U S Airborne Electronic Attack Programs Background and Issues for Congress Updated May 14 2019 Congressional Research Service https crsreports congress gov R44572 SUMMARY U S Airborne Electronic Attack Programs Background and Issues for Congress U S airborne electronic warfare EW programs involve developing and procuring EW aircraft and EW systems that are mounted on U S aircraft The President’s FY2020 budget request for the Department of Defense DOD proposes funding for a number of airborne EW programs R44572 May 14 2019 John R Hoehn Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs The Role of Airborne EW in Modern Warfare EW is a component of modern warfare particularly in response to threats posed by potential adversaries such as Russia or China EW refers to operations that use the electromagnetic spectrum i e the “airwaves” to detect listen to jam and deceive or “spoof” enemy radars radio communication systems data links and other electronic systems EW also refers to operations that defend against enemy attempts to do the same The shift in the international security environment from the post-Cold War era to an era of renewed great power competition has led to an increased focus on EW in U S defense planning and programming particularly aspects of EW related to highend warfare U S Airborne Electronic Attack Capabilities Airborne EW capabilities are a component of U S military airpower Although dedicated U S EW aircraft are relatively few in number compared with U S fighters strike fighters and attack aircraft they play a role in helping to ensure the combat survivability and effectiveness of other aircraft and friendly forces on the ground DOD’s three primary manned EW electronic attack aircraft are the Navy EA-18G Growler the Air Force EC-130H Compass Call and the Air Force EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host A fourth manned aircraft—the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter—has extensive integrated EW capabilities DOD’s primary airborne electronic attack payloads include the AN ALQ-99 electronic attack suite the Next Generation Jammer and the Miniature Air Launched Decoy-Jammer EW Oversight Issues for Congress Congress has continually shown interest in EW and the decisions it makes regarding EW could affect future U S military capabilities and funding requirements In particular EW programs pose several potential oversight issues for Congress  Whether DOD is prioritizing appropriately airborne EW programs in its planning and budgeting relative to other U S military EW programs such as those for U S ground forces or Navy surface ships and to other DOD non-EW priorities    Whether DOD’s proposed mix of airborne EW capabilities and investments is appropriate The evolution of technology and how new technologies can be employed for EW operations The Air Force’s planned rate for procuring EC-37Bs and replacing EC-130Hs Congressional Research Service Contents Introduction 1 Background 1 Electronic Warfare 1 Overview 1 EW in an Era of Renewed Great Power Competition 2 Relationship of EW to Cyberwarfare 3 EW as an Element of U S Airpower 4 EW Aircraft 4 Boeing EA-18G Growler 4 Lockheed Martin EC-130H Compass Call 6 EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host Aircraft 8 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 9 Airborne EW Payloads 11 AN ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System TJS 11 Next Generation Jammer NGJ 13 Miniature Air-Launched Decoy MALD and Jammer MALD-J 16 Potential Issues for Congress 18 Congressional EW Working Group EWWG 18 Airborne EW as a DOD Priority 18 Mix of Airborne EW Capabilities and Investments 19 Role of Emerging Technologies 20 EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host Aircraft Procurement 20 Figures Figure 1 Overview of Electronic Warfare 2 Figure 2 EA-18G Growler 5 Figure 3 EC-130H Compass Call 7 Figure 4 EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host Aircraft 8 Figure 5 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 10 Figure 6 F-35 EW System-Related Equipment 11 Figure 7 EA-18G Growler Equipped with AN ALQ-99F Tactical Jamming System 12 Figure 8 ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming Pods 12 Figure 9 Next Generation Jammer—Mid Band NGJ-MB 13 Figure 10 Next Generation Jammer—Mid Band NGJ-MB 14 Figure 11 Next Generation Jammer—Mid Band NGJ-MB 15 Figure 12 Miniature Air-Launched Decoy MALD 17 Figure 13 Miniature Air-Launched Decoy MALD 17 Appendixes Appendix Recent Congressional Action 21 Congressional Research Service Contacts Author Information 22 Congressional Research Service Introduction1 This report focuses on selected U S airborne electronic attack programs Such programs involve developing and procuring both the aircraft whose primary mission is electronic warfare EW and the EW systems that are mounted on U S aircraft The President’s FY2020 budget request for the Department of Defense DOD seeks funding for a number of airborne EW programs These programs pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress and its decisions on these issues could affect future U S military capabilities and funding requirements Congress has continually shown interest in EW and airborne electronic attack in particular Some Members have formed the EW Working Group and they routinely discuss improving EW capabilities The National Defense Authorization Acts over the past several years have included provisions related to EW and electronic attack Most recently the FY2019 John S McCain National Defense Authorization Act discussed the Air Force’s acquisition strategy for a new EW attack aircraft as well as a study to catalogue all EW capabilities Background Electronic Warfare Overview2 Electronic warfare EW —sometimes also called electromagnetic maneuver warfare EMW 3—is a component of modern warfare particularly in response to threats posed by technologically sophisticated potential adversaries such as Russia and China EW generally refers to operations that use the electromagnetic spectrum i e the “airwaves” to detect listen to jam and deceive or “spoof” enemy radars radio communication systems and data links and other electronic systems It also refers to operations for defending against enemy attempts to do the same More formally DOD defines electronic warfare as “military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy ”4 As shown in Figure 1 DOD divides EW into electronic warfare support electronic protection and electronic attack Electronic warfare support sometimes also referred to as electronic support measures ESM involves listening to an adversary’s radar and radio transmissions in order to detect locate and understand how to avoid jam or deceive those systems Electronic protection involves limiting the electromagnetic signatures of one’s own military equipment and hardening 1 This report was originally authored by Ray Zuniga then-Air Force Fellow For a brief overview of EW see CRS In Focus IF11118 Defense Primer Electronic Warfare by John R Hoehn 3 See for example John Joyce “Navy Expands Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare for ‘Victory at Sea ’” Navy News Service November 2 2017 Robert K Ackerman “Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare Looms as New U S Navy Discipline ” Signal February 11 2015 4 Department of Defense DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms As of February 2019 p 78 accessed March 13 2019 at https www jcs mil Portals 36 Documents Doctrine pubs dictionary pdf See also Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-13 1 Electronic Warfare February 8 2012 144 pp including covers accessed March 13 2019 at https www globalsecurity org military library policy dod joint jp3_13_1_2012 pdf and https publicintelligence net jcs-ew 2 Congressional Research Service 1 one’s own military equipment against the effects of enemy EW operations Electronic attack EA involves jamming and deceiving enemy radars and radio communications and data links Developing ever-better EW systems is a component of the overall competition in military capabilities between major military powers This issue is not frequently discussed publicly in much detail because the specifics of EW programs tend to be classified and are closely related to intelligence systems and capabilities Figure 1 Overview of Electronic Warfare Source Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-13 1 Electronic Warfare February 8 2012 Figure I-3 on p I-5 accessed March 13 2019 at https www globalsecurity org military library policy dod joint jp3_13_1_2012 pdf and https publicintelligence net jcs-ew EW in an Era of Renewed Great Power Competition During the Cold War EW capabilities supported the overall competition in military capabilities between the U S -led NATO alliance and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact alliance The end of the Cold War and the shift in the early 1990s to the post-Cold War era—a period that featured reduced tensions between major powers and a strong U S military emphasis on countering terrorist and insurgent organizations—may have led to a reduced emphasis in U S defense plans and programs related to so-called high-end warfare meaning high-intensity warfare against technologically sophisticated adversaries Congressional Research Service 2 In recent years the shift in the international security environment from the post-Cold War era to an era of renewed great power competition has increased the focus on EW in U S defense planning and programming 5 In particular attention has been given to aspects of EW related to high-end warfare and to concerns among some observers that the United States needs to strengthen its efforts in EW as part of its overall effort to preserve U S qualitative military superiority over potential adversaries such as Russia and China DOD notes Russia has placed an emphasis on EW in its military modernization effort 6 For example Russia reportedly has employed EW as part of its military operations in Ukraine and Syria 7 DOD similarly states that China recognizes the importance of EW in modern military operations and is developing its EW capabilities as an integral part of its broad-based military modernization effort 8 As China encourages greater integration between its civil and military technological and industrial bases 9 its EW capabilities may benefit from the sophistication of its extensive civilian electronics industry 10 Relationship of EW to Cyberwarfare EW emerged in the early and middle decades of the 20th century with the invention and spread of radio and radar and their use in military operations It therefore predates cyberwarfare which emerged decades later with the invention and spread of computers and the internet Today some overlap exists between EW and cyberwarfare though there is a key difference between the two EW focuses on military operations that use the electromagnetic spectrum against radars and radio communication and data links while cyberwarfare activities—which occur on a day-to-day basis as well as during overt conflicts—target computers and servers and involve significant use of the wired connections between them EW and cyberwar activities can support one another 11 5 For more on this shift see CRS Report R43838 A Shift in the International Security Environment Potential Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress by Ronald O'Rourke and CRS In Focus IF11139 Evaluating DOD Strategy Key Findings of the National Defense Strategy Commission by Kathleen J McInnis 6 See Department of Defense Defense Intelligence Agency Russia Military Power Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations 2017 pp 32 42 7 See for example Yuri Lapaiev “Ukraine as Clandestine Testing Ground for Russian Electronic Warfare ” Eurasia Daily Monitor vol 15 issue 157 November 5 2018 “Russia Deploys Electronic Warfare in Syria ” Army Recognition October 17 2018 Tom O’Connor “Russia’s Electronic Warfare System in Syria Will Be Able to Track Planes in Europe and Israel ” Newsweek September 28 2018 Lara Seligman “Russian Jamming Poses a Growing Threat to U S Troops in Syria ” Foreign Policy July 30 2018 Roger N McDermott Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025 Challenging NATO in the Electromagnetic Spectrum International Centre for Defence and Security Tallinn Estonia September 2017 p 39 8 See Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018 p 74 For more on China’s military modernization effort see CRS Report R44196 The Chinese Military Overview and Issues for Congress by Ian E Rinehart and CRS Report RL33153 China Naval Modernization Implications for U S Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress by Ronald O'Rourke 9 For more on these efforts see Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018 pp 1-2 81 84-85 121 10 For an example of these types of activities see CRS In Focus IF10119 U S -China Relations by Susan V Lawrence Wayne M Morrison and Jonah Langan-Marmur 11 DOD states that s ince cyberspace requires both wired and wireless links to transport information both offensive and defensive cyberspace operations may require use of the EMS electromagnetic spectrum for the enabling of effects in cyberspace Due to the complementary nature and potential synergistic effects of EW and CNO computer network operations they must be coordinated to ensure they are applied to maximize effectiveness Cyberspace operations may be used to force an adversary Congressional Research Service 3 EW as an Element of U S Airpower Although dedicated U S EW aircraft are relatively few in number compared with the number of U S fighters strike fighters and attack aircraft they play a role in helping to ensure the combat survivability and effectiveness of other aircraft and friendly forces on the ground EW aircraft detect and jam enemy radars and air defense command-and-control equipment so that U S fighters strike fighters attack aircraft and bombers can more safely penetrate enemy airspace EA-18G Growlers discussed below accompany U S fighters strike fighters and attack aircraft on missions to penetrate enemy airspace Other U S EW aircraft such as the EC-130H Compass Call aircraft discussed below perform their EW missions from standoff locations in less contested airspace Fifth-generation stealthy U S aircraft such as the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter are less dependent on EW support than are less stealthy earlier-generation U S aircraft Even F22s and F-35s however still benefit from EW support under certain circumstances 12 EW aircraft support the Navy’s Naval Integrated Fires Counter-Air NIF-CA concept and help ensure the combat survivability and effectiveness of less stealthy earlier-generation U S aircraft and friendly forces on the ground EW Aircraft Although various U S manned and unmanned aircraft perform EW operations this report focuses on DOD’s three primary manned EW electronic attack aircraft the EA-18G Growler the EC130H Compass Call and the EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host It also focuses on a fourth manned aircraft the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter which has extensive built-in EW capabilities Each of these four aircraft is discussed briefly below Boeing EA-18G Growler The Boeing EA-18G Growler Figure 2 is a Navy carrier-capable EW aircraft Its primary mission is to detect and jam enemy radars Among the 60 or more aircraft in an aircraft carrier’s embarked air wing typically four or five are EA-18Gs These aircraft are also operated by the Royal Australian Air Force RAAF from wired to wireless networks that are vulnerable to EA electronic attack EW may be used to set favorable conditions for cyberspace operations by stimulating networked sensors denying wireless networks or other related actions In the defensive environment EW systems may detect and defeat attacks across wireless access points Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-13 1 Electronic Warfare February 8 2012 p I-15 accessed March 13 2019 at https www globalsecurity org military library policy dod joint jp3_13_1_2012 pdf and https publicintelligence net jcs-ew 12 The F-35 includes inherent EW capabilities as discussed below Congressional Research Service 4 Figure 2 EA-18G Growler Source Photo accompanying Megan Eckstein “Electronic Warfare Executive Committee to Focus on Strategy Acquisition ” USNI News March 18 2015 The EA-18G is the successor to the carrier-capable EA-6B Prowler which was operated by both the Navy and Marine Corps The EA-18G achieved initial operational capability IOC in September 2009 13 and EA-18Gs have gradually replaced EA-6Bs The final operational EA-6Bs operated by the Marine Corps were retired in March 2019 14 Unlike the EA-6B which was a four-seat aircraft the EA-18G has a crew of two The EA-6B was an EW variant of the Navy and Marine Corps carrier-capable A-6 Intruder attack plane similarly the EA-18G is an EW variant of the Navy and Marine Corps carrier-capable F A-18F Super Hornet strike fighter The EA-18G is equipped with an airborne electronic attack AEA avionics suite that has evolved from the EA-6B’s Improved Capability III ICAP III AEA system As discussed below the EA18G carries AN ALQ-99 jamming pods which are to be replaced by Next Generation Jammer jamming pods The Navy states that “the EA-18G’s electronic attack upgrades meet or exceed EA-6B Airborne… Electronic Attack capability to detect identify locate and suppress hostile electromagnetic emitters provide enhanced connectivity to National Theater and strike assets and provide organic precision emitter targeting for employment of onboard suppression weapons to fulfill operational requirements ”15 The Navy further states that 13 Department of the Navy U S Navy Program Guide 2017 p 11 See for example Shawn Snow “EA-6B Prowler One of the Saltiest Warfighters in the Marine Corps Retires ” Marine Corps Times March 8 2019 Justin Katz “Marine Corps to Complete Prowler Retirement in March ” Inside Defense November 1 2018 15 Department of Defense Fiscal Year FY 2018 Budget Estimates Navy Justification Book Volume 1 of 4 Aircraft Procurement Navy Budget Activity 01−04 May 2017 p 1 PDF page 69 of 242 14 Congressional Research Service 5 t he EA-18G provides full-spectrum airborne electronic attack AEA capabilities to counter enemy air defenses and communication networks most notably anti-radiation missiles These capabilities continue to be in high demand in overseas contingency operations where Growler operations protect coalition forces and disrupt critical command and control links 16 The Air Force does not operate an aircraft directly analogous to the EA-18G The last such Air Force aircraft was the EF-111 Raven an EW variant of the F-111 fighter The Air Force retired the last of its EF-111s in 1998 The Navy states that “the EA-18G inventory objective of 160 aircraft will support ten carrierbased squadrons five active expeditionary squadrons and one reserve squadron ”17 A total of 163 EA-18Gs were procured through FY2016 including a final procurement of 10 in FY2016 The Department of the Navy does not plan further procurement of EA-18Gs EA-18Gs like F A18E Fs currently are receiving funding for a service life extension 18 the Growler is expected to be replaced starting in the 2030s 19 Lockheed Martin EC-130H Compass Call20 The EC-130H Compass Call Figure 3 is an EW aircraft based on a modified version of the C130 Hercules cargo aircraft The EW system on the aircraft is called the Compass Call system The Air Force states that the EC-130H “disrupts enemy command and control communications and limits adversary coordination essential for enemy force management ” The Compass Call system employs offensive counter-information and electronic attack or EA capabilities in support of U S and Coalition tactical air surface and special operations forces 16 Department of the Navy U S Navy Program Guide 2017 p 10 Department of the Navy U S Navy Program Guide 2017 p 11 18 Research and development efforts to improve the capabilities of EA-18Gs in coming years are funded in Program Element PE 0604269N EA-18 Squadrons—a line item in the Navy’s research and development account In the Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget this PE is line 112 in the Navy’s research and development account 19 Department of Defense Annual Aviation Inventory and Funding Plan Fiscal Years FY 2019-2048 p 10 Accessed at https apps dtic mil dtic tr fulltext u2 1062648 pdf 20 Unless otherwise indicated information in this section is taken from U S Air Force fact sheet “EC-130H Compass Call ” September 23 2015 accessed March 15 2019 Although this fact sheet is dated September 23 2019 the Air Force states that its online fact sheets contain up-to-date information and statistics 17 Congressional Research Service 6 Figure 3 EC-130H Compass Call Source U S Air Force official website EC-130H Compass Call Fact Sheet September 23 2015 accessed April 1 2019 at http www af mil AboutUs FactSheets Display tabid 224 Article 104550 ec-130h-compass-call aspx The EC-130H is operated by a crew of 14 most of whom are assigned to operate the aircraft’s EW systems The EC-130H can be considered a so-called “low-density high-demand asset ” meaning a specialized asset that exists in DOD in relatively low numbers but that DOD uses extensively A February 2018 press report states that t he small 14-aircraft EC-130H fleet has been flying since 1981—and near-constantly in the Afghanistan Iraq and Syrian conflicts because of the unique capability it offers in communications jamming and electronic attack It has been a key element in the fight against ISIS an adversary that has adapted high technology to its tactics and strategy… EC-130Hs there have been deployed nonstop since 2002 the longest continuously deployed Air Force unit in the Afghanistan war 21 The EC-130H achieved IOC in 1983 EC-130Hs are being replaced over time by new EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host aircraft see next section The Air Force projects in its FY2020 budget submission that it will have 13 EC-130Hs and no EC-37Bs in service at the end of FY2019 and 12 EC-130Hs and one EC-37B in service at the end of FY2020 While EC-130Hs remain in service the Air Force plans to modernize them to improve their capabilities and reduce their maintenance costs which have been rising as the aircraft have aged 22 Brian W Everstine “Electronic Warfare Isn’t Going Away—But EC-130Hs Will ” Air Force Magazine February 2018 22 Modernization of EW systems on EC-130Hs is funded through a line item in the Modification of In-service Aircraft i e Budget Activity 05 part of the Air Force’s aircraft procurement account in a line item entitled “Compass Call ” In the Air Force’s FY2020 budget submission this is line item 53 21 Congressional Research Service 7 EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host Aircraft Air Force plans call for replacing the service’s EC-130Hs over time with a total of 10 new EC37B Compass Call Re-Host aircraft Figure 4 Figure 4 EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host Aircraft Artist’s rendering Source Artist rendering accompanying Brian W Everstine “Electronic Warfare Isn’t Going Away—But EC130Hs Will ” Air Force Magazine February 2018 The first EC-37B was procured in FY2018 two more were procured in FY2019 and the Air Force’s proposed FY2020 budget requests $114 1 million for the procurement of a fourth in FY2020 Air Force plans call for procuring additional EC-37Bs at a rate of one per year until the planned total of 10 is reached The Air Force’s FY2020 budget submission projects that the first new EC-37B will enter the Air Force’s inventory by the end of FY2020 The first two EC-37Bs are scheduled to achieve Initial Operational Capability IOC in 2023 23 L3 Technologies a U S defense contractor involved in EW programs is the prime contractor for the EC-37B The EC-37B is based on the Gulfstream G550 commercial business jet an aircraft 23 Procurement of EC-37Bs is funded through the Other Aircraft i e Budget Activity 04 part of the Air Force’s aircraft procurement account in a line item entitled “Compass Call ” In the Air Force’s FY2020 budget submission this is line item 15 This line item is not to be confused with the previously discussed line item 53 in the Air Force’s FY2020 aircraft procurement account which is also called Compass Call Line item 15 is for the procurement of new EC-37B aircraft while line item 53 is for the procurement of Compass Call EW systems for both existing EC-130H aircraft and new EC-37B aircraft Congressional Research Service 8 that the Air Force also uses as the basis for its C-37B VIP transport aircraft The Air Force states that EC-37Bs will receive Prime Mission Equipment PME from legacy donor EC-130H aircraft as well as new upgraded PME… The re-hosted COMPASS CALL platform will utilize 70% of the PME off of the current airframe without modification the remaining 30% of PME will be new or modified repackaged for the re-host Compared to the EC-130H the re-hosted COMPASS CALL aircraft will provide increased range speed endurance and operating altitude for better stand-off range and survivability This will enable the USAF to effectively conduct Electronic Attack EA in an Anti-Access Area Denial A2AD environment 24 The Air Force’s acquisition strategy of replacing the EC-130H fleet by re-hosting their EW systems on new Gulfstream G550 aircraft was a subject of debate in Congress and contract-award protests 25 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter The Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Figure 5 is being procured in three versions for the Air Force F-35A Marine Corps F-35B and Navy F-35C Another CRS report provides an overview of the F-35 program which is DOD’s largest single acquisition program 26 While the F-35’s primary missions are air-to-ground combat i e strike operations and air-to-air combat i e fighter operations the F-35 has a built-in EW capability that is claimed by Lockheed Martin officials—the prime contractor manufacturing the aircraft—to be significantly greater than that of previous U S fighters and attack aircraft Lockheed officials state that the F35’s EW system designated AN ASQ-239 serves as a signals collector system which provides radar warning identifies the geolocation of electronic emitters tracks multiple aircraft simultaneously provides high-gain i e a highly focused radio antenna high gain counter measures and high gain electronic attack through the radar 27 According to Lockheed officials these EW capabilities are designed to provide wide-frequency coverage 28 quick reaction time high sensitivity and probability of intercept accurate direction finding track multiple aircraft and provide self-protection countermeasures and jamming 24 Department of Defense Fiscal Year FY 2020 Budget Estimates Air Force Justification Book Volume 1 of 2 Aircraft Procurement Air Force Vol-1 March 2019 p 113 25 For press articles providing a review of the debate over the Compass Call replacement acquisition strategy see Brian W Everstine “Electronic Warfare Isn’t Going Away—But EC-130Hs Will ” Air Force Magazine February 2018 Rachel Cohen “Congress Tells Air Force Not to Replicate EC-X Strategy for Other Programs ” Inside Defense November 17 2017 Valerie Insinna “L3 Gets Compass Call Contract Names Gulfstrem As Airframe Provider ” Defense News September 8 2017 26 CRS Report RL30563 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter JSF Program by Jeremiah Gertler 27 Greg Lemons Karen Carrington Dr Thomas Frey and John Ledyard Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company “F35 Mission Systems Design Development and Verification ” AIAA Aviation Forum June 25-29 Atlanta GA 2018 Aviation Technology Integration and Operations Conference approved for public release 5 1 18 JSF18-502 p 6 accessed April 2 2019 at https www lockheedmartin com content dam lockheed-martin eo documents webt F35_Mission_Systems_Design_Development_and_Verification pdf Lockheed officials state on page 7 that “the EW system is common among the three F-35 variants except for the forward Band 3 4 arrays which employ longer elements for the F-35C Carrier Variant CV Also differing the distance between the inboard and outboard arrays is less on the CV variant due to the wing fold In addition to the EW Band 3 4 apertures the radar MFA multifunction is employed to support EW functions ” 28 LtGen Steven Rudder has stated to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the F-35 can providing jamming across most frequencies however there are deficiencies which can only be provided by the EA-18G Statement of Lieutenant General Steven Rudder before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower hearing on Navy and Marine Corps Aviation Programs in Review March 6 2018 pp 57-58 Congressional Research Service 9 Figure 5 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Source Defense Visual Information Distribution Service DVIDS “National Cherry Festival Air Show 2018 Image 2 of 12 ” accessed April 1 2019 Lockheed Martin claims that due to the inherent built-in electronic warfare capabilities the F-35 does not require a dedicated electronic attack aircraft to support it 29 this would potentially free up other aircraft to perform electronic attack missions to protect less stealthy aircraft To provide its organic jamming capability the F-35uses its active electronically scanned array AESA radar which teamed with advanced jamming algorithm packages can potentially provide 10 times the jamming power of legacy aircraft 30 Figure 6 shows the location of EW system-related equipment on the F-35 During a 2018 hearing on the Navy and Marine Corps aviation program review Lieutenant General Steven Rudder stated that although the Marine Corps was retiring the EA-6B the Marine Corps’ new F-35Bs would have sufficient EW capability for most Marine Corps contingencies 31 Lockheed Martin “Unprecedented Battlefield Access ” accessed April 1 2019 See also BAE Systems “AN ASQ239 F-35 electronic warfare countermeasure system ” accessed April 2 2019 at https www baesystems com en-us product an-asq-239-f-35-ew-countermeasure-system 30Tyler Rogoway “Could the F-35 Become the Biggest Electronic Intelligence Collection System Ever Devised ” The Drive July 6 2016 31 Statement of Lieutenant General Steven Rudder before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower hearing on Navy and Marine Corps Aviation Programs in Review March 6 2018 pp 57-58 29 Congressional Research Service 10 Figure 6 F-35 EW System-Related Equipment Source Greg Lemons Karen Carrington Dr Thomas Frey and John Ledyard Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company “F-35 Mission Systems Design Development and Verification ” AIAA Aviation Forum June 25-29 Atlanta Georgia 2018 Aviation Technology Integration and Operations Conference approved for public release 5 1 18 JSF18-502 Figur 8 on page 7 accessed April 2 2019 at https www lockheedmartin com content dam lockheed-martin eo documents webt F35_Mission_Systems_Design_Development_and_Verification pdf Airborne EW Payloads DOD’s primary airborne electronic attack payloads include the AN ALQ-99 electronic attack suite the Next Generation Jammer and the Miniature Air Launched Decoy-Jammer Each of these systems is discussed briefly below AN ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System TJS The AN ALQ-99 tactical jamming system Figure 7 and Figure 8 see also Figure 2 consists of a series of electronic jamming pods The system was originally developed in the 1970s for the EA-6B and it was also used by the EF-111A The system has been updated over time and is currently carried by EA 18Gs The current version of the system called the ALQ-99F V achieved IOC in 1999 Navy plans call for replacing the ALQ-99 with the Next Generation Jammer see next section The Navy states that the ALQ-99 “is the only airborne tactical jamming system in the Department of Defense inventory The ALQ-99 system is facing material and technological obsolescence and cannot counter all current much less future threats ”32 Department of the Navy U S Navy Program Guide 2017 p 27 The Navy’s use of the word “tactical” refers to how the system is carried on a tactical fighter aircraft as opposed to an aircraft like the EC-130H Compass Call 32 Congressional Research Service 11 Figure 7 EA-18G Growler Equipped with AN ALQ-99F Tactical Jamming System Source Annotated U S Navy photo as printed in Government Accountability Office Next Generation Jammer DOD Should Continue to Assess Potential Duplication and Overlap As Program Moves Forward GAO-13-642 August 2013 p 5 Figure 8 ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming Pods Source Briefing slide accompanying Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway “Navy’s Next Gen Jammer Is Three Pods Not One And Competition For One Of Them Just Heated Up ” The Drive October 25 2018 In this press report the caption for the briefing slide states “An RAAF Royal Australian Air Force briefing slide showing the interior layout of the two types of AN ALQ-99 pod ” Congressional Research Service 12 Next Generation Jammer NGJ As mentioned above Navy plans call for replacing the ALQ-99 with a new EW system called the Next Generation Jammer NGJ Figure 9 Figure 10 and Figure 11 Figure 9 Next Generation Jammer—Mid Band NGJ-MB Artist’s rendering Source Photo accompanying Sam LaGrone “L3 Northrop Selected for Next Generation Jammer Work Program Stalled After Raytheon Protest ” USNI News August 21 2018 The NGJ is being developed in three increments designed to jam across three radio frequency bands to prevent adversaries from using their communications and radar systems 33 The first increment which is to provide EW capability in mid-band frequencies was previously referred to as Increment 1 but is now called the AN ALQ-249 system or the Next Generation Jammer—Mid Band NGJ-MB The next increment which is to provide EW capability in low-band frequencies was previously referred to as Increment 2 is now called the Next Generation Jammer—Low Band NGJ-LB The remaining increment currently called Increment 3 is to provide EW capability in high-band frequencies DOD states that “the order of development of the increments was determined by the assessed capabilities of the developing threat and shortfalls of the legacy system to counter those capabilities with Inc 1 the Increment 1 system covering the most critical threats ”34 33 Radars and radios operate at different frequencies depending on what mission they are trying to accomplish Lower frequencies i e “low-band” provide a longer range picture of the airspace but cannot be used to launch a missile Middle-band radars can provide target quality pictures for missiles however do not have as long of a range High-band radars can provide high-fidelity pictures however they shorter ranges and the radio frequencies can be disrupted by objects and even water molecules For more information see CRS In Focus IF11155 Defense Primer Military Use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum by John R Hoehn 34 Department of the Navy U S Navy Program Guide 2017 p 27 and Department of Defense Director Operational Test Evaluation FY 2016 Annual Report December 2016 p 303 Congressional Research Service 13 Figure 10 Next Generation Jammer—Mid Band NGJ-MB Artist’s rendering Source Department of Defense Director Operational Test Evaluation FY 2016 Annual Report December 2016 p 303 Raytheon was awarded the contract for developing NGJ-MB L3 Systems Northrop Grumman and Harris were awarded the contract for developing NGJ-LB 35 The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission states that NGJ-MB is scheduled to achieve IOC in the fourth quarter of FY2022 36 The NGJ program has been a subject of congressional oversight for several years 37 An August 2018 press report states the Navy stalled in its development of the NGJ however with the renewed focus of “great power competition ” particularly with Russia and China the NGJ has been given increased importance and priority 38 Frank Kendall when he served as the Undersecretary of Acquisition Technology and Logistics decided to accelerate the program See for example Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway “Navy’s Next Gen Jammer Is Three Pods Not One And Competition For One Of Them Just Heated Up ” The Drive October 25 2018 Sam LaGrone “L3 Northrop Selected for Next Generation Jammer Work Program Stalled After Raytheon Protest ” USNI News August 21 2018 36 See also Julian Kerr “Avalon Airshow 2019 Next Generation Jammer on Track for US Navy IOC in 2022 ” Jane’s Defence Weekly February 28 2019 Paul McLeary “Navy’s New EW Jammer to be Ready in 2022 Breaking Defense July 17 2018 37 See for example Government Account Ability Office Weapon Systems Annual Assessment Knowledge Gaps Pose Risks to Sustaining Recent Positive Trends GAO-18-360SP April 2018 pp 102-103 Department of Defense Director Operational Test Evaluation FY 2016 Annual Report December 2016 pp 303-304 Government Accountability Office Next Generation Jammer DOD Should Continue to Assess Potential Duplication and Overlap As Program Moves Forward GAO-13-642 August 2013 27 pp 38 Sam LaGrone “L3 Northrop Selected for Next Generation Jammer Work Program Stalled After Raytheon Protest ” USNI News August 21 2018 35 Congressional Research Service 14 Figure 11 Next Generation Jammer—Mid Band NGJ-MB Source Illustration accompanying Joseph Trevithick “The Navy’s New Jammers For Its EA-18G Growlers Cut Back Their Range More Than The Old Pods ” The Drive November 28 2018 The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission requests $524 3 million for PE 0604274N in FY2020 The budget submission projects annual funding to decline in subsequent years to $178 4 million in FY2022 and zero funding thereafter as research and development work on NGJ-MB is completed and NGJ-MB transitions from research and development to procurement 39 The budget submission estimates the total research and development cost of NGJ-MB at $3 985 0 million i e about $4 0 billion of which $2 848 2 million i e about $2 8 billion has been received through FY2019 The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission requests $6 2 million for PE0604274N—the first procurement funding requested for NGJ-MB 40 The submission projects that in subsequent years as procurement of NGJ-MB ramps up annual funding for this line item would increase to $144 7 million in FY2021 and $534 1 million by FY2024 The submission estimates the total procurement cost of NGJ-MB at $4 830 9 million i e about $4 8 billion The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission requests $111 1 million for this PE in FY2020 and projects annual funding to increase in subsequent years to $241 5 million in FY2024 41 The submission estimates the total research and development cost of NGJ-LB at $3 499 1 i e about $3 5 billion of which $178 3 million has been received through FY2019 39 Research and development work on NGJ-MB is funded in Program Element PE 0604274N Next Generation Jammer NGJ —a line item in the Navy’s research and development account In the Navy’s FY2020 budget submission PE 0604274N is line 116 in the account 40 Procurement of NGJ-MB is funded through a line item called Next Generation Jammer NGJ in the Modification of Aircraft i e Budget Activity 05 part of the Navy’s aircraft procurement account In the Navy’s FY2020 budget submission it is line 59 in the account 41 Research and development work on NGJ-LB is funded in PE 0604282N Next Generation Jammer NGJ Increment II another line item in the Navy’s research and development account In the Navy’s FY2020 budget submission this PE is line 118 in the account Congressional Research Service 15 Impact of Next Generation Jammer on Range of EA-18G Because the NGJ reportedly produces more drag on the EA-18G according to the Navy the Next Generation Jammer has the potential of reducing the operational range of the EA-18G A November 28 2018 press report states that the NGJ Mid-band pod produces more drag than the current ALQ-99 42 Raytheon’s proposal for the low-band pod was partially rejected as a result of increased drag over competing designs These increases in drag have been reported to reduce the operational range of the EA-18G The specific impact on range is classified 43 Miniature Air-Launched Decoy MALD and Jammer MALD-J DOD states that the Miniature Air Launched Decoy MALD and Jammer MALD-J also designated ADM-160 Figure 12 and Figure 13 is designed as a low-cost expendable vehicle that can replicate the flight and radar signatures of manned aircraft The MALD-J adds an electronic attack component According to the DOD “MALD-J is designed to support an airborne strike force to achieve mission success by jamming enemy radars and air‑defense systems by degrading denying detection of friendly aircraft or munitions ”44 MALD has a reported range of about 500 nautical miles 45 It was first developed in the mid1990s and more than 2 000 have been produced A new version designated MALD-X is now being developed An August 2018 press report states that MALD-X enhances the modular nature of the mini cruise missile with the ability to accommodate different electronic warfare payloads that are more advanced than those found on MALD-J What is planned to come out of MALD-X is a networked decoy that can use its adaptive electronic warfare payload to deliver electronic attacks on air defense nodes autonomously or at the direction of operators from a afar in a semi-autonomous fashion 46 A derivative of MALD-J and MALD-X designated MALD-N is being developed for use on Navy F A-18E F strike fighters 47 Joseph Trevithick “The Navy’s New Jammers For Its EA-18G Growlers Cut Back Their Range More Than The Old Pods ” The Drive November 28 2018 43 The Raytheon Company File B-416578 1 October 22 2018 Accessed at https www gao gov docket B-416578 1 44 Department of Defense Director Operational Test and Evaluation FY 2017 Annual Report January 2018 p 265 45 See for example Raytheon “MALD Decoy Disrupting Enemy Air Defense Systems ” undated accessed April 4 2019 46 Tyler Rogoway “Recent MALD-X Advanced Air Launched Decoy Test Is A Much Bigger Deal Than It Sounds Like ” The Drive August 24 2018 See also Colin Clark “Did We Put This Bug In SCO’s Ear MALD-X Tested For Swarm EW ” Breaking Defense August 23 2018 Kimberly Underwood “U S Military Takes MALD-X Outfitted with Electronic Warfare to the Air ” Signal August 24 2018 47 Matthew Nelson “Raytheon to Develop Miniature Aerial Decoy Tech for Navy ” Executive Biz January 31 2019 Richard Scott “MALD-N Programme Transitions into TMRR Phase Splits off Jammer Payload ” Jane’s Missiles Rockets October 2 2018 Jason Sherman “Navy Taps Raytheon to Launch Next-Generation EW Decoy the MALDN ” Inside Defense September 26 2018 Tamir Eshel “US Navy to Field a Networked Decoy Jammer ” Defense Update August 26 2018 Tyler Rogoway “Recent MALD-X Advanced Air Launched Decoy Test Is A Much Bigger Deal Than It Sounds Like ” The Drive August 24 2018 42 Congressional Research Service 16 Figure 12 Miniature Air-Launched Decoy MALD Shown fitted to a B-52H bomber Source Photo accompanying Tyler Rogoway “Recent MALD-X Advanced Air Launched Decoy Test Is A Much Bigger Deal Than It Sounds Like ” The Drive August 24 2018 The caption to the photo states “MALDs loaded up on a B-52H ” Figure 13 Miniature Air-Launched Decoy MALD Source Photo accompanying Tyler Rogoway “Recent MALD-X Advanced Air Launched Decoy Test Is A Much Bigger Deal Than It Sounds Like ” The Drive August 24 2018 Congressional Research Service 17 Potential Issues for Congress Congressional EW Working Group EWWG Given their interest in and concerns about U S EW capabilities in the era of renewed great power competition some Members of Congress have met in recent years through the Electronic Warfare Working Group EWWG 48 In the 115th Congress Representative Bacon introduced the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Readiness Act of 2018 H R 5522 This bill would have asked the DOD to    develop a joint campaign modeling capability to model electromagnetic spectrum effect on operations assess capabilities and capacities of EW platforms associated with operational plans and develop an interim and annual report on programs and personnel assigned to EW missions 49 An identical bill in the Senate was referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee 50 Airborne EW as a DOD Priority One potential oversight issue for Congress is whether DOD is giving too little too much or the right amount of priority to airborne EW programs in its planning and budgeting relative to other U S military EW programs such as those for U S ground forces or Navy surface ships and to other DOD non-EW priorities particularly in the context of renewed great power competition and improvements in air defense and EW capabilities by Russia China and other potential adversaries Congress may consider developments such as Russia’s deployment and sales to other countries of advanced air defense systems Some observers have expressed concern about Russia’s ability to use its advanced air defense systems such as its S-400 surface-to-air SAM missile system to establish hard-to-penetrate anti-access area-denial A2 AD zones around defended areas in Europe and Middle East and for countries that purchase Russian-made air defense systems such as China to do something similar in other regions 51 Other observers state that the capabilities of See for example “EWWG Briefing “Electronic Warfare Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations ” concerning a briefing scheduled for October 3 2017 accessed March 11 2019 at http dearcolleague us 2017 09 ewwg-briefingelectronic-warfare-electromagnetic-spectrum-operations “AOC Association of Old Crows Advocacy EW Working Group Hosts EW EMSO Educational Briefing Series for Congress ” March 29 2017 accessed March 11 2019 at http www ecrow org articles index-v4 asp aid 432979 issueID 52139 Association of Old Crows invitation to panel discussion on the electromagnetic spectrum scheduled for June 21 2016 accessed March 11 2019 at http www ecrow org pdf EWWG_invitation_6 21 pdf Association of Old Crows photo of June 21 2016 meeting accessed March 11 1019 at https www facebook com aocrows photos electronic-warfare-working-group-ewwghosts-electromagnetic-spectrum-ems-panel-w 1056968031018192 The Association of Old Crows AOC is a professional association for those with an interest in EW For more on the AOC see Association of Old Crows “Mission History ” accessed March 11 2019 at https www crows org page missionandhistory 49 H R 5522 50 S 2949 51 See for example Michael Cecire “NATO Is Focusing on the Wrong Russian Threat in Eastern Europe ” World Politics Review October 26 2018 “China’s Anti-Access Area Denial ” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance August 24 2018 Dominik Jankowski “Six Ways NATO Can Address the Russian Challenge ” Atlantic Council July 4 2018 48 Congressional Research Service 18 Russia’s A2 AD air defense systems have been overrated 52 The Defense Intelligence Agency states that Russian air defense are among the best in the world and they continue to develop highly-capable systems which they export to countries like China interested in acquiring long range defensive systems 53 DOD states that China’s air force has one of the largest air defense forces with a series of advanced long-range surface-to-air missiles These consist of the Russian S-300PMU the domestically produced CSA-9 and the recently fielded Russian S-400 system 54 An April 2018 press report stated emphasis added One of the “wicked problems” U S commandos are facing now is in Syria which U S Army General Tony Thomas called the “most aggressive electronic warfare environment on the planet from our adversaries They are testing us every day knocking our communications down disabling our EC-130s etc ”55 Another factor Congress may consider is how in a situation of finite DOD funding devoting more funding to airborne EW programs would affect funding for other EW priorities or DOD non-EW priorities and what the resulting net change would be in overall U S military capabilities Mix of Airborne EW Capabilities and Investments Another potential oversight issue for Congress is whether DOD’s proposed mix of airborne EW capabilities and investments is appropriate given the current and projected capabilities of potential adversaries such as Russia and China Specifically what is DOD’s vision by combining specialized tactical EW aircraft such as the EA-18G standoff EW aircraft such as the EC-130H and EC-37B strike fighters with embedded EW capabilities such as the F-35 and air-launched decoys and jammers with growing numbers of stealthy fifth-generation F-35s What evolutions are occurring in U S military operational concepts Is it appropriate for example that the Air Force and Marine Corps no longer operate their own specialized tactical EW aircraft while the Navy continues to operate and invest in the EA-18G and its Next Generation Jammer EW pods More generally to what degree do the airborne EW capabilities of the Air Force Navy and Marine Corps overlap and is that overlap appropriate “The Baltic Dilemma NATO Security in the Russian Anti-Access Bubble ” Royal Danish Defence College May 3 2018 announcement for a conference scheduled for May 29 2018 Ian Williams The Russia – NATO A2AD Environment ” Center for Strategic and International Studies Missile Threat CSIS Missile Defense Project January 3 2017 52 See for example Robert Dalsjö Christofer Berglund and Michael Jonsson Bursting the Bubble Russian A2 AD in the Baltic Sea Region Capabilities Countermeasures and Implications FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency March 2019 114 pp David Axe “A New Report Claims Russia’s Mighty Missiles Might Not Be So Mighty Afterall ” National Interest March 7 2019 See also Jyri Raitasalo “It Is Time to Burst the Western A2 AD Bubble ” Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademien Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences June 16 2017 53 Defense Intelligence Agency Russia Military Power Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations 2017 p 79 54 Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018 pp 34-35 55 Howard Altman “SOCom Leader Wanted to Toss Google Exec from Car Because He Was Right ” Tampa Bay Times April 26 updated April 27 2018 Congressional Research Service 19 Role of Emerging Technologies A third potential issue for Congress is how DOD uses advances in technology Electronic attack platforms have evolved from the manned platforms with relatively large crew sizes such as the EA-6B Prowler and the EC-130H Compass Call to the EA-8G Growler with a crew of two and the MALD-J which does not have crew and is a standoff weapon Evolving A2 AD environments potentially make traditional stand-in jamming too dangerous for manned aircraft Therefore Congress may consider policy for DOD regarding developing platforms that are capable of operating in A2 AD environments What unmanned EW programs does DOD currently fund Does DOD plan to develop additional stand-in jamming systems EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host Aircraft Procurement Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the Air Force’s planned quantity and rate for procuring EC-37Bs and replacing EC-130Hs The Air Force plans to replace 14 EC-130H aircraft with 10 EC-37Bs The Air Force currently maintains 10 EC-130H Compass Calls for operations with one aircraft devoted to testing and three additional aircraft in back-up inventory How does the Air Force plan to use a smaller fleet of aircraft Would 10 EC-37B aircraft be able to meet operational demands Some Members of Congress have expressed an interest in procuring EC-37Bs more quickly than the Air Force plans so as to accelerate the replacement of EC-130Hs with EC-37Bs The committee and conference report language bearing on this issue for the John S McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 and the FY2019 DOD appropriations act appear below Congressional Research Service 20 Appendix Recent Congressional Action John S McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 H R 5515 S 2987 P L 115-232 The House Armed Services Committee in its report H Rept 115-676 of May 15 2018 on H R 5515 the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act stated that t he committee supports the Air Force’s efforts to recapitalize the aging EC–130H Compass Call fleet with the more capable EC–37 type aircraft The committee notes that the Air Force must first comply with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 Public Law 114–328 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 Public Law 115–91 before it can carry on with the transition plan The Air Force requested $108 1 million for fiscal year 2019 for one EC–37 The committee is concerned that the Air Force plan to procure one aircraft per year over 10 years in order to recapitalize this fleet is not the most efficient way to move the capability to the field quickly and may put the Compass Call mission at unacceptable risk of mission failure Therefore the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by February 1 2019 on the Compass Call transition plan This plan should include 1 courses of action to accelerate the recapitalization of the EC–130H fleet and Baseline 4 development and deployment for incoming EC–37 aircraft 2 attendant timelines for each course of action 3 cost estimates for each course of action 4 recommended course of action and a plan to manage both fleets while supporting combatant commander requirements and 5 an assessment of the potential for future cooperative development and procurement of EC–37B Compass Call aircraft by the Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom and the Royal Australian Air Force in a way the leverages the best practices of the RC–135 cooperative program arrangement with the Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom Pages 23-24 The Senate Armed Services Committee in its report S Rept 115-262 of June 5 2018 on S 2987 the John S McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 stated the following The committee supports the Air Force’s efforts to recapitalize the aging EC–130H Compass Call fleet with the EC–37 type aircraft The committee notes that before it can carry on with the transition plan the Department of Defense must first comply with the related provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 Public Law 114–328 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 Public Law 115–91 While the committee notes that Department has submitted the certification required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 Public Law 115– 91 delays in satisfying the requirement has led to a work stoppage on the program lasting at least six weeks The committee is concerned about the potential for further work stoppages should the Secretary of the Air Force fail to make a timely determination that the EC–37B has a high likelihood of meeting combatant requirements as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 Public Law 114–328 The committee encourages the Secretary of the Air Force to make a timely determination for this requirement to avoid further program delays and cost overruns Congressional Research Service 21 Therefore the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force not more than 60 days after the determination required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 Public Law 114–328 is made to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees on the Compass Call transition plan This plan should include 1 Courses of action to accelerate the recapitalization of the EC–130H fleet and Baseline 4 development and deployment for incoming EC–37 aircraft a attendant timelines for each course of action b cost estimates for each course of action and 2 Recommended course of action and a plan to manage both fleets while supporting combatant commander requirements Pages 40-41 FY2019 DOD Appropriations Act Division A of H R 6157 P L 115-245 The House Appropriations Committee in its report H Rept 115-769 of June 20 2018 on the FY2019 DOD appropriations act H R 6157 stated the following The committee’s recommendation of FY2019 procurement funding for the program includes an increase of $194 000 000 above the budget request to procure and modify one additional EC–37B Compass Call aircraft with the expectation that such funds will allow the Air Force to accelerate the fielding of the fourth such aircraft to meet combatant commander needs and mitigate performance concerns regarding the legacy EC–130H fleet The Committee recommends that the Secretary of the Air Force consider increasing the procurement of EC–37B aircraft to two per year if such a pace of recapitalization can be achieved without unduly disrupting the operational availability of Compass Call capability for the combatant commanders Page 188 In final action on the FY2019 DOD Appropriations Act Division A of H R 6157 P L 115-245 of September 28 2018 Congress increased the requested amount for procurement of new EC-37Bs by $108 million for “Program increase - accelerate fourth EC-37B aircraft ”56 Author Information John R Hoehn Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs Acknowledgments This report was originally written by Ray Zuniga then-Air Force Fellow at the Congressional Research Service It has subsequently been maintained by Jeremiah Gertler Nathan Lucas and John R Hoehn of CRS 56 Joint Explanatory Statement for H R 6157 PDF page 203 of 559 line 15 Congressional Research Service 22 Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service CRS CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role CRS Reports as a work of the United States Government are not subject to copyright protection in the United States Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS However as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material Congressional Research Service R44572 · VERSION 8 · UPDATED 23