The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Background and Issues for Congress Updated January 3 2013 Congressional Research Service https crsreports congress gov R42077 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Summary The Unified Command Plan UCP and associated Combatant Commands COCOMs provide operational instructions and command and control to the Armed Forces and have a significant impact on how they are organized trained and resourced—areas over which Congress has constitutional authority The UCP is a classified executive branch document prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CJCS and reviewed and updated every two years that assigns missions planning training and operational responsibilities and geographic areas of responsibilities to COCOMs Functional COCOMs operate worldwide across geographic boundaries and provide unique capabilities to geographic combatant commands and the services while Geographic COCOMs operate in clearly delineated areas of operation and have a distinctive regional military focus There are currently nine COCOMs          USSOCOM U S Special Operations Command MacDill Air Force Base FL USSTRATCOM U S Strategic Command Offutt Air Force Base NE USTRANSCOM U S Transportation Command Scott Air Force Base IL USAFRICOM U S Africa Command Kelley Barracks Stuttgart Germany USCENTCOM U S Central Command MacDill Air Force Base FL USEUCOM U S European Command Patch Barracks Stuttgart Germany USNORTHCOM U S Northern Command Peterson Air Force Base CO USPACOM U S Pacific Command Camp H M Smith HI USSOUTHCOM U S Southern Command Miami FL This report provides information on the history mission and operational considerations for each of these organizations as well as a brief discussion of current issues associated with the UCP and these commands The origins of the UCP and COCOMs are rooted in World War II After the war U S leaders taking advantage of the lessons learned in both theaters initiated a series of legislative changes that resulted in the current UCP process and COCOM construct The UCP and COCOMs are covered under Title 10 - Armed Forces Subtitle A - General Military Law Part I–Organization and General Military Powers Chapter 6–Combatant Commands These provisions detail the responsibilities and authorities of COCOMs as well as legal requirements related to the UCP Potential issues for Congress include the implications of a strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific region Another issue is whether there is a need for greater interagency involvement in the UCP development process A possible area for congressional concern is if Geographical COCOMs have made U S foreign policy “too militarized ” Some have also suggested there might be a need for separate COCOMs apart from the current nine to better address emerging regional and ethnic alignments as well as emerging threats such as cyber warfare Finally if Congress believes the current COCOM construct does not meet contemporary or future security requirements there are proposals for alternative organizational structures that might prove more effective Congressional Research Service The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Contents What Are the Unified Command Plan UCP and Combatant Commands COCOMs 1 Introduction 1 Unified Command Plan UCP 1 Combatant Command COCOM 2 Functional Combatant Commands 2 Geographic Combatant Commands 2 Origins of the UCP 3 Outline Command Plan 1946—The First UCP 3 National Security Act of 1947 P L 80-253 4 DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 P L 85-599 4 Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 P L 99-433 4 What Laws Govern the UCP 5 UCP Update Cycle 5 Other Agency Involvement 6 Congressional Involvement 7 The Current UCP 7 Change One to the 2011 UCP 8 Origins of the COCOMs 8 What Laws Govern COCOMs 9 General Discussion of Provisions 9 Command Authority 10 COCOM Commander’s Responsibilities 10 COCOM Funding 11 COCOM Budgetary Provisions 11 Functional and Geographic Combatant Commands 12 Basic Organizational Principles 12 Interagency Representation in COCOMs 13 Functional Combatant Commands 13 U S Special Operations Command USSOCOM 13 Mission 13 History 14 Subcomponents 15 U S Army Special Operations Command USASOC 15 Naval Special Warfare Command NSWC 15 Air Force Special Operations Command AFSOC 15 Marine Special Operations Command MARSOC 15 Joint Special Operations Command JSOC 15 Other Components 16 Joint Special Operations University JSOU 16 Special Operations Command–Joint Capabilities SOC-JC 16 Ongoing Operations 16 Selected Current Issues 16 SOF Support to Combatant Commanders 16 Efforts to Address “Fraying” of the Forces 17 Congressional Research Service The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Continued Efforts to Expand USSOCOM Authorities and Control of Deployed SOF 17 U S Strategic Command USSTRATCOM 18 Mission 18 History 18 Subcomponents 19 Service Subcomponents 19 Functional Components 19 Ongoing Operations 20 Selected Current Issues 21 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment 21 Possible Shortfalls in Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISR Analysts 21 USCYBERCOM Workforce 21 U S Transportation Command USTRANSCOM 22 Mission 22 History 22 Subcomponents 23 Surface Deployment and Distribution Command SDDC 23 Military Sealift Command MSC 23 Air Mobility Command AMC 24 Ongoing Operations 24 Selected Current Issues 24 Ground Supply to Afghanistan 24 Guam and Building Toward USTRANSCOM’s Future 25 Geographic Combatant Commands 25 U S Africa Command USAFRICOM 25 Mission 25 A Different Kind of Combatant Command 25 History 26 Subcomponents 27 U S Army Africa USARAF 27 U S Naval Forces Africa NAVAF 27 U S Air Forces Africa AFAFRICA 27 U S Marine Corps Forces Africa MARFORAF 27 Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa CJTF-HOA 28 Special Operations Command-Africa SOCAFRICA 28 Ongoing Operations 28 U S Deployment to Central Africa 28 Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara OEF-TS 29 Exercises 29 Selected Current Issues 29 Regional Threats 29 Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISR Challenges 29 Additional Forces Allocated to USAFRICOM 29 U S Central Command USCENTCOM 30 Mission 30 History 30 Subcomponents 31 U S Army Central ARCENT 31 Congressional Research Service The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands U S Naval Forces Central Command NAVCENT 32 U S Air Forces Central AFCENT 32 U S Marine Corps Forces Central Command MARCENT 32 Special Operations Command Central SOCCENT 32 Ongoing Operations 32 Selected Current Issues 33 Middle East Unrest 33 Iranian Interference 33 U S European Command USEUCOM 33 Mission 33 USEUCOM Commander and NATO 34 History 34 Subcomponents 35 U S Army Europe USAEUR 35 U S Naval Forces Europe NAVEUR 36 U S Air Forces in Europe USAFE 36 U S Marine Corps Forces Europe MARFOREUR 36 Special Operations Command Europe SOCEUR 36 Ongoing Operations 36 Support to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force ISAF in Afghanistan 36 Multi-National Joint and Interagency Exercises 36 Exercises in the Baltics Balkans and Caucasus 37 Selected Current Issues 37 Afghanistan 37 The Balkans 37 Missile Defense 37 U S Northern Command USNORTHCOM 38 Mission 38 North American Aerospace Defense Command NORAD 38 Missile Defense 38 Unique Civil Support Mission 38 History 39 Subcomponents 40 Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region JFHQ-NCR 40 Joint Task Force Alaska JTF-AK 40 Joint Task Force Civil Support JTF-CS 40 Joint Task Force North JTF North 40 Army North ARNORTH 41 Air Force North AFNORTH 41 U S Fleet Forces Command USFF 41 Ongoing Operations 41 Selected Current Issues 42 Countering Transnational Criminal Organizations 42 The Arctic 42 U S Pacific Command USPACOM 42 Mission 42 History 43 Subcomponents 44 U S Army Pacific USARPAC 44 Congressional Research Service The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands U S Forces Korea USFK 44 U S Eighth Army 44 U S Pacific Fleet PACFLT 44 U S Pacific Air Force PACAF 44 U S Marine Forces Pacific MARFORPAC 44 Special Operations Command Pacific SOCPAC 45 Other Major USPACOM Organizations 45 Joint Intelligence Operations Center JIOC 45 Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies APCSS 45 Joint POW MIA Accounting Command JPAC 45 Joint Interagency Task Force West JIATF-West 45 Ongoing Operations 45 Selected Current Issues 46 Regional Challenges 46 U S Strategic Shift to the Pacific 46 Report to Congress on Resources Needed for U S Strategic Shift to the Pacific 47 U S Southern Command USSOUTHCOM 48 Mission 48 History 48 Subcomponents 49 U S Army South ARSOUTH 49 U S Naval Forces Southern Command U S Fourth Fleet COMUSNAVSO COMFOURTHFLT 49 Air Forces Southern Twelfth Air Force AFSOUTH 50 U S Marine Forces South USMARFORSOUTH 50 Special Operations Command South USSOCSOUTH 50 USSOUTHCOM Task Forces and Direct Reporting Units 50 Joint Task Force Bravo JTF-Bravo 50 Joint Task Force Guantanamo JTF–Guantanamo 50 Joint Interagency Task Force South JIATF South 50 Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies CHDS 50 Ongoing Operations 51 Exercises and Military-to-Military Activities 51 Task Force-Oriented Activities 51 Selected Current Issues 51 Counter-Trafficking 51 Natural Disasters Poverty and Violence 51 Extra-Regional Actors 52 Potential Issues for Congress 52 What Are the Implications of the Asia-Pacific Strategic Shift for the UCP and COCOMs 52 Is Greater Interagency Involvement in the UCP Process Needed 53 Has U S Foreign Policy Become “Too Militarized” as a Result of the Geographic COCOMs 54 Are There Other Regions or Functions That Merit a Separate COCOM 55 Is There an Alternative to COCOMs 57 Replacing Subcomponent Commands with Joint Task Forces JTFs 57 Replacing COCOMs with a Joint Interagency Organization 57 Congressional Research Service The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Figures Figure 1 Combatant Command Chain of Command 10 Tables Table 1 FY2011–FY2013 Operations Management O M Budget 11 Appendixes Appendix 2011 UCP COCOM Areas of Responsibility 59 Contacts Author Information 59 Congressional Research Service The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands What Are the Unified Command Plan UCP and Combatant Commands COCOMs Introduction The Unified Command Plan UCP and associated Combatant Commands COCOMs provide operational instructions and command and control to the Armed Forces and have a significant impact on how they are organized trained and resourced—areas over which Congress has constitutional authority In a grand strategic sense the UCP and the COCOMs are the embodiment of U S military policy both at home and abroad The COCOMs not only execute military policy but also play an important role in foreign policy and Congress in both oversight and budgetary roles has shown great concern in this regard All Combatant Commanders testify to the Armed Services Committees on an annual basis about their posture and budgetary requirements and frequently host Members and staff during a variety of congressional delegation visits Unified Command Plan UCP The Department of Defense DOD defines the Unified Command Plan UCP as The document approved by the President that sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders establishes their missions responsibilities and force structure delineates the general geographical area of responsibility AOR for geographic combatant commanders and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders 1 The UCP is a classified executive branch document prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CJCS and reviewed and updated at a minimum every two years While the UCP is normally on a two-year cycle it can be updated anytime based on changing strategic political and budgetary requirements As noted the UCP assigns missions planning training and operational responsibilities and geographic areas of responsibilities to COCOMs The UCP is assessed and modified taking into consideration the following strategic documents 2     The National Security Strategy of the United States of America The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America The National Military Strategy of the United States of America and The current UCP The UCP process also takes into consideration the strategic context such as the war in Afghanistan the global economic situation relationships with allies etc and command guidance from the President and senior DOD civilian and military leadership As part of the final review process before the UCP is submitted to the President the proposed UCP is reviewed by senior service leaders the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council NSC Congress is not included in this review process but does have visibility into issues affecting UCP development 1 Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms November 8 2010 as amended through May 15 2011 p 385 2 Information in this section is from a briefing provided to CRS by the Joint Staff Plans Division on October 7 2010 Congressional Research Service 1 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Combatant Command COCOM DOD defines Combatant Command COCOM as A unified3 or specified4 command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities 5 Dr Cynthia Watson a professor at the National War College and author of “Combatant Commands Origins Structure and Engagements” describes combatant commands as being Commands in charge of utilizing and integrating air land sea and amphibious forces under their commands to achieve U S national security objectives while protecting national interests Four now three of the unified commands handle functional concerns while there are six with geographic mandates The specific configurations have shifted over the decades but the idea that geography provides an organizing principle remains the same allowing each combatant command to have its specific threats and opportunities The combatant commanders work with the military forces in their theaters and report to the commander in chief and secretary of defense The combatant commanders do not serve on the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor are they the senior U S representatives in the theater 6 The number of combatant commands is not regulated by law or policy and their numbers and responsibilities have varied over the years Today there are nine active COCOMs and one COCOM–U S Joint Forces Command JFCOM was disestablished in 2010 and all of its remaining functions were transferred to other COCOMs or organizations Functional Combatant Commands Functional combatant commands operate worldwide across geographic boundaries and provide unique capabilities to geographic combatant commands and the services    USSOCOM U S Special Operations Command MacDill Air Force Base FL USSTRATCOM U S Strategic Command Offutt Air Force Base NE and USTRANSCOM U S Transportation Command Scott Air Force Base IL Geographic Combatant Commands Geographic combatant commands operate in clearly delineated areas of operation and have a distinctive regional military focus  USAFRICOM U S Africa Command Kelley Barracks Stuttgart Germany Joint Publication 1-02 defines a unified command as a “command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ” 4 Joint Publication 1-02 defines a specified command as “a command that has a broad continuing mission normally functional and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department ” 5 Ibid p 60 6 Cynthia A Watson “Combatant Commands Origins Structure and Engagement ” Praeger Security International 2011 p 15 hereinafter Cynthia A Watson 3 Congressional Research Service 2 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands      USCENTCOM U S Central Command MacDill Air Force Base FL USEUCOM U S European Command Patch Barracks Stuttgart Germany USNORTHCOM U S Northern Command Peterson Air Force Base CO USPACOM U S Pacific Command Camp H M Smith HI and USSOUTHCOM U S Southern Command Miami FL Origins of the UCP The United States’ experience with global warfare in World War II provided countless lessons attesting to the importance of unity of military effort achieved through the unified command of U S forces 7 While the United States was able to achieve a degree of unified command in the European theater under General Dwight Eisenhower—Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force—attempts to establish unified command in the Pacific “proved impossible ”8 Differences between the Army and Navy precluded any sort of unified command arrangement and General Douglas MacArthur commanded U S Army Forces Pacific while Admiral Chester Nimitz commanded the U S Pacific Fleet Although both commanders were able to work together to defeat Japan there was a considerable amount of friction between these two powerful independent commands After the war President Truman noted We must never fight another war the way that we fought the last two I have the feeling that if the Army and Navy had fought our enemies as hard as they fought each other the war would have ended much earlier 9 Outline Command Plan 1946—The First UCP10 In 1946 the Chief of Naval Operations characterized the Pacific command arrangement as “ambiguous and unsatisfactory” and proposed a single command over the Pacific not including Japan Korea and China to provide unity of command over all U S forces in the region The Army and the Army Air Forces rejected this proposal favoring instead unified command based on assignment of mission and forces as opposed to geographic areas After a great deal of discussion and compromise a worldwide system of unified command was established President Truman approved the “Outline Command Plan” in December 1946 establishing seven commands as an “interim measure for the immediate post war period ” The seven commands were        Far East Command Pacific Command Alaskan Command Northeast Command Atlantic Fleet Caribbean Command and European Command 7 Unless otherwise noted information in this section is taken from the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint History Office “The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1999 ” Washington DC 2003 8 Ibid p 11 9 Charles A Stevenson “Underlying Assumptions of the National Security Act of 1947 ” Joint Forces Quarterly 1st Quarter 2008 10 Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint History Office “The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1999 ” Washington DC 2003 p 11 Congressional Research Service 3 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Some of these seven commands contained more than one service and were in a sense unified while others such as the Atlantic Fleet were service-specific Even though these commands were established to achieve a degree of unity the services continued in many instances to plan and act independently Since 1946 the UCP has continued to evolve—sometimes in a dramatic manner— to reflect ever changing strategic organizational and political requirements While Congress has influenced the UCP over the years three major legislative initiatives have had a lasting impact on the UCP National Security Act of 1947 P L 80-253 While the National Security Act of 1947 is best known for the creation of the U S Air Force the Central Intelligence Agency CIA and establishing the office of the Secretary of Defense it also created the Unified Combatant Command UCC system 11 The UCC system signified the recognition by the United States that it would continue to have a worldwide continuous global military presence The National Security Act of 1947 also gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS the responsibility to establish unified commands in “strategic areas” subject to the approval of the President and Secretary of Defense 12 DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 P L 85-599 13 In 1958 President Eisenhower—the former Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force— decided a more unified and streamlined chain of command to employ combat forces was needed essentially putting an end to separate land sea and air combat President Eisenhower sought “a complete unification of all military planning and combat forces and commands” and proposed the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 to Congress to amend the National Security Act of 1947 The DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 authorized the President acting through the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the JCS to establish unified or specified commands assign missions and determine their force structure This act did not alter any of the authorities established by the National Security Act of 1947 but instead established a clear line of command from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders Combatant commanders were delegated full operational control over forces assigned to them but once these forces were assigned they could only be transferred with presidential approval Responsibility for the administration of these assigned forces was to remain with their respective services Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 P L 99-433 14 In the aftermath of the failed 1980 multi-service mission to rescue U S hostages in Iran and the 1983 invasion of Grenada which featured numerous instances of poor inter-service planning and cooperation there was renewed emphasis on “jointness” both in Congress and at the Pentagon Goldwater-Nichols sought to “rebalance the relative power of the geographic commands versus the services ”15 Goldwater-Nichols called for the Chairman of the JCS CJCS to review the missions responsibilities and force structure and geographic boundaries for each COCOM not less than every two years and recommend changes to the Secretary of Defense and the President In addition the act expanded the CJCS’s and combatant commander’s powers and gave 11 Cynthia A Watson p 13 “The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1999 ” p 15 13 Ibid p 26 14 Cynthia A Watson pp 14-15 15 Ibid 12 Congressional Research Service 4 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands combatant commanders greater interaction with Congress and greater participation in the DOD budget process What Laws Govern the UCP The UCP and COCOMs are covered under Title 10 - Armed Forces Subtitle A - General Military Law Part I–Organization and General Military Powers Chapter 6–Combatant Commands As it relates to the UCP Section 161 inter alia stipulates     Unified COCOMs are established by the President through the Secretary of Defense SECDEF with the advice and assistance of the CJCS The CJCS shall periodically review at least every two years missions responsibilities including geographic boundaries and force structure of each combatant command Based on this review the CJCS will recommend to the President through the SECDEF changes to missions responsibilities and force structure deemed necessary The President except in times of hostilities or imminent danger will notify Congress not less than 60 days after establishing a new combatant command or significantly revising the missions responsibilities or force structure of an existing combatant command Also under Section 161 the CJCS is required to consider during each periodic UCP review       Whether there was an adequate distribution of responsibilities among the regional unified combatant commands Whether fewer or differently configured commands would permit the United States to better execute war fighting plans Whether any assets or activities were redundant Whether war fighting requirements were adequate to justify current commands Whether exclusion of certain nations from the Areas of Responsibility presented difficulties with respect to national security objectives in those areas and Whether the boundary between the U S Central and European Commands could create command conflicts in the context of a major regional conflict in the Middle East UCP Update Cycle16 Generally the UCP update cycle runs from 12 to 18 months The current UCP process consists of five iterative phases described below 1 Guidance DOD UCP planners review four central documents The National Security Strategy of the United States of America The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America The National Military Strategy of the United States of America and the current UCP UCP participants also receive command guidance in various forms and in varying degrees and are apprised of the strategic context under which the UCP will be evaluated During the final part of 16 Information in this section is from a briefing provided to CRS by the Joint Staff Plans Division on October 7 2010 Congressional Research Service 5 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands 2 3 4 5 this phase stakeholders Combatant Commanders Service Chiefs and the Joint Staff identify issues they believe need to be addressed during the UCP update cycle Slate During this phase issues are slated for discussion At the beginning of the phase an action officer planning conference is held to discuss UCP issues After the conference stakeholders submit Issue Development Papers IDPs to the Joint Staff where they are posted online on a secure operating system SIPRNET 17 where stakeholders can view and comment on them After a period of time these IDPs and associated comments are sent to the Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy and the Director J-5 for validation Those IDPs that make it through the validation process are then “slated” and placed online so stakeholders can develop positions for the next phase of the UCP process Assessment This phase begins with a Planner’s Assessment Conference where courses of action COA are developed for each validated IDP These COA provide decision makers with a range of choices to address the IDPs Once the COA are agreed at the conference they are again posted online for review and comment After a period of time the COA are finalized and “closed out ” Adjudication The adjudication phase is a four part process whereby the issues and COA are sent to various levels of the Joint Staff for approval The first level is the Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy and after review and approval a draft UCP is published Next comes the Director J-5 and another revised draft UCP is published This draft UCP is then taken to a Service Chiefs’ “Tank”18 meeting and after that meeting another UCP draft is prepared Finally a Joint Chiefs of Staff Tank meeting is held and a final draft UCP is prepared posted on the SIPRNET and is then ready for final review Review During this phase the UCP is reviewed and revised for the final time The first review is held at the “four-star level” including Service Chiefs Combatant Commanders and other 4-star level general officers and DOD civilians Next the SECDEF reviews the draft UCP and suggests changes The next step is the National Security Council NSC review where the UCP is commented on by other U S government agencies Finally after incorporating the views of the NSC principals the UCP is taken to the President for approval and final publication Other Agency Involvement19 There are other executive branch agencies State Department Department of Justice Department of Homeland Security and the Central Intelligence Agency to name a few that are collectively referred to as the Interagency and have a vested interest in the UCP because some of its associated military tasks intersect with the responsibilities of these agencies While none of these agencies are formally part of the UCP development process they do have access to it by means of agency liaison officers stationed at the COCOMs and on the Joint Staff These liaison officers have visibility of the IDP and COA process as well as access to draft UCPs and are able to report their observations and concerns to their principals i e Secretary of State Attorney General etc SIPRNET stands for Secret Internet Protocol Router Network DOD’s classified computer network Tank is the euphemism for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Conference Room in the Pentagon where sensitive important senior-level meetings are held 19 Information in this section is from a briefing provided to CRS by the Joint Staff Plans Division on October 7 2010 17 18 Congressional Research Service 6 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands The NSC also receives periodic updates on UCP development or revisions during the UCP cycle The principals may then choose to address their UCP concerns with senior DOD leadership During the NSC UCP Review other agencies can publicly voice concerns with the UCP but unless an agency has not been actively following the UCP development there should be no “surprises” when the UCP is reviewed by the NSC Congressional Involvement20 Congress currently has no statutory role in the UCP development revision or review process other than those stipulated in Title 10 Chapter 6 Sections 161 and 166 Congress does however make its concerns known during hearings private conversations between Members and staff and DOD leadership and through lending support to UCP-related issues through legislation or by resolution For example prior to the 2007 decision to stand up AFRICOM a number of Members called for the creation of a separate geographic combatant command for Africa Congress also periodically includes provisions in annual National Defense Authorization Acts calling for DOD studies and reports on certain aspects of COCOM structure and operations These requirements in addition to providing information to Congress also serve the purpose of identifying areas of congressional concern which can influence DOD COCOM-related resourcing and policy decisions The Current UCP The 2011 UCP is a classified document On April 8 2011 DOD released the 2011 UCP and the unclassified highlights were included in the following news release DOD Releases Unified Command Plan 201121 The Department of Defense released today the updated Unified Command Plan UCP a key strategic document that establishes the missions responsibilities and geographic areas of responsibility for commanders of combatant commands Unified Command Plan 2011 signed by the President on April 6 assigns several new missions to the combatant commanders Every two years the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to review the missions responsibilities and geographical boundaries of each combatant command and recommend to the President through the Secretary of Defense any changes that may be necessary As in past years the 2011 review process included the combatant commanders service chiefs and DOD leadership Significant changes made by UCP 2011 include - Shifting areas of responsibilities boundaries in the Arctic region to leverage longstanding relationships and improve unity of effort As a result of this realignment responsibility for the Arctic region is now shared between USEUCOM and USNORTHCOM rather than USEUCOM USNORTHCOM and USPACOM as directed in previous UCPs - Giving USNORTHCOM responsibility to advocate for Arctic capabilities - Codifying the President’s approval to disestablish U S Joint Forces Command - Expanding U S Strategic Command’s responsibility for combating weapons of mass destruction and developing Global Missile Defense Concept of Operations 20 21 Ibid U S Department of Defense News Release DOD Releases Unified Command Plan 2011 N 288-11 April 8 2011 Congressional Research Service 7 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands - Giving U S Transportation Command responsibility for synchronizing planning of global distribution operations UCP 2011 continues to support U S defense security commitments around the world while improving military responsiveness to emerging crises A map with the UCP COCOM Areas of Responsibility is included in the Appendix Change One to the 2011 UCP22 On September 12 2011 President Obama signed Change One to the 2011 UCP which primarily captured the administrative changes reflecting the disestablishment of USJFCOM and a number of SECDEF-directed Efficiency Initiatives These changes include  Removing any language referring to USJFCOM which was disestablished on August 31 2011  Removing language for geographic combatant command standing joint force headquarters 23 which are approved for disestablishment by the end of FY2012 Adding the responsibility of global standing joint headquarters to USTRANSCOM Transferring the Joint Warfare Analysis Center missions from USJFCOM to USSTRATCOM and Removing language and responsibilities for Information Operations Military Deception and Operations Security from USSTRATCOM as these mission areas are to be transferred to the Joint Staff    Origins of the COCOMs The non-statutory origins of COCOMs are rooted in the U S experience in World War II Prior to World War II the services operated independently and despite lessons learned from World War I suggesting the Army and Navy needed to better communicate and plan no real concerted effort was made to coordinate the Armed Forces largely attributed to “bureaucratic distrust and service rivalry ”24 During this period Marine Corps fears the Army would lobby to eliminate the Marines on the grounds they were a “redundant service” as well as Army efforts to maintain control over the country’s air arm typified the climate among the services that made any meaningful reform virtually impossible 25 World War II presented unique challenges not faced during the 18-month U S involvement in the First World War While World War I was fought in a variety of theaters such as Europe Africa the Mediterranean and the Middle East U S involvement was primarily limited to Europe and was predominately land-centric In terms of strategic planning and command relationships the United States played a supporting role 22 Taken from information provided to CRS by the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 13 2011 From Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms as amended through September 15 2011 a Standing Joint Force Headquarters or SJFHQ is a staff organization operating under a flag or general officer providing a combatant commander with a full-time trained joint command and control element integrated into the combatant commander’s staff whose focus is on contingency and crisis action planning 24 Cynthia A Watson p 11 25 Ibid 23 Congressional Research Service 8 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands The United States’ experience in World War II bore little resemblance to that of the Great War The European and Pacific theaters of the Second World War varied significantly with the European Theater being a land-centric conflict supported by naval operations whereas the Pacific Theater was naval-centric and supported by Marine and Army ground forces Both theaters also featured extensive supporting air force operations including long-range strategic bombing campaigns unprecedented in both size and scope In terms of relationships with allies the United States assumed the leadership role in both the Pacific and European theaters—largely due to its unmatched military and industrial resources—despite insistence that the U S was “co-equal partners” with Great Britain France and Russia Unlike 1918 after the Japanese surrender in 1945 U S political and military leaders did not advocate a post war policy of isolationism because of fears of a communist Russia and to a lesser extent China U S global military presence was viewed as a guarantee against unfettered communist expansion and this presence necessitated an effective geographically focused long-term joint command arrangement What Laws Govern COCOMs As previously noted COCOMs are governed by the provisions contained in Sections 161 through 168 of Title X Armed Forces U S Code 26 These sections address the following provisions            Section 161 The establishment of COCOMs Section 162 Chain of command and assignment of forces for COCOMs Section 163 Role of the CJCS Section 164 Assignment and powers and duties of commanders of COCOMs Section 165 Administration and support of COCOMs Section 166 COCOM budget proposals Section 166a Funding COCOMs through the CJCS Section 166b Funding for combating terrorism readiness initiatives Section 167 Unified COCOMs for special operations forces Section 167a Unified COCOMs for joint warfighting experimentation acquisition authority and Section 168 Military-to-military and comparable activities General Discussion of Provisions27 These provisions assign a number of responsibilities to the CJCS including a regular at least every two years review of the missions responsibilities areas of operation and force structure of each combatant command Upon completion of this review the Chairman provides suggestions to the President—through the SECDEF—for changes in missions force structure and responsibilities for the COCOMs These provisions also tie the services to the COCOMs as the Secretaries of the military departments are directed to assign their forces unless assigned elsewhere such as a multi-national peacekeeping operation to COCOMs These forces can only be transferred from the commands by the SECDEF 26 Unless otherwise noted information in this section is taken from Sections 161-168 Title 10–Armed Forces pp 144154 and Cynthia A Watson pp 2-6 27 Information in this section is taken from Cynthia A Watson pp 2-6 Congressional Research Service 9 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Command Authority Forces assigned to COCOMs are under the command of that COCOM commander with the chain of command starting with the President and running through the SECDEF as indicated in Figure 1 The CJCS serves as a link between the President and the SECDEF and the COCOM commanders The President can send guidance to COCOM commanders through the CJCS and the chairman can relay combatant commander’s needs and concerns to the SECDEF and the President The CJCS may exercise oversight of the COCOMs if desired by the SECDEF but has no command authority over the COCOMs In this regard the CJCS is described as taking part in national security discussions but not in the formal decision-making process as it relates to COCOMs Figure 1 Combatant Command Chain of Command Source This figure is taken from the author’s National Defense University academic notes 2010 Note USJFCOM was disestablished in August 2011 and no longer functions as a COCOM COCOM Commander’s Responsibilities COCOM commanders are responsible for the accomplishment of missions assigned to them as well as all aspects of joint training logistics and military operations COCOM commanders are also responsible for establishing command relationships with subordinate commands as well as organizing subordinate units as deemed necessary While Combatant Commanders exercise control over subordinate units from different services the services retain administrative control of their personnel to include assignment promotion schooling and retirement To facilitate administrative control geographic combatant commands have service subcomponents for each service Congressional Research Service 10 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands COCOM Funding On an annual basis COCOMs request Operations and Maintenance O M funding Funding for forces assigned to COCOMs are funded by the respective services and funding for operations are funded separately such as operations in Afghanistan and counterterror operations that have primarily been funded through the Overseas Contingency Operations OCO account Table 1 provides O M funding figures for the COCOMs from FY2011 to FY2013 It should be noted that some amounts include operational and OCO costs see corresponding notes Table 1 FY2011–FY2013 Operations Management O M Budget $ in thousands COCOM FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 USAFRICOM 259 368 282 152 285 022 USEUCOM 134 377 120 278 119 267 USSOUTHCOM 198 930 193 257 206 342 USPACOM 301 919 268 014 300 097 USNORTHCOM 274 572 203 803 200 114 USSTRATCOM 648 459 507 382 689 821 USCENTCOMa 106 631 137 167 179 266 7 269 710 3 890 115 5 096 226 13 588 13 368 13 003 USSOCOMb USTRANSCOMc Source Information in this table was provided to CRS by the Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD Comptrollers Office Note COCOM amounts unless noted reflect headquarters and mission support O M funding a Does not include figures for operations in Afghanistan b USSOCOM figures include both headquarters and operational funds c USTRANSCOM is funded predominately with customer orders COCOM Budgetary Provisions The SECDEF is required to submit an annual budget proposal for the COCOMs and funding may be requested for joint exercises force training contingencies and selected operations Proposed funding for special operations forces SOF training with foreign forces may also be requested COCOMs can also receive funds through the CJCS as part of the “Combatant Commander Initiative Fund ” Although not a COCOM the U S element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command NORAD is also eligible for this fund Authorized activities include       Force training Contingencies Selected operations Command and control Joint exercises to include activities of participating foreign nations Humanitarian and civic assistance Congressional Research Service 11 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands     Military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries Personnel expenses of defense personnel for bilateral or regional cooperation programs Force protection and Joint warfighting capabilities COCOMs also have access to a DOD budget account known as the “Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund ” Authorized activities under this fund include    Procurement and maintenance of physical security equipment Improvement of physical security sites Under extraordinary circumstances  Physical security management planning  Procurement and support of security forces and security technicians  Security reviews investigations and vulnerability assessments and  Any other activity relating to physical security Functional and Geographic Combatant Commands Basic Organizational Principles28 COCOM commanders hold four-star flag rank and have risen through the ranks of their respective services commanding at the highest levels COCOM commanders have also met Joint Military Education Requirements as set forth in the Goldwater-Nichols Act The President nominates combatant commanders based on the recommendations of the SECDEF The Senate Armed Services Committee holds confirmation hearings for the nominees and the Senate then votes to confirm the candidates While four-star officers from any service may serve as combatant commander for any given COCOM some appointments e g U S Pacific Command being commanded by a Navy admiral traditionally have gone to specific services The basic configurations of COCOM staffs are generally the same and mirrors the Joint Staff at the Pentagon COCOM staffs are organized as follows although there are variations based on unique COCOM mission areas          28 J-1 Directorate of Manpower and Personnel J-2 Directorate of Intelligence J-3 Directorate of Operations J-4 Directorate of Logistics J-5 Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy J-6 Directorate of Command Control Communication and Computer J-7 Directorate of Operational Planning and Joint Force Development J-8 Directorate of Force Structure Resources and Assessment and J-9 Directorate of Interagency Partnering Ibid pp 19-21 Congressional Research Service 12 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Within the COCOM command and staff construct Joint Task Forces JTFs are often created to address a single policy concern and allocate resources such as anti-drug efforts or humanitarian assistance on a short- to mid-term basis JTFs can also be established in response to a crisis or for a long-term commitment Some COCOMs also have a political advisor POLAD assigned to the commander to serve as an interface with the civilian portion of the national security establishment as well as the ambassadors and embassy staffs of countries that fall under the COCOM commander’s UCP mandate Interagency Representation in COCOMs29 Both Functional and Geographic COCOMs have integrated assets and representatives of other agencies and departments of the U S government into the COCOM’s structure to enhance operations Examples of this representation include     USAFRICOM A State Department Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Activities a senior U S Agency for International Development USAID advisor and two other senior U S diplomats who serve as a Foreign Policy Advisor and as the J-9 Director of Outreach USCENTCOM An Interagency Action Group IAG established in the J-3 Directorate of Operations to integrate USCENTCOM and Interagency activities USEUCOM Established a J-9 Directorate for Interagency Partnering and USNORTHCOM A Joint Interagency Coordinating Group JIACG that integrates and synchronizes the activities of numerous civilian State Federal and private sector organizations Functional Combatant Commands U S Special Operations Command USSOCOM 30 Website http www socom mil Mission31 USSOCOM’s primary mission is to organize train and equip special operations forces SOF and provides those forces to the Geographic Combatant Commanders under whose operational control they serve USSOCOM also develops special operations strategy doctrine and procedures for the use of SOF and also develops and procures specialized SOF-unique equipment for its assigned forces USSOCOM is also the lead COCOM for synchronizing DOD planning against terrorists and their networks on a global basis USSOCOM also can execute 29 Information in this section is taken from Department of Defense Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 944 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 P L 111-383 Department of Defense Report on Organizational Structures of the Headquarters of the Geographic Combatant Commands June 2011 p 3 30 For detailed information on USSOCOM subcomponents and assigned forces see CRS Report RS21048 U S Special Operations Forces SOF Background and Issues for Congress by Andrew Feickert 31 Posture Statement of Admiral William H McRaven USN Commander United States Special Operations Command before the 112th Congress House Armed Services Committee March 7 2012 Congressional Research Service 13 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands global operations against terrorist networks when directed to do so by the President or Secretary of Defense The diverse nature of USSOCOM’s counterterror mission requires working extensively with other non-DOD U S Government Agencies sometimes referred to as the Interagency History32 The 1980 Desert One tragedy and the 1983 loss of 237 Marines in Beirut combined with the command and control problems experienced during Grenada in 1983 heightened apprehensions about DOD’s ability to manage the services including special operations forces who were “owned” by their respective service By 1983 there was a small but growing sense in Congress of the need for military reforms In June the Senate Armed Services Committee SASC under the chairmanship of Senator Barry Goldwater R-AZ began a two-year-long study of DOD which included an examination of SOF With concern mounting on Capitol Hill DOD created the Joint Special Operations Agency on January 1 1984 This agency had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF units and did little to address SOF issues Within Congress there was a growing sense that a radical restructuring of SOF was needed Proponents included Senators Sam Nunn D-GA and William Cohen R-ME both members of the SASC and Representative Dan Daniel D-VA the chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee HASC Congressman Daniel believed the U S military establishment had little interest in special operations and that U S SOF was second-rate when compared to countries such as Great Britain and Israel Senators Nunn and Cohen also believed that DOD was not preparing adequately for future threats Senator Nunn expressed a growing frustration with the Service’s practice of reallocating monies appropriated for SOF modernization to non-SOF programs and suggested the U S needed a more efficient organization and a more direct chain of command for special operations In early 1986 SOF advocates introduced reform bills in the House and Senate The Senate bill co-sponsored by Senator Nunn and others called for a joint military organization for SOF and the establishment of an office in DOD to ensure adequate funding and policy emphasis for lowintensity conflict and special operations Representative Daniel’s proposal went even further—he wanted a national special operations agency headed by a civilian who would bypass the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the SECDEF thereby keeping Joint Chiefs and services out of the SOF budget process Congress held hearings on the two bills in the summer of 1986 CJCS Admiral William J Crowe led the Pentagon’s opposition to the bills and proposed instead a new special operations forces command led by a three-star general This proposal was not well received by Congress who wanted a four-star officer in charge so that he could deal on an equal footing with the four-star Service Chiefs President Reagan approved the establishment of USSOCOM on April 13 1987 DOD activated USSOCOM on April 16 1987 and nominated Army General Lindsay to be USSOCOM’s first commander Information in this section is taken from author’s National War College course materials USSOCOM History Book “Founding and Evolution of USSOCOM ” pp 5-11 32 Congressional Research Service 14 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Subcomponents33 U S Army Special Operations Command USASOC USASOC includes Army Special Forces also known as Green Berets Rangers Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Operations MISO —formerly known as psychological operations PSYOPS —units In addition the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment SOAR provides rotary wing support to all SOF units Naval Special Warfare Command NSWC NSWC consists of Sea Air and Land SEAL teams that conduct operations in both maritime and ground environments NSWC also has SEAL Delivery Vehicle SDV teams—specialized SEALs that pilot small submersible vehicles that can deliver SEALs to their area of operations NSWC includes Special Boat Teams that can deliver SEALs from ship to shore as well as operate in the littorals and rivers Air Force Special Operations Command AFSOC AFSOC provides specialized fixed and rotary wing support to USSOCOM units In addition to aircraft support AFSOC also provides Combat Controllers Pararescue Jumpers Special Operations Weather Teams and Tactical Air Control Parties TACPs to support special operations AFSOC is currently establishing a capacity to train and advise partner nation aviation units as part of foreign internal defense initiatives Marine Special Operations Command MARSOC Established in 2005 MARSOC is the newest USSOCOM subcomponent It consists of three Marine Special Operations Battalions a Marine Special Operations Support Group a Marine Special Operations Intelligence Battalion and the Marine Special Operations School Joint Special Operations Command JSOC 34 According to USSOCOM JSOC is a sub unified command charged with studying special operations requirements and techniques to ensure interoperability and equipment standardization JSOC also plans and conducts special operations exercises and training and develops joint special operations tactics USOCOM also notes JSOC “is comprised of an impressive amalgamation of rigorously screened and accessed Soldiers Sailors Airmen Marines and Civilians ” and “past and present members of JSOC have participated in all of our Nation’s wars and contingency operations since it was activated in 1980 ” Press reports suggest JSOC is home to USSOCOM’s national mission forces which reportedly conduct highly sensitive combat and supporting operations against terrorists on a worldwide basis 35 33 Information from this section is taken from CRS Report RS21048 U S Special Operations Forces SOF Background and Issues for Congress by Andrew Feickert and USSOCOM website http www socom mil 34 Information in this section is taken from the JSOC web page http www socom mil Pages JointSpecialOperationsCommand aspx 35 Jennifer D Kibbe “The Rise of the Shadow Warriors ” Foreign Affairs Volume 83 Number 2 March April 2004 and Sean D Naylor “JSOC to Become Three-Star Command ” Army Times February 13 2006 and U S Army Congressional Research Service 15 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Other Components Joint Special Operations University JSOU 36 JSOU’s stated mission is to Educate Special Operations Forces executive senior and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international security decision-makers both military and civilian through teaching research and outreach in the science and art of Joint Special Operations Special Operations Command–Joint Capabilities SOC-JC 37 With the August 2010 disestablishment of JFCOM SOCJFCOM was transferred to USSOCOM where it was renamed SOC-JC SOC-JC’s mission is to train conventional and special operations force commanders and their staffs in the employment of Special Operations Forces focusing on the full integration of SOF and the conventional forces in both planning and execution to enhance warfighting readiness Ongoing Operations USSOCOM operates on a global basis in both overt and classified modes Missions range from foreign internal defense to counterterrorism but the primary emphasis for U S SOF is attacking terrorists and terror cells worldwide While USSOCOM’s primary focus of these activities is the USCENTCOM region USSOCOM Commander Admiral William McRaven stated “U S special operations forces are in 78 countries around the world supporting U S policy objectives ”38 Selected Current Issues39 SOF Support to Combatant Commanders In testimony Admiral McRaven noted that even when operations conclude in Afghanistan historical data suggest that there will be a constant demand for a “steady state” SOF-deployed force of almost 12 000 SOF troops to support COCOM requirements As SOF forces continue their Quadrennial Defense Review QDR -mandated growth USSOCOM assesses they will have adequate capacity by FY2017 to meet the anticipated COCOM demand without placing undue risk to global counterterrorism CT operations This FY2017 target is predicated on USSOCOM’s self-imposed growth rate of 3% to 5% annually which is intended to maintain the overall quality of special operations forces Special Operations Command News Service “Gates Nominates McRaven Thurman for Senior Posts ” Release Number 110303-02 March 3 2011 http www soc mil UNS Releases 2011 March 110303-02 html 36 Information in this section is taken from the JSOU web page https jsou socom mil 37 Information in this section is taken from Special Operations Command–Joint Capabilities website http www sojc socom mil 38 Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on the Proposed Fiscal 2013 Defense Authorization as it Relates to the U S Central Command and U S Special Operations Command March 8 2012 p 10 39 Information in this section is taken from the Posture Statement of Admiral William H McRaven USN Commander United States Special Operations Command Before the 112th Congress House Armed Services Committee March 7 2012 Congressional Research Service 16 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Efforts to Address “Fraying” of the Forces In March 2011 then USSOCOM Commander Admiral Eric Olson testified that the decade-long wars had resulted in some “fraying around the edges” for U S SOF 40 This almost constant state of deployment had resulted in significant time away from families and limited time for needed professional training and education and created a great deal of pressure on SOF and their families As a result of a study initiated under Admiral Olson a lack of predictability resulting from a demanding operational tempo and increased difficulties for SOF troops reconnecting and reintegrating into family activities after returning from deployments were identified as two primary sources of ongoing stress 41 As a result Admiral McRaven has established a task force that has been tasked with building and implementing innovative solutions across USSOCOM to address these stressors Continued Efforts to Expand USSOCOM Authorities and Control of Deployed SOF Reports suggest USSOCOM will continue to push for more control over deployed special operations forces At present once U S SOF deploys into a region they are controlled by a geographic combatant commander and USSOCOM can no longer control where they go or what mission they perform According to USSOCOM officials “Admiral McRaven is looking for the freedom to move forces where he needs them and when he needs them ” This requirement seemingly suggests USSOCOM is currently allocating its SOF units to combatant commands with little to no mission guidance which in itself might be considered problematic Given USSOCOM’s counterterrorism mandate it would appear that USSOCOM could task these SOF units with missions at the national level which would be mutually supportive of the combatant commander’s regional missions for the SOF unit If USSOCOM gets expanded authorities it would exert enhanced control primarily through TSOCs which currently work exclusively for each combatant commander but USSOCOM contends that TSOCs operate “without any greater centrality to recognizing how the actions of one TSOC in his regional area of responsibility can do things that influence another region ” If USSOCOM gets the additional authorities it has requested it could give the USSOCOM Commander the ability to have a direct relationships with the TSOCs While these enhanced authorities might benefit USSOCOM they might also violate the principal of “unity of command” despite USSOCOM’s insistence that combatant commanders would have to approve any of USSOCOM’s moves of deployed SOF units One report suggests that “turning SOCOM into a global combatant command would create constant friction with regional commands” and that efforts to gain additional authorities were perceived by some as a “power grab ” The potential for a dual chain of command could result in unnecessary friction between USSOCOM and geographic combatant commands and host countries possibly having an unintended detrimental impact on the deployed SOF unit Because there appears to be a number of contentious issues regarding enhanced USSOCOM authorities Congress might choose to examine these issues in greater detail 40 41 Ibid p 5 Ibid pp 13-14 Congressional Research Service 17 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands U S Strategic Command USSTRATCOM Website http www stratcom mil Mission42 USSTRATCOM’s primary responsibility is the stewardship and employment of U S nuclear weapons and to detect deter and prevent attacks against the United States and our allies and to join with the other combatant commands to defend the nation should deterrence fail Specific responsibilities include planning synchronizing advocating and employing capabilities to meet the United States’ strategic deterrence space operations cyberspace operations global strike missile defense intelligence surveillance reconnaissance ISR and combating weapons of mass destruction WMD History43 USSTRATCOM was established October 1 2002 USSTRATCOM has provided intelligence planning and cyber support to coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq It monitors orbiting satellites and space debris allowing spacecraft to avoid collision USTRATCOM has also deployed systems to provide limited protection against ballistic missile attack The missions most directly associated with USSTRATCOM and its predecessors are deterrence and global strike These were the missions of Strategic Air Command SAC from 1946 to 1992 and of the first USSTRATCOM from 1992 to 2002 Though best known for its connection with the nuclear deterrent SAC conducted conventional bombing operations during the Korean War and Vietnam War and the first Persian Gulf War 1991 On June 1 1992 SAC was replaced by a new unified command USSTRATCOM The new command’s primary mission was to deter attack especially nuclear attack on the United States and its allies and if deterrence failed employ nuclear forces in response The U S military began operating in space in the late 1950s with many of the early systems developed to meet SAC’s needs for surveillance warning meteorology and communications By 1985 space activities had grown to such a scale that DOD created a new unified command USSPACECOM to manage military space operations Secretary Rumsfeld’s initiative to merge USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM led to the creation of the current USSTRATCOM in 2002 Two other areas took on increasing importance beginning around 2000 missile defense and cyberspace operations By September 2004 the United States had deployed a limited system that offered some protection to North America and had opened discussions about extending the system to cover allies The U S military’s reliance on computer networks grew exponentially in the 1980s and 1990s National leaders took steps to protect defense networks in 1998 creating a Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense and assigning it to USSPACECOM As computer attacks against DOD become more sophisticated and frequent there were calls to place greater emphasis and visibility on cyber operations Defense Secretary Robert Gates favored a new sub-unified Information in this section is taken from USSTRATCOM’s web page http www stratcom mil and Statement of General C Robert Kehler Commander United States Strategic Command before the Senate Committee on Armed Services March 29 2011 43 http www stratcom mil history 42 Congressional Research Service 18 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands command under USSTRATCOM that would recombine offensive and defensive computer network operations Established May 21 2010 U S Cyber Command USCYBERCOM was fully operational on October 31 2010 Subcomponents Service Subcomponents44 Air Force Global Strike Command AFGSC AFGSC is responsible for the Air Force’s three intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM wings two B-52 Stratofortress wings and the sole B-2 Spirit wing AFGSC has two numbered air forces that are tasked with providing capabilities to combatant commands The Eighth Air Force controls the long-range nuclear bomber assets B-52s and B-2s and the Twentieth Air Force controls the ICBM wings Air Force Space Command AFSPC AFSPC provides space and cybersecurity forces for USSTRATCOM It has two numbered air forces providing these capabilities The Fourteenth Air Force controls and supports several satellite systems including the Global Positioning System GPS Defense Satellite Communications Systems Phase II and III and the Defense Meteorological Support Program In addition the Fourteenth Air Force has Atlas Delta and Titan launch vehicles at its disposal to put payloads into orbit The Twenty-Fourth Air Force plans and conducts cyberspace operations in support of combatant commands U S Army Forces Strategic Command ARSTRAT ARSTRAT conducts space and missile defense operations and provides planning integration control and coordination of Army forces and capabilities in support of USSTRATCOM missions Fleet Forces Command Fleet Forces Command is responsible for the entire Atlantic Ocean the Caribbean Sea and the waters around Central and South America extending into the Pacific to the Galapagos Island Marine Corps Forces U S Strategic Command MARFORSTRAT MARFORSTRAT serves as the Marine Corps service component to USSTRATCOM Functional Components45 U S Cyber Command USCYBERCOM USCYBERCOM is a sub unified command that is subordinate to USSTRATCOM USCYBERCOM plans coordinates integrates synchronizes and conducts activities to defend 44 http www stratcom mil service_components http www stratcom mil functional_components and U S Strategic Command “Snap Shot ”–A Summary of USSTRATCOM Facts and Information March 2011 45 Congressional Research Service 19 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands DOD information networks and also conducts cyber space activities to enable U S military activities Joint Functional Component Command-Global Strike JFCC-GS JFCC-GS optimizes planning integration execution and force management of assigned missions to deter attacks against the United States its territories possessions and bases Joint Functional Component Command– Integrated Missile Defense JFCC-IMD JFCC-IMD synchronizes operational-level global missile defense planning operations support and the development of missile defense effects for DOD Joint Functional Component Command-Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance JFCC-ISR JFCC-ISR plans integrates and coordinates intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance in support of strategic and global operations and strategic deterrence Joint Functional Component Command- Space JFCC-Space JFCC-Space is responsible for executing continuous integrated space operations to deliver theater and global effects in support of national and combatant commander objectives Joint Information Operations Warfare Center JIOWC JIOWC provides joint information operations planning execution and operational-level integration of Electronic Warfare Operations Security and Military Deception across DOD to support USSTRATCOM joint force commanders and U S national objectives On September 12 2011 President Obama signed Change One to the 2011 UCP which transfers the Information Operations Military Deception and Operations Security missions from USSTRATCOM to the Joint Staff so it is possible the structure and missions of JIOWC may change significantly in the near future USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction SCC-WMD SCC-WMD plans advocates and advises the USSTRATCOM commander on WMD-related matters Ongoing Operations46 According to USSTRATCOM’s commander USSTRATCOM’s major ongoing operation is to detect deter and prevent attacks against the United States and to join with the other combatant commands to defend the nation should deterrence fail One aspect of this operation is the “around the clock” command and control of U S nuclear forces USSTRATCOM is also involved in implementing the new START treaty and efforts to sustain and modernize the nuclear triad and the nuclear weapons complex 46 Statement of General C Robert Kehler Commander United States Strategic Command before the Senate Committee on Armed Services March 27 2012 Congressional Research Service 20 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands USSTRATCOM provides support to other combatant commanders in the areas of integrated missile defense and ISR operations Not unlike its nuclear deterrence activities USSTRATCOM and USCYBERCOM operate on a daily basis to improve their ability to operate and defend the DOD information network and make sure critical activities can continue even in the face of adversary attempts to deny or disrupt them USSTRATCOM is also responsible for U S military space operations on a day-to-day basis such as launching satellites and monitoring activities in space Selected Current Issues47 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment48 In March 2012 the USSTRATCOM commander noted during a Senate Armed Services Committee SASC hearings his concerns over the sustainment of the nation’s nuclear weapons In testimony he noted that as U S nuclear weapons age the United States faces continued erosion of the nuclear enterprise’s physical and intellectual capital necessitating investment in stockpile certification warhead life extension and infrastructure recapitalization Without these investments USSTRATCOM will not be able to maintain the nation’s nuclear deterrent Possible Shortfalls in Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISR Analysts49 During congressional testimony the USSTRATCOM commander noted that the command’s ability to process and analyze data from “increasingly capable ISR platforms is also a growing challenge ” It was suggested not only are analysts dealing with more data but also with an increased operational tempo which imposes even greater demands on the timeliness of their analysis and reporting Conservative USTRATCOM estimates suggest the command would need a 100% increase in analysts to meet COCOM requirements—which USTRATCOM believes is “an unrealistic level of growth in almost any environment let alone a fiscally constrained one ” USCYBERCOM Workforce50 The USSTRATCOM commander expressed about USCYBERCOM’s technical capacity and workforce Noting that USCYBERCOM needs the best trained and educated people in its cyberspace workforce concerns were expressed that the U S education system might not be emphasizing the appropriate academic disciplines A possible solution to this situation could be “encouraging and improving science technology engineering and math education from an early age ” Another factor contributing to workforce concerns was the belief that “traditional military 47 Ibid Ibid p 13 For additional information on U S nuclear weapons see CRS Report RL30345 U S Nuclear Weapons Policy Force Structure and Arms Control Issues by Amy F Woolf 49 Statement of General C Robert Kehler Commander United States Strategic Command before the Senate Committee on Armed Services March 27 2012 p 16 50 Statement of General C Robert Kehler Commander United States Strategic Command before the Senate Committee on Armed Services March 27 2012 p 25 For additional information on USCYBERCOM see CRS Report R40836 Cybersecurity Current Legislation Executive Branch Initiatives and Options for Congress by Catherine A Theohary and John Rollins 48 Congressional Research Service 21 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands recruitment and retention programs may not be the best or fastest way to build a stable cyber cadre for the long term ” U S Transportation Command USTRANSCOM Website http www transcom mil Mission51 Develop and direct the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise to globally project strategic national security capabilities accurately sense the operating environment provide end-to-end distribution process visibility and support joint U S government and Secretary of Defenseapproved multinational and nongovernmental logistical requirements History52 World War II the Berlin blockade the Korean War and the Vietnam War demonstrated the need for the United States to maintain a capable and ready transportation system for national security A 1978 exercise exposed significant gaps in understanding between military and civilian participants mobilization and deployment plans fell apart and as a result the United States and its NATO allies “lost the war ” Two major recommendations came out of the exercise First the Transportation Operating Agencies later called the Transportation Component Commands should have a direct reporting chain to the JCS Second the JCS should establish a single manager for deployment and execution As a result the JCS formed the Joint Deployment Agency JDA in 1979 at MacDill Air Force Base FL Although the JDA had responsibility for integrating deployment procedures it did not have authority to direct the Transportation Operating Agencies or Unified and Specified Commanders to take corrective actions keep data bases current or adhere to milestones In April 1987 President Reagan ordered the SECDEF to establish a Unified Transportation Command UTC a directive made possible in part by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 which revoked the law prohibiting consolidation of military transportation functions Designated the United States Transportation Command USTRANSCOM its mission was to provide global air sea and land transportation to meet national security needs It had three transportation component commands—the Air Force’s Military Airlift Command replaced by Air Mobility Command in 1992 the Navy’s Military Sealift Command and the Army’s Military Traffic Management Command renamed Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command in 2004 On June 22 1987 the President nominated Air Force General Duane H Cassidy as the first USTRANSCOM commander The commander of USTRANSCOM received operational direction from the National Command Authority NCA through the CJCS There were however some deficiencies in this new command arrangement The services retained their single-manager charters for their respective transportation modes Even more restrictive USTRANSCOM’s authorities were limited primarily to wartime As a result during peacetime USTRANSCOM’s component commands continued to operate day-to-day much as they had in the past They controlled their industrial funds and maintained responsibility for service-unique missions service-oriented procurement and maintenance 51 52 Information in this section is taken from http www transcom mil about whatIs cfm Taken directly from http www transcom mil about briefHistory cfm Congressional Research Service 22 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands scheduling and DOD charters during peacetime single-manager transportation operations They also continued to have operational control of forces DOD learned much from the strategic deployment for Desert Shield Desert Storm and foremost among those lessons was USTRANSCOM and its component commands needed to operate in peacetime as they would in wartime Consequently on February 14 1992 the SECDEF gave USTRANSCOM a new charter Stating the command’s mission to be “to provide air land and sea transportation for DOD both in time of peace and time of war ” the charter greatly expanded the authorities of the USTRANSCOM commander Under the new charter the Service Secretaries assigned the components to the USTRANSCOM commander in peace and war In addition the military departments assigned to him under his combatant command all transportation assets except those that were service-unique or theater-assigned The charter also made the USTRANSCOM commander DOD’s single-manager for transportation other than service-unique and theater-assigned assets On September 16 2003 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld designated the USTRANSCOM commander as the Distribution Process Owner DPO to serve “as the single entity to direct and supervise execution of the Strategic Distribution system” in order to “improve the overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution related activities - deployment sustainment and redeployment support during peace and war ” As the DPO USTRANSCOM partnered with other COCOMs the services defense agencies Office of the Secretary of Defense Joint Staff and industry to improve the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise Since 2003 USTRANSCOM has gained additional responsibilities related to its role as the Distribution Process Owner In 2004 USTRANSCOM became the portfolio manager for DOD logistics information technology systems and received acquisition authority for procuring information technology systems carrying out research projects and obtaining services needed to transform the DOD supply chain Subcomponents53 Surface Deployment and Distribution Command SDDC “SDDC provides ocean terminal commercial ocean liner service and traffic management services to deploy sustain and redeploy U S forces on a global basis The command is responsible for surface transportation and is the interface between DOD shippers and the commercial transportation carrier industry This includes movement of servicemembers household goods and privately owned vehicles SDDC is the nation’s largest customer to the moving industry with more than 500 000 household goods moves a year The command also provides transportation for troops and materiel to ports of departure in the U S and overseas and manages 24 ports worldwide including military terminals at Sunny Point N C and Concord Calif ” Military Sealift Command MSC “MSC provides sealift transportation services to deploy sustain and redeploy U S forces around the globe MSC provides sealift with a fleet of government-owned and chartered U S -flagged ships MSC executes Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement VISA contracts for chartered vessels Sealift ships principally move unit equipment from the U S to theaters of operation all over the world In addition to sealift ships MSC operates a fleet of prepositioned ships strategically placed around the world and loaded with equipment and supplies to sustain Army 53 http www transcom mil about cocom cfm Congressional Research Service 23 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Navy Marine Corps Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency operations These ships remain at sea ready to deploy on short notice which significantly reduces the response time for the delivery of urgently needed equipment and supplies to a theater of operation ” Air Mobility Command AMC “AMC provides strategic and tactical airlift air refueling and aeromedical evacuation services for deploying sustaining and redeploying U S forces wherever they are needed Many special duty and operational support aircraft are also assigned to AMC including Air Force One In addition AMC contracts with commercial air carriers through Civil Reserve Air Fleet CRAF and other programs for movement of DOD passengers and cargo AMC’s air fleet provides swift response as an element of America’s global reach ” Ongoing Operations54 USTRANSCOM conducts military and commercial transportation distribution process integration terminal management aerial refueling and global patient movement on a daily basis In 2011 the Air Mobility Command AMC deployed a rotational force of over 60 C-130 tactical airlift aircraft plus 120 KC-135 and KC-10 aerial refueling aircraft AMC also employed 21 C-17 transport aircraft in dedicated support of USCENTCOM and across all COCOMs on a daily basis at least one-third of AMC’s air mobility fleet was used to support global operations The Military Sealift Command MSC and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command SDDC moved over 19 9 million tons of cargo worldwide USTRANSCOM noted MSC tankers delivered 1 6 billion gallons of fuel to support global operations and SDDC had moved over 3 500 pieces of mission essential cargo by commercial sealift and then used airlift to transport this cargo to Afghanistan Selected Current Issues55 Ground Supply to Afghanistan The Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication PAK GLOC when open remain the quickest and most cost-effective route for surface transportation into Afghanistan Ground transportation through Pakistan had been curtailed since November 2011 and in early July 2012 the PAK GLOC was reopened after extensive negotiations It should be noted there is no guarantee the Pakistani government will not close the PAK GLOC if there are future disputes with the U S government or NATO USTRANSCOM continues efforts to expand surface networks that supply Afghanistan Called the Northern Distribution Network NDN USTRANSCOM’s stated priority is to enhance and improve this network In 2011 over 40% of all cargo supporting Operation Enduring Freedom OEF moved through the NDN’s truck water rail and air routes In 2011 a total of 27 000 containers were delivered via NDN surface transportation—an increase of 15% from 2010 The importance of the NDN to USTRANSCOM’s operations will likely grow as U S forces begin leaving Afghanistan in preparation for handing over security responsibilities to the Afghan government by 2014 54 Statement of General William Fraser USAF Commander United States Transportation Command Before the House Armed Services Committee on the State of the Command March 7 2012 55 Ibid Congressional Research Service 24 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Guam and Building Toward USTRANSCOM’s Future56 As part of the Administration’s shift in strategic emphasis to the Asia-Pacific region USTRANSCOM noted during testimony the importance of Guam as a key multimodal logistics node USTRANSCOM expressed its support of infrastructure improvements to ensure successful distribution operations in the region USTRANSCOM has partnered with the Defense Logistics Agency DLA and with congressional approval has invested $101 3 million in the recapitalization of the fuel hydrant infrastructure and $61 million in a JP-8 pipeline between Apra Harbor and Anderson Air Force Base Geographic Combatant Commands U S Africa Command USAFRICOM 57 Website http www africom mil Mission “Africa Command protects and defends the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and when directed conducts military operations in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development ”58 “USAFRICOM is responsible for U S military relations with 54 African countries including the islands of Cape Verde Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe along with the Indian Ocean islands of Comoros Madagascar Mauritius and Seychelles U S Central Command maintains its traditional relationship with Egypt though USAFRICOM coordinates with Egypt on issues relating to Africa security ”59 A Different Kind of Combatant Command60 Dr Cynthia Watson a professor at the National War College and author of “Combatant Commands Origins Structure and Engagements ” observes USAFRICOM has a different type of mission noting USAFRICOM allows the U S government particularly DOD to work toward a more stable environment in which political and economic growth can take place with three former U S commands consolidated into a single new one to best work out the U S government efforts Africa Command hopes to avoid that traditional combatant command goals of warfighting in favor of war prevention making its orientation quite different from other parallel organizations 56 Ibid For additional information on USAFRICOM see CRS Report RL34003 Africa Command U S Strategic Interests and the Role of the U S Military in Africa by Lauren Ploch Blanchard 58 Fact Sheet United States Africa Command http www africom mil getArticle asp art 1644 59 AFRICOM FAQs http www africom mil AfricomFAQ asp 60 Cynthia A Watson p 174 57 Congressional Research Service 25 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands History61 Africa’s previous command arrangements USEUCOM has had responsibility for most of Africa since the end of World War II 62 reflect the relatively low level of importance assigned to the African continent within the U S military structure Before the creation of USAFRICOM Africa generally received less attention than other regions under the three aforementioned military commands USCENTCOM was focused on U S security priorities in Iraq and Afghanistan USEUCOM was preoccupied with NATO relations with European allies and Russia USPACOM was primarily focused on regional powers such as China India and North Korea There was a consensus that the previous command arrangements for Africa represented a “suboptimal organizational structure ” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed that previous command arrangements for the African continent were “an outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War ” U S foreign policy in the region like its military involvement was primarily concerned with Cold War geopolitics rather than African policy and development Scholars have referred to this policy attitude as “benign neglect ” designating Africa as the “stepchild” of U S foreign policy This attitude continued after the end of the Cold War when the opportunity to articulate coherent policy was overlooked While the transformation of the geopolitical landscape was significantly altered by the fall of the Soviet Union America’s attention was focused on the newly freed Eurasian states In 1995 in its U S Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa DOD noted that “ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa ” Events in the late 1990s began to change U S perception of security interests in Africa In 1998 two U S embassies in Africa were bombed While many scholars believe these twin bombings marked a turning point in U S strategic policy toward the region the domestic terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 forced a reassessment of U S policy vis-à-vis Africa and its role in the global war on terrorism The growing strategic importance of Africa for the United States was subsequently articulated in government documents In the 2002 National Security Strategy the concept of weak states and their role in global instability was an important theme The 2006 National Security Strategy solidified the newly important role of Africa observing “Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this administration ” The National Security Presidential Directive NSPD 50 signed by President Bush in September 2006 provided the first update to overall U S strategy toward Africa since 1992 Africa’s abundance of natural energy resources has made it an attractive region for countries the United States China and India seeking additional resources U S officials note three areas are of particular concern 1 the number of soft targets e g embassies and consulates 2 the recruiting potential for young angry marginalized youth from Somalia to Morocco and 3 the potential of sanctuary for international terrorists particularly in large ungoverned spaces Africa has also been a target terrorist activity there were attacks on the U S embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 on targets in Mombasa Kenya in 2002 and in Algiers in 2007 In particular the Horn of Africa is of concern to terrorism experts and military personnel 63 In addition to terrorism concern the growth of international piracy in the region has become a serious problem for the international community 64 Information in this section is taken from Milady Ortiz “U S Africa Command A New Way of Thinking ” National Security Watch Association of the U S Army Institute of Land Warfare ” March 13 2008 62 Cynthia A Watson p 174 63 For additional information on regional terrorism see CRS Report R41473 Countering Terrorism in East Africa The U S Response by Lauren Ploch Blanchard 64 For additional information on piracy around the Horn of Africa see CRS Report R40528 Piracy off the Horn of Africa by Lauren Ploch Blanchard et al 61 Congressional Research Service 26 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands On February 6 2007 the White House announced a presidential directive to create a new unified combatant command in Africa U S Africa Command USAFRICOM commenced official operations on October 1 2007 and remained a sub-unified command under U S European Command USEUCOM until October 2008 On October 1 2008 USAFRICOM was declared fully mission capable and took over the role of geographic combatant command for Africa While the USAFRICOM headquarters remains in Germany there are aspirations to possibly move it to Africa sometime in the future but regional sensitivities and security concerns have made this a challenging proposition Subcomponents U S Army Africa USARAF 65 Headquartered in Vicenza Italy USARAF is the Army component to USAFRICOM In concert with national and international partners it conducts sustained security engagement with African land forces to promote peace stability and security in Africa If required USAFRICOM can deploy as a contingency headquarters in support of crisis response USAFRICOM is staffed by the Southern European Task Force SETAF which prior to August 2008 was an airborne task force that supported NATO in both combat and humanitarian operations U S Naval Forces Africa NAVAF 66 “NAVAF is part of a combined U S Naval Forces Europe NAVEUR NAVAF headquarters and is tasked with the conduct of the full range of maritime operations and theater security cooperation in concert with coalition joint interagency and other partners in order to advance security and stability in Europe and Africa Their combined areas of responsibility cover approximately half of the Atlantic Ocean from the North Pole to Antarctica as well as the Adriatic Baltic Barents Black Caspian Mediterranean and North Seas NAVEUR-NAVAF headquartered in Naples Italy covers all of Russia Europe and nearly the entire continent of Africa It encompasses 105 countries with a combined population of more than one billion people and includes a landmass extending more than 14 million square miles ” The U S Sixth Fleet supports NAVAF operations in the AFRICOM AOR and is headquartered in Naples Italy U S Air Forces Africa AFAFRICA 67 “AFAFRICA or 17th Air Forces conducts sustained security engagement and operations to promote air safety security and development in Africa AFAFRICA is located at Ramstein Air Base in Germany ” U S Marine Corps Forces Africa MARFORAF MARFORAF located Stuttgart Germany is the Marine’s service component headquarters for USAFRICOM “MARFORAF conducts operations exercises training and security cooperation activities throughout the African Continent ”68 65 http www usaraf army mil http www naveur-navaf navy mil 67 http www africom mil pdfFiles AFRICOMfactsheet05AUG2011 pdf 68 Ibid 66 Congressional Research Service 27 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa CJTF-HOA “CJTF-HOA is USAFRICOM’s forward operating task force located at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti It is one of more than 23 tenant organizations CJTF-HOA has approximately 2 000 people assigned on rotating tours While the core staff works at Camp Lemonnier most of the service members assigned to CJTF-HOA are “embedded” in partner nations performing a range of activities—building partner security capability capacity and infrastructure through regional cooperation military-to-military programs civil-military affairs projects and professional military education programs Through an indirect approach the task force along with coalition and other U S defense components provides support to regional organizations to help foster cooperation enhance collective peace-keeping improve humanitarian assistance and support civil-military operations ”69 Special Operations Command-Africa SOCAFRICA “On October 1 2008 SOCAFRICA was established as USAFRICOM’s Theater Special Operations Command—a functional sub-unified special operations command for Africa SOCAFRICA contributes to USAFRICOM’s mission through the application of the full spectrum of special operations forces capabilities including civil affairs information operations theater security cooperation crisis response and campaign planning ”70 SOCAFRICA is headquartered in Stuttgart Germany Ongoing Operations U S Deployment to Central Africa71 On October 14 2011 President Obama informed Congress that on October 12 2011 a small team of U S military personnel began deploying to Uganda and that by November about 100 U S military personnel—primarily U S Special Forces—would be deployed to Central Africa to act as advisors to partner forces who are attempting to kill or capture the leadership of the Lord’s Resistance Army LRA The LRA is a nonreligious terror group that routinely kidnaps children and forces them to serve as soldiers which has committed multiple acts of terror in the region over the past two decades U S forces are operating in Uganda South Sudan the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the mission has been characterized as a mission of “months as opposed to years ” In the past USAFRICOM has provided training and equipment to a variety of central African militaries USAFRICOM’s involvement has been credited with helping central African forces attrite the LRA to about 200 core fighters and about 600 supporters USAFRICOM notes that about 100 U S service members continue to operate in Uganda South Sudan the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as advisors While not characterized as an “open-ended commitment” USAFRICOM regularly “reviews and assesses” the effectiveness of this effort to determine if continued involvement is warranted 69 AFRICOM FAQs http www africom mil AfricomFAQ asp USSOCOM 2011 Fact Book http www socom mil News Documents USSOCOMFactBook2011 pdf 71 Information in this section is taken from The White House Office of the Press Secretary to the speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate October 14 2011 and Lisa Daniels “Official Troops in Central Africa for Months Not Years ” American Forces Press Service October 26 2011 and USAFRICOM Information Paper “U S Military Support to African Efforts to Counter the Lord’s Resistance Army ” February 2012 70 Congressional Research Service 28 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara OEF-TS “OEF-TS is the US Military regional plan against terrorist and violent extremists OEF-TS is the military component to Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership TSCTP together with other USG organizations OEF-TS will help enhance stability and deter terrorist activity on the African continent with an emphasis on greater security in North Africa USAFRICOM is working with international partners in a regional approach to common areas of concern such as commerce education and economic development OEF-TS works with the partner nations to expand military -to-military cooperation ensure adequate resources are available to train advise assist regional units and establish mechanisms to promote better regional cooperation communications and intelligence-sharing ”72 Exercises73 USAFRICOM uses exercises to encourage the development of partner nation’s security capabilities and instilling professionalism in Africa’s various military and security forces These exercises range from traditional land combat operations to logistics and medical operations humanitarian aid and disaster response to counterterrorism training Selected Current Issues Regional Threats74 The USAFRICOM commander testified that Africa accounts for 14 of the world’s 20 weakest states and these fragile states lack the capacity or political will to confront demographic political social and economic challenges Threats in the region include activities of Al Qaeda and its affiliates in East Africa the Maghreb and the Sahel Illicit trafficking and violent extremist organizations VEOs also pose threats to regional security and U S national interests Of further concern many man-portable air defense systems MANPADS disappeared from unsecured storage sites during the 2011 Libyan conflict and could potentially be trafficked to extremist groups Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISR Challenges The USAFRICOM commander testified that ISR continues to be a challenge 75 USAFRICOM is reportedly seeking an expansion of ISR activities in Africa and is seeking additional assets particularly unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs to adequately cover the continent 76 Additional Forces Allocated to USAFRICOM77 Reports suggest that beginning in 2013 as U S military commitment to Afghanistan begins to decrease more troops will be available for USAFRICOM As early as March 2013 the Army 72 USAFRICOM OEF Trans-Sahara http www africom mil fetchBinary asp pdfID 20100526130828 Fact Sheet USAFRICOM 2012 Exercises February 2012 74 Statement of General Carter F Ham USA Commander United States Africa Command Before the House Armed Services Committee February 29 2012 75 Ibid 76 Craig Whitlock “Military Expands Spying in Africa ” New York Times June 14 2012 77 Information in this section is taken from John Vandiver “AFRICOM Announces New Rapid Reaction Forces ” Stars 73 Congressional Research Service 29 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands reportedly plans to deploy around 1 200 troops to Africa primarily to participate in partner building engagement and training activities but these forces could also rapidly respond to sudden challenges or crises in the region In addition largely in response to the September 11 2012 attacks in Benghazi that killed the U S Ambassador to Libya and three other Americans a dedicated U S SOF Commander’s in-Extremis Force was established in early October 2012 Previously USAFRICOM had shared this force with USEUCOM While USAFRICOM reportedly stated their in-Extremist Force will be stationed in Ft Carson Colorado—home of the 10th Special Forces Group—some suggest that this force will spend most of its time forwarddeployed to Africa in order to be more responsive The allocation of both general-purpose Army forces and U S SOF in-Extremis forces offers the commander of USAFRICOM more flexibility in conducting engagement and training operations and also affords an added element of security that can be deployed in the event of crisis U S Central Command USCENTCOM Website http www centcom mil Mission “With national and international partners U S Central Command promotes cooperation among nations responds to crises and deters or defeats state and non-state aggression and supports development and when necessary reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security stability and prosperity ”78 History The Iranian hostage crisis that played out from 1979 to 1981 and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan served to underscore the need to strengthen U S presence in the region President Carter established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force RDJTF in March 1980 and President Reagan took steps to transform the RDJTF into a permanent unified command over a two-year period USCENTCOM was formally established on January 1 1983 By late 1988 the regional strategy largely focused on the potential threat of a Soviet invasion of Iran The new USCENTCOM commander General H Norman Schwarzkopf believed an invasion of Iran was unlikely and began to focus on the possible emergence of a new regional threat—Iraq On August 2 1990 these beliefs became a reality when Iraq invaded Kuwait The United States and other nations responded quickly by forming a coalition and deploying forces to Saudi Arabia to deter further Iraqi aggression On January 17 1991 U S and coalition forces launched Operation Desert Storm with an air interdiction campaign which prepared the theater for a coalition ground assault The primary coalition objective the liberation of Kuwait was achieved on February 27 and the next morning a cease-fire was declared just 100 hours after the commencement of the ground campaign Even though formal hostilities ended after the hundred hour war there were other security concerns Operation Provide Comfort was implemented in April 1991 to provide humanitarian assistance to the Kurds and enforce a “no-fly” zone in Iraq In August 1992 Operation Southern Watch began in response to Saddam’s noncompliance with U N Security Council Resolution 688 and Stripes December 19 2012 and Kristina Wong “Army Plans to Shift Troops to U S Africa Command ” The Washington Times December 24 2012 78 http www centcom mil Congressional Research Service 30 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands condemning his brutal repression of Iraqi civilians in southeastern Iraq In January 1997 Operation Northern Watch replaced Provide Comfort and focused on enforcing the northern nofly zone Throughout the decade USCENTCOM operations such as Vigilant Warrior Vigilant Sentinel Desert Strike Desert Thunder I and II and Desert Fox responded to Iraqi threats to its neighbors or to enforce U N Security Council resolutions To prevent widespread starvation attributed to clan warfare USCENTCOM undertook Operation Provide Relief in 1992 to supply humanitarian assistance to Somalia and northeastern Kenya as sanctioned by the U N In 1993 despite some U N success in the countryside the situation in Mogadishu worsened and a series of violent confrontations compelled President Clinton to order the withdrawal of U S troops from Somalia Throughout the decade following the Gulf War terrorist attacks had a major impact on USCENTCOM forces in the region In 1996 the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia were bombed killing 19 U S airmen In 1998 terrorists attacked the U S embassies in Kenya and Tanzania killing 250 persons including 12 Americans The October 2000 attack on the USS Cole resulting in the deaths of 17 U S sailors was linked to Osama bin Laden’s al Qaida organization The September 11 2001 attacks compelled the United States to initiate a war against international terrorism USCENTCOM launched Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001 to expel the Taliban government in Afghanistan which was harboring al Qaida terrorists hosting terrorist training camps and repressing the Afghan population In the wake of 9 11 some members of international community found Iraq’s lack of cooperation with United Nation Security Council UNSC Resolutions regarding weapons of mass destruction unacceptable Continued Iraqi resistance led the UNSC to authorize the use of force by a U S -led coalition Operation Iraqi Freedom began March 19 2003 Following the defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan November 9 2001 and Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq April 8 2003 USCENTCOM continued to provide security to the new governments in those countries conducting counterinsurgency operations and assisting host nation security forces to provide for their own defense Beginning in October 2002 USCENTCOM conducted operations in the Horn of Africa to assist host nations there to combat terrorism establish a secure environment and foster regional stability USCENTCOM also provided disaster relief such as the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan and the large-scale evacuation of American citizens from Lebanon in 2006 On October 1 2008 DOD transferred responsibility for Sudan Eritrea Ethiopia Djibouti Kenya and Somalia to the newly established USAFRICOM while Egypt remained in the USCENTCOM AOR 79 Subcomponents U S Army Central ARCENT 80 ARCENT in addition to being the Army component has the mission to serve as an expeditionary headquarters to handle operations across the full spectrum for limited duration operations The U S Third Army forms the basis of this subcomponent command and also serves as the Coalition Forces Land Component Command ARCENT has a forward headquarters in Doha Qatar 79 80 http www centcom mil en about-centcom our-history Cynthia A Watson p 142 Congressional Research Service 31 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands U S Naval Forces Central Command NAVCENT 81 NAVCENT has its headquarters in Manama Bahrain the homeport of the U S Fifth Fleet NAVCENT forces in the region normally include either a Carrier Strike Group Expeditionary Strike Group or an Amphibious Strike Group NAVCENT also serves as the command element for the Combined Maritime Forces which is comprised of naval forces from about two dozen nations that are responsible for combating terrorism piracy and illegal drug trafficking in the region U S Air Forces Central AFCENT 82 “Located at Shaw Air Force Base South Carolina the 9th Air Force is the headquarters for AFCENT and serves as the air component for a 27-nation area within the USCENTCOM AOR The 9th Air Force is also an intermediate headquarters under Air Combat Command and is responsible for five active-duty flying wings as well as overseeing the operational readiness of 18 designated units of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve ” U S Marine Corps Forces Central Command MARCENT 83 “MARCENT is designated as the Marine Corps service component for USCENTCOM MARCENT is responsible for all Marine Corps forces in the CENTCOM AOR MARCENT provides Marine Expeditionary Forces capable of conducting a wide range of operations offering the command a responsive and unique set of capabilities ” MARCENT has a forward headquarters in Bahrain Special Operations Command Central SOCCENT 84 “SOCCENT is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base FL and is a subordinate unified command of U S Central Command It is responsible for planning Special Operations throughout the USCENTCOM AOR planning and conducting peacetime joint combined Special Operations training exercises and orchestrating command and control of peacetime and wartime Special Operations as directed SOCCENT exercises operational control of assigned and attached SOF that deploy for the execution of training and for operational missions in the USCENTCOM area of operations as directed by the USCENTCOM commander When directed by the USCENTCOM commander SOCCENT forms a Joint Special Operations Task Force JSOTF ” Ongoing Operations85 USCENTCOM forces are conducting a theater-wide campaign in conjunction with other partner nations against Al Qaeda and its extremist allies USCENTCOM’s stated main effort is in Afghanistan where U S NATO and coalition allies are conducting a counterinsurgency campaign as well as training equipping and advising Afghan military and police forces so they can eventually take over security responsibilities for their country With U S forces out of Iraq USCENTCOM notes it will take on an increasing maritime character with special operations 81 Ibid pp 141-142 http www afcent af mil main welcome asp 83 http www marines mil unit marforcent Pages MARCENT_Main aspx 84 http www socom mil News Documents USSOCOMFactBook2011 pdf 85 Statement of U S Marine Corps General James N Mattis U S Central Command Commander before the House Armed Services Committee on March 7 2012 about the posture of U S Central Command 82 Congressional Research Service 32 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands forces and air forces supporting operations USCENTCOM believes that naval forces—with embarked troops—will provide a physical presence and a cost-effective means of projecting power in the event of a crisis Selected Current Issues86 Middle East Unrest Concern has been expressed over past and current unrest in Egypt Bahrain Jordan Syria and Yemen spurred by people’s demands for democratic rights in those countries In the case of Egypt a long-standing regime was deposed and is now moving to a more democratic form of government Of critical concern to many is that despite overtures towards democracy widespread demonstrations have resulted in varying degrees of instability in these countries In the case of Egypt Jordan Yemen and Bahrain they are considered crucial counterterrorism partners and long-term unrest and possible political changes could have a detrimental impact on U S counterterrorism efforts in the region Despite international pressure open conflict continues in Syria with some suggesting that it could eventually turn into a long-term full-fledged civil war that could pose a threat to regional security and stability While there have been calls for outside military intervention the pervasive approach appears to be “hands off” in nature Given the volatility of these countries USCENTCOM could be called upon in short order to protect U S national interests in the region Iranian Interference87 U S intelligence agencies and USCENTCOM have long held that Iran has provided arms ammunition money and improvised explosive device IED components to insurgents opposing U S efforts in Afghanistan Iran also stands accused of exploiting the Arab Awakening undermining democracy in Iraq and supporting the Asad regime in Syria behaviors that some believe are the primary catalyst in pushing the region toward an arms race or armed conflict The challenge to USCENTCOM is how to best mitigate Iranian interference to promote long-term regional stability U S European Command USEUCOM Website http www eucom mil Mission88 The mission of USEUCOM is to conduct military operations international military partnering and interagency partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend the United States USEUCOM forces constitute the United States military contribution to NATO 86 Ibid Ibid 88 http www eucom mil documents fact-sheets EUCOM-Factsheet-Command-2010 pdf 87 Congressional Research Service 33 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands USEUCOM Commander and NATO The USEUCOM Commander also traditionally serves as the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO SACEUR SACEUR’s responsibilities are outlined as follows 89 SACEUR is responsible for the overall command of NATO military operations He conducts the necessary military planning for operations including the identification of forces required for the mission and requests these forces from NATO countries as authorized by the North Atlantic Council and as directed by NATO’s Military Committee SACEUR analyzes these operational needs in cooperation with the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation SACEUR makes recommendations to NATO’s political and military authorities on any military matter that may affect his ability to carry out his responsibilities For day-to-day business he reports to the Military Committee composed of Military Representatives for Chiefs of Defense of NATO member countries He also has direct access to the Chiefs of Defense and may communicate with appropriate national authorities as necessary to facilitate the accomplishment of his tasks In the case of an aggression against a NATO member state SACEUR as Supreme Commander is responsible for executing all military measures within his capability and authority to preserve or restore the security of Alliance territory History90 USEUCOM was established August 1 1952 to provide unified command and authority over all U S forces in Europe For several years after World War II the services had maintained separate commands in Europe that reported directly to the JCS After the end of the occupation of Germany in 1949 some questioned the U S commitment to the defense of Western Europe against the Soviet Union The Berlin Crisis of 1948-1949 exacerbated these concerns and in 1949 the allies established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO but little else was done to address the Soviet threat The June 1950 surprise attack on South Korea by Communist North Korea served as a catalyst and in 1951 NATO established Allied Command Europe and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe SHAPE General Dwight D Eisenhower was recalled from retirement to become the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe SACEUR Even as the war in Korea raged the U S reinforcements to Europe to deter the Soviet Union from similar aggression there and between 1950 and 1953 U S military personnel in Europe grew from 120 000 to over 400 000 To provide for national command within NATO and to help control this build-up of forces Eisenhower proposed a separate command for all U S forces in Europe Because the senior U S commander would continue as Supreme Allied Commander Europe Eisenhower recommended giving “a maximum of delegated authority” to a four-star deputy The first U S Commander-in-Chief Europe USCINCEUR was General Matthew B Ridgway former commander of Eighth Army and the Far East Command during the Korean War USEUCOM used the Military Assistance Program to help its NATO partners build their military capabilities USEUCOM also conducted out-of-sector operations such as a major contingency 89 90 http www nato int cps en natolive topics_50110 htm http www eucom mil documents fact-sheets EUCOM-Factsheet-History-2010 pdf Congressional Research Service 34 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands operation to Lebanon in 1958 In 1961 Berlin once again became a flashpoint when the Soviets erected a wall to stop people fleeing Communist rule In the early 1960s policy disagreements emerged within NATO and in 1966 France demanded the removal of all U S and NATO headquarters and forces from France The following year SHAPE moved to Mons Belgium while Headquarters USEUCOM moved to Patch Barracks USEUCOM continued to prepare for the defense of Europe and began a series of annual REFORGER Return of Forces to Europe exercises in 1967 Cold War crises continued including the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia But the readiness of U S forces in Europe slowly declined due to the Vietnam War and balance of payment problems Troop strength in Europe fell to 265 000 by 1970 During the 1970s the Cold War transitioned to an era of détente and negotiations although tensions remained high as both sides modernized their conventional and nuclear forces In the late 1970s the Soviet Union deployed SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles into Eastern Europe and in 1979 invaded Afghanistan NATO responded with a “two-track” decision to step up negotiations while deploying U S intermediate-range Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles to counter the Soviet threat During the 1980s the Armed Forces began to recover from the Vietnam War and U S forces in Europe grew to over 350 000 The UCP was changed in 1983 to transfer responsibility for the Middle East from USEUCOM to a new combatant command USCENTCOM but USEUCOM retained responsibility for the “confrontation states” of Israel Lebanon and Syria At the same time USEUCOM was formally assigned responsibility of Africa south of the Sahara In 1989 the Soviet Union and its empire in Eastern Europe collapsed and the Cold War came to an end In 1991 USEUCOM and its components provided forces to USCENTCOM for another out-of-sector operation Desert Storm USEUCOM reached out to the emerging democracies through programs such as the Joint Contact Team Program NATO Partnership for Peace and the National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program It was also active in peace and stability operations in the Balkans including Bosnia Macedonia and Kosovo But it had to conduct these new missions with fewer assigned forces as its strength fell below 120 000 After the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks USEUCOM provided major forces for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and stepped up its efforts to protect U S interests in Europe and Africa Subsequent terrorist attacks in the USEUCOM theater in Casablanca Madrid London and Algiers made it clear that terrorism demanded a collective response USEUCOM worked to build partner capacity in Europe and Africa for peacekeeping operations and deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan USEUCOM launched Operation Enduring Freedom and Trans-Sahara in 2007 while continuing to provide rotational forces to Afghanistan and Iraq Subcomponents91 U S Army Europe USAEUR Located in Heidelberg Germany USAEUR trains equips deploys and provides command and control of forward-deployed land forces able to support and conduct the full spectrum of joint and combined multi-national operations and engagement activities 91 http www eucom mil documents fact-sheets EUCOM-Factsheet-Command-2010 pdf and House and Senate Armed Services Committees Testimony of Admiral James G Stavridis United States Navy Commander United States European Command Before the 112th Congress 2011 March 2011 Congressional Research Service 35 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands U S Naval Forces Europe NAVEUR Located in Naples Italy NAVEUR the U S Navy component command conducts a full range of maritime operations as well as theater security cooperation operations with NATO allies The U S Sixth Fleet which is also a subcomponent of AFRICOM forms the basis of this subcomponent command U S Air Forces in Europe USAFE Located at Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany USAFE the Air Force component command operates from five main operating bases that supports nine air wings These wings provide a full spectrum of air support including strategic airlift as well as air support to ground forces and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance support The Third Air Force forms the basis of this subcomponent command U S Marine Corps Forces Europe MARFOREUR Located in Stuttgart Germany MARFOREUR employs pre-positioned assets to rapidly deploy expeditionary forces and equipment and conduct a wide array of operations including building partner capacity Special Operations Command Europe SOCEUR Located at Patch Barracks Stuttgart Germany SOCEUR provides flexibility throughout a full range of military operations including combat special operations humanitarian assistance noncombatant evacuations and joint-combined military operations Ongoing Operations92 Support to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force ISAF in Afghanistan93 USEUCOM’s support to ISAF is significant About 90% of the 40 000 non-U S troops deployed to Afghanistan are from the European theater USEUCOM’s support to ISAF is primarily focused on preparing these nation’s forces for deployment to Afghanistan These supporting activities include sending mobile planning teams to assess partner nation equipment and training requirements and working with these countries to develop a comprehensive pre-deployment plan Multi-National Joint and Interagency Exercises Multi-national and joint interagency exercises constitute the most significant form of peacetime interaction with NATO allies and other partners In 2011 USEUCOM conducted 22 major exercises involving almost 50 000 U S allied and partner nation personnel from 42 nations These exercises focused on preparing partner nations for ongoing coalition operations including ISAF enhancing overall NATO interoperability and improving NATO’s military interoperability with Israel 92 House Armed Services Committee Testimony of Admiral James G Stavridis United States Navy Commander United States European Command February 29 2012 93 For more information on NATO in Afghanistan see CRS Report RL33627 NATO in Afghanistan A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance by Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin Congressional Research Service 36 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Exercises in the Baltics Balkans and Caucasus In support of NATO initiatives USEUCOM provides U S forces for nine NATO and Partnership for Peace training events in the Baltics In addition USEUCOM provides forces for major exercises in the Balkans which not designed to help to improve these nation’s military capabilities but also to ease regional tensions Selected Current Issues94 Afghanistan USEUCOM currently has about 12 000 U S troops forward deployed to Afghanistan serving in a variety of capacities As previously noted USEUCOM plays a central role in training and deploying non-U S forces and the USEUCOM Commander in his SACEUR role is a central figure in persuading NATO allies to provide troops and resources for ISAF As overall U S involvement in Afghanistan begins to wind down NATO involvement will also likely follow suit and in some instances some NATO nations might opt for an abrupt end to their support to ISAF USEUCOM’s and SACEUR’s primary challenge will likely be to develop plans for and manage a smooth transition as NATO forces draw down and transition security functions to the Afghan National Army It is possible USEUCOM and NATO might have some residual support requirements in Afghanistan after the transition and these efforts will also require resources and management The Balkans USEUCOM has participated in NATO operations in the Balkans since the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords At the height of Operation Joint Endeavor in 1996 the United States had over 20 000 troops in the Balkans While current USEUCOM troop commitments to the Balkans are negligible continued engagement in the region is viewed by most as essential in keeping the region stable As such USEUCOM participation in NATO exercises and training teams in this region is deemed essential not only to improve capabilities and diffuse tensions but also to signify U S long-term interest and commitment to the Balkan region Missile Defense95 USEUCOM notes an increasing and expanding ballistic missile threat to USEUCOM’s area of focus citing missile-related activities in Iran and Syria as well as those of non-state actors such as Hizbollah In response to this threat the United States and Poland have initiated a cooperative air and missile defense partnership whereby the United States rotates Patriot anti-missile and antiaircraft batteries to Poland on a quarterly basis and conducts training with their Polish counterparts In September 2011 Romania agreed to the stationing of 24 interceptor missiles on Romanian soil and Turkey agreed to accept sophisticated U S radar which is now operational In the spring of 2012 the U S Navy added two ballistic missile defense BMD -capable ships to the theater to further improve NATO missile defense These events as well as plans to expand coverage to other countries have elicited opposition from Russia and have complicated NATO’s relationship with Moscow USEUCOM’s challenge will likely be to continue to play a role in 94 House Armed Services Committee Testimony of Admiral James G Stavridis United States Navy Commander United States European Command February 29 2012 95 For additional information see CRS Report RL34051 Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe by Steven A Hildreth and Carl Ek Congressional Research Service 37 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands developing European ground-based missile defense while at the same time maintaining an effective military relationship with Russia under potentially trying circumstances U S Northern Command USNORTHCOM Website http www northcom mil Mission96 “USNORTHCOM’s mission is to conduct homeland defense civil support and security cooperation to defend and secure the United States and its interests USNORTHCOM was established Oct 1 2002 to provide command and control of DOD homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities USNORTHCOM’s area of operation includes air land and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States Alaska Canada Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles It also includes the Gulf of Mexico the Straits of Florida portions of the Caribbean region to include The Bahamas Puerto Rico and the U S Virgin Islands The commander of USNORTHCOM is responsible for theater security cooperation with Canada Mexico and The Bahamas ” North American Aerospace Defense Command NORAD 97 “The commander of USNORTHCOM also commands NORAD a joint U S -Canadian command responsible for aerospace warning aerospace control and maritime warning for Canada Alaska and the continental United States For the aerospace warning mission the commander of NORAD provides an integrated tactical warning and attack assessment to the governments of Canada and the United States To accomplish the aerospace control mission NORAD uses a network of satellites ground-based radar airborne radar and fighters to detect intercept and if necessary engage any air-breathing threat to Canada and the United States In conjunction with its aerospace control mission NORAD assists in the detection and monitoring of aircraft suspected of illegal drug trafficking This information is passed to civilian law enforcement agencies to help combat the flow of illegal drugs into North America The Command has developed an initial concept for implementing the new maritime warning mission ” Missile Defense USNORTHCOM is the combatant command responsible for the operation of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System GMD designed to defend the United States against the threat of a limited ballistic missile attack from nations such as North Korea and Iran Unique Civil Support Mission98 USNORTHCOM’s civil support mission includes domestic disaster relief operations during fires hurricanes floods and earthquakes Support also includes counter-drug operations and managing the consequences of a terrorist event employing a weapon of mass destruction The command 96 http www northcom mil About index html Ibid and http www norad mil about index html 98 Ibid 97 Congressional Research Service 38 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands provides assistance to a nonmilitary Primary Agency when tasked to do so by DOD Per the Posse Comitatus Act 99 military forces can provide civil support but cannot become directly involved in law enforcement 100 History101 On April 17 2002 DOD announced the establishment of USNORTHCOM to consolidate under a single unified command those existing homeland defense and civil support missions that were previously executed by other military organizations On May 8 2002 U S Air Force General Ralph E Eberhart the commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command NORAD and U S Space Command was nominated to be the first commander of USNORTHCOM USNORTHCOM attained initial operational capability on October 1 2002 USNORTHCOM provided support in response to the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster in February 2002 and in May 2003 participated in a comprehensive terrorism response exercise States—Top Officials 2 or TOPOFF 2 USNORTHCOM conducted Exercise Determined Promise 03 in Clark County NV and Colorado Springs CO This major exercise was designed to evaluate the command’s ability to command and control multiple homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities missions simultaneously Following Exercise Determined Promise 03 USNORTHCOM announced full operational capability on September 11 2003 In February 2004 USNORTHCOM conducted Exercise Unified Defense 04 This major exercise allowed the USNORTHCOM Fifth Army Joint Task Force Alaska and associated units to practice the homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities’ missions The exercise involved the Department of Homeland Security and more than 50 federal state and local organizations During the summer of 2004 USNORTHCOM supported interagency efforts to deter and defeat any possible threats against several National Security Special Events Exercise Determined Promise 04 conducted in August 2004 tested USNORTHCOM’s ability to assist civil and federal authorities in a coordinated response to simulated chemical radiological and explosive hazards conducted in California and Virginia In the same month USNORTHCOM supported the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s efforts to provide relief to areas in Florida most impacted by Hurricane Charley In September 2005 as directed by the Secretary of Defense and in accordance with the National Response Plan USNORTHCOM supported the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Emergency Management Agency FEMA and other federal agencies in disaster relief efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina More than 21 400 active-duty servicemembers and 45 700 Army and Air National Guard members supported the effort in the U S Gulf Coast In May 2006 USNORTHCOM participated in Exercise Ardent Sentry 06 which involved numerous federal provincial state and local agencies in Canada and the United States The exercise required participants to respond to simulated terrorist activities and manage the consequences of a range of simulated man-made and natural disasters Exercise Ardent Sentry 06 helped military and civilian officials prepare to respond to a variety of national crises On July 4 2006 the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea launched six ballistic missiles including a long-range Taepodong-2 missile USNORTHCOM personnel were immediately able 99 For a definition of the Posse Comitatus Act that limits the use of military force in law enforcement see http www northcom mil About history_education posse html 100 For additional information on Posse Comitatus see CRS Report RS22266 The Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance Legal Issues by Jennifer K Elsea and R Chuck Mason 101 http www northcom mil About history_education history html Congressional Research Service 39 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands to detect the launch of all the missiles While Ground-based Midcourse Defense System interceptors at Fort Greely AK and Vandenberg Air Force Base CA were operational during the launches top officials from the command were able to quickly determine the missiles posed no threat to the United States or its territories Subcomponents102 Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region JFHQ-NCR “JFHQ-NCR based at Fort McNair Washington D C is responsible for land-based homeland defense defense support of civil authorities DSCA and incident management in the National Capital Region JFHQ-NCR is responsible for protecting the District of Columbia and neighboring counties and cities of Maryland and northern Virginia JFHQ-NCR draws together the existing resources of the Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps Coast Guard and NORAD into a single point headquarters for planning coordination and execution of the mission in the National Capital Region ” Joint Task Force Alaska JTF-AK “JTF-AK is headquartered at Elmendorf Air Force Base Alaska JTF-AK’s mission is to in coordination with other government agencies deter detect prevent and defeat threats within the Alaska Joint Operations Area AK JOA in order to protect U S territory citizens and interests and as directed conduct Civil Support operations ” Joint Task Force Civil Support JTF-CS “JTF-CS was originally formed as a standing joint task force under USJFCOM JTF-CS was transferred to USNORTHCOM when USNORTHCOM was established October 1 2002 The task force consists of active Guard and Reserve military members drawn from all service branches as well as civilian personnel who are commanded by a federalized Title X National Guard general officer JTF-CS plans and integrates DOD support to the designated Primary Agency for domestic chemical biological radiological nuclear or high-yield explosive CBRNE consequence management operations When approved by the Secretary of Defense and directed by the commander of USNORTHCOM JTF-CS deploys to the incident site and executes timely and effective command and control of designated DOD forces providing support to civil authorities to save lives prevent injury and provide temporary critical life support ” Joint Task Force North JTF North “JTF North based at Biggs Army Airfield Fort Bliss TX is the DOD organization tasked to support our nation’s federal law enforcement agencies in the interdiction of suspected transnational threats within and along the approaches to the continental United States Transnational threats are those activities conducted by individuals or groups that involve international terrorism narcotics trafficking alien smuggling weapons of mass destruction and the delivery systems for such weapons that threaten the national security of the United States ” 102 http www northcom mil About index html Congressional Research Service 40 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Army North ARNORTH “ARNORTH is the Army component of NORTHCOM and is located at Fort Sam Houston TX ARNORTH’s mission is to conduct homeland defense civil support operations and theater security cooperation activities ARNORTH is responsible for developing and unifying the military response capability for chemical biological radiological nuclear and high-yield explosives CBRNE incidents In addition the Civil Support Readiness Directorate trains National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams which are state first responders for chemical biological radiological nuclear or high-yield explosive incidents ” Air Force North AFNORTH “Headquartered at Tyndall Air Force Base near Panama City FL 1st Air Force is assigned to Air Combat Command It has the responsibility of ensuring the air sovereignty and air defense of the continental United States As the CONUS geographical component of the bi-national North American Aerospace Defense Command it provides airspace surveillance and control and directs all air sovereignty activities for the continental United States Fleet Forces Command USFF ” U S Fleet Forces Command USFF “USFF is the Navy component of USNORTHCOM and is located at Norfolk VA USFF’s mission is to provide maritime forces prepared to conduct homeland defense civil support operations and theater security cooperation activities when directed by USNORTHCOM Additionally USFF has responsibilities to generate ready Navy forces for assignment to global Regional Combatant Commanders execute the Fleet Response Plan FRP using the Fleet Training Continuum articulate to the Chief of Naval Operations the integrated Fleet warfighting requirements as coordinated with all Navy Component Commanders and provide operational planning support to USTRATCOM ” Ongoing Operations USNORTHCOM’s and NORAD’s missions of homeland defense air and missile defense and maritime warning involve a multitude of continuous operations in a variety of domains These operations are best described as monitoring detection and warning and in the case of airbreathing threats interception According to the USNORTHCOM commander Our daily efforts include countering terrorism and transnational criminal organizations preparing to support our federal and state partners in the wake of a natural or manmade disaster air defense against both internal and external threats maritime and ballistic missile defense and of course a growing focus on the Arctic 103 103 Statement of General Charles H Jacoby Jr Commander United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command before the House Armed Services Committee March 6 2012 Congressional Research Service 41 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Selected Current Issues104 Countering Transnational Criminal Organizations105 Mexican transnational criminal organizations TCOs and their involvement in the illicit trafficking of drugs weapons money and human beings into the United States is one of USNORTHCOM’s primary homeland security concerns USNORTHCOM in keeping with U S law and working with and through other U S government agencies is working with the Mexican government to defeat the TCOs USNORTHCOM efforts include providing the Mexican military with material solutions as well as sharing operational insights and experiences In addition to efforts along the southern U S border USNORTHCOM has been providing support to U S law enforcement agencies along both southern and northern borders This support includes sensors radar forward-looking infrared and manned and unmanned aerial border surveillance Because access to these platforms is not unlimited concerns exist that if a greater level of support is required along one border assets available for the other border might become constrained The Arctic106 Because of the growing geo-strategic importance of the Arctic the USNORTHCOM Commander has designated the Arctic as a key focus area Along these lines USNORTHCOM is currently examining how to support other U S government agencies in the region with search and rescue assets humanitarian assistance disaster response and law enforcement As part of this examination USNORTHCOM has identified deficiencies in all-domain awareness communications infrastructure including a deepwater port mobility including an adequate national icebreaking capability search and rescue enabling capabilities Arctic Ocean charting and the ability to observe and forecast Arctic environmental change U S Pacific Command USPACOM Website http www pacom mil Mission107 “USPACOM protects and defends in concert with other U S Government agencies the territory of the United States its people and its interests With allies and partners USPACOM is committed to enhancing stability in the Asia-Pacific region by promoting security cooperation encouraging peaceful development responding to contingencies deterring aggression and when necessary fighting to win This approach is based on partnership presence and military readiness ” USPACOM’s AOR covers half of the earth and is home to 3 billion people living in three dozen countries with five of these nations being U S allies and with many more important economic 104 Ibid For additional information on Mexican operations against TCOs see CRS Report R41576 Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations Source and Scope of the Rising Violence by June S Beittel 106 For additional information on the Arctic see CRS Report R41153 Changes in the Arctic Background and Issues for Congress coordinated by Ronald O'Rourke 107 http www pacom mil web Site_Pages USPACOM Facts shtml 105 Congressional Research Service 42 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands and security partners USPACOM’s AOR contains the world’s three largest economies and almost one-third of U S two-way trade in goods and services In addition much of the world’s trade and energy that fuels the global economy transits Asia’s sea and air lines of communication History108 USPACOM was established as a unified command on January 1 1947 and is the oldest and largest of the United States’ COCOMs The present USPACOM includes areas originally assigned to two other unified commanders The Far East Command which had been established on January 1 1947 was disestablished on July 1 1957 and all its responsibilities were assumed by the Pacific Command That same day the command assumed some of the responsibilities of the Alaskan Command and individual Army and Air Force component commands for the Pacific also were established in Hawaii Added responsibilities were assigned to USPACOM on January 1 1972 for military forces and elements in the Indian Ocean Southern Asia and the Arctic The Pacific Command’s AOR was further expanded on May 1 1976 to the east coast of Africa This enlarged the Pacific Command to more than 50% of the earth’s surface an area of over 100 million square miles Another enlargement of the USPACOM area took place in October 1983 when CINCPAC was assigned responsibility for the People’s Republic of China the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Mongolia and the Republic of Madagascar CINCPAC was also redesignated Commander in Chief U S Pacific Command USCINCPAC A new Alaskan Command ALCOM was established on July 7 1989 at Elmendorf Air Force Base Alaska as a subordinate unified command responsible to USCINCPAC This placed the defense of Alaska and its surrounding waters under the leadership of one commander providing a unity of command absent from the state since the early 1970s From 1989 through 2000 three UCPs slightly reduced USPACOM’s AOR With the focus of attention shifting to the Middle East the August 16 1989 plan assigned responsibility for the Gulf of Oman and Gulf of Aden to Commander USCENTCOM The January 1 1996 plan transferred the Seychelles and adjacent waters to USCENTCOM On October 1 2000 responsibility for Indian Ocean waters off Tanzania Mozambique and South Africa was transferred from USPACOM to USEUCOM The UCP changed as a result of the events of September 11 2001 and the ensuing war on terrorism as well as the new defense strategy articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review For the first time the entire surface of the earth was divided among the various unified commands A new USNORTHCOM was created for homeland security and other changes in the various commands’ responsibilities resulted in significant changes for USPACOM The West Coast of North America was reassigned from USPACOM to USNORTHCOM While Alaska was included in the reassignment to USNORTHCOM Alaskan Command forces remained assigned to USPACOM in the Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum Antarctica was also added to USPACOM’s AOR Approved in April 2002 the new UCP became effective October 1 2002 The 2008 UCP signed on December 17 2008 documented the transfer of all areas of the Indian Ocean previously assigned to USPACOM west of 68 degrees east to the newly established USAFRICOM As a result four island countries off the east coast of Africa that were formerly assigned to PACOM were reassigned to AFRICOM Comoros Madagascar Mauritius and Reunion 108 http www pacom mil web site_pages uspacom history shtm Congressional Research Service 43 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Subcomponents109 U S Army Pacific USARPAC Located in Fort Shafter Hawaii USARPAC is the Army’s component command in the Pacific and supplies Army forces for full-spectrum security operations USARPAC is the most forward deployed unit in the Army still on U S soil in Hawaii U S Forces Korea USFK USFK is a subcommand within USPACOM responsible to U S forces in Korea While this is a joint headquarters command has traditionally been held by a four-star U S Army general U S Eighth Army The U S Eighth Army operates in conjunction with USFK and the United Nations Command in Korea U S Eighth Army’s stated mission is described as Eighth Army supports deterrence of North Korea aggression against the Republic of Korea Should deterrence fail Eighth Army supports Non-combatant Evacuation Operations NEO transitions to hostilities generates combat power to support Commander in Chief United Nations Command USFK’s campaign and provides combat support and combat service support to assigned attached and other designated forces within the Korea Theater of Operation and on order conducts combat operations 110 U S Pacific Fleet PACFLT PACFLT consists of the California-based Third Fleet and the Fifth Fleet in Japan It is the world’s largest fleet command responsible for 100 million square miles more than half the Earth’s surface from the West Coast of the United States into the Indian Ocean PACFLT consists of approximately 180 ships nearly 2 000 aircraft and 125 000 Sailors Marines and government civilian employees 111 U S Pacific Air Force PACAF PACAF is headquartered at Hickam Air Force Base Hawaii where it plans conducts and coordinates defensive and offensive air operations in the Asian and Pacific region PACAF’s components consists of the Seventh Air Force in South Korea the Fifth Air Force in Japan the Eleventh Air Force in Alaska and the Thirteenth Air Force in Guam U S Marine Forces Pacific MARFORPAC MARFORPAC the Marine component headquarters includes the First Marine Expeditionary Force in California and the Third Marine Expeditionary Force based in Okinawa 109 Cynthia A Watson pp 49-55 http 8tharmy korea army mil mission asp 111 http www cpf navy mil about facts 110 Congressional Research Service 44 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Special Operations Command Pacific SOCPAC SOCPAC located at Camp H M Smith Oahu Hawaii is a sub-unified command and serves as the SOF component command for USPACOM Special Operations Command Korea SOCKOR SOCKOR located at Camp Kim in Yongsan Korea is the Theater Special Operations Command responsible for special operations on the Korean peninsula and when established the Korean Theater of Operations Other Major USPACOM Organizations112 Joint Intelligence Operations Center JIOC The JIOC is the central clearing house for intelligence throughout the theater and is responsible for managing intelligence requirements at the strategic level and supports USPACOM Subcomponents and Subordinate Commands Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies APCSS APCSS supports USPACOM security cooperation and capacity-building efforts by means of international executive education and specialized assistance programs that are intended to both educate and foster relationships between key regional security officials Joint POW MIA Accounting Command JPAC JPAC’s mission is to achieve the fullest possible accounting of all Americans missing as a result of past conflicts Joint Interagency Task Force West JIATF-West JIATF-West is the USPACOM executive agent for countering drug-related transnational crimes in the Asia-Pacific region primarily by supporting U S law enforcement agencies operating in the region Ongoing Operations113 While USPACOM has significant on-the-ground presence in Korea as well as a variety of naval and air activities throughout its AOR its primary focus is exercise and engagement programs USPACOM’s current program consists of 18 major exercises involving joint military forces as well as other U S government agencies These exercises are conducted with 27 of 36 USPACOM partner nations On the operational side USPACOM played a crucial role in helping Japan in the aftermath of the March 11 2011 earthquake and resultant tsunami which devastated parts of Japan USPACOM and its subordinate commands provided direct disaster relief support on the ground at sea and in 112 Statement of Admiral Robert F Willard U S Navy Commander U S Pacific Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U S Pacific Command Posture April 12 2011 pp 27-29 113 Statement of Admiral Robert F Willard U S Navy Commander U S Pacific Command Before the House Armed Services Committee on U S Pacific Command Posture March 1 2012 Congressional Research Service 45 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands the air Of note Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines continues its eight-year-old noncombat role in supporting Filipino armed forces in their efforts to contain violent extremist organizations VEOs in their country Selected Current Issues Regional Challenges In his March 2012 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee the USPACOM commander indicated current major issues in his AOR 114 These issues included the threat to the United States and its allies posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies and its potential for instability 115 Another issue was transnational violent extremist organizations VEOs undermining stability and threatening Allies and emerging partners The USPACOM commander voiced concern with China’s significant military modernization associated with its unclear intent 116 He also noted that territorial disputes and increasingly assertive actions to resolve them present the potential for conflict and instability Cyber threats and transnational criminal activity—to include piracy and trafficking in narcotics and persons—were cited as growing areas of concern Finally humanitarian crises such as pandemics and famines as well as natural disasters such as tsunamis earthquakes and volcanoes and environmental degradation presented unique challenges to USPACOM U S Strategic Shift to the Pacific117 On January 26 2012 senior DOD leadership unveiled a new defense strategy based on a review of potential future security challenges current defense strategy and budgetary constraints This strategy will rebalance the Army’s global posture and presence emphasizing where potential problems are likely to arise such as the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East The major focus of this new strategy is the Asia-Pacific and the Navy plans to rebalance its fleet Secretary of Defense Panetta recently told Asian leaders “By 2020 the Navy will re-posture its forces from today’s roughly 50 50 split between the Atlantic and Pacific to about a 60 40 split between those oceans—including six aircraft carriers a majority of our cruisers destroyers littoral combat ships and submarines ”118 It is not known if such a change in strategic emphasis will require additional resources or authorities for USPACOM 114 Ibid For additional information on North Korean nuclear weapons see CRS Report RL34256 North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Technical Issues by Mary Beth Nikitin 116 For information on Chinese naval modernization see CRS Report RL33153 China Naval Modernization Implications for U S Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress by Ronald O'Rourke 117 For additional information see CRS Report R42448 Pivot to the Pacific The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia coordinated by Mark E Manyin 118 Jim Garamone Panetta Describes U S Shift in Asia-Pacific ” American Forces Press Service June 1 2012 115 Congressional Research Service 46 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Report to Congress on Resources Needed for U S Strategic Shift to the Pacific Concerned about the resources needed to successfully prosecute the Administration’s Asia-Pacific strategy the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act requires DOD to conduct a comprehensive review detailed in the following section 119 SEC 1068 REPORT ON MILITARY RESOURCES NECESSARY TO EXECUTE UNITED STATES FORCE POSTURE STRATEGY IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION a REVIEW REQUIRED — 1 IN GENERAL —The Secretary of Defense shall in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conduct a comprehensive review of the national defense strategy force structure force modernization plans infrastructure budget plan and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with regard to the Asia Pacific region to determine the resources equipment and transportation required to meet the strategic and operational plans of the United States 2 ELEMENTS —The review required under paragraph 1 shall include the following elements A The force structure force modernization plans infrastructure budget plan and other elements of the defense program of the United States associated with the Asia Pacific region that would be required to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in the national defense strategy B An estimate of the timing for initial and final operational capability for each unit based in realigned within or identified for support to the Asia Pacific region C An assessment of the strategic and tactical sea ground and air transportation required for the forces assigned to the Asia Pacific region to meet strategic and operational plans D The specific capabilities including the general number and type of specific military platforms their permanent station and planned forward operating locations needed to achieve the strategic and warfighting objectives identified in the review E The forward presence phased deployments pre-positioning and other anticipatory deployments of manpower or military equipment necessary for conflict deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts F The budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions and phased operations in the Asia Pacific region at a low-to-moderate level of risk and any additional resources beyond those programmed in the current future-years defense program required to achieve such a level of risk G Budgetary recommendations that are not constrained to comply with and are fully independent of the budget submitted to Congress by the President pursuant to section 1105 of title 31 United States Code b CJCS REVIEW —Upon the completion of the review under subsection a the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense the Chairman’s assessment of the review including the Chairman’s assessment of risk and a description of the capabilities needed to address such risk c REPORT — 119 Information in the following section is taken from Report 112-705 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 Conference Report to Accompany H R 4310 December 18 2012 Congressional Research Service 47 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands 1 IN GENERAL —Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the results of the review required under subsection a 2 CONTENT —The report required under paragraph 1 shall include the following elements A A description of the elements set forth under subsection a 1 B A description of the assumptions used in the examination including assumptions relating to— i the status of readiness of the Armed Forces ii the cooperation of allies and partners mission-sharing and additional benefits to and burdens on the Armed Forces resulting from coalition operations iii warning times iv levels of engagement in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies and withdrawal from such operations and contingencies v the intensity duration and military and political end-states of conflicts and smallerscale contingencies and vi the roles and responsibilities that would be discharged by contractors C Any other matters the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate D The full and complete assessment of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under subsection b including related comments of the Secretary of Defense 3 FORM —The report required under paragraph 1 may be submitted in classified or unclassified form U S Southern Command USSOUTHCOM Website http www southcom mil appssc index php Mission120 “USSOUTHCOM is responsible for providing contingency planning operations and security cooperation for Central and South America the Caribbean except U S commonwealths territories and possessions Cuba as well as for the force protection of U S military resources at these locations USSOUTHCOM is also responsible for ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal and canal area ” History121 During World War II the Roosevelt Administration established the U S Caribbean Defense Command 1941-1947 a prototype unified military organization to defend the Panama Canal and surrounding area The command organized and implemented an active system of regional defense including antisubmarine and counterespionage operations 120 121 http www southcom mil AppsSC pages about php http www southcom mil AppsSC factfiles php id 76 Congressional Research Service 48 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Located in Panama the U S Caribbean Defense Command also established military training missions in Latin America distributed military equipment to regional partners through the Lend Lease program and opened U S service schools to Latin American soldiers sailors and airmen At the height of the war U S military planners assigned 130 000 uniformed personnel to duty stations in Latin America and the Caribbean Roughly half of those forces were under the direct control of the U S Caribbean Defense Command In 1947 U S strategists adopted a national security plan that transformed the wartime headquarters into the U S Caribbean Command Beyond defending the Panama Canal it assumed broad responsibilities for inter-American security cooperation in Central and South America During the 1950s defense officials also removed the Caribbean basin from the U S Caribbean Command’s area of focus In the event of a global war with the communist powers they reasoned U S Atlantic Command based in Norfolk VA needed the Caribbean basin to conduct hemispheric antisubmarine operations By 1960 the U S Caribbean Command carried a name that incorrectly described its geographic interests Central and South America The Kennedy Administration changed the name to USSOUTHCOM on June 6 1963 During the 1960s the USSOUTHCOM mission involved defending the Panama Canal contingency planning for Cold War activities and the administration of the U S foreign military assistance program in Central and South America In particular USSOUTHCOM personnel undertook civic-action projects with partner nation forces to accelerate regional development During the 1970s the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended disestablishing the command to trim the U S military presence abroad For political reasons the command narrowly survived albeit with limited responsibilities and resources In the 1980s internal conflicts in El Salvador Nicaragua and elsewhere rekindled U S military interest in Latin America and the Reagan Administration revitalized USSOUTHCOM When the Cold War ended the command like other U S military organizations entered a period of dramatic change In rapid succession USSOUTHCOM was assigned responsibility for counterdrug operations expanded its area of geographic focus to include the Caribbean and enhanced its capacity for humanitarian missions In September 1997 USSOUTHCOM moved to Miami FL Subcomponents122 U S Army South ARSOUTH ARSOUTH is located at Ft Sam Houston Texas where its primary mission is to support regional disaster and counterdrug operations ARSOUTH also is responsible for oversight planning and logistical support for humanitarian and civic assistance projects throughout the region U S Naval Forces Southern Command U S Fourth Fleet COMUSNAVSO COMFOURTHFLT COMUSNAVSO COMFOURTHFLT is located in Mayport Naval Base in Florida and supports USSOUTHCOM with a full range of naval capabilities Its primary responsibility is to provide sea-based forward presence to ensure freedom of maneuver as well as developing cooperative relationships with partners in the region 122 http www southcom mil AppsSC pages team php Congressional Research Service 49 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Air Forces Southern Twelfth Air Force AFSOUTH AFSOUTH is located at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona and is responsible for Air Force forces in the region AFSOUTH serves as the executive agent for forward operating locations in the region and provides joint and combined radar surveillance and intra-theater airlift U S Marine Forces South USMARFORSOUTH USMARFORSOUTH is located in Miami Florida and advises USSOUTHCOM on the proper employment and support of Marine forces operating in the region In addition USMARFORSOUTH conducts deployment redeployment planning and supervises mission execution for assigned Marine forces Special Operations Command South USSOCSOUTH USSOCSOUTH is located near Miami Florida and provides primary theater contingency response forces and plans for and conducts special operations in support of USSOUTHCOM USSOCSOUTH can also serve as a Joint Special Operations Task Force when required USSOUTHCOM Task Forces and Direct Reporting Units123 Joint Task Force Bravo JTF-Bravo JTF-Bravo is located at Soto Cano Air Base Honduras and operates a forward all weather day night C-5 Galaxy-capable air base JTF-Bravo organizes multilateral exercises and with partner nations supports humanitarian and civic assistance counterdrug contingency and disaster relief in Central America Joint Task Force Guantanamo JTF–Guantanamo JTF-Guantanamo is located at the U S Naval Station Guantanamo Cuba and conducts detention and interrogation operations in support of worldwide U S counterterrorism operations Joint Interagency Task Force South JIATF South JIATF-South is located in Key West Florida and is an interagency task force that integrates and synchronizes U S counterdrug operations and is responsible for the detection and monitoring of suspect air and maritime drug activity in the region JIATF South works in coordination with USNORTHCOM’s JTF North on a variety of counterdrug and counter trafficking operations Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies CHDS CHDS is located in Washington DC and provides education outreach and research and knowledge-sharing activities on defense and policy making with regional military and political leaders 123 Ibid Congressional Research Service 50 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Ongoing Operations124 Exercises and Military-to-Military Activities USSOUTHCOM is involved in a variety of exercises and military-to-military operations in support of the Theater Engagement Plan On an annual basis USSOUTCOM conducts medical readiness training exercises engineering exercises and disaster relief and humanitarian assistance exercises For example USSOUTHCOM conducted civic assistance exercises Beyond the Horizon and New Horizons in El Salvador the Dominican Republic and Haiti In addition USSOUTHCOM conducts medical readiness training exercises and other annual military exercises designed to facilitate interoperability build capabilities and provide opportunities to share best practices with regional military and security forces Task Force-Oriented Activities JTF-Guantanamo continues to serve as a detention and interrogation center for suspected terrorists JTF-Bravo and JIATF-South are involved in a wide variety of day-to-day activities and operations designed to counter illicit trafficking of people narcotics money and weapons In addition to operations against Transnational Criminal Organizations USSOUTHCOM task forces also work to counter violent extremist organizations from the Middle East which have been active in Latin America and the Caribbean and are considered a potential threat Selected Current Issues125 Counter-Trafficking The USSOUTHCOM Commander noted that illicit trafficking of drugs weapons and people and their associated TCOs constitute the primary threat to regional security Working in conjunction with regional partners USSOUTCOM is combating these criminal organizations through demand reduction eradication and regulation of source materials suppression of money laundering and interdiction of illegal shipments as they transit to the United States and other end-user countries These efforts not only involve regional partners but also various U S Interagency offices Natural Disasters Poverty and Violence The USSOUTHCOM Commander testified that natural disasters poverty and violence in the region have a negative impact on regional security and stability Widespread and frequent natural disasters in the region have worsened economic and social conditions in countries that can illafford these types of setbacks and when governments cannot make discernible progress recovering in the aftermath of these events citizens lose faith in government While economic conditions in some countries have improved poverty particularly in Central America creates conditions for social stagnation These social conditions create openings for criminal organizations to recruit new members who both undermine legitimate governance and contribute to increasing violence against private citizens 124 Posture Statement of General Douglas M Fraser United States Air Force Commander United States Southern Command Before the 112th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee March 6 2012 125 Ibid Congressional Research Service 51 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Extra-Regional Actors While the USSOUTHCOM Commander noted there are economic benefits for countries in his AOR in establishing or renewing relationships with extra-regional actors such as China Russia and Iran it also presents a number of challenges Currently 18 countries in Central and South America and the Caribbean receive military training from China and in 2011 Venezuela became the largest importer of Russian arms in the world In addition to extra-regional state actors violent extremist organizations from the Middle East are active in Latin America and the Caribbean and are involved in fund-raising activities to finance worldwide activities Potential Issues for Congress Congress is presented with a wide range of national security policy issues that are impacted by the provisions of the UCP as well as the COCOM construct As the U S arguably moves to a post-Iraq Afghanistan era where global military operations against terrorists could be the new “steady state ” it might prove prudent to re-examine the UCP and COCOMs The Administration’s decision to shift U S national strategic emphasis to the Asia-Pacific region and Middle East also presents considerations for Congress As new threats such as cyber attacks and TCOs take center stage and new international actors such as China and India emerge while established actors such as Russia and Iran transition to different types of security challenges such a re-examination could serve to increase the efficacy of U S national security policy What Are the Implications of the Asia-Pacific Strategic Shift for the UCP and COCOMs The Administration’s decision to shift strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific while maintaining an active role in the Middle East raises a number of issues for possible congressional consideration Potential issues include the following         In terms of the UCP will a new UCP need to be issued in the near future to codify this change in strategic emphasis Will new Title 10 authorities be required to facilitate this shift Does Headquarters USPACOM require additional staff and resources to implement the Administration’s new strategy Is USPACOM’s command infrastructure adequately geographically positioned to take on this new strategic challenge Compared to USCENTCOM and USAFRICOM the USPACOM region can be viewed as somewhat peaceful In this regard is focusing on the Asia-Pacific region the best course of action when there are at present a number of volatile conflicts and potential civil wars in the Middle East and Africa What are the impacts to the other COCOM’s as a result of the Asia-Pacific shift What resources will they lose due to this shift and how do respective combatant commanders plan to compensate for a possible loss of resources Are there UCP-directed missions and responsibilities that COCOM commander will no longer be able to accomplish as a result of shifting resources to the AsiaPacific region What has been the response of our allies and potential adversaries as a result of the announced strategic shift Congressional Research Service 52 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Is Greater Interagency Involvement in the UCP Process Needed 126 In the Fall 2010 edition of the Interagency Journal former U S Ambassador Edward Marks noted The geographic commands have essentially two tasks war planning and fighting and military engagement programs Both tasks remain and will always remain fundamental responsibilities of the Department of Defense and the military services However while the war planning and fighting responsibility obviously remains uniquely a duty of the Department of Defense and the military services the engagement programs no longer can be handled as a discrete military activity In today’s world military engagement programs with other countries can only be seen as part of the overall engagement activity of the U S government The so-called “nexus” of security challenges—terrorism narcotics smuggling international criminal networks etc —can no longer be managed as single agency programs but must be integrated into “whole of government” programs 127 The concept of a “whole of government approach to national security” has taken on renewed emphasis since September 11 2001 Past and current senior military leadership have repeatedly called for greater participation in national security matters from other U S government agencies even going so far as to publically advocate for greater funding levels for the State Department and U S Agency for International Development USAID so they can play a greater role in military operations In the current strategic environment COCOMs are being faced with security challenges that fall outside the traditional military realm One such challenge transnational criminal organizations or TCOs is a stated concern of Combatant Commanders both in a domestic and international context In this regard if TCOs are expected to become a central security issue for COCOMs and the President and DOD include TCO-related responsibilities in the UCP enhanced interagency involvement in the UCP process from the Justice Department other U S law enforcement entities and others could prove to be beneficial It can be argued while greater resources for other U S government agencies are important of equal importance is participation in the UCP process It has been noted that military engagement programs are at the forefront of geographical COCOM’s responsibilities and as hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan diminish over time and the U S defense budget decreases military engagement could become the primary focus of all geographical COCOMs Under the current UCP development process the U S Interagency has a degree of visibility but participation is limited While Interagency participation in developing regional war plans might not be appropriate a greater role in planning for military engagement activities might not only enhance these programs but might also identify areas of redundancy with other U S government regional engagement programs This enhanced role could include more Interagency representatives in the early stages of the UCP review and development process and increasing military presence in key Interagency positions particularly directorates that are responsible for strategic planning and resourcing While the Interagency might welcome the opportunity to play a greater role DOD might be less than enthusiastic with including a greater role for other U S government agencies in what it likely considers fundamental strategic military planning 126 For additional information on U S Interagency issues see CRS Report RL34455 Organizing the U S Government for National Security Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates by Catherine Dale Nina M Serafino and Pat Towell 127 Edward Marks “Rethinking the Geographic Combatant Commands InterAgency Journal Vol 1 Issue 1 Fall 2010 p 20 Congressional Research Service 53 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands In this regard Congress might consider an in depth examination of the UCP development process This examination could focus on the current level of Interagency participation and identifying areas in the process where greater Interagency involvement could be beneficial Has U S Foreign Policy Become “Too Militarized” as a Result of the Geographic COCOMs In September 2000 Washington Post reporter Dana Priest published a series of articles whose central premise was Combatant Commanders wielded an inordinate amount of political influence within the countries in their areas of responsibility and “had evolved into the modern-day equivalent of the Roman Empire’s proconsuls—well-funded semi-autonomous unconventional centers of U S foreign policy ”128 Some national security experts consider this series as the catalyst of the continuing debate as to whether or not COCOMs have assumed too much influence overseas thereby diminishing the roles other U S government entities play in foreign and national security policy Despite the post-September 11 2011 ascendancy of the Interagency in foreign policy and national security matters the debate over the COCOM’s role continues In 2007 testimony from Mark Malan from Refugees International before the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee he noted In some parts of the world like Iraq and Afghanistan the face of U S foreign policy is clearly a military one In Africa the DOD appears to be putting a civilian mask on the face of a combatant command with its marketing pitch for USAFRICOM This disingenuous strategy is not working The veneer of the mask is simply too thin and attempts to patch the holes that have emerged—by telling us “what AFRICOM is not about” and reemphasizing a humanitarian and developmental role for the U S military in Africa— simply make the face of U S foreign policy much shadier The notion of a benign U S combatant command is an enigma to those who clearly understand and accept the need for the U S to secure access to Africa’s natural resources especially oil and to establish bases from which to destroy networks linked to Al-Qaeda When the U S promotes a combatant military command in terms of development and humanitarianism Africans will inevitably suspect that the true story is being kept from them 129 The assertion that COCOMs have usurped other U S government entities in the foreign policy arena may deserve greater examination Geographic Combatant Commanders generally agree their role is more political than military A former USEUCOM and Supreme Allied Commander Europe SACEUR estimated he spent about 70% of his time on political-military issues despite having ongoing combat operations in the Balkans 130 USCENTCOM commanders have reportedly spent a significant amount of time meeting with the senior Iraqi and Afghan political leadership over the past 10 years discussing issues of building and maintaining armed forces civil-military relations and other national security matters While these discussions might not conform to what have been traditionally considered war fighting-related topics the complexities Dana Priest “A Four-Star Foreign Policy U S Commanders Wield Rising Clout Autonomy ” September 28 2000 “An Engagement in 10 Time Zones Zinni Crosses Central Asia Holding Hands Building Trust ” September 29 2000 “Standing Up to State and Congress ” September 30 2000 Washington Post 129 Testimony from Mark Malan Refugees International Washington DC “AFRICOM A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing ” before the Subcommittee on African Affairs Committee on Foreign Relations U S Senate at a hearing entitled “Exploring the U S Africa Command and a New Strategic Relationship with Africa ” August 1 2007 130 Howard D Belote “Proconsuls Pretenders or Professionals The Political Role of Regional Combatant Commanders ” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition 2004 128 Congressional Research Service 54 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands of U S involvement in these two countries suggests Combatant Commanders have been required to play a more pronounced political role Some U S government officials suggest the Combatant Commander State Department relationship as it currently exists has proven beneficial A former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs noted he was a huge fan of the regional commanders I was the ambassador to Turkey in EUCOM when the deputy commander the commander and I were on the same page—there was nothing we couldn’t achieve In 6 years in Turkey as deputy chief of mission and ambassador there was never a single conflict Now I’m dealing with Colombia I’ve made five of my six visits with SOUTHCOM’s commander We do everything together Yes someone could goof But the system works wonderfully—the regional commanders are some of the finest America has to offer When the commander and ambassador are on the same page it’s a very powerful combination I’m a complete believer 131 Congress has examined aspects of this COCOM-State Department relationship in terms of the broader topic of civil-military relations as well as how it pertains to USAFRICOM and its role in U S foreign policy In a broader context Congress might wish to consider the role Geographic COCOMs play in U S foreign policy abroad This consideration could take into account more than just the State Department but also other U S government agencies that play a foreign policy role While presence and access to resources have been cited as positive attributes for COCOM involvement overseas it is possible a reallocation of resources might put a more “civilian” face on U S engagement and development efforts possibly resulting in greater acceptance and efficacy in regions that are sensitive to U S military presence In examining the respective roles of COCOMs the State Department and others it might be possible to identify both areas of redundancy as well as areas requiring greater emphasis thereby enhancing overall U S effectiveness in political-military relations with nations in respective regions With many experts predicting shrinking or flat U S military and State Department budgets over the next few years such an examination might lead to a more cost effective approach to U S foreign policy Are There Other Regions or Functions That Merit a Separate COCOM 132 While Geographic COCOMs suggest their regional perspective is their primary virtue others argue the “strict geographic regionalism” the COCOMs were aligned under is no longer how the world is organized 133 These critics contend globalization at one end and localism tribalism at the other end has made the Geographic COCOM construct less than ideal 134 Given this view some suggest there are opportunities to address this disparity The Subcontinent or Indian Ocean or western Asia has been cited as one AOR that could merit a separate command With long-term strategic emphasis on countering violent extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan it might be in the nation’s best interest to establish a separate command rather than continuing to include them in USCENTCOM where the command’s planners and decision makers must also focus on issues such as Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and regional influence the IsraelPalestine impasse and the fate of Syria and Egypt India might also figure into this strategic 131 Ibid p 8 Unless otherwise noted information in this section is taken from Cynthia A Watson “Combatant Commands Origins Structure and Engagement ” Praeger Security International 2011 pp 185-186 133 Edward Marks p 21 134 Ibid 132 Congressional Research Service 55 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands recalculation as its relationships with Pakistan and China have a significant political-military impact in the region Some believe India—currently the responsibility of USPACOM—might be a better fit under a separate Subcontinent COCOM Another area where a new COCOM could be warranted is Central Asia Such a new command could include Turkmenistan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan and Uzbekistan—all presently under USCENTCOM—and could be a natural complement to a Subcontinent COCOM as many of the region’s issues are more “localized” as tribes in the region tend not to conform to established political borders These cross-border tribal and ethnic issues are viewed by many as key contributors to regional instability While the establishment of new COCOMs might have an academic appeal critics note such a course of action might not be fiscally sustainable Establishment of new COCOMs is viewed as being a resource-intensive undertaking—even if resources are taken from existing COCOMs New COCOMs would require additional Joint-qualified senior and mid-level officers as well as supporting military civilian and possibly contractor staff New COCOMs would also likely require additional physical infrastructure and if there is an intent to headquarter these new COCOMs in their AORs there might also be political and diplomatic issues to consider In a fiscally constrained environment these considerations might outweigh any operational benefits that might be derived from the establishment of new COCOMs Aside from Geographic COCOMs there might also be cause to re-examine Functional COCOMs One area for possible examination is if U S Cyber Command—currently a Subunified Command under USSTRATCOM—should be elevated to a full-fledged Combatant Command 135 Proponents cite the following five benefits of this course of action     Unity of Command Effort The current DOD approach to cyberwarfare is scattered across the services and defense agencies The services the Defense Information Systems Agency DISA the National Security Agency NSA the Intelligence Community and the other COCOMs have unsynchronized cyberspace warfighting capabilities A separate and distinct USCYBERCOM would have greater authority responsibility legitimacy and visibility than the current arrangement Synchronization Under the current command arrangement USCYBERCOM might not have sufficient authority to fully synchronize cyber operations across the services and COCOMs This could lead to a situation in which a COCOM decides to conduct cyber operations within its AOR and because there are no physical boundaries in cyber space these actions could have an adverse impact on the other COCOMs Mass A central COCOM with exclusive authority could mass the cyber activities of the other COCOMs services and DOD agencies into a coordinated effort to achieve mass effects on their intended target Offensive Operations One perceived benefit of elevating USCYBERCOM to full combatant command status is it would enable the U S government to place greater emphasis on offensive cyber operations as opposed to the current disparate emphasis on defensive cyber operations which are viewed by some as less effective than offensive operations Information in this section unless otherwise noted is from David M Hollis “USCYBERCOM The Need for a Combatant Command Versus a Subunified Command ” Joint Forces Quarterly Issue 58 3rd Quarter 2010 pp 48-53 135 Congressional Research Service 56 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands  Diverse Mission Focus Supporters argue the current command arrangement results in a lack of direction and discipline amongst DOD and government entities that makes oversight and ultimately funding more difficult An elevated USCYBERCOM could serve to provide a single mission focus for the U S military While proponents suggest in the long run a separate USCYBERCOM would be cost efficient such an undertaking in a fiscally constrained environment could prove to be a difficult undertaking There might also be resistance from the other COCOMs to ceding their cyber-related responsibilities to an elevated USCYBERCOM arguing that they better understand the cyber threats in their specific regions than would a single entity responsible for a wider range of cyber threats Because it might be difficult to identify recruit and retain cyber-qualified personnel that would likely be needed for a separate USCYBERCOM cyber professionals from the COCOMs might be sought after to staff a new USCYBERCOM which could cause resentment from the COCOMs Is There an Alternative to COCOMs Some experts believe the COCOM construct is a relic of the Cold War where the central mission of the U S military was to prepare for and conduct combat operations in specific geographical regions against conventional armed forces These experts suggest a more radical approach to the issue of COCOMs is required so they remain relevant in a post-September 11 2001 world Two possible alternatives to the current COCOM construct are usually discussed Replacing Subcomponent Commands with Joint Task Forces JTFs 136 This proposal advocates retaining the COCOM headquarters and substituting a number of JTFs for the service-centric Subcomponent Commands This approach could streamline and reduce infrastructure and simplify command channels These JTFs could be designed on a regional functional basis for specific operational tasks and would be more flexible and reduce response time to crises in the region Larger COCOM AORs might also benefit from several JTFs that could provide focused planning and operational execution in smaller more manageable portions of their AORs Another perceived benefit of this construct is if a specific condition within a COCOM’s AOR is resolved the JTF established to address the issue could be rapidly disestablished thereby reducing personnel infrastructure and operations and maintenance O M costs Replacing COCOMs with a Joint Interagency Organization137 This proposal advocates replacing COCOMs with permanent standing civilian-led interagency organizations that would have regional responsibility for all aspects of U S foreign policy These organizations would be led by highly credentialed civilians potentially with a four-star military deputy and would report directly to the President through the National Security Council NSC These organizations would include representatives from all major U S government agencies Information in this section unless otherwise noted is taken from W Spencer Johnson “New Challengers for the Unified Command Plan ” Joint Forces Quarterly Summer 2002 pp 62-70 137 Brigadier General Jeffery Buchanan U S Army Captain Maxie Y Davis U S Navy and Colonel Lee Wright U S Air Force “Death of the Combatant Command Toward a Joint Interagency Approach ” Joint Forces Quarterly Issue 52 1st Quarter 2009 136 Congressional Research Service 57 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands including DOD This construct would change only the authority to integrate all elements of U S national power and DOD would continue to exercise its Title 10 authority by means of JIATFs A perceived benefit of this approach is it could result in a significant increase in unity of effort across all the instruments of U S national power through all phases of an operation to include pre and post-conflict Another benefit is such an organization might better facilitate both coalition and alliance-based operations from a political standpoint as it may be more palatable for some nations to work with a civilian-led organization rather than a military-centric one This new construct might also have benefits for both regional engagement and developmental efforts thereby reducing the military “face” of these operations particularly in regions that are sensitive to U S military presence These are but two possible alternatives to the current COCOM construct While Congress might not choose to directly address COCOM reform particularly if there is a general belief the current COCOM construct meets current and future security needs it is possible that as Congress the Administration and DOD continue to pursue government-wide efficiencies aimed at reducing federal spending these and other alternatives might inform the debate Congressional Research Service 58 The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands Appendix 2011 UCP COCOM Areas of Responsibility Author Information Andrew Feickert Specialist in Military Ground Forces Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service CRS CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role CRS Reports as a work of the United States Government are not subject to copyright protection in the United States Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS However as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material Congressional Research Service R42077 · VERSION 11 · UPDATED 59