Russia Background and U S Policy Updated August 21 2017 Congressional Research Service https crsreports congress gov R44775 Russia Background and U S Policy Summary Over the last five years Congress and the executive branch have closely monitored and responded to new developments in Russian policy These developments include the following       increasingly authoritarian governance since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidential post in 2012 Russia’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and support of separatists in eastern Ukraine violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces INF Treaty Moscow’s intervention in Syria in support of Bashar al Asad’s government increased military activity in Europe and cyber-related influence operations that according to the U S intelligence community have targeted the 2016 U S presidential election and countries in Europe In response the United States has imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions related to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Syria malicious cyber activity and human rights violations The United States also has led NATO in developing a new military posture in Central and Eastern Europe designed to reassure allies and deter aggression U S policymakers over the years have identified areas in which U S and Russian interests are or could be compatible The United States and Russia have cooperated successfully on issues such as nuclear arms control and nonproliferation support for military operations in Afghanistan the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs the International Space Station and the removal of chemical weapons from Syria In addition the United States and Russia have identified other areas of cooperation such as countering terrorism illicit narcotics and piracy Like previous U S Administrations President Donald J Trump has sought to improve U S Russian relations at the start of his tenure In its first six months the Trump Administration expressed an intention to pursue cooperation or dialogue with Russia on a range of pursuits e g Syria North Korea cybersecurity At initial meetings with President Putin in April and July 2017 Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and President Trump said they agreed to find ways to improve channels of communication and begin addressing issues dividing the two countries At the same time the Administration has indicated that it intends to adhere to core international commitments and principles as well as to retain sanctions on Russia Secretary Tillerson has stated that Ukraine-related sanctions will remain in place “until Moscow reverses the actions that triggered” them Secretary Tillerson and other officials also have noted the severity of Russian interference in the 2016 U S presidential election and the need for an appropriate response Since the start of the 115th Congress many Members of Congress have actively engaged with the Administration on questions concerning U S -Russian relations As of August 2017 Congress has held more than 20 hearings on matters directly relating to Russia codified and strengthened sanctions through the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 P L 11544 Title II and considered other measures to assess and respond to Russian interference in the 2016 elections influence operations in Europe INF Treaty violations and illicit financial activities abroad This report provides background information on Russian politics economics and military issues It discusses a number of key issues for Congress concerning Russia’s foreign relations and the U S -Russian relationship Congressional Research Service Russia Background and U S Policy Contents Political Structure and Developments 1 Democracy and Human Rights 2 Government Reshuffles 6 September 2016 State Duma Elections 9 The Opposition 11 The Economy 13 Economic Impact of Sanctions 15 U S -Russian Trade and Investment 16 Energy Sector 18 Foreign Relations 21 Russia and Other Post-Soviet States 21 Ukraine Conflict 24 NATO-Russia Relations 26 EU-Russia Relations 29 Russia-China Relations 30 Russia’s Intervention in Syria 31 Russia’s Global Engagement 34 The Military 35 Russia’s Military Footprint in Europe 36 U S Policy Toward Russia 40 U S Policy Under the Obama Administration 40 U S Policy Under the Trump Administration 42 Congressional Action in the 115th Congress 46 Selected Issues in U S -Russian Relations 47 U S Sanctions on Russia 47 Ukraine-Related Sanctions 47 Sanctions for Malicious Cyber Activity 48 Sanctions for Human Rights Violations and Corruption 49 Other Sanctions 49 Malicious Cyber Activity 50 Interference in U S Elections 50 Other Activities 52 Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation 53 Outlook 55 Figures Figure 1 Map of Russia 2 Figure 2 U S Merchandise Trade with Russia 17 Figure 3 Separatist Regions in Eastern Ukraine 25 Figure 4 Russia’s Military Footprint in Europe 39 Congressional Research Service Russia Background and U S Policy Tables Table 1 Election Results to the State Duma September 18 2016 9 Table 2 European Imports of Russian Natural Gas 2015 20 Contacts Author Information 55 Congressional Research Service Russia Background and U S Policy Political Structure and Developments Russia formally known as the Russian Federation is the principal successor to the United States’ former superpower rival the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics USSR or Soviet Union In its modern form Russia came into being in December 1991 after its leaders joined those of neighboring Ukraine and Belarus to dissolve the USSR From 1922 to 1991 Soviet Russia was the core of the USSR established in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the Russia Basic Facts civil war that followed The USSR spanned Land Area 6 3 million square miles about 1 8 times much the same territory as the Russian Empire the size of the United States before it Prior to the empire’s establishment Population 142 4 million mid-2016 est in 1721 Russian states had existed in various Administrative Divisions 83 administrative subdivisions including 21 ethnic-based republics and the forms for centuries Today Russia’s multiethnic federal structure is inherited from the Soviet period and includes regions republics territories and other subunits The country’s constitution provides for a strong presidency and central authority The government is accountable to the president not the legislature and observers consider the presidential Administration rather than the Cabinet headed by a prime minister to be “the true locus of power ”1 cities of Moscow and St Petersburg Russian law considers Ukraine’s occupied region of Crimea and the Crimean city of Sevastopol to be additional administrative subdivisions Ethnicity Russian 77 7% Tatar 3 7% Ukrainian 1 4% Bashkir 1 1% Chuvash 1 0% Chechen 1 0% Other 10 2% Unspecified 3 9% 2010 census Gross Domestic Product $1 268 trillion 2016 est $26 100 per capita purchasing power parity 2016 est Political Leaders President Vladimir Putin Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev Speaker of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin Speaker of the Federation Council Valentina Matviyenko Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu Source CIA World Factbook Russia’s president is Vladimir Putin who has led the country as president 2000-2008 2012-present or prime minister 2008-2012 for more than 17 years see “Vladimir Putin” text box below In recent years opinion polls have reported increased levels of support for President Putin Since the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region in March 2014 he has consistently received approval from more than 80% of respondents in opinion polls 2 This reported approval level is considerably higher than what Putin received in polls over the previous two years when his approval rating was in the low 60s Russia’s bicameral legislature is the Federal Assembly The upper chamber the Federation Council has 170 deputies two each from Russia’s 83 regions and republics including two major cities Moscow and St Petersburg and four from Ukraine’s occupied region of Crimea These deputies are not directly elected but are chosen by regional executives and legislatures The lower house the State Duma has 450 deputies half of which are elected by proportional representation and half of which are in single-member districts The State Duma also includes members from occupied Crimea four from majoritarian districts and another four from party lists 3 The judiciary is the least developed of Russia’s three branches Courts are widely perceived to be subject to manipulation and control by government officials The Supreme Court is the highest 1 Karen Dawisha Putin’s Kleptocracy Who Owns Russia New York NY Simon and Schuster 2014 p 2 Ratings over time are available from the Levada Center at http www levada ru en 3 See U S Department of the Treasury “Treasury Sanctions Individuals for Activities Related to Russia’s Occupation of Crimea ” November 14 2016 at https www treasury gov press-center press-releases Pages jl0609 aspx 2 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 1 Russia Background and U S Policy appellate body The Constitutional Court rules on the legality and constitutionality of governmental acts and on disputes between branches of government or federative entities A 2015 law gives the Constitutional Court the legal authority to disregard verdicts by interstate bodies that defend human rights and freedoms if the court concludes that such verdicts contradict Russia’s constitution although the latter requires compliance of rules established by international treaties over domestic law 4 A Supreme Commercial Court which handled commercial disputes and was viewed by experts as relatively impartial was dissolved in September 2014 with its areas of jurisdiction transferred to the Supreme Court lower-level commercial courts continue to function Figure 1 Map of Russia Sources Graphic produced by the Congressional Research Service CRS Map information generated by Hannah Fischer using data from the Department of State 2015 and Esri a geographic data company 2014 Democracy and Human Rights Under Putin’s rule Russia has experienced a steady decline in its democratic credentials At the start of the 2000s the U S government-funded nongovernmental organization NGO Freedom House classified Russia as a “hybrid” regime with democratic and authoritarian elements By the 4 Many observers believe that the intent of this law was to enable Russia to ignore rulings by the European Court of Human Rights ECHR which Russia joined in 1996 Carl Schreck “Russian Law On Rejecting Human Rights Courts Violates Constitution Experts Say ” RFE RL December 16 2015 at https www rferl org a russian-law-on-rejectinghuman-rights-courts-violates-constitution-experts-say 27432125 html Library of Congress Law Library “Russian Federation Constitutional Court Allows Country to Ignore ECHR Rulings ” May 18 2016 at http www loc gov law foreign-news article russian-federation-constitutional-court-allows-country-to-ignore-echr-rulings Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 2 Russia Background and U S Policy end of Putin’s second term in 2008 Freedom House considered Russia to be a consolidated authoritarian regime This status continued during the tenure of Putin’s handpicked successor for one term Dmitry Medvedev despite some signs of liberalization Since Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 Freedom House has noted a new rise in authoritarian governance in Russia In its 2017 annual report Freedom House assigned Russia the same “freedom rating” it gave to China Yemen Cuba and the Democratic Republic of Congo 5 Vladimir Putin After more than 15 years in the Soviet Union’s Committee for State Security the KGB Vladimir Putin held a variety of governmental positions from 1990 to 1998 first in the local government of St Petersburg his native city and then in Moscow In 1998 Russian President Boris Yeltsin appointed Putin head of the Federal Security Service FSB a successor agency to the KGB and prime minister a year later in August 1999 Yeltsin unexpectedly resigned on New Year’s Eve 1999 and Putin became acting president He was elected president in March 2000 with 53% of the vote Putin served eight years as president before stepping down in 2008 in compliance with constitutional limits on successive terms His successor was Dmitry Medvedev a trusted former presidential chief of staff deputy prime minister and board chairperson of the state-controlled energy company Gazprom As prime minister from 2008 to 2012 Putin continued to govern Russia in tandem with Medvedev who remained informally subordinate to Putin In September 2011 Medvedev announced that he would not run for reelection paving the way for Putin to return to the presidency In exchange Medvedev was to become prime minister Putin’s return to the presidency had always been plausible but the announcement was met with some public discontent particularly in Moscow A series of protests followed the December 2011 parliamentary elections which domestic and international observers considered to be marred by fraud and other violations In March 2012 Putin won the presidency His current term extends to 2018 as president Medvedev extended the next presidential term to six years Putin has not confirmed if he is planning to run for reelection although many observers believe he plans to do so Russia’s authoritarian consolidation has involved a wide array of nondemocratic practices and human rights violations The U S Department of State’s most recent human rights report notes that the Russian government has “increasingly instituted a range of measures to harass discredit prosecute imprison detain fine and suppress individuals and organizations critical of the government ” The report also notes the “lack of due process in politically motivated cases ”6 According to the human rights report Russian NGOs have been “stymied” and “stigmatize d ” including through a 2012 law that requires foreign-funded organizations that engage in activity seeking to affect policymaking loosely defined to register and identify as “foreign agents ” In addition a 2015 law enables the government to identify as “undesirable” foreign organizations engaged in activities that allegedly threaten Russia’s constitutional order defense capability or state security and to close their local offices and bar Russians from working with them 7 Freedom House scores post-Communist states on an index of “democratic progress ” which includes seven different categories of governance and ranges between 1 most democratic and 7 least democratic States that receive a “Democracy Score” between 4 and 5 are considered “transitional governments or hybrid regimes” between 5 and 6 “semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes” and between 6 and 7 “consolidated authoritarian regimes ” Russia’s Democracy Score has gone from a 4 88 in 2001 to a 6 57 in 2017 In addition Freedom House ranks all countries in the world on a “freedom” scale which includes measures of political rights and civil liberties Russia’s 2017 “freedom rating” is 6 5 out of 7 not free Annual scores reflect the state of affairs at the start of the year See the annual reports for Russia in Freedom House Nations in Transit at https freedomhouse org report nations-transit nations-transit2017 and Freedom House Freedom in the World 2017 at https freedomhouse org report freedom-world freedomworld-2017 6 U S Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 Russia at http www state gov j drl rls hrrpt humanrightsreport index htm year 2016 dlid 265466 7 For background see International Center for Not-for-Profit Law “Civic Freedom Monitor Russia ” at http www icnl org research monitor russia html 5 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 3 Russia Background and U S Policy As of the start of August 2017 88 NGOs are classified as foreign agents of these 7 have been added since the start of the year 8 In 2014 Russia’s main domestic election-monitoring organization Golos was the first organization to be so classified Just before the September 2016 Duma election a well-known polling organization the Levada Center also was branded a foreign agent in October 2016 a prominent human rights group Memorial was so labeled as well Eleven organizations or their subsidiaries have been barred from Russia for “undesirable” activity In 2015-2016 barred organizations included the National Endowment for Democracy Open Society Foundations including the Open Society Institute Assistance Foundations U S Russia Foundation for Economic Advancement and the Rule of Law National Democratic Institute International Republican Institute and Media Development Investment Fund In April 2017 three allegedly foreign-registered affiliates of the NGO and civic movement Open Russia were added to the list Open Russia was founded by former oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky who served 10 years in prison on charges deemed by the opposition and most observers to be politically motivated In June 2017 the German Marshall Fund’s Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation also was barred 9 Russian law also limits freedom of assembly and expression Public demonstrations require official approval and police have broken up protests by force The fine for participation in unsanctioned protests can be thousands of dollars repeat offenders risk imprisonment In 2016 new “antiterrorism” legislation known as the Yarovaya Laws hardened punishments for “extremism” a crime that has been broadly interpreted to encompass antistate criticism on social media required telecommunications providers to store data for six months and imposed restrictions on locations of religious worship and proselytization A 2013 law restricts lesbian gay bisexual transgender LGBT rights by prohibiting “propaganda” among minors including in the media or on the Internet that would encourage individuals to consider “non-traditional sexual relationships” as attractive or socially equivalent to “traditional” sexual relationships In June 2017 the European Court on Human Rights ruled that the law is discriminatory and violates freedom of expression 10 These laws and related discriminatory actions have impacted religious and sexual minorities In April 2017 for example Russia’s Supreme Court upheld a March order of the Justice Ministry banning the operations of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia for what it ruled to be “extremist” activity Since then Jehovah’s Witnesses have reported increased harassment and violence The Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the organization in July 2017 11 Also in April 2017 Russian media reported that local authorities in Chechnya a majority-Muslim republic in Russia’s North Caucasus had rounded up more than 100 men on the basis of their The list of organizations currently classified as “foreign agents” is available on the website of the Russian Ministry of Justice at http unro minjust ru NKOForeignAgent aspx Some organizations classified as foreign agents have been declassified after the government determined that these organizations no longer receive foreign funding and others have shut down In February 2017 Human Rights Watch noted that 158 organizations had been classified at some point as foreign agents Human Rights Watch “Russia Government vs Rights Groups ” February 6 2017 at https www hrw org russia-government-against-rights-groups-battle-chronicle 9 The list of organizations classified as “undesirable” is available on the website of the Russian Ministry of Justice at http minjust ru ru activity nko unwanted 10 Sewell Chan “Russia’s ‘Gay Propaganda’ Laws Are Illegal European Court Rules ” New York Times June 20 2017 at https www nytimes com 2017 06 20 world europe russia-gay-propaganda html 11 Jason Le Miere “Jehovah’s Witnesses Ban Appeal Rejected by Russia’s Supreme Court Allowing Government to Seize Worship Halls ” Newsweek July 17 2017 at http www newsweek com jehovahs-witnesses-russia-ban-appeal637816 8 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 4 Russia Background and U S Policy suspected homosexuality 12 Reports indicate that detained individuals were beaten and tortured and that at least three died as a result of the roundup including two reportedly killed by relatives after their release from detention 13 Putin’s presidential spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that the government had no information concerning the allegations and the local administration’s press secretary denied the reports 14 In May 2017 Putin said that he would speak to Russia’s prosecutor-general and minister of internal affairs “concerning the rumors” about the detentions but it is unclear what if any subsequent measures the government took 15 Over the years a number of opposition-minded or critical Russian journalists human rights activists politicians whistleblowers and others including opposition politician Boris Nemtsov in 2015 have been reported murdered or have died under mysterious circumstances 16 Although those who commit crimes are often prosecuted suspicions frequently exist that such crimes are ordered by individuals who remain free 17 Corruption Observers contend that Russia suffers from high levels of corruption The U S State Department’s 2016 Human Rights Report notes that corruption in Russia is “widespread throughout the executive branch as well as in the legislative and judicial branches at all levels of government Its manifestations include bribery of officials misuse of budgetary resources theft of government property kickbacks in the procurement process extortion and improper use of one’s official position to secure personal profits ” Transparency International TI a nongovernmental organization NGO ranks Russia 131 out of 176 countries on its 2016 Corruption Perception Index similar to Kazakhstan Iran Nepal and Ukraine though Russia’s TI ranking has improved over time in 2010 the country ranked 154 out of 178 Many Russians share these perceptions of corruption In a February 2016 poll by the Russia-based Levada Center 76% of respondents said that Russian state organs were either significantly or wholly affected by corruption Of respondents who engaged in activities such as vehicle registration and licensing hospital stays university admissions and funerals 15%-30% reported having paid a bribe as did nearly half of those who reported being detained by traffic police Estimates of bribe amounts vary In December 2015 Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that the average amount of a bribe in criminal cases was around $2 500 In September 2016 a domestic NGO Clean Hands calculated the average reported bribe to be around five times that amount 12 Human Rights Watch They Have Long Arms and They Can Find Me Anti-Gay Purge by Local Authorities in Russia’s Chechen Republic May 2017 at https www hrw org node 304090 Masha Gessen “The Gay Men Who Fled Chechnya’s Purge ” New Yorker July 3 2017 The original reports in Russian are Elena Milashina “Honor Killing ” Novaya Gazeta April 1 2017 at https www novayagazeta ru articles 2017 04 01 71983-ubiystvo-chesti and Elena Milashina and Irina Gordienko “Violence Against Chechen Gays ” Novaya Gazeta April 4 2017 at https www novayagazeta ru articles 2017 04 04 72027-raspravy-nad-chechenskimi-geyami-publikuem-svidetelstva 13 Human Rights Watch They Have Long Arms and They Can Find Me p 15 14 The press secretary also reportedly told a Russian journalist that there were no homosexuals in Chechnya and even if there were these individuals probably would be killed by their own relatives Tanya Lokshina “Anti-LGBT Violence in Chechnya ” April 4 2017 15 TASS Russian News Agency “Putin Vows to Discuss Gay Rights Issue in North Caucasus with Prosecutor General ” May 5 2017 at http tass com politics 944803 16 For example the Committee to Protect Journalists cites cases of 38 murdered journalists from 1993 to 2017 including 24 since Putin was elected president at https cpj org killed europe russia murder php In January 2017 Representative Marcy Kaptur included for the Congressional Record January 12 2017 H399-H400 a list of 33 journalists killed in Russia since Putin came to power 17 Some critics and opponents of the Russian government also are said to have become victims of other measures such as poisoning In February 2017 opposition figure Vladimir Kara-Murza who lives part-time in the United States fell seriously ill for the second time in two years while visiting Moscow and had to be placed in an induced coma KaraMurza is a frequent visitor to Congress and campaigned in favor of U S sanctions on Russian officials Several Members of Congress issued statements of support for Kara-Murza after learning of his illness Carl Schreck “‘Poisoned’ Kremlin Critic Vladimir Kara-Murza What You Need to Know ” RFE RL February 8 2017 at http www rferl org a explainer-russia-kara-murza-kremlin-critic-poisoned 28298062 html Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 5 Russia Background and U S Policy Government officials are occasionally arrested for bribery or compelled to resign from their posts In 2016 cases included a regional governor who was once an opposition figure the mayor of Russia’s Pacific port city Vladivostok an Interior Ministry anticorruption official and the head of the Federal Customs Service Although observers often presume there may be grounds for arrest or dismissal these cases tend not to be interpreted as elements of a serious anticorruption campaign but rather as manifestations of political and economic infighting or as a way to remove ineffective or troublesome politicians Few of Russia’s most senior officials are arrested or dismissed for corruption On the contrary many observers including within the U S government believe that Putin and several of his closest colleagues have amassed considerable wealth while in power In a January 2016 interview then-Acting Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Adam Szubin said that “We’ve seen President Putin enriching his friends his close allies and marginalizing those who he doesn’t view as friends using state assets ” Szubin also noted that Putin “supposedly draws a state salary of something like $110 000 a year That is not an accurate statement of the man’s wealth and he has longtime training and practices in terms of how to mask his actual wealth ” Russian government officials reject all such claims Sources U S Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2016 Russia Transparency International “Corruption Perceptions Index 2016” Levada Center “Impressions about the Scale of Corruption and Personal Experience ” April 6 2016 in Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation “Today—the International Anti-Corruption Day ” December 9 2015 Association of Russian Lawyers for Human Rights Corruption in Russia An Independent Annual Report of the All-Russian Anticorruption Social Organization Clean Hands September 21 2016 BBC News “Russia BBC Panorama Kremlin Demands ‘Putin Corruption’ Proof ” January 26 2016 Government Reshuffles Many observers agree that Vladimir Putin is the most powerful person in Russia However Putin does not rule alone For most of his tenure he has presided over a complex network of officials and business leaders many of whom are individuals Putin knew from his time in the Soviet KGB or when he worked in the St Petersburg local government in the early 1990s 18 An influential leadership circle below Putin includes government officials heads of strategic state-owned enterprises and businesspersons Since 2012 the Russian-based Minchenko Consulting group has produced a series of well-regarded studies that assess who besides Putin are the most influential figures in the Russian policymaking process 19 This list specifies 8 to 10 individuals who wield the greatest influence see “Key Russian Officials Under Putin” text box including some who do not hold official positions as well as around 50 other key individuals in the security political economic and administrative spheres 18 For a thorough review see Dawisha Putin’s Kleptocracy The most recent report is Minchenko Consulting Politburo 2 0 Dismantling or Reset November 7 2016 in Russian at http www minchenko ru analitika analitika_61 html Another prominent list of influential Russian elites counts Putin’s chief of staff Anton Vaino and his deputy Sergei Kiriyenko among the top 10 leading officials Dmitry Orlov “Russia’s 100 Top Politicians in January 2017 ” Nezavisimaia Gazeta February 3 2017 in Russian at http www ng ru ideas 2017-02-01 5_6917_politics html Also see Nikolay Petrov “Down the Funnel Russia’s Trajectory After 2014 ” Russian Politics Law vol 53 no 4 2015 pp 18-22 and Brian Taylor “Clans and Networks ” The Code of Putinism forthcoming publication 19 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 6 Russia Background and U S Policy Observers have noted some recent changes to this system of governance 20 The first change is a reduction in influence of several of Putin’s longtime senior associates including Putin’s former chief of staff and former minister of defense Sergei Ivanov who was once pegged as a possible successor to Putin Since 2014 four senior officials close to Putin have retired and Ivanov and at least one other appear to have been demoted see “Resignations or Demotions of Longtime Putin Colleagues” text box Key Russian Officials Under Putin Alexander Bortnikov Director of the Federal Security Service FSB Sergei Chemezov Chief Executive Officer CEO of Rostec hi-tech and defense state corporation Sergei Lavrov Foreign Minister Dmitry Medvedev Prime Minister Nikolay Patrushev Secretary of the Security Council Igor Sechin CEO of Rosneft state oil company Sergei Shoigu Minister of Defense Sergei Sobyanin Mayor of Moscow Vyacheslav Volodin Chair of Parliament Viktor Zolotov Director of the National Guard Notes Chemezov Medvedev Patrushev Sechin Shoigu and Sobyanin are listed by Minchenko Consulting see footnote 19 as among Russia’s eight most influential policymakers under Putin together with businessmen Yuri Kovalchuk and Arkady Rotenberg A related change is a steady rise in the number of senior officials who are at least a decade younger than Putin aged 64 and have risen as Putin’s subordinates more than as his colleagues Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev aged 51 straddles this divide he has worked with Putin since St Petersburg and was Putin’s handpicked successor to the presidency 2008-2012 after Putin’s first two terms Others have served Putin or Medvedev for several years and have gained relatively powerful positions Several other younger officials have emerged recently They are generally seen as having no real power bases of their own and as entirely loyal to Putin Some are bureaucrats who have replaced Putin’s retiring colleagues Observers also have noted the rapid rise of at least three younger officials who started their careers as members of the presidential security service i e Putin’s bodyguards and have gone on to serve as regional governors one is currently a deputy head of the Federal Security Service FSB 21 In assessing the impact of these changes a few considerations may be useful to keep in mind First there does not appear to be a single explanation for the declining influence of Putin’s longtime colleagues The most common factors that observers suggest are Resignations or Demotions of Longtime Putin Colleagues Vladimir Kozhin Head of the Presidential Administrative Directorate demoted May 2014 Vladimir Yakunin Head of the Russian Railways resigned August 2015 Viktor Ivanov Head of the Federal Drug Control Service retired May 2016 service dissolved General Yevgeny Murov Head of the Federal Guard Service a more powerful version of the U S Federal Protective Service and Secret Service retired May 2016 Andrei Belyaninov Head of the Federal Customs Service resigned July 2016 Sergei Ivanov Presidential Chief of Staff and former minister of defense demoted August 2016 Note Kozhin Yakunin V Ivanov Murov and S Ivanov are subject to U S Ukraine-related sanctions For example Anders Åslund “Putin’s Great Purge ” American Interest August 24 2016 at http www theamerican-interest com 2016 08 24 putins-great-purge 21 The three are deputy FSB head Yevgeny Zinichev Governor of Tula region Aleksey Dyumin and acting Governor of Yaroslavl region Dmitry Mironov See for example Oleg Kashin “How Do You Get to Be a Governor in Vladimir Putin’s Russia ” New York Times September 8 2016 at https www nytimes com 2016 09 09 opinion how-do-youget-to-be-a-governor-in-vladimir-putins-russia html 20 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 7 Russia Background and U S Policy declining efficiency or increasing mismanagement 22 However these factors are not evident in every case Moreover when they are relevant the reasons behind them have varied including corruption age and even bereavement Sergei Ivanov recently lost his son to a drowning accident Second the changes do not yet amount to a total turnover Several of Putin’s other longtime colleagues remain in positions of considerable power or influence see “Longtime Putin Colleagues Still in Power” text box Third this gradual “changing of the guard” is occurring against the backdrop of what observers characterize as frequently vicious struggles for wealth and influence among different power centers but most often between the FSB in particular its Interior Security Department and others the Ministry of Internal Affairs the Investigative Committee a kind of Federal Bureau of Investigation Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov and a more liberal i e economically oriented wing of the Russian government 23 Considerable speculation has occurred that such rivalries on occasion lead to developments that Putin does not control Potential examples include the February 2015 murder of opposition politician Boris Nemtsov which was blamed on people close to Kadyrov and the November 2016 arrest of Minister of Economic Development Alexey Ulyukaev which observers suspect is linked to a rivalry with Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin considered one of Russia’s most influential policymakers 24 Longtime Putin Colleagues Still in Power Sergei Chemezov CEO of Rostec Russia’s large state-owned military-industrial complex who oversees scores of hi-tech and defense companies across the country Nikolay Patrushev Chair of the National Security Council Colleagues reportedly have referred to Patrushev as “Russia’s most underestimated public figure ” He is thought to have had considerable influence in shaping Russia’s recent anti-Western foreign policy trajectory including the annexation of Crimea Igor Sechin CEO of Rosneft Sechin has long been considered one of the most powerful officials in Russia with not only influence over the state-owned oil sector but also unofficial ties to elements of the FSB Last year Sechin was subject to some speculation that he risked overstepping his bounds and losing power but he ultimately appeared to strengthen his position at the expense of various rivals Viktor Zolotov Head of the National Guard Zolotov is considered to be singularly loyal to Putin He now heads a new security apparatus that officially serves as a special police force to combat terrorism and organized crime but is widely considered to be Putin’s “personal army” and potentially a repressive tool for fighting civil unrest Other Longtime Putin Colleagues Still in Power Andrei Fursenko Presidential Aide German Gref Sberbank Dmitry Kozak Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Kudrin Vice Chair Presidential Economic Council Alexei Miller Gazprom Sergei Naryshkin Foreign Intelligence Service Yevgeny Shkolov Presidential Aide and Nikolai Tokarev Transneft Some influential businessmen also are longtime colleagues of Putin Arkady and Boris Rotenberg Nikolai Shamalov and Gennady Timchenko Notes Chemezov is subject to U S and European Union EU Ukraine-related sanctions as are Kozak Naryshkin and A Rotenberg Sechin is subject to U S Ukraine-related sanctions as are Fursenko B Rotenberg For example Andrew Monaghan “Putin’s Removal of Ivanov as Chief of Staff Is More About Rejuvenation ” Chatham House August 15 2016 at https www chathamhouse org expert comment putins-removal-ivanov-chiefstaff-more-about-rejuvenation 23 For example Karina Orlova “The Siloviki Coup in Russia ” American Interest September 21 2016 at http www the-american-interest com 2016 09 21 the-siloviki-coup-in-russia 24 For example Joshua Yaffa “The Unaccountable Death of Boris Nemtsov ” New Yorker February 26 2016 at http www newyorker com news news-desk the-unaccountable-death-of-boris-nemtsov and Ilya Matveev “The Big Game Ulyukaev Sechin and Russia’s Neopatrimonial Privatisation ” OpenDemocracy Russia November 21 2016 at https www opendemocracy net od-russia ilya-matveev big-game-ulyukaev-sechin-and-russias-neopatrimonialprivatisation 22 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 8 Russia Background and U S Policy and Timchenko Patrushev and Shamalov are subject to EU sanctions In addition Rostec is subject to U S and partially EU Ukraine-related sanctions and Rosneft is subject to U S and EU Ukraine-related sanctions September 2016 State Duma Elections On September 18 2016 Russians elected the State Duma the lower house of parliament Russia’s last parliamentary elections in December 2011 triggered a wave of protests against electoral fraud and heralded the rise of a revitalized opposition against Putin’s government Five years later expectations of democratic change at the ballot box had subsided With a voter turnout of 48% the ruling United Russia UR party won a resounding victory with more than 75% of the seats as opposed to 53% in 2011 All other seats went to those considered loyal opposition parties and deputies No parties genuinely in opposition sometimes termed the liberal opposition won any seats see Table 1 25 Table 1 Election Results to the State Duma September 18 2016 Party List % Party List Seats SingleMember Seats Total Seats % of Seats United Russia UR 54 2% 140 203 343 76 2% Communist Party KPRF a 13 3% 35 7 42 9 3% Liberal Democratic Party of Russia LDPR a 13 1% 34 5 39 8 7% 6 2% 16 7 23 5 1% A Just Russiaa Other 11 2% 0 3 3 0 7% Yablokob 2 0% 0 0 0 0 0% PARNASb 0 7% 0 0 0 0 0% 98% 225 225 450 Total 100% Source Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation at http www vybory izbirkom ru Notes Total party list percentage is calculated out of the total number of valid and invalid ballots a The KPRF LDPR and A Just Russia parties are considered the loyal opposition parties These parties criticize the government if not Putin but typically support its legislative initiatives b Yabloko and PARNAS are liberal opposition parties considered to be genuinely in opposition to the government They fall under the “Other” category which includes several small parties that did not meet the 5% threshold for party list representation The ruling UR party traditionally polls lower than Putin who does not formally lead the party but it appeared to benefit from a surge in patriotic sentiment unleashed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea Russia’s so-called defense of pro-Russian populations in eastern Ukraine and appeals for national solidarity in the face of Western sanctions and criticism 26 UR also experienced a certain For additional background see CRS Insight IN10573 Russia’s Parliamentary Elections by Cory Welt Denis Volkov “How Long Will It Be Before 2011-2012 Style Mass Protests Reemerge ” Intersection September 8 2016 at http intersectionproject eu article society how-long-will-it-be-2011-2012-style-mass-protests-reemerge 25 26 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 9 Russia Background and U S Policy renewal in advance of elections party primaries promoted the rise of many candidates new to national politics and eliminated a number of sitting deputies 27 At the same time the Russian government took measures after the last election to bolster the victory of UR and minimize opposition gains across the country 28 Fourteen parties that received at least 3% of the vote in the last election or held at least one seat in a regional council competed in the 2016 election Other parties technically could register after collecting 200 000 signatures but no such registrations were approved In addition state-controlled media and government officials subjected opposition leaders to a barrage of negative publicity branding them as agents of the West 29 Restrictions on mass demonstrations tightened A centrally controlled redistricting process led to the carving up of urban centers that leaned toward the opposition Finally the election date was moved up from December 2016 considerably shortening the campaign period 30 UR also benefited from a change in electoral rules restoring a mixed electoral system that had been in place through 2003 parliamentary elections UR’s financial and administrative resources across the countryside were expected to help the party win more seats via single-member races than it would in a purely proportional contest indeed UR candidates won more than 90% of these races 31 By comparison in the contested 2011 election when seats were allocated entirely by party-list vote UR officially won 49% of the vote as opposed to 54% in 2016 but only 53% of seats as opposed to 76% in 2016 Election observers also raised concerns about fraud The election observation mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSCE noted that the counting process was bad or very bad in 23% of the polling stations it observed One widely cited statistical analysis by a Russian scholar also suggested the election was marred in certain areas of the country by high levels of fraud including ballot-box stuffing 32 Besides UR the three parties that gained seats have served in parliament already and are known as the loyal opposition These parties criticize the government if not Putin but typically support its legislative initiatives Two are longtime fixtures of Russian politics the Communist Party KPRF led by Gennadiy Zyuganov and the right-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party LDPR led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky The third A Just Russia led by Sergei Mironov is a center-left Darrell Slider and Nikolai Petrov “United Russia’s ‘Primaries’ A Preview of the Duma Elections ” Russian Analytical Digest no 186 July 15 2016 28 Vladimir Gelman “Correction of Errors How the Kremlin Re-equilibrated Authoritarian Elections in 2016 ” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No 437 August 2016 at http www ponarseurasia org memo correction-errors-howkremlin-re-equilibrated-authoritarian-elections-2016 29 For example Yelena Plotnikova and Robert Coalson “Samara Governor Offers a Stark Choice United Russia or the CIA ” RFE RL September 10 2016 at http www rferl org a russia-samara-governor-merkushkin-united-russia-cia 27978955 html 30 Nikolay Petrov “Putin’s Gamble on Russia’s Duma Elections ” European Council on Foreign Relations September 8 2016 at http www ecfr eu article commentary_putins_gamble_on_russias_duma_elections_7109 31 Felix Riefer “Russian Parliamentary Elections to Take Place Under New Rules ” Deutsche Welle August 16 2016 at http www dw com en russian-parliamentary-elections-to-take-place-under-new-rules a-19478968 32 OSCE ODIHR International Election Observation Mission Russian Federation—State Duma Elections “Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions ” September 18 2016 at http www osce org odihr elections russia 265186 Leonid Bershidsky “Russia Proves Vote Fraud Can Happen Anywhere ” Bloomberg View September 26 2016 at https www bloomberg com view articles 2016-09-22 russia-proves-vote-fraud-can-happen-anywhere Olga Sichkar Jack Stubbs and Gleb Stolyarov “Phantom Voters Smuggled Ballots Hint at Foul Play in Russian Vote ” Reuters September 20 2016 at http www reuters com article us-russia-election-fraud-idUSKCN11Q1RI 27 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 10 Russia Background and U S Policy party that flirted with the opposition in 2011-2012 before returning to the fold and expelling some of its members who remained in opposition 33 The Opposition As noted above no liberal opposition party won Duma seats in the 2016 elections However two liberal opposition parties neither of which was in the previous parliament were eligible to compete Yabloko identified with its former longtime chairman Grigory Yavlinsky and PARNAS led by a former prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov as well as previously Boris Nemtsov slain in 2015 Both parties consider themselves European-style liberal democratic parties though other parties criticized PARNAS in 2016 for including at least one populist firebrand near the top of its list 34 In addition 18 single-member races were contested by candidates representing the Open Russia movement founded by former oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky 35 The party of another prominent opposition leader anticorruption activist and 2013 Moscow mayoral candidate Alexei Navalny had its registration revoked in 2015 ostensibly for technical reasons and thus was unable to participate in the election Navalny himself is barred from running for political office due to a 2013 criminal conviction that resulted in a suspended sentence Navalny supporters and most outside observers deemed the case and a second one to be politically motivated and in February 2016 the European Court of Human Rights ECHR concluded that the trial had violated Navalny’s rights 36 Opposition fragmentation was an issue prior to the election Opposition leaders protected their individual brands and appeared to fear that these brands could be damaged by formal unification with other parties electoral blocs have been banned since 2005 In 2015 Navalny’s Party of Progress had joined with PARNAS and others in a “Democratic Coalition ” which was to run candidates under the PARNAS banner The coalition soon encountered difficulties however It was barred from registering candidates in September 2015 regional elections and in spring 2016 the coalition collapsed after PARNAS leader Kasyanov was targeted in a scandal involving alleged hidden video footage of an affair with a party colleague 37 Vladimir Kara-Murza “Back on the Leash The End for A Just Russia ” Institute of Modern Russia January 29 2013 at http imrussia org en politics 377-back-on-the-leash-the-end-for-a-just-russia Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber “Dmitry Gudkov L'Enfаnt Terrible of the State Duma ” Moscow Times October 6 2014 at https themoscowtimes com articles dmitry-gudkov-lenfnt-terrible-of-the-state-duma-40113 34 Nataliya Vasilyeva “Russian Opposition Faces Infighting Apathy at Upcoming Vote ” Associated Press September 12 2016 at http bigstory ap org article a178ad99cd8f49e59e7f84a50f775b16 russian-opposition-faces-infightingapathy-upcoming-vote 35 Ola Cichowlas “Russian Election Watch 2016 Noteworthy Candidates ” Moscow Times September 12 2016 at https themoscowtimes com articles russian-election-watch-2016-noteworthy-candidates-55249 36 Meduza “Navalny Wants Supreme Court to Review His First Criminal Conviction Saying He’s Being Kept from Elections Intentionally ” August 22 2016 at https meduza io en news 2016 08 22 navalny-wants-supreme-court-toreview-his-first-criminal-conviction-saying-he-s-being-kept-from-elections-intentially Neil MacFarquhar and Ivan Nechepurenko “Aleksei Navalny Viable Putin Rival Is Barred from a Presidential Run ” New York Times February 8 2017 at https www nytimes com 2017 02 08 world europe russia-aleksei-navalny-putin html 37 Meduza “Russia’s Democratic Coalition The Opposition Is Being Barred from Elections Again Here’s What You Need to Know ” July 29 2015 at https meduza io en feature 2015 07 29 russia-s-democratic-coalition Meduza “The Strange Death of Russia’s ‘Democratic Coalition ’” May 31 2016 at https meduza io en feature 2016 06 01 thestrange-death-of-russia-s-democratic-coalition 33 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 11 Russia Background and U S Policy For now observers tend to see Vladimir Putin’s rule as relatively stable although new signs of discontent have arisen Ongoing economic difficulties see “The Economy ” below have led to small-scale protests across Russia as prices have risen salaries have fallen unemployment has grown and social spending has been reduced 38 In March and June 2017 nationwide protests spearheaded by Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation reportedly attracted thousands many of whom were university-aged or younger to demonstrate against corruption Hundreds of protestors were temporarily detained including Navalny who was fined and sentenced to respectively 15 days and 30 days in prison for what the courts cited as illegal activity 39 Whether such protests are sufficient to catalyze a more substantial political movement remains to be seen Some observers believe that the government is seeking to minimize popular discontent by continuing to increase social benefits in the lead-up to the next presidential election scheduled for March 2018 even as expenditures in education health care and defense stay flat or decline 40 Potential future scenarios tend to center on succession politics whether engineered by Putin or prompted by his incapacitation or untimely passing As late as June 2017 Putin still would not say if he was planning to run for reelection although many observers believe he plans to do so 41 In the event of a controlled succession in 2018 or after observers speculate about a number of well-known potential successors However the eventual choice also could be a relatively unknown figure Putin himself was a highly unexpected choice to succeed his predecessor Boris Yeltsin Many observers put little stock in the possibility of a democratic transition of power In such a scenario candidates are thought more likely to emerge from right-wing nationalist forces or a new post-Communist left not from a liberal pro-Western opposition or civil society whose influence has been seriously undermined by the Russian government Other scenarios involve a loss of control by Putin or members of his inner circle as a result of a collapsing economy weakened state apparatus or an external war gone wrong Some observers have speculated that rival political centers could compete for power in Putin’s absence and that this competition could turn violent In addition some have voiced concerns that an uncontrolled transition could lead to the rise of more nationalist forces Local Elections Formally Russia has a robust system of subnational elections in practice the country’s top-down system provides centralized control over key issues Regional and municipal councils are elected as are governors of most of Russia’s 83 regions and republics though candidates must secure the signatures of 5%-10% of all their region’s municipal deputies which is seen as a major constraint Kremlin-backed leaders dominate local government structures All but one of Russia’s 83 governors are United Russia UR members or other government-backed figures In the Siberian region of Irkutsk in September 2015 Communist Party member Sergei Levchenko became the only gubernatorial candidate since elections were reintroduced in 2012 to defeat a government-backed opponent UR also has majorities typically substantial ones Sean Guillory “Kremlinology An Intervention ” OpenDemocracy Russia September 13 2016 at https www opendemocracy net od-russia sean-guillory kremlinology-intervention 39 See for example Joshua Yaffa “What the Russian Protests Mean for Putin ” New Yorker March 27 2017 at http www newyorker com news news-desk what-the-russian-protests-mean-for-putin and Maxim Trudolyubov “Alexei Navalny and the Cycle of Russian Protest ” Atlantic June 15 2017 at https www theatlantic com international archive 2017 06 navalny-russia-protests 530463 40 Andrey Movchan “Pensions and Security Russian Budget Reveals Government Priorities ” Carnegie Moscow Center December 15 2016 at http carnegie ru commentary fa 66454 41 TASS Russian News Agency “Putin Says Too Early to Discuss 2018 Presidential Election ” June 1 2017 at http tass com politics 949110 38 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 12 Russia Background and U S Policy in all regional councils only a handful of regional deputies across the country are affiliated with the liberal opposition Certain regions and cities contain more opposition-minded voters most notably the two major urban centers of Moscow and St Petersburg In the September 2013 Moscow mayoral election opposition candidate Alexei Navalny won 27% of the vote incumbent Sergei Sobyanin Putin’s former chief of staff and deputy prime minister won 51% Some regions in Siberia and the Far East as well as in the Northwest also elect greater numbers of opposition candidates including the Communists and other loyal opposition parties Although Russian law allows for the direct election of mayors in cities other than Moscow and St Petersburg most municipalities have an indirectly elected mayor or council head who shares authority with a more powerful appointed or indirectly elected city manager A few opposition candidates have won competitive mayoral elections although some of the more prominent were subsequently removed from office and even imprisoned Sources J Paul Goode “The Revival of Russia’s Gubernatorial Elections Liberalization or Potemkin Reform ” Russian Analytical Digest no 139 November 18 2013 pp 9-11 Joel C Moses “Putin and Russian Subnational Politics in 2014 ” Demokratizatsiya vol 23 no 2 Spring 2015 pp 181-203 Maria Tsvetkova “When Kremlin Candidate Loses Election Even Voters Are Surprised ” Reuters September 29 2015 Ola Cichowlas “Endangered Species Why Is Russia Locking Up Its Mayors ” Moscow Times August 2 2016 The Economy42 The Russian economy has gone through periods of decline growth and stagnation since 1991 In the first seven years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union 1992-1998 Russia experienced an average annual decline in gross domestic product GDP of 6 8% A decade of strong economic growth followed in which Russia’s GDP increased on average 6 9% per year The surge in economic growth—largely the result of increases in world oil prices—helped to raise the Russian standard of living and brought a significant degree of economic stability The Russian economy was hit hard by the global financial crisis and resulting economic downturn that began in 2008 The crisis exposed weaknesses in the economy including its significant dependence on the production and export of oil and other natural resources and its weak financial system The Russian government’s reassertion of control over major industries especially in the energy sector also contributed to an underachieving economy As a result Russia’s period of economic growth came to an abrupt end by 2009 Although Russian real GDP increased 5 2% in 2008 it declined by 7 8% in 2009 Russia began to emerge from its recession in 2010 with 4 5% GDP growth that year but by 2013 growth had again slowed to 1 3% 43 Since 2014 two external shocks—low oil prices and international sanctions—have contributed to considerable economic challenges In particular Russia has grappled with the following     economic contraction with growth slowing to 0 7% in 2014 before contracting by 2 8% in 2015 capital flight with net private capital outflows from Russia totaling $152 billion in 2014 compared to $60 billion in 2013 rapid depreciation of the ruble more than 50% against the dollar over the course of 2014 increasing inflation from 6 8% in 2013 to 15 5% in 2015 42 This section was prepared primarily by Rebecca Nelson Specialist in International Trade and Finance For more see CRS Report R43895 U S Sanctions and Russia’s Economy by Rebecca M Nelson 43 International Monetary Fund IMF World Economic Outlook April 2017 at https www imf org external pubs ft weo 2017 01 weodata index aspx Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 13 Russia Background and U S Policy     declining trade with the dollar value of exports and imports down by 31% and 36% respectively from 2014 to 2015 budgetary pressures with the budget deficit widening from 1 2% in 2013 to 3 4% in 2015 drawing on international reserves to offset fiscal challenges with reserves falling from almost $500 billion in January 2014 to $356 billion in April 2015 and more widespread poverty which increased from 16 1 million living in poverty in 2014 to 19 2 million in 2015 13 4% of the population 44 During 2016 Russia’s economy largely stabilized even as sanctions remained in place Russia’s economy only slightly contracted 0 2% net private sector capital outflows slowed from more than $150 billion in 2014 to $19 8 billion in 2016 inflation fell by more than half since 2015 to 7 0% the value of the ruble stabilized reserves began to rise and the government successfully sold new bonds in international capital markets in May 2016 Around 19 8 million 13 5% of the population were estimated to be living in poverty 45 Net inflows of foreign direct investment FDI into Russia which essentially came to a halt in late 2014 and early 2015 started to resume in 2016 Most notably a consortium of the Qatar Investment Authority QIA Qatar’s national sovereign wealth fund and Glencore a Swiss-based mining and commodity trading firm purchased 19 5% of the state-controlled Rosneft Russia’s largest oil company for €10 2 billion about $10 6 billion at the time 46 According to the International Monetary Fund IMF Russia’s economy is projected to grow by 1 4% in 2017 47 The IMF argues that after two years of recession the economy is recovering due to a rise in oil prices and improved investor sentiment but that the medium-term prospects are subdued given oil prices still well below their peak and structural weaknesses in Russia’s economy 48 Low oil prices also have strained the government budget which ran a deficit of 3 7% of GDP in 2016 but the fiscal outlook has improved as oil prices have stabilized with a budget deficit of 1 9% of GDP projected for 2017 49 The government has tapped one of Russia’s sovereign wealth funds the Reserve Fund to address the budget shortfall and its resources have IMF World Economic Outlook April 2017 Central Bank of Russia External Sector Statistics “Net Inflows Outflows of Capital by Private Sector ” at https www cbr ru eng statistics Prtid svs ch itm_49171#CheckedItem IMF Exchange Rates Database at https www imf org external np fin ert GUI Pages CountryDataBase aspx The Customs Committee of Russia as accessed from Global Trade Atlas Central Bank of Russia External Sector Statistics “International Reserves of the Russian Federation ” http www cbr ru eng statistics Prtid svs and World Bank Russia Economic Report 35 April 6 2016 at http www worldbank org en news pressrelease 2016 04 06 russia-economic-report-35 45 World Bank Russia Economic Report 37 May 2017 at http www worldbank org en country russia publication rer 46 The consortium borrowed most of the funds from Intesa Sanpaolo an Italian bank and others including Russian banks BP the UK-based international energy company owns 19 75% of Rosneft The purpose and method of the sale has raised some questions among observers See Katya Golubkova Dmitry Zhdannikov and Stephen Jewkes “How Russia Sold Its Oil Jewel Without Saying Who Bought It ” Reuters January 25 2017 at http www reuters com article us-russia-rosneft-privatisation-insight-idUSKBN1582OH Sarah McFarlane and Summer Said “Russia Could Buy Back Stake It Sold in Rosneft ” Wall Street Journal June 7 2017 at https www wsj com articles russia-to-buyback-stake-it-sold-in-rosneft-1496827804 47 IMF World Economic Outlook Update July 2017 at http www imf org en Publications WEO Issues 2017 07 07 world-economic-outlook-update-july-2017 48 IMF Russian Federation 2017 Article IV Consultation-Press Release Staff Report July 2017 at http www imf org en Publications CR Issues 2017 07 10 Russian-Federation-2017-Article-IV-Consultation-PressRelease-Staff-Report-45054 49 Ibid 44 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 14 Russia Background and U S Policy fallen to about $16 billion from $143 billion in 2008 50 The government is considering consolidating its two sovereign wealth funds as the government continues to face budget shortfalls Russia’s other sovereign wealth fund the National Wealth Fund was designed to help balance the pension system and has about $75 billion 51 In the longer term Russia’s economy faces long-standing structural challenges including slow economic diversification weak protection of property rights burdensome administrative procedures state involvement in the economy and adverse demographic dynamics 52 The IMF argues that sanctions dampen the potential for accelerating investment growth 53 Some analysts also have noted that the low value of the ruble may hamper Russia’s attempts to innovate and modernize its economy and that the economy’s continued reliance on oil makes it vulnerable to another drop in oil prices 54 Despite Western sanctions and Russia’s own retaliatory ban against agricultural imports the EU as a whole remains Russia’s largest trading partner In 2016 47% of Russia’s merchandise exports went to EU member states and 38% of its merchandise imports came from EU member states By country Russia’s top three merchandise export destinations were the Netherlands 10% China 10% and Germany 7% and its top three sources of merchandise imports were China 21% Germany 11% and the United States 6% 55 Economic Impact of Sanctions It is difficult to assess whether and to what extent sanctions on Russia and Russia’s retaliatory measures have impacted the country’s economy over the past few years for details on U S sanctions against Russia see “Ukraine-Related Sanctions ” below Sanctions were imposed at the same time the price of oil a major export and source of revenue for the Russian government dropped significantly by more than 60% between the start of 2014 and the end of 2015 56 That said many economists including at the IMF have argued that the twin shocks of sanctions and low oil prices have adversely affected Russia’s economy 57 In 2015 the IMF estimated that sanctions and Russia’s retaliatory ban on agricultural imports reduced output in Russia over the Vladimir Kuznetsov “Russian Wealth Fund Has This Year’s Biggest Drop as Buffers Wilt ” Bloomberg September 6 2016 at https www bloomberg com news articles 2016-09-06 russian-wealth-fund-has-this-year-s-biggest-drop-asbuffers-wilt Andrey Ostroukh “Russia’s Reserve Fund Grows to $16 71 Billion as of July 1 ” Reuters at https www reuters com article russia-funds-idUSR4N1IY00Q 51 Olga Tanas and Anna Andrianova “Russia Eyes a $90 Billion Sovereign Wealth Fund ” Reuters June 19 2017 at https www bloomberg com news articles 2017-06-19 russia-to-discuss-merging-wealth-funds-into-90-7-billioncoffer Ostroukh “Russia’s Reserve Fund Grows to $16 71 Billion as of July 1 ” July 4 2017 52 IMF Russian Federation Staff Report for the 2016 Article IV Consultation July 2016 at https www imf org external pubs ft scr 2016 cr16229 pdf 53 IMF Russian Federation 2017 Article IV Consultation-Press Release Staff Report July 2017 54 Pavel Koshkin and Ksenia Zubacheva “The Worst of the Economic Crisis in Russia Lies Ahead ” Russia Direct January 22 2016 at http www russia-direct org analysis worst-economic-crisis-russia-lies-ahead 55 European Commission Directorate-General for Trade “European Union Trade In Goods With Russia ” May 3 2017 at http trade ec europa eu doclib docs 2006 september tradoc_113440 pdf and Customs Committee of Russia as accessed from Global Trade Atlas 56 Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis “Global Price of Brent Crude ” at https fred stlouisfed org series POILBREUSDM accessed February 2 2017 57 For example see IMF “IMF Staff Concludes Visit to Russian Federation ” November 29 2016 at https www imf org en News Articles 2016 11 29 PR16529-Russian-Federation-IMF-Staff-Concludes-Visit 50 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 15 Russia Background and U S Policy short term between 1 0% and 1 5% 58 The IMF’s models suggest that the effects on Russia over the medium term could be more substantial reducing output by up to 9 0% as lower capital accumulation and technological transfers weaken already declining productivity growth At the start of 2016 a State Department official argued that sanctions were not designed to push Russia “over the economic cliff” in the short run but rather were designed to exert long-term pressure on Russia 59 In November 2014 Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov estimated the annual cost of sanctions to the Russian economy at $40 billion 2% of GDP compared to $90 billion-$100 billion 4%-5% of GDP lost due to lower oil prices 60 Similarly Russian economists estimated that the economic sanctions would decrease Russia’s GDP by 2 4% by 2017 but the effect would be 3 3 times less than the effect from the oil-price shock 61 In November 2016 Putin stated that the sanctions are “severely harming Russia” in terms of access to international financial markets although the impact was not as severe as the harm from the decline in energy prices 62 In December 2016 the Office of the Chief Economist at the U S State Department published estimates of the impact of the U S and European Union EU sanctions in 2014 on a firm-level basis 63 The main finding was that the average company or associated company in Russia subject to sanctions lost about one-third of its operating revenue more than one-half of its asset value and about one-third of its employees relative to nonsanctioned peers The longer-term effect of sanctions if they are kept in place is unclear The economic bite of restrictions on U S long-term financing for certain sectors or technology for specific Russian oil exploration projects may manifest more prominently in coming years At the same time the longterm impact may depend on whether Russia can develop viable and reliable alternative economic partners particularly among countries that have refrained from sanctions such as China India and Brazil to fulfill economic activities restricted by U S and EU sanctions U S -Russian Trade and Investment Even before sanctions were imposed the United States had relatively little direct trade and investment with Russia Over the past decade Russia has accounted for less than 2% of total U S merchandise imports less than 1% of total U S merchandise exports less than 1% of U S FDI and less than 1% of FDI in the United States 64 At the same time in 2016 the United States was Russia’s third-largest source of merchandise imports and 10th-largest destination for exports 58 IMF Russian Federation Staff Report for the 2015 Article IV Consultation August 2015 p 5 at http www elibrary imf org view IMF002 22733-9781513502441 22733-9781513502441 227339781513502441_A001 xml 59 Robin Emmott “Sanctions Impact on Russia to Be Longer Term U S Says ” Reuters January 12 2016 at http www reuters com article us-ukraine-crisis-sanctions-idUSKCN0UQ1ML20160112 60 European Parliamentary Research Service Sanctions over Ukraine Impact on Russia March 2016 at http www europarl europa eu EPRS EPRS-Briefing-579084-Sanctions-over-Ukraine-impact-Russia-FINAL pdf 61 Evsey Gurvich and Ilya Prilepskiy “The Impact of Financial Sanctions on the Russian Economy ” Russian Journal of Economics 2015 pp 359-385 62 Nikolaus Blome Kai Diekmann and Daniel Biskup “Putin—The Interview ‘For Me It Is Not Borders That Matter ’” Bild November 1 2016 at http www bild de politik ausland wladimir-putin russian-president-vladimirputin-the-interview-44092656 bild html 63 Daniel Ahn and Rodney Ludema Measuring Smartness Understanding the Economic Impact of Targeted Sanctions Office of the Chief Economist U S Department of State December 2016 Working Paper 2017-01 at https www state gov documents organization 267590 pdf 64 Trade data are from the U S Census Bureau the Customs Committee of Russia and Eurostat as accessed from Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 16 Russia Background and U S Policy Over the past three years U S merchandise trade with Russia has fallen by almost half see Figure 2 U S merchandise exports to Russia fell from $11 1 billion in 2013 to $5 8 billion in 2016 U S merchandise imports from Russia fell from $27 1 billion in 2013 to $14 5 billion in 2016 U S investment ties with Russia also continued to weaken U S investment in Russia was $9 2 billion in 2015 down from a peak of $20 8 billion in 2009 65 Russian investment in the United States was $4 5 billion down from a peak of $8 4 billion in 2009 U S merchandise imports from Russia tend to be dominated by oil and unfinished metals Of the $14 5 billion in merchandise that the United States imported from Russia in 2016 about half was mineral fuels and oils $7 2 billion particularly noncrude oil $6 6 billion Other top U S merchandise imports from Russia in 2016 included aluminum $1 33 billion iron and steel $1 3 billion inorganic chemicals precious and rare-earth metals and radioactive compounds $1 2 billion particularly enriched uranium $1 03 billion precious metals stones and related products $696 million particularly unfinished platinum $607 million fertilizers $502 million and fish crustaceans and aquatic invertebrates $410 million These products accounted for more than 85% of U S imports from Russia in 2016 U S merchandise exports to Russia tend to focus on machinery and manufactured products Of the $5 8 billion in commodities exported by the United States to Russia in 2016 the top export was nuclear reactors boilers machinery and parts $1 4 billion Other top U S merchandise exports to Russia in 2016 included aircraft spacecraft and related parts $1 3 billion vehicles and parts $617 million optic photo medic and surgical instruments $438 million electric machinery and sound equipment $421 million and pharmaceutical products $190 million These products accounted for more than 75% of U S exports to Russia in 2016 Figure 2 U S Merchandise Trade with Russia Source Created by CRS using U S Census Bureau data as accessed from Global Trade Atlas Even though overall trade and investment flows between the United States and Russia are limited economic ties at the firm and sector levels are in some cases substantial Several large U S companies such as PepsiCo Ford Motor Company General Electric and Boeing have been actively engaged with Russia exporting to Russia entering joint ventures with Russian partners and relying on Russian suppliers for inputs The U S -Russia Business Council a Washington- Global Trade Atlas unless otherwise noted U S investment data are from the U S Bureau of Economic Analysis on a historical-cost basis 65 U S Bureau of Economic Analysis Data are U S direct investment position abroad on a historical-cost basis Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 17 Russia Background and U S Policy based trade association that provides services to U S and Russian member companies has a membership of around 170 U S companies conducting business in Russia 66 In 2012 Russia joined the World Trade Organization WTO and Congress passed and the President signed legislation that allowed the President to extend permanent normal trade relations to Russia P L 112-208 Part of this legislation requires the U S Trade Representative to report annually on the implementation and enforcement of Russia’s WTO commitments The 2016 report stresses that although Russia acted as a responsible member of the WTO community in some areas such as reducing bound tariffs maximum rates allowed by the WTO between trading states by the required deadline other areas were more problematic Russia’s actions continued to depart from the WTO’s core tenets of liberal trade transparency and predictability in favor of inward-looking import-substitution economic policies 67 Separately some analysts have raised questions about whether Russia’s retaliatory ban on agriculture imports from the United States and other countries is compliant with its obligations under the WTO whereas others argue that the ban may be permitted under the national security exemption To date no state has formally challenged the ban at the WTO Energy Sector68 Russia is a significant producer of energy in various forms including crude oil natural gas coal and nuclear power In 2016 Russia was the third-largest oil producer behind the United States and Saudi Arabia the second-largest natural gas producer behind the United States and the sixth-largest coal producer It is also a significant exporter of oil and the largest natural gas exporter the latter providing Russia with market power which it has exploited for geopolitical purposes Natural gas is more of a regional commodity than oil because natural gas requires expensive infrastructure for transport Oil by contrast is a global market in which Russia does not have the same type of leverage over countries as it does with its natural gas exports Table 2 below provides data for all countries in Europe that received Russian natural gas EU members are in bold in 2015 the latest year for which data are available 69 Seven EU countries Bulgaria Estonia Finland Hungary Latvia Romania and Slovenia relied on Russia for 100% of their natural gas imports in 2015 as did five non-EU countries Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Macedonia Moldova and Serbia Russian gas imports made up more than half the total gas consumption in 20 countries However only three EU countries Hungary Latvia and Lithuania and three non-EU countries Armenia Belarus and Moldova depended on Russian gas for more than 20% of their total primary energy consumption To maintain its leverage and position as Europe’s dominant gas supplier Russia has sought to develop multiple pipeline routes to reduce its dependence on transit states such as Ukraine and to satisfy regional markets To the north the Nord Stream pipeline runs under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany Russia’s state-controlled natural gas company Gazprom is seeking to build a second parallel pipeline Nord Stream 2 with the financial support of five European energy companies However the project still must receive approval from the governments of Denmark Finland and Sweden whose waters it would cross The European Union specifically the EU’s 66 U S -Russia Business Council at http www usrbc org site membership services U S Trade Representative 2016 Report on the Implementation and Enforcement of Russia’s WTO Commitments December 2016 at https ustr gov sites default files 2016-WTO-Report-Russia pdf 68 This section was coauthored with Michael Ratner Specialist in Energy Policy For more on Russian-European energy relations see CRS Report R42405 Europe’s Energy Security Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification coordinated by Michael Ratner 69 In 2015 Russia also exported natural gas to China Japan Kazakhstan South Korea and Taiwan 67 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 18 Russia Background and U S Policy executive branch the European Commission also is considering whether and to what extent the proposed pipeline would be subject to existing EU regulations Opponents of the pipeline—including among others the governments of Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Ukraine and many Members of the U S Congress—argue that the pipeline runs counter to the stated EU goal of diversifying European energy supply sources by increasing reliance on Russian gas In addition they contend that by bypassing existing pipelines to Eastern Europe through Ukraine Nord Stream 2 could leave Ukraine and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe more vulnerable to supply cutoffs or price manipulation by Russia To the south Russia had long planned the South Stream pipeline that would have run under the Black Sea to Bulgaria That project was canceled at the end of 2014 Despite initial skepticism and a temporary decline in Turkish-Russian relations however the planned South Stream pipeline has been replaced to an extent by the Turk Stream project which follows a similar route across the Black Sea but stops at the Turkish-Greek border Gazprom has signed some contracts for the project including one for the laying of pipe Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 19 Russia Background and U S Policy Table 2 European Imports of Russian Natural Gas 2015 Russian Imports as % of Total Imports Russian Imports as % of Total Gas Consumption Russian Imports as % of Primary Energy Consumption Armenia 83% 83% 40% Austria 68% 57% 11% Belarus 100% 100% 66% Belgium 30% 58% 17% Bosnia and Herzegovina 100% 100% 3% Bulgaria 100% 97% 14% Czech Republic 48% 47% 9% Denmark 53% 21% 3% Estonia 100% 100% 19% Finland 100% 100% 9% France 20% 22% 3% Georgia 15% 15% 4% Germany 41% 50% 12% Greece 61% 61% 6% Hungary 100% 81% 23% Italy 38% 34% 14% Latvia 100% 100% 30% Lithuania 84% 84% 37% Macedonia 100% 100% 2% Moldova 100% 100% 68% Netherlands 8% 6% 2% Poland 77% 56% 8% Romania 100% 2% 0% Serbia 100% 72% 9% Slovakia 90% 88% 20% Slovenia 100% 100% 6% Switzerland 8% 8% 1% Turkey 54% 54% 17% Ukraine 44% 21% 8% Country Sources CRS on the basis of data from Cedigaz http www cedigaz org industry data provider 2015 British Petroleum BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2016 at http www bp com en global corporate energyeconomics statistical-review-of-world-energy html and U S Energy Information Administration International Energy Outlook 2016 at http www eia gov outlooks ieo Notes European Union member states are in bold Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 20 Russia Background and U S Policy Foreign Relations In recent years many Members of Congress and other U S policymakers have paid growing attention to Russia’s active and increasingly forceful foreign policy both toward neighboring states such as Georgia and Ukraine and in regard to operations further afield such as the intervention in Syria and interference in political processes in Europe and the United States These actions have even resurrected talk of a new Cold War 70 Although Russian foreign policy has been increasingly active observers note that the principles guiding it have been largely consistent since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 One principle is to reestablish Russia as the center of political gravity for the post-Soviet region and to minimize the military and political influence of rival powers particularly NATO and more recently the EU A second principle is to establish Russia as one of a handful of dominant poles in global politics capable in particular of competing and where necessary cooperating with the United States Beyond these fundamentals debates exist on a number of related issues Such issues include whether strong responses by outside powers can deter Russian aggression or whether these responses run a risk of escalating conflict how much states that disagree with Russia on key issues can cooperate with Moscow whether the Russian government is primarily implementing a strategic vision or reacting to circumstances and the actions of others and the extent to which the Russian leadership takes actions abroad to strengthen its domestic position Russia and Other Post-Soviet States Since the collapse of the Soviet Union one fundamental goal of Russian foreign policy has been to retain and where necessary rebuild close ties with neighboring states that were once part of the USSR Many observers inside and outside Russia interpret this policy as laying claim to a traditional sphere of influence Although Russian policymakers avoid reference to a sphere of influence they have used comparable terms at various times In the early 1990s Russia’s foreign minister and other officials employed the term near abroad to describe Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors and in 2008 President and current Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev referred to Russia’s neighbors as constituting a “region” where Russia has “privileged interests ”71 The original mechanism for reintegrating the post-Soviet states was the Commonwealth of Independent States CIS which was established by the Presidents of Russia Belarus and Ukraine in December 1991 The CIS includes as members or participants all post-Soviet states except the Baltics Estonia Latvia and Lithuania all now NATO and EU members and Georgia 72 The organization has had limited success in promoting regional integration however See for example Dmitri Trenin “Welcome to Cold War II ” Foreign Policy March 4 2014 at http foreignpolicy com 2014 03 04 welcome-to-cold-war-ii and James Stavridis “Are We Entering a New Cold War ” Foreign Policy February 17 2016 at http foreignpolicy com 2016 02 17 are-we-entering-a-new-cold-warrussia-europe 71 William Safire “On Language The Near Abroad ” New York Times May 22 1994 at http www nytimes com 1994 05 22 magazine on-language-the-near-abroad html Economist “Medvedev on Russia’s Interests ” September 1 2008 at http www economist com blogs certainideasofeurope 2008 09 medvedev_on_russias_interests 72 The full members of the Commonwealth of Independent States CIS are Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Moldova Russia Tajikistan and Uzbekistan Neither Turkmenistan nor Ukraine signed the CIS charter in 1993 although both countries participate in the organization Turkmenistan considers itself an “associate member” Georgia withdrew from the CIS after its 2008 war with Russia 70 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 21 Russia Background and U S Policy Russia has had relatively more success developing multilateral relations with a narrower circle of states In recent years Russia has mainly accomplished this aim via two institutions the Collective Security Treaty Organization CSTO a security alliance that includes Russia Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the Eurasian Economic Union EEU an evolving single market that includes all CSTO members except Tajikistan a prospective candidate 73 Current members of these organizations mostly have joined voluntarily if not always enthusiastically 74 Their goals in joining have been diverse Although these aims could include the facilitation of trade and investment as well as protection against a variety of external threats including terrorism and drug trafficking they also may include a desire to accommodate Russia ensure opportunities for labor migration promote intergovernmental subsidies and bolster regime security Russia dominates both the CSTO and the EEU It has around 75% of the EEU’s total population approximately 85% of EEU members’ total GDP and more than 95% of CSTO members’ military expenditures 75 Russia maintains active bilateral economic security and political relations with CSTO and EEU member states and observers often consider these bilateral ties to be of greater significance than Russia’s multilateral relations within these two institutions Russia’s main military facilities in CSTO member states consist of bases in Tajikistan Armenia and Kyrgyzstan and radar stations in Belarus and Kazakhstan Russia’s relations with its CSTO and EEU partners are not always smooth In addition to expressing differences over the principles and rules of the two institutions Russia’s closest partners have been reluctant to bind themselves entirely to Russia on matters of foreign policy and economic development None of them followed Russia’s lead in recognizing Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states in 2008 Russia secured relatively greater support from partners in its annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region In March 2014 Armenia and Belarus voted with Russia and eight other states to reject United Nations General Assembly UNGA Resolution 68 262 which affirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity In December 2016 Armenia Belarus and Kazakhstan voted with Russia and 19 other states to reject UNGA Resolution 71 205 which “condemn ed the temporary occupation” of Crimea and reaffirmed nonrecognition of its annexation 76 73 For more on the Eurasian Economic Union EEU see CRS In Focus IF10309 Eurasian Economic Union by Gabriel M Nelson 74 The most visible reluctance concerned Armenia’s membership in the EEU The Armenian government which was planning to conclude an association agreement with the EU abruptly reversed course and declared its intent to join the EEU after a meeting of the Russian and Armenian presidents in September 2013 Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev referred to EEU membership as “the lesser of two evils ” TASS “No Option for Kyrgyzstan But to Join Customs Union—Kyrgyzstan President ” October 27 2014 at http tass com economy 756666 75 Stratfor “Why the Eurasian Union Will Never Be the EU ” September 17 2016 at https www stratfor com analysis why-eurasian-union-will-never-be-eu Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military Expenditure Database 2015 at https www sipri org databases milex 76 U N General Assembly Resolution 68 262 passed 100-11 with 58 abstentions Kazakhstan abstained whereas Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were absent Resolution 71 205 passed 73-23 with 76 abstentions including by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan U N General Assembly Resolution A RES 68 262 “Territorial Integrity of Ukraine ” March 27 2014 at http www un org en ga search view_doc asp symbol A RES 68 262 U N General Assembly Resolution A RES 71 205 “Situation of Human Rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol Ukraine ” December 19 2016 at http www un org en ga search view_doc asp symbol A RES 71 205 The voting records are available at respectively https graphics8 nytimes com packages html world middleeast voting pdf and http www un org en ga third 71 docs voting_sheets L 26 pdf Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 22 Russia Background and U S Policy Russia’s partners also have cultivated strong ties with other countries Kazakhstan in particular has developed strong relations with China and the West particularly in the energy sector China is the largest trading partner of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Although Armenia and Belarus have close bilateral relations with Russia in the security and economic spheres they also have established economic ties to Europe and Belarus’s authoritarian leader Alexander Lukashenko periodically criticizes Russia for what he considers unfair bilateral trading practices and strongarm diplomacy Both Armenia and Kazakhstan have established institutional partnerships with NATO Armenia is a troop contributor to the NATO-led Kosovo Force and Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan For more than 13 years Kyrgyzstan hosted a major military base and transit center for coalition troops fighting in Afghanistan Russia also has partnerships with three post-Soviet states that are not members of the CSTO or the EEU Azerbaijan Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan These three states have opted to pursue independent foreign policies and do not seek membership in Russian-led or other security and economic blocs 77 Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are significant energy producers they partner with Russia but also have developed major alternative transit routes for oil in Azerbaijan’s case and natural gas In addition Russia has cultivated a partnership with Uzbekistan although the latter competes with Kazakhstan for regional leadership in Central Asia and has long-standing disputes with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Russia’s relations with Georgia Moldova and Ukraine have been the most difficult These three states have sought to cultivate close ties with the West Georgia has consistently pursued NATO membership and served as one of NATO’s closest nonallied partners in Iraq and Afghanistan Moldova and Ukraine are also close NATO partners 78 All three states have concluded association agreements with the EU that include the establishment of free-trade areas and encourage harmonization with EU laws and regulations Georgia Moldova and Ukraine also have territorial conflicts with Russia which stations military forces within these states’ territories without their consent see Figure 4 below Since the first years of independence Georgia and Moldova have confronted separatist regions supported by Moscow in Georgia Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Moldova Transnistria Following a steady worsening of relations with Georgia together with increasing clashes between Georgian and separatist forces Russia went to war with Georgia in August 2008 to prevent Georgia from reestablishing control over South Ossetia The war resulted in the expulsion of Georgian residents and the destruction of their villages as well as Russian recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Russia has periodically imposed embargoes on key imports from Georgia and Moldova although both states have managed to partially normalize relations with Russia Moldova’s current president Igor Dodon seeks to reorient Moldova closer to Russia although his formal powers to do so are relatively limited in Moldova’s political system 77 Turkmenistan is constitutionally neutral Uzbekistan was a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization from 2006 to 2012 Azerbaijan contributes troops to the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan 78 At the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest NATO members agreed that Georgia and Ukraine would “become members of NATO ” In 2010 Ukraine adopted a “non-bloc” i e nonaligned status but its parliament rejected that status in December 2014 after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support of separatists in eastern Ukraine NATO “Bucharest Summit Declaration ” April 3 2008 at http www nato int cps en natolive official_texts_8443 htm Steven Pifer “Ukraine Overturns Its Non-bloc Status What Next with NATO ” Kyiv Post December 26 2014 at https www kyivpost com article opinion op-ed steven-pifer-ukraine-overturns-its-non-bloc-status-what-next-withnato-376208 html Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 23 Russia Background and U S Policy Ukraine Conflict79 Many observers consider that of all the postSoviet states Ukraine has been the most difficult for Russia to accept as fully independent 80 Even before 2014 the RussianUkrainian relationship suffered turbulence with disputes over Ukraine’s ties to NATO and the EU the status of Russia’s Crimea-based Black Sea Fleet and the transit of Russian natural gas via Ukraine to Europe Under Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych 2010-2014 such disputes were largely papered over By the end of 2013 Yanukovych appeared to make a decisive move toward Russia postponing the conclusion of an association agreement with the EU and agreeing to substantial financial assistance from Moscow The decision to postpone Ukraine’s agreement with the EU was a catalyst for the so-called Euromaidan protests which led to a government crackdown on demonstrators violent clashes between protestors and government forces and eventually the demise of the Yanukovych regime Ukraine’s armed conflict with Russia emerged soon after Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014 Moscow annexed Crimea the next month and facilitated the rise of new separatist movements in eastern Ukraine the Donetsk and Luhansk regions together known as the Donbas see Figure 3 In late August 2014 Russia stepped up support to separatists in reaction to a new Ukrainian offensive Summary of Minsk-2 Provisions 1 Immediate and full bilateral cease-fire 2 Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides 3 Effective international monitoring regime 4 Dialogue on a modalities of local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and b the future status of certain districts in Donetsk and Luhansk 5 Pardon and amnesty via a law forbidding persecution and punishment of persons involved in the conflict 6 Release of all hostages and other illegally detained people based on a principle of “all for all ” 7 Safe delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need based on an international mechanism 8 Restoration of full social and economic links with affected areas 9 Restoration of full Ukrainian control over its border with Russia alongside the conflict zone beginning from the first day after local elections and ending after the introduction of a new constitution and permanent legislation on the special status of districts in Donetsk and Luhansk 10 Withdrawal of all foreign armed groups weapons and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory and disarmament of all illegal groups 11 Constitutional reform in Ukraine including decentralization and permanent legislation on the special status of districts in Donetsk and Luhansk 12 Local elections in districts of Donetsk and Luhansk to be agreed upon with representatives of those districts and held according to OSCE standards 13 Intensification of the work of the Trilateral Contact Group Ukraine Russia OSCE including through working groups on implementation of the Minsk agreements In September 2014 the leaders of France Germany Russia and Ukraine together with separatist representatives negotiated a cease-fire agreement the Minsk Protocol named after the city where it was reached However the protocol failed to end fighting or prompt a political resolution to the crisis The parties met again in February 2015 and reached a more detailed cease-fire agreement known as Minsk-2 This agreement mandates a total cease-fire the withdrawal of heavy weapons and 79 This section draws on CRS Report RL33460 Ukraine Current Issues and U S Policy by Vincent L Morelli In 2008 a Russian newspaper alleged that Putin told President George W Bush “that Ukraine is not even a state What is Ukraine Part of its territories is Eastern Europe but the greater part is a gift from us ” James Marson “Putin to the West Hands off Ukraine ” Time May 25 2009 at http content time com time world article 0 8599 1900838 00 html The original article was published in Kommersant April 7 2008 in Russian at http www kommersant ru doc 877224 80 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 24 Russia Background and U S Policy foreign troops and fighters and full Ukrainian control over its border with Russia among other provisions see “Summary of Minsk-2 Provisions” box Figure 3 Separatist Regions in Eastern Ukraine Sources Graphic produced by CRS Map information generated by Hannah Fischer using data from the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency 2016 the Department of State 2015 and geographic data companies Esri 2014 and DeLorme 2014 To date most observers perceive that little has been achieved in implementing the provisions of Minsk-2 despite commitments made by all sides Although the conflict’s intensity has subsided at various times a new round of serious fighting arose at the end of January 2017 and lasted for several days As of mid-May 2017 the Office of the U N High Commissioner for Human Rights estimated that the conflict had led to at least 10 090 combat and civilian fatalities 81 Moscow officially denies Russia’s involvement in the conflict outside of Crimea where there are an estimated 28 000-29 000 Russian troops most observers agree however that Russia has unofficially deployed troops to fight helped recruit Russian “volunteers ” and supplied Donbas 81 The Office of the U N High Commissioner for Human Rights estimated that this figure includes at least 2 777 civilian deaths including the 298 individuals who died in the July 17 2014 shootdown of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 Office of the U N High Commissioner for Human Rights Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine 16 February 2017 to 15 May 2017 pp 2 7 at http www ohchr org Documents Countries UA UAReport18th_EN pdf Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 25 Russia Background and U S Policy separatists with weapons and armed vehicles 82 Estimates of the number of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine have declined since their height in 2015 83 In March 2017 testimony to a Senate Appropriations Subcommittee Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Pavlo Klimkin said that there were now about 4 200 Russian troops in the region together with around 40 000 militants presumably a combination of local and Russian fighters 84 NATO-Russia Relations85 The Ukraine conflict has heightened long-standing tensions between NATO and Russia Three days after Russia’s annexation of Crimea then-NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen declared that NATO could “no longer do business as usual with Russia ”86 Accordingly Russian actions in Ukraine resulted in a series of actions by NATO and its members intended to counter Moscow and to reassure Central and Eastern European allies that NATO will protect them against potential future acts of Russian aggression Even before the Ukraine conflict post-Cold War efforts to build a cooperative NATO-Russia partnership had at best mixed results Allies sought to assure a suspicious and skeptical Russia that NATO did not pose a security threat or seek to exclude Russia from Europe The principal institutional mechanism for NATO-Russia relations is the NATO-Russia Council NRC which was established in May 2002 five years after the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act provided the formal basis for bilateral cooperation Recognizing that NATO and Russia face many of the same global challenges and share similar strategic priorities Russian and NATO leaders structured the NRC as a forum of equal member states with goals that included political dialogue on security issues the determination of common approaches and the conduct of joint operations 87 Formal meetings of the NRC were suspended in April 2014 and resumed in 2016 Prior to the suspension over events in Ukraine NATO and Russia had identified a number of areas for cooperation In 2010 they endorsed a Joint Review of 21st Century Security Challenges intended to serve as a platform for cooperation 88 The review identified several common security 82 For a recent official Ukrainian estimate of the size and composition of the Russian military force in Crimea see Testimony of Pavlo Klimkin in U S Congress Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State Foreign Operations and Related Programs Russian Policies Intentions Toward Specific European Countries hearings 115th Cong 1st sess March 7 2017 Transcript available at http www cq com doc congressionaltranscripts-5056818 For additional background on Russia’s militarization of Crimea see Reuters “In Crimea Russia Signals Military Resolve with New and Revamped Bases ” November 1 2016 and Dave Gilbert and Fred Pleitgen “Russia Puts on Show of Military Strength in Crimea ” CNN September 9 2016 83 In March 2015 a few weeks after the Minsk-2 peace agreement was signed the U S Army Europe Commander Lieutenant General Ben Hodges estimated that there were around 12 000 Russian troops in eastern Ukraine Reuters “Some 12 000 Russian Soldiers in Ukraine Supporting Rebels U S Commander ” March 3 2015 One detailed study of the Russian military presence in Ukraine and combat deaths is James Miller et al An Invasion by Any Other Name The Kremlin’s Dirty War in Ukraine The Interpreter Institute of Modern Russia September 2016 at http www interpretermag com an-invasion-by-any-other-name-the-kremlins-dirty-war-in-ukraine 84 Testimony of Pavlo Klimkin in U S Congress Russian Policies Intentions Toward Specific European Countries March 7 2017 85 This section draws on CRS Report R43478 NATO Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe coordinated by Paul Belkin and CRS Report R44550 NATO’s Warsaw Summit In Brief by Paul Belkin 86 NATO “A Strong NATO in a Changed World ” speech by NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Brussels Forum March 21 2014 at http www nato int cps en natohq opinions_108215 htm 87 NATO “NATO-Russia Council ” April 15 2016 at http www nato int cps en natohq topics_50091 htm 88 NATO “NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement ” November 20 2010 at http www nato int cps en natohq news_68871 htm Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 26 Russia Background and U S Policy challenges including instability in Afghanistan terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction In the past observers highlighted operations related to Afghanistan as a key example of enhanced NATO-Russia cooperation From 2009 Russia allowed the transit over its territory via air and land of cargo for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force ISAF in Afghanistan In partnership with the U N Office on Drugs and Crime UNODC Russia and NATO member states also jointly trained Afghan Pakistani and Central Asian counternarcotics officers with a view toward reducing narcotics transit to and through Russia In 2011 NATO and Russia established a Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund to provide maintenance training and spare parts for Afghanistan’s Russian-produced helicopters 89 Nonetheless disagreements within the alliance and between NATO and Russia persisted on some core issues In particular although a 2010 agreement to pursue cooperation on missile defense was seen as a significant breakthrough ensuing negotiations were marked by disagreement and increasingly vocal Russian opposition to NATO plans After Russia’s actions in Ukraine NATO moved to implement what its leadership characterized as the greatest reinforcement of NATO’s collective defense since the end of the Cold War 90 Measures taken to reassure allies in Central and Eastern Europe and to deter further Russian aggression include the following     New Enhanced Forward Presence EFP of four multinational combat battalions of about 1 000-1 200 troops each in Poland and the three Baltic states The four battalions in operation since early 2017 are led by the United Kingdom in Estonia Canada Latvia Germany Lithuania and the United States Poland Significant increase in NATO military exercises in Central and Eastern Europe and a bolstered naval and air presence including through NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission Expansion of the NATO Response Force NRF —a multinational defense force—from 13 000 to 40 000 troops and creation of a new rapid-reaction Very High Readiness Joint Task Force VJTF within the NRF of approximately 5 000 ground forces capable of deploying at short notice New command-and-control capacities in Central and Eastern Europe including multinational headquarters in Poland and Romania The United States has been a key architect of and contributor to NATO’s reassurance and deterrence initiatives and it has sought to bolster U S force posture in Europe in response to Russian actions The enhanced U S military presence in Eastern Europe—dubbed Operation Atlantic Resolve—has primarily consisted of increased rotational deployments of air ground and naval assets and a significant increase in military exercises 91 To fund these increased U S military activities Congress appropriated around $5 2 billion from FY2015 to FY2017 for a new European Reassurance Initiative ERI also referred to as the European Deterrence Initiative In NATO “NATO-Russia Counter-Narcotics Training Reaches Milestone ” April 19 2012 at http www nato int cps en natohq news_86310 htm NATO “NATO-Russia Council Expands Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund Project for Afghanistan ” April 23 2013 at http www nato int cps en natohq news_100106 htm 90 For details see NATO “Boosting NATO’s Presence in the East and Southeast ” updated August 11 2017 at http www nato int cps en natohq topics_136388 htm NATO “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence ” fact sheet May 2017 at http www nato int nato_static_fl2014 assets pdf pdf_2017_05 1705-factsheet-efp pdf NATO “NATO Response Force ” updated January 16 2017 at http www nato int cps en natohq topics_49755 htm 91 For details on Operation Atlantic Resolve see the Department of Defense’s OAR website at http www defense gov home features 2014 0514_atlanticresolve 89 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 27 Russia Background and U S Policy its proposed FY2018 budget the Trump Administration requested $4 8 billion for ERI a 40% increase over the Obama Administration’s FY2017 request Recent Air and Sea Incidents Since 2014 Russia has adopted an increasingly aggressive posture with its air and sea patrols and military exercises According to the Lithuanian Defense Ministry for example NATO fighter jets scrambled to intercept Russian aircraft nearing or in some cases entering Baltic countries’ airspace 140 times in 2014 160 times in 2015 and 110 times in 2016 A 2014 report by the European Leadership Network provided a list of selected “high risk” or “serious” incidents during that year including the following  In March 2014 a Russian military reconnaissance aircraft flying with its transponder switched off to avoid commercial radar came within 100 meters of colliding with an SAS 737 passenger plane taking off from Copenhagen Another similar episode occurred in December 2014  On four separate instances during 2014 Russian fighter aircraft intercepted U S and Swedish reconnaissance aircraft  In April 2014 an unarmed Russian fighter aircraft made 12 low-altitude passes of the destroyer USS Donald Cook in the Black Sea coming within 1 000 meters at an altitude of 150 meters In September 2014 Russian fighters flew within 300 meters of the Canadian frigate HCMS Toronto in the Black Sea  In June 2014 Russian aircraft approached the Danish island of Bornholm in what appeared to be a simulated attack In September 2014 Russian aircraft over the Labrador Sea practiced cruise-missile attacks against the U S mainland and Russian aircraft violated Swedish airspace while conducting a mock bombing run  In September 2014 Russian officials detained a Lithuanian shipping vessel operating in international waters in the Barents Sea and towed it to Murmansk  A “massive outburst” of Russian air activity occurred along NATO’s borders in October 2014 in conjunction with a large Russian military aviation exercise Selected reported incidents from 2015 to 2017 include the following  In June 2015 six unarmed SU-24s flew 500 meters from the destroyer USS Ross in international waters in the Black Sea  In October 2015 U S fighter aircraft intercepted two TU-142 reconnaissance antisubmarine aircraft that reportedly came within one nautical mile of the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan east of the Korean peninsula  In January 2016 an SU-27 reportedly came within 5 meters of a U S RC-135 over the Black Sea  On two occasions in April 2016 SU-27s came within 15-25 meters of a U S RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace over the Baltic Sea and reportedly performed a barrel roll over the top of the U S aircraft  On two other occasions in April 2016 Russian SU-24 bombers made several low-altitude passes of the USS Donald Cook in the Baltic Sea reportedly coming within 10 meters of colliding with the ship  In September 2016 an SU-27 fighter aircraft intercepted a U S Navy P-8 conducting routine operations in international airspace over the Black Sea reportedly coming within 3 meters of a collision at one point  In September 2016 fighter jets from Norway the United Kingdom UK France and Spain consecutively intercepted two TU-160 bombers that flew near Norway and onward near the UK Ireland France and Spain  In February 2017 an SU-24 fighter aircraft flew within 200 meters of the USS Porter guided missile destroyer in the Black Sea Another two SU-24 aircraft and an IL-38 maritime patrol aircraft also flew near the destroyer  In April and May 2017 U S fighter aircraft intercepted Russian Tu-95 bombers IL-38 maritime patrol aircraft and Su-35 fighter aircraft near Alaska in five separate incidents including on four consecutive days in April These were reportedly the first such flights since 2015  In May 2017 an SU-27 fighter aircraft flew within approximately 6 meters of a U S Navy P-8 surveillance plane over the Black Sea Despite the close distance around 20 feet a U S Navy spokesperson characterized the encounter as “safe and professional ”  In June 2017 an SU-27 fighter aircraft flew within 1 5 meters 5 feet of a U S RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea in an encounter a U S official referred to as “unsafe ” Sources Damien Sharkov “NATO Russian Aircraft Intercepted 110 Times Above Baltic in 2016 ” Newsweek January 4 2017 European Leadership Network “Dangerous Brinkmanship Close Military Encounters Between Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 28 Russia Background and U S Policy Russia and the West in 2014 ” November 2014 and European Leadership Network “Russia-West Dangerous Brinkmanship Continues ” March 12 2015 additional media reports full citation information available to congressional clients from the author Note Prepared with Derek E Mix Analyst in European Affairs EU-Russia Relations92 Like NATO the EU has had to reconsider its relationship with a more assertive Russia and the implications for European security and stability Especially after the July 2014 shootdown of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over Ukraine the EU closely coordinated with the United States in imposing sanctions on Russia see “U S Sanctions on Russia ” below Even after the imposition of sanctions Russia is the EU’s fourth-largest trade partner behind the United States China and since 2015 Switzerland and main supplier of natural gas see Table 2 above Crafting common EU policies has been challenging given various EU member states’ different national histories and economic relations with Russia Many in the EU have long advocated for a pragmatic “strategic partnership” with Russia based largely on commercial and energy ties as well as practical cooperation on certain foreign policy issues Others such as Poland and the Baltic states by contrast have tended to view Russia more as a potential threat to themselves and their neighbors The sharpness of such divisions within the EU appeared to diminish before 2014 but Russia’s annexation of Crimea caused a distinct shift in perceptions across the board Pragmatists moved more into alignment with those who have tended to view Russia with greater wariness Furthermore many in Europe have expressed concern about Russia’s efforts to expand its influence on the continent by other than military means Media reports and outside experts contend that the Russian government is seeking to influence European political discourse policymaking and electoral processes with an array of tools Such measures reportedly have included the use of disinformation the spread of fake news cyberattacks on government or political party computer systems and the cultivation of relations with European political parties and allies broadly sympathetic to Russian views Efforts by the Russian government to influence Europe’s political landscape appear aimed at sowing disunity and destabilizing the EU and NATO In recent years a new and increasingly evident ideological link has appeared between European far-right parties and the Russian leadership 93 Most of these far-right parties tend to be antiestablishment and anti-EU and they often share some combination of extreme nationalism a commitment to “law and order” and traditional family values and anti-immigrant anti-Semitic or anti-Islamic sentiments A few parties on the left or far left also appear to harbor more friendly views toward Russia Concrete evidence of direct financial support from the Russian government to European political parties is difficult to identify Widespread speculation exists however that the Russian 92 This section was coauthored with Derek E Mix Specialist in European Affairs Also see CRS Report R44249 The European Union Current Challenges and Future Prospects by Kristin Archick 93 See for example Dalibor Rohac Edit Zgut and Lorant Gyori Populism in Europe and Its Russian Love Affair American Enterprise Institute January 2017 at http www aei org wp-content uploads 2017 01 Populism-in-Europeand-Its-Russian-Love-Affair pdf and Alina Polyakova et al The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses Atlantic Council November 2016 at http www atlanticcouncil org publications reports kremlin-trojan-horses Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 29 Russia Background and U S Policy government has funneled money through Russian banks or other organizations and individuals to far-right parties in Europe Many suggest that Russia also has been proactive in offering organizational expertise political know-how and media assistance to parties on Europe’s far right Russian support reportedly has included establishing and coordinating pro-Russian parties nongovernmental civil organizations and think tanks and supporting friendly media outlets 94 Many experts note that the Russian government under Putin has become very sophisticated in its efforts to exert influence in Europe At the same time analysts point out that many European countries have been dealing with Russian disinformation and political meddling for decades although they acknowledge that Russia’s digital and cyber capabilities have greatly increased in recent years Russia-China Relations95 Russia and China have many reasons to cooperate Both countries have a desire to counter what they see as U S hegemony regionally and worldwide Both are wary of the U S military presence in Asia and often criticize U S efforts to upgrade the United States’ defense capabilities with its treaty allies Japan and South Korea Both hold vetoes on the U N Security Council and often work together to adjust or oppose U N Security Council resolutions that are supported by Western states China and Russia are far from embracing a full alliance with one another however To a large extent the partnership depends on external events in a web of relationships around the world U S behavior may be the largest variable to the extent that China and Russia feel the United States is challenging their strategic space they may feel driven to develop stronger relations In recent years Beijing has not wanted to enter into an explicitly anti-Western alliance its trade volume with the United States dwarfs that with Russia and it has been loath to confront the West directly Russia’s intervention in Ukraine also has affected its relations with China On the one hand the intervention drove closer cooperation and a strong show of solidarity as Western countries imposed sanctions and attempted to isolate Putin diplomatically On the other hand it also created an imbalance in the relationship as Moscow’s need for Beijing’s support increased Beijing also appeared to be uneasy with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine which was at odds with China’s official statements concerning respect for the sovereignty independence and territorial integrity of other countries Tensions also have periodically risen because of a perception in Russia that large numbers of Chinese migrants are crossing the border for possible economic opportunity in the sparsely populated Russian Far East Many observers assert that the numbers of Chinese in Russia are much lower than suspected and some suggest that the flow of Chinese migrants from Russia may now be going in the other direction given the comparative economic vibrancy of the Chinese side 96 94 Political Capital Institute The Russian Connection The Spread of Pro-Russian Policies on the European Far Right March 14 2014 at http politicalcapital hu library php article_read 1 article_id 100 95 This section draws on CRS Report R44613 Northeast Asia and Russia’s “Turn to the East” Implications for U S Interests by Emma Chanlett-Avery 96 For example Alexander Gabuev Friends with Benefits Russian-Chinese Relations After the Ukraine Crisis Carnegie Moscow Center June 29 2016 p 23 at http carnegieendowment org files CEIP_CP278_Gabuev_revised_FINAL pdf Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 30 Russia Background and U S Policy China is Russia’s largest trading partner but Russia does not rank in China’s top 10 partners Trade between the two countries declined substantially in 2015 with Chinese exports to Russia falling by more than 30% and Chinese imports from Russia falling by more than 20% mostly due to the steep drop in energy prices In 2016 bilateral trade increased modestly primarily on the basis of growing Chinese exports to Russia whereas Russian imports to China declined by a small amount Energy deals have played an important role in Russia and China’s partnership particularly after Moscow’s relations with the West soured after its actions in Ukraine China has been willing to sign large oil-for-loan deals with Russia which has supplied around 14% of China’s crude oil imports since 2012 97 In 2014 China and Russia signed an agreement to construct a major gas pipeline the “Power of Siberia ” which the two countries say will start transporting gas by the end of 2019 Russia and China have discussed additional gas pipeline routes although construction plans have been repeatedly postponed 98 Russia-China security relations have advanced significantly in recent years Under the auspices of the multilateral Shanghai Cooperation Organization SCO Russia and China have held increasingly large and sophisticated bilateral and multilateral military exercises dubbed “Peace Mission ” since 2005 99 They also have held joint naval drills since 2012 most recently in the Mediterranean Sea and the Sea of Japan in 2015 the South China Sea in 2016 and the Baltic Sea in 2017 Some analysts say that by holding these high-profile exercises Beijing and Moscow intend to send strong signals to the West particularly the United States 100 Russia’s Intervention in Syria101 Russian military involvement in Syria dates back to the 1950s when the former Soviet Union courted Syrian nationalist rulers as a counterbalance to U S regional partners Soviet and Russian naval forces have accessed a facility at the Syrian port of Tartus since the early 1970s using it as a logistical hub to enable longer Mediterranean operations Former Syrian President Hafez al Asad 1971-2000 regularly hosted Soviet military and economic advisers but resisted Moscow’s attempts to leverage Russian military assistance to gain greater or permanent access to shore facilities Before the start of Russia’s current intervention in Syria Russian personnel continued to be based in Syria to maintain Russian military equipment and train Syrians although their numbers fluctuated over time After the NATO-led 2011 military intervention in Libya the Russian government came out more strongly in support of President Bashar al Asad’s regime Moscow supplied Damascus with military and financial assistance It also provided Asad with diplomatic support insisting that U S Energy Information Administration “More Chinese Crude Oil Imports Coming from Non-OPEC Countries ” April 14 2017 at https www eia gov todayinenergy detail php id 30792 98 Olesya Astakhova and Oksana Kobzeva “Russia-China Talks Over New Gas Routes Stalled Sources ” Reuters June 7 2017 at http www reuters com article us-russia-china-energy-idUSKBN18Y1TX Gazprom “Russian Gas Supplies to China via Power of Siberia to Start in December 2019 ” July 4 2017 at http www gazprom com press news 2017 july article340477 99 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization also includes Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan and since June 2017 India and Pakistan Afghanistan Belarus Iran and Mongolia have observer status 100 For details see Richard Weitz Parsing Chinese-Russian Military Exercises Strategic Studies Institute U S Army War College April 2015 at http www strategicstudiesinstitute army mil pdffiles PUB1266 pdf 101 This section was coauthored with Carla Humud Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs and Christopher Blanchard Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs For an overview of the Syria conflict see CRS Report RL33487 Armed Conflict in Syria Overview and U S Response coordinated by Carla E Humud 97 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 31 Russia Background and U S Policy U N efforts to promote the establishment of a transitional government focus on brokering an agreement between the Syrian government and rebel movements rather than what the United States and its allies typically characterized as the negotiated departure of Asad 102 Despite their differences Russia and the United States cooperated in the United Nations and with the League of Arab States in a fitful and unsuccessful string of peacemaking endeavors In September 2013 the Russian government made a surprise proposal to work with the United States in establishing an international mission to remove chemical weapons from Syria as a way to avoid U S military intervention Over the summer of 2015 Moscow began a gradual buildup of Russian personnel combat aircraft and military equipment in Syria Russia then began airstrikes in September 103 initially focusing on Syrian opposition targets including some groups reportedly backed by the United States In 2016 Russia expanded its targeting to include Islamic State forces although it continued to occasionally target U S -backed rebel groups In addition Russia continues to resupply Syrian military forces although Russian officials have stated they are merely fulfilling existing contracts To date airstrikes have constituted Russia’s primary offensive military effort in Syria These strikes have enabled forces loyal to Asad to reverse some opposition gains particularly in and around Aleppo Russia’s introduction of advanced air defense systems in Syria also reportedly constrains the ability of other aircraft to operate freely in the area and complicates proposals calling for the establishment of a no-fly zone At the same time Russia has pushed for cooperation between U S and Russian military forces in Syria against terrorist groups which in Russia’s view include a number of groups fighting the Asad government Russian ground forces in Syria appear to have played a limited combat role and seem to be focused primarily on defending Russian bases and installations although some may be embedded as advisers with Syrian military forces 104 Russia’s transfer of modernized weapons systems to the Syrian military which prior to the unrest had relied on older Russian or even Soviet-era equipment has bolstered the capabilities of Asad government forces It also has provided the Russian military with an opportunity to test new weapons systems and a platform to market Russian equipment to potential regional buyers In early 2017 Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that Russia had tested 162 types of weapons in Syria 105 Russian media have highlighted the performance of the T-90 battle tank in Syria claiming that it is able to withstand strikes from U S -made TOW missiles 106 For background on Russia’s Syria policy see Dmitri Trenin The Mythical Alliance Russia’s Syria Policy Carnegie Moscow Center February 2013 at http carnegie ru 2013 02 12 mythical-alliance-russia-s-syria-policy-pub-50909 and Samuel Charap “Russia Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention ” Survival Global Politics and Strategy vol 55 no 1 2013 pp 35-41 103 In October 2015 the United States and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a safety-of-flight protocol for aircraft operating in the same airspace 104 See Mark Galeotti and Jonathan Spyer “Russia to Defend Core Syrian Government Areas ” IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review September 22 2015 Jeffrey White “Russia’s Military Strategy in Syria Becoming Clearer as Its Forces Engage in Combat ” Washington Institute for Near East Policy Policy Watch 2503 October 9 2015 at http www washingtoninstitute org policy-analysis view russias-military-strategy-in-syria-becoming-clearer-as-itsforces-engage-in and Dmitry Gorenburg and Michael Kofman “There Is No Russian Withdrawal from Syria ” War on the Rocks March 18 2016 at https warontherocks com 2016 03 there-is-no-russian-withdrawal-from-syria 105 Lucian Kim “Russian Defense Minister Says His Military Has Tested 162 Weapons In Syria ” NPR February 23 2017 at http www npr org sections parallels 2017 02 23 516895124 russian-defense-minister-says-his-military-hastested-162-weapons-in-syria 106 Mansur Mirovalev “How Russia’s Military Campaign in Syria is Helping Moscow Market Its Weapons ” Los 102 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 32 Russia Background and U S Policy Going forward Russia may continue operations against Syrian rebel groups with the aim of weakening any credible or capable opposition to the Asad government This course of action could place the Syrian regime in a stronger negotiating position vis-à-vis rebels while also accomplishing Russia’s goal of avoiding Western-led regime change in Syria In the short term Russia potentially could extend its operations in Islamic State-held areas of central and eastern Syria Over the long term Russia may seek to retain influence with the Syrian government by continuing to advise and assist the Syrian military Russia has agreements to maintain a long-term presence at both the Tartus naval facility and the Hmeimim airbase in Latakia Russia has adopted an increasingly active role in political negotiations between the Syrian government and opposition groups Since January 2017 Russia Turkey and Iran have hosted peace talks in Astana Kazakhstan During a fourth round of talks in early May representatives of Russia Iran and Turkey signed a memorandum calling for the creation of four “de-escalation areas” in Syria 107 The memorandum stipulated that the de-escalation areas be administered by forces from the three signatory countries or “guarantors ” raising the possibility that these areas might become de facto spheres of influence for Russia Iran or Turkey and generate an additional influx of personnel from those countries into Syria 108 Laying the groundwork for two of the four de-escalation areas Russia has deployed military police and set up monitoring stations in the eastern suburbs of Damascus and in southwestern Syria along the Jordanian border 109 The planned de-escalation area in southwestern Syria emerged from a cease-fire deal brokered in July by the United States Russia and Jordan 110 Analysts have offered a variety of motivations for Russia’s intervention in Syria 111 In general the series of losses suffered by forces of the Russian-backed Syrian government in 2015 U S and other third-party security assistance to Syrian opposition groups the growth of the Islamic State organization in Syria and the potential for broader U S -led coalition military operations all may have contributed to Russia’s decision to enter the conflict directly In 2015 the prospect of Asad’s defeat had several negative implications for Russia It would have meant the loss of a key partner in the Middle East a region in which Russia had begun to expand its influence to help establish itself as a global power and peer competitor to the United States It also would have set another major precedent for a U S military-backed transition in the Middle East after Iraq and Libya something Moscow firmly opposed Finally Russian authorities insisted that the final beneficiary of the Asad regime’s collapse would be the Islamic State and other extremists who would be the likely victors in the ensuing contest for national power Angeles Times November 25 2017 at http www latimes com world la-fg-russia-weapons-20161118-story html 107 The areas are to be located in four noncontiguous parts of Syria Idlib Province and its surroundings some parts of northern Homs Province eastern Ghouta in the Damascus suburbs and parts of the southern provinces of Dar’a and Quneitra 108 A fifth round of talks in early July 2017 proved inconclusive and the issue of where to draw the borders of the deescalation areas was postponed to a sixth round of talks scheduled for the end of August 2017 109 Al-Araby al-Jadeed “Russian Troops ‘Man Checkpoints’ in Syria’s Flash-Point Eastern Ghouta ” July 26 2017 at https www alaraby co uk english news 2017 7 26 russian-troops-man-checkpoints-in-syrias-flash-point-ghouta 110 Jeff Mason and Denis Dyomkin “Partial Ceasefire Deal Reached in Syria in Trump’s First Peace Effort ” Reuters July 07 2017 at http www reuters com article us-mideast-crisis-syria-ceasefire-idUSKBN19S2DG 111 See for example Paul Stronski “Russia’s Fight in Syria Reflects the Kremlin’s Fears at Home ” Reuters September 29 2015 at http blogs reuters com great-debate 2015 09 28 russias-fight-in-syria-follows-a-dangerouspattern and Ekaterina Stepanova Russia’s Policy on Syria After the Start of Military Engagement Policy Memo No 421 PONARS Eurasia at http www ponarseurasia org memo russias-policy-syria-after-start-military-engagement Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 33 Russia Background and U S Policy Such an outcome in turn could promote the spread of Islamist extremism to other countries including within Central Asia and Russia itself Russian authorities have said that up to a few thousand Russian citizens predominantly from Muslim-populated republics in the North Caucasus have fought with the Islamic State and other extremist movements in Syria and Iraq Since Russia’s intervention commanders once affiliated with the Al Qaeda-aligned Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus established in 2007 reportedly have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and formed a local affiliate the Wilayah Kawkaz Russia’s leadership may have believed that intervention although potentially risky could help to avoid these negative outcomes by shoring up the Asad regime bolstering Russian influence and staving off the collapse of the state and a takeover by Islamist extremists In addition analysts have suggested that international criticism and sanctions related to Russia’s actions in Ukraine encouraged the Russian government to seek ways to reassert its global influence 112 By intervening in Syria Moscow could demonstrate its ability to project military power past its immediate neighborhood test existing and new capabilities and make Russia an unavoidable diplomatic player on an issue of significance to the United States and other countries Russia’s Global Engagement With the exception of Russia’s relations with China and its Syria intervention Russia’s foreign policy priorities traditionally have focused primarily on the post-Soviet region and the West However Russia like the Soviet Union before it actively pursues foreign relations on a global scale Russia plays a significant global role as one of five permanent members of the U N Security Council Until its annexation of Crimea in 2014 Russia was a member of the Group of Eight G8 together with the West’s seven leading economies including Japan 113 It is also a member of BRICS an alternative group of states with large economies that also includes Brazil India China and South Africa In these and other international fora Russia has engaged on global issues such as nonproliferation including combatting the nuclear weapons programs of Iran and North Korea counterterrorism counterpiracy and global health challenges Russia is a leading oil and gas exporter see “Energy Sector ” above and over the last several years the second-largest major weapons exporter in the world its top clients include India China Vietnam and Algeria 114 Russia has constructed nuclear power plants in Europe Iran India and China with more under construction or planned In addition Russia has cultivated a variety of bilateral partnerships around the globe In Asia Russia also has cultivated good relations with Japan with which it still has a territorial dispute over islands Russia annexed at the end of World War II as well as with India Pakistan more recently Afghanistan Vietnam and across Southeast Asia 115 In the Middle East Russia’s Syria intervention is exceptional in scope but reflects a long-standing policy of fruitful relations with regional governments including Algeria Egypt Iran Iraq and Libya In Latin America Russia For example Stepanova Russia’s Policy on Syria after the Start of Military Engagement Joshua Yaffa “Putin Syria and Why Moscow Has Gone War-Crazy ” New Yorker October 14 2016 at http www newyorker com news news-desk putin-syria-and-why-moscow-has-gone-war-crazy 113 This group has since returned to the status of the Group of Seven G7 114 CRS Report R44716 Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations 2008-2015 by Catherine A Theohary Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI “Increase in Arms Transfers Driven by Demand in the Middle East and Asia says SIPRI ” February 20 2017 at https www sipri org media press-release 2017 increasearms-transfers-driven-demand-middle-east-and-asia-says-sipri 115 For more on U S -Japan relations see CRS Report R44613 Northeast Asia and Russia’s “Turn to the East” Implications for U S Interests by Emma Chanlett-Avery 112 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 34 Russia Background and U S Policy has sought to reengage with Soviet-era partners Cuba and Nicaragua as well as Venezuela Brazil and others In sub-Saharan Africa Russia has not developed similarly strong relations however it has begun to expand its focus on this region where the Soviet Union used to have several close partners The Military116 Russia’s armed forces surprised most U S and European observers with their actions in Ukraine starting in March 2014 and in Syria from September 2015 Since the end of the Cold War conventional wisdom about the Russian military has tended to indicate a force in relative decline with aging Soviet-era equipment and with technology and a philosophy of warfare lagging well behind that of the United States and other NATO members Analysts have noted that the shortcomings of Russia’s military appeared to be confirmed by its relatively lackluster performance in the 2008 conflict with Georgia see “Russia and Other Post-Soviet States ” above Over the past three years however many analysts have been struck by the improved capabilities exhibited by the Russian military as well as the unexpected ways in which Russia has used its military       Russian special forces elite airborne troops and naval infantry effected a swift and bloodless seizure of Ukraine’s Crimea region in March 2014 The subsequent Russian involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine highlighted the practice of “hybrid warfare ” centered on the use of irregular “separatist” forces covertly backed by regular military troops along with an information and propaganda campaign orchestrated to create misdirection and spread an alternate international narrative The campaign in Syria in addition to serving a number of broader Russian interests and diplomatic objectives has allowed Russia to test and display how various components of its military work together in an expeditionary setting The Syria operation has demonstrated noteworthy capabilities such as the launch of long-range cruise missiles from naval vessels in the Caspian Sea and the deployment of Russia’s most modern combat aircraft It also has highlighted the Russian military’s ability to effect “area denial” with an air defense “bubble” of overlapping advanced missile systems 117 At the same time Russia has been upgrading or constructing new facilities in the Arctic and reactivating Soviet bases in the Arctic that fell into disuse with the end of the Cold War In December 2014 Russia launched a new Arctic Joint Strategic Command In addition Russia has been forming two new brigades specializing in Arctic warfare Over the past several years Russia also has adopted an increasingly aggressive posture with its air and sea patrols and military exercises see “Recent Air and Sea Incidents” text box above 116 This section was coauthored with Derek E Mix Analyst in European Affairs Thomas Gibbons-Neff “Top NATO General Russians Starting to Build Air Defense Bubble over Syria ” Washington Post September 29 2015 at https www washingtonpost com news checkpoint wp 2015 09 29 top-natogeneral-russians-starting-to-build-air-defense-bubble-over-syria 117 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 35 Russia Background and U S Policy Russian Military Modernization Since 2008 Russia’s military has undergone substantial reforms The reform program has focused largely on streamlining command structures and increasing professionalization increasing unit combat readiness and personnel training and reequipping forces through an ambitious acquisition program Although many of Russia’s reform efforts have faced myriad challenges partial reversals and other setbacks some of the efforts appear to have been at least partly successful in achieving their objectives and yielding improved capabilities Russia also has pursued an ambitious modernization program as it steadily increased defense spending at least until 2016 when the defense budget declined for the first time in years In 2010 Russia announced a new 10-year State Armaments Program SAP for 2011-2020 calling for approximately 20 trillion rubles in new weapons procurement over that period This figure amounted to approximately $664 billion at the time but is approximately $333 billion as of August 2017 due to depreciation of the ruble Prior to returning to the presidency in 2012 Prime Minister Putin outlined the procurement goals of the SAP In the coming decade Russian armed forces will be provided with over 400 modern land and sea-based inter-continental ballistic missiles 8 strategic ballistic missile submarines about 20 multi-purpose submarines over 50 surface warships around 100 military spacecraft over 600 modern aircraft including fifth generation fighter jets more than 1 000 helicopters 28 regimental kits of S-400 air defense systems 38 battalion kits of Vityaz missile systems 10 brigade kits of Iskander-M missile systems over 2 300 modern tanks about 2 000 selfpropelled artillery systems and vehicles and more than 17 000 military vehicles The plan calls for upgrading 11% of military equipment each year with a final goal of increasing the share of modern weaponry to 70% of total inventory by 2020 For 2015 Putin related the expected share of “modern weapons” was 32% in the Army 33% in the Air Force 40% in airborne units and “over 50%” in the Navy and aerospace defense forces Some analysts have questioned the definition of modern in this context noting that in some cases the term appears to include newer versions of older designs Although the SAP has achieved some significant results the process also has faced considerable challenges and encountered delays Since 2014 the Russian economy has been negatively affected by falling oil prices and international sanctions with a prolonged recession accompanied by severe currency depreciation high inflation and increased capital flight The downturn has strained public finances and complicated long-term budgetary and planning efforts Accompanying an overall decline in defense spending from 2016 the approval of a new 30-trillion ruble currently over $500 billion SAP for the period 2016-2025 was postponed until 2018 due to the instability of economic conditions Additionally some analysts doubt that the Russian defense industry can produce and deliver the full complement of equipment at the pace and scale envisioned by the SAP Sources Dmitry Gorenburg Russia’s State Armaments Program 2020 Is the Third Time the Charm for Military Modernization Policy Memo No 125 PONARS Eurasia October 2010 Vladimir Putin “Being Strong National Security Guarantees For Russia ” Rossiiskaya Gazeta February 20 2012 TASS “Putin Prioritizes Task to Keep Pace of Armed Forces Modernization ” May 12 2015 Russia’s Military Footprint in Europe Russia’s Western Military District stretches from its border with Finland in the north to its border with northeastern Ukraine and includes Kaliningrad a Russian territorial exclave wedged between Poland and Lithuania see Figure 4 Officially the Western Military District hosts around 400 000 troops or 40% of Russia’s total military forces Unofficial estimates put the number closer to 300 000 total active military forces are estimated at around 830 000 in 2016 The Western Military District includes the 6th Army 20th Guards Army and 1st Guards Tank Army the 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army as well as Airborne Troops the Baltic Fleet based in Kaliningrad naval infantry and coastal defense forces and intelligence support and special forces units 118 In May 2016 Russia announced plans to put two new divisions in the 118The official number is from Russia’s Ministry of Defense at http structure mil ru structure okruga west history htm For unofficial estimates see International Institute of Strategic Studies The Military Balance 2017 February 13 2017 pp 211 218-219 Anna Maria Dyner “Russia Beefs Up Military Potential in the Country’s Western Areas ” Polish Institute for International Affairs June 13 2016 at https www pism pl publications bulletin Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 36 Russia Background and U S Policy Western Military District and another in the Southern Military District Caucasus Black Sea and Caspian region totaling approximately 30 000 new troops Defense experts say that Russian forces stationed in the region including surface ships submarines and advanced S-400 air defense systems could “allow Russia to effectively close off the Baltic Sea and skies to NATO reinforcements ”119 According to a RAND report based on a series of war games staged in 2014 and 2015 a quick Russian strike would be able to reach the capitals of Estonia and Latvia in 36-60 hours 120 Kaliningrad is a key strategic territory for Russia allowing the country to project military power into NATO’s northern flank The territory has a heavy Russian military presence including the Baltic Fleet and two airbases In October 2016 the Russian Minister of Defense reported that Russia had temporarily deployed Iskander short-range nuclear-capable missiles in the region something they have done in the past 121 Many consider the deployment to be a response to new NATO deployments and some observers suspect that Russia is planning to deploy the missiles to Kaliningrad on a permanent basis 122 Sources close to the Russian military have said that it is “part of a long-standing plan to modernize Russia’s non-nuclear ballistic missile system ”123 According to NATO officials Russia is using Kaliningrad “to pursue what is known as an antiaccess area denial A2 AD strategy for surrounding areas That involves a strategic layering of surface-to-air missiles to block off NATO’s air access if needed to the three Baltic states and about a third of Poland ” According to one Russian analyst “Moscow’s plan for Kaliningrad is not to flood it with troops and firepower but to modernize its military infrastructure ”124 Analysts also have observed that Kaliningrad’s geographic isolation creates the potential for a scenario whereby Russia tries “to seize the 100-kilometer wide strip on the Polish-Lithuanian border known as the Suwalki Gap that separates the exclave from Belarus a Russian ally ”125 In addition to the increased militarization of its western flank Russia has increased its military presence in neighboring states It has extensively militarized Ukraine’s occupied region of Crimea home of the Black Sea Fleet and an estimated 28 000-29 000 troops around double the number stationed there prior to Russia’s occupation Russia used to lease naval facilities from Ukraine 126 Russia also continues to sponsor and support separatist movements in eastern no-35-885 and Andrey Frolov “Russian Army in 2014 and Western Military District” presentation at http www defmin fi files 2840 Andrey_Frolov_Russian_army_SPb_25_04_2014 pdf 119 Henry Meyer “Putin’s Military Buildup in the Baltic Stokes Invasion Fears ” Bloomberg July 6 2016 at https www bloomberg com news articles 2016-07-06 putin-s-military-buildup-in-the-baltic-stokes-invasion-fears 120 David A Shlapak and Michael W Johnson Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics RAND Corporation September 30 2016 at http www rand org pubs research_reports RR1253 html 121 Reuters “Russia Moves Nuclear-Capable Missiles Into Kaliningrad ” October 8 2016 at http www reuters com article us-russia-usa-missiles-confirm-idUSKCN1280IV 122 Geoff Brumfiel “Russia Seen Moving New Missiles To Eastern Europe ” NPR December 8 2016 at http www npr org sections parallels 2016 12 08 504737811 russia-seen-moving-new-missiles-to-eastern-europe 123 Lidia Kelly “Russia’s Baltic Outpost Digs in for Standoff with NATO ” Reuters July 5 2016 at http www reuters com article us-nato-russia-kaliningrad-idUSKCN0ZL0J7 124 Ibid 125 Meyer “Putin’s Military Buildup in the Baltic Stokes Invasion Fears ” 126 For a recent official Ukrainian estimate of the size and strength of the Russian military force in Crimea see Testimony of Pavlo Klimkin in U S Congress Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State Foreign Operations and Related Programs Russian Policies Intentions Toward Specific European Countries hearings 114th Cong 1st sess March 7 2017 For additional background on Russia’s militarization of Crimea see Reuters “In Crimea Russia Signals Military Resolve with New and Revamped Bases ” November 1 2016 at http www reuters com investigates Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 37 Russia Background and U S Policy Ukraine including unofficially deploying as many as 12 000 troops to the region in 2015 and more recently 4 200-7 500 troops according to Ukrainian government sources 127 Russia also has stationed military forces in Georgia and Moldova without these states’ consent Since Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia its military bases in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have housed some 3 500-4 000 personnel each In 2016 Russia finalized an agreement with the de facto authorities of Abkhazia establishing a combined group of military forces in the occupied region Earlier this year Russia concluded an agreement with South Ossetia to integrate the breakaway region’s military forces with its own In Moldova Russia continues to deploy 1 500-2 000 troops in Transnistria of which Moldova accepts a few hundred as peacekeepers 128 Finally Russia deploys military troops by consent on the territory of its longtime military ally Armenia which hosts some 3 300-5 000 Russian troops In recent years Armenia also has concluded agreements with Russia to establish a joint air defense system and a combined group of forces both on the basis of previous arrangements 129 special-report russia-crimea and Dave Gilbert and Fred Pleitgen “Russia Puts on Show of Military Strength in Crimea ” CNN September 9 2016 at http www cnn com 2016 09 09 europe crimea-war-games-pleitgen 127 On estimates of Russian troops in Ukraine see Reuters “Some 12 000 Russian Soldiers in Ukraine Supporting Rebels U S Commander ” March 3 2015 at http www reuters com article us-ukraine-russia-soldiersidUSKBN0LZ2FV20150303 Bellingcat Russia’s War in Ukraine The Medals and Treacherous Numbers A Bellingcat Investigation August 31 2016 at https www bellingcat com news uk-and-europe 2016 08 31 russias-warukraine-medals-treacherous-numbers RFE RL “Kyiv Says Russia Has at Least 5 000 Troops in Eastern Ukraine ” November 29 2016 at http www rferl org a ukraine-russia-troops-crimea 28146059 html Testimony of Pavlo Klimkin in U S Congress Russian Policies Intentions Toward Specific European Countries March 7 2017 see transcript available at http www cq com doc congressionaltranscripts-5056818 and International Institute of Strategic Studies The Military Balance 2017 p 224 128 International Institute of Strategic Studies The Military Balance 2017 February 13 2017 p 224 Ekaterina Zgirovskaya “Global Presence ” Gazeta ru December 16 2015 in Russian at https www gazeta ru army 2015 12 16 7972523 shtml 129 Emil Danielyan “Russia Armenia Agree to Boost Joint Military Force ” Azatutyun am RFE RL November 30 2016 Eduard Abrahamyan “Russia and Armenia Establish Joint Ground Forces ” CACI Analyst December 16 2016 International Institute of Strategic Studies The Military Balance 2017 Nikolai Litovkin “Russia and Armenia To Create Joint Defense Force in Caucasus ” Russia Beyond the Headlines November 16 2016 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 38 Russia Background and U S Policy Figure 4 Russia’s Military Footprint in Europe Sources Graphic produced by CRS Map information generated by Hannah Fischer using data from the Department of State 2015 and 2016 geographic data companies ArcWorld 2014 and DeLorme 2014 and the U S interagency Humanitarian Information Unit 2016 and IISS Military Balance 2017 Strategic and Snap Military Exercises In recent years Russia has significantly increased the frequency of large-scale strategic exercises and short-notice snap drills serving to bolster the readiness of its forces rehearse for a variety of contingencies in its neighborhood and gain experience in the rapid redeployment of large numbers of personnel and equipment In 2009 Russia alarmed many U S and European observers with exercises rehearsing an attack on Poland and the Baltic states and culminating in a simulated nuclear strike on Warsaw In March 2013 according to NATO officials the Russian Air Force conducted a mock nuclear strike against Sweden An exercise in western Russia involving Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 39 Russia Background and U S Policy 150 000 troops in February-March 2014 unfolded in conjunction with the seizure of Crimea At the tactical level smaller-scale unit exercises and live-fire exercises reportedly also have increased in frequency NATO officials assert that Russia staged about a dozen unannounced large-scale snap military drills in 2015-2016 including in the run-up to the July 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw Besides testing units’ readiness for battle mobilization procedures equipment and command systems the exercises were presumed to be a signal to NATO through the display of forces and weaponry NATO countries such as Poland Romania and the Baltics have been concerned about a repeat of tactics used during the takeover of Crimea with putative exercises morphing into an actual assault operation Russia’s next major strategic exercise Zapad-2017 West-2017 is scheduled for September 2017 raising concerns among Russia’s western neighbors Regularly scheduled every four years the exercise will take place in western Russia including Kaliningrad as well as in Belarus It is estimated that some 70 000-100 000 troops will participate This is a far greater number than were involved in the last Zapad exercise in 2013 but similar to the number of participants in last year’s major strategic exercise in southern Russia Kavkaz-2016 Sources Matthew Day “Russia ‘Simulates’ Nuclear Attack on Poland ” The Daily Telegraph November 1 2009 Testimony of Ian J Brzezinski in U S Congress Senate Committee on Armed Services United States Policy on Europe hearings 114th Cong 1st sess April 28 2015 Gustav Gressel Russia’s Quiet Military Revolution and What It Means For Europe European Council on Foreign Relations October 2015 Edward Lucas The Coming Storm Baltic Sea Security Report Center for European Policy Analysis June 2015 additional media reports full citation information available to congressional clients from the author U S Policy Toward Russia For more than 25 years the U S -Russian relationship has gone through positive and negative periods The spirit of the U S -Russian “strategic partnership” forged by Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin in the early 1990s was gradually overtaken by increasing tension and mutual recrimination in large part as a consequence of disagreements over Russia’s efforts to reestablish a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet region U S promotion of NATO enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe and NATO’s military intervention in the former Yugoslavia in the mid1990s Presidents George W Bush and Vladimir Putin believed they could restore U S -Russian relations particularly in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 The two countries reshaped their relationship on the basis of cooperation against terrorism and the economic integration of Russia with the West However tensions arose again around a number of issues including the Iraq War the so-called color revolutions in Ukraine Georgia and Kyrgyzstan involving protests against electoral fraud that unseated corrupt regimes Russian energy and security pressure on its neighbors and U S and NATO plans to deploy missile defenses in Europe Cooperation continued in some areas but the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict caused bilateral ties to deteriorate to their lowest point since the Cold War U S Policy Under the Obama Administration On entering office the Obama Administration asserted it could prompt a “reset” of relations with Russia’s new president Dmitry Medvedev During the Obama Administration the United States and Russia cooperated in a number of areas This cooperation resulted in the following  establishment of a U S -Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission with 21 working groups that met regularly until activities were suspended as a result of Russian actions in Ukraine 130 For more on the U S -Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission see U S Department of State “U S -Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission ” at https 2009-2017 state gov p eur ci rs usrussiabilat index htm 130 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 40 Russia Background and U S Policy        a new strategic arms control agreement the 2010 New START Treaty ground and air transit of supplies through Russia to supply U S and NATO troops in Afghanistan via the Northern Distribution Network cooperation in Afghan counternarcotics and combat helicopter maintenance Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization the imposition of new multilateral sanctions on Iran and development of the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA U N Security Council sanctions on North Korea and the removal of chemical weapons from Syria under the auspices of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Despite this progress U S -Russian relations remained challenging in several respects Although in 2011 Russia joined China in abstaining from a U N Security Council vote establishing a no-fly zone in Libya Putin then Russia’s prime minister expressed disapproval of the decision as an unwarranted intrusion into Libya’s internal affairs Since 2011 Russian diplomats have cited the example of the NATO mission in Libya as evidence that the inclusion of civilian protection provisions in U N Security Council resolutions will be manipulated by the United States and others for purposes of regime change U S -Russian relations worsened with Russia’s disputed December 2011 parliamentary elections and Putin’s March 2012 return to the presidency Two days after the parliamentary elections then-U S Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed “serious concern” about the election and implied that it had been “neither free nor fair ”131 In response Putin accused the State Department of interfering in Russia’s internal affairs and ultimately seeking to promote regime change 132 Putin infused his presidential campaign with a heavy dose of anti-Americanism painting the Russian opposition and prodemocracy NGOs as Western pawns Russian state television accused the new U S ambassador and architect of the reset policy Michael McFaul of plotting revolution after his first meeting with opposition and civil-society activists 133 Relations continued to decline In December 2012 Congress passed and the President signed into law the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act P L 112-208 Title IV as part of a broader piece of legislation normalizing U S trade with Russia The Magnitsky Act required the President to identify and impose sanctions on individuals involved in the detention abuse or death of Sergei Magnitsky a Russian lawyer and auditor who died in prison after uncovering massive tax fraud that implicated the government as well as others whom the United States determines are “responsible for extrajudicial killings torture or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” in Russia 134 Russian reaction was intense as the sanctions were seen as a direct assault on the legitimacy and integrity of the government and an Hillary Rodham Clinton “Remarks at the OSCE First Plenary Session ” U S Department of State December 6 2011 at https 2009-2017 state gov secretary 20092013clinton rm 2011 12 178315 htm 132 David M Herszenhorn and Ellen Barry “Putin Contends Clinton Incited Unrest over Vote ” New York Times December 8 2011 at http www nytimes com 2011 12 09 world europe putin-accuses-clinton-of-instigating-russianprotests html 133 Paul J Saunders “U S Ambassador’s Rough Welcome in Moscow Is the Reset Failing ” Atlantic January 23 2012 at https www theatlantic com international archive 2012 01 us-ambassadors-rough-welcome-in-moscow-is-thereset-failing 251808 134 For more on the Magnitsky sanctions program see U S Department of the Treasury “The Magnitsky Sanctions ” at https www treasury gov resource-center sanctions Programs pages magnitsky aspx 131 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 41 Russia Background and U S Policy “unwarranted intrusion into its internal affairs ”135 In response the Russian government terminated an adoption agreement that had entered into force the month before and banned U S adoptions of Russian children 136 In the wake of the Magnitsky Act the Russian government also moved to dismantle a number of other links between Russia and the United States The day after the act was introduced President Putin signed Russia’s “foreign agent” law requiring foreign-funded organizations that engage in activity seeking to affect policymaking to register and identify as foreign agents In September 2012 Russia requested that the United States close down foreign assistance programs run by the U S Agency for International Development Russia also informed the United States that it was unwilling to renew an agreement that had supported nonproliferation-related Cooperative Threat Reduction Nunn-Lugar programs in Russia since 1992 see “Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation ” below In August 2013 the White House announced it would “postpone” a U S -Russian presidential summit planned for September because of inadequate “progress in our bilateral agenda” since Putin returned to the presidency 137 In 2014 U S relations with Russia deteriorated further in reaction to Russia’s invasion and annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and its subsequent support of separatists in eastern Ukraine The United States in coordination with the EU and others promised to impose increasing costs on Russia until it “abides by its international obligations and returns its military forces to their original bases and respects Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity ”138 The United States suspended discussions on trade and investment and military-to-military contacts as well as certain kinds of nonproliferation and energy research cooperation 139 Russia also was removed from the G8 and the United States EU and other allies introduced sanctions on Russia for its actions see “Ukraine-Related Sanctions ” below In December 2016 President Obama imposed sanctions for election-related malicious cyber activity see “Sanctions for Malicious Cyber Activity ” below The Administration also declared 35 Russian diplomatic personnel persona non grata and denied Russian personnel access to two Russian government-owned compounds in Maryland and New York The Administration said these measures were a response to the increased harassment of U S diplomatic personnel in Russia over the previous two years 140 U S Policy Under the Trump Administration Like the Administrations before it the Trump Administration came into office seeking to improve relations with Russia Following a January 28 2017 call between Presidents Trump and Putin Reuters “Russia ‘Outraged’ over Senate Passing Magnitsky Bill ” June 27 2012 at http www reuters com article us-russia-usa-rights-idUSBRE85Q0EK20120627 136 RFE RL “Putin Signs Bill Banning U S Adoptions ” December 28 2012 at http www rferl org a putin-signs-billbanning-us-adoptions-magnitsky 24810783 html 137 The White House “Statement by the Press Secretary on the President’s Travel to Russia ” August 7 2013 at https obamawhitehouse archives gov the-press-office 2013 08 07 statement-press-secretary-president-s-travel-russia 138 The White House “Fact Sheet Ukraine-Related Sanctions ” March 17 2014 at https obamawhitehouse archives gov the-press-office 2014 03 17 fact-sheet-ukraine-related-sanctions 139 See testimony by Eric Rubin Deputy Assistant Secretary Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs in U S Congress House Foreign Affairs Committee U S Foreign Policy Toward Ukraine hearings 114th Cong 1st sess March 6 2014 at https 2009-2017 state gov p eur rls rm 2014 mar 223023 htm 140 The White House “Fact Sheet Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment ” December 29 2016 at https obamawhitehouse archives gov the-press-office 2016 12 29 fact-sheet-actions-responserussian-malicious-cyber-activity-and 135 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 42 Russia Background and U S Policy the White House issued a statement noting that the call “was a significant start to improving the relationship between the United States and Russia that is in need of repair ” The statement also said the two presidents expressed hope that their countries “can move quickly to tackle terrorism and other important issues of mutual concern ”141 In his first public remarks on February 16 2017 Secretary of State Rex Tillerson noted that the United States would “consider working with Russia where we can find areas of practical cooperation that will benefit the American people ”142 Meeting with Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in Moscow in April 2017 Secretary Tillerson “expressed his view that the current state of U S -Russia relations is at a low point” and that “ t he world’s two foremost nuclear powers cannot have this kind of relationship ”143 In July 2017 President Trump met with Putin on the sidelines of a G20 meeting in Hamburg Germany Many observers concur that improved U S -Russian relations would be welcome In an article published in December 2016 for instance then-U S Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter wrote that the United States would “work to preserve cooperation on issues where our interests align and hold the door open to renewed partnership in the future ” Carter noted that “Russia is simply too big too powerful and potentially too dangerous to be ignored or fully isolated ”144 A key question however is whether the United States can succeed in building improved relations with Russia while maintaining strong commitments to its allies and partners and standing firm on fundamental principles Questions concerning the extent of Russian interference in the U S presidential election also have imposed constraints on the Administration’s ability to improve relations with Russia The Administration has expressed a desire to pursue cooperation with Russia on a range of pursuits e g Syria North Korea cybersecurity Media reports in March 2017 suggested that the Administration believed the time “may not be right” for seeking cooperation with Russia in the battle against the Islamic State 145 However after Secretary Tillerson’s April 2017 meeting with Putin he noted that they “shared perspectives on possible ways forward” in Syria including the need to “deny a safe haven for terrorists” and “find a solution to the Syrian conflict ”146 During President Trump’s July 2017 meeting with Putin Secretary Tillerson said that the two leaders discussed a newly established de-escalation agreement in the southwestern part of Syria bordering Jordan and the possibility of cooperating to de-escalate conflict in other areas of Syria The Secretary said the agreement among the United States Russia and Jordan was the “first indication of the U S and Russia being able to work together in Syria ”147 The White House “Readout of the President’s Call with Russian President Vladimir Putin ” January 28 2017 at https www whitehouse gov the-press-office 2017 01 28 readout-presidents-call-russian-president-vladimir-putin 142 Rex W Tillerson “Remarks Following Meeting With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov ” U S Department of State February 16 2017 at https www state gov secretary remarks 2017 02 267671 htm 143 Rex W Tillerson “Remarks With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a Press Availability ” U S Department of State April 12 2017 at https www state gov secretary remarks 2017 04 270136 htm 144 Ash Carter “A Strong and Balanced Approach to Russia ” Survival Global Politics and Strategy vol 58 no 6 December 2016 p 61 Also see for example several of the contributions in The National Interest “Symposium Advice to President Trump on U S -Russia Policy ” November 28 2016 at http nationalinterest org feature symposium-advice-president-trump-us-russia-policy-18522 145 Julie Pace “Trump Wary of Russian Deal New Advisers Urge Tougher Stand ” Associated Press March 4 2017 at https www apnews com 8bf076a9e5314c19a28f79dbc5d967fe 146 Tillerson “Remarks With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a Press Availability ” April 12 2017 147 The White House “Press Briefing by Secretary of State Tillerson and Secretary of Treasury Mnuchin on the President’s Meetings at the G20 ” July 7 2017 at https www whitehouse gov the-press-office 2017 07 07 press141 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 43 Russia Background and U S Policy Secretary Tillerson’s April 2017 meeting with Putin covered other issues as well The Secretary noted that he Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov “discussed approaches to improving channels of communication” between the two governments and “agreed to establish a working group to address smaller issues and make progress toward stabilizing the relationship so that we can then address the more serious problems ”148 Secretary Tillerson also indicated that Russia could play a “constructive role in encouraging the regime in North Korea to change its course” on the development of a nuclear program In August 2017 Russia joined the United States China and other members of the U N Security Council to impose new sanctions on North Korea in response to recent missile launches The Administration has said it supports the establishment of a dialogue with Russia on cybersecurity although U S officials suggest this will take time to evolve In July 2017 President Trump appeared to reject the idea of establishing a joint “cybersecurity unit” with Russia Tom Bossert Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism however subsequently underlined the importance of holding a “dialogue” with Russia on cybersecurity “about the rules of the road in cyberspace norms and expectations ”149 Administration officials have said that Russia’s election interference poses a challenge to improved relations Following his meeting with Putin in April 2017 Secretary Tillerson stated that Russia’s interference in U S elections was “serious enough to attract additional sanctions ”150 In July 2017 the Secretary indicated that President Trump opened his meeting with Putin at the G20 by “raising the concerns of the American people regarding Russian interference” and that “ t he two leaders agreed this is a substantial hindrance in our ability to move the RussianU S relationship forward ”151 In a July visit to Kyiv Ukraine the Secretary further noted that the election interference “stands as an obstacle to our ability to improve the relationship between the United States and Russia” and characterized the desired cybersecurity dialogue as one structured around gaining “assurances” that “interference in our elections will not occur by Russia or anyone else ”152 Also in July Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats reiterated there was “no dissent” within the U S intelligence community on the question of Russian interference in U S elections 153 The Administration also seeks to promote change in Russia’s policy toward Ukraine In February 2017 U S Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley referred to a recent flare-up of violence in Ukraine noting that “the dire situation in eastern Ukraine is one that demands clear and strong condemnation of Russian actions ” She stated that “the United States continues to briefing-presidents-meetings-g20-july-7-2017 148 Quotations in this paragraph are from Tillerson “Remarks With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a Press Availability ” April 12 2017 149 The White House “Press Gaggle by Homeland Security Advisor Tom Bossert en route Newark NJ ” July 14 2017 at https www whitehouse gov the-press-office 2017 07 14 press-gaggle-homeland-security-advisor-tom-bossert-enroute-newark-nj 150 Tillerson “Remarks With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a Press Availability ” April 12 2017 151 “Press Briefing by Secretary of State Tillerson and Secretary of Treasury Mnuchin on the President’s Meetings at the G20 ” July 7 2017 152 Rex W Tillerson “Remarks With Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko At a Joint Press Availability ” U S Department of State July 9 2017 at https www state gov secretary remarks 2017 07 272446 htm 153 Ken Dilanian “Intelligence Director Says Agencies Agree on Russian Meddling ” NBC News July 21 2017 at http www nbcnews com news us-news intelligence-director-says-agencies-agree-russian-meddling-n785481 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 44 Russia Background and U S Policy condemn and call for an immediate end to the Russian occupation of Crimea” and that “Crimearelated sanctions will remain in place until Russia returns control of the peninsula to Ukraine ”154 Secretary Tillerson has repeatedly underlined the significance of getting Russia to change its approach in Ukraine On several occasions he has stated that Ukraine-related sanctions will remain in place “until Moscow reverses the actions that triggered” them 155 In February 2017 he said that the United States expects Russia “to honor its commitment to the Minsk agreements and work to de-escalate the violence in Ukraine ”156 After his April 2017 meeting with Putin Secretary Tillerson noted that “the situation in Ukraine will remain an obstacle to improvement in relations between the U S and Russia ” He called on Russia to “make progress in implementation by de-escalating violence and taking steps to withdraw separatist armed forces and heavy weapons so that OSCE observers can fulfill their role ”157 The Secretary repeated this call in a visit to Kyiv Ukraine in July 2017 as did President Trump three days before in Warsaw Poland where he “urge d Russia to cease its destabilizing activities in Ukraine and elsewhere ”158 The next day Secretary Tillerson announced the appointment of former U S Ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker to the newly established position of U S Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations On August 2 2017 President Trump signed into law the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 P L 115-44 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act Title II The law codifies sanctions on Russia provided for in existing Ukraine-related and cyberrelated executive orders In addition the act strengthens other sanctions on Russia and requires or recommends several new sanctions as well as establishes a congressional review of any presidential move to ease or lift sanctions Although President Trump signed the act he said in a signing statement that the legislation was “significantly flawed” and stated his reservations with certain provisions noting he would implement them “in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations ”159 Before the President signed the act into law the Russian government reacted to its passage in Congress by ordering a reduction of U S mission personnel in Russia to no more than 455 which it said was equal to the number of Russian personnel in the United States 160 It also suspended U S usage of storage and resort facilities in Moscow Observers viewed these measures in part Ambassador Nikki Haley “Remarks at a U N Security Council Briefing on Ukraine ” U S Mission to the United Nations February 2 2017 at https usun state gov remarks 7668 155 Rex W Tillerson “Remarks to NATO-Ukraine Commission ” U S Department of State March 31 2017 at https www state gov secretary remarks 2017 03 269359 htm U S Department of State “Secretary Tillerson’s Meeting With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov ” May 10 2017 at https www state gov r pa prs ps 2017 05 270780 htm Tillerson “Remarks With Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko At a Joint Press Availability ” July 9 2017 156 Tillerson “Remarks Following Meeting With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov ” February 16 2017 157 Tillerson “Remarks With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a Press Availability ” April 12 2017 158 Tillerson “Remarks With Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko At a Joint Press Availability ” July 9 2017 The White House “Remarks by President Trump to the People of Poland ” July 6 2017 at https www whitehouse gov the-press-office 2017 07 06 remarks-president-trump-people-poland-july-6-2017 159 The White House “Statement by President Donald J Trump on the Signing of H R 3364 ” August 2 2017 at https www whitehouse gov the-press-office 2017 08 02 statement-president-donald-j-trump-signing-hr-3364 160 President Putin later said this would mean a reduction of around 755 mission personnel which would include foreign nationals Neil MacFarquhar “Russia Seizes 2 U S Properties and Orders Embassy to Cut Staff ” New York Times July 28 2017 at https www nytimes com 2017 07 28 world europe us-russia-sanctions html Andrew Roth “Putin Orders Cut of 755 Personnel at U S Missions ” Washington Post July 30 2017 at https www washingtonpost com world putin-orders-cut-of-755-personnel-at-us-missions 2017 07 30 8a4b0044-755511e7-8c17-533c52b2f014_story html 154 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 45 Russia Background and U S Policy as a delayed response to the Obama Administration’s December 2016 decision to evict Russian personnel and deny access to Russia’s diplomatic compounds Congressional Action in the 115th Congress In the first several months of the 115th Congress many Members have expressed their sense that the United States should adhere to core international commitments and principles in its dealings with Russia As of August 2017 congressional committees have held more than 20 hearings on matters relating to Russia including on U S election interference other influence campaigns sanctions INF Treaty violations civil society Russian military and security policy and U S responses to Russian activities The 115th Congress has passed and the President has signed into law the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 P L 115-44 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act Title II This act codifies sanctions on Russia provided for in existing Ukraine-related and cyber-related executive orders strengthens additional sanctions and requires or recommends several new sanctions as well as establishes a congressional review of any presidential move to ease or lift sanctions for details see “U S Sanctions on Russia ” below Such measures including from other draft legislation initially were included in Title II of S 722 Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017 which passed the Senate in June 2017 The following month the House version of the bill H R 3364 passed the House by a vote of 419-3 and the Senate on July 27 2017 by a vote of 98-2 The President signed the bill which also includes sanctions on Iran and North Korea into law on August 2 2017 As in past years FY2017 foreign operations appropriations impose restrictions on foreign assistance to Russia’s central government although funds have been made available “to support democracy programs in the Russian Federation including to promote Internet freedom” P L 115-31 Division J §7070 Additional restrictions exist on defense and energy appropriations P L 115-31 Division C §8105 a and Division D §305 a Legislation also has been introduced calling on the U S government to assess and respond to Russian influence operations illicit financial activities abroad or INF treaty violations The 2017 Intelligence Authorization Act established an executive interagency committee for countering active measures by Russia to exert covert influence P L 115-31 Division N §501 Relevant measures also are included in the current versions of the House and Senate National Defense Authorization Acts for 2018 H R 2810 S 1519 and the current version of the House and Senate Intelligence Authorization Acts for 2018 H R 3180 S 1761 In FY2017 Congress appropriated not less than $100 million in foreign assistance for a Countering Russian Influence Fund intended to counter influence and aggression in Europe and Eurasia P L 115-31 §7070 d The Countering Russian Influence Fund is to “be made available to civil society organizations and other entities in such countries for rule of law media cyber and other programs that strengthen democratic institutions and processes and counter Russian influence and aggression ” The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 P L 115-44 Title II Subtitle B authorizes an additional $250 million in FY2018 and FY2019 for the Countering Russian Influence Fund Assistance is to be provided to NATO and EU members and aspirants to strengthen their democratic institutions counter Russian disinformation and cyberattacks against critical infrastructure and electoral mechanisms and promote energy security The act requires the President to submit reports on media organizations funded and controlled by the Russian government in Russia or abroad and on the use of Russian funds intended to influence the outcome of elections or campaigns in Europe and Eurasia Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 46 Russia Background and U S Policy The act also states §253 that the United States “does not recognize territorial changes effected by force including the illegal invasions and occupations of Abkhazia South Ossetia Crimea Eastern Ukraine and Transnistria ” Current foreign operations appropriations restrict funds for implementing policies and actions that would recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea or support Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia There also are restrictions on foreign assistance to the central governments of countries that support Russia’s annexation of Crimea or that recognize the independence of Abkhazia or South Ossetia P L 115-31 Division J §7070 In June 2017 the House passed a resolution H Res 351 condemning violence and persecution in Chechnya against individuals on the basis of actual or suspected sexual orientation and calling on Russian and local officials to hold accountable the perpetrators of such abuse see “Democracy and Human Rights ” above The resolution called on the U S government to identify individuals involved who would qualify for sanctions under the Magnitsky Act P L 112-208 Title IV or the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act P L 114-328 Subtitle F A similar resolution has been introduced in the Senate S Res 211 Selected Issues in U S -Russian Relations U S Sanctions on Russia161 Ukraine-Related Sanctions Most U S sanctions on Russia have been established in response to Russia’s aggressive actions in and toward Ukraine 162 Since 2014 the United States has imposed Ukraine-related sanctions on at least 595 individuals and entities 163 President Obama in issuing decisions to impose economic sanctions on Russia declared that Russia’s activities in Ukraine threaten the peace security stability sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbor and constitute a threat to U S national security A series of executive orders issued in 2014 EOs 13660 13661 13662 13685 and codified by P L 115-44 form the basis for designating Russian individuals and entities subject to Ukrainerelated sanctions In issuing the EOs President Obama identified individuals and entities subject to economic restrictions for having undermined the stability of Ukraine misappropriated its state assets annexed Crimea to Russia used illicit armed force in Ukraine or conducted business trade or investment in occupied Crimea Any individual or entity designated pursuant to these orders is subject to the blocking of assets under U S jurisdiction and denial of entry into the United States In addition U S persons are prohibited from engaging in transactions with 161 This section draws on CRS In Focus IF10552 U S Sanctions on Russia Related to the Ukraine Conflict coordinated by Cory Welt and CRS In Focus IF10694 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act by Dianne E Rennack Kenneth Katzman and Cory Welt Also see CRS Insight IN10634 Overview of U S Sanctions Regimes on Russia by Cory Welt and Dianne E Rennack CRS In Focus IF10614 EU Sanctions on Russia Related to the Ukraine Conflict by Kristin Archick Dianne E Rennack and Cory Welt and CRS Report R43895 U S Sanctions and Russia’s Economy by Rebecca M Nelson 162 For more on Ukraine-related sanctions see U S Department of the Treasury “Ukraine- Russia-Related Sanctions ” at https www treasury gov resource-center sanctions Programs Pages ukraine aspx U S Department of Commerce “Frequently Asked Questions on BIS’s Russia Sanctions ” at https www bis doc gov index php component content article 9-bis carousel 775-frequently-asked-question-on-bis-s-russia-sanctions and U S Department of State “Ukraine and Russia Sanctions ” at https 2009-2017 state gov e eb tfs spi ukrainerussia 163 In addition to individuals and entities in Russia this total includes former Ukrainian officials de facto officials of Crimea and the Donbas secessionist entities and Crimea-based companies EU sanctions are broadly similar to U S sanctions although each has imposed sanctions on individuals and entities that the other has not Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 47 Russia Background and U S Policy designated entities or persons The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control OFAC continues to investigate transactions and designate persons and entities most recently in June 2017 In addition in what are known as sectoral sanctions OFAC restricts transactions by persons under U S jurisdiction related to investment and financing for designated state-controlled companies in Russia’s financial sector and financing for designated companies in Russia’s energy and defense sectors and prohibits transactions related to the development of deepwater Arctic offshore or shale oil projects within Russia P L 115-44 directs the Secretary of the Treasury to further restrict financing in Russia’s financial and energy sectors and to extend prohibitions related to the above oil projects to projects worldwide that involve any designated persons that have an ownership interest of not less than 33% The Departments of State and Commerce also deny export licenses for military dual-use and energy-related goods for almost 200 designated end-users most of which are also subject to Treasury-administered sanctions In addition the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 P L 113-272 as amended by P L 11544 requires sanctions that were previously discretionary on foreign persons who make “a significant investment” in deepwater Arctic offshore or shale oil projects in Russia and on foreign financial institutions that fund such projects or engage in transactions for any person subject to Ukraine-related sanctions The Support for the Sovereignty Integrity Democracy and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 P L 113-95 requires sanctions on persons responsible for undermining “the peace security stability sovereignty or territorial integrity of Ukraine ” More than three years since Ukraine-related sanctions were first imposed observers suggest that their effectiveness in changing Russian policy so far has been uncertain even if they have probably had a negative effect on the Russian economy see “Economic Impact of Sanctions ” above Russia has not reversed its occupation and annexation of Crimea nor has it dropped support for the Donbas separatists Since sanctions were introduced however Russia has signed two agreements that recognize all of the Donbas as a part of Ukraine and Russian-backed rebel military operations have been limited to areas along the perimeter of the current conflict zone Sanctions for Malicious Cyber Activity In December 2016 the Obama Administration identified nine individuals and entities as subject to sanctions for election-related malicious cyber activity see “Malicious Cyber Activity ” below 164 Designees include Russia’s leading spy agency Federal Security Service or FSB military intelligence Main Intelligence Directorate or GRU and senior GRU officials including its head Designees are subject to the blocking of assets under U S jurisdiction prohibitions on transactions with U S persons and for individuals denial of entry into the United States P L 115-44 codified these sanctions and enlarged the scope of prohibited cyber-related activities to include a range of activities conducted on behalf of the Russian government that undermine the Executive Order 13694 “Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious CyberEnabled Activities ” 80 Federal Register 18077 April 2 2015 as amended by Executive Order 13757 “Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities ” 82 Federal Register 1 January 3 2017 Also see U S Department of the Treasury “Sanctions Related to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities ” at https www treasury gov resource-center sanctions Programs pages cyber aspx and The White House “Fact Sheet Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment ” December 29 2016 164 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 48 Russia Background and U S Policy cybersecurity of any U S or foreign person 165 P L 115-44 also requires restrictions on U S or foreign persons who engage in significant transactions with persons related to Russia’s defense or intelligence sectors as specified by the President Sanctions for Human Rights Violations and Corruption Human rights-related sanctions also are specified in legislation The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 P L 112-208 Title IV requires the President to identify persons involved in the detention abuse or death of Sergei Magnitsky see “U S Policy Under the Obama Administration ” above and the ensuing cover-up or who are “responsible for extrajudicial killings torture or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” in Russia Designees are subject to the blocking of assets under U S jurisdiction prohibitions on transactions with U S persons and denial of entry into the United States To date 44 individuals are subject to Magnitsky-related sanctions 166 The Support for the Sovereignty Integrity Democracy and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 P L 113-95 as amended by P L 115-44 requires sanctions on Russian government officials associates and family members responsible for acts of significant corruption and those who facilitate such acts The act as amended also requires sanctions on foreign persons who support serious human rights abuses in territory Russia occupies or controls P L 115-44 requires sanctions on individuals who make or facilitate investments of $10 million or more that contribute to Russia’s privatization of state-owned assets “in a manner that unjustly benefits” government officials relatives or associates Other Sanctions The Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 P L 113-272 requires sanctions against Russian state-run arms exporter Rosoboronexport Russian entities that transfer weapons to Syria Ukraine Georgia or Moldova and foreign financial institutions that engage in related transactions and Gazprom if the company is found to withhold natural gas from NATO member states 167 165 P L 115-44 defines these activities to include 1 significant efforts— A to deny access to or degrade disrupt or destroy an information and communications technology system or network or B to exfiltrate degrade corrupt destroy or release information from such a system or network without authorization for purposes of— i conducting influence operations or ii causing a significant misappropriation of funds economic resources trade secrets personal identifications or financial information for commercial or competitive advantage or private financial gain 2 significant destructive malware attacks and 3 significant denial of service activities 166 As of December 2016 the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act P L 114-328 Subtitle F establishes similar human rights sanctions worldwide For more on the Magnitsky sanctions program see U S Department of the Treasury “The Magnitsky Sanctions ” at https www treasury gov resource-center sanctions Programs pages magnitsky aspx 167 Rosoboronexport also has been designated for Ukraine-related sanctions under EO 13662 Restrictions against entering into government contracts and other transactions with Rosoboronexport have been in annual appropriations acts since 2013 as well as in the Iran North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act P L 109-353 The latter’s prohibitions do not apply to contracts related to the maintenance or repair of Mi-17 helicopters “for the purpose of providing assistance to the security forces of Afghanistan as well as for the purpose of combating terrorism and violent extremism globally ” They also do not apply to procurement related to the purchase or maintenance of optical sensors that “improve the U S ability to monitor and verify Russia’s Open Skies Treaty compliance” 82 Federal Register 15547-15548 March 29 2017 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 49 Russia Background and U S Policy P L 115-44 also introduces other sanctions The act requires sanctions on foreign persons that materially contribute to the Syrian government’s ability to acquire or develop a variety of advanced or prohibited weapons and defense articles The act also authorizes but does not require sanctions on U S or foreign persons who make investments or engage in trade valued at $1 million or $5 million over 12 months that enhances Russia’s ability to construct energy export pipelines The act also requires reports by the Secretary of the Treasury on the potential effects of expanding sanctions to include broader sets of Russian political and economic elites oligarchs and parastatal entities and to sovereign debt and derivative products as well as on U S efforts to combat illicit finance relating to Russia Russian individuals and entities also have been designated under sanctions regimes related to Syria North Korea terrorism transnational crime and weapons proliferation Malicious Cyber Activity Interference in U S Elections168 On January 6 2017 the Office of the Director of National Intelligence ODNI released a declassified report on Russian activities and intentions related to the 2016 U S presidential election 169 The report states that the Central Intelligence Agency the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI and the National Security Agency have “high confidence” that President Putin “ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election” in order to “undermine public faith in the US democratic process denigrate Hillary Clinton and harm her electability and potential presidency ” The report also contends that the Russian government “aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him ” Unofficial allegations of Russian interference in the presidential election were made public in or around June 2016 170 Allegedly the Russian government illicitly collected and authorized the release of emails and documents of the Democratic National Committee DNC and emails of Clinton’s campaign chairperson John Podesta These operations were alleged to be part of broader collection efforts against the Democratic Party targets included other Clinton campaign staffers some of whose emails were released and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee which had emails and personal information released 171 168 This section draws on CRS Insight IN10635 Russia and the U S Presidential Election by Catherine A Theohary and Cory Welt 169 “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections ” Intelligence Community Assessment 201701D January 6 2017 at https www dni gov files documents ICA_2017_01 pdf 170 Ellen Nakashima “Russian Government Hackers Penetrated DNC Stole Opposition Research on Trump ” Washington Post June 14 2016 at https www washingtonpost com world national-security russian-governmenthackers-penetrated-dnc-stole-opposition-research-on-trump 2016 06 14 cf006cb4-316e-11e6-8ff77b6c1998b7a0_story html 171 On early reports of Clinton campaign and Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee intrusions see SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Intelligence “Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign ” June 16 2016 at https www secureworks com research threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidentialcampaign and Joseph Menn Dustin Volz and Mark Hosenball “Exclusive FBI Probes Hacking of Democratic Congressional Group—Sources ” Reuters July 29 2016 at http www reuters com article us-usa-cyber-democratsexclusive-idUSKCN1082Y7 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 50 Russia Background and U S Policy Operations focused on the Democratic Party in turn appear to have been part of a broader campaign against U S and international targets In the United States targets allegedly included a number of Republican-connected individuals including state-level officials and campaigns as well as former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Phillip Breedlove and former Secretary of State Colin Powell 172 Although collection efforts included Republican targets then-FBI Director James Comey stated in a January 10 2017 hearing that Russian hackers breached and exfiltrated data from “old domains” of the Republican National Committee RNC and that investigators found no evidence that the current RNC or the Trump campaign were “successfully hacked ”173 No emails connected to either the RNC or the Trump campaign were released The majority of released emails including most of those from the DNC and Podesta were disclosed by WikiLeaks which allegedly received emails from Russian intelligence-connected sources Other emails and materials were released by online persona Guccifer 2 0 and website DC Leaks both allegedly linked to Russian intelligence 174 The ODNI report generally corroborates these claims It also corroborates further claims that “Russian intelligence accessed elements of multiple state or local electoral boards ” In June 2017 Department of Homeland Security officials testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that “election-related networks including websites in 21 states were potentially targeted by Russian government cyber actors ” including “a small number that were successfully compromised ”175 The ODNI report also noted that the Russian government engaged in international influence efforts through state-run media and social media “trolls” for the purposes of promoting Trump and denigrating Clinton 176 Although some state-level voter registration systems may have been hacked the ODNI report said that there was no evidence of tampering with vote tallies or that information in emails released by WikiLeaks had been tampered with prior to the emails’ release The report also states that although Russia pursued Republican-affiliated targets it “did not conduct a comparable disclosure campaign ”177 Congress is investigating Russian interference in U S elections In January 2017 the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence launched inquiries into Russian cyber activities and “active measures” surrounding the U S election as well as more broadly 178 The Senate Elias Groll “Russian Hacking Campaign Hits Republicans Too ” Foreign Policy August 12 2016 at http foreignpolicy com 2016 08 12 russian-hacking-campaign-hits-republicans-too 173 Testimony of FBI Director James Comey in U S Congress Senate Select Intelligence Committee Russian Intelligence Activities hearings 115th Cong 1st sess January 10 2017 Transcript available at http www cq com doc congressionaltranscripts-5017431 174 Thomas Rid “How Russia Pulled Off the Biggest Election Hack in U S History ” Esquire October 20 2016 at http www esquire com news-politics a49791 russian-dnc-emails-hacked 175 Testimony of Jeanette Manfra Acting Deputy Undersecretary for Cybersecurity and Communications National Protection and Programs Directorate and Dr Samuel Liles Acting Director Cyber Division Office of Intelligence and Analysis U S Department of Homeland Security in U S Congress Senate Select Intelligence Committee Addressing Threats to Election Infrastructure hearings 115th Cong 1st sess June 21 2017 at https www intelligence senate gov sites default files documents os-jmanfra-062117 PDF 176 “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections ” Intelligence Community Assessment 177 Ibid 178 Office of Richard Burr U S Senator for North Carolina “Joint Statement on Committee Inquiry into Russian Intelligence Activities ” press release January 13 2017 at https www burr senate gov press releases joint-statementon-committee-inquiry-into-russian-intelligence-activities U S House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence “Joint Statement on Progress of Bipartisan HPSCI Inquiry into Russian Active Measures ” January 25 2017 at http intelligence house gov news documentsingle aspx DocumentID 758 172 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 51 Russia Background and U S Policy Committees on Armed Services Foreign Relations and Judiciary have conducted related hearings Some Members also have proposed a variety of other independent or joint commissions committees or investigations 179 Other Activities The U S government also has taken legal actions against Russian individuals for alleged malicious cyber activities that are apparently unrelated to elections In December 2016 two individuals became subject to cybercrime-related sanctions including for the alleged “theft of over $100 million” from U S businesses and institutions and personal information from over 500 million Yahoo accounts 180 In March 2017 the Department of Justice indicted four individuals including one of those subject to sanctions and two FSB officers on charges related to the theft of Yahoo user information 181 The Department of Justice is seeking the extradition from the Czech Republic and Spain of two other Russian individuals suspected of cybercrimes 182 In April 2017 another Russian individual who is the son of a Russian member of parliament was sentenced to 27 years in prison for charges related to credit card and identity theft 183 In recent months several people have been prosecuted inside Russia for other alleged cybercrimes 184 Although details are scant those arrested include FSB officials who are reportedly being tried for treason including one subsequently indicted in the United States for economic crimes Some Russian media have speculated that the arrests were related to Russia’s interference in U S elections Others arrested or charged in absentia have been accused of being members of a hacking group known as Shaltai Boltai Humpty Dumpty in Russian or Anonymous International that allegedly acquired distributed and sold private information of Russian officials since 2013 After reportedly cooperating with authorities and pleading guilty the head of the hacking group was sentenced to two years in prison in July 2017 179 For example H R 356 H Con Res 15 H Con Res 24 and S 27 The White House “Fact Sheet Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment ” December 29 2016 181 U S Department of Justice “U S Charges Russian FSB Officers and Their Criminal Conspirators for Hacking Yahoo and Millions of Email Accounts ” March 15 2017 at https www justice gov opa pr us-charges-russian-fsbofficers-and-their-criminal-conspirators-hacking-yahoo-and-millions 182 U S Department of Justice “Yevgeniy Nikulin Indicted for Hacking LinkedIn Dropbox and Formspring ” October 21 2016 at https www justice gov opa pr yevgeniy-nikulin-indicted-hacking-linkedin-dropbox-and-formspring U S Department of Justice “Russian National Indicted with Multiple Offenses in Connection with Kelihos Botnet ” April 21 2017 at https www justice gov opa pr russian-national-indicted-multiple-offenses-connection-kelihos-botnet 183 U S Department of Justice “Russian Cyber-Criminal Convicted of 38 Counts Related to Hacking Businesses and Stealing More Than Two Million Credit Card Numbers ” August 25 2016 at https www justice gov opa pr russiancyber-criminal-convicted-38-counts-related-hacking-businesses-and-stealing-more-two Nicole Perlroth “Russian Hacker Sentenced to 27 Years in Credit Card Case ” New York Times April 21 2017 at https www nytimes com 2017 04 21 technology russian-hacker-sentenced html 184 On the cases described here see Vitnija Saldava and Vladimir Isachenkov “Russian Hackers Get Burned in Deal with Russia’s Spy Agency ” February 9 2017 Associated Press https apnews com 0bf1a1845d014d3fb5b328b559a8c0cb and Lincoln Pigman “Hacker Who Aided Russian Intelligence Is Sentenced to 2 Years ” July 6 2017 New York Times https www nytimes com 2017 07 06 world europe vladimir-anikeyev-russiahacking html 180 Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 52 Russia Background and U S Policy Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation185 During the Cold War arms control negotiations and treaties played a key role in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union Arms control negotiations were often one of the few channels for formal communication The talks provided the United States and the Soviet Union with a forum to air their security concerns and raise questions about plans and programs During the 1990s as the relationship between the United States and Russia improved arms control no longer played as central a role in fostering cooperation between the two nations Nonetheless since 1992 the United States and Russia have negotiated three arms control treaties of which two ultimately entered into force the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty of 2002 and the New Strategic Arms Reduction New START Treaty of 2010 Currently the New START Treaty and the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces INF Treaty are the two fundamental nuclear arms control agreements between the United States and Russia The New START Treaty expires in 2021 though it may be extended for a period of five years the two countries must meet the treaty’s limits on strategic arms by February 2018 The treaty limits each side to no more than 800 land-based intercontinental ICBM and submarine-launched SLBM ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments within that total each side may retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs SLBMs and heavy bombers The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1 550 deployed warheads In addition the treaty requires extensive monitoring and inspection activity The Trump Administration has not offered any official statements on the future of New START and has not indicated whether it might seek a five-year extension of the treaty or negotiate a new treaty before New START’s 2021 expiration With regard to the INF Treaty most experts agree that the elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe mitigated a key source of potential instability However in 2014 the United States charged Russia with violating the INF Treaty by developing a ground-launched cruise missile with a range between 500 and 5 500 kilometers which is banned by the INF Treaty the treaty does not ban or restrict air-delivered or sea-based missiles 186 In October 2016 press reports indicated that the Obama Administration believed Russia may be moving toward deployment as it had begun to produce the missile in numbers greater than what was needed for a test program 187 In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on March 8 2017 General Paul Selva the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed press reports that Russia had begun to deploy a new ground-launched cruise missile 188 He stated that Russia’s deployment had violated the “spirit and intent” of the treaty that Russia had deliberately deployed the missile to pose a threat to NATO facilities and that it showed no inclination to return to compliance with the treaty 189 185 This section draws on CRS Report R43037 Next Steps in Nuclear Arms Control with Russia Issues for Congress by Amy F Woolf CRS Report R41219 The New START Treaty Central Limits and Key Provisions by Amy F Woolf CRS Report R43832 Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces INF Treaty Background and Issues for Congress by Amy F Woolf and CRS Report R43143 The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction Issues for Congress by Mary Beth D Nikitin and Amy F Woolf 186 U S Department of State Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments July 2014 pp 8-10 at https www state gov t avc rls rpt 2014 230047 htm 187 Michael R Gordon “Russia Is Moving Ahead with Missile Program That Violates Treaty U S Officials Say ” New York Times October 19 2016 at https www nytimes com 2016 10 20 world europe russia-missiles-inf-treaty html 188 Michael R Gordon “Russia Deploys Missile Violating Treaty and Challenging Trump ” New York Times February 14 2017 at https www nytimes com 2017 02 14 world europe russia-cruise-missile-arms-control-treaty html 189 Testimony of Gen Paul Selva Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in U S Congress House Armed Services Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 53 Russia Background and U S Policy The United States and Russia also are party to other arms control treaties and agreements Some of these agreements mandate strategic exercise and missile launch notifications The United States signed a “hotline” agreement with the Soviet Union in 1963 establishing a permanent means for emergency communications this agreement was updated in 2008 The United States and Russia still use the system reports indicate that President Obama used it to communicate with Putin about the hacking and interference with the U S elections 190 The two countries also established Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers NRRC in 1987 These centers have served as a mechanism for the parties to provide notifications and transmit data mandated by bilateral arms control agreements and the 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement Consequently the NRRCs remain significant for the implementation of other agreements In addition since 1992 the United States has spent more than $10 billion to help Russia and the other former Soviet states dismantle nuclear weapons and ensure the security of nuclear weapons weapons-grade nuclear material other weapons of mass destruction and related technological know-how This funding supported the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program managed by the Department of Defense along with nonproliferation programs managed by the Departments of Energy and State These programs helped to transport store and eliminate weapons in Russia They also funded improvements in security at storage areas for nuclear weapons and materials Over time the United States allocated a growing proportion of its funding to projects that focused on securing and eliminating chemical and biological weapons and securing storage sites that house nuclear warheads removed from deployed weapons systems The memorandum of understanding that governed implementation of U S -Russian cooperation in threat reduction and nonproliferation expired in June 2013 In its stead the United States and Russia signed a new bilateral protocol to a 2008 Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in Russia Framework Agreement a vehicle under which countries aid Russia with Soviet-era weapons cleanup work 191 Under this new framework the two countries agreed to cooperate on some areas of nuclear security but nuclear weapons dismantlement and chemical weapons destruction projects ceased The United States and Russia also continued to cooperate on nuclear nonproliferation objectives in other countries such as removing weapons-usable fuel from research reactors and planned bilateral nuclear research projects Joint nonproliferation efforts declined further after Russia’s actions in Ukraine In April 2014 the U S Department of Energy put certain joint research projects and meetings on hold 192 In December 2014 Russia informed the United States it would no longer accept U S assistance in securing nuclear materials under an agreement to cooperate on protection control and accounting of nuclear materials the agreement expired in June 2017 193 At the end of 2014 Congress stated Committee Military Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence Requirements hearings 115th Cong 1st sess March 8 2017 Transcript available at http www cq com doc congressionaltranscripts-5056669 Also see Michael R Gordon “Russia Has Deployed Missile Barred by Treaty U S General Tells Congress ” New York Times March 8 2017 at https www nytimes com 2017 03 08 us politics russia-inf-missile-treaty html 190 David E Sanger “White House Confirms Pre-election Warning to Russia over Hacking ” New York Times November 16 2016 at https www nytimes com 2016 11 17 us politics white-house-confirms-pre-election-warningto-russia-over-hacking html 191 U S Department of State “A New Legal Framework for U S -Russian Cooperation in Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security ” June 19 2013 at https 2009-2017 state gov r pa prs ps 2013 06 210913 htm 192 David E Sanger and William J Broad “U S -Russia Nuclear Deal Stalls as Tensions over Ukraine Rise ” New York Times August 2 2014 at https www nytimes com 2014 08 03 world europe us-nuclear-deal-with-russia-fails-astensions-rise html 193 Bryan Bender “Russia Ends U S Nuclear Security Alliance ” Boston Globe January 19 2015 at https www bostonglobe com news nation 2015 01 19 after-two-decades-russia-nuclear-security-cooperation- Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 54 Russia Background and U S Policy that most nuclear security activities in Russia were to be completed no later than 2018 P L 113291 §3122 and Congress has since imposed restrictions on nonproliferation assistance funding to Russia except with a national security waiver P L 114-328 §3122 The most prominent remaining bilateral nuclear security projects in Russia ceased in 2016 On October 3 2016 President Putin issued a decree suspending participation in a bilateral U S Russian weapons plutonium disposal agreement the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement or PMDA 194 The next day Russia suspended participation in a 2013 cooperative agreement on nuclear- and energy-related research which already had been largely frozen since 2014 and terminated a 2010 agreement on exploring options for converting research reactors from weapons-usable fuel which had been largely completed 195 Both sides said they would continue to work on pledges made under the PMDA Outlook Moving forward most expect Congress to continue to play an active role in shaping U S policy toward Russia In doing so Members of Congress may consider several issues including but not limited to the following        monitoring the Administration’s implementation of new sanctions requirements on Russia monitoring the Administration’s implementation of programs intended to respond to Russian interference in U S and European domestic political processes assessing current and possible future measures to reassure European allies and partners and to deter potential Russian aggression considering ways to promote Russia’s compliance with its commitments to resolve the Ukraine conflict developing responses to Russian violations of the INF Treaty determining whether additional possibilities exist to cooperate with Russia in the resolution of the Syria conflict and the fight against the Islamic State and examining whether other policy areas still exist in which cooperation with Russia remains both possible and in the U S interest e g North Korea nuclear program arms control cybersecurity dialogue space Author Information Cory Welt Analyst in European Affairs becomes-casualty-deteriorating-relations 5nh8NbtjitUE8UqVWFIooL story html 194 For more see CRS Insight IN10594 Recent Developments in U S -Russian Nonproliferation Cooperation by Mary Beth D Nikitin and Cory Welt and CRS Report R43125 Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plant and Plutonium Disposition Management and Policy Issues by Mark Holt and Mary Beth D Nikitin 195 Lidia Kelly “Russia Suspends Nuclear Agreement Ends Uranium Research Pact with United States ” Reuters October 5 2016 at http www reuters com article us-russia-usa-nuclear-uranium-idUSKCN12521J Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 55 Russia Background and U S Policy Acknowledgments Contributions to this report were made by Christopher M Blanchard Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Carla E Humud Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs Derek E Mix Analyst in European Affairs Rebecca M Nelson Specialist in International Trade and Finance and Michael Ratner Specialist in Energy Policy In addition portions of the report draw on other CRS products as cited in the text as well as CRS Report RL33407 Russian Political Economic and Security Issues and U S Interests coordinated by Jim Nichol and Steven Woehrel Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service CRS CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role CRS Reports as a work of the United States Government are not subject to copyright protection in the United States Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS However as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material Congressional Research Service R44775 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 56