving results ere sho m 1n terms of expected percentages of the targets or value in each category destroyed In the case of UrbanIndustrial Floor Space and Urban Blast Fatalities the estimates are of damage to the contents of the 170 largest cities down to a opulation 7 of 90 000 'Which contains approx Jmtely 8o per cent of the toi al industrial floor space of the Soviet Union and·approximately 50 million out of a total of 210 million people The estimates of total population fatalities are percentages of the Soviet total The Unsheltered case corresponds to the effects expected_ in a population vithout extensive civil defense preparation but taking ' · advantage of 'What shelter is noI'I lB lly s ve ihble The Sheltered case ' ''_ ' -' corresponds to fallout shelter for 4o per cent of the - cban population and' i' 20 per cent of the rural The At I east•• reflects the fact that the esti- •· · mates do not include fallout from attacks on isolated military targets Tne effects on surrounding cities of attacks on naval bases are included in the estimates The assumed number of Soviet IC i'M sites varies between the optimistic cases in 'Which the low end of the range is used and the pessimistic cases in ilich the high end is used Therefore the percentages sho'Wil should not be interpreted as representing fractions of the same numbers T 10 forces and tvo years are sho 'D on pages 9 and 10 I Those forces I am reco ending for End-Fiscal Year 1965 and 1967 I '· II and Those forces proposed by the individual Services though not jointly by the JCS for the sBJ 11e years The calculations suggest that either force 'IJOuld provide us 'With a powerful capability to carry out the objectives mentioned earlier However as I indicated earlier the extra capability provided by the individual Service proposal a runs up inst strongly dil linishing returns and yields very little in terms of extra target destruction Moreover the theatre forces wre not included in these calculations though SIOP •62 includes about 270 alert aircraft and missiles i'rom these forces On the other hand 'With the exception of the defense suppression targets no targets in China or the other satellites were included However ve do not now expect China to develop a significant long rarge ____ _ nuclear delivery force 1n the time period undE'r consideration I 1' she does and a change seems indicated there 'Will be time for us to increase our forces appropriately 8 I 00 pAA lBOH OF TAKJEr IJU3r J Tl CAPABlLITrES OF AllrER iATIVE FORCES Eh D FISCAL n AR 1965 Percent c ted nll l iocUui pt etic Peu 1 t irlic - fr I I II II i Pop ili tioo Id Inml strz Urbe n-Izdustria l Y 1 oor ce or Urb l lils at tr llties 88 - - - - - - 69 88 80 80 43 35 43 35 33 26 33 26 20 20 lic mber ae11 99 99 88 93 58 80 Support Airfi elda 97 99 52 76 7 3T Detense Bapprea111o l 76 87 38 38 T T Iiuclear eto ns ge Production 96 98 69 69 6 5 98 98 62 62 T T Bott Iim- Sites 96 100 45 80 5 5 Sott ICIM Sites 99 100 45 88 ltl 59 Ha rd ICIM Sites Tl 75 16 19 l 1 Total ti o l t i e s Unahe lterd s t leut Pmq mie ltarei c t le at 25 25 Jl ili'tcy 'l' rgeta - Naval Su' arine Bl Bes Alert Force Alert Force Weapons z - 2482 2993 l 107 148T - -691 5 m 3386 4112 156o 207T 574 I II Vee pons 3¼ 6 Meg tans i -rrio • - Total r· - Deliverei co ' er et 9 eiclstic Med1 tn asid stic I Il I II I II 399 951 ' _ Successful attack rould rend er the bMeB inoperable but cit' course -would leave untouched missil e subu rines at sea 9 caa ARIBa 01' W13't'RJC' L'IO CAPABILI'I'll S C11' roP CES FISCAL mR l 967 pt 13 ist i Percent e i Illl il'Ul C Pessmutic ' - L _g_ -n I ti 0 1cn 1 rz -I -II- Ur'b iD -I o u trir J Floor Space 84 Qr Urben BJ Jt st r- ties Total Popuh tio i t i e s UnsheJ end iot ls st Prl rt Shel tend ·at leut 79 T9 68 68 37 37 32 30 26 32 26 25 l9 25 19 98 99 94 99 81 99 lbpport A1rt 1 elts 99 99 72 96 7 ·78 Dei'ense S i o n 88 95 50 er 9· lO 95 95 46 79 0 31 Ea val Iii 8ub rine Ez ses 97 97 54 l2 l2 Sort IliB l Sites 99 99 54 85 92 2 Sort Ica Sites 99 99 82 97 43 97 Rs rd ICR Sites 54 77 T 25 1 5 30 J fil itu - a rJ er P lt sOf Jiiclear Btorcge a Alert Poree WespalB Sl a Z Alert l'rocblction Force 'I-otal f Wee pons 4181 MegatOZ18 54 o -nel 1- erc -d en T-c 'f et Hed IIS l Pessilu st1c I II I II Optmist1c I II 15 8 3028 4578 762o 341T 5295 1' 26 - II 10 38-- -638 1912 3320 71io 2272 T e direct co arisoD of force D - rs es such is less i orta at thb l the ays in -hic i re base e n i operete o ll' forces For e r e ple ve could out-ni ber the Soviets three to one in IC31 's and still have en i de ua e deterrent posture if cur cissiles ' ere soft e nd concentrated vever the force increments 'llbich I reco ending ere ell in a protected mode bard an dispersed or bile Given a veil protected posture relative num ers ere still icycrtent for several reasons a A large Soviet superiority in I 3' 's cocld overco oe the protection afforded our IC •s by h u dening end ispsrs l and it possitle for the Sov-iets to dest r-o y- most our fixed-base fo -ces e d ssile at7 e ck b A large Soviet superiority in tissiles would worsen tbe outcome of a ther nuclee r -e x c A le rge Soviet superiority i l IC 3' t ' s would be likely to have s very 1 lfevorable i I pa ct on Soviet s ggressiveness in the cold -war Therefore we have no intention of lett ng ourselves be serio'l Sly outnu bered in IClM's by the Soviet Union Eow me ny ICR i's will the Soviet Union have n the mid-196 1 s The answer is intrinsically u certein because it is still subject to Soviet decisions which may not yet have been i ade e nd w icb vill be influenced by m u _ o -n decisions Eovever 'lie do koo· a good deal about tbeir posture today We are able to estime te that the Soviets nov have fro o 25 to 50 operational ICR i launchers • Their IC EM bui J d-' 'P appears to be deliberately paced not a ere sh progre n On the be sis of 'lfua t has been o'bserved so far ' the Soviets i ll have from 200 to 4oO IClM's in mid-1964 Jt even if the most pessimistic Air For e rtlJ l tes prove to be valid in mid-1964 We ·will still eg_ue 1 the Sovi1 Union in IC EM' s at about 850 each T'nis vill be combined ·with a substanti l U S superiority in all ether categories of long range nucle ar delivery systel lS Moreover ti' the Soviet Union exceeds our most pessiJ list1c estillla tes a n 'i builds up e much larger force by 1965 or 1967 ve are confident that e - ill find out s bout it in t i ne to e d oi - prog - 1 ppropriately • t- s a hedge against this unlikely possib-i 1 ty ve a - e ezpending our Minute iren production capacity to over 6o sEii t s a m inth 'Wb en this is done the lead til le for be rd and dispersed lfi nute ICR •s i 11 be about 26 months Therefore 'lie 'Will have e g -ee t -iee1 of 'lexibility to expand the progra I at a later date if it should pro •e to be necessa ry to do so In other categories of lo og range nuclear delivery syste s we 'W'ill have a substantial superiority Soviet long ra ie e aviation now CO prises about 1 000 medium bombers or e nkers e r id about 150 heavy bombers or tankers equipped with air-to-surface l issiles The heavy bo tiber category is fe r more sign1fica lt than the medium bOI lber ce tegory We · nJ have 630 h1 avy bombers plus al st as any tankers B cause the Soviets wotlld have to use some of their bombers e s te ikers this nll meo an effective U S heavy b ber force appro dJmtely four or x ore ti II E s li rge as that of the Soviets • The lBS1 now bu bout 20 convent1or ally powered 1nib 1 r1De1 '16 1ch probt 'bl r capable of l uoching ebort-r- nge btll 1atic J ds11le11 r pprcn 1 izLtcq 150-3 0 ceut1e l mllea though not imile auhm rged 'Sr 1953 the Barlets could probably introduce nu cl r powered 1ubr r1De1 v1th a s rged hunch system e Q l d1um roJJ111 1c · I ·' t11llis There is no evidence to suggest that the S w-1ets h3 ve a I i·oi ri n pproa chlng our Pola rill prog -e m either 1n eii e or « L1J l 1tT III B u 1s tor R cm endat1ons on Specific Wee pon System Cboicea Within the sen ral q_u Iltit tive reqw re nte for e d ditionu lc cg e nu cl eu delive17 78tel ls suggested by the e bove conaidera ticma tbe fol loY1ng c re the reuOtUI far rq specific program rec0 1 en6 tiona B-52'• - Air l'crce h a propoeed the procure nt of 52 ad ditiODl J B-52'• 45 w1llg unit eq uiP Ut plus 7 comxe nd support v1th FI 1962 tlmda c t of procurillg and opersting these a ircra ft v1th 30 ui oci ted tc nkers snd B Q1 olt z 1B111lea tor 5 rear period llOUl d be about $1 Ji · bllliana v' reucma for recor endi ng 6 1 1 nst this procure nt tbe fol l av1ng I I ·-- a lie l re dy ban a large oree of intercontinental r s In id-1965 it v1ll c i e 630 B-52'e 8 E -58 1 11 s nd -we do not decide to pl i ae them out sooner 225 B-47'•• The alert B-52 1 a and B-58'11 a l011e v1ll be able to carr - about 1500 bOlllbs pl WI l 1 000 a ir launched crl asiles The alert B-li-T'• Y1l l be able to C n7 another 200 bombs b An eD 7Jlination of the ta rget s y-stem show tl2t oat tarceta · and all of thoae ct the highest priority are be111t a tt cked by miei 1le1 first because the t rget11 are sofi · fixed and of knovn loe tion e nd therefore vulnerable to missile a ttaclt second in the cue of the mil 1-tar ' ta rgete the miaa1le1 reach their targets much t eter tb n do bal l' bere and therefore YOuld be more ettective in catc enar cy- bombers and mia111 le1 on the ground and third Om missile syater is ha v-e e cuch greater i urviva1 potentia l 6 lld endursnce ill the -wa - t 1 me environment and tberetore can be used id th -m ire control and deliberation c The bomber• e re sofi a nd concentrated a nd they depend 'Ul 0D IIIU'Dillg and quick responae tor their surviva J under attack Thia 1• a lea• rella ble m aJUS oi' FOtect1on tbs n b rdening and d111 Ua l ar ll Obiliey Moreover it means that the bomber mat be camitted to a k ver - e61'l3° in tbe wr and cannot be beld 1n reserve to be uaed 1n controlled and deliberate WT 12 ' I I d B c bcrs iu-e expensive l'cr the s CO§t in toul fin aysten co1t1 u 1 Yi ag E-52'1 rtth tv t - -s 14 S- ts 'WC can bq 250 Jl 1 nut n d IUld or 6 Pol il auh rilles Air dete e studies indiCAte t the i ist efi'c ctive fcr y ie'tra ting 1 r deteiu ea e re 1ov a l titi 6 E tre tio l i id c efc iae s e•i both at 'E lich are - -e eft' cti 'i tl a l t 1 D to o tr' l dete ea t tlt tude The SQ-'D- J t il5 i n to 6 9 ICil jc - ill tba r e i tns tic o t y ct tbe B-52 r ct rel tiT tlT lo1r cost foe S t ld ssilea cc a 1ert l xvi' 'n to be r hle to OTUCtX e t - Scrriet d fenM e nd it J OBBibJ e or th J I to go into their 'bageta ctd C the 11 'With gr Ti Q bo l a 'n e tct- J C05t or 1150 t a for tbe period rr 1$62-1$67 is e t J3 ted to be $1 6 billiCQ X-l35 Twency-11-eTen at r t -135'a 540 c cn ti0 JSl aircratt hue n 1962 - ' been procured tb ro1 e h Air 1'orce studies fa 1Hczte th t S O KC-135 1 s re Yi th r ost ct the i r t going to riuw xt t the B-52 toree bout TO X C-l35'a re reqmred to nL 20 tar c d posts end 8 to stJF tCU L the B-58 neet E s te t 'be c u1 t e l l 70 tllnkerJ1 zi cre n -135 re Dr It required to enable tbe B-52•a to rea h their t a rgets the bssi5 fer tbe l1r J'crce stated r e q er c are ta nkr n 111 to illl I- e biliti a tbe bo l era to penetrate defenses bJ' tl la a to chose mre 'avcrsble route a or to tJ y i ore 11 t lcr r a1ti L ortm d tic '11 · ca i bilicy acldeved this li J l nd SQ'i cl t tor d s asia i an not bcr h req uired l lreaver Skybol t a piiea °P'li to be z cre e 'feeti -e ·' 'l'bere ore in '1 Y' j the penditure a $1 l billions to procure 160 extn snke'r I a ud t e tbs tor 5 ie Dot req_uired The force a 64o t n' er cicl I rer mnend nll pr vid e l1-70 to sllppO 't the B-52's 8 tor tbe 3- xS'a 70 to TAC a nd 20 or rommnd posts ________ ·-- _ _ ___ _ _ _-·- __ rue n Titan II ' Ille 18 extra tan missiles e d b r lorce wou1 d cost 11pprorllztel $372 rrlJBons t procure and oi e --ate o 5 • 'nie- -Tita n II ma a s ta nt _l l rger pay-1 ce d t l n fin• • It 'rill be e ble to deliver _ _ rather tb n - J 1o1a d for Xinutemui · I t th tow stateJa coat at t'itan II 1a Lbout four tiJ s tbat a a Millu' c nn d and dup5raed lt equa _ · - cost tour M1 tn tteEen re to 'be preferred to a 1e T1t 5n rirst tbq re leaa vulnc -zi bl e and seccmd they- prorlde BC e target 13 V oreover ir- al rcti dy plAn to ba ve 11 stib5'1 8 ntial force er A c nd Titan 'Which should be adequa tc for those peCUu purp06e11 re-q u1r l ic la rge payloads There rcre I do not reco nd proc ure nt er dd1 tioDll l Titans • Minutemm rd d Dispersed Minutcl Bn l I D ba11 the l oYest 1711tem cost of my of our ICB 'a at about 5 5 I illiOilll per missile in 5 yeu coats It 1s cl e rl1' the preferred wa y to acquire J XJre IC EM' a • How ve - I a m not rec nd1ng tbat ve procure more tblm 100 in rr 1963 1 a e our over-all force require ta do not c ake it n ACea11 r7 The di 'terence betvet I1 the Air Force proposed procurement er 6oo z is • iles inn 1963 nd the 100 I a a reccmiending in 5 yes r system coats is tel T t 2 75 billlona bbile K1nut n - __ Mobile Kinutemsn vould aerve a s hedge inst our bei Ilg h TiJ 7 outnumbered by' the So-riet IClM rorce a lov Soviet CEP or te ilure o r the hardened Jlli tutemr n to Jieet eatimtcd bl Ast resut n ee-condition s loveri Ilg the aurrlval potential ot m rd and d i s d Killutemn It v uJ d al a o 11en-e a a a hedge a gainst unex peete4· 4Tance• in SOYiet anti-aullm u-ine tlUfire ca iie bility that vould reduce tha securi't 7 of Pola ris However Mobile Kimrtem n '1 11Q be ve troubles o r ita cnm · including wartime rallout 'Which 1%J 1' reduce substantialJ y' its 1'Srt1 endurance peacetime sabotage and espioi ia ge Id ope -aticma J problem associated vi th the transport o r expl o111ves a Ld attempted l' l1l CP operation Moreover -we -were to com plete the Air Farce reca e program o r 300 Mobile Minute i en Mobile Minutem n vould coat aboat 2 5 tiloes as mu ch per missile as Y 1 nute i an bit rd and Msperied ' Therefore 'W'e are not yet certain tbat Mobile Minutel s n v1ll be required The action I 8lll reccrm 'nd1ng 1s 1n the ns ture ot l es4 t-ilre reduction on the miesile production program I r the co ib1D ti011 o r contingencies favori Ilg Mobile Minuteman does not OCCUZ 1 I sball recoaaider the decisio and rec end ca ncel 18 tion o r the production program Polaris This system ha a the most survival potential in the wartime environ nt o r any ot our long raDge nuclear de iver y ayatems Pcl ru missiles do not haYe to be l un cbed ear 1n the -uar tbeT can be held in reserve and used in a controlled and deJ ilierate W7 to ebieve our wrtime objectivee 'or e mmpJ e Polaris 1s ·1aea1 ror CO mter-cit retaliation Howver as the calculations show above indica te the force al rea ey programied ie large and can cc use gre11 t da zge to the popul tion and industry o r the Soviet Union This reduces the urgeDCT ·-· 0 • •• • • · •• • - h - • • • • - or a ore PolAr u i u11ile• Co ae I reec a mld t R FQOUre 6 re Pole rill uuli 3 ri nea 1n rr 1963 eoct on 5 buia the 6 1uh - rinea l'1 ll be bout 30 ldll icma l en th n tbl th 10 sul c ri a p ropoocd bJ ' t'a Q · I ··- ·-··- 15 ---- ·-···-·-·•·- _ APPEfiDIX I ASSUMED OPERATIONAL FACTORS FOR 1965 AND 1967 TARG E r D AJI AGE CALCULATIONS All ass ptions are characterized alternatively as Optimistic Median or Pessimistic I Assl l lled Soviet ICBM Force l HedJ e n § lllistic 1967 ffil 00 Pessi llstic 1965 ful ber of ICEM 1 s 4oo 500 750 1 000 ll00 1500 Soft Sites 3 psi 100 50 200 125 300 eoo rd Sites 3-00 psi 200 400 350 750 500 1100 Yield 7Ml' lOMT 7Mr lOMr 7MT lOHl' CEP 1 n mi 8 n mi r n mi 75 75 6 n mi '--· Reliability 7 8 5 n Ei •5 a 85 The Soviets are assu c ed to apply their forces against curs 1n a roug hl r optimal fashion Thus for example Titan I will bave a consic era bly lover survival rate than Atlas F of eqUB l blast resistance because the concentratio n of missiles makes it a more attractive target Only the effects of a Soviet missile attack are included 1n our force survival rates It ·1s assumed that re launch our surviving missiles before Soviet bombers arrive The validity of this assumption does depend on our baving a surv1Y8l le high level c e nd and control systelll A-1 ·• __ ll II As5U led Survival Reliability and Penetration Factors Th probabiltty of e aissile or aircraft delivering its weapon to the target can ·t e thought of as the procillct of three factors Survival Rate under enemy attack or SR Reliability Pate or RR Penetration Fia te through enemy defenses or PR For any given Soviet force level the Survival Rete of our forces will va ry with our force siz 'l'he to rces ropos- il · y ·the indi' idual Services will there ore have hi3her survival rates than the orces rec ended 1y the Secretary of Defens because they e re larger In those cases in 'llhich th' y l f ' 'er ·i he Surrival Rates associated vith the forces I w n reco mnendin ere desi511atec by I these associated 'lfith the individual Service proposals ·uy II _ The assu ed iacto rs are show•in the ta les Which follow To avoid a misleading i pression of spurious accuracy a l factors have been rounded to the nearest •05 An e pla 'lation of the 1 -asis for the assumptions follows the taoles A-2 -· 1·7 Tc bl I - Ass- ed Si -v · -e l Re He b L - S S'Le a 'P -R · l i c i l si t c Medj an - ·Rei or bv W t m • En i-FY l965 ese icist1c A l efi e r s s - 1 • 95 75 iffi PF Yiela CZP Atlss D Csort 3 r 1-- 50 90 50 I 05 Bo r l 20 80 l' n l 1 l Yielf CEP Tita I 1 50 Bo RE PR l II -mr--i - -- ·-------- r- l L 65 l 30 P - P - 1 r -lB A- -15 l l 75 8o P B-52's 40 50 l 5 70 l _50 'I - l l 60 l 50 l 50 75 10 75 ro _ 6o 50 55 70 • ' l j l P y -65 l l I l l '' f RR lO 50 85 65 f__ Y5 E M j EP p Y ld CEP H a •o Do on ilc rt S-22 s l 75 l - 30 50 70 85 R 'lt - l l l r a II 55 l 65 t_ Yield CEP I 10 l 85 Mi - Elili I Avg or Mobile Y E J d CF P l t on ilert S fc 20 70 l RR JJ l f____ Y it lti CEP ··- ' Ti't 1 l 6o Bo PR -oS - 5 70 l r R SR 25 J J O 1-- rt 8 - 90 I '- Y i eljJ CEl' rtla ifl_ lO l 10 4o ' _J l III Basis for Assumed Cperaticnal Factors No g ·eat precision - Fin be r laiiued i'or these factors The use of an ciptimistic-pessimistic range is intencied to indicate the existence of uncertainty Hovever the ranges can be taken to include all values having a su'bstantial likelihood Alert Bomber Survival Rate In tbe optimistic case we receive tactical warning and act on it fast enough to launch all of the alert bombers In the pessimistic case for any of a r u lher of possible reasons 90 per cent of the alert bombers are caught on the ground In the median case half the alert bombers g t off This can be -ce ken as M approx ma tion to the results of a 25 per cent airborne alert though in the case o f 8 ll airborne alert the fact that it is knom vhich bcmbers yill survive attack should make more efficient targetine possible BOII ber Penetration Rate _ The ranee 75 - 50 is roughly consistent with SAC estimates The improvement to 80 in 1967 is associated with effertive a r defense suppression The 25 pessimistic assu ipticn descri1es a r ase in which the Alert Force has been mostly cau ilt on the ground in which only a small force survives penetrates in an uncoordinated way and without effective air defense suppre ssion · J CBM Survival ates These are explained by the assUlried Soviet Forces issile Reliability Rates The optimistic num ers are Service estimates or desizi1 objectives The pessimistic numbers are based on est iLlates made in WSEG Study No 50 A-5