Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Capabilities and Related Policy Issues Updated March 17 2009 Congressional Research Service https crsreports congress gov RL31787 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Summary This report describes the emerging areas of information operations cybersecurity and cyberwar in the context of U S national security It also notes related policy issues of potential interest to Congress For military planners the control of information is critical to military success and communications networks and computers are of vital operational importance The use of technology to both control and disrupt the flow of information has been generally referred to by several names information warfare electronic warfare cyberwar netwar and Information Operations IO Currently IO activities are grouped by the Department of Defense DOD into five core capabilities 1 Psychological Operations 2 Military Deception 3 Operational Security 4 Computer Network Operations and 5 Electronic Warfare Current U S military doctrine for IO now places increased emphasis on Psychological Operations Computer Network Operations and Electronic Warfare which includes use of nonkinetic electromagnetic pulse EMP weapons and non-lethal weapons for crowd control However as high technology is increasingly incorporated into military functions the boundaries between all five IO core capabilities are becoming blurred DOD also acknowledges the existence of a cyber domain which is similar to air land and sea This new domain is the realm where military functions occur that involve manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum Control of the spectrum is essential to military success across all other domains Definitions and examples of the overlapping categories of IO activity are contained in the appendixes This report will be updated to accommodate significant changes Congressional Research Service Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Contents Introduction 1 Background 1 Information Operations by Adversaries 2 Electronic Warfare 2 Psychological Operations 3 Computer Network Operations 3 Cyberwarfare Estonia Georgia and Kyrgystan 4 Law and Proportionality for Information Operations 6 Cyberattack Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism 7 Cyberterrorism 7 Cybercrime 7 Cyberespionage 9 Terrorism Linked to Cybercrime 11 Terrorist Groups Linked to Hackers 13 Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack 13 International Convention on Cybercrime 14 The Need to Improve Cybersecurity 15 New U S A F Cyber Command 16 Joint Command Structure for Cyberwarfare 17 Cyberwarrior Education 18 DOD and the U S Critical Infrastructure 19 Federal Efforts to Protect Computers 19 Policy Issues 21 DOD and Cyberattack Response 21 Incentives for the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 22 Improving Security of Commercial Software 23 Education and Awareness of Cyberthreats 23 Coordination Between Private Sector and Government 23 Legislative Activity in the 110th Congress 24 Potential Future Issues for Congress 26 Computer Network Defense CND 29 Computer Network Exploitation CNE 30 Computer Network Attack CNA 30 Domination of the Electromagnetic Spectrum 31 Electromagnetic Non-Kinetic Weapons 31 Appendixes Appendix A Definitions 27 Appendix B DOD Information Operations Core Capabilities 28 Congressional Research Service Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Contacts Author Information 32 Congressional Research Service Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Introduction Background Control of information has always been part of military operations and the U S Strategic Command views information operations as a core military competency with new emphasis on 1 use of electromagnetic energy 2 cyber operations and 3 use of psychological operations to manipulate an adversary’s perceptions Department of Defense DOD officials now consider cyberspace to be a domain for warfare similar to air space land and sea A recent memo issued by the Secretary of Defense defines cyberspace as “a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures including the internet telecommunications networks computer systems and embedded processors and controllers ”1 This definition is consistent with the one presented in the 2008 National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations NMS-CO which is the overall guidance for all the services A September 29 2008 memo signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense defines cyberspace operations as “The employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace Such operations include computer network operations and activities to operate and defend the Global Information Grid ” Cyberspace operations are a component of Information Operations IO which also includes Electronic Warfare EW Each service has organizations with IO and EW responsibilities 1 the Naval Network Warfare Command NETWARCOM is the Navy’s central operational authority for space information technology requirements network and information operations in support of naval forces afloat and ashore 2 2 the Army Reserve Information Operations Command has responsibility for conducting information operations the U S Army IO Proponent is responsible for developing requirements for IO doctrine and training and the Army Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Directorate provides testing services for Electronic Warfare 3 and finally 3 the Air Force has created what was to have been a major Cyber Command but will now be a Numbered Air Force NAF the 24th Air Force to the Air Force Space Command with responsibility for its portion of cyberwarfare electronic warfare and protection of U S critical infrastructure networks that support telecommunications systems utilities and transportation 4 The DOD views information itself as both a weapon and a target in warfare In particular Psychological Operations PSYOP provides DOD with the ability to rapidly disseminate persuasive information to directly influence the decision making of diverse audiences and is seen 1 This definition appears in an FOUO memo for use of the entire DOD Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England “Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments Subject The Definition of ‘Cyberspace ’” May 12 2008 http www afei org documents NewCyberspaceDefinition pdf 2 Naval Network Warfare Command http www netwarcom navy mil United States Army Information Operations Proponent April 2007 http usacac army mil CAC usaiop asp James E McConville U S Army Information Operations Concept and Execution Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin http www fas org irp agency army mipb 1997-1 mcconvl htm U S Army Test and Evaluation Command http www atec army mil OTC%5Cwho_iewtd_is htm 4 Peter Buxbaum Air Force Explores the Next Frontier Government Computer News February 19 2007 http www gcn com print 26_04 43153-1 html 3 Congressional Research Service 1 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity as a means for deterring aggression and important for undermining the leadership and popular support for terrorist organizations 5 However a 2006 report by the RAND Corporation describes how IO can also affect audiences outside of the intended target stating in contingencies involving an opponent information operations planning and execution should include noncombatant considerations that may have nothing to do with affecting the enemy’s activities or defending friendly force capabilities In today’s conflict environment the impact of information operations is seldom limited to two opposing sides Second and higher-order effects will most likely influence all parties in opposition impact various and varied noncombatant groups and be interpreted in different ways by members of the media and audiences worldwide 6 Thus new technologies for military IO also create new national security policy issues including 1 consideration of psychological operations used to affect friendly nations or domestic audiences and 2 possible accusations against the U S of war crimes if offensive military computer operations or electronic warfare tools severely disrupt critical civilian computer systems or the systems of non-combatant nations Because of the new communications technologies and the growth of the Internet EW and IO have taken on new importance Insurgents use cell phones garage door openers and other remotely controlled electronic devices to detonate roadside bombs and afterwards transmit video images of successful attacks against U S troops for broadcast on the local news or the Internet to influence public opinion about the future outcome of the war In some cases populations may have these video broadcasts or local TV news stories in their native language as their only source of information DOD is seeking methods to counter these actions where violence may be seen as secondary to the use and manipulation of information This report describes current adversary threats in the information environment and DOD capabilities for conducting military information operations gives the current state of federal cybersecurity efforts and provides an overview of related policy issues Information Operations by Adversaries The electromagnetic spectrum is the arena in which information operations take place Aspects of the electromagnetic spectrum can be used by adversaries to conduct kinetic attacks disrupt access influence targets and steal data A review of the types of activity currently being conducted by adversaries illustrates the overlap between the various pillars of information operations The following are examples of current threats to the United States Electronic Warfare The US military’s dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum is being challenged Terrorist groups use wireless electronics to detonate roadside bombs Improvised Explosive Devices 5 DOD Information Operations Roadmap October 30 2004 p 3 This document was declassified January 2006 and obtained through FOIA by the National Security Archive at George Washington University http www gwu edu nsarchiv NSAEBB NSAEBB177 info_ops_roadmap pdf 6 Russell Glenn Heavy Matter Urban Operations’ Density of Challenges Rand Monograph Report Turning Density to Advantage C4ISR and Information Operations as Examples Ch 4 p 25 http www rand org pubs monograph_reports MR1239 MR1239 ch4 pdf Congressional Research Service 2 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity They also use the Internet to transmit financial transactions and use free Global Positioning System GPS signals and commercial satellite video and images to direct their ground attacks against U S and coalition troops 7 In addition peer competitors are focusing on electronic warfare as a crucial element of their military operations by attempting to deny US forces’ access to the spectrum which enables such equipment as radars communication links computer networks and sensors to work 8 Psychological Operations In what some have termed the “Battle of Ideas ” electronic media plays an important role in influencing populations Reportedly only a small portion of the Iraqi populace watch and listen to the current government run television and radio news broadcasts with the majority preferring instead to support the foreign satellite news stations such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya Observers say that most Arabs believe that U S sponsored news broadcasts are managed too closely by the coalition powers and do not objectively present the news When the Iraqi Governing Council IGC prohibited Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya from covering all IGC events during a short period in early 2004 this action reportedly gave many Iraqi people the impression that the Coalition Provisional Authority CPA was manipulating their information 9 Some observers have also stated that terrorist groups through use of the Internet are now challenging the monopoly over mass communications that both state-owned and commercial media have long exercised A strategy of the terrorists is to propagate their messages quickly and repeat them until they have saturated cyberspace Internet messages by terrorist groups have become increasingly sophisticated through use of a cadre of Internet specialists who operate computer servers worldwide Other observers have also stated that al-Qaeda has relied on a Global Islamic Media Unit to assist with its public outreach efforts 10 Computer Network Operations As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Cartwright told Congress in March 2007 “America is under widespread attack in cyberspace ” The low cost of entry for example a laptop connected to the Internet and the ability to operate anonymously are factors that makes information operations in cyberspace attractive to adversaries who know they cannot challenge the United States in a symmetrical war Cyber-based threats against U S information infrastructures are now a growing area of concern for national security The US CERT recently revealed that attacks on US government systems increased by 40% in 2008 11 Assaults on these systems have been sustained for nearly a decade In 1999 a series of attacks with the US codename “Moonlight Maze” were aimed at DOD’s unclassified Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network NIPRnet the network which is used to exchange information internally These attacks may have compromised massive amounts of sensitive military data and appeared to originate from a mainframe in Russia In 2003 a series Daniel Helmer The Poor Man’s FBCB2 R U Ready 4 the 3G Celfone Armor November December 2006 p 7 Association of Old Crows Electronic Warfare The Changing Face of Combat AOC The Electronic Warfare Information Operations Association 2009 9 Maj Patrick Mackin Information Operations and the Global War on Terror The Joint Force Commander’s Fight for Hearts and Minds in the 21st Century Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College September 2 2004 p 14 10 Jacquelyn S Porth Terrorists Use Cyberspace as Important Communications Tool U S Department of State USInfo State Gov May 5 2006 http usinfo state gov is Archive 2006 May 08-429418 html 11 Peter Eisler “Reported Raids on Federal Computer Data Soar ” USA Today February 17 2009 7 8 Congressional Research Service 3 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity of cyberattacks designed to copy sensitive data files was launched against DOD systems and the computers belonging to DOD contractors The cyberespionage attack apparently went undetected for many months This series of cyberattacks was labeled “Titan Rain ” and was suspected by DOD investigators to have originated in China The attacks were directed against the U S Defense Information Systems Agency DISA the U S Redstone Arsenal the Army Space and Strategic Defense Installation and several computer systems critical to military logistics Although no classified systems reportedly were breached many files were copied containing information that is sensitive and subject to U S export-control laws In 2006 an extended cyberattack against the U S Naval War College in Newport Rhode Island prompted officials to disconnect the entire campus from the Internet 12 A similar attack against the Pentagon in 2007 led officials to temporarily disconnect part of the unclassified network from the Internet DOD officials acknowledge that the Global Information Grid which is the main network for the U S military experiences more than three million daily scans by unknown potential intruders 13 Lt General Charles Croom JTF-Global Net Operations has stated that cyber attackers “are not denying disrupting or destroying American military operations – yet But that doesn’t mean they don't have the capability ” 14 Potential adversaries such as China Russia Cuba Iran Iraq Libya North Korea and several non-state terrorist groups are reportedly developing capabilities to attack or degrade U S civilian and military networks “Titan Rain” is an example of successful attacks against non-classified military systems which DOD officials claim were directed by other governments 15 Maj Gen William Lord Air Force stated publicly in 2007 that “China has downloaded 10 to 20 terabytes of data from the NIPRNet already ” According to the Defense Department’s annual report to Congress on China’s military prowess the Chinese military is enhancing its information operations capabilities 16 The report finds that China is placing specific emphasis on the ability to perform information operations designed to weaken an enemy force’s command and control systems 17 Cyberwarfare Estonia Georgia and Kyrgystan On April 27 2007 officials in Estonia moved a Soviet-era war memorial commemorating an unknown Russian who died fighting the Nazis The move stirred emotions inciting rioting by ethnic Russians and the blockading of the Estonian Embassy in Moscow The event also marked the beginning of a series of large and sustained Distributed Denial-Of-Service DDOS attacks launched against several Estonian national websites including government ministries and the Chris Johnson Naval War College Network “Web Site Back Up Following Intrusion ” Inside the Navy December 18 2006 13 Some estimates say that up to 90% of computer software used in China is pirated and thus open to hijack through computer viruses James Lewis Computer Espionage Titan Rain and China Center for Strategic and International Studies December 14 2005 14 Rebecca Grant Victory in Cyberspace An Air Force Special Report Air Force October 2007 15 Elinor Abreu Epic cyberattack reveals cracks in U S defense CNN com May 10 2001 http archives cnn com 2001 TECH internet 05 10 3 year cyberattack idg Declan McCullagh Feds Say Fidel Is Hacker Threat WiredNews com February 9 2001 http www wired com news politics 0 1283 41700 00 html Staff Cyberattack could result in military response USAToday February 14 2002 http www usatoday com tech news 2002 02 14 cyberterrorism htm 16 See the FY2004 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power http www defenselink mil pubs d20040528PRC pdf 17 John Bennett “Commission U S Should Push Beijing to up Pressure on North Korea ” Inside the Pentagon June 17 2004 12 Congressional Research Service 4 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity prime minister’s Reform Party 18 DDOS attacks occur when remote computers often vast networks of “zombies” infected with malicious code are instructed to target particular websites with requests overwhelming the sites with traffic so that they become unavailable Estonia’s infrastructure relies heavily on information technology and the country is described as being the most “wired” in Europe Because availability of basic services to Estonian citizens was disrupted the attacks were considered crippling Initially the Russian government was blamed by Estonian officials for the cyberattacks but it is unclear whether the attacks are sanctioned or initiated by the Russian government NATO sent computer security experts to Estonia to help protect government systems against continued attacks and to help recover from the attacks However some analysts later concluded that the cyber attacks targeting Estonia were not a concerted attack but instead were the product spontaneous anger from a loose federation of separate attackers Technical data showed that sources of the attack were worldwide rather than concentrated in a few locations The computer code that caused the DDOS attack was posted and shared in many Russian language chat rooms where the moving of the statue was a very emotional topic for discussion These analysts state that although various Estonian government agencies were taken offline there was no apparent attempt to target national critical infrastructure other than internet resources and no extortion demands were made Their analysis concluded that there was no Russian government connection to the attacks against Estonia 19 Occurring simultaneously with a kinetic attack by Russian forces on Georgia’s separatist regions the country’s major internet service providers were targeted with coordinated sustained cyber attacks knocking the some of the government’s websites offline while defacing others Investigations later determined that the attacks began with online Russian hacking forums who distributed lists of Georgian internet sites as targets Unlike the DDOS attacks on Estonia the Georgian sites were taken down by exploiting a vulnerability in widely used software to manage Web databases Rather than involving botnets comprised of thousands attacks of this nature can be conducted with a single computer In its effort to mitigate the attacks the Georgian government blocked all internet traffic originating from Russian users However blogs quickly appeared with detailed instructions on how to bypass the block by re-routing the traffic through internet addresses in other countries 20 Although there is no evidence linking the Russian government directly there is much to suggest that the attacks were at least tolerated and perhaps even encouraged by Russian officials In another example of the growing popularity of cyber attacks as an intimidation tactic Kyrgystan’s two main internet service providers—which take up approximately 80% of the country’s bandwidth—were systematically targeted with denial of service attacks effectively taking the country offline Again there is no evidence of direct involvement with the Russian Government these attacks instead appeared to have originated with a Russian “cyber militia ”21 Possible motives for the network assault include Russia’s displeasure with a U S air base located in Kyrgystan and with the Kyrzyg government’s opposition party which relies on the internet as its media outlet 18 Robert Vamosi Cyberattack in Estonia—what it really means CnetNews com May 29 2007 http news com com Cyberattack in Estonia-what it really means 2008-7349_3-6186751 html 19 Estonian DDoS—a final analysis Heise Security http www heise-security co uk news print 90461 20 Brian Krebs “Report Russian Hacker Forums Fueled Georgia Cyber Attacks ” Washington Post October 16 2008 http voices washingtonpost com securityfix 2008 10 report_russian_hacker_forums_f html 21 “Kyrgystan Knocked Offline” Wall Street Journal January 28 2009 pg 10 Congressional Research Service 5 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity A persistent problem after a computer network attack is accurate and timely identification of the attacker This uncertainty may affect decisions about how and against whom or even whether to retaliate Law and Proportionality for Information Operations These incidents indicate a trend towards cyberattacks as a form of political manipulation If cyberspace is a new battlefield on which war may be waged then the international community will be challenged to come together to determine its conduct The attack on Estonia a member of NATO raised questions of whether the actions taken could be defined as an “armed attack” under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty 22 Internationally Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations is the guidance for response 23 For now NATO and other states consider network protection to be a national responsibility However questions of sovereignty attribution and response thresholds remain It has been presumed that the rules of engagement for information operations will follow the law of Armed Conflict meaning a response taken after receiving an electronic or cyber attack will be scaled in proportion to the attack received and distinctions will be maintained between combatants and civilians 24 However protection against attack through cyberspace is a new task for the military and the offensive tools and other capabilities used by DOD to stage retaliatory strikes against enemy systems are highly classified Experience has shown that a reactive defense is not very effective against increasingly powerful and rapid malicious cyber attacks or against other malicious activity using the electromagnetic spectrum A more effective defense against these attacks is to incorporate predictive active and pre-emptive measures that allow DOD defenders to prevent deflect or minimize the efforts of the attacker Accurate attribution is important when considering whether to retaliate using military force or police action Some DOD officials have indicated that the majority of cyber attacks against DOD and U S civilian agency systems are suspected to originate in China and these attacks are consistently more numerous and sophisticated than cyberattacks from other malicious actors The motives appear to be primarily cyberespionage against civilian agencies DOD contractors and DOD systems The espionage involves unauthorized access to files containing sensitive industrial technology and unauthorized research into DOD operations Some attacks included attempts to implant malicious code into computer systems for future use by intruders 25 22 Article V states that an armed attack against one member shall be considered an attack against them all and that if such an attack occurs each of them in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations will assist the Party with such action as it deems necessary including the use of armed force Full text of the Washington Treaty is available at http www nato int docu basictxt treaty htm 23 Chapter VII Actions With Respect to Threats to the Peace Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes the members’ rights to self-defense in the event of an armed attack 24 The Law of Armed Conflict LOAC is a part of public international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities between nations and is intended to protect civilians the wounded sick and shipwrecked LOAC training for U S military is a treaty obligation for the United States under provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions Also under 18 U S Code 2441 war crimes committed by or against Americans may violate U S criminal law James Baker When Lawyers Advise Presidents in Wartime Naval War College Review Winter 2002 Vol LV No 1 Terry Kiss ed Law of Armed Conflict Air University Library Maxwell AFB Jan 2005 http www au af mil au aul bibs loacots htm 25 Josh Rogin “Cyber officials Chinese hackers attack ‘anything and everything ’” FCW com February 13 2007 http www fcw com article97658-02-13-07-Web printLayout Congressional Research Service 6 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Cyberattack Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism In order to determine the legality of a response to malicious cyber behavior the categories of activity actors and jurisdictions must be clearly defined Labeling a “cyberattack” as “cybercrime” or “cyberterrorism” is problematic because of the difficulty determining with certainty the identity intent or the political motivations of an attacker 26 “Cybercrime” can be very broad in scope and may sometimes involve more factors than just a computer hack “Cyberterrorism” is often equated with the use of malicious code However a “cyberterrorism” event may also sometimes depend on the presence of other factors beyond just a “cyberattack ” Cyberterrorism Various definitions exist for the term “cyberterrorism ” just as various definitions exist for the term “terrorism ”27 Analysis of cyberspace misconduct is complicated by the presence of violence in the definitions of terrorism Security expert Dorothy Denning defines cyberterrorism as “ politically motivated hacking operations intended to cause grave harm such as loss of life or severe economic damage ”28 The Federal Emergency Management Agency FEMA defines cyberterrorism as “unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers networks and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives ”29 Others indicate that a physical attack that destroys computerized nodes for critical infrastructures such as the Internet telecommunications or the electric power grid without ever touching a keyboard can also contribute to or be labeled as cyberterrorism 30 Thus it is possible that if a computer facility were deliberately attacked for political purposes all three methods described above physical attack EA and cyberattack might contribute to or be labeled as “cyberterrorism ” CRS is unaware of any reported acts of cyberterrorism to date Cybercrime Cybercrime is crime that is enabled by or that targets computers Some argue there is no agreedupon definition for “cybercrime” because “cyberspace” is just a new specific instrument used to help commit crimes that are not new at all Cybercrime can involve theft of intellectual property a violation of patent trade secret or copyright laws However cybercrime also includes attacks against computers to deliberately disrupt processing or may include espionage to make unauthorized copies of classified data If a terrorist group were to launch a cyberattack to cause 26 Serge Krasavin What is Cyberterrorism Computer Crime Research Center April 23 2004 http www crimeresearch org analytics Krasavin 27 Under 22 USC Section 2656 “terrorism” is defined as premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience The United States has employed this definition of terrorism for statistical and analytical purposes since 1983 U S Department of State 2002 Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 http www state gov s ct rls pgtrpt 2001 html 10220 htm 28 Dorothy Denning “Activism Hactivism and Cyberterrorism The Internet as a tool for Influencing Foreign Policy ” in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt eds Networks and Netwars Rand 2001 p 241 Dorothy Denning Is Cyber War Next Social Science Research Council November 2001 at http www ssrc org sept11 essays denning htm 29 http www fema gov pdf onp toolkit_app_d pdf 30 Dan Verton “A Definition of Cyber-terrorism ” Computerworld August 11 2003 http www computerworld com securitytopics security story 0 10801 83843 00 html Congressional Research Service 7 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity harm such an act also fits within the definition of a cybercrime The primary difference between a cyberattack to commit a crime or to commit terror is found in the intent of the attacker and it is possible for actions under both labels to overlap One of the most prevalent forms of cybercrime is identity theft Botnets and other examples of malicious code can operate to assist cybercriminals with identity theft a crime generally motivated by financial gain Current FBI estimates are that identity theft costs American businesses and consumers $50 billion a year Individual users are often lured into clicking on tempting links that are found in email or when visiting websites Clicking on titles such as “Buy Rolex watches cheap ” or “Check out my new Photos ” can take advantage of web browser vulnerabilities to place malicious software onto a users system which allows a cybercriminal to gather personal information from the user’s computer Malicious code can scan a victim’s computer for sensitive information such as name address place and date of birth social security number mother’s maiden name and telephone number Full identities obtained this way are bought and sold in online markets False identity documents can then be created from this information using home equipment such as a digital camera color printer and laminating device to make official-looking driver’s licenses birth certificates reference letters and bank statements 31 Identity theft involving thousands of victims is also enabled by inadequate computer security practices within organizations 32 MasterCard International reported that in 2005 more than 40 million credit card numbers belonging to U S consumers were accessed by computer hackers 33 Some of these account numbers were reportedly being sold on a Russian website and some consumers have reported fraudulent charges on their statements Officials at the UFJ bank in Japan reportedly stated that some of that bank’s customers may also have become victims of fraud related to theft of the MasterCard information 34 In June 2006 officials from the U S Department of Energy acknowledged that names and personal information belonging to more than 1 500 employees of the National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA had been stolen in a network intrusion that apparently took place starting in 2004 The NNSA did not discover the security breach until one year after it had occurred 35 Some sources report that stolen credit card numbers and bank account information are traded online in a highly structured arrangement involving buyers sellers intermediaries and service industries Services include offering to conveniently change the billing address of a theft victim through manipulation of stolen PINs or passwords Observers estimated that in 2005 such Lou Bobson “Identity Theft Ruining Lives ” The Sunday Mail May 20 2007 p 62 On April 12 2005 personal information such as Social Security Numbers for 310 000 U S citizens may have been stolen in a data security breach that involved 59 instances of unauthorized access into its corporate databases using stolen passwords Boston College reported in March 2005 that a hacker had gained unauthorized access to computer database records with personal information for up to 106 000 alumni and in the same month Chico State University of California reported that its databases had been breached containing the names and Social Security numbers for as many as 59 000 current and former students David Bank and Christopher Conkey “New Safeguards for Your Privacy ” The Wall Street Journal March 24 2005 p D1 33 Jonathan Krim and Michael Barbaro “40 Million Credit Card Numbers Hacked ” Washington Post June 18 2005 p A01 See also the report by the U S House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee July 1 2005 raising concerns about potential ties between identity theft victims and terrorism Caitlin Harrington “Terrorists Can Exploit Identity Theft Report From House Democrats Says ” CQ Homeland Security July 1 2005 34 BBC News “Japan Cardholders ‘Hit’ by Theft ” June 21 2005 at http news bbc co uk 1 hi business 4114252 stm 35 Dawn Onley and Patience Wait “DOD’s Efforts to Stave off Nation-State Cyberattacks Begin with China ” Government Computer News August 21 2006 31 32 Congressional Research Service 8 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity services for each stolen MasterCard number cost between $42 and $72 36 Other news articles report that in 2007 a stolen credit card number sells online for only $1 and a complete identity including a U S bank account number credit-card number date of birth and a governmentissued ID number now sells for just $14 to $18 37 As of January 2007 35 states have enacted data security laws requiring businesses that have experienced an intrusion involving possible identity theft to notify persons affected and to improve security for protection of restricted data However existing federal and state laws that impose obligations on information owners may require harmonization to provide protections that are more uniform 38 Identity theft continues to plague government systems The U S government’s online recruiting website monster com suffered an intrusion in August 2007 that affected the confidential information of nearly 1 3 million users The company admitted to waiting several days before notifying the public of the breach The website was attacked again in February 2009 resulting in the theft of personal data for millions of users worldwide In February 2009 the Federal Aviation Administration issued a letter exposing a data breach that affected more than 45 000 employees There have been many criticisms of the FAA’s handling of the situation particularly for its failure to publish pertinent information on its website Some argue that FISMA’s requirements have agencies focused on meeting deadlines rather than expending resources on added security measures Also in February 2009 the Air Force shut down all internet access at Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama The measure was in response to an intrusion that may have affected the security of all Air Force systems but also to stress the importance of information assurance to individual components Air Force Chief of Staff General Schwartz stated that the disconnect was ordered because personnel “hadn't demonstrated—in our view at the headquarters—their capacity to manage their network in a way that didn't make everyone else vulnerable This is the kind of effort that’s required up and down the line ” On March 10 2009 the Army publicly announced a breach of a database containing personal information about nearly 1 600 soldiers The intrusions may have compromised the data on those participating in the Army’s Operation Tribute to Freedom program which allows soldiers to share their stories with the public For details on cybercrime and federal computer fraud see CRS Report 97-1025 Cybercrime An Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and Related Federal Criminal Laws by Charles Doyle Cyberespionage Cyberespionage involves the unauthorized probing to test a target computer’s configuration or evaluate its system defenses or the unauthorized viewing copying and exfiltration of data files Deliberate network intrusions whether for industrial espionage or espionage involving military information qualify as cyberespionage If there is disagreement about this it is likely because technology has outpaced policy for labeling actions in cyberspace In fact industrial cyberespionage may now be considered a necessary part of global economic competition and 36 CCRC staff Russia Biggest Ever Credit Card Scam Computer Crime Research Center July 8 2005 at http www crime-research org news 08 07 2005 1349 37 David Hayes “A Dollar goes a Long Way in Swiping Private Data ” The Kansas City Star March 20 2007 p 1 38 For more information about laws related to identity theft see CRS Report RL34120 Federal Information Security and Data Breach Notification Laws by Gina Marie Stevens Congressional Research Service 9 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity secretly monitoring the computerized functions and capabilities of potential adversary countries may also be considered essential for national defense 39 U S counterintelligence officials reportedly have stated that about 140 different foreign intelligence organizations regularly attempt to hack into the computer systems of U S government agencies and U S companies Cyberespionage which enables the extraction of massive amounts of information electronically has now transformed the nature of counterintelligence by enabling a reduced reliance on conventional spying operations 40 The Internet including satellite links and wireless local networks now offers new low cost and low risk opportunities for espionage In 2001 a Special Committee of Inquiry established by the European Parliament accused the United States of using its Echelon electronic spy network to engage in industrial espionage against European businesses Echelon was reportedly set up in 1971 as an electronic monitoring system during the Cold War European Union member Britain operates the system which includes listening posts in Canada Australia and New Zealand Echelon is described as a global spy system reportedly capable of intercepting wireless phone calls e-mail and fax messages made from almost any location around the world 41 Former director of the U S Central Intelligence Agency James Woolsey has reportedly justified the possibility of industrial espionage by the United States on the basis of the use of bribery by European companies Officials of the European parliament reportedly expressed outrage about the justification while not denying that bribery is sometimes used to make sales 42 Some government officials warn that criminals now sell or rent malicious code tools for cyberespionage and the risk for damage to U S national security due to cyberespionage conducted by other countries is great One industry official arguing for stronger government agency computer security practices stated that “If gangs of foreigners broke into the State or Commerce Departments and carried off dozens of file cabinets there would be a crisis When the same thing happens in cyberspace we shrug it off as another of those annoying computer glitches we must live with ”43 Security experts warn that all U S federal agencies should now be aware that in cyberspace some malicious actors consider that no boundaries exist between military and civilian targets According to an August 2005 computer security report by IBM more than 237 million overall U S intelligence officials speaking on background explained that they have routinely penetrated potential enemies’ computer networks These officials claim that thousands of attacks have taken place and sensitive information was stolen John Stanton “Rules of Cyber War Baffle U S Government Agencies ” National Defense February 2000 http www nationaldefensemagazine org issues 2000 Feb Rules htm 40 Jeanne Meserve “Official International Hackers Going after U S Networks ” CNN com October 19 2007 http www cnn com 2007 US 10 19 cyber threats index html 41 Martin Asser “Echelon Big brother without a cause ” BBC News July 6 2000 http news bbc co uk 1 hi world europe 820758 stm 42 European Parliament resolution on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications ECHELON interception system 2001 2098 INI European Parliament approved on September 5 2001 by 367 votes for 159 against and 39 abstentions http www cyber-rights org interception echelon European_parliament_resolution htm Gerhard SCHMID Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications ECHELON interception system Doc A5-0264 2001 May 9 2001 http www statewatch org news 2001 sep 02echelon htm James Woolsey Intelligence Gathering and Democracies The Issue of Economic and Industrial Espionage Federation of American Scientists March 7 2000 http ftp fas org irp news 2000 03 wool0300 htm 43 James Lewis testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emerging Threats Cybersecurity and Science and Technology April 15 2007 39 Congressional Research Service 10 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity security attacks were reported globally during the first half of that year 44 Government agencies were targeted the most reporting more than 54 million attacks while manufacturing ranked second with 36 million attacks financial services ranked third with approximately 34 million and healthcare received more than 17 million attacks The most frequent targets for these attacks all occurring in the first half of 2005 were government agencies and industries in the United States 12 million followed by New Zealand 1 2 million and China 1 million These figures likely represent an underestimation given that most security analysts agree that the number of incidents reported are only a small fraction of the total number of attacks that actually occur Terrorism Linked to Cybercrime The proportion of cybercrime that can be directly or indirectly attributed to terrorists is difficult to determine However linkages do exist between terrorist groups and criminals that allow terror networks to expand internationally through leveraging the computer resources money laundering activities or transit routes operated by criminals For example the 2005 U K subway and bus bombings and the attempted car bombings in 2007 also in the U K provide evidence that groups of terrorists are already secretly active within countries with large communication networks and computerized infrastructures plus a large highly skilled IT workforce London police officials reportedly believe that terrorists obtained high-quality explosives used for the 2005 U K bombings through criminal groups based in Eastern Europe 45 A recent trial in the U K revealed a significant link between Islamic terrorist groups and cybercrime In June 2007 three British residents Tariq al-Daour Waseem Mughal and Younes Tsouli pled guilty and were sentenced for using the Internet to incite murder The men had used stolen credit card information at online web stores to purchase items to assist fellow jihadists in the field—items such as night vision goggles tents global positioning satellite devices and hundreds of prepaid cell phones and more than 250 airline tickets through using 110 different stolen credit cards Another 72 stolen credit cards were used to register over 180 Internet web domains at 95 different web hosting companies The group also laundered money charged to more than 130 stolen credit cards through online gambling websites In all the trio made fraudulent charges totaling more than $3 5 million from a database containing 37 000 stolen credit card numbers including account holders’ names and addresses dates of birth credit balances and credit limits 46 Cybercriminals have made alliances with drug traffickers in Afghanistan the Middle East and elsewhere where illegal drug funds or other profitable activities such as credit card theft are used to support terrorist groups 47 Drug traffickers are reportedly among the most widespread users of encryption for Internet messaging and are able to hire high-level computer specialists to help evade law enforcement coordinate shipments of drugs and launder money Regions with major 44 The Global Business Security Index reports worldwide trends in computer security from incidents that are collected and analyzed by IBM and other security organizations IBM press release IBM Report Government Financial Services and Manufacturing Sectors Top Targets of Security Attacks in First Half of 2005 IBM August 2 2005 45 Walsh Terrorism on the Cheap Rollie Lal “Terrorists and Organized Crime Join Forces ” International Herald Tribune May 25 2005 at http www iht com articles 2005 05 23 opinion edlal php Barbara Porter “Forum Links Organized Crime and Terrorism ” By George summer 2004 http www2 gwu edu bygeorge 060804 crimeterrorism html 46 Brian Krebs “Three Worked the Web to Help Terrorists ” The Washington Post July 6 2007 p D01 47 Peter Bergen “The Taliban Regrouped and Rearmed ” The Washington Post September 10 2006 p B1 Helen Cooper “NATO Chief Says More Troops Are Needed in Afghanistan ” The New York Times September 22 2006 p 10 Congressional Research Service 11 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity narcotics markets such as Western Europe and North America also possess optimal technology infrastructure and open commercial nodes that increasingly serve the transnational trafficking needs of both criminal and terrorist groups 48 Officials of the U S Drug Enforcement Agency DEA reported in 2003 that 14 of the 36 groups found on the U S State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations were also involved in drug trafficking A 2002 report by the Federal Research Division at the Library of Congress revealed a “growing involvement of Islamic terrorist and extremists groups in drug trafficking ” and limited evidence of cooperation between different terrorist groups involving both drug trafficking and trafficking in arms 49 Consequently DEA officials reportedly argued that the war on drugs and the war against terrorism are and should be linked 50 State Department officials at a Senate hearing in March 2002 also indicated that some terrorist groups may be using drug trafficking as a way to gain financing while simultaneously weakening their enemies in the West through exploiting their desire for addictive drugs 51 The poppy crop in Afghanistan reportedly supplies resin to produce over 90% of the world’s heroin supporting a drug trade estimated at $3 1 billion Reports indicate that money from drug trafficking in Afghanistan is used to help fund terrorist and insurgent groups that operate in that country Subsequently U S intelligence reports in 2007 have stated that “al Qaeda in Afghanistan” has been revitalized and restored to its pre-September 11 2001 operation levels and may now be in a better position to strike Western countries 52 Drug traffickers have the financial clout to hire computer specialists with skills for using technologies which make Internet messages hard or impossible to decipher and which allow terrorist organizations to transcend borders and operate internationally with less chance of detection Many highly trained technical specialists that make themselves available for hire originally come from the countries of the former Soviet Union and the Indian subcontinent Some of these technical specialists reportedly will not work for criminal or terrorist organizations willingly but may be misled or unaware of their employers’ political objectives Still others will agree to provide assistance because other well-paid legitimate employment is scarce in their region 53 48 Glenn Curtis and Tara Karacan The Nexus Among Terrorists Narcotics Traffickers Weapons Proliferators and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe a study prepared by the Federal Research Division Library of Congress December 2002 p 22 at http www loc gov rr frd pdf-files WestEurope_NEXUS pdf 49 L Berry G E Curtis R A Hudson and N A Kollars A Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups Federal Research Division Library of Congress Washington DC May 2002 50 Authorization for coordinating the federal war on drugs expired on September 30 2003 For more information see CRS Report RL32352 War on Drugs Reauthorization and Oversight of the Office of National Drug Control Policy by Mark Eddy Also see D C Préfontaine QC and Yvon Dandurand Terrorism and Organized Crime Reflections on an Illusive Link and its Implication for Criminal Law Reform International Society for Criminal Law Reform Annual Meeting—Montreal August 8-12 Workshop D-3 Security Measures and Links to Organized Crime August 11 2004 at http www icclr law ubc ca Publications Reports International%20Society%20Paper%20of%20Terrorism pdf 51 Rand Beers and Francis X Taylor U S State Department Narco-Terror The Worldwide Connection Between Drugs and Terror testimony before the U S Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Technology Terrorism and Government Information March 13 2002 52 Matthew Lee and Katherine Shrader Al-Qaida has rebuilt U S intel warns Associated Press July 12 2007 http news yahoo com s ap 20070712 ap_on_go_pr_wh us_terror_threat_32 _ylt AuURr2eP8AhBrfHyTOdw714Gw_IE Associated Press “Afghanistan’s poppy crop could yield more than 2006’s record haul UN says ” International Herald Tribune June 25 2007 http www iht com articles ap 2007 06 25 asia AS-GEN-Afghan-Drugs php 53 Louise Shelly Organized Crime Cybercrime and Terrorism Computer Crime Research Center September 27 2004 http www crime-research org articles Terrorism_Cybercrime Congressional Research Service 12 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Terrorist Groups Linked to Hackers Links between computer hackers and terrorists or terrorist-sponsoring nations may be difficult to confirm Membership in the most highly skilled computer hacker groups is sometimes very exclusive and limited to individuals who develop demonstrate and share only with each other their most closely guarded set of sophisticated hacker tools These exclusive hacker groups do not seek attention because maintaining secrecy allows them to operate more effectively Some hacker groups may also have political interests that are supra-national or based on religion or other socio-political ideologies while other hacker groups may be motivated by profit or linked to organized crime and may be willing to sell their computer services regardless of the political interests involved Information about computer vulnerabilities is now for sale online in a hackers’ “black market ” For example a list of 5 000 addresses of computers that have already been infected with spyware and which are waiting to be remotely controlled as part of an automated “bot network” reportedly can be obtained for about $150 to $500 Prices for information about computer vulnerabilities for which no software patch yet exists reportedly range from $1 000 to $5 000 Purchasers of this information are often organized crime groups various foreign governments and companies that deal in spam 54 Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack Some experts estimate that advanced or structured cyberattacks against multiple systems and networks including target surveillance and testing of sophisticated new hacker tools might require from two to four years of preparation while a complex coordinated cyberattack causing mass disruption against integrated heterogeneous systems may require 6 to 10 years of preparation 55 This characteristic where hackers devote much time to detailed and extensive planning before launching a cyberattack has also been described as a “hallmark” of previous physical terrorist attacks and bombings launched by Al Qaeda It is difficult to determine the level of interest or the capabilities of international terrorist groups to launch an effective cyberattack A 1999 report by The Center for the Study of Terrorism and Irregular Warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School concluded that it is likely that any severe cyberattacks experienced in the near future by industrialized nations will be used by terrorist groups simply to supplement the more traditional physical terrorist attacks 56 Some observers have stated that Al Qaeda does not see cyberattack as important for achieving its goals preferring attacks which inflict human casualties 57 Other observers believe that the groups most likely to consider and employ cyberattack and cyberterrorism are the terrorist groups operating in post-industrial societies such as Europe and the United States rather than Hackers sell their information anonymously through secretive websites Bob Francis “Know Thy Hacker ” Infoworld January 28 2005 at http www infoworld com article 05 01 28 05OPsecadvise_1 html 55 Dorothy Denning “Levels of Cyberterror Capability Terrorists and the Internet ” http www cs georgetown edu denning infosec Denning-Cyberterror-SRI ppt presentation and Zack Phillips “Homeland Tech Shop Wants to Jump-Start Cybersecurity Ideas ” CQ Homeland Security September 14 2004 at http homeland cq com hs display do docid 1330150 sourcetype 31 binderName news-all 56 Report was published in 1999 available at http www nps navy mil ctiw reports 57 The Ashland Institute for Strategic Studies has observed that Al Qaeda is more fixated on physical threats than electronic ones John Swartz “Cyberterror Impact Defense Under Scrutiny ” USA Today August 3 2004 p 2B 54 Congressional Research Service 13 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity international terrorist groups that operate in developing regions where there is limited access to high technology However other sources report that Al Qaeda has taken steps to improve organizational secrecy through more active and sophisticated use of technology and evidence suggests that Al Qaeda terrorists used the Internet extensively to plan their operations for September 11 2001 58 In past years Al Qaeda groups reportedly used new Internet-based telephone services to communicate with other terrorist cells overseas Khalid Shaikh Mohammed one of the masterminds of the attack against the World Trade Center reportedly used special Internet chat software to communicate with at least two airline hijackers Ramzi Yousef who was sentenced to life imprisonment for the previous bombing of the World Trade Center had trained as an electrical engineer and had planned to use sophisticated electronics to detonate bombs on 12 U S airliners departing from Asia for the United States He also used sophisticated encryption to protect his data and to prevent law enforcement from reading his plans should he be captured 59 Tighter physical security measures now widely in place throughout the United States may encourage terrorist groups in the future to explore cyberattack as way to lower the risk of detection for their operations 60 However other security observers believe that terrorist organizations might be reluctant to launch a cyberattack because it would result in less immediate drama and have a lower psychological impact than a more conventional bombing attack These observers believe that unless a cyberattack can be made to result in actual physical damage or bloodshed it will never be considered as serious as a nuclear biological or chemical terrorist attack 61 Some experts fear that an attack on critical infrastructures such as the nation’s electric grid or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition SCADA utilities delivery systems either through kinetic or cyber means may be more likely For an explanation of vulnerabilities and security measures see CRS Report RL30153 Critical Infrastructures Background Policy and Implementation by John D Moteff International Convention on Cybercrime Cybercrime is also a major international challenge even though attitudes about what comprises a criminal act of computer wrongdoing still vary from country to country However the Convention on Cybercrime was adopted in 2001 by the Council of Europe a consultative assembly of 43 countries based in Strasbourg The Convention effective July 2004 is the primary international treaty dealing with breaches of law “over the internet or other information networks ” The Convention requires participating countries to update and harmonize their criminal laws against hacking infringements on copyrights computer facilitated fraud child pornography and other illicit cyber activities 62 Although the United States has signed and ratified the Convention it did not sign a separate protocol that contained provisions to criminalize xenophobia and racism on the Internet which David Kaplan “Playing Offense The Inside Story of How U S Terrorist Hunters Are Going after Al Qaeda ” U S News World Report June 2 2003 pp 19-29 59 Robert Windrem “9 11 Detainee Attack Scaled Back ” September 21 2003 http www msnbc com news 969759 asp 60 “Terrorism An Introduction ” April 4 2003 at http www terrorismanswers com terrorism 61 James Lewis “Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism Cyber War and Other Cyber Threats ” December 2002 at http www csis org tech 0211_lewis pdf 62 Full text for the Convention on Cyber Crime may be found at http conventions coe int Treaty Commun QueVoulezVous asp NT 185 CM 8 DF 18 06 04 CL ENG 58 Congressional Research Service 14 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity would raise Constitutional issues in the United States 63 The separate protocol could be interpreted as requiring nations to imprison anyone guilty of “insulting publicly through a computer system” certain groups of people based on characteristics such as race or ethnic origin a requirement that could make it a crime to e-mail jokes about ethnic groups or question whether the Holocaust occurred Reportedly the Department of Justice has said that it would be unconstitutional for the United States to sign that additional protocol because of the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of expression The Electronic Privacy Information Center in a June 2004 letter to the Foreign Relations Committee objected to U S ratification of the Convention because it would “create invasive investigative techniques while failing to provide meaningful privacy and civil liberties safeguards ”64 On August 3 2006 the U S Senate passed a resolution of ratification for the Convention The United States will comply with the Convention based on existing U S federal law and no new implementing legislation is expected to be required Legal analysts say that U S negotiators succeeded in scrapping most objectionable provisions thereby ensuring that the Convention tracks closely with existing U S laws 65 The Need to Improve Cybersecurity Department of Defense DOD officials have stated that while the threat of cyber attack is “less likely” to appear than conventional physical attack it could actually prove more damaging because it could involve disruptive technology that might generate unpredictable consequences that give an adversary unexpected advantages 66 The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 required that the Department of Homeland Security DHS coordinate efforts to protect the cybersecurity for the nation’s critical infrastructure This resulted in two reports in 2005 titled “Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan ” and “The National Plan for Research and Development in Support of Critical Infrastructure Protection ” where DHS provided a framework for identifying and prioritizing and protecting each infrastructure sector However some observers question why in light of the many such reports describing an urgent need to reduce cybersecurity vulnerabilities there is not an apparent perceived sense of national urgency to close the gap between cybersecurity and the threat of cyberattack For example despite Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 FISMA some experts argue that security remains a low priority or is treated almost as an afterthought at some domestic federal agencies 67 In 2007 the Government Accountability Office issued a report titled “Critical Infrastructure Protection Multiple Efforts to Secure Control Systems Are Under Way but 63 The U S Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing on the Convention on June 17 2004 CRS Report RS21208 Cybercrime The Council of Europe Convention by Kristin Archick Estelle Durnout Council of Europe Ratifies Cybercrime Treaty ZDNet March 22 2004 at http news zdnet co uk business legal 0 39020651 39149470 00 htm 64 http www epic org privacy intl senateletter-061704 pdf 65 For more information about the Convention on Cybercrime see CRS Report RS21208 Cybercrime The Council of Europe Convention by Kristin Archick 66 Advantages of EA and CNA might derive from United States reliance on a computer-controlled critical infrastructure along with unpredictable results depending on severity of the attack Jason Sherman “Bracing for Modern Brands of Warfare ” Air Force Times September 27 2004 http www airforcetimes com story php f 1AIRPAPER-358727 php 67 Statement of James A Lewis Senior Fellow and Director Technology and Public Policy Program Center for Strategic and International Studies Committee on House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on Government Management Organization and Procurement Subcommittee on Information Policy Census and National Archives June 7 2007 Congressional Research Service 15 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Challenges Remain ” which states that cybersecurity risks have actually increased for infrastructure control systems because of the persistence of interconnections with the Internet and continued open availability of detailed information on the technology and configuration of the control systems The report states that no overall strategy yet exists to coordinate activities to improve computer security across federal agencies and the private sector which owns the critical infrastructure 68 Some observers argue that as businesses gradually strengthen their security policies for headquarters and administrative systems the remote systems that control critical infrastructure and manufacturing may soon be seen as easier targets of opportunity for cybercrime Cybercrime is obviously one of the risks of doing business in the age of the internet but observers argue that many decision-makers may currently view it as a low-probability threat Some researchers suggest that the numerous past reports describing the need to improve cybersecurity have not been compelling enough to make the case for dramatic and urgent action by decision-makers Others suggest that even though relevant information is available future possibilities are still discounted which reduces the apparent need for present-day action In addition the costs of current inaction are not borne by the current decision-makers These researchers argue that IT vendors must be willing to regard security as a product attribute that is coequal with performance and cost IT researchers must be willing to value cybersecurity research as much as they value research for high performance or cost-effective computing and finally IT purchasers must be willing to incur present-day costs in order to obtain future benefits 69 New U S A F Cyber Command The Air Force is not laying claim to the cyber domain but their new mission statement issued in August 2008 indicates they are building a force to operate in that domain Former Secretary of the Air Force Michael W Wynne recently stated that the new mission of the U S Air Force is to “fly and fight in air space and cyberspace ” For the Air Force this means that military action in cyberspace now includes defending against malicious activity on the Internet and anywhere across the entire electromagnetic spectrum including the energy spectrum bands for radio microwaves infrared X-ray and all other options for directed energy where national security is threatened 70 Secretary Wynne stated that cyberwarfare flows naturally from the Air Force’s traditional missions such as downloading data from platforms in space and that U S capabilities should be expanded to also enable the shut down of enemy electronic networks Air Force officials led by the Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Michael Mosley met at the Pentagon in a “cyberwarfare-themed summit” during November 2006 to make plans for a new Air Force Cyber Command 71 General Elder stated that the planning session would include an assessment of cyberwarfare requirements to defend the nation 72 68 GAO -08-119T Critical Infrastructure Protection Multiple Efforts to Secure Control Systems are Under Way but Challenges Remain October 17 2007 69 Seymour Goodman and Herber Lin editors Toward a Safer and More Secure Cyberspace Committee on Improving Cybersecurity Research in the United States National Research Council 2007 pp 261-267 http books nap edu openbook php isbn 0309103959 70 John Bennett and Carlo Munoz USAF Sets Up First Cyberspace Command Military com November 4 2006 http www military com features 0 15240 118354 00 html 71 Contact for Dr Lani Kass Director of Air Force Cyberspace Task Force and Special Assistant to General Michael Moseley is through Maj Gary Conn 72 Personal communication with Air Force Public Affairs Office January 26 2007 Congressional Research Service 16 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Homeland security reportedly would also be a large part of the Cyber Command’s new responsibility including protection of telecommunications systems utilities and transportation Several issues to be considered may include 1 what kind of educational skills technical skills and training are needed for staff at the Cyber Command and 2 what kind of career path can be offered to those in the Air Force who want to participate in defending the new cyber domain A provisional team led by AFCYBER Commander Maj Gen William T Lord was starting to look at these issues Then Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Norton Schwartz announced October 8 2008 that there would no longer be a new major command developed for cyberspace operations Instead the Air Force would continue with standing up a component-Numbered Air Force which will focus on cyberspace warfighting operations The 24th Air Force will be led by a 2-star general and will operate in support of NORTHCOM and STRATCOM missions which could include anything from hurricane relief to homeland defense All other administrative policy and organize-train-equip oversight now falls under Air Force Space Command The AFCYBER P team will stay formed so they can assist in developing a roadmap to outline the actions needed to transition the work done this past year over to the space command The provisional team will also assist with other tasks as needed until the new organizational construct is formalized The new organization will operate on an equal footing with other Numbered Air Force headquarters Eventually there may be a new major command for cyberspace that will stand alongside the Air Force Space Command and the Air Combat Command Some speculate that there may be a standalone combatant command for cyberspace 73 Precise future command relationships are still being decided in the ongoing planning effort and more details will be forthcoming 74 Joint Command Structure for Cyberwarfare Currently the U S Strategic Command USSTRATCOM which is a unified combatant command for U S strategic forces controls military information operations space command strategic warning and intelligence assessments global strategic operations planning under the Unified Command Plan and also has overall responsibility for Computer Network Operations CNO 75 USSTRATCOM gives most of the daily defense and operational activity to the National Security Agency Beneath USSTRATCOM are several Joint Functional Component Commands JFCCs 1 space and global strike integration 2 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 3 network warfare 4 integrated missile defense and 5 combating weapons of mass destruction 76 The JFCC-Network Warfare JFCC-NW and the JFCC-Space Global Strike JFCC-SGS have responsibility for overall DOD cyber security while the Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations JTF-GNO and the Joint information Operations Warfare Center JIOWC both have direct responsibility for defense against cyber attack 77 The JTF-GNO defends the DOD Global “New Cyber CoCom Likely” by Colin Clark DoD Buzz Online Defense and Acquisition Journal March 6th 2009 accessed at http www dodbuzz com 2009 03 06 new-cyber-cocom-likely 74 Personal communication with Air Force Public Affairs Office January 26 2007 75 The Public Affairs Office for the Air Force at the Pentagon can be contacted by congressional clients 76 United State Strategic Command July 2006 http www stratcom mil organization-fnc_comp html 77 Clark A Murdock et al Beyond Goldwater-Nichols U S Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era Phase 2 Report July 2005 Center for Strategic and International Studies p 128 http www ndu edu lIbrary docs BeyondGoldwaterNicholsPhase2Report pdf 73 Congressional Research Service 17 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Information Grid while the JIOWC assists combatant commands with an integrated approach to information operations These include operations security psychological operations military deception and electronic warfare The JIOWC also coordinates network operations and network warfare with the JTF-GNO and with JFCC-NW Cyberwarrior Education The President’s Comprehensive National Cyber-security Initiative has identified cyber education and training as one of its critical areas of focus As more U S military systems become computerized and linked to networks some argue there is a growing need for qualified Electronic Warfare operators 78 In a recent speech Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordan England said that “in the U S the number of scientists and engineers is declining at a time when numbers in many other countries are increasing This decline in science and technology poses the greatest longterm threat to our country including our cyber networks ” Each year DOD conducts a Cyber Defense Exercise where teams of students from the nation’s military academies advance their cyber skills in practice competition where they deliberately hack into test networks and also protect these test networks against intrusions by other teams The Officer Professional Military Education Policy OPMEP offers guidance on information operations IO and areas related to both IO and command and control C2 and efforts are underway towards integrating cyber warfare into Joint Professional Military Education curriculum An impediment to the program is the heavily classified nature of cyberspace doctrine and the international students who comprise some of the student body at the schools However DOD has stated a need to attract train and retain skilled information technology professionals beyond those enrolled in the military academies In an attempt to solve this problem the Air Force Research Laboratory AFRL Cyber Operations Branch offers a 10-week summer program each year for university students consisting of intensive studies in cyber security The Advanced Course in Engineering ACE Cyber Security Boot Camp has been held at Rome NY for the past four years and involves between 40 and 60 student applicants from Air Force and Army pre-commissioning programs some National Science Foundation Cyber Corps Fellows and some civilian college students For 2006 the theme was “Cybercraft ” described as a non-kinetic weapon platform that seeks dominance in cyberspace corresponding to the new mission of the Air Force to “fly and fight in air space and cyberspace ” according to program director Dr Kamal Jabbour Students study legal and policy issues cryptography computer network defense and attack steganography and analysis of malicious code ACE students also spend an average of three days per week in internships at the Air Force Research Laboratory or with local industry partners and participate in officer development activities The faculty for ACE is drawn from Syracuse University West Point and Norwich University DHS and the National Science Foundation NSF have recognized the ACE program as an official internship program for Federal Cyber Service Scholarship for Service SFS program The SFS program seeks to increase the number of skilled students entering the fields of information assurance and cyber security by funding universities to award two-year scholarships in cyber security Graduates are then required to work for a federal agency for two years Recent ACE graduates are now working at the Air Force Office of Special Investigations the AFRL and the NSA Also as a result of ACE summer program success with college students in September 2006 Syracuse University developed a special cyber security course to be offered in 12 high schools in 78 Patience Wait Army Shores up EM spectrum skills Government Computer News March 19 2007 Congressional Research Service 18 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity New Your State Currently Syracuse University offers 29 introductory cyber security courses in 148 high schools throughout New York New Jersey Maine Massachusetts and Michigan High school students who successfully complete the cyber security courses can receive Syracuse college credits in computer science and engineering DOD and the U S Critical Infrastructure DOD officials have noted that because 80% of U S commerce goes through the Internet DOD systems must develop a capability to adequately protect it 79 Currently to assist commercially owned telecommunications networks communications satellite systems and other civilian critical infrastructure systems DOD contracts with Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute to operate the Computer Emergency Response Team CERT-CC while DHS in partnership with private industry operates a parallel organization called US-CERT Both organizations monitor trends in malicious code and cyber crime send out alerts about threats to computer systems and provide guidance for recovery after an attack The Defense Information Systems Agency oversees the military’s Global Information Grid GiG and provides support for net-centric operations through the JTF-GNO The GiG is an interconnected set of capabilities that includes any DoD system equipment software or service that transmits stores or processes DoD information The Joint Staff J-6 is working on an initiative called “GiG 2 0 ” which may take advantage of cloud computing applications and social networking tools Few details are known about the program at this point but briefings suggest that the goal is to reconcile the inconsistent security postures and interoperability problems among the multiple service infrastructures by creating a joint DOD enterprise 80 Federal Efforts to Protect Computers The federal government has taken steps to improve its own computer security and to encourage the private sector to also adopt stronger computer security policies and practices to reduce infrastructure vulnerabilities In 2002 the Federal Information Security Management Act FISMA was enacted giving the Office of Management and Budget OMB responsibility for coordinating information security standards and guidelines developed by federal agencies 81 In 2003 the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace was published by the Bush Administration to encourage the private sector to improve computer security for the U S critical infrastructure through having federal agencies set an example for best security practices 82 The OMB has mandated that all U S Government enable their networks to handle traffic from IPv6 a next generation set of internet protocols IPv6 was developed in response to the imminent exhaustion of IP addresses the new system will allow more flexibility in address assignment and simplifies the translating mechanism used to route traffic to particular sites Network security is 79 John Doyle Air Force To Elevate Status Of Cyberspace Command Aerospace Daily Defense Report March 22 2007 80 Vice Admiral Nancy Brown Director for Command Control Communications and Computer Systems GIG 2 0 J6 The Joint Staff Presentation at AFCEA Solution Series Information Assurance Washington DC September 9 2008 http www afcea org events solutions 08 infoassurance files Tue_1300_Brown pdf 81 GAO has noted that many federal agencies have not implemented security requirements for most of their systems and must meet new requirements under FISMA See GAO Report GAO-03-852T Information Security Continued Efforts Needed to Fully Implement Statutory Requirements June 24 2003 82 Tinabeth Burton ITAA Finds Much to Praise in National Cybersecurity Plan May 7 2003 http www findarticles com p articles mi_go1965 is_200303 ai_n7418485 Congressional Research Service 19 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity also a built-in feature of IPv6 architecture and government systems running it are anticipated to be more secure Federal agencies now support the IPv6 protocol and its interoperability but are not necessarily using it on a day-to-day basis Full operational transition to IPv6 remains a future goal The National Cyber Security Division NCSD within the National Protection and Programs Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security DHS oversees a Cyber Security Tracking Analysis and Response Center CSTARC tasked with conducting analysis of cyberspace threats and vulnerabilities issuing alerts and warnings for cyberthreats improving information sharing responding to major cybersecurity incidents and aiding in national-level recovery efforts In addition a new Cyber Warning and Information Network CWIN has begun operation in 50 locations and serves as an early warning system for cyberattacks 83 The CWIN is engineered to be reliable and survivable has no dependency on the Internet or the public switched network PSN and reportedly will not be affected if either the Internet or PSN suffer disruptions 84 In January 2004 the NCSD also created the National Cyber Alert System NCAS a coordinated national cybersecurity system that distributes information to subscribers to help identify analyze and prioritize emerging vulnerabilities and cyberthreats NCAS is managed by the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team US-CERT a partnership between NCSD and the private sector and subscribers can sign up to receive notices from this new service by visiting the USCERT website 85 To observers the most pervasive question regarding cyberattack and response is “Who’s in charge ” In an attempt to clarify roles and responsibilities and to develop an all-encompassing strategy then president George W Bush launched a $30 billion dollar Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative CNCI in 2008 to prioritize and coordinate cyber defense across government The initiative was prompted by the Director of National Intelligence’s urging and was led by ODNI’s Joint Interagency Cyber Task Force The Obama administration is continuing this effort by conducting a 60-day cybersecurity review led by Melissa Hathaway who was the coordinator of the ODNI task force For more on the CNCI see CRS Report R40427 Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative Legal Authorities and Policy Considerations by John Rollins and Anna C Henning DHS is lead agency for the Federal Government’s cybersecurity it coordinates government and private-sector efforts through its National Cyber Security Center NCSC However there are high-ranking officials who assert that NSA should run the government’s cybersecurity efforts as it does for the military The resident technological talent within NSA and the benefits of having both defensive and offensive capabilities co-located make the idea attractive to some Critics point towards allegations of NSA’s civil liberties violations with internet monitoring programs and say that having this one agency in charge of all things cyber will erode the public trust Also the private sector may be less inclined to work cooperatively with the NSA—which they maintain would present a big problem as 80% of the United States infrastructure is privately owned There have also been criticisms that DHS’s cyber programs are inadequately funded and that the leadership lacks the authority necessary to push forward its initiatives To illustrate this point Bara Vaida “Warning Center for Cyber Attacks is Online Official Says ” Daily Briefing GovExec com June 25 2003 84 The Cyber Warning Information Network CWIN provides voice and data connectivity to government and industry participants in support of critical infrastructure protection http www publicsectorinstitute net ELetters HomelandSecurityStrategies Volume1No1 CyberWarningNetLaunch lsp 85 http www us-cert gov cas 83 Congressional Research Service 20 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Rob Beckstrom the director of the NCSC resigned on March 6 2009 over concerns that the NSA was “dominating” cybersecurity efforts At a hearing on March 10 2009 several experts testifying before the House Subcommittee on Emerging Threats Cybersecurity and Science and Technology echoed this sentiment 86 For a thorough discussion of reforming the national security structure to meet today’s challenges see CRS Report RL34455 Organizing the U S Government for National Security Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates by Catherine Dale Nina M Serafino and Pat Towell Policy Issues Several areas for possible congressional consideration are help to determine appropriate responses by DOD to a cyberattack examine the incentives for achieving the goals of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and the CNCI or for developing a new national strategy search for ways to improve the security of commercial software products explore ways to increase security education and awareness for businesses and home PC users and find ways for private industry and government to coordinate to protect against cyberattack reconsider classification levels to allow for increased information sharing oversight for DOD execution of cyberdefense appropriations Congress may also wish to consider ways to harmonize existing federal and state laws that require notice to persons when their personal information has been affected by a computer security breach and that impose obligations on businesses and owners of that restricted information 87 DOD and Cyberattack Response If a terrorist group were to use a cybercrime botnet to subvert computers in a third party country such as China to launch a cyberattack against the United States the U S response to the cyberattack would presumably need to be carefully considered in order to avoid retaliating against the wrong entity Would the resulting effects of cyberweapons used by the United States be difficult to limit or control Would a cyberattack response that could be attributed to the United States possibly encourage other extremists or rogue nations to start launching their own cyberattacks against the United States Would an attempt by the U S to increase surveillance of another entity via use of cyberespionage computer code be labeled as an unprovoked attack even if directed against the computers belonging to a terrorist group If a terrorist group should subsequently copy or reverse-engineer a destructive U S military cyberattack program could it be used against other countries that are U S allies or even turned back to attack civilian computer systems in the United States 88 If the effects become widespread and severe could the 86 This testimony can be accessed at http homeland house gov hearings index asp ID 175 For more information about laws related to identity theft see CRS Report RL34120 Federal Information Security and Data Breach Notification Laws by Gina Marie Stevens 88 See CRS Report RL31787 Information Operations Electronic Warfare and Cyberwar Capabilities and Related Policy Issues by Clay Wilson 87 Congressional Research Service 21 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity U S use of cyberweapons exceed the customary rules of military conflict or violate international laws 89 Commercial electronics and communications equipment are now used extensively to support complex U S weapons systems and are possibly vulnerable to cyberattack This situation is known to our potential adversaries 90 To what degree are military forces and national security threatened by computer security vulnerabilities that exist in commercial software systems and how can the computer industry be encouraged to create new commercial off-the-shelf COTS products that are less vulnerable to cyberattack Incentives for the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace Does the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace present clear incentives for achieving security objectives Suggestions to increase incentives may include requiring that all software procured for federal agencies be certified under the “Common Criteria” testing program which is now the requirement for the procurement of military software However industry observers point out that the software certification process is lengthy and may interfere with innovation and competitiveness in the global software market 91 Should the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace rely on voluntary action on the part of private firms home users universities and government agencies to keep their networks secure or is there a need for possible regulation to ensure best security practices Has public response to improve computer security been slow partly because there are no regulations currently imposed 92 Would regulation to improve computer security interfere with innovation and possibly harm U S competitiveness in technology markets Two of the former cybersecurity advisers to the president have differing views Howard Schmidt has stated that market forces rather than the 89 The laws of war are international rules that have evolved to resolve practical problems relating to military conflict such as restraints to prevent misbehavior or atrocities and have not been legislated by an overarching central authority The United States is party to various limiting treaties Sometimes the introduction of new technology tends to force changes in the understanding of the laws of war Gary Anderson and Adam Gifford “Order Out of Anarchy The International Law of War ” The Cato Journal August 2004 vol 15 no 1 pp 25-36 90 Stanley Jakubiak and Lowell Wood “DOD Uses Commercial Software and Equipment in Tactical Weapons ” Statements before the House Military Research and Development Subcommittee Hearing on EMP Threats to the U S Military and Civilian Infrastructure October 7 1999 House Armed Services Committee Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack hearing July 22 2004 91 Agencies operating national security systems are required to purchase software products from a list of lab-tested and evaluated products in a program run by the National Information Assurance Partnership NIAP a joint partnership between the National Security Agency and the National Institute of Standards and Technology The NIAP is the U S government program that works with organizations in a dozen other countries around the world which have endorsed the international security-evaluation regimen known as the “Common Criteria ” The program requires vendors to submit software for review in an accredited lab a process that often takes a year and costs several thousand dollars The review previously was limited to military national security software and equipment however the Administration has stated that the government will undertake a review of the program to “possibly extend” this software certification requirement to civilian agencies Ellen Messmer White House issue “National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace ” Network World Fusion February 14 2003 at http www nwfusion com news 2003 0214ntlstrategy html 92 Business executives may be cautious about spending for large new technology projects such as placing new emphasis on computer security Results from a February 2003 survey of business executives indicated that 45% of respondents believed that many large Information Technology IT projects are often too expensive to justify Managers in the survey pointed to the estimated $125 9 billion spent on IT projects between 1977 and 2000 in preparation for the year 2000 Y2K changeover now viewed by some as a non-event Sources reported that some board-level executives stated that the Y2K problem was overblown and over funded then and as a result they are now much more cautious about future spending for any new massive IT initiatives Gary H Anthes and Thomas Hoffman “Tarnished Image ” Computerworld May 12 2003 vol 37 no 19 p 37 Congressional Research Service 22 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity government should determine how product technology should evolve for better cybersecurity however Richard Clarke has stated that the IT industry has done little on its own to improve security of its own systems and products 93 Improving Security of Commercial Software Some security experts emphasize that if systems administrators received the necessary training for keeping their computer configurations secure then computer security would greatly improve for the U S critical infrastructure However should software product vendors be required to create higher quality software products that are more secure and that need fewer patches Could software vendors possibly increase the level of security for their products by rethinking the design or by adding more test procedures during product development Education and Awareness of Cyberthreats Ultimately many observers argue that reducing the threat to national security from cybercrime depends on a strong commitment by government and the private sector to follow best management practices that help improve computer security Numerous government reports already exist that describe the threat of cybercrime and make recommendations for management practices to improve cybersecurity A 2004 survey done by the National Cyber Security Alliance and AOL showed that most home PC users do not have adequate protection against hackers do not have updated antivirus software protection and are confused about the protections they are supposed to use and how to use them 94 How can computer security training be made available to all computer users that will keep them aware of constantly changing computer security threats and that will encourage them to follow proper security procedures Coordination Between Private Sector and Government What can be done to improve sharing of information between federal government local governments and the private sector to improve computer security Effective cybersecurity requires sharing of relevant information about threats vulnerabilities and exploits 95 How can the private sector obtain information from the government on specific threats which the government now considers classified but which may help the private sector protect against cyberattack How can the government obtain specific information from private industry about the number of successful computer intrusions when companies resist reporting because they want to avoid 93 Howard Schmidt points out that major technology firms now promote anti-virus software and encourage better cybersecurity practices He stresses that market forces are causing private industry to improve security of products Martin Kady “Cybersecurity a Weak Link in Homeland’s Armor ” CQ Weekly February 14 2005 Meanwhile Richard Clarke who initially opposed regulation during his tenure in the Clinton and Bush administrations now states that the IT industry only responds to improve security of its products when regulation is threatened William Jackson “To Regulate or Not to Regulate That Is the Question ” Government Computer News February 26 2005 94 A 2004 survey of 329 PC users revealed that most computer users think they are safe but lack basic protections against viruses spyware hackers and other online threats In addition large majorities of home computer users have been infected with viruses and spyware and remain highly vulnerable to future infections AOL and the National Cyber Security Alliance “Largest In-home Study of Home Computer Users Shows Major Online Threats Perception Gap ” October 2004 at http www staysafeonline info news NCSA-AOLIn-HomeStudyRelease pdf 95 Government Accountability Office Homeland Security Efforts To Improve Information Sharing Need to Be Strengthened GAO-03-760 August 2003 Congressional Research Service 23 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity publicity and guard their trade secrets 96 Should cybercrime information voluntarily shared with the federal government about successful intrusions be shielded from disclosure through Freedom of Information Act requests How can the United States better coordinate security policies and international law to gain the cooperation of other nations to better protect against a cyberattack Pursuit of hackers may involve a trace back through networks requiring the cooperation of many Internet Service Providers located in several different nations 97 Pursuit is made increasingly complex if one or more of the nations involved has a legal policy or political ideology that conflicts with that of the United States 98 Thirty-eight countries including the United States participate in the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime which seeks to combat cybercrime by harmonizing national laws improving investigative abilities and boosting international cooperation However how effective will the Convention without participation of other countries where cybercriminals now operate freely For more on the Convention see CRS Report RS21208 Cybercrime The Council of Europe Convention by Kristin Archick Legislative Activity in the 110th Congress H R 1525—The Internet Spyware I-SPY Prevention Act of 2007 proposed penalties for unauthorized access to computers or the use of computers to commit crimes The bill passed the House on May 22 2007 On May 23 2007 this bill was received in the Senate and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary H R 1684—The Department of Homeland Security Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 established within the Department of Homeland Security an Office of Cybersecurity and Communications headed by the Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and Communications with responsibility for overseeing preparation response and reconstitution for cybersecurity and to protect communications from terrorist attacks major disasters and other emergencies including large-scale disruptions The bill directed the Assistant Secretary to do the following Establish and maintain a capability within the Department for ongoing activities to identify threats to critical information infrastructure to aid in detection of vulnerabilities and warning of potential acts of terrorism and other attacks Conduct risk assessments on critical information infrastructure with respect to acts of terrorism Develop a plan for the continuation of critical information operations in the event of a cyber attack Define what qualifies as a cyber incident of national significance for purposes of the National Response Plan 96 CRS Report RL30153 Critical Infrastructures Background Policy and Implementation by John D Moteff Trace back to identify a cyberattacker at the granular level remains problematic Dorothy Denning Information Warfare and Security Addison-Wesley 1999 p 217 98 In Argentina a group calling themselves the X-Team hacked into the website of that country’s Supreme Court in April 2002 The trial judge stated that the law in his country covers crime against people things and animals but not websites The group on trial was declared not guilty of breaking into the website Paul Hillbeck “Argentine Judge Rules in Favor of Computer Hackers ” February 5 2002 at http www siliconvalley com mld siliconvalley news editorial 3070194 htm 97 Congressional Research Service 24 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Develop a national cybersecurity awareness training and education program that promotes cybersecurity awareness within the Federal Government and throughout the Nation Consult and coordinate with the Under Secretary for Science and Technology on cybersecurity research and development to strengthen critical information infrastructure against acts of terrorism This bill passed the House on May 9 2007 On May 11 2007 this bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs H R 3237—The Smart Grid Facilitation Act of 2007 proposed to modernize the Nation’s electricity transmission and distribution system to incorporate digital information and controls technology “Smart grid” technology functions would include the ability to detect prevent respond to or recover from cyber-security threats and terrorism The new Grid Modernization Commission would be directed to undertake and update on a biannual basis an assessment of the progress toward modernizing the electric system including cybersecurity protection for extended grid systems On August 24 2007 the bill was referred to House subcommittee on Energy and Environment H R 3221—The New Direction for Energy Independence National Security and Consumer Protection Act proposed establishment of the Grid Modernization Commission to facilitate the adoption of Smart Grid standards technologies and practices across the Nation’s electricity grid This bill became P L 110-289 on July 30 2008 H R 1585 the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 required the Secretary of Defense to conduct a quadrennial roles and missions review for the Department of Defense which will also include cyber operations This bill became P L 110-181 on January 28 2008 99 H Rept 110-146 on H R 1585 by the Committee on Armed Services This report stated that within 180 days after enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2008 the Secretary of Defense must submit a report to congressional defense committees with the following requirements 1 Review legal authorities to ensure effective cyberspace operations 2 Review DOD’s policies for information sharing and risk management for cyberspace operations 3 Provide an overview of DOD’s cyberspace organization strategy and programs 4 Assess operational challenges including the impact of the military’s reliance on commercial communications infrastructure 5 Recommend ways to improve DOD’s ability to coordinate cyberspace operations with law enforcement intelligence communities the commercial sector and with international allies The recommendations shall include consideration of the establishment of a single joint organization for cyberspace operations 6 Provide an overview of training and educational requirements 7 Provide an overview of funding for cyberspace operations 99 Department of Defense Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report January 2009 pg 14 Congressional Research Service 25 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity The DOD Roles and Missions Review report issued in January 2009 placed cyberspace high on the list of focus areas and asserted that this domain will be one in which major combat operations may take place Potential Future Issues for Congress Could provocative actions for example intelligence gathering by the U S military that involves using intrusive cyber or electronic warfare tools to monitor enemy system activity or copy important data files be challenged by other nations as a violation of the law of Armed Conflict Exploratory intrusions by U S military computers to gather intelligence may provoke other strong or unexpected responses from some countries or extremist groups that are targeted for monitoring by DOD Several questions also may arise when considering a retaliatory cyber or electronic warfare counterstrike 1 if the attacker is a civilian should the attack be considered a law enforcement problem rather than a military matter 2 if a U S military cyberattack against a foreign government also disables civilian infrastructure can it be legally justified or 3 how can the military be certain that a targeted foreign computer system has not been innocently set up to appear as an attacker by another third party attacker Some observers have stated that success in future conflicts will depend less on the will of governments and more on the perceptions of populations and that perception control will be achieved and opinions shaped by the warring group that best exploits the global media 100 As a result of the increasingly sophisticated use of networks by terrorist groups and the potentially strong influence of messages carried by the global media does DOD now view the Internet and the mainstream media as a possible threat to the success of U S military missions How strongly will U S military PSYOP be used to manipulate public opinion or reduce opposition to unpopular decisions in the future Another emerging issue may be whether DOD is legislatively authorized to engage in PSYOP that may also affect domestic audiences 101 DOD Joint Publication 3-13 released February 2006 provides current doctrine for U S military Information Operations and explains the importance of achieving information superiority 102 However the DOD Information Operations Roadmap published October 2003 states that PSYOP messages intended for foreign audiences increasingly are consumed by the U S domestic audience usually because they can be re-broadcast through the global media The Roadmap document states that “ the distinction between foreign and domestic audiences becomes more a question of USG U S Government intent rather than information dissemination practices by DOD ”103 This may be interpreted to mean that DOD has no control over who consumes PSYOP messages once they are re-transmitted by commercial media 100 Maj Gen Robert Scales Ret Clausewitz and World War IV Armed Forces Journal July 2006 p 19 Psychological Operations are authorized for the military under Title 10 USC Subtitle A Part I Chapter 6 Section 167 “Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces ” 102 DOD Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations February 13 2006 http www dtic mil doctrine jel new_pubs jp3_13 pdf 103 DOD Information Operations Roadmap October 30 2003 p 26 http www gwu edu nsarchiv NSAEBB NSAEBB177 info_ops_roadmap pdf 101 Congressional Research Service 26 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Appendix A Definitions Information Information is a resource created from two things phenomena data that are observed plus the instructions systems required to analyze and interpret the data to give it meaning The value of information is enhanced by technology such as networks and computer databases which enables the military to 1 create a higher level of shared awareness 2 better synchronize command control and intelligence and 3 translate information superiority into combat power DOD Information Operations The current DOD term for military information warfare is “Information Operations” IO DOD information operations are actions taken during time of crisis or conflict to affect adversary information while defending one’s own information systems to achieve or promote specific objectives 104 The focus of IO is on disrupting or influencing an adversary’s decision-making processes An IO attack may take many forms for example 1 to slow adversary computers the software may be disrupted by transmitting a virus or other malicious code 2 to disable sophisticated adversary weapons the computer circuitry may be overheated with directed high energy pulses and 3 to misdirect enemy sensors powerful signals may be broadcast to create false images Other methods for IO attack may include psychological operations such as initiating TV and radio broadcasts to influence the opinions and actions of a target audience or seizing control of network communications to disrupt an adversary’s unity of command Computer Network Defense CND is the term used to describe activities that are designed to protect U S forces against IO attack from adversaries Part of CND is information assurance IA which requires close attention to procedures for what is traditionally called computer and information security DOD places new emphasis on the importance of dominating the entire electromagnetic spectrum with methods for computer network attack and electronic warfare DOD also emphasizes that because networks are increasingly the operational center of gravity for warfighting the U S military must be prepared to “fight the net ”105 Because the recently declassified source document containing this phrase has some lines blacked out it is not clear if “ net” means the Internet If so then this phrase may be a recognition by DOD that Psychological Operations including public affairs work and public diplomacy must be employed in new ways to counter the skillful use of the Internet social networking tools and the global news media by U S adversaries 104 From the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms January 2003 http www dtic mil doctrine jel doddict data i index html 105 DOD Information Operations Roadmap October 30 2003 p 6-7 http www gwu edu nsarchiv NSAEBB NSAEBB177 info_ops_roadmap pdf Congressional Research Service 27 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Appendix B DOD Information Operations Core Capabilities In Joint Publication 3-13 DOD identifies five core capabilities or “pillars ” for conduct of information operations 1 Psychological Operations 2 Military Deception 3 Operations Security 4 Computer Network Operations and 5 Electronic Warfare 106 These capabilities are interdependent and increasingly are integrated to achieve desired effects Psychological Operations PSYOP DOD defines PSYOP as planned operations to convey selected information to targeted foreign audiences to influence their emotions motives objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments organizations groups and individuals 107 For example during the Operation Iraqi Freedom OIF broadcast messages were sent from Air Force EC-130E aircraft and from Navy ships operating in the Persian Gulf along with a barrage of e-mail faxes and cell phone calls to numerous Iraqi leaders encouraging them to abandon support for Saddam Hussein The civilian Al Jazeera news network based in Qatar beams its messages to well over 35 million viewers in the Middle East and is considered by many to be a “market competitor” for U S PSYOP Terrorist groups can also use the Internet to quickly place their own messages before an international audience Some observers have stated that the U S will continue to lose ground in the global media wars until it develops a coordinated strategic communications strategy to counter competitive civilian news media such as Al Jazeera 108 Partly in response to this observation DOD now emphasizes that PSYOP must be improved and focused against potential adversary decision making sometimes well in advance of times of conflict Products created for PSYOP must be based on in-depth knowledge of the audience’s decision-making processes Using this knowledge the PSYOPS products then must be produced rapidly and disseminated directly to targeted audiences throughout the area of operations 109 Following the Smith-Mundt Act DOD policy prohibits the use of PSYOP for targeting American audiences 110 However while military PSYOP products are intended for foreign targeted audiences DOD also acknowledges that the global media may pick up some of these targeted messages and replay them back to the U S domestic audience Therefore a sharp distinction between foreign and domestic audiences cannot be maintained 111 Military Deception MILDEC Deception guides an enemy into making mistakes by presenting false information images or statements MILDEC is defined as actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers with regard to friendly military capabilities thereby causing the adversary to 106 JP 3-13 Information Operations February 13 2006 DOD Dictionary of Military Terms http www dtic mil doctrine jel doddict 108 Air Force Operation Iraqi Freedom Information Operations Lessons Learned First Look AFC2ISRC CX July 23 2003 http www insidedefense com secure data_extra pdf3 dplus2004_265 pdf 109 DOD Information Operations Roadmap October 30 2003 p 6 http www gwu edu nsarchiv NSAEBB NSAEBB177 info_ops_roadmap pdf 110 22 USC Chapter 18 “The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 ” 111 DOD Information Operations Roadmap October 30 2003 p 26 http www gwu edu nsarchiv NSAEBB NSAEBB177 info_ops_roadmap pdf 107 Congressional Research Service 28 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity take or fail to take specific actions that will contribute to the success of the friendly military operation As an example of deception during Operation Iraqi Freedom OIF the U S Navy deployed the Tactical Air Launched Decoy system to divert Iraqi air defenses away from real combat aircraft Operational Security OPSEC OPSEC is defined as a process of identifying information that is critical to friendly operations and which could enable adversaries to attack operational vulnerabilities For example during OIF U S forces were warned to remove certain information from DOD public websites so that Iraqi forces could not exploit sensitive but unclassified information Computer Network Operations CNO CNO includes the capability to 1 attack and disrupt enemy computer networks 2 defend our own military information systems and 3 exploit enemy computer networks through intelligence collection usually done through use of computer code and computer applications The Joint Information Operations Warfare Command JIOWC and the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare JFCCNW are responsible for the evolving mission of Computer Network Attack 112 The exact capabilities of the JIOWC and JFCCNW are highly classified and DOD officials have reportedly never admitted to launching a cyber attack against an enemy however many computer security officials believe the organization can destroy networks and penetrate enemy computers to steal or manipulate data and take down enemy command-andcontrol systems They also believe that the organization consists of personnel from the CIA National Security Agency FBI the four military branches and civilians and military representatives from allied nations 113 The Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations JTFGNO currently residing within the Defense Information Security Agency DISA is an operational arm of the services A recent decision to move the JTF-GNO under the auspices of the National Security Agency will put defensive and operational capabilities within the same organization 114 Computer Network Defense CND CND is defined as defensive measures to protect information computers and networks from disruption or destruction CND includes actions taken to monitor detect and respond to unauthorized computer activity Responses to IO attack against U S forces may include use of passive information assurance tools such as firewalls or data encryption or may include more intrusive actions such as monitoring adversary computers to determine their capabilities before they can attempt an IO attack against U S forces Some DOD officials believes that CND may lack sufficient policy and legal analysis for guiding appropriate responses to intrusions or attacks on DOD networks Therefore DOD has recommended that a legal review be conducted to determine what level of intrusion or data John Lasker U S Military’s Elite Hacker Crew Wired News April 18 2005 http www wired com news privacy 0 1848 67223 00 html U S Strategic Command Fact File http www stratcom mil fact_sheets fact_jtf_gno html and http www stratcom mil fact_sheets fact_jioc html 113 John Lasker U S Military’s Elite Hacker Crew April 18 2005 Wired News http www wired com news privacy 0 67223-0 html tw wn_story_page_prev2 114 Some fear this move will have negative repercussions on civil liberties 112 Congressional Research Service 29 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity manipulation constitutes an attack The distinction is necessary in order to clarify whether an action should be called an attack or an intelligence collection operation and which aggressive actions can be appropriately taken in self-defense This legal review should also determine if appropriate authorities permit U S forces to retaliate through manipulation of unwitting third party computer hosts And finally DOD has recommended structuring a legal regime that applies separately to domestic and to foreign sources of computer attack against DOD or the U S critical infrastructure 115 Computer Network Exploitation CNE CNE is an area of IO that is not yet clearly defined within DOD Before a crisis develops DOD seeks to prepare the IO battlespace through intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance and through extensive planning activities This involves intelligence collection that in the case of IO is usually performed through network tools that penetrate adversary systems to gain information about system vulnerabilities or to make unauthorized copies of important files Tools used for CNE are similar to those used for computer attack but configured for intelligence collection rather than system disruption Although CNE is an activity designed for data exfiltration it is unknown whether the methods used to penetrate networks could also be used for an attack by an adversary Computer Network Attack CNA CNA is defined as effects intended to disrupt or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks As a distinguishing feature CNA normally relies on a data stream used as a weapon to execute an attack For example sending a digital signal stream through a network to instruct a controller to shut off the power flow is CNA while sending a high voltage surge through the electrical power cable to short out the power supply is considered Electronic Warfare However a digital stream of computer code or a pulse of electromagnetic power can both be used to also create false images in adversary computers During Operation Iraqi Freedom U S and coalition forces reportedly did not execute any computer network attacks against Iraqi systems Even though comprehensive IO plans were prepared in advance DOD officials stated that top-level approval for several CNA missions was not granted until it was too late to carry them out to achieve war objectives 116 U S officials may have rejected launching a planned cyber attack against Iraqi financial computers because Iraq’s banking network is connected to a financial communications network also located in Europe Consequently according to Pentagon sources an information operations attack directed at Iraq might also have brought down banks and ATM machines located in parts of Europe as well Such global network interconnections plus close network links between Iraqi military computer systems and the civilian infrastructure reportedly frustrated attempts by U S forces to design a cyber attack that would be limited to military targets only in Iraq 117 In a meeting held in January 2003 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology White House officials sought input from experts outside government on guidelines for use of cyber-warfare 115 DOD Information Operations Roadmap October 30 2003 p 52 http www gwu edu nsarchiv NSAEBB NSAEBB177 info_ops_roadmap pdf 116 Elaine Grossman “Officials Space Info Targets Largely Cobbled On-The-Fly for Iraq ” Inside the Pentagon May 29 2003 117 Charles Smith “U S Information Warriors Wrestle with New Weapons ” NewsMax com March 13 2003 http www newsmax com archives articles 2003 3 12 134712 shtml Congressional Research Service 30 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Officials have stated they are proceeding cautiously since a cyberattack could have serious cascading effects perhaps causing major disruption to networked civilian systems 118 In February 2003 the Bush Administration announced national-level guidance for determining when and how the United States would launch computer network attacks against foreign adversary computer systems The classified guidance known as National Security Presidential Directive 16 is intended to clarify circumstances under which a disabling computer attack would be justified and who has authority to launch such an attack Electronic Warfare EW EW is defined by DOD as any military action involving the direction or control of electromagnetic spectrum energy to deceive or attack the enemy High power electromagnetic energy can be used as a tool to overload or disrupt the electrical circuitry of almost any equipment that uses transistors micro-circuits or metal wiring 119 Directed energy weapons amplify or disrupt the power of an electromagnetic field by projecting enough energy to overheat and permanently damage circuitry or jam overpower and misdirect the processing in computerized systems The Electronic Warfare Division of the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office has responsibility for creating electronic warfare policy and for supporting development of new electromagnetic spectrum concepts that can be translated into equipment and weapons Domination of the Electromagnetic Spectrum DOD now emphasizes maximum control of the entire electromagnetic spectrum including the capability to disrupt all current and future communication systems sensors and weapons systems This may include 1 navigation warfare including methods for offensive space operations where global positioning satellites may be disrupted or 2 methods to control adversary radio systems and 3 methods to place false images onto radar systems block directed energy weapons and misdirect unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs or robots operated by adversaries 120 For example military IO testing examined the capability to secretly enter an enemy computer network and monitor what their radar systems could detect Further experiments tested the capability to take over enemy computers and manipulate their radar to show false images 121 Electromagnetic Non-Kinetic Weapons Non-kinetic weapons emit directed electromagnetic energy that in short pulses may permanently disable enemy computer circuitry For example an electromagnetic non-kinetic weapon mounted in an aircraft or on the ground might disable an approaching enemy missile by directing a High Power Microwave HPM beam that burns out the circuitry or that sends a false telemetry signal Bradley Graham “Bush Orders Guidelines for Cyber-Warfare ” Washington Post February 7 2003 Section A p 1 CRS Report RL32544 High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse HEMP and High Power Microwave HPM Devices Threat Assessments by Clay Wilson 120 DOD Information Operations Roadmap October 30 2003 p 61 http www gwu edu nsarchiv NSAEBB NSAEBB177 info_ops_roadmap pdf 121 These programs were called Suter 1 and Suter 2 and were tested during Joint Expeditionary Forces Experiments held at Nellis Air Force Base in 2000 and 2002 David Fulghum “Sneak Attack ” Aviation Week Space Technology June 28 2004 p 34 118 119 Congressional Research Service 31 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity to misdirect the targeting computer 122 Also at reduced power electromagnetic non-kinetic weapons can also be used as a non-lethal method for crowd control The Active Denial System ADS developed by the Air Force is a vehicle-mounted nonlethal counter-personnel directed energy weapon Currently most non-lethal weapons for crowd control such as bean-bag rounds utilize kinetic energy However the ADS projects a focused beam of millimeter energy waves to induce an intolerable burning sensation on an adversary’s skin repelling the individual without causing injury Proponents say the ADS is safe and effective at ranges between 50 and 1 600 feet The nonlethal capabilities of the ADS are designed to protect the innocent minimize fatalities and limit collateral damage 123 Approximately $40 million has been spent on this technology over the past ten years Military officials requested that ADS devices be deployed to Iraq to assist Marines in guarding posts countering insurgent snipers and protecting convoys In July 2005 it was reported that the Active Denial System would be deployed to Iraq before the end of the year Under an initiative called Project Sheriff troops would receive a total of 15 vehicles Concerns of political fallout have delayed these plans as of early 2007 initial deployment was slated no sooner than 2010 The ADS system would be the first operationally deployed directed-energy weapon for counterpersonnel missions 124 Author Information Catherine A Theohary Analyst in National Security Policy and Information Operations Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service CRS CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role CRS Reports as a work of the United States Government are not subject to copyright protection in the United States Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS However as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material David Fulghum “Sneak Attack ” Aviation Week Space Technology June 28 2004 p 34 Active Denial System Fact Sheet Air Force Research Lab Office of Public Affairs Kirtland Air Force Base http www de afrl af mil Factsheets ActiveDenial pdf 124 Jason Sherman Pentagon Considering Sending Non-Lethal Ray Gun to Iraq Inside Defense March 2 2007 122 123 Congressional Research Service RL31787 · VERSION 8 · UPDATED 32
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